Pp. v.

Samson
Cristina and Gerry were married to each other. On June 27, 2002,
Cristina and her children were at home watching television when
Gerry, drunk, arrived home. He asked her if she cooked food, to
which she replied no as she had no money to buy food. Gerry
scolded her, uttered words against her, then slapped her. When
Cristinas father, who resides nearby arrived, and pacified them.
Gerry returned, however, and poked a knife at her neck. Cristina
pleaded for her life, but Gerry persisted. Gerry then slapped her
twice. Cristina was able to take the knife when she pushed him to
the ground. Cristina asked him not to come near her, and pointed
the knife at him, but Gerry suddenly grabbed her, and that was the
time the knife went in contact with his chest. She shouted for help
when she saw her husband bloodied, and Rodolfo, her father, and
Allan, her brother came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Allan
testified that he heard yelling and shouting at her sisters house.
After fifteen minutes of screaming, they heard Cristina cry for help.
They immediately went to the house and saw her holding Gerry, and
requested them to bring Gerry to the hospital. However, Gerry was
declared dead on arrival.
After four years, Cristina was arraigned and held for trial for
Parricide. The RTC convicted her. In its view, there was no longer
any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though
there was an existent danger as there was an altercation before the
stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as
admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even
concluded that it was she who provoked him when she suddenly
pushed him to the ground. She then took the knife and told him not
to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him. After she
took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
to speak of that would necessitate the need to kill. The CA affirmed
the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not Cristina may be held liable for Parricide.
Ruling: Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance,
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal
act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the
accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however,
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing

evidence.2 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense

shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.3
To invoke self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.4
Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs
to be proved by the accused, is the element of unlawful aggression.
It must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense. 5 When the Court
speaks of unlawful aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. There is
an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts the
life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense in actual or
imminent danger. There must be actual physical force or actual use
of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous, otherwise, it does
not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.6
It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife
from her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to
move towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer.
He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her wellgrounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to
wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that,
being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually
killed her.
In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still
in danger. It is to be noted that before she was able to take hold of
the weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed it at her
throat. So when he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and
grabbed her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the extreme
precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the
knife and make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed
The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met
if the person invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner
equivalent to the means of attack used by the aggressor. The

reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an accused is to

defend himself depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon,
the physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who
invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the
assault
In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victims
chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this
fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him. It was a reasonable
means chosen by her in view of the attending circumstances, to wit:
that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to
her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea
that he refrain from coming near her; and that she had no other
available means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other
than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time or sufficient
tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be
used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the
processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of selfpreservation.13 When it is apparent that a person has reasonably
acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that
act or to mitigate his liability.14
Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate
the reasonableness of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect
equality between the weapon used by the one defending himself and
that of the aggressor is not required. 15 What the law requires is a
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the
accused is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves
or impels his defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not
depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such
injury.16
Lack of Sufficient Provocation
The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain
the trial courts observation that it was Cristina who provoked her
husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be
considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
aggression.17 She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity,
when her husband removed the knife away from her throat, to save
herself from what she had perceived to be a danger to her life.

Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same reasonable

way.
Flight as an Indication of Guilt or Non-guilt
Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be established,
for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available
opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. 18 It has been
held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an indication
of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying
put is proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning
ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose
not to flee.19 In Cristinas case, she explained that she took flight for
fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her husbands
siblings.20 The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee
acceptable. She did not hide from the law but from those who would
possibly do her harm.
The RTC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her
explanation for her choice of action. Nevertheless, under the
circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers. In such a case, it is the
duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.
Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under
Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, she should be exonerated of the
crime charged. For the same reason, the Court finds no act or
omission from which a civil liability may arise.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The May 6, 2014 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant, Cristina
Samson, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Pp. v. CA & Tangan

At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C.
Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south. He had
just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the
same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving
his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle,
Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. Generoso was
moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in
Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangans
path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to
let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but
when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or
five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his
lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a
U-turn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with
his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. As the Mirandas
got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted, Putang ina mo,
bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso and Tangan then
exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the
latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano
ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangan countered, Ikaw, ano ang gusto
mo? With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber
handgun on the front seat.
According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann
Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his
gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to
intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after
that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the
accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but
because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the
gun reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of
Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda
causing the latter to fall and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda
told Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel Miranda
grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling,
Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia
Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red Tshirt took the
gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who
was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his
witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was
taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to

grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while
the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the
accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.
According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after
falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the
gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on
the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran
after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan
found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel
arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two
ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz,
helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be
brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine
General Hospital but he expired on the way.
[After analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial
court found that: When the accused took the gun from his car and
when he tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the
accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the
possession of the gun that it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the
stomach. The court believes that contrary to the testimony of the
accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when
the gun fell to the ground, it will not first explode or if it did,
somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet would
not be perpendicular or horizontal.]
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. After a reinvestigation, however, the information
was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he
was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide
case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was
denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial
of the two cases was ordered.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of
firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor;

consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate

penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
to indemnify the heirs of the victim. Tangan was released from
detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in
the homicide case.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity
to P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a
motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution,
alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No. 103613, naming as respondents the
Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate
courts judgment be modified by convicting accusedappellant of
homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating
circumstance. Subsequently, the Office of the Solicitor General, this
time acting for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for
extension to file comment to its own petition for certiorari.
Discovering its glaring error, the Office of the Solicitor General later
withdrew its motion for extension of time. Tangan filed a Reply asking
that the case be submitted for decision.
Tangan filed a separate petition for review under Rule 45, docketed
as G.R. No. 105830. Since the petition for certiorari filed by the
Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two cases were
consolidated. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be excused from filing a comment
to Tangans petition for review, in order to avoid taking contradictory
positions.
RTC: Tangan is guilty of Homicide with the attendance of the
privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and
ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the offended party, and passion and obfuscation

order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is

necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be
present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with
either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete
selfdefense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be
selfdefense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to
prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no
basis.
The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come
from the person defending himself but from the victim. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the
exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and
Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be
considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with
physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of
either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan
undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to
wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no
intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his
gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result
of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the
intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused
the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his
felonious act.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself is not supported by evidence. By
repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times,
Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated
blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be
irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be
considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite
provocation for the other party to act violently.

Issue: WON Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.

The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of

sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation under Article 13,
paragraphs 4 and 6, have no factual basis. Tangans acts were done
in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.

Held: Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act,

but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving
the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused. In

Disposition of the Supreme Court: The petition in G.R. No. 103613 is

DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS

CA: Affirmed.

Pp. v. Narvaez
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22,
1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into
his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he
heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He
addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house
and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with
"No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium,"
and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior
to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)
was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land
settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of
the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On
June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting
was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite
the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and ceiling of the walls of
the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the
part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the
person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to

subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being
awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the
original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although
he acted in defense of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art.
11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful
aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given
Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time
was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence.
Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be
acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that
every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack.
In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself.
Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art.
13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is
homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable
on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrest mayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is
unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of
civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to
fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification
of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was
enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is

favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be

given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating

circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self
defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify each
group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his
immediate release is ordered.

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful

aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had
given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and
putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that
possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation;
while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to
be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel

attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending

himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art.
13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is
homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable
on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrest mayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is
unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiary imprisoned for nonpayment of
civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to
fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification

of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was

enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is
favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be
given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating
circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self
defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify each
group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his
immediate release is ordered.

Pp. v. Boholst- Caballero

Facts: The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left,
and Boholst and her daughter was left to the support of her parents.

No wound or injury on her body treated by the

physician

That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C
is incredible

Contradictory statements

Has motive: husbands abandonment

One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing
her, manhandled her. There were an exchange of words and later on,
Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face
until her nose bled.
Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling,
she held on to his waist. As she did so, she grasped the knife tucked
by the left side of his body.

The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not
disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified by the
witnesses

She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her
saying that he will kill her. Because she had no other recourse, she
pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the
left side of his body near the belt line.

The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that

could confirm the narration of the appellant: location of the wound
inflicted on the victim.

When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw
the knife.
In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn
and blood-stained dress she wore that night. The police officer
accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer
be found, she was advised to just give any knife and she did (now
marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness, Caballeros friend)
On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for
Caballero, and when he approached her, she suddenly stabbed
Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later
interviewed by the police officer confirming that his wife stabbed
him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be
transferred to another hospital. He died on the way.
Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?
Held: Yes. The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and
convincing:

Testimony improbable as brought

demonstration during the trial

out

by

her

As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she
had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left
side of her husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back
portion just below the waist, as also described by the attending
physician as the left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was
drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her testimony, for as she
lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite
natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left
side of the mans belt and thrust it at that section of the body
nearest to her hand at the moment.
This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the
prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the wound should have
been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than
at his back.
The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her
husband and for several months prior to the incident, she appeared
resigned to her fate. She also surrendered herself immediately the
morning after.
The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches
as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region

to the victims large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal

matter. >.<
All the elements of self-defense are present: unlawful aggression as
pointed out above; reasonable necessity for means employed:
woman strangled and chocked by a furious aggressor, rendered
almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital
is the imminent peril to Boholsts life. The knife afforded appellant
the only reasonable means with which she could free and save
herself. Necessity knows no law; Lack of sufficient provocation:
Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a valid excuse that she
went carolling to earn money for their child.
Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of
conviction set aside. Acquitted.

Pp. v. Chua Hiong

Facts: On Nov.15, 1956 Pelayo told Atty. Clapano in his office and
within hearing distance of three other people that upon his
investigation about the existence of gambling in the community, a
Chinese operator named Lim Peng told him that then Gov. Alejandro
Almendras (now Senator) used to receive from him P500 protection
money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in
city council session wherein he did not directly mention but
insinuated through his interpellations that the governor was
receiving tongs. Pelayo admits having the said conversation with
Clapano.
Issues:
(1) WON the conversation was said in confidence and covered by the
rule on privileged communication
(2) WON the crime charged which is serious slander should only be
intriguing against honor
(3) WON words were uttered in Self Defense to what the governor
had said about him previously
Held:

Pp. v. Toring
On the night of the murder, there was a benefit dance held in Naga,
Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the
princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta and one of the
candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto. Around 10:45 P.M.,
his daughter was proclaimed the winner. After the proclamation,
Augusto stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature.
At that moment, Luis Toring, Diosdado Berdon, and Carmelo Berdin
were seen by barangay tanod Felix Berdin whispering in a dark area.
Berdon handed a knife to Toring who approached Augusto from
behind and stabbed him in the right side. Thereafter, the three
assailants ran towards the dark and Felix was unable to catch them.
Augusto was brought to the hospital where he died on arrival.
According to the necropsy report, Augustos death was due to a
massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the abdomen.
The location of the murder weapon was pointed out by Carmelo
Berdin to be at Luis Torings house.

(1) NO this contention of confidence is inconsistent with contention

of self-defense, there were others who heard the remarks he made to
Clapano thus could not have given the communication in confidence.

The three were charged with conspiracy in killing Samuel Augusto in

a treacherous manner. It was alleged that Berdon supplied the
weapon which Toring used for stabbing Augusto while Berdin
concealed the weapon.

(2) NO - it cannot be Intriguing against honor because the source of

the information can be pin-pointed= Lim Peng. When the source can
be determined and the information was passed for the purpose of
causing dishonor, the act is slander

The morning after the incident, Toring was sleeping in the hut with
his older brother, Arsenio when Edgar Augusto, the younger brother
of Samuel, shot them and Arsenio was hit on the left leg. It was also
mentioned that a year before the incident, Toring was shot by Edgar.

(3) NO even if on a previous occasion the governor made

derogatory remarks against Pelayo, the retaliation with scurrilous
words cannot be self-defense. It will only exist of the defendant did
not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the
purpose of repairing the effect of the damage caused to him. There is
no justification for him to hit back of make the same imputation of
accusation because this is not an act of defense but an aggression
itself

Ruling: First, it must still be proven that Augusto brought a firearm on

the night of the benefit dance. Also, it cannot be said that Toring was
impelled by the desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on
his cousin. Rather, we was motivated by revenge, resentment, or evil
motive due to the feud between the Augusto and Toring brothers.
Toring should also be credited with the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Nighttime cannot be considered
an aggravating circumstance since there was no proof that it was
purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or to prevent
its discovery. On Berdons part, his participation by supplying the
knife was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, the fact that

Berdin knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that the
former concealed it to prevent its discovery. Berdins willingness to
retrieve and surrender the weapon to the police is inconsistent with
guilt.

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa- Gimenez, then private secretary of
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandumdated January 8, 1986
(hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in
blackand white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President
Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help
of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds
by means of three (3) withdrawals (January 10, 16 and 31, 1986).The
disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and
Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the
normal procedure". With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their
claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction, Tabuena
and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the
Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration.
Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of obedience to a
lawful order be appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime
charged?
Held: The Court reversed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Accused
Tabuena and Peralta are ACQUITTED.
It is settled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals,
for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He
could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier
said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior the
former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably
exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any
person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose."Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that
the President was entitled to receive the P55Million since he was
certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised
supervision and control over government agencies. And the good
faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President's

office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS

Memorandum.

Ocampo v. Florenciano

Whether or not a decree for legal separation be granted.

Overview: This is an action for legal separation which Jose de

Ocampo filed against his wife Serafina on the ground of adultery. The
case was dismissed by the Court of first Instance which was affirmed
by the Court Appeals holding that there was confession of judgment,
plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.

Ruling:

Facts:
Jose de Ocampo (Petitioner) and Serafina Florenciano (Respondent)
got married on April 5, 1938 and as a result of such union, they
begot several children. Sometime in March 1951, Ocampo discovered
that his wife was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. He
sent his wife to Manila to study beauty culture. Again, Ocampo
discovered that aside from Jose Arcalas, Serafina was going out with
several other men. Serafina left Ocampo after she finished her study
and since then the two lived separately.
After Ocampo caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
Nelsom Orzame on June 18, 1955, he signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation. Serafina conformed to his intention
provided that she will not be charged with adultery in a criminal
action.
Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation but the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it holding there was confession of
judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription which was AFFIRMED by the Court of Appeals.
CAs decision:
With regard to the defendants adultery with Jose Arcalas, the
husbands right to legal separation had prescribed because his
action was not filed within one year fro March 1951 when plaintif
discovered her infidelity (art.102,NCC).
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, after discovery of such, the
husband expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation
which the defendant had readily agreed to. Before the fiscal, the
defendant even reiterated her conformity to the legal separation and
admitted having sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. The Appellate
Court had interpreted such facts as a confession of judgment under
Art.101 and thus, legal separation could not be decreed.
Issue:

Yes. As the Court understand the article, it does not exclude, as

evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon
a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens
when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of
plaintif to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the
plaintifs demand.
Supposing the statement of defendant constitutes a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independent of such statement, the decree may and should be
granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by the plaintif. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendants confession. If a
confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes
the separation will immediately confess judgment for the purpose of
preventing it.
The fact that the defendant like also to be legally separated from
her husband, is not an obstacle to the successful prosecution of the
action. When the court is informed that defendant equally desires the
separation and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be
doubly careful lest a collusion exists. However, the Court of Appeals
did not find collusion.
There would be collusion if the parties had arranged by making it
appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it
was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal
separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
According to the evidence presented in the instant case, the offense
of adultery had really took place. The defendant could not have
falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might
send her to jail the moment her husband request the Fiscal to
prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a
personal risk.
In connection to this, collusion may not be inferred from the mere
fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables
the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it (Williams
vs. Williams, Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig). And proof that defendant

desires the divorce and makes no defense, it not by itself collusion

(Pohlman vs. Pohlman).
The plaintiffs failure to actively search for the defendant and take
her home (after the latter left him in 1952) does not constitute
condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It
was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal
home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner
refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than
the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon
her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor
of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband

to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a

judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to
support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate
his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside
the conjugal home.