LEGAL RESEARCH

What is JUDICIAL POWER?

The Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. Under the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, it is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
In what bodies is judicial power vested in our jurisdiction?
Article 8 Section 1
Judicial power will be vested in the Supreme Court and all Lower Courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

What is the legal basis of accepting judicial decisions as part of our legal system?
Composition of the Supreme Court
The Philippine Supreme Court is composed of one chief justice and 14 associate justices. The justices are
allowed to hear cases en banc, which means all of them sitting together, or in divisions of three, five or seven
members. Under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, however, the following cases are required to be
decided en banc:

Those involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law

Those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations

Those required by the Rules of Court to be decided en banc

The modification or reversal of doctrines laid down by the Court sitting in division or en banc

Definition of Judicial Power

The chief function of the judicial branch is the exercise of judicial power. Unlike the US Constitution, Sec. 1,
par. 2, Art. VIII of the Philippine Constitution defines judicial power as "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."

According to retired Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz in his book Philippine Political Law, this provision of
the 1987 Constitution expanded the definition of judicial power by including not only the traditional exercise of
judicial power - which is the settlement of conflicting legal rights - but also giving the judiciary the power to
review the exercise of discretion by the political branches of government. Justice Cruz contends that the
Supreme Court can now rule even on the wisdom of the president and congress's decision (political questions)
if they are guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Former Constitutional Commission (body that drafted the 1987 Philippine Constitution) delegate Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, however, was careful to point out in his book The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer that
the expanded definition of judicial power (also known as expanded certiorari jurisdiction) did not do away with
the political question doctrine (the rule that courts cannot rule on the exercise of discretion by the political
branches under the principle of separation of powers), but to prevent the judiciary from shying away in its duty
to review acts of the executive and legislature at the mere invocation of the political question doctrine even
when there is clear abuse in the exercise of power by these branches.

At any rate, in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, in denying the plea for the Court
not to review the impeachment proceeding brought before the House of Representatives against former Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., has ruled that it is not only a power but a duty on the courts to rule on actions of the
other branches of government whenever there has been a grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
powers.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Jurisdiction refers to the authority and extent by which courts decide cases. Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution
enumerates two kinds of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, namely: original and appellate. Original jurisdiction
refers to the power of the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases brought directly to it, while appellate to
cases which have already been decided by lower courts.

Under Section 5, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over "cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions forcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus." The same section enumerates the following as falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court:

1.

All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

2.

All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

3.

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

4.

All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

5.

All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Section 5 also provides that Congress may not reduce or deprive the foregoing jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as a guarantee to its independence.

What is the principle of Stare Decisis? To stand by that which is decided

Stare Decisis is a legal principle by which judges are obliged to respect the precedents established by prior
decisions. The words originate from the phrasing of the principle in the Latin maxim Stare decisis et non quieta
movere: "to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed." In a legal context, this is understood to mean
that courts should generally abide by precedents and not disturb settled matters.

This doctrine requires a Court to follow rules established by a superior court.

The doctrine that holdings have binding precedence value is not valid within most civil law jurisdictions as it is
generally understood that this principle interferes with the right of judges to interpret law and the right of
the legislature to make law. Most such systems, however, recognize the concept ofjurisprudence constante,
which argues that even though judges are independent, they should judge in a predictable and non-chaotic
manner. Therefore, judges' right to interpret law does not preclude the adoption of a small number of selected
binding case laws.

CASE NO. 1 LAZATIN VS. DISIERTO GR. NO. 147097

Petitioner
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and
ANGELITO A. PELAYO,
Respondent

HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN,

THIRD DIVISION,
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution [1] dated
September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with
Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello
F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he
was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed
vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he
received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L.
David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution[2] dated May 29, 2000 recommending the
filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds

and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the
Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087
to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, whichmotions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against
petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution [3] dated September 18,
2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency
of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
Resolution. In a Memorandum[4] dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the
OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases
against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the
aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.

II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.[5]

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no

authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because,
under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with
the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the
Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which
was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the

Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a
separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the
OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which
made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the
checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he
made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation
of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long
been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional
infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution
had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.[6]
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the
Ombudsman shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law. Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was
indeed present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did
not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other
powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the
Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
x x

x x

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and
duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:

x x x x
MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the
Ombudsman is: to exercise such powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law. So, the legislature may vest him with
powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
x x x x
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: The Tanodbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as provided by law.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be
performed by the Ombudsman are such functions or duties as may be
provided by law. The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on might
remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these to the
Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.
x x x x
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional
body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive
powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
x x x x
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
x x x x
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would
like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but
we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we should
prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels
that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order
that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an
irreversible disability.[7]

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained,
thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as
among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 (An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman and for Other Purposes) is unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
x x x x
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers,
except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate
of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may exercise
such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law, it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor

under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the
powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman;
or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as
Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.
[8]

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.[9] More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,[10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of
the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. [11] The Court's ruling
in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to
authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is,
therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from
legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of
R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this
contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established)is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People[13] as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court
thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by
all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.[14]

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.

Remington Steel Corporation,[15]the Court expounded on the importance of
the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[16]

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise,
the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished.[17] Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can
the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisisshould not be applied to this case. They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP
Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts,
speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman
correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That
issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a
remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,[18] to wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which isextra ordinem - beyond the ambit
of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and
assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari.An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court
in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting
evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of
the court a quo.[19]

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause
would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the
Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition
forCertiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[20] imparting the value of the Ombudsman's
independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act
or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as
long as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of
the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in exercising
his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches of government. This is
to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.
[21]

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is
imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,[22] the Court
elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. x x x[23]

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner
described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and
properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the
Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in
this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 2 Fermin VS. People Gr. No. 157643

Facts:

Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable for
Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in an
estafa case here in the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases to
confront there. This was said to be due to their, especially Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos
money, failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were
selling and not being on good terms with the latter
Annabelle and Eddie filed libel cases against Fermin and Tugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.

RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty of libel.

CA: Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation but Fermin's conviction was affirmed.

Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition. She argues that she had
no knowledge and participation in the publication of the article, that the article is not libelous
and is covered by the freedom of the press.

Issue: WON Cristy Fermin is guilty of libel

Held: YES

Case No. 3
G.R. No. 137980

November 15, 2000

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner,

vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated June 20, 2000.
Respondent argues that the complaint for ejectment below was not based on non-payment of rentals but on the
alleged expiration of respondents lease contract with petitioner and the formers refusal to accept and comply with
the new rental rates and conditions. According to respondent, there was no allegation in the complaint of any failure
on its part to pay any of the monthly rentals stipulated in the contract of lease and the same, not having been raised
as an issue, should not have been passed upon by this Court.
The records, however, show that the issue of non-payment of rentals was, in fact, consistently raised from the
Municipal Trial Court all the way to this Court. Indeed, petitioners Position Paper before the Municipal Trial Court
dedicates an entire portion to respondents "Violation of Terms and Conditions", inclusive of its unpaid rentals.
There, petitioner argued as follows
"Assuming for the sake of argument that the original lease contract subsists, still the ground for ejectment of
non-payment of rental holds. It should be borne in mind that since April, 1994, defendant has not paid

plaintiff a single cent. If, according to defendant, the original lease contract subsists then, it should have
continued to pay the amount of P20,500.00 per month stipulated thereon." 1 (underscored in the original)
This allegation of non-payment of rentals was in petitioners petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals, 2 as
well as in the instant petition for review3 before us.
Next, respondent assails the application of its security deposit of P1,020,000.00 to rentals for the period of August,
1985 to November, 1989 as erroneous, since the same period only covers 52 months, while the amount of
P1,020,000.00 would only account for 49.76 months. A cursory study of Annexes "K" and "L" of the Affidavit of
Elizabeth Palma,4 referred to in our Decision,5 readily reveals that the rentals due on the leased property for the
period of August, 1985 to November, 1989 was P1,066,000.00. Hence, the whole amount of P1,020,000.00 given by
respondent as security deposit was sufficient to cover the rentals, still leaving a balance of P46,000.00. This
amount, together with outstanding rentals on other properties likewise leased by respondent from petitioner, was
paid for by respondents liquidator as part of its payment of P5,232,325.00.
Respondent also contends that the application of its security deposit was improper since it was not authorized under
the provisions of the lease contract, and thus amounted to a unilateral amendment of the same. This is untenable.
The stipulation in the lease contract that the security deposit shall be applied to the rentals due from the 11th to the
20th years of the lease presupposes that rental payments up to the 10th year are up to date. But this was not the
case here. In fact, respondent had an outstanding account of P1,066,000.00 representing unpaid rent for the period
of August, 1985 to November, 1989, or from 5th to the 8th years of the lease term. Had the security deposit not
been applied for that period, respondent would have been subject to immediate ejectment. Precisely, the security
deposit was applied for the said period to cover for the unpaid rentals and to avoid immediate ejectment for nonpayment of rentals. Respondents insistence that the security deposit be applied to the 11th to 20th years of the
lease as stipulated should thus fail.
In demanding that its security deposit be applied to the rentals for the 11th to the 20th years, respondent
conveniently overlooks its unpaid obligations for the earlier period for which the said security deposit was actually
applied. Does it expect to have such unpaid rentals merely written off? Evidently, that is exactly what respondent
intended. Respondent also argues in its present Motion for Reconsideration that, inasmuch as it was closed and
under receivership, it should not be answerable for its unpaid rentals over the leased premises during such time,
passing the responsibility instead to the Central Bank. Respondent relies on the argument that its closure and
consequent lack of access to its funds to pay off its obligations, including the rentals on the leased premises, was a
fortuitous event which should excuse it from liability. Granting, without conceding, that liability should not lie with
respondent for unpaid rentals on the leased premises while it was under control of the Central Bank, this matter is
not an issue in the instant case, where the subject matter is merely ejectment. As the lessee of the premises,
respondent had the exclusive obligation to settle any unpaid rentals. Petitioner dealt directly with respondent, and
therefore had the right to enforce the lease contract against respondent only. Any right of action that respondent
may have against the Central Bank is a matter that can be best ventilated in the proper forum.
The fact that the application of respondents security deposit was effected by and between petitioner and
respondents liquidator does not have any bearing on its validity, as the basic premise for its operation remains the
same.
Finally, we reject respondents argument that the principle of res judicata should equally apply to the issue of rent
payment. As we have already clearly set out in the challenged Decision, "respondents failure to pay any rentals
beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the
outcome of G.R. No. 129887."6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Principle of RES JUDICITA

the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal
systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal.[1]; and the term is also used
to refer to the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such cases between the same parties,
which is different between the two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous with "preclusion".
Elements of Res Judicata
1. The former judgment must be final
2. Judgment must be on the merits of the case
3. The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.
4. There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both cases.

Cause of action - defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
Types of Res Judicita

Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)

Rule: If judgment is rendered in favor of a plaintiff in a particular suit, the plaintiff is precluded from raising claims (in
any future litigation) which were raised in (or could have been raised) in that lawsuit.

Elements: Before a court will apply the doctrine of res judicata to a claim, three elements must be satisfied:
1.

There must have been prior litigation in which identical claims were raised (or could have been
raised). In general, claims are sufficiently identical if they are found to share a common nucleus of operative
fact.

2.

The parties in the second litigation must be identical in some manner to the parties in the original
litigation, or be in privity with the parties in the first action.
Note: A party is considered to be in privity with a party in the original litigation if:
1.
2.

The nonparty succeeded to the interest of a party;

The nonparty, though it did not technically participate in the first suit, controlled one partys
litigation in that suit;

3.

The nonparty shares a property interest with the party;

4.

The party and the nonparty have an agency relationship (agent/principal); or

5.

The party otherwise adequately represented the interest of the nonparty in the previous
litigation.

B. There must have been a final judgment on the merits in the original litigation. Note: Not all final judgments are
based on the merits of the case (i.e., cases dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, etc.).
B. Scope: Res judicata bars relitigation of claims that were previously litigatedas well as claims that could
have been litigated in the first lawsuit.
C. Counterclaims: Res judicata is generally not applied to potential counterclaims by defendants, so defendants
are not necessarily barred from raising a counterclaim in future litigation. However, remember that all
counterclaims must conform to FRCP Rule 13(a), and that some counterclaims are compulsory (must be raised
in original litigation or they are waived).

Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

Rule: If an issue has been decided in a particular case, it is treated as decidedwithout further proofin any
subsequent litigation that involves the issue. In other words, a person or party who seeks to relitigate any already
decided issue is collaterally stopped from doing so.
Elements: Before a court will apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, three elements must be satisfied:
1.

2.

There must have been a prior litigation in which the identical issue was brought before the court.

The issue must have been actually litigated in the first judicial proceeding, and the party against
whom collateral estoppel is being asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
first judicial proceeding.

3.

The issue must necessarily have been decided and rendered as a necessary part of the courts final
judgment.
B. Scope: Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does not bar future litigation over issues not actually
raised in the original judicial proceeding, even if the issues could have been raised.
C.
D. Who may be bound: The old rule that only the actual parties (and those in privities with the actual parties) to
the first judicial proceeding may be bound by the courts findings/decision on the issue has been virtually
abolished. Increasingly, courts have been willing to allow strangers (persons not involved in the first litigation)
to use collateral estoppel in various situations to prevent another party from relitigating an issue.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: bar by former
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
Posted on February 15, 2012by Erineus

The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the government
service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA.
Conclusiveness of Judgment
De Jesus contends that under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata,
the present case is bound by the decision of this Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.[43]
The original complaint filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason spawned two cases, an
administrative proceeding docketed as OMB-C-A-0496-J, which is the subject of this present case,

and a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges docketed
as OMB-C-C-02-0712-J.
As to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by the Ombudsman, and nine (9)
informations for falsification of public documents were separately filed against De Jesus and
Parungao with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27894-27902. After his Motion to
Quash was denied, De Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. Nos.
164166 & 164173-80, entitled De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.[44] This petition was resolved on October
17, 2007 in favor of De Jesus with the finding that the evidence could not sustain a prima facie case.
His Motion to Quash was granted for lack of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused. The Court stated that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea was present, finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers
constituted an absolutely false narration of facts.
As a result, the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan were consequently dismissed on March
14, 2008.[45] Copies of the decisions of this Court and the Sandiganbayan were submitted to the CA
through a Manifestation with Most Urgent Ex-Parte Motion onApril 24, 2008.
De Jesus cited the case of Borlongan v. Buenaventura[46] to support his argument that this
administrative case should be bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.
[47] In Borlongan, similar to the situation prevailing in this case, the complaint-affidavit filed with
the Ombudsman also spawned two cases a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for
the filing of criminal charges, and an administrative case subject of the petition. In said case, this
Court found that its factual findings regarding the proceeding for the determination of probable cause
bound the disposition of the factual issues in the administrative case under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment, as both the probable cause proceeding and the administrative case
require the same quantum of evidence, that is, substantial evidence.Furthermore, the factual
backdrop in the proceeding for the determination of probable cause, which this Court declared as
insufficient to hold respondents for trial, was the same set of facts which confronted this Court in the
administrative case.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA raised the jurisprudential principle that the
dismissal of a criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the administrative charges due to the distinct and independent nature of one proceeding
from the other. They further countered that the only issue resolved in De Jesus was the absence
of mens rea, which was not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official
documents as an administrative offense;[48] and although it was found that there was no absolutely
false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers, the issue in this administrative case was
not limited solely to falsification of official documents. It was further contended that the evidence and
admissions in the administrative case were different from the evidence in the criminal case, thus, the
findings in the criminal case could not bind the administrative case. Finally, they argued that the
doctrine of res judicata would only apply to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
administrative matters.[49]

The Court agrees with De Jesus insofar as the finding regarding the falsification of official documents
is concerned.
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of thePhilippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxx
(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or
any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject
matters of the two suits are the same.[50] The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section
47 above, is referred to as bar by former judgment; while the second rule, which is embodied in
paragraph (c), is known as conclusiveness of judgment.[51]
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an
administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is
conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City[52] explained such, to wit:
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It
has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in

another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201,
210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar
by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues
in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue
and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
[53]
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for
probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of official
documents, and require the same quantum of evidence[54] substantial evidence, as was similarly
found in Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by De Jesus.
It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal
intent or mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed unnecessary for a
finding of guilt in an administrative case for falsification of official documents,[55] it was expressly
found by this Court in De Jesus that there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of
appointment papers. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder as follows:
Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In this
case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was
present. The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier than
December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as shown by the

serial numbers. The first set has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216,
168217, 168287 and 168288; while the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294,
168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this fact.Indeed,
petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment papers but nothing in said documents
constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the
basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the members of the Board appointing their respective
confidential staff conformably with the DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on
said appointment papers as the concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12,
2001. In fact, the DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be
implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee concerned.In any case, Jamora
authorized the issuance of the second set of appointment papers.Following the CSC Rules, the second
set of appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that the appointing
authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee
whose appointment became ineffective.There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioners act
warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the petitioners guilt.
[56] [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely
false narration of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public
documents is concerned, and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other acts of De
Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the
complaint.
Contrary to Tuason and LWUAs contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De Jesusas to the
absence of falsification is based on the same evidence as in this administrative case. There are,
however, other evidence and admissions present in this case as cited by Tuason and LWUA which
pertain to other issues and not to the issue of falsification.
Meanwhile the doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian[57] that res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, has been
abandoned in subsequent cases[58] which have since applied the principle of res judicata to
administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable to the case at bench. Thus,
given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesusthat there was no false statement of facts in both
sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.
Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case at bench,
this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesusbased on a careful
review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory
requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense. What is
simply required is a showing that De Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed the appointment
papers knowing fully well that they were false.[59]

The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers were made,
De Jesus and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They prepared and signed the
first set on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the Board members appointing their
respective confidential staff conformably with DBM approval. The second set was prepared to correct
the retroactive appointments to conform to the CSC reportorial requirements, and the same was also
approved by Administrator Jamora. There was no reason for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such
to be false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation, but
not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no falsification of official documents occured.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: bar by former
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
Posted on February 15, 2012by Erineus

The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the government
service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA.
Conclusiveness of Judgment
De Jesus contends that under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata,
the present case is bound by the decision of this Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.[43]
The original complaint filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason spawned two cases, an
administrative proceeding docketed as OMB-C-A-0496-J, which is the subject of this present case,
and a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges docketed
as OMB-C-C-02-0712-J.
As to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by the Ombudsman, and nine (9)
informations for falsification of public documents were separately filed against De Jesus and
Parungao with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27894-27902. After his Motion to
Quash was denied, De Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. Nos.
164166 & 164173-80, entitled De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.[44] This petition was resolved on October
17, 2007 in favor of De Jesus with the finding that the evidence could not sustain a prima facie case.
His Motion to Quash was granted for lack of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused. The Court stated that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea was present, finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers
constituted an absolutely false narration of facts.
As a result, the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan were consequently dismissed on March
14, 2008.[45] Copies of the decisions of this Court and the Sandiganbayan were submitted to the CA
through a Manifestation with Most Urgent Ex-Parte Motion onApril 24, 2008.
De Jesus cited the case of Borlongan v. Buenaventura[46] to support his argument that this
administrative case should be bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.

[47] In Borlongan, similar to the situation prevailing in this case, the complaint-affidavit filed with
the Ombudsman also spawned two cases a proceeding for the determination of probable cause for
the filing of criminal charges, and an administrative case subject of the petition. In said case, this
Court found that its factual findings regarding the proceeding for the determination of probable cause
bound the disposition of the factual issues in the administrative case under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment, as both the probable cause proceeding and the administrative case
require the same quantum of evidence, that is, substantial evidence.Furthermore, the factual
backdrop in the proceeding for the determination of probable cause, which this Court declared as
insufficient to hold respondents for trial, was the same set of facts which confronted this Court in the
administrative case.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA raised the jurisprudential principle that the
dismissal of a criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the administrative charges due to the distinct and independent nature of one proceeding
from the other. They further countered that the only issue resolved in De Jesus was the absence
of mens rea, which was not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official
documents as an administrative offense;[48] and although it was found that there was no absolutely
false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers, the issue in this administrative case was
not limited solely to falsification of official documents. It was further contended that the evidence and
admissions in the administrative case were different from the evidence in the criminal case, thus, the
findings in the criminal case could not bind the administrative case. Finally, they argued that the
doctrine of res judicata would only apply to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
administrative matters.[49]
The Court agrees with De Jesus insofar as the finding regarding the falsification of official documents
is concerned.
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of thePhilippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxx
(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or
any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject
matters of the two suits are the same.[50] The first rule which corresponds to paragraph (b) of Section
47 above, is referred to as bar by former judgment; while the second rule, which is embodied in
paragraph (c), is known as conclusiveness of judgment.[51]
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an
administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is
conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City[52] explained such, to wit:
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It
has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201,
210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar
by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues
in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue
and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between

the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
[53]
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for
probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of official
documents, and require the same quantum of evidence[54] substantial evidence, as was similarly
found in Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by De Jesus.
It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal
intent or mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed unnecessary for a
finding of guilt in an administrative case for falsification of official documents,[55] it was expressly
found by this Court in De Jesus that there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of
appointment papers. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder as follows:
Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In this
case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was
present. The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier than
December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as shown by the
serial numbers. The first set has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216,
168217, 168287 and 168288; while the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294,
168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this fact.Indeed,
petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment papers but nothing in said documents
constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the
basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the members of the Board appointing their respective
confidential staff conformably with the DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on
said appointment papers as the concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12,
2001. In fact, the DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be
implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee concerned.In any case, Jamora
authorized the issuance of the second set of appointment papers.Following the CSC Rules, the second
set of appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that the appointing
authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee
whose appointment became ineffective.There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioners act
warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case
and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the petitioners guilt.
[56] [Emphasis supplied]

Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely
false narration of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public
documents is concerned, and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other acts of De
Jesus and Parungao which may amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the
complaint.
Contrary to Tuason and LWUAs contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De Jesusas to the
absence of falsification is based on the same evidence as in this administrative case. There are,
however, other evidence and admissions present in this case as cited by Tuason and LWUA which
pertain to other issues and not to the issue of falsification.
Meanwhile the doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian[57] that res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, has been
abandoned in subsequent cases[58] which have since applied the principle of res judicata to
administrative cases. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable to the case at bench. Thus,
given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesusthat there was no false statement of facts in both
sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.
Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case at bench,
this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesusbased on a careful
review of the evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory
requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense. What is
simply required is a showing that De Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed the appointment
papers knowing fully well that they were false.[59]
The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers were made,
De Jesus and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They prepared and signed the
first set on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the Board members appointing their
respective confidential staff conformably with DBM approval. The second set was prepared to correct
the retroactive appointments to conform to the CSC reportorial requirements, and the same was also
approved by Administrator Jamora. There was no reason for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such
to be false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation, but
not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no falsification of official documents occured.
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration or the
condition, status or relationship of the person, however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent

to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)

CHAPTER II

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya Lolas
Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned
the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized
three books when the honorable Justice twisted the true intents of the following books to support the assailed
decision:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law
(2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by
Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Blacks Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons
original ideas or creative expressions as ones own.
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there
was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillos researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404),
the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying

plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where
there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in
establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state
that the foreign authors works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the
attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the
advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or
corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly
competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions.
The researcher finished third in her class and 4 in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that
the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts
are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can
it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases
to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized
though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every
sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.
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