LEGAL RESEARCH AND STATUTES

CASE 1: PEOPLE V. LAUREL (GR. NO. 120353)

[G.R. No. 120353. February 12, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLOR N. LAUREL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila finding accused-appellant
Flor N. Laurel guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale penalized under Art. 38, par. (b), in relation to
Art. 39, par. (a), of the Labor Code.
From 19 October 1991 to 25 May 1992 accused-appellant Flor N. Laurel promised employment
abroad for a fee to complaining witnesses Ricardo San Felipe, Rosauro San Felipe, Juanito Cudal and
Cenen Tambongco, Jr. However, after receiving P12,000.00 from Tambongco, Jr., P11,000.00 from
each of the San Felipe brothers and P6,000.00 from Cudal, Laurel reneged on her promises and went
into hiding. Verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) revealed that
Laurel was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Consequently, she was haled to court and charged with large scale illegal recruitment.
Accused Laurel did not deny the charge against her. Instead, when called to the witness stand,
she presented an affidavit of desistance by Juanito Cudal as well as several receipts, Exhs. "2," "3,"
"4," "5" and "6," signed by the other private complainants acknowledging payment by her of the
amounts taken from them in "full settlement" of her obligation. Thus, on the basis of these
documents, she moved to dismiss the case. But the court a quo denied her motion on the ground
that the elements of large scale illegal recruitment were established beyond reasonable doubt
through the combined testimonies of the four (4) offended parties. The court a quo noted that the
affidavit of desistance as well as the receipts for payments made were prepared and signed after the

prosecution had already rested its case. Consequently, the trial judge rendered a decision convicting
the accused Flor N. Laurel and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00
conformably with Art. 39, par. (a), of the Labor Code. In addition, the accused was ordered to return
the balance of what she had received from each complainant. Hence, this appeal.
As in the court below, accused-appellant does not deny the charge against her. She contends
however that she should have been convicted only of simple illegal recruitment and not of large
scale illegal recruitment.
She argues through counsel that since illegal recruitment in large scale is defined in Art. 38, par.
(b), of the Labor Code immediately following the definition of illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate, it follows that for illegal recruitment to be considered committed in large scale it should
have been committed by a syndicate. Hence, an individual who commits an act of illegal recruitment
even if it be against three (3) or more persons cannot be charged with illegal recruitment in large
scale.
The interpretation is completely erroneous. Article 38, par. (b), of the Labor Code reads:
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage x x x x
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group (underscoring supplied).
The language of the law is very clear that illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if
done against three or more persons individually or as a group. The number of offenders, whether

an individual or a syndicate, is clearly not considered a factor in the determination of its

commission. The rule is well-settled that when the language of the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, there is no room for attempted interpretation or extended court rationalization of the
law.[4] The duty of the court is to apply it, not to interpret it. [5] Counsel for accused-appellant was
misled by the fact that illegal recruitment in large scale is defined immediately after illegal
recruitment by a syndicate. However, the only reason therefor is that they are both considered
offenses involving economic sabotage as the law itself so provides. Besides, we have affirmed time
and again the conviction of an individual for large scale illegal recruitment. [6]
As regards the alleged desistance by private complaints, we rule that although an affidavit of
desistance may be given due course even if executed only on appeal, it may be given such credit only
when special circumstances exist engendering doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
[7]
Otherwise,
without
such
special
circumstances,
courts
[8]
[9]
look with disfavor on affidavits of retraction considering them as exceedingly unreliable.
There is absolutely nothing in the affidavits of retraction executed by private complainants which
creates doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. The complainants merely allege that they made a
mistake and "misunderstood the circumstances."[10] However, aside from such sweeping statement
as "misunderstood the circumstances," no detail is given as to how their mistake or misapprehension
of circumstances can indicate absence of or at least cast doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. On
the contrary, we have every reason to conclude that the affidavits of retraction were executed by
private complainants only because accused-appellant returned the money taken from them as
evidenced by the receipts marked as Exhs. "2," "3," "4," "5" and "6."[11] As complainant Ricardo San
Felipe testified in court: "I will withdraw, if the payments is (sic) complete, sir."[12] Thus, given the
reason for their desistance, the solemn testimonies given by private complainants shall not be
disregarded for it is a matter of public interest that every crime must be prosecuted and the author
thereof penalized.[13]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting accused-appellant Flor
N. Laurel of illegal recruitment in large scale penalized under Art. 38, par. (b), in relation to Art. 39,
par. (a), of the Labor Code and sentencing her to life imprisonment is AFFIRMED. However, the
portion of the appealed decision directing accused-appellant to pay the balance of what she had
received from each of private complainants is DELETED in view of the full settlement of her civil
liability as acknowledged by private complainants themselves.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 2: (GR. NO. 148512) PDF FILE
CASE 3: GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF THE PRES
(GR. NO. 196231)
G.R. No. 196231

January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGANSANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,
vs.

ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D.
MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF
MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4, 2012
Decision1which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.2
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary
proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary
proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1 O-J-460
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the

Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of
the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989.3
In view of the Courts ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for
reconsideration.
I. ANTECEDENTS
A. Gonzales petition (G.R. No. 196231)
a. Factual antecedents
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal
Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutors Office against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery
extortion and physical injury.4
On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative charge
for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza,
et al. based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS. 5
On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendozas case to his office. The Office
of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24, 2008. 6 Mendoza, et al. filed their
position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order. 7

Pending Gonzales action on Mendoza, et al.s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaws complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal
without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaws failure to prosecute. 9
On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.s case, Gonzales forwarded
the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. 10In his draft
decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the
penalty of dismissal from the service. 11
Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsmans decision that approved Gonzales
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration 12 on
November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. 13
On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.s case records to the
Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14, 2009, the
case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia for review and
recommendation.14
GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for
appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales
office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with the case
records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman. 16
On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.s case, Mendoza
hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as
hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it
ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the
incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for
their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." 17 The IIRC
stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales failure to promptly resolve Mendozas motion for
reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate
resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further
determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative
proceedings.19
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of
Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office. 20
b. The OP ruling
On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the
service.21According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendozas]
Motion for Reconsideration [that spanned for nine (9) long months] xxx amounted to gross neglect
of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsmans own Rules of
Procedure."22
c. The Petition
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the
Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on Mendozas motion for
reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took
to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within
nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order. 23
B. Sulits petition (G.R. No. 196232)
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed
an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent
petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecutions evidence against
Garcia.
On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff,
entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia. 24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i)
withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense
of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money laundering and
enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would
convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the real and personal
properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the information. 25
The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 2010 26 based on the parties submitted Joint
Motion for Approval.27
The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on
Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the
Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No.

6770.28The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the
filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate government
office.
Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. 29 On March 24,
2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OPs jurisdiction. 30 The question of
jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011,
prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.
II. COURTS RULING
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales petition and
to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
(As the full explanation of the Courts vote describes below, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as
the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not
include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution. The prevailing ruling on this latter
point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Marvic Mario Victor Leonen).
A. Preliminary considerations:
a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners
At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
Courts September 4, 2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of
our ruling reinstating Gonzales.
This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Courts review of its ruling on the whole case since
a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or
invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to

discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the
legal correctness of the OPs decision on the merits will be an empty one.
In other words, since the validity of the OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case including the
constitutional issue remains alive for the Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration.
b. The justiciability of the constitutional
issue raised in the petitions
We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is
a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law, 31 as where the court finds that there are
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the
government.32
In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress choice to grant
concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory
grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core
constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section
5, Art. XI of the Constitution.
To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 grants where the Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a vacuum,
more so when the authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and constitutional intents,
the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties granted and imposed on it by
Article VIII of the Constitution.

B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve
as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in
the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of
the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government
critic.33
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionallymandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate.
Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any
administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously
vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases. 34
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II 35 and
the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to
be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. 36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [emphasis ours,
italics supplied]
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," 37 the Court has upheld its actions,
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No.
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and
the Constitution.38
The Ombudsmans broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5,

Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
[emphasis ours]
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."39 It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with
its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers. 40
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsmans independence
Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as
"independent."41The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions
performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable
interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress,
but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from
political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of
their core functions.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the interference
that the President may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility of the

Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal
system.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions need for independence. In
the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing
for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise
that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. 43 In a
similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted
the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
political pressure.44
Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although it
enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal
autonomy is granted to the constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding,
the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep the Commission
independent from the executive branch and other political leaders:
MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to him our
concept, he can advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the committee is
that we need a body that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive because the
Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this commission would need not only the
cooperation of the executive branch of the government but also of the judicial branch of government.
This is going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also want a commission to

function even under the worst circumstance when the executive may not be very cooperative.
However, the question in our mind is: Can it still function during that time? Hence, we are willing to
accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to reconcile this. We realize the need for
coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build in some safeguards that it will not be
rendered useless by an uncooperative executive.
xxxx
MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights go to a
country, the most credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often these are
private organizations, many of which are prosecuted, such as those we find in many countries in Latin
America. In fact, what we are proposing is an independent body on human rights, which would
provide governments with credibility precisely because it is independent of the present
administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be credible because it is not
subject to pressure or control from the present political leadership.
Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are in
opposition today and those who are in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow. Therefore, if
we have a Commission on Human Rights that would investigate and make sure that the rights of each
one is protected, then we shall have a body that could stand up to any power, to defend the rights of
individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and so on. 45
These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions
have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned,
jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President,

even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional
the Presidents act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
Comelec "however well-meaning"47 it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners
of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power
of the President:
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by
the Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights and vested with the
delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and
recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function with independence
and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the
pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate
of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.
Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec, 49 the Court considered even the mere review of the rules of the
Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of independence of
this body. Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less pressure on a constitutional
body than the Executives power to discipline and remove key officials of the Office of the
Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but
is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican
democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning. 50
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
vesting disciplinary authority
in the President over the

Deputy Ombudsman violates

the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional
Our discussions, particularly the Courts expressed caution against presidential interference with the
constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak
for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for violating the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes
its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks
and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she
is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines
where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be
declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman fully
support this position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional Commission expressed his
apprehension that any form of presidential control over the Office of the Ombudsman would diminish
its independence.51 The following exchanges between Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod
further reveal the constitutional intent to keep the Office of the Ombudsman independent from the
President:
MR. OPLE. xxx
May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an amendment
xxx, by way of designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good
government, efficiency of the public service and the integrity of the President of the Philippines,
instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which would be accountable to
no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?
MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we
prepared the report, it was the opinion of the Committee and I believe it still is that it may not
contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of the
culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive department. Therefore, as we
saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous influence of the
President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a special fiscal. The whole
purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions and to produce a vehicle that will give
true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret that we cannot accept the
proposition.52
The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive
power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power
over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty
to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its
members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the public if the rule were

otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who
appears to enjoy the Presidents favor, would be discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with
his complaint; the complainants impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be
susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the
constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as champion of the people against
corruption and bureaucracy.
d. The mutual-protection argument for
crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770
In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack of an
external check against the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the
Ombudsman and her Deputies.
While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that this
concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in place.
On the one hand, the Ombudsmans Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject
to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsmans attempt to cover up
the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same
attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.
The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a nonpolitical independent body mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial disputes,
whose judges and employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman and
whose neutrality would be less questionable. The Members of the Court themselves may be subjected
to the impeachment power of Congress.
In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly implausible.
At the same time, the Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the independence

granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from either the Executive or
Congress and is in full accord with constitutional intent.
e. Congress power determines the
manner and causes for the removal
of non-impeachable officers is not a
carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, 53 Congress is empowered to determine the modes
of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second
sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of
"removal only by impeachment" to favored public officers. 54 Understandably so, impeachment is the
most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by its nature, a sui
generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by
the process required to initiate the proceeding;56 the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; 57 the
limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment
cases;59and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt. 60 All these argue against the extension
of this removal mechanism beyond those mentioned in the Constitution.
On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment
proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the highest
echelons of responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of the negative practical effects of
impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive process in terms of the cost of
prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation. 61 Thus, in a cost-

benefit analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting Congress power to otherwise

legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the country.
It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution should be
read. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket
authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause
of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional
guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle
of checks and balances.62
In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of
removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic
principles and precepts established by the Constitution.
In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority is
not a blanket authority for Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without running
afoul of the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without disrupting the
delicate check and balance mechanism under the Constitution. Properly viewed from this perspective,
the core constitutional principle of independence is observed and any possible absurdity resulting
from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the Constitution itself vested Congress
with the power to determine the manner and cause of removal of all non-impeachable officials, this
power must be interpreted consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in Macalintal v. Comelec 63 is apt:
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."

While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is
intended as a measure of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor since these
grounds are not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment - this
argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman that it
creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles hangs over the Deputy
Ombudsmans head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external pressures and influence of
officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of external reprisal from the very office he is to check for
excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high standard
required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that
the Presidents power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate when
balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing of an administrative case
against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their
suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI
of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special
Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the
Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices
independent constitutional bodies.
At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its
decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal
of public trust is patently erroneous. The OPs decision perfectly illustrates why the requirement of
impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a
measure of protection of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue

a. The Office of the Presidents

finding of gross negligence
has no legal and factual leg to
stand on
The OPs decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct. The
assailed Decision of the OP reads:
Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the inordinate
and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain Mendozas Motion for Reconsideration timely filed on
5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency in the performance of
official duty.64
b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Let us again briefly recall the facts.
1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman,65 which was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration; 66
2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and make his
recommendation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;
3. April 5, 2010 GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate superior,
Dir. Cecilio;68
4. April 27, 2010 Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order; 69
5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) Gonzales endorsed
the draft order for the final approval of the Ombudsman. 70

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were
already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.71
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP 72 relied on Section 8, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990,
as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendozas Motion for Reconsideration
within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales
since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing

Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 7 on
the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed decision, the period for resolving the case
does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed:
Section 6. Rendition of decision. Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared submitted
for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his findings and
recommendation for the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be reviewed by
the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned. With respect to low ranking
public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving authority. Upon approval,
copies thereof shall be served upon the parties and the head of the office or agency of which the
respondent is an official or employee for his information and compliance with the appropriate
directive contained therein. [italics and emphases supplied]
Thus, the OPs ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five
days, to review a case was totally baseless.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The OPs claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on Mendozas
motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous cases
that involve the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot
conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendozas case should have been prioritized
over other similar cases.
The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.73 This consideration certainly militates against the OSGs observation that there was "a
grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay"74 on the part of Gonzales.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among
others, quasi-judicial bodies,75 like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself a relative concept. 76 Thus,
the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective constitutional sense. Unfortunately, because of
the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in dismissing Gonzales, the political and, perhaps,
"practical" considerations got the better of what is legal and constitutional.
The facts do not show that Gonzales subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their
work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is
noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review the case for the
first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four
months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and
discretion. If this Court rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the
Ombudsmans constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country would be
subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that these
periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this with the
established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases something the Court may be hard put
to justify.
d. No undue interest
The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendozas case by having the case
endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.
The fact that Gonzales had Mendozas case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if it
were based merely on the request of the alleged victims father. The Constitution empowers the
Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against any

public official or employee of the government. 78 This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No.
6770,79 and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as amended. 80
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on the prosecution officers recommendations, the finding of guilt
on the part of Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al. admitted that
they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to stay the whole night until
the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was allowed to leave the
precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his promise to return with the
proper documents.81 These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to conclude that Mendoza, et al.
irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic
violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when appropriate. 82
Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales decision differs from the decision
of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we cannot tie the hands
of any judicial or quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur with the decisions of other
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have also taken cognizance of the case. To do so in the
case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be repugnant to the independence that our Constitution has
specifically granted to this office and would nullify the very purpose for which it was created.
e. Penalty of dismissal totally
incommensurate with established facts
Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal imposed by
the OP necessarily suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held
liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made to account only for lapses in our responsibilities. It is
notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time nine days followed by
Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft took less than four months, and the
Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping incident rendered Mendozas motion moot.

In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion, however, does
not preclude the Ombudsman from looking into any other possible administrative liability of Gonzales
under existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing
Tanodbayan at the time83 became the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution.
While the composition of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution does
not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing discussions on the
unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to the
Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expounded in jurisprudence.
Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the Ombudsman,
known as the Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Accordingly, on June 11,
1978, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted PD No. 1487. 85
Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive
authority" to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.87 PD No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control and
supervision over the Special Prosecutor. 88 Consistent with this grant of power, the law also authorized
the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail to the Office of the CSP "any officer or employee of
Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the executive supervision thereof" to assist the
Office of the CSP.
In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken away
from it by the Office of the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor" under the Tanodbayans control, 90 with the exclusive authority to conduct

preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Unlike the earlier
decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint Special Investigators and subordinate
personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public officer or employees who "shall be under
the supervision and control of the Chief Special Prosecutor." 91 In 1979, PD No. 1630 further amended
the earlier decrees by transferring the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor directly to
the Tanodbayan himself.92
This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987
Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created. 93 The existing Tanodbayan is
made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now94 or hereafter may be provided by law."95
Other than the Ombudsmans Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman.96 Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command, Congress enacted RA No. 6770
to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
extent of its disciplinary authority.
In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but the
Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the President the
authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor, from a list of nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law requires that
the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence. 97
The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the
Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies. 98 Their terms of office,99 prohibitions and
qualifications,100 rank and salary are likewise the same. 101 The requirement on disclosure102 is imposed
on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of vacancy in the Office

of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President
may designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman. 103The power of
the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other government agencies to render assistance
to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor. 104
Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman, both
under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would insulate
the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the Special
Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman was
designed for.
Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the
Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and
supervision over that office.105 This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of the
Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem
fit.1wphi1 Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her
duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.
Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking
executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal
powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject
to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates
against a differential treatment between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special

Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for
her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an argument that, at bottom,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and
is, in fact, separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the Court said:
Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the President. Xxx
In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to
be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise
its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or
grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the
power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. 107
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at
par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is
concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.

III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, 108 the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We
declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor
to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative
investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 4: GR NO 183505
COMMISSIONER
INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Petitioner,
- versus -

OF

G.R. No. 183505

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.

and FIRST ASIA REALTY
DEVELOPMENT
Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
February 26, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to
absurdity or injustice, legislative history is all important. In such cases, courts may take judicial notice of
the origin and history of the law,[1] the deliberations during the enactment,[2] as well as prior laws on the
same subject matter[3] to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Republic Act
(RA) No. 9282,[4]seeks to set aside the April 30, 2008 Decision[5] and the June 24, 2008 Resolution[6] of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Factual Antecedents
Respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) and First Asia Realty Development Corporation (First
Asia) are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines. Both are engaged in the business of operating cinema houses, among others.[7]
CTA Case No. 7079
On September 26, 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) sent SM Prime a Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN) for value added tax (VAT) deficiency on cinema ticket sales in the amount
of P119,276,047.40 for taxable year 2000.[8] In response, SM Prime filed a letter-protest dated December
15, 2003.[9]

On December 12, 2003, the BIR sent SM Prime a Formal Letter of Demand for the alleged VAT
deficiency, which the latter protested in a letter dated January 14, 2004.[10]
On September 6, 2004, the BIR denied the protest filed by SM Prime and ordered it to pay the VAT
deficiency for taxable year 2000 in the amount of P124,035,874.12.[11]
On October 15, 2004, SM Prime filed a Petition for Review before the CTA docketed as CTA Case No.
7079.[12]
CTA Case No. 7085
On May 15, 2002, the BIR sent First Asia a PAN for VAT deficiency on
cinema ticket sales for taxable year 1999 in the total amount of P35,823,680.93.[13] First Asia protested the
PAN in a letter datedJuly 9, 2002.[14]
Subsequently, the BIR issued a Formal Letter of Demand for the alleged VAT deficiency which was
protested by First Asia in a letter dated December 12, 2002.[15]
On September 6, 2004, the BIR rendered a Decision denying the protest and ordering First Asia to pay
the amount ofP35,823,680.93 for VAT deficiency for taxable year 1999.[16]
Accordingly, on October 20, 2004, First Asia filed a Petition for Review before the CTA, docketed as CTA
Case No. 7085.[17]
CTA Case No. 7111
On April 16, 2004, the BIR sent a PAN to First Asia for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for taxable
year 2000 in the amount of P35,840,895.78. First Asia protested the PAN through a letter dated April 22,
2004.[18]
[19]

Thereafter, the BIR issued a Formal Letter of Demand

First Asia protested the same in a letter dated July 9, 2004.[20]

for

alleged

VAT

deficiency.

On October 5, 2004, the BIR denied the protest and ordered First Asia to pay the VAT deficiency in the
amount ofP35,840,895.78 for taxable year 2000.[21]
This prompted First Asia to file a Petition for Review before the CTA on December 16, 2004. The case
was docketed as CTA Case No. 7111.[22]
CTA Case No. 7272
Re: Assessment Notice No. 008-02
A PAN for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for the taxable year 2002 in the total amount
of P32,802,912.21 was issued against First Asia by the BIR. In response, First Asia filed a protest-letter
dated November 11, 2004. The BIR then sent a Formal Letter of Demand, which was protested by First Asia
on December 14, 2004.[23]
Re: Assessment Notice No. 003-03
A PAN for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales in the total amount of P28,196,376.46 for the taxable
year 2003 was issued by the BIR against First Asia. In a letter dated September 23, 2004, First Asia
protested the PAN. A Formal Letter of Demand was thereafter issued by the BIR to First Asia, which the
latter protested through a letter dated November 11, 2004. [24]
On May 11, 2005, the BIR rendered a Decision denying the protests. It ordered First Asia to pay the
amounts ofP33,610,202.91 and P28,590,826.50 for VAT deficiency for taxable years 2002 and 2003,
respectively.[25]
Thus, on June 22, 2005, First Asia filed a Petition for Review before the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No.
7272.[26]
Consolidated Petitions

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) filed his Answers to the Petitions filed by SM Prime and
First Asia.[27]
On July 1, 2005, SM Prime filed a Motion to Consolidate CTA Case Nos. 7085, 7111 and 7272 with CTA
Case No. 7079 on the grounds that the issues raised therein are identical and that SM Prime is a majority
shareholder of First Asia. The motion was granted.[28]
Upon submission of the parties respective memoranda, the consolidated cases were submitted for
decision on the sole issue of whether gross receipts derived from admission tickets by cinema/theater
operators or proprietors are subject to VAT.[29]
Ruling of the CTA First Division
On September 22, 2006, the First Division of the CTA rendered a Decision granting the Petition for
Review. Resorting to the language used and the legislative history of the law, it ruled that the activity of
showing cinematographic films is not a service covered by VAT under the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997, as amended, but an activity subject to amusement tax under RA 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. Citing House Joint Resolution No. 13, entitled Joint Resolution
Expressing the True Intent of Congress with Respect to the Prevailing Tax Regime in the Theater and Local
Film Industry Consistent with the States Policy to Have a Viable, Sustainable and Competitive Theater and
Film Industry as One of its Partners in National Development,[30] the CTA First Division held that the House
of Representatives resolved that there should only be one business tax applicable to theaters and movie
houses, which is the 30% amusement tax imposed by cities and provinces under the LGC of 1991. Further,
it held that consistent with the States policy to have a viable, sustainable and competitive theater and film
industry, the national government should be precluded from imposing its own business tax in addition to
that already imposed and collected by local government units. The CTA First Division likewise found that
Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 28-2001, which imposes VAT on gross receipts from admission to
cinema houses, cannot be given force and effect because it failed to comply with the procedural due
process for tax issuances under RMC No. 20-86.[31] Thus, it disposed of the case as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby GRANTS the Petitions for
Review. Respondents Decisions denying petitioners protests against deficiency value-added

taxes are hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, Assessment Notices Nos. VT-00-000098, VT-99000057, VT-00-000122, 003-03 and 008-02 are ORDERED cancelled and set aside.
SO ORDERED.[32]
Aggrieved, the CIR moved for reconsideration which was denied by the First Division in its Resolution
dated December 14, 2006.[33]
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
Thus, the CIR appealed to the CTA En Banc.[34] The case was docketed as CTA EB No. 244. [35] The
CTA En Banchowever denied[36] the Petition for Review and dismissed[37] as well petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The CTA En Banc held that Section 108 of the NIRC actually sets forth an exhaustive enumeration of
what services are intended to be subject to VAT. And since the showing or exhibition of motion pictures,
films or movies by cinema operators or proprietors is not among the enumerated activities contemplated in
the phrase sale or exchange of services, then gross receipts derived by cinema/ theater operators or
proprietors from admission tickets in showing motion pictures, film or movie are not subject to VAT. It
reiterated that the exhibition or showing of motion pictures, films, or movies is instead subject to
amusement tax under the LGC of 1991. As regards the validity of RMC No. 28-2001, the CTA En
Banc agreed with its First Division that the same cannot be given force and effect for failure to comply with
RMC No. 20-86.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse, where petitioner alleges that the CTA En Banc seriously erred:
(1)

In not finding/holding that the gross receipts derived by

operators/proprietors of cinema houses from admission tickets [are] subject to the 10% VAT
because:
(a)
THE EXHIBITION OF MOVIES BY CINEMA OPERATORS/PROPRIETORS TO THE
PAYING PUBLIC IS A SALEOF SERVICE;

(b)
UNLESS EXEMPTED BY LAW, ALL SALES OF SERVICES ARE EXPRESSLY
SUBJECT TO VAT UNDER SECTION 108 OF THE NIRC OF 1997;
(c)

SECTION 108 OF THE NIRC OF 1997 IS A CLEAR PROVISION OF LAW AND THE
APPLICATION OF RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND EXTRINSIC AIDS IS
UNWARRANTED;

(d)
GRANTING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT RULES OF CONSTRUCTION ARE
APPLICABLE HEREIN, STILL THE HONORABLE COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE
SAME AND PROMULGATED DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS;
(e)
THERE IS NO VALID, EXISTING PROVISION OF LAW EXEMPTING
RESPONDENTS SERVICES FROM THE VAT IMPOSED UNDER SECTION 108 OF THE
NIRC OF 1997;
(f)

QUESTIONS ON THE WISDOM OF THE LAW ARE NOT PROPER ISSUES TO BE

TRIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT; and

(g)
RESPONDENTS WERE TAXED BASED ON THE PROVISION OF SECTION 108
OF THE NIRC.
(2)

In ruling that the enumeration in Section 108 of the NIRC of 1997 is

exhaustive in coverage;

(3)

In misconstruing the NIRC of 1997 to conclude that the showing of

motion pictures is merely subject to the amusement tax imposed by the Local Government
Code; and

(4)

In invalidating Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 28-2001.[38]

Simply put, the issue in this case is whether the gross receipts derived by operators or proprietors of
cinema/theater houses from admission tickets are subject to VAT.

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that the enumeration of services subject to VAT in Section 108 of the NIRC is not
exhaustive because it covers all sales of services unless exempted by law. He claims that the CTA erred in
applying the rules on statutory construction and in using extrinsic aids in interpreting Section 108 because
the provision is clear and unambiguous. Thus, he maintains that the exhibition of movies by cinema
operators or proprietors to the paying public, being a sale of service, is subject to VAT.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that a plain reading of Section 108 of the NIRC of 1997 shows
that the gross receipts of proprietors or operators of cinemas/theaters derived from public admission are
not among the services subject to VAT. Respondents insist that gross receipts from cinema/theater
admission tickets were never intended to be subject to any tax imposed by the national government.
According to them, the absence of gross receipts from cinema/theater admission tickets from the list of
services which are subject to the national amusement tax under Section 125 of the NIRC of 1997 reinforces
this legislative intent. Respondents also highlight the fact that RMC No. 28-2001 on which the deficiency
assessments were based is an unpublished administrative ruling.
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The enumeration of services subject to VAT under Section 108 of the NIRC
is not exhaustive
Section 108 of the NIRC of the 1997 reads:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties.

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a valueadded tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of
services, including the use or lease of properties.
The phrase sale or exchange of services means the performance of all kinds of
services in the Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those
performed or rendered by construction and service contractors; stock, real estate, commercial,
customs and immigration brokers; lessors of property, whether personal or real; warehousing
services; lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling,
processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others; proprietors, operators or keepers of
hotels, motels, rest houses, pension houses, inns, resorts; proprietors or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors, cafes and other eating places, including clubs and caterers; dealers in
securities; lending investors; transportation contractors on their transport of goods or cargoes,
including persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire and other domestic common carriers
by land, air and water relative to their transport of goods or cargoes; services of franchise
grantees of telephone and telegraph, radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise
grantees except those under Section 119 of this Code; services of banks, non-bank financial
intermediaries and finance companies; and non-life insurance companies (except their crop
insurances), including surety, fidelity, indemnity and bonding companies; and similar
services regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of
the physical or mental faculties. The phrase sale or exchange of services shall likewise
include:
(1) The lease or the use of or the right or privilege to use any copyright, patent,
design or model, plan, secret formula or process, goodwill, trademark, trade brand or other like
property or right;
xxxx
(7) The lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs; and
(8) The lease or the use of or the right to use radio, television, satellite transmission
and cable television time.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the sale or
exchange of services subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, including, similar services, and
shall likewise include, indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only.[39]
Among those included in the enumeration is the lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and
discs. This, however, is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motion pictures or films. As pointed
out by the CTA En Banc:
Exhibition in Blacks Law Dictionary is defined as To show or display. x x x To produce anything
in public so that it may be taken into possession (6th ed., p. 573). While the word lease is
defined as a contract by which one owning such property grants to another the right to possess,
use and enjoy it on specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated
price, referred to as rent (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 889). x x x[40]
Since the activity of showing motion pictures, films or movies by cinema/ theater operators or
proprietors is not included in the enumeration, it is incumbent upon the court to the determine whether
such activity falls under the phrase similar services. The intent of the legislature must therefore be
ascertained.
The legislature never intended operators
or proprietors of cinema/theater houses to be covered by VAT
Under the NIRC of 1939,[41] the national government imposed amusement tax on proprietors, lessees,
or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses, boxing exhibitions, and other places of
amusement, including cockpits, race tracks, and cabaret.[42] In the case of theaters or cinematographs, the
taxes were first deducted, withheld, and paid by the proprietors, lessees, or operators of such theaters or
cinematographs before the gross receipts were divided between the proprietors, lessees, or operators of the
theaters or cinematographs and the distributors of the cinematographic films. Section 11[43] of the Local
Tax Code,[44] however, amended this provision by transferring the power to impose amusement tax [45] on

admission from theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusements
exclusively to the local government. Thus, when the NIRC of 1977[46] was enacted, the national government
imposed amusement tax only on proprietors, lessees or operators of cabarets, day and night clubs, Jai-Alai
and race tracks.[47]
On January 1, 1988, the VAT Law[48] was promulgated. It amended certain provisions of the NIRC of
1977 by imposing a multi-stage VAT to replace the tax on original and subsequent sales tax and percentage
tax on certain services. It imposed VAT on sales of services under Section 102 thereof, which provides:
SECTION 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. (a) Rate and base of tax. There
shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% percent of gross
receipts derived by any person engaged in the sale of services. The phrase sale of services
means the performance of all kinds of services for others for a fee, remuneration or
consideration, including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors;
stock, real estate, commercial, customs and immigration brokers; lessors of personal
property; lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling,
processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others; and similar services regardless of
whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental
faculties: Provided That the following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered
persons shall be subject to 0%:
(1)
Processing manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business
outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, x x x
xxxx
Gross receipts means the total amount of money or its equivalent representing the
contract price, compensation or service fee, including the amount charged for materials supplied
with the services and deposits or advance payments actually or constructively received during
the taxable quarter for the service performed or to be performed for another person, excluding
value-added tax.

(b)
Determination of the tax. (1) Tax billed as a separate item in the invoice. If
the tax is billed as a separate item in the invoice, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts,
excluding the tax.
(2)
Tax not billed separately or is billed erroneously in the invoice. If the tax is not
billed separately or is billed erroneously in the invoice, the tax shall be determined by multiplying
the gross receipts (including the amount intended to cover the tax or the tax billed erroneously)
by 1/11. (Emphasis supplied)
Persons subject to amusement tax under the NIRC of 1977, as amended, however, were exempted from the
coverage of VAT.[49]
On February 19, 1988, then Commissioner Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. issued RMC 8-88, which clarified that
the power to impose amusement tax on gross receipts derived from admission tickets was exclusive with
the local government units and that only the gross receipts of amusement places derived from sources
other than from admission tickets were subject to amusement tax under theNIRC of 1977, as
amended. Pertinent portions of RMC 8-88 read:
Under the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, as amended), the jurisdiction to levy amusement tax
on gross receipts arising from admission to places of amusement has been transferred to the
local governments to the exclusion of the national government.
xxxx
Since the promulgation of the Local Tax Code which took effect on June 28, 1973 none of
the amendatory laws which amended the National Internal Revenue Code, including the value
added tax law under Executive Order No. 273, has amended the provisions of Section 11 of the
Local Tax Code. Accordingly, the sole jurisdiction for collection of amusement tax on admission
receipts in places of amusement rests exclusively on the local government, to the exclusion of
the national government. Since the Bureau of Internal Revenue is an agency of the national
government, then it follows that it has no legal mandate to levy amusement tax on admission
receipts in the said places of amusement.

Considering the foregoing legal background, the provisions under Section 123 of the
National Internal Revenue Code as renumbered by Executive Order No. 273 (Sec. 228, old NIRC)
pertaining to amusement taxes on places of amusement shall be implemented in accordance
with BIR RULING, dated December 4, 1973 and BIR RULING NO. 231-86 dated November 5,
1986 to wit:
x x x Accordingly, only the gross receipts of the amusement places derived from
sources other than from admission tickets shall be subject to x x x amusement tax
prescribed under Section 228 of the Tax Code, as amended (now Section 123, NIRC, as
amended by E.O. 273). The tax on gross receipts derived from admission tickets shall
be levied and collected by the city government pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 231, as amended x x x or by the provincial government, pursuant to
Section 11 of P.D. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code. (Emphasis supplied)
On October 10, 1991, the LGC of 1991 was passed into law. The local government retained the power
to impose amusement tax on proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees under Section 140 thereof.[50] In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall
first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the local government
before the gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of
the cinematographic films. However, the provision in the Local Tax Code expressly excluding the national
government from collecting tax from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusements was no longer included.
In 1994, RA 7716 restructured the VAT system by widening its tax base and enhancing its
administration. Three years later, RA 7716 was amended by RA 8241. Shortly thereafter, the NIRC of
1997[51] was signed into law. Several amendments[52] were made to expand the coverage of VAT. However,
none pertain to cinema/theater operators or proprietors. At present, only lessors or distributors of
cinematographic films are subject to VAT. While persons subject to amusement tax[53] under the NIRC of
1997 are exempt from the coverage of VAT.[54]
Based on the foregoing, the following facts can be established:

(1)

Historically, the activity of showing motion pictures, films or movies by

cinema/theater operators or proprietors has always been considered as a form of
entertainment subject to amusement tax.

(2)

Prior to the Local Tax Code, all forms of amusement tax were imposed by the
national government.

(3)

When the Local Tax Code was enacted, amusement tax on admission tickets from
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusements were
transferred to the local government.

(4)

Under the NIRC of 1977, the national government imposed amusement tax only on
proprietors, lessees or operators of cabarets, day and night clubs, Jai-Alai and race tracks.

(5)

The VAT law was enacted to replace the tax on original and subsequent sales tax
and percentage tax on certain services.
(6)
When the VAT law was implemented, it exempted persons subject to amusement
tax under the NIRC from the coverage of VAT.
(7)

When the Local Tax Code was repealed by the LGC of 1991, the local government
continued to impose amusement tax on admission tickets from theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusements.

(8)

Amendments to the VAT law have been consistent in exempting persons subject to
amusement tax under the NIRC from the coverage of VAT.

(9)

Only lessors or distributors of cinematographic films are included in the coverage

of VAT.

These reveal the legislative intent not to impose VAT on persons already covered by the amusement
tax. This holds true even in the case of cinema/theater operators taxed under the LGC of 1991 precisely
because the VAT law was intended to replace the percentage tax on certain services. The mere fact that
they are taxed by the local government unit and not by the national government is immaterial. The Local

Tax Code, in transferring the power to tax gross receipts derived by cinema/theater operators or proprietor
from admission tickets to the local government, did not intend to treat cinema/theater houses as a separate
class. No distinction must, therefore, be made between the places of amusement taxed by the national
government and those taxed by the local government.
To hold otherwise would impose an unreasonable burden on cinema/theater houses operators or
proprietors, who would be paying an additional 10%[55] VAT on top of the 30% amusement tax imposed by
Section 140 of the LGC of 1991, or a total of 40% tax. Such imposition would result in injustice, as persons
taxed under the NIRC of 1997 would be in a better position than those taxed under the LGC of 1991. We
need not belabor that a literal application of a law must be rejected if it will operate unjustly or lead to
absurd results.[56] Thus, we are convinced that the legislature never intended to include cinema/theater
operators or proprietors in the coverage of VAT.
On this point, it is apropos to quote the case of Roxas v. Court of Tax Appeals,[57] to wit:
The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore, it should be
exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be
exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the hen that lays the golden
egg. And, in order to maintain the general public's trust and confidence in the Government this
power must be used justly and not treacherously.
The repeal of the Local Tax Code by the LGC of 1991 is not a legal basis for
the imposition of VAT
Petitioner, in issuing the assessment notices for deficiency VAT against respondents, ratiocinated that:
Basically, it was acknowledged that a cinema/theater operator was then subject to
amusement tax under Section 260 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, computed on the amount paid for admission. With the
enactment of the Local Tax Code under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 231, dated June 28, 1973,
the power of imposing taxes on gross receipts from admission of persons to cinema/theater and

other places of amusement had, thereafter, been transferred to the provincial government, to
the exclusion of the national or municipal government (Sections 11 & 13, Local Tax
Code). However, the said provision containing the exclusive power of the provincial
government to impose amusement tax, had also been repealed and/or deleted by Republic Act
(RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, enacted into law on
October 10, 1991. Accordingly, the enactment of RA No. 7160, thus, eliminating the
statutory prohibition on the national government to impose business tax on gross
receipts from admission of persons to places of amusement, led the way to the valid
imposition of the VAT pursuant to Section 102 (now Section 108) of the old Tax Code,
as amended by the Expanded VAT Law (RA No. 7716) and which was implemented
beginning January 1, 1996.[58] (Emphasis supplied)
We disagree.
The repeal of the Local Tax Code by the LGC of 1991 is not a legal basis for the imposition of VAT on
the gross receipts of cinema/theater operators or proprietors derived from admission tickets. The removal
of the prohibition under the Local Tax Code did not grant nor restore to the national government the power
to impose amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors. Neither did it expand the coverage
of VAT. Since the imposition of a tax is a burden on the taxpayer, it cannot be presumed nor can it be
extended by implication. A law will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly,
and unambiguously.[59] As it is, the power to impose amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or
proprietors remains with the local government.
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 28-2001 is invalid
Considering that there is no provision of law imposing VAT on the gross receipts of cinema/theater
operators or proprietors derived from admission tickets, RMC No. 28-2001 which imposes VAT on the gross
receipts from admission to cinema houses must be struck down. We cannot overemphasize that RMCs
must not override, supplant, or modify the law, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law
they seek to apply and implement.[60]

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to discuss whether RMC No. 28-2001 complied with the
procedural due process for tax issuances as prescribed under RMC No. 20-86.
Rule on tax exemption does not apply
Moreover, contrary to the view of petitioner, respondents need not prove their entitlement to an
exemption from the coverage of VAT. The rule that tax exemptions should be construed strictly against the
taxpayer presupposes that the taxpayer is clearly subject to the tax being levied against him.[61] The reason
is obvious: it is both illogical and impractical to determine who are exempted without first determining who
are covered by the provision.[62] Thus, unless a statute imposes a tax clearly, expressly and unambiguously,
what applies is the equally well-settled rule that the imposition of a tax cannot be presumed. [63] In fact, in
case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.[64]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed April 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc holding that gross receipts derived by respondents from admission tickets in showing
motion pictures, films or movies are not subject to value-added tax under Section 108 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and its June 24, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 5: 66 SCRA 113
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp.
(Phil.), respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for petitioner.
Carlos J. Valdez & Associates for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing the Commissioner of Customs'
decision holding respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the Standard-Vacuum Refining
Corporation (Phil.) and hereinafter referred to as ESSO) liable in the total sum of P775.62 as special
import tax on certain articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No. 387, otherwise known as
the Petroleum Act of 1949.
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay
Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the
granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment,
machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed
the special import tax (which it paid under protest) on the following separate importations:
1) One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of assessed a special import tax in
the amount of P31.98 (Airport Protest No. 10);
2) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56; assessed special import tax in
the amount of P43.82 (Airport Protest No. 11);
3) One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58; assessed special import tax in the
amount of P60.72 (Airport Protest No. 12);

4) One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary Equipment with C & F value of
$2,389.69; assessed special import tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport Protest No. 15);
5) One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80; assessed special import tax in the
amount of P26.00 (Airport Protest No. 16); and
6) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39; assessed special import tax in
the amount of P147.00 (Airport Protest No. 17). 1
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the
payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352,
and dismissed the protest. 2
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of
Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs. 3
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review of the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner
Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO which
the latter had paid under protest. 4
This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this Court for review.
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 is separate and distinct
from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by
respondent ESSO from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not
include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in R.A. No. 1394. 5
For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:

A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that the legislature considered the
special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties as witness the fact that Section
2(a) of the said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax when
it provided that ... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein, the total revenue
derived from the customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported
from the United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange
tax imposed under Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such
goods, articles or products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by
proclamation, suspend the reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding
calendar year ....
If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of petroleum refinery concessions
like the protestant (respondent herein), such exemption should have been clearly stated in
the statute. Exemptions are never presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest and
most unambiguous language and not left to mere implication. 6
Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignment of errors allegedly committed by the
Court of Tax Appeals in the controverted decision, to wit:
1st assignment of error:
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TERM "CUSTOMS DUTY" IN
ARTICLE 103 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394;
2nd assignment of error:
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
CUSTOMS DUTIES UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX.

On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals rationalized the ground for its ruling thus:
If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious meaning of words in consonance
with settled rules of interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an impost or
a charge on the importation or bringing into the Philippines of all goods, articles or products
subject thereto, for the phrase "import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or
brought into the Philippines" in explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customs
duties. It is hardly necessary to add that "customs duties" are simply taxes assessed on
merchandise imported from, or exported to a foreign country.
And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is essentially a customs duty,
or at least partakes of the character thereof.
Citing numberous American decisions and definitions of terms "customs duties," "duties," "imposts,"
"levies," "tax," and "tolls," and their distinctions, including some pronouncements of this Court on the
subject, the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths to show that the term "special
import tax" as used in R.A. No. 1394 includes customs duties. It sees the special import tax as nothing
but an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the Philippines of goods, articles or
products. 7
To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the similarity in the basis of computation of the
customs duty as well as the similarity in the phraseology of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1394 (which
established the special import tax) and Section 9-01 of the Tariff & Customs code (the basic law
providing for and regulating the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations). 8
For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the petition, leaned heavily on the same
arguments as those given by the Tax Court, the burden of which is that the special import tax law is a
customs law. 9

It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein
private respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387,
or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No.
1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.
We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments
presented by both parties and We are convinced that the only thing left to this Court to do is to
determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of the two statutes involved, i.e.,
Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to
be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters
that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the
reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. 10
Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to the finding of the Court of Tax Appeals that
"The language of Republic Act No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that
the phrase 'Special import tax' is taken to include customs duties" and countered with the argument
that "An examination of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1394 will indubitably reveal that Congress
considered the special import tax as a tax different from customs duties, as may be seen from the
fact that Section 2(a) of said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax ..."
Thus:
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total revenue derived from the
customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the United
States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed under
Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or
products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by proclamation, suspend the
reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ...

Petitioner further argues:

Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, while the special import tax
is provided for by Republic Act No. 1394. If our legislature had intended to classify the
special import tax as customs duty, the said Art would not have expressly exempted from
payment of the special Import tax importations of machinery, equipment, accessories, and
spare parts for use of industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred to
are the industries exempt from the payment of Customs duties or the non-exempt ones
(Sec. 6). It is sufficient that the imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry. 11
A study of petitioner's two assignments of errors shows that one is anchored on practically the same
ground as the other: both involve the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act of 1949) in
relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The Special Import Tax Law).
While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found in the two cited laws, which in a
way was likewise resorted to by the respondent ESSO, it would do Us well to restate the fundamental
rule in the construction of a statute.
In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should
receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism
between the Act to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly
the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the
other, either expressly or by implication.
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history
of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their
derivation, validity and operation. 12

Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us consider the history, the purpose and objectives
of Republic Act No. 387 as it relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other laws passed by the Congress
of the Philippines insofar as they relate to each other.
Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this for its title, to wit:
AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION
OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION
OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN
THE BUREAU OF MINES; TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Art. 103 of said Act reads:
ART. 103. Customs duties. During the five years following the granting of any
concessions, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment,
machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides:
ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged. ...; nor shall any other
special taxes or levies be applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under this
Act be subjected to any provincial, municipal, or other local taxes or levies; nor shall any
sales tax be charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or portion thereof,
manufactured by the concessionaire and used in the working of his concession. ....
Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:

ART. 104. No export to be imposed. No export tax shall be levied upon petroleum
produced from concessions granted under this Act.
The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its three articles just cited give a clue to the
intent of the Philippine legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and development of the
petroleum resources of the country. Through the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no
uncertain terms that the intensification of the exploration for petroleum must be carried on
unflinchingly even if, for the time being, no taxes, both national and local, may be collected from the
industry. This is the unequivocal intention of the Philippine Congress when the language of the
Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or
repealed by subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature must be upheld.
Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the subsequent legislation, R.A. No.
1394, the Special Import Tax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the legislature
considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties.
Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special Import Tax Law, is entitled as follows:
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS
IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS
NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETYSEVEN AND THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE.
The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior statutes. As will be seen later, all these
laws dealt with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of levy on
importation of goods into the country.
Section I of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be levied, collected and paid
as special import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the
Philippines, irrespective of source, during the period and in accordance with the rates
provided for in the following schedule:
xxx xxx xxx
It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this Act, the pertinent provision of the Petroleum
Law, for which there appears to be no proviso to the contrary has been modified or altered.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax provided for in its Section I shall not be
imposed against importation into the Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by
new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with R A. No. 901 and a long list of other
goods, articles, machinery, equipment, accessories and others.
We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No. 1394, namely:
R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17% on foreign exchange sold by the
Central Bank or its agents. This is known as the Exchange Tax Law;
R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and repealed Sections three and four of
R.A. No. 601;
R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended earlier by R.A. No.
814;
R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended;
R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as amended previously by R.A. No. 1175;

R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601 as amended by R.A. Nos.
1175 and 1197.
As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop, Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and
revoked six earlier statutes which had something to do with the imposition of special levies
and/or exemption of certain importations from the burden of the special import taxes or
levies. On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum Act, had been
spared from the pruning knife of Congress, although this latter law had granted more
concessions and tax exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were amended,
repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The answer must be that the Congress of the
Philippine saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in
order to keep the door open to the exploitation and development of the petroleum
resources of the country with such incentives as are given under that law.
This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a parallelism in a case brought
earlier before this Court.
A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a "merchant" by the Collector of Internal Revenue. He
paid under protest and filed an action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that he was an agriculturist
and not a merchant. When this Court was called upon to interpret the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Law on whether fish is an agricultural product which falls under the exemption provisions of
said law, it inquired into the purpose of the legislature in establishing the exemption for agricultural
products. We held:
The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the legislature had in mind in
establishing the exemption contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the law-making body that
by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry would be favored and
the development of the resources of the country encouraged. .... 13

Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids the history of the enactment of
the statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or provision in the law had been
applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We are convinced that R.A. No. 387,
The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development
of the petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax
exemptions. This is the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would
invest their financial resources towards the achievement of this national economic goal.
On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A.
No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is not favored
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the
same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and
convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter
of the earlier. 14
As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by Republic Act No. 1394 six statutes dealing
with the imposition of special imposts or levies or the granting of exemptions from special import
taxes. Yet, considering the tremendous amount of revenues it was losing under the Petroleum Law of
1949, it failed to include the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the Special Import Taw
Law. The reason for this is very clear: The legislature wanted to continue the incentives for the
continuing development of the petroleum industry.
It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the theory of the herein petitioner, R.A. No.
387 had not been repealed by R.A. No. 2352 which expressly abrogated Section 6 of R.A. No. 1394 but
did not repeal any part of R.A. No. 387. Therefore, the exemption granted by Republic Act No. 387 still
stands.

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this Court to the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Tax Appeals on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which findings and conclusions
We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 5:
G.R. No. 109404

January 22, 1996

FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"? This is the
major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent
Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the
respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.

On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his coowner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the
Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a resolution on
January 17, 1979 inter aliaordering petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in
said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo
alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but
that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said
property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his payments because
of petitioner's failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance
of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the
contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered
petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondent's purchase
contract over one lot, and as to the other, "it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269546
has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the management of E & S Delta
Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private
respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates from date of receipt
hereof until fully paid."

The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the . . .
Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . " However, in order to hasten the
resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court
resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D.
957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private
respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land purchase
agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot
govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts
executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from
the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory
construction stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the
primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although
it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a

statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense
which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy
and objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and the
disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was
enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may
fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers", and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human
settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and
other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to
pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value;2 (emphasis supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative intent
must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even

upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective
application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise
its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in
connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to
P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said
law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain
and continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and
will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply
and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is
filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a

subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in
favor of the owner or developer, when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid
including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to
the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves, which
expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the entire
area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of
this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66
and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules
and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for residential purposes as
may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the Congress of the
Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the General Registration Office
and other government agencies. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23
thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further
payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete development
of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part
of the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were
confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent

Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters: although private respondent
started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he
had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had
the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in
timely fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts.
But by that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D.
957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded
by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private respondent had
been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of the defaults for a
long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12 although (according to
petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the
supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary's) Decision dated
March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had become final
and executor, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which
provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof . . . , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED due course
and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 6: PEOPLE V. PRINGAS

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 175928

Present:

- versus -

ALVIN PRINGAS y PANGANIBAN

Accused-Appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,* and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

August 31, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On appeal before Us is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006
which affirmed in toto the decision[2] dated 16 August 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154,
convicting accused-appellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5, [3] 11[4] and 12[5] of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On 25 April 2003, appellant was charged before the RTC of Pasig City with Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of
Republic Act No. 9165 under the following informations:

Criminal Case No. 12360-D

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully
authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and give away to Police Officer Joselito Esmallaner, a police poseur buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing
white crystalline substance weighing three (3) centigrams (0.03 grams), which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.[6]
Criminal Case No. 12361-D
On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control three (3) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance weighing, the following
to wit:
(a)

twenty-five (25) decigrams (0.25 grams);

(b)

two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams); and

(c)

two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams).

for a total of twenty-nine (29) decigrams (0.29 grams), which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.[7]
Criminal Case No. 12362-D
On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess drug paraphernalia, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in is possession, custody and
control, the following to wit:
(a)
(b)

one (1) small tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing four (4) smaller unsealed transparent plastic bags each
with traces of white crystalline substance;
one (1) improvised water pipes containing traces of white crystalline substance;

(c)

two (2) empty strips of aluminum foil;

(d)

one (1) pin;

(e)

one (1) pair of scissors;

(f)

one (1) improvised bamboo tongs;

(g)

one (1) pack of empty small transparent plastic bag;

(h)

one (1) improvised burner; and

(i)

two (2) disposable lighters.

all are fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting any dangerous drug into the body.[8]

On 30 April 2003, appellant, having been charged without the benefit of a preliminary investigation, filed a motion for
reinvestigation.[9] On 14 May 2003, the trial court granted the motion and ordered the Pasig City Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.[10] With the finding of the City Prosecutor that no cogent reason existed to modify or reverse its
previous finding of probable cause against accused-appellant, the trial court set the cases for arraignment and trial.[11]
When arraigned on 4 September 2003, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.[12]
During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the existence and the contents of the Request for Laboratory
Examination[13] and the Forensic Chemist Report,[14] with the qualification that the subject of the forensic report was not taken
from him, and if ever same was taken from him, it was obtained illegally.[15]
With the termination of the pre-trial conference, the cases were heard jointly.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO1 Joselito Esmallaner[16] and SPO3 Leneal Matias,[17] both members of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 22 April 2003, SPO4 Danilo Tuao, Officer-in-Charge of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station, designated PO1 Joselito Esmallaner to act as a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant
alongBeverly Street, Barangay Buting, Pasig City. At around 10:30 p.m., the buy-bust team headed by SPO3 Leneal Matias
arrived at the target area. PO1 Esmallaner and the informant proceeded to the unnumbered house of appellant, while SPO3
Matias and the other members of the team positioned themselves around ten (10) meters away to serve as back-up.
After the informant knocked on appellants front door, the latter came out. Upon recognizing the informant, appellant
asked, Pare, ikaw pala. Bibili ka ba? The informant who was standing next to PO1 Esmallaner replied Oo, itong kasama ko
kukuha. Appellant then asked PO1 Esmallaner how much drugs he intended to buy to which PO1 Esmallaner replied, P100
lang. PO1 Esmallaner thereafter gave a one hundred peso (P100.00) bill to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant went inside
the house. Appellant returned and handed to PO1 Esmallaner a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance later
found to beshabu.[18]
Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Esmallaner grabbed appellants hand and got the P100.00 bill from the right front
pocket of appellants pants. He introduced himself as a police officer and informed the appellant of his violation and his
constitutional rights. PO1 Esmallaner then marked the plastic sachet [19] and placed his initials JE on the upper right portion of
theP100.00[20] bill with serial number FX230133.[21]
After seeing that PO1 Esmallaner tried to grab the hand of appellant, who was able to run inside the house and tried to
lock the door, SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team followed PO1 Esmallaner inside appellants house. Matias saw

three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets[22] containing a white crystalline substance which turned out to be shabu,
two disposable lighters,[23] six strips of aluminum foil with traces of shabu,[24] improvised water pipe used as tooter,
[25]

improvised burner,[26]wooden sealer, small scissors,[27] 14 pieces of transparent plastic sachets,[28] and one small needle[29] on

top of a small chair (bangkito). The items confiscated were marked and turned over to the Investigator who requested
laboratory examination on said items.
On 23 April 2003, Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E[30] was issued with the conclusion that the four sachets, together with
four other unsealed transparent plastic bags and a water pipe used as tooter, taken from appellant, were positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). On the same date, poseur-buyer PO1 Esmallaner and team leader SPO3 Matias
executed their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.[31]
For the defense, appellant[32] took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Gina Dean.[33]
Appellant and his common-law wife deny that a buy-bust occurred. Appellant claims that at about 10:00 p.m. of 22 April
2003, he and his common-law wife were with their three children in their house in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig City, when
somebody kicked the door of their house. Appellant was in the comfort room, while his common-law wife was in the bedroom
taking care of their children. Thereafter, four persons, later identified as police officers Esmallaner, Mapula, Espares and
Familiara, entered without any warrant of arrest or search warrant. He asked them what they wanted and he was told that they
were going to arrest him. When he asked for the reason why he was being arrested, he was told that he would just be informed
in their office. With his hands on his back, appellant was handcuffed. The policemen subsequently conducted a search in the
house, but they neither recovered nor took anything. After that, appellant was brought to the police station, investigated and
placed in jail. He added that the violent entry made by the policemen was witnessed by some of his neighbors, namely, Buboy,
Macmac and Zaldy, who were then having a drinking session.

On 19 August 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. It disposed of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ALVIN PRINGAS is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.
Accused ALVIN PRINGAS is also found GUILTY OF Violation of Section 11 of the same law and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of imprisonment and to
pay a fine ofP400,000.00 and also of violation of Section 12 of R.A. 9165, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
from SIX (6) MONTHS (and)ONE (1) DAY as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum, and to pay a fine
of P10,000.00.
Considering the penalty imposed, the immediate commitment of the accused to the National Bilibid Prisons is ordered.
The Court fully realizes that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense committed by the accused is quite severe. However,
the Court will not question the wisdom of the law and of the legislators who passed it. Dura lex, sed lex. The only thing that the
Court can do is to recommend that the accused be pardoned after he shall have served the minimum period of the penalty imposed on
him.[34]

On 3 September 2004, appellant, through counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.
[35]

With the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court transmitted [36] the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for

review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[37]

In its Decision dated 31 August 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.[38]
Unsatisfied, appellant appealed his conviction before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.[39]

With the elevation of the records to the Court and the acceptance of the appeal, the parties were required to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. [40] The parties manifested that they were not filing
supplemental briefs, arguing that the issues of the case had been discussed in their respective briefs.[41]
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED
DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 21 AND
86, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

Appellant argues that the apprehending police officers failure to comply with the provisions (Sections 21 and 86) of
Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the validity of appellants arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized
from him. He maintains that since the procurement of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, during the buy-bust
operation was violative of said law and of his constitutional right against illegal arrest, the same should not have been received
in evidence to prove his guilt they being inadmissible under the law.
Appellant claims that the police officers violated Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the alleged buy-bust
operation that led to the apprehension of appellant was conducted without the involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). It is his contention that nowhere in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by the members of the arresting
team was it shown that the buy-bust operation was conducted with the assistance, coordination, knowledge or consent of the
PDEA.
We find this claim untenable.

In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, it is stated that That, on or about 10:30 PM April 22, 2003, as instructed by SPO4
DANILO TUAO, OIC/SDEU, this Office effected a coordination to (sic) Metro Manila Regional Office of PDEA and formed
a team of SDEU operatives with a confidential informant to conduct anti-narcotics/Buy-bust operation against the said person x
x x.[42] This portion of the affidavit clearly negates appellants claim that the buy-bust operation subject of the case was not
with the involvement of the PDEA. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the aforementioned statement was not contained in
the affidavit, appellants claim of lack of involvement of the PDEA will render neither his arrest illegal nor the evidence seized
from him inadmissible. QuotingPeople v. Sta. Maria,[43] we resolved the very same issue in this wise:
Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible
having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.
The argument is specious.
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
Sec. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and
Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics
Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service
with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational
and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such
personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such
agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to
positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their
original mother agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take
effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail
service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to joint the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other
crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conductetd by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to
the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the
PDEA on all drug related matters.
Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer
drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also
silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without
the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction,
or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court
ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the investigations and
prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the
PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA,
serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, :shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement
of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act. We find much
logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement
authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the lead agency in the campaign against the menace of dangerous
drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the
Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR
emphasizes this point by providing:
(a)
Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies. The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in
support of the PDEA x x x. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement
personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

As regards the non-participation of PDEA in a buy-bust operation, we said:

[T]he challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to
be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the
legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.[44]

As regards Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, appellant insists there was a violation of said section when pictures,
showing him together with the confiscated shabu, were not immediately taken after his arrest. He added that the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest of the apprehending team did not indicate if the members thereof physically made an inventory of the illegal drugs in
the presence of the appellant or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and given a copy thereof. In short,
appellant insists that non-compliance with Section 21 regarding the custody and disposition of the confiscated/seized dangerous
drugs and paraphernalia, i.e., the taking of pictures and the making of an inventory, will make these items inadmissible in
evidence.
We do not agree. Section 21 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the

apprehending officer/team.[45] Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case under consideration, we
find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized/confiscated items were
immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for examination.
Though the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21 was not expressly stated by the arresting/buy-bust
team, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or the items seized/confiscated inadmissible. In the case
at bar, as in Sta. Maria, the justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question during the trial the
custody and disposition of the items taken from him. Assuming that Sections 21 and 86 were indeed breached, appellant should
have raised these issues before the trial court. This, he did not do. Never did he question the custody and disposition of the
items that were supposedly taken from him. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals that he raised them. This, he
cannot do. We held:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did
not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21
and 86 of Republic Act 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were raised instead for the first time on appeal. In no instance
did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.[46]

Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant was charged with
violation of Section 5 for selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the

delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[47] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[48]
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and the team leader of the
apprehending team narrated how the buy-bust happened, and that the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The
poseur-buyer, PO1 Joselito Esmallaner, identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Esmallaners testimony was corroborated
by the team leader, SPO3 Leneal Matias. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 grams which was bought from
appellant for P100.00 was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) per Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E.
In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved
in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug
dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.[49] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation
deserve full faith and credit.[50]
In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias credible. It is a
fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respects
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. [51] The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [52] Finding no reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stand by their findings.

We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said presumption was not
overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper
motive. Appellant and his common-law wife testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers. [53]
Appellants defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must
simply fail.[54] Being his common-law wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his
neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to present them or any of them to prove
his point.
Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.29 gram. In illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.[55] All these elements have been established.
SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a
white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small chair (bangkito) in the house of appellant.
Q.

After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened?

A.

I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to run inside their house, and tried to close
the door, sir.

Q.

As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any?

A.

We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir.

Q.

Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner?

A.

To arrest the accused, sir.

Q.

What did you do in particular?

A.

PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also inside the house, sir.

Q.

So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any?

A.

PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small
bangkito, sir.

Q.

Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small bangkito?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items?

A.

I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir.

Q.

When you said it what would this?

A.

The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir.

Q.

Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and marked it?

A.

The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of small stripe of aluminum foil with
traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat
plastic sachet, fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir.

Q.

Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated?

A.

Yes, sir.[56]

Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the bangkito following the buybust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic sachets was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D733-03E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia seized are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 9165.
Reviewing the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find them to be in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 154, convicting accused-appellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.
9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Pringas (2007) Jackie Canlas

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts: On 22 Apr 2003, SP04 Tuano, Officer-in-charge of the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit of thePasig City Police designated P01 Joselito Esmallaner to act as a poseur buyer
in a buy-bustoperation headed by SP03 Leneal Matias to be conducted against Alvin
Pringas in his house inBeverly Street, Buting, Pasig City.
Upon recognizing the informant, Pringas sold to Esmallaner a plastic sachet containing a
whitecrystalline substance later found to be shabu, for Php100.

After conducting the sale, Esmanaller then arrested Pringas. He introduced himself as a
policeofficer and informed the Pringas of his violation and his constitutional rights.
Matias recovered the following from Pringas house:
3 pcs. of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline
substancewhich turned out to be shabu (Methamphetamine Hydrochloride)
2 disposable lighters
6 strips of aluminium foil with traces of shabu (Methamphetamine Hydrochloride)
Improvised water pipe used as a tooter
Improvised burner
Wooden sealer
Small scissors
14 pcs. Of transparent plastic sheets
1 small needle on top of a small chair (bangkito)
Pringas Defense: He denied the bu
y-bust operations. He claimed that he and his common-lawwife Gina Dean were with
their three children in their House in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig Citywhen somebody
(later identified as Esmanaller, Mapula, Espares and Familiara) kicked the doorof their
house, entered without any search warrant or arrest warrant. The
policemensubsequently conducted a search in the house but they neither recovered nor
took anything.The violent entry was even witnessed by 3 of his neighbours who were
having a drinkingsession.
Pringas was charged with Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165
Trial Court and Court of Appeals found him GUILTY
Issue:

WON Pringas is guilty of the offenses charged despite the inadmissibility of the evidence
havingbeen obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86, RA 9165
Ruling: YES
Ratio:
Pringas Arguments
SC
Police officers violated Section 86 of RA 9165when the alleged buy-bust operation that
led tothe apprehension of the appellant was conductedwithout the involvement of
PDEA.It was very clear in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of Esmanaller and Matias that the
buy-bust operationsubject of the case was not with the involvementof the PDEA.
CASE 7: G.R. No. 171042

June 30, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying
the marriage of respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three years later or on October 12, 2000,
Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint 1 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-702 of the Family Code.

Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading to the complaint. 3 No collusion was
established between the parties.4 Upon the authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City
appeared in the case under the formers supervision and control.5
From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila S. Tecson on January 10, 2001, 6 the
following are gathered:
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martinis vacation after the expiration of his contract on board an ocean-going
vessel.
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage,7 following which they moved to the
house of Lynnettes parents at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on
weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that the
two of them stay in the house of Martinis parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with
his parents.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned his mother and his family, and she
soon realized that he was a "mamas boy." And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his parents
house and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would deny that he was around.
In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract overseas, 8 he stayed with Lynnette. When
in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he stayed with his parents.
On the insistence of his mother, Martinis monetary allotment was shared equally between her and Lynnette.
Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette stopped receiving her share of
the allotment, drawing her to inquire from Martinis employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on
even month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible and should just part ways.

The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette
learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he was "single" and named his mother as principal
allottee.9
Hence, Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage.
Aside from her deposition,10 Lynnette presented her Certificate of Marriage,11 Martinis undated Seafarer Information
Sheet,12 the letter of clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal
interview,13 Dr. Gerongs testimony,14 and the Psychological Evaluation Report15 prepared by Dr. Gerong after his
interview of Lynnette and her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.16
In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioners residence, but the defendant would always go home to
his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-go-lucky, and would just see the
plaintiff for his physical and sexual needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted, abandoned;
5. Defendants parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling [with] the finances coming from
the income as a seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any protestations from the plaintiff who has
been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would still depend upon the decisions of his
parents and without any personal directions as to what to do with his family;

9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and wife like any ordinary
couple17(underscoring supplied),
and concluded that
Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. Th[ese are]
the core personality dysfunctions noted and have been exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the
familial well-being;
The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and incurable because personality
and character are stable whether or not it is normal and adaptive.
xxxx
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and
family.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of defendant Martini Dico
Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared to be [a] dependent person
to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a married man and to establish a domicile for his
family and to support his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the defendant?

A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mamas boy" as alleged, that will endanger the integrity of the
marriage because instead of establishing a permanent conjugal relationship with the wife the husbanddefendant would remain dependent on his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the chances, if any?
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character disorder or dysfunction["] and as I
have said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive over time. And if it is established as early as
adolescent period and up to the present it has remained persistent thru the years and therefore its a permanent
trait of the defendant-husband, therefore its incurable.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Decision20 of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple
exchanged their marriage vows."
The Solicitor General, via appeal,21 challenged before the Court of Appeals the trial courts decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIOS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST. 22
By Decision23 of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Addressing the Solicitor
Generals argument that Dr. Gerongs testimony failed to establish the cause of Martinis psychological incapacity and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage,24 the Court of Appeals held:
x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republics contention and its supporting above-cited doctrine, this Court cites the
more recent jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos v. Marcos,25 in which the High Tribunal has foregone
with the requirement that the defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist as aconditio sine
qua non for declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus:

"The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated x x x [w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination for the person concerned need not be
resorted to."26
Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S.
Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist declaring the defendant psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations in marriage and family life was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the defendant
suffers psychological incapacity.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the Solicitor Generals contention that Martinis abandonment of Lynnette is a ground for legal separation and not
for declaration of nullity of marriage,28 and that Martinis alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code,29 the Court of Appeals declared:
x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee but
the defendants being a mamas boy.30
xxxx
Being a Mamas Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself single and naming his
mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately,
abandoning her manifested defendants psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are manifestations
of severe psychological disorder rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his marital
obligations.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor Generals Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the Court of Appeals,33 the present
petition34 was filed, faulting the appellate court to have gravely erred:
I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT
DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS.

II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY ONES SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS BEING A MAMAS BOY IS A MANIFESTATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISORDER.35 (Italics in the original)
The Solicitor Generals arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendants alleged psychological incapacity (being a mamas boy) began in his
adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding.
He made no effort to look into and testify on defendants past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain
defendants alleged psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendants alleged defect is incurable, he failed to explain why it is
clinically or medically permanent. His only basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a
mamas boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail
why the defendants alleged psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is
suffering from.36 (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctors findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:
The said findings reveal nothing in defendants past life and acts that shows a behavior pattern that would prove
his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerongs finding that defendants parents are too controlling because
they were made co-allottees of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged psychological incapacity
of defendant and state whether or not it incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family. There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendants

incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that such illness must be shown to be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and grave [Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant by a
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private respondent must stillprove the
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity(Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original;
italics and underscoring supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martinis alleged personality traits are of the
nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases, 37 and that
Martinis abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage.38
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41
which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable
marriages, and Article 55 on legal separation.39 Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to
be applied indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.40
And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.41
"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature
must be fully explained x x x.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological
incapacity.43 Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties
and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, 44 which insensitivity or incapacity should have
been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 45
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. 46
Dr. Gerong found that Martinis "personality disorders" including his being a "mamas boy" are "serious, grave, existing
already during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his
family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family."
The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnettes
deposition. From Lynnettes deposition, however, it is gathered that Martinis failure to establish a common life with her

stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will,47 which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor
arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality
disorders of Martini have been existing since Martinis adolescent years has not been explained. It bears recalling that
Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years
old, far removed from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his representing himself as single in his
Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, as indications of Martinis dependence on his family amounting to his
incapacity to fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially given that the Seafarers
Information Sheet is not even dated48 and, therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini contracted
marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological incapacitated is not
required, the root cause thereof must be "medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately
establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.49 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State,50 cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties.51 In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff.52 Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.53
As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court sympathizes with her predicament,
its first and foremost duty is to apply the law.54 Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented. 55
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 13, 2005 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

CASSE 8: PEOPLE V. PURISIMA

86 SCRA 542
G.R. No. L-42050-66
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978)
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8, RULE 110
FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them

The details of which will be recounted below

an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz,that the Information did
not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed,
blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second,
that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The
petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the
residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.
HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS
MADE BY THERESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to
inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or,
whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid
all objectionable mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
CASE 9: A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995
PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the Philippine National Police Station Commander in Bato,
Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip in the afternoon of September 14, 1987. 1 After
preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad with the
crime of Homicide as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon" of
the crime of Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of September 1987, in the Island of Dawahon,
Municipality of Bato, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the preliminary
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shot one GENARO TAGSIP, with a revolver .38 Cal. Snub Nose Smith and Wesson
(Paltik) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby causing

and inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound on his head which was the
direct and immediate cause of the death of Genaro Tagsip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Hilongos, Leyte, October 20, 1987.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the
consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused
would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally
charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of "four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year ofprision correccional maximum as
maximum." 2 Consequently, in his decision promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge
found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted
Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six years of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum
period, exactly in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. 3
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S.
Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled
People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In said letter-complaint, complainant contends that the
sentence of respondent judge finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser
offense of Attempted Homicide and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct.
Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual with the
consent of the offended party to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such
offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction.

He explains that during the May 3, 1990 hearing, accused and his counsel, with the acquiescence and
in the presence of the prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's desire to plea bargain
pursuant to the aforestated rule. Moreover, he avers that in a conference on June 27, 1990, the wife
of the victim herself agreed to the accused's plea of guilty to attempted homicide, instead of
homicide as she needed the monetary indemnity to raise her two orphaned children. In a
Memorandum dated February 5, 1993, the Deputy Court Administrator recommended that the
complaint be dismissed, explaining that:
Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
whether or not it is included in the offense charged in the complaint or information, with
the consent of the offended party and the fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that the fiscal
consented to abbreviate the proceedings and in order not to run the risk of the accused
being acquitted, because there was no conclusive evidence to obtain the conviction of the
accused to the offense charged in the complaint of information.
It may be stated in this connection that unlike in the crime of murder where the accused
may plead to the lesser offense of homicide, in homicide a misinterpretation may arise, as
in this case, when the accused pleads guilty to attempted homicide, because here the fact
of the death of the victim, which is the principal element of the crime is obliterated. This is
specially so because the decision/sentence does not contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law but merely an account that the accused pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense and the penalty imposed. 4
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the
accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused
Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled
with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined
in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.

Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a
misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized
by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal
application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the
dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes
judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right
and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous,
judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear
negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly
inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body
of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that he
merely applied the rule to the letter, the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag"
alerting him of the possibility of injustice. The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of the
charge against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a
more expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the law is
so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.6
Finally, every judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 7 A judge
should not only be aware of the bare outlines of the law but also its nuances and ramifications,
otherwise, he would not be able to come up with decisions which are intrinsically fair. In failing to
exercise even ordinary common sense, a judge could be held administratively liable for a verdict that
could in no way be legally or factually sustained or justified.

We note, however, that under the circumstances of the case, respondent judge's erroneous exercise
of his judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. The phraseology of Sec. 2,
Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely eliminate possible misinterpretation. This
observation is bolstered by the fact that the same provision prompted the Department of Justice, on
July 31, 1990, or three months after respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990,
to issue Circular No. 35, 8 later amended by Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and
setting limitations on the application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent reached
compulsory retirement age on April 5, 1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary entitles him
to a certain measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands unique because of the
potently absurd result of respondent's application of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law
for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision
appear in respondent's record of service.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 7, Annex "A".
2 Id., at 9, Annex "C."
3 Ibid.
4 Id., at 3.

5 Civil Code, art. 10.

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
6 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, 221 SCRA 95.
7 Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.01.
8 DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 35.
Sec. 2, RULE 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides for a
process wherein the accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. To
attain the laudable objectives of the rules on plea bargaining and in order that the
disposition of criminal cases may be expedited its uniformly as possible by eliminating
unnecessary and costly litigation and in the interest of justice, you are hereby directed
to observe the following guidelines, to wit:
1. The trial prosecutor shall immediately move for suspension of the proceedings
whenever the accused manifests his intention in court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, to allow the trial prosecutor to evaluate the implications of the offer.
2. The trial prosecutor, with consent of the offended party, may motu proprio agreed
to the offer of the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense if the penalty imposable
for the offense charged is prision correccional (Maximum of six years) or lesser or a
fine not exceeding P12,000.00.
3. When the penalty imposable for the offense charged is prision mayor (at least six
years and one day) or higher or a fine exceeding P12,000.00, the trial prosecutor shall
first submit his comment/recommendation to the City/Provincial Prosecutor or to the
Chief State Prosecutor as the case may be, for approval. If the favorable

recommendation is approved in writing, the trial prosecutor with consent of the

offended party, may agree to a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. For this purpose, the
Chief State Prosecutor or the Provincial/City Prosecutor concerned shall act on the
recommendation of the trial prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt
thereof. In no case shall the subject plea to a lesser offense be allowed without the
written approval of the above respective heads of office.
4. In all cases, the penalty for the lesser offense to which the accused may be allowed
to plead guilty shall not be more than two (2) degrees lower than the imposable
penalty for the crime originally charged, notwithstanding the presence of mitigating
circumstances. The lesser offense shall also be one that is necessarily related to the
offense charged or that the nature of the offense must belong to the same
classification or title under the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
For your guidance and strict compliance.
December 11, 1990