Terrorism Reps K

1NC Securitization Shell

Apocalyptic nuclear or terror rhetoric justifies violence and
limitless government intervention, and demonizes the other.
Only the alts emancipatory politics allows a release from
incapacitation
Gay 6 [William C. Gay, UNC Charlotte Philosophy professor with a PhD in Philosophy, and associate at the
Center of Professional and Applied Ethics; Apocalyptic Rhetoric Versus Nonviolent Action pg 45-47; Spiritual &
Political Dimensions of Nonviolence & Peace; January 2006; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/ApocalypticThinkingversusNonviolentAction.pdf>.]

Since 11 September 2001, many people, especially in the United States, have come to
regard terrorism as if it represents a comparably grave moral problem. In fact, some people are
so afraid that they are willing to let government go to virtually any limits to reduce this
(the terrorist) threat. This time, governments are the ones using fear; they are using fear to
motivate the public to accept as necessary and justifed the military responses
employed to counter terrorism. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears face factual, psychological,
political, and moral pitfalls. First, because the claims are so extreme, they are often not
credible. For example, when scientists raised solid factual objections, scientists and government officials
dismissed the prophets of nuclear apocalypse as misinformed extremists. The scientists and government officials
belittled the fear that the nuclear prophets sought to exploit when they exaggerated their portrayals. But

some

people do not want to let facts get in the way of a good argument . For some,
persuasion is a more important goal than truth . If you believe that exaggeration, especially when
it generates fear, can bring about a good result, you may throw prudence to the wind. You may justify your
lapse into distortion as benevolent deception , but the fact remains that it is like Platos royal lie
and may be exposed. Are we now seeing a similar phenomenon with respect to how government is
using public fear of terrorism? Critics of the current policy are doing little to counter governmental
exaggerations about the international terrorist threat. Are their exaggerations benevolent deceptions or something

apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated

fears run a psychological risk. Compare the responses to the nuclear threat and the
terrorist threat. Regardless of whether the big boom will bring on global doom, does belief in nuclear
war as apocalyptic motivate people to eliminate this threat ? Much of the public protest
much less noble? Beyond the prospect for factual rebuttal,

against governmental plans relied on the myth of the motivating power of fear to spur otherwise apathetic citizens
to rally around the anti-nuclear cause. But as we well know, the antinuclear bandwagon is not exactly overflowing

Initially after the events of 11 September 2001, many people were motivated
to act. Unfortunately, already many people are beginning to suppress their fear .
Suppressing negative emotions or entering a state of denial represents the psychological risk that
faces apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears . The saying that the main responses to fear are
fght or flight is instructive. We have no way to guarantee that people frightened by accounts
of the horrors of nuclear war or terrorist attacks will fght back . Many people take flight,
especially when they feel disempowered in the political arena and see how
these days.

limited the success of past efforts has been. These persons may suffer from psychic numbing. When fear is
suppressed, the call to action is avoided. Even when fear is not suppressed, it can be misdirected. The
political risk resulting from apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is that these concerns can get co-opted.
How are we to fght off apocalyptic or global terrorism? Nuclear prophets like Jonathan Schell say we must rid the

anti-terrorist politicians say we must rid the world of

terrorists; we must wage a war against terrorism. Ironically, political leaders argue that the
world of nuclear weapons. Current

possession of nuclear weapons is the means for preventing the apocalyptic horrors of nuclear war. Just in case
deterrence fails, government officials now tell us a missile defense system should be in place.

Six months

after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration announced plans to
use modifed nuclear weapons to destroy terrorist stronghold stashes of weapons of mass
destruction, or to respond to terrorist attacks that make use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. Officials
have told us for quite some time that governmental possession of chemical and biological weapons is one of the
means of preventing evil governments or terrorist organizations from using weapons of mass destruction. Now, the
claim is also made that the modifed nuclear weapons being urged by the Bush administration for possible use in
the war on terrorism will also function to deter terrorism. In the past, and again currently, governmental leaders,

preying on public fears, achieve acquiesce to an ideology that portrays

international adversaries as totally diabolical and completely untrustworthy. Under
by

these conditions, and supposedly in order to save their citizens from the absolute evils, military and political
leaders present military preparedness and military actions as the only, or best, insurance against nuclear
apocalypse and terrorist attacks. The fnal risk facing apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is moral.

Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears are too farsighted . Farsightedness or hyperopia
is the pathological condition in which vision is better for distant than near objects. For example, nuclear prophets do
bring into sharp focus a hopefully distant objectthe prospect that somewhere down the road we will reach an
omega point where the destructiveness of war will in fact be apocalyptic. The judgment is surely correct that the
precipitation of global doom would be a profoundly immoral act. But people who are farsighted fail to bring nearby

Even if nuclear apocalypse or further terrorist attacks of the magnitude of

11 September might not be very far down the road, numerous other war-like objects
are much closer to us. In fact, they surround us. Since World War II, no year has passed in which fewer than
four wars were being waged somewhere on this planet. When we devote too much of our attention
to imagining the worst that could happen, we risk inflicting moral hyperopia on
ourselves. Just as we are being myopic when we focus primarily on crime in the streets
when confronting the problem of human violence , even so we are being hyperopic to focus
predominantly on the threats of nuclear apocalypse and global terrorism when confronting the
problems of large-scale violence. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears risk leaving us morally
objects into sharp focus.

shortchanged when they lead us to fail to fght against the horrors of violence that are not distant or possible
threats but everyday realities. We need to respond to on-going atrocities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and

we need to seek feasible protection

from devastating harms such as AIDS, hunger, and environmental degradation that
actually are currently afflicting us.
Africa that are on a scale quite adequate for moral outrage, and

Legal solutions mask the Otherization of the Terrorist that

allows violent atrocities and killing civilians under the guise of
preemptive strikes and neutralizing threats
Heathcote 11 (Gina, BA, LLB (ANU); LLM (Westminster); PhD (LSE/Lond). Senior
Teaching Fellow, School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies. Melbourne
Journal of International Law, Volume 11 FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF
THE WAR ON TERROR https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1252086730/feminist-reflections-on-the-end-of-the-war-on-terror)
The global war against terrorism developed (at least) three types of narratives to project
legality on to the political rhetoric. The frst type of narrative centred on prior international legal debates
over the possibility of anticipatory force and attempts to expand self-defence under the conditions of the
global war against terrorism to encompass pre-emptive self-defence. That is, the use of force
may be justifed in response to low-level and persistent terrorist threats . The second type of
narrative focused on past Security Council resolutions and contended that states may use force if force can be justifed through

use of force
is justifed in failed states, as well as in response to potential threats from rogue
states with the perceived capacity to build weapons of mass destruction , due to a lack of
implied authorisations found in prior Security Council resolutions. The third range of narratives argued that the

stable or democratic government. More recent articulations of this justifcation have used the terminology of a material breach of

the Security Council resolutions by Iraq, and thus cast the US-led invasion as some form of counter-measure or enforcement tool.

anticipatory self-defence came

to include a narrative on the possibility of the use of pre-emptive force to track
down, kill or capture the hard core of the terrorists. Reisman and Armstrong suggest this is more
Under the frst narrative, the controversial customary international law category of

likely to involve strategic preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction or terrorist training camps than [l]arge-scale

This description constructs terrorist camps and WMD production

facilities as (strangely) outside of the territory of states, implicitly suggesting that these
are something Other to the political independence and territorial integrity encompassed by the
attacks on states.29

prohibition on the use of force articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) under art 2(4). Although the 2010

The United States is

waging a global campaign against al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle
and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the
National Security Strategy appears to dismiss the Bush Doctrine, the Obama strategy states:

worlds most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qaida safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim

requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that

applies every tool of American power both military and civilian as well as the concerted efforts
of like-minded states and multilateral institutions. This somewhat oblique statement must be read alongside
continued US military strikes in Pakistan and other states identified as
harbouring the al-Qaeda threat, often through the controversial use of unmanned drones that
mimics rather than rejects the Bush policy of pre-emptive strikes. The Obama and Bush justifcation for
these military acts remains that of homeland security. The 2010 National Security Strategy further states: we are working
communities around the world. Success
judiciously

with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders while acknowledging that [w]e must deny these
groups the ability to conduct operational plotting from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position operatives. These

statements avoid direct engagement with the international law on the use of force .
US state practice since the Obama Administration came to power, however, indicates that the perceived terrorist threats abroad
have been denied the capacity to materialise through pre-emptive strikes on civilian communities.34

Vote Neg to refuse the affirmatives representations of

terrorism
Milojevi 2 [Ivana Milojevi, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and
futures studies, and Visiting Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies
and Research, University of Novi Sad; Gender, Peace and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War;
University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic__Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Authors frst language is Serbian.
Social and economic strategies require radical transformation and restructuring of societies and
economies. This means working towards the objectives of equality, development and peace by improving employment, health and
education (The Beijing Platform for Action, The Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, in Peterson, Runyan, 1999:218).
Approximately 3,000 deaths from terrorist attack on Unites States are 3,000 deaths too many. But so are estimated 24,000 deaths of
people who died of hunger on the same day, 6,000 children killed by diarrhea and 2,700 children killed by measles on the 11
September 2001 (New Internationalist, 2001:18-19). If we become aware that the number of malnourished children in developing
countries is about 149 million, the number of women who die each year of pregnancy and childbirth about 500,000 and number of
illiterate adults 875 million it is clear that where priorities should be. Preventing terrorism by policing is crucial but so is the holy

The
understanding of security predominately in terms of national security or the
security of the state is becoming obsolete by the day . Although the USA did not in any way deserve
the attacks that occurred on the 11th September, we should still become aware that all violence (in the international, national
or family realms) is interconnected (Tickner, 1993:58). Which means that there is an intimate
connection between both direct, structural and cultural violence, as well as
domestic and international violence. Thus, any serious attempt to end war must
involve signifcant alterations in local, national, and global hierarchies (Peterson and Runyan,
1999:228). This includes addressing sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, and
gendered nationalism which have all been vital to sustaining militarism and the us
and them mentality that goes along with it (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:228), One of the most important
war against injustice, structural and cultural violence, poverty. These problems are, as is terrorism, global problems.

strategy, connected to socio-economic trasformations is demilitarization. Availability of weapons may not be sufficient factor for war
and terrorism but certainly it is necessary.

Particular cultural cognitive maps determine how are

technologies to be used. Still, the general production, availability and the trade of weapons directly support various
wars as well as terrorism. Unfortunately, the direction taken after 11th September has been further militarisation, because the new
reasons for further militarisation have been activated. The logical response should instead had been redirection of resources from
the military towards civilian needs and requirements. This would include a redirection of resources towards development of
international courts system, towards initiatives that work on inter-cultural understandings, communication and alliances. The overall
problem of course is that the patriarchal worldview determines that life-taking activities are better funded than life-giving ones. For
example, worldwide, over half the nations of the world still provide higher budgets for the military than for their countries health
needs. In the USA alone, the Pentagon received $17 billion more than it requested in both 1996 and 1997 (The Ohio story, quoted
in Peterson and Runyan, 1999:125). The awaited peace dividend after the end of the cold war has not materialized because 6 years
later the Pentagon in the USA still receives 5 times what is spend on education, housing, job training and the environment combined
(The Ohio Story, in Peterson and Runyan, 1999:120). Demands for de-militarisation are underlined by the more acute awareness
that peace is not a state but a process. The focus is on peace-building, peace-making and peace-keeping, contesting the belief that
peace is a kind of condition or state which is achieved or simply occurs (Boudling, 1990:141). Or as something that happens only

The awareness that peace never exists as a condition, only

as a process (Boulding, 1990:146) means that military involvement or doing war - is
seen as directly opposite from doing peace, that is, from various peace-making
activities. The patriarchal worldview implies that waging wars is sometimes necessary to maintain the peace. Alternative
perspectives to this worldview imply that peace cannot be defned only as the
absence of war and that both direct and structural forms of violence need to be
addressed. Therefore, peace does not merely depends on the absence of war, but
rather on constant efforts to achieve equality of rights, equal participation in
decision making processes and equal participation in distribution of the resources
that sustain society (Borelli in Brock-Utne, 1989:2). In that sense, peace either happens now, as well as yesterday and
after the military intervention is over.

tomorrow, or it does not. Its temporal and geographical locations almost entirely depend on peace activities and result from active
practicing of peace promoting activities. Doing

war is therefore, not a necessary condition for

achieving reconciliation, but directly opposite condition that can best be defned as
the absence of peace, and peace promoting activities. The list of previously mentioned strategies is
by no means exclusive, but it is an example of how different visions for the future as well as a different worldview bring different

Current and traditional means of

resolving conflicts have resulted in a well-documented violent history. If
future histories are to be changed, traditional, neo-liberal, realists and
understanding of how conflicts are to be understood and resolved.

patriarchal discourses, with their trademark short-term orientation,

need

to be abandoned. They could be replaced with alternatives that provide an

expanded sense of time and long-term orientation as well as a more balanced views
on war/violence, human nature, history, conflict, power, sovereignty, security,
strength, identity, peace and future. This means that it is those alternatives that
are, in effect, more pragmatic, realistic and viable . The emerging global order requires constant
negotiations and building of alliances between all our diversities. It requires global justice and fairness rather then the might is
right approach currently practiced by individualistically oriented and self-centered nation states. In our globalized, compressed,
hyperreal and hybrid world the alternatives that aim to develop both unifed and diversifed terrestrial futures have not become
less, but rather more urgently needed and necessary. Consequently,

they could potentially be one important

path that can be taken in order to, epistemologically and strategically, support the
efforts and struggles toward global peace and global security.

1NC Islamophobia Shell

Their representations of terrorism are inherently violent and
Islamophobic
Alghamdi 15 (Emad A. Alghamdi, English Language Institute, King Abdulaziz
University, The Representation of Islam in Western Media: The Coverage of Norway
Terrorist Attacks, May 1st, 2015, International Journal of Applied Linguistics &
English Literature,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/259481741_The_Representation_of_Islam_i
n_Western_Media_The_Coverage_of_Norway_Terrorist_Attacks, JAS)
While myriad sources of information contribute to the discordant image of Islam and
Muslims in western public perceptions , many scholars argue the media are the most
influential (Kanso & Nelson, 2010). The negative representation of and the dissemination of
propaganda against Islam and Muslims in mainstream western media is not a new
phenomenon. Studies in media or political discourse have revealed that the
portrayals of Islam and Muslims in western media tends to emphasize stereotypes
and discriminatory rhetoric, casting, as such, an unfavorable light on Muslims and
Islam. The depiction of Islam and Muslims as a negative Other for western societies
and the general illformed and uninformed conceptions of Islam and Muslim are
strongly attributed to the western media representations of Islam within two frames;
in clash with the west and associated with terrorism/extremism or violence (Eid,
2014, p. 104). Language has always been a key factor in forming, constructing and later revealing the ill-formed

language is a pivotal
means in which "attitudes towards groups can be constructed, maintained or
challenged" (p.54). Through a manipulative use of language and word choices ,
Muslims in western media have been irrationally portrayed as social deviants,
irrational, backward, uncivilized, and as posing security threats to western societies .
As part of the discourse on security and terrorism, the association of Islam with terrorism and
violence has come to be accepted, to the extent that terms such as Muslim and
terrorist have become almost synonymous (Eid & Karim, 2014, p.105). Explicit and
implicit allegations of Muslims as being accountable for any terrorist attacks
occurring in the world have been vividly pronounced in media discourse post 9/11.
According to Poorebrahim and Zarei (2012) the image of Muslims as social deviants and security
threats is being regenerated against the backdrop of the ' war on terror' .
Heightened security concerns have made the Muslims community an easy target for
an extraordinary level of media scrutiny (conclusion, para.1). Due to this propaganda, many
Islamic countries, especially Middle Eastern countries, have encountered considerable
pressure for making new reforms and changes in their political and educational
systems. Saudi Arabia, of instance, has faced considerable international and local pressures for change in recent
perceptions of Islam and Muslims in westerners minds. Reath (1998) asserted that

years (Elyas & Picard, 2010). Because of the fear from producing more Islamic fundamentalists, and the fear of

frst initial stage

of introducing English and its culture to the primary schools (not previously taught
at that stage) (Elyas, 2008). 5. Conclusion In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Norway, some western
media institutions made news coverage reports and published news articles in
which Islam and Muslims were allegedly held accountable for the attacks . Using media
losing its strong connection with the White House, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has begun its

discourse analysis, the present study linguistically analyzed a video report and a collection of biased news articles

western media institutions used

word choices, implicature, and modal expressions to hold Muslims
accountable for the attacks. However, the tone of allegation varied dramatically
from one article to another ranging from a mere suspicion to an overt accusation.
towards Islam and Muslims. The analyses revealed that these

The varying degrees of uncertainty or assertion of the authors statements were reflected in the varied linguistic
forms and devices used within the discourse.

Islamophobia is racism
Musharbash 14 (Yassin Musharbash, deputy editor in the investigative
department of German newsweekly Die Zeit, Islamophobia is racism, pure and
simple, December 10th, 2014, the guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/10/islamophobia-racismdresden-protests-germany-islamisation, JAS)
Islamophobia can be easily observed. Anti-Muslim
websites such as Politically Incorrect have expanded and become more aggressive, cherrypicking reports of crimes by Muslim perpetrators in order to confrm their prejudices;
books with a clear anti-Muslim agenda such as that of Thilo Sarrazin, a former Berlin fnance
Over the past few years the advance of

senator have sold hundreds of thousands of copies, including claims that Muslim immigrants are dumbing down
Germany; parties such as Pro Kln, which hysterically warn of an Islamic land grab, have been founded. It is
against this backdrop that we have to look at the weekly protests in Dresden against the Islamisation of Germany.

Few of those attending are neo-Nazis or classic rightwing radicals. Instead, the vast
majority are normal citizens. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, there are hardly any Muslims in
Dresden. Islamophobia apparently has as much to do with imagination as with reality. To be sure, Islamophobia
is no German speciality. In the Netherlands, for example, similar developments started years earlier. In fact,
Islamophobia is

on the rise across western Europe, not least in the UK. As a journalist with an Arabic name, I

receive a fair amount of Islamophobic hate mail, as do many colleagues with a similar background. Three
years ago, when we realised this was happening to all of us and had become more frequent, we started to stage
public events at which we read from these letters to an audience. But we dont just read the letters. We have
created a show around it a party, if you like called Hate Poetry Slam, during which we compete over who has
received the meanest, most racist, most hateful letter. It is a public act of catharsis. But much more importantly,
when read out loud in front of hundreds of people, the full extent of idiocy, the lack of logic, the hysteria in these

Islamophobia cant be laughed

away and ours is just small way of dealing with it . But whats clear is that traditional racist
arguments are now more likely to come in the form of abuse on the basis of religion .
letters becomes palpable. And laughable. Advertisement Of course,

The argument is often that Jews share the same values as Christians, and Vietnamese immigrants are good at

Muslims neither is true; plus, they want to take over. Which is why their
religion is in fact an ideology; which is why it is OK to be against it; which in turn makes you a freedom
integrating, but for

fghter. Whats feeding this? Clearly 9/11 and other Jihadist terrorist attacks play a role. But thats not all. There is

losing out economically, for which Muslims are scapegoated ; theres the challenge of
living in a society changing rapidly in the light of globalisation; theres anger about
the increasing visibility of immigrants. The organisers of the Dresden demonstrations claim to be
fear of

responding to street fghts between Salafsts and Kurds that broke out in western Germany a few weeks ago. But
framing

this and other problems as part of a phenomenon of Islamisation is

ridiculous. And yet it is time we started to take this seriously. Those people in the streets of Dresden may be
nonviolent but they have been infected with a smug contempt for a minority, and may
embolden the more radical fringes of the Islamophobic spectrum . Politicians here have
sensed that something is building. But until very recently, they mostly just maintained that peoples grievances

racist sentiment that came with their

complaints. This needs to change now. It needs to be made clear that
should be taken seriously, rather than criticising the

Islamophobia in Germany is no legitimate expression of anger or frustration and

most certainly nothing to be proud of. Its racism, plain and simple .

Must reject racism

Memmi 2000 (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris, RACISM,
translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165)
struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without
remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be
undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be
indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To
give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other
people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the
slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the
persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that
the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself]
himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable
negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain
sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and
always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from
animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge.
The

However, it remains true that ones moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice
among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking,
that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism

One cannot found a moral order, let alone

a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the
other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical
point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is the truly
capital sin.fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanitys spiritual traditions counsel respect
for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel
respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical
morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other
is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy.

suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice,
because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one
is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the
strongest.

One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains
within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with
respect so that they treat you with respect. Recall, says the bible, that you were once a stranger
in Egypt, which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that

It is an ethical and a practical appeal indeed, it is a

contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition
for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands
the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this
contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and
destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace.
True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
you risk becoming once again someday.

Links

Terrorism Securitization
The Intelligence community is the reason we fear terror today,
every so called terror plot is started by them
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

This alarmist bias generated by the IC is fed through leaks to journalists who
disseminate them, fueling a peculiar American hysteria on terrorism, which forces
politicians to be responsive and show that they are tough on terrorism, continuing a
vicious spiral of continuous terror. The alarmist bias is self-protective. Usually IC products follow the
rule that the recent past42 is the best predictor of the future, and their estimate is often that, with a caution that
negative events can happen. If nothing bad happens, then their authors can celebrate being right for the most part.
If things improve, they wont be blamed for a conservative estimate. However, if bad things happen, they can
always point out that their caution anticipated such outcomes. In truth, people are more likely to get blamed for not
anticipating bad things than for not foreseeing good things. The result is that most intelligence estimates play it

This bias is then also

directly communicated to policy makers, who, in turn, perpetuate the politics of
fear, which is amplifed by the press and government friendly experts. Rather than
calming the public, politicians are generally alarmists, both as a need to respond to
their constituents fears and as a result of the bias of their advisers.
safe and, with rare and courageous exceptions, build in a negative and alarmist bias.

Terrorism must be evaluated as a discursive construct

Bartolucci and Gallo 13 (Valentina Bartolucci and Giorgio Gallo, Department
of Computer Science, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, Terrorism, System Thinking and
Critical Discourse Analysis, August 16th, 2013, Systems Research and Behavioral
Science, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sres.2206/pdf, JAS)
Terrorism, it seems, is everywhere . It is widely present in daily conversations and political debates, in
TV programmes, newspaper articles and books. With its associated narratives and interlinked
discourses, it is articulated within academic, political, media and cultural
productions up to the point that it has become so pervasive as to be found in
popular jokes, tattoos, novels and even children books (see also Croft, 2006). Terrorism is also
the object of many states regulations and is frequently stated as one of the principal reasons
for military interventions. Nevertheless, often its pervasive influence goes
unnoticed, despite the fact that its diffuse effects impact on several aspects of the
public and private lives of individuals and groups, conditioning many dimensions of
contemporary life (Bartolucci, 2012). Today, terrorism is also a major focus of scholarly research with
thousands of books and articles published every year. Crucially, the fact that terrorism is not strictly
an abstract academic feld of study, but now infuses and impacts upon virtually
every aspect of modern life (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 2) demands a change of
paradigm. This paper precisely seeks to propose a different approach to terrorism that
consists in putting at the forefront the discursive dimension of the phenomenon and
in grounding its analysis in a systems perspective. Terrorism is here approached not
as an objective, freestanding, * Correspondence to: Giorgio Gallo, Department of Computer Science,
University of Pisa, Via Largo Bruno Pontecorvo 3, 56127 Pisa, Italy. E-mail: gallo@di.unipi.it Received 12 March 2013
Copyright 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 8 July 2013 Systems Research and Behavioral Science Syst.
Res. 32, 1527 (2015) Published online 16 August 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI:

self-evident phenomenon, but rather as a discursive construction that,

although loaded with assumptions, cultural biases and moral charges, is often used
10.1002/sres.2206

uncritically and unreflectively with far-reaching consequences (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al.,
2011; Bartolucci, 2010, 2012). Approaching terrorism as a social construction embedded in a
specifc geographical, temporal and sociopolitical contextualization has obvious
implications for the way it is approached as an object of study. In particular, it
means that its study needs to be focused on the often complex relationship
between the actual event labelled as terrorism, the representation of the same
event and, following from that, the necessity or effectiveness of responses to
terrorism, both at a theoretical as well as practical level. In this context, critical discourse
analysis (CDA) seems to be the ideal framework to address the importance of the discursive
dimension of terrorism by providing an analysis of discourses and discerning
connections between language and other elements in social life that are often
opaque (Fairclough, 2003). It is worth pointing out that to approach terrorism as a discursive
construction, which is applied to certain acts (and not others) in a specifc
sociopolitical context as well as geographical and temporal settings, is not the
same thing as arguing that terrorism acts are not real, that real people do
not harm or kill other people. Rather, it is to say that the representation of real acts of violence as
terrorism is conditioned by a complex series of political, social and discursive practices located in a specifc context.

actions and pronouncements of politicians, academics, lawyers and

others transform a particular act of violence such as a bombing or murder into
an act of terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 3). The awareness of the role of the context and of the many
and diverse actors proper of CDA suggests the need to ground the analysis within systems
theory as an epistemic theoretical framework. System thinking (ST) is an ideal approach, to
In other words, the

understand complex phenomena and problems, by seeing reality as a system and taking into account the complex
pattern of interrelations between its parts as well as their interactions with the environment (for an application of ST

The section following the

introduction contains a critical analysis of the US political framing of the 11
September 2001 events as terrorism and of the US intervention in Afghanistan. The
Terrorism, Discourse and Context section proposes a different approach to terrorism
and counterterrorism analysis that consists in putting at the forefront the discursive
dimension of the phenomenon and in grounding it in an ST perspective . CDA is a mode of
in conflict analysis, see Gallo, 2012). The paper is structured in the following way.

research traditionally associated with the academic feld of applied linguistics. It is aimed both at providing an
analysis of discourses and at discerning connections between language and other elements in social life that are

Operationally, CDA complements the linguistic analysis with

an interdisciplinary approach directed at the deconstruction of the whole
sociopolitical and historical contexts in which discourses are embedded. The
Systems Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis section addresses the dynamics of
terrorism, enlightening some key elements of ST that can enhance the
understanding of terrorism, among which are causal loops and feedbacks, delays,
emergent properties and overshoot-and-collapse. The discussion is enriched by a discussion on
often opaque (Fairclough, 1992).

the Afghanistan war and the Peace for Galilee operation. The speeches reported in the text have been coded and
reported in Appendix A.

Terrorism Islamophobia
Terrorism is proxy for race, for Muslim
Daulatzai 12
(Sohail, Born at the Af-Pak border and raised in L.A. near the U.S-Mexico border, Sohail Daulatzai writes about race,
culture, and politics, Associate Professor in the Department of Film and Media Studies and the Program in African
American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, BLACK STAR, CRESCENT MOON The Muslim International
and Black Freedom beyond America, Kindle Edition, p.172)

In the post-9/ 11 era, the rhetoric of terrorism has become a proxy for race,
generating tremendous political and ideological capital for U.S. nationalism and the
implementation of a whole infrastructure and apparatus of control through the War
on Terror. The embodiment of terrorism has been the Muslim, a highly racialized
fgure that has been mobilized to reinforce American hegemony abroad and also to
contain anti-racist and economic justice movements domestically. This threat of
terrorism to American interests abroad has justifed a violent reassertion of
American power and militarism to extend Cold War alliances, further American
geopolitical dominance, and refashion the United States as the sole power in a
unipolar world through preemptive war, covert intervention, aggressive
militarism, and unilateralism. Domestically, the threat of terror from the
immigrant Muslim has justifed a highly racialized crackdown on immigrants in the
United States, resulting in the normalization of deportations, detentions, and
disappear-ance. Muslims now occupy a space where the rule of law has determined
that the rule of law does not apply, and they embody a condition in which they do
not have the right to have rights.

Nuclear Terrorism
Fearing nuclear terror is government hype to action its
unlikely, alt causes, and lack of realistic considerations
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

the fear of nuclear terrorism has had

mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including
in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful
world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive,
If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects,

reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt

evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the

theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is
virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard
desire to obtain such weapons,

to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area,
operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of
virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen
shooting victim when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access
to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their trade. If public sympathy is important to their
cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their

The acquisition of nuclear

weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires signifcant
time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired
device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a groups more
immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group
has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as thenenemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddams nonexistent nuclear

it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped

realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in
2008: Nuclear terrorism ...turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a
world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings,
mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast
conspiracies, allegations of cover-ups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and
disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008:
weapons),

26)

Islamic Terrorism
The notion of Islamic terrorism statistically unfounded and
homogenizes Islam
Jackson 07
(Richard Jackson, University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies, Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political and Academic
Discourse, June 21st, 2007, Government and Opposition,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x/pdf, JAS)
The Islamic

terrorism discourse is susceptible to both frstand second-order

critiques. A frst-order critique reveals that the discourse is predicated on a number of highly
problematic and contestable labels, assumptions and narratives , while a secondorder critique exposes the ways in which the discourse functions politically to
naturalize and legitimize particular forms of knowledge and political practices. FirstOrder Critique Employing the same social scientifc modes of analysis, terminology and empirical categories used

many of the key terms, labels, assumptions

and narratives of the Islamic terrorism discourse are highly contestable, and the
discourse as a whole consists of a number of over-simplifcations, misconceptions
and mistaken inferences. At the most fundamental level, it can be argued that it is
profoundly misleading to use terms like the Muslim world, Islam, 70 This narrative is
by the Islamic terrorism texts, it can be argued that

expressed in Husain Haqqani, Islams Medieval Outposts, Foreign Policy, 133 (2002), pp. 5864. 71 In one of the
most cited texts on religious terrorism, Mark Juergensmeyer states that the young bachelor self-martyrs in the
Hamas movement . . . expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most
delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking, Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p.
201. In fact, a surprising number of Islamic terrorism texts, in discussing the Islamic tradition of martyrdom,
mention the seventy blackeyed virgins in paradise, with its implicit promise of sexual fulflment, as being a primary
motive for suicide bombings. See Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical Islam, p. 93. 412 GOVERNMENT AND
OPPOSITION The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd Islamism, Islamic

simply too much

variation within Islam and Islamic movements for meaningful or illuminating
generalizations, not least because Islam consists of over a billion people from more
than 50 countries, languages and cultures, fve major doctrinal groupings and
hundreds of smaller sects, theological traditions and cultural-religious variants .72
Even terms like extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism or moderates require
careful qualifcation and contextualization.73 There are great variations in Islamic
fundamentalist and Islamist movements, not least between Sunni and Shia, violent
and non-violent, political and quietist, utopian and accommodationist, nationalist
and internationalist and those that fall between and cross over such crude divisions .
terrorists, jihadists or any of the other core labels as guiding analytical categories. There is

Every Islamist group is a product of a unique history and context, and comparing Islamists in Saudi Arabia with
Uzbek, Somali, Bangladeshi or Malaysian Islamists, for example, usually serves to obscure rather than illuminate.74

dividing line between extremists and moderates is not only context

specifc, but also highly porous. Terms like extremist and fundamentalist also obscure the fact that
In practice, the

Islamist groups engage in an array of political, social and cultural activities, few of which could be described as

label Islamic terrorists in

itself is highly misleading because it lumps together an extremely diverse set of
groups, cells, movements and individuals, and conceals the importance of local
contingencies in their form and development.75 At the very least, it obscures the way in which 72
radical. Moreover, when it is used to describe a single category of people, the

See John Esposito, Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace, Current History, 93: 579 (1994), pp. 1924. 73 This
point is powerfully made in Guilain Denoeux, The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam, Middle East Policy,

9: 2 (2002), pp. 5681. Denoeux argues that the term fundamentalism is particularly misleading when applied to
Islam because the word has connotations derived from its origins in early twentieth-century American
Protestantism. See also Zaheer Kazmi, Discipline and Power: Interpreting Global Islam: A Review Essay, Review of
International Studies, 30 (2004), pp. 24554; and M. E. Yapp, Islam and Islamism, Middle Eastern Studies, 40: 2
(2004), pp. 16182. 74 See Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism, London, I.B. Tauris,
2006. 75 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London, Penguin, 2003, p. 24. CONSTRUCTING
ENEMIES 413 The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd different groups

great many Islamist groups have rejected

violent struggle as a strategic necessity due to theological or pragmatic
reassessment, while others have adopted violence when non-violent struggle
failed.76 In contradistinction to most Islamic terrorism texts, there is a large and sophisticated body
of research that confrms that Islamic doctrine and practice, including varieties of
Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism, is not typically or necessarily violent,
antidemocratic or incompatible with secularism and modernity .77 This research suggests
that not only are Islamic values compatible with democracy,78 but, as opinion polls
have consistently shown over many years, the great majority of individuals in
Muslim countries prefer democracy over other kinds of political systems.79 Nor is it the
split, merge and move away or towards violent actions; a

case that Islamists are opposed to democracy; in many countries they constitute the only viable vehicle for
democratic participation and opposition in relatively closed political systems.80 As Mumtaz Ahmad has noted: The
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish, Malaysian, Egyptian, Jordanian, Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan Islamists have
already accepted the Islamic legitimacy of popular elections, the electoral process, the multiplicity of political
parties and even the authority of the popularly elected parliament to legislate not only on socio- 76 See Ismail,
Rethinking Islamist Politics. 77 It is as true for Islam as it is for Christianity that the fundamentalist emphasis on
personal purity often takes an individual rather than a collective and political expression that greater religious
devotion more often leads to political withdrawal than to militancy. Joseph Schwartz, Misreading Islamist Terrorism:
The War against Terrorism and Just-War Theory, Metaphilosophy, 35: 3 (2004), p. 278. 78 See John Esposito and
John Voll, Democracy and Islam, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996; Niaz Kabuli, Democracy According to
Islam, Pittsburgh, PA, Dorrance Publications, 1994; and Anthony Shahid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots,
Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 79 World Values Survey data from
19952001 support this fnding, discussed in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Public Opinion Among Muslims and
the West, in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds), Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the

the problem would seem to be

not that Islam is antithetical to democracy but that repressive regimes, often with
the support of Western powers, have suppressed democratic movements. 80 Esposito,
Government, and the Public, London, Routledge, 2003. In other words,

Political Islam, p. 23. 414 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007
Government and Opposition Ltd economic matters but also on Islamic doctrinal issues.81 We should also note that

Islamist movements like Hamas, Hizbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood (referred to
simply as Islamic terrorists in most texts), as well as Islamist parties in several
Central Asian states,82 have not only participated in national elections, but have
well-established internal democratic processes. In fact, Islamist groups have adopted a multitude
of strategies and approaches to their interaction with the state and other social actors and are engaged in a variety

Islamism is
perhaps better understood as a dynamic set of processes rather than a fxed or
essential identity. Arguably the most important challenge to the discourse pertains
to the notion of religious terrorism as an analytical category and to the narratives
of the religious foundations of Islamic terrorism in particular. In the frst instance, as Fred
of locally defned projects, most of which are focused on winning power. From this perspective,

Halliday notes, it is nonsense to seek the causes, as distinct from legitimation, of violence in the texts or traditions
of any religion, because all religions have texts or traditions that allow a violent (or a pacifst) reading.83 It is not
that the rhetorical justifcations of violence are unimportant or that terrorist groups never appeal to religious ideas,

Similarly,
it is a logical fallacy to assume that some shared characteristic among terrorists
including a common religion is necessarily linked to their terrorist actions: the fact
that the majority of terrorists are men, for example, does not mean that being male
predisposes one to terrorism.84 81 Mumtaz Ahmad, Islam and Democracy: The Emerging Consensus,
simply that they are secondary to the strategic decision to employ violence in pursuit of political goals.

Milli Gazette, 2 October 2002, quoted in Takeyh and Gvosdev, Radical Islam, p. 94. Ahmad also notes that several
Islamist parties have revised their opposition to women holding political office. Similarly, Schwartz notes that

when Islamist parties have gained mainstream political influence, their political
stance has often evolved in strikingly moderate and pragmatic directions . Schwartz,
Misreading Islamist Terrorism, p. 280. 82 See Anna Zelkina, Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia:
How Genuine is the Islamic Threat?, Religion, State & Society, 27: 34 (1999), pp. 35572; and Shirin Akiner, The
Politicisation of Islam in Postsoviet Central Asia, Religion, State & Society, 31: 2 (2003), pp. 97122. 83 Halliday,
Two Hours that Shook the World, pp. 46, 78. See also, Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 32. 84 Sageman, Understanding Terror
Networks, p. 144. CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 415 The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007 Government and
Opposition Ltd In addition, and contrary to widely held beliefs, every major empirical study on the subject has
thrown doubt on the purported link between religion and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, for
example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all,

little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic

fundamentalism, or any one of the worlds religions .85 Some of the key fndings of the
concluded that there is

study that support this assessment include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated

leading practitioners of suicide

terrorism are the secular, MarxistLeninist Tamil Tigers, who committed 76 attacks;
of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43 per
cent were religious; there were 41 attacks attributed to Hizbollah during this period, of which eight were
by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the

carried out by Muslims, 27 by communists and three by Christians (the other three attackers could not be

95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader

political and military campaign that has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end
what is perceived as foreign occupation .86 Similarly, Sagemans widely quoted study compiled
identifed); and

detailed biographical data on 172 participants of Islamic terrorist groups. Some of the relevant fndings of his
study include, among others: only 17 per cent of the terrorists had an Islamic religious education; only 8 per cent of
terrorists showed any religious devotion as youths; only 13 per cent of terrorists indicated that they were inspired to
join solely on the basis of religious beliefs; increased religious devotion appeared to be an effect of joining the
terrorist group, not the cause of it; there is no empirical evidence that the terrorists were motivated largely by hate
or pathological prejudice; Islamic terrorist groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there are more
volunteers than they can accommodate; the data, along with fve decades of research, failed to provide any support
for the notion of religious brainwashing; and there is no evidence 85 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic
of Suicide Terrorism, New York, Random House, 2005, p. 4. 86 Ibid, pp. 4, 17, 139, 205, 210. Papes fndings are
supported by recent ethnographic research. See Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, New York, Columbia University Press,
2005. 416 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007 Government and
Opposition Ltd of any individual joining a terrorist group solely on the basis of exposure to internet-based

demonstrate that the notion that

Islamic terrorism results from poverty, disaffection and alienation is unsupported . In
fact, both of these studies show that the overwhelming majority of terrorists are middle or
upper class, of above-average educational standing, professionally employed, often
married or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities and generally
have good future prospects. Robert Pape concludes that the typical profle of a terrorist
resembles the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots
movement rather than a religious fanatic.88 In addition to quantitative research, content and
material.87 Interestingly, the data compiled in these two projects also

interpretive analysis of so-called jihadist literature suggest that the central aims, goals and concerns are political
and nationalist in the traditional sense, and the use of religious language and symbols is instrumental rather than
primary. Halliday, for example, argues that Islamist discourse, although often expressed in religious terms, is a form
of secular or nationalist protest at external and internal domination and forms of exclusion.89 Within such a

Islamism is probably more accurately described as a revolutionary ideology

than a violent religious cult.90 This conclusion is also drawn by several studies of al-Qaeda, the
reading,

quintessential Islamic terrorist group.91 These texts 87 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 93, 97, 110,
115, 1215, 163. Other studies that question the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism
include: Stephen Holmes, Al Qaeda, September 11, 2001, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense of Suicide
Missions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 13172; Ariel Merari, The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal
Terrorism in the Middle East, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, New York, Cambridge University Press,
1990; and Ehud Sprinzak, Rational Fanatics, Foreign Policy, 120 (2000), pp. 6673. 88 Pape, Dying to Win, p. 216.
Sageman similarly suggests that from all the evidence, many participants joined in search of a larger cause worthy

of sacrifce, Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 97. 89 Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World, pp. 129
31. See also, Tarak Barkwai, On the Pedagogy of Small Wars , International Affairs, 80: 1 (2004), pp. 1937. 90
See Roxanne Euban, Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action, Political Theory, 30: 1 (2002), pp.

bin Ladens grievances are political but articulated in

religious terms and with reference to a religious worldview. The movement is rooted
in social, economic and political contingencies . Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. xxvxxvi. See also, Peter
435. 91 Jason Burke concludes that

Bergen, Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London, CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 417 The
Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd reveal a fairly nuanced political analysis
and a clear set of political goals, including: support for the establishment of a Palestinian state; ending US military
occupation of the Arabian peninsular and its ongoing support for Israel; overthrowing corrupt and oppressive Arab
regimes; supporting local insurgencies in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Philippines and elsewhere; and the expulsion of
Western forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.92 In fact, after examining al-Qaedas mobilization rhetoric, and based on
the aforementioned empirical analysis of the groups members and targeting strategies, Pape concluded: Al-Qaeda
is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues... than a cross-national military alliance of national
liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat. For al-Qaeda, religion
matters, but mainly in the context of national resistance to foreign occupation.93 In short, in-depth qualitative
studies suggest that terrorism is always local; that is, it is driven by identifable political grievances and issues
specifc to particular societies and locales.

Counter Terrorism
Representations of hegemony and counterterrorist narratives
fail to address structural inequalities, inefficiencies, replication
of terrorism, and state sponsored violence
Milojevi 2 [Ivana Milojevi, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and
futures studies, and Visiting Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies
and Research, University of Novi Sad; Gender, Peace and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War;
University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic__Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Authors frst language is Serbian.

global hegemonic discourse is predominantly based on neo-liberal

and rationalist theories, it is this worldview that helps form common sense notions of
success and failure. However, as feminist authors in the feld of International Relations such as V. Spike
Peterson, Cynthia Enloe, Jan Jindy Pettman, Rebecca Grant, Kathleen Newland and others have shown, a
different worldview suggests different solutions to conflicts between and among
states. For example, if the impacts on environment and human relatedness are included
in the analysis different understanding on whether military solutions work emerges .
That is, if environment and human relatedness are protected and enhanced, the
solution is successful. On the other hand, if they are damaged then it obviously is not. The latest military
Given that the current

action by the USA has been provoked by a violent and murderous attack which occurred on American soil. There is
nothing wrong with people demanding perpetrators brought to justice. Except that those directly involved are
already all dead. But it is also justifable to attempt to bring to justice those that have either organized or in any

retaliation has brought other grievances

and increased the overall death toll. We do not really know what motivated those men to
fly airplanes into WTC buildings and Pentagon on September 11th . We can only guess.
One possibility is that they sought to damage symbols of American economic and
political power because of the damage this power does to others . Another guess is that
they were waging some sort of holy war against the Christian West because of the damage it has done to
Islam. Yet another guess is that their action was also facilitated by their desire to die as martyrs ,
achieving a one-way direct ticket to heaven. But what we do know with higher certainty is that they believed
that higher goals justify the sacrifce of some human lives . We are also a bit clearer on what
motivated the USA to conduct its military campaign in Afghanistan , because their
representatives communicate to us through global media . What we are told is that
Afghanistan has been bombed because its then government cooperated with and
protected terrorists. And we are yet again reminded that sacrifce of some human lives is
necessary. While there are important and crucial differences between these two players in the current conflict
it seems that both establishments operate from a similar paradigm and a similar
worldview. Both accept the category of collateral damage when it comes to the lives
of those seen and defned as the other. Both seem to worry more about strategic goals rather
then the impacts their actions might have on the system as a whole. Both believe that
violence is the only language the other will understand and consequently promote
violent and military solutions to the problem. Both promote violent
hypermasculinities, either overtly or covertly, contributing towards the creation, maintenance and further
other ways facilitated these horrible attacks; except that

enhancement of global culture of war. And, with their either total exclusion or tokenistic inclusion of womens and/or

There is no doubt that, at least at the level of litany

and obvious, violence works. In that sense, despite all the efforts not to give in to
terrorism, terrorist actions do work. The terrorist action on September 11th produced not only very
feminists perspectives, both are deeply patriarchal.

concrete results in terms of destruction it has created, it has also brought attention to all range of problems from

But terrorist actions were

successful in other ways too. In fact, one of the strongest impacts terrorist actions
have brought with them is their counter-productivity . Destruction of symbols of American (or
Western?) economic and political power further hurt the most vulnerable. Those that were on the
receiving end of structural violence prior to the attack have suffered even more as a
result of it. The exacerbated recession, the redirection of resources towards military and the redirection of aid
structural inequalities to American involvement in the Middle East.

for victims of retaliatory military campaign have all further hurt those in whose name the terrorist actions were
possibly taken. If men who hijacked and crashed the planes thought they were helping Islam, again they could not
be more wrong. Governments throughout Islamic world have not been overthrown and replaced by the alleged
true version of Islamic governance. On the other hand, Muslims were killed not only in the direct attack on WTC
but also in its aftermath, e.g. during demonstrations in Pakistan. A Muslim nation, Afghanistan, has suffered
immensely. Muslims living in predominately non-Muslim states have also suffered from increased racism and racial

How then did the terrorist attack address current world

imbalances or challenging existing power hierarchies? The similar question can be
asked in relation to American retaliation. That is, how are piece-meal strategies, such as direct
military involvement in Afghanistan going to produce real changes, addressing the root causes of terrorism? How
is the extensive use of force and demonization of the other - the enemy, not going
to confrm what the USA is already accused of ? How are ultimatums and strategic alliances based
hatred. Some have even been killed.

on exercising the existing worldwide power going to help support equitable diplomacy and true international
cooperation?

Iran
Discursive representations of Iran arent neutral, but rather
biased to present it as irrational, and failed
Morgan No date
(David Morgan, B.A. (Hons.) International Relations, A Discourse of Legitimation,
After 2012,
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/media/wwwlboroacuk/content/phir/documentsandpdfs/topstu
dentessays/D%20Morgan%20-%20Dissertation.pdf, JAS)
Chapter 1: Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran The process of recontextualisation as described by
Fairclough and Van Leeuwen is the procedure by which semiosis in a war on terror discourse can be
operationalised into political discourse specifc to Iran. It is in this light that we approach the objectives of this
chapter. Firstly, through the application of a discursive analytical framework onto G.W. Bushs State of the Union
Address 2002 (SUA02)5 the semiotic elements that are used to develop a war on terror discourse were identifed.
Secondly, the results6 from this process were compared with President Barack Obamas SUA in January 2012
(SUA12)7 and his speech to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)8 in March 2012. Obamas SUA12
was chosen as a key Presidential speech to the American public, where he addresses foreign policy issues and, the
AIPAC speech as a key Middle East foreign policy speech. The framework applied to Bushs SUA02 is largely an

My
framework demonstrates three key strategies that actors employ to legitimise
action: 1) an appeal to emotions that evoke a sense of fear; 2) speech proposals of
a hypothetical future, and; 3) rationality of the decision process . This was also 5 See
adaptation of the strategies identifed by Antonio Reyes, introduced in the literature review9 above.

Appendix 1 6 See Appendix 2 7 See Appendix 3 8 See Appendix 4 9 See page 7 - Literature Review David Morgan

Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran informed by Van

Leeuwens (2007) four categories of legitimisation authorisation, moral
evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis10. By identifying direct utterances from the SUA02
B011513 14 Chapter 1:

to Obamas language from a strict list of fndings could lead me to overlook occurrences of recontextualisation that
may inform my wider evaluation. However, I have chosen this process because it denies any extra interpretation on
my part as the researcher that may lead me to more subjective conclusions. In any case, as is shown in the analysis

appeal to
emotions that evoke a sense of fear In the frst strategy, speakers evoke certain
feelings by making reference to emotions through their speech. By appealing to
emotions that give the audience a sense of fear, action is legitimised as a necessary
precaution to avert the consequence the speaker is proposing (Reyes 2011) live or die
may present equally strong feelings but they are at quite different ends of broad
spectrum. A key feature to achieving this strategy is the construction of the adversary,
them, in relation to the familiar group, us11 (Wodak, Meyer 2001). Wodak (2001, 2002) describes
how this distinction is created through three speech strategies referential,
nomination, and predicative to construct the other. Firstly, referential strategies
develop systems for referring to the enemy, i.e. terrorists, extremists, regimes etc.
as can be seen in Bushs language in (1): 10 See page 6 - Literature Review 11 For an interesting study
that follows, there is substantial evidence to suggest recontextualisation has occurred. Strategy 1: an

see ODDO, J., 2011. 'War legitimation discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US Presidential speeches'.
Discourse and Society, 22(3), pp. 287-314 David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror
and towards Iran 15 (1) [T]he terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (Bush 2002).

referential strategy used to identify terrorists and regimes is bound to the

pursuit of weapons that evokes a sense of fear . Therefore, they become intertextually linked to
In (1), the

the language in (2) and (3) from Obama: (2) The regime [Iran] is more isolated than ever before (Obama 2012a). (3)
No Israeli government can tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of a regime [Iran] that denies the holocaust,
threatens to wipe Israel off the map, and sponsors terrorists groups committed to Israels destruction (Obama
2012b). Furthermore, a

dramatisation of the enemys actions appeals to fear responses

through a tactic, introduced by Reyes (2008: 34), called Explicit Emotional Enumeration (EEE). Politicians
state the threat enumerating the negative actions of the enemy (EEE) and they
provide the solution (war) to eliminate that threat (Reyes 2008: 35). This strategy is realised
by breaking the object under discussion into a descriptive list, whilst presenting no
new information to the listener. It is purely used as an appeal to emotions (Reyes 2008).
Excerpt (1) above demonstrates the breakdown of weapon types, where (4) shows EEE in reference to terrorist
groups: (4) A terrorist underworld including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed (Bush
2002). The EEE in this case, then, allows simplifed reference through intertextuality to these groups as they have
been explicitly named beforehand. This is seen in (5) by using the referential phrase Irans proxies: David Morgan
B011513 16 Chapter 1: Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran (5) [I]t would embolden Irans proxies, that

strategy can also

be used to defne the victims of terrorism, demonstrating that the other does not
discriminate in their attacks. In (6), Bush describes events in Iraq to demonstrate his
point. In (7), Obama recontextualises this to Iran: (6) This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder
have carried out terrorists attacks from the Levant to Southeast Asia (Obama 2012b). This

thousands of its own citizens leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children (Bush 2002). (7) We
will stand for the rights and dignity of all human beings men and women; Christians, Muslims and Jews (Obama

joint effort of referential strategies in describing what the other is, and
the appeal to emotion that the speaker can achieve through EEE, provides the initial
building block towards constructing the adversary . This image can then be brought to
life by the second strategy of nomination . Nomination strategies, refer to, [w]hat traits,
characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? (Wodak, Meyer 2001: 73), i.e.
killers, murderers. Essentially, this constructs what threat the other presents to the listener :
2012b). The

(8) We have seen the depth of our enemies hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life (Bush
2002). (9) Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder (Bush 2002). As part of my discursive
framework, I applied a Transitive Model from Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) as developed by Michael Halliday
(Halliday, Matthiessen David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and towards Iran 17

outline verbal, mental and material verb-types. Specifcally chosen verbs are
linguistically linked to the nouns that nomination strategies wish to highlight . In (10),
the noun regime becomes linked to material verb-type brutalised and in (11) Iran is linked to mental
verb-type threaten. Both examples below are from Obama: (10) a regime that has brutalised its own
2004), to

people (Obama 2012b). (11) And we will safeguard Americas own security against those who threaten our citizens,
our friends, and our interests. Look at Iran (Obama 2012a). This is not dissimilar to Bush in 2002, where in (12)
Iran is linked to both pursues these weapons, exports terror and repress, which are certainly material but also
mental verb-types, and (13) links regimes with sponsor, threatening also as material and mental: (12) Iran
aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian peoples hope
for freedom (Bush 2002). (13) Our goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our

demonstrates how
particular nouns that have pre-existing ideological meanings are distinguished for
reoccurring use in certain discourses. This means speakers can use these words
efficiently when constructing discourse as they do not need to explain their
disagreement towards them at each use. Furthermore, Bushs use of aggressively
in excerpt (12) demonstrates the third predicative strategy . David Morgan B011513 18
Chapter 1: Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran In order to cement an
appeal to the listeners emotions, predicative strategies attach particular
attributes to the other in order to emphasise the extent of the threat. This is achieved
friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002). Hallidays (2004) work

by using a clause or adjective to state something about the subject beyond the initial understanding of a verb or
noun (Halliday, Matthiessen 2004). Key to our study is the recontextualisation from the predicates Bush attaches to
the general nouns regimes and weapons in (14), to the specifc case of Iran in Obamas speech in (15): (14) The
United States of America will not permit the worlds most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the worlds most
destructive weapons (Bush 2002). (15) Irans nuclear program a threat that has the potential to bring together the
worst rhetoric about Israels destruction with the worlds most dangerous weapons (Obama 2012a). Furthermore,

once the predicative strategy has been employed, and the predicate accepted by
the listener, an argumentation tactic is used to build a scenario where this may

become reality for the listener. Argumentative strategies allow specifc persons or
social groups [that] try to justify and legitimise the exclusion, discrimination,
suppression and exploitation of others (Wodak, Meyer 2001: 73, Wodak, Pelinka 2002). This can
allow the speaker to achieve highly persuasive utterances to legitimise actions that become naturalised into social
practices of exclusion and discrimination through a description of what the other has done (Reyes 2011). In (16),
Bush is describing Iraqs actions towards weapons inspectors that ultimately constituted the main argument for the
US invasion in 2003: David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and towards Iran 19 (16)
This is a regime that agreed to international inspectors then kicked out the inspectors (Bush 2002). Essentially,

the argument of the speaker succeeds, some form of social action will
transpire because this is microcosm of the struggle for predominance between
orders of discourse as described by Fairclough12. The predominance of the war on terror
order of discourse in American political and military institutions gives Obamas
recontextualisation of nuclear proliferation issues with Iran in (17) added
signifcance: (17) But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better, and if Iran changes
course and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations (Obama 2012a). This is of great
pertinence here because it would seem that the revelations of not fnding WMDs in
Iraq should create a reluctance of the public to accept any actions towards Iran on
the same basis. However, this feeling is anesthetised because of the perennial emotional appeal of what Iran
where

represents that is constructed in the war on terror discourse, which has been recontextualised to the Iranian issue.

appeal to emotions in the Iranian case is cemented by the employment of

referential, nomination and predicative strategies, supported by an argumentative
strategy to show what they have actually done . This evokes a sense of fear in the
audience as they are distinguished from us, and so the next stage to gaining
acceptance for action is the hypothetical circumstances this situation may lead us
to. 12 See Methodology David Morgan B011513 20 Chapter 1: Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran
Therefore, an

Strategy 2: speech proposals of a hypothetical future The second strategy proposes circumstances that may
transpire if the speakers warnings or suggestions are not heeded. This is most ef fectively

achieved

through a linkage of problems in the past with the future to develop

intertextuality13, allowing the speaker to suggest immediate action in the present (Reyes 2011). Key to
accomplishing legitimisation here are conditional structures that employ markers of
modalisation such as would and could, to allow speculation on future events (Reyes 2011: 794). Bednarek
(2006: 21-23) describes this as epistemic modality that conveys the speakers degree of confdence in the truth of

general hypothetical future structures

constructed by Bush have been recontextualized specifcally to Iran by Obama .
the proposition. Excerpt (18) and (19) demonstrate how

Interestingly here, Obama gives a detailed scenario of what could happen, which further appeals to the listeners
emotions: (18) By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They
could provide these to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or
attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (Bush
2002). (19) There are risks that an Iranian nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist organisation. It is
almost certain that others in the region could feel compelled to get their own nuclear weapon, triggering an arms
race in one of the worlds most volatile regions (Obama 2012b). 13 See page 9 - Methodology David Morgan A

actors can propose

a hypothetical future without epistemic modality, which suggests complete
confdence in the proposition to give the statement added signifcance . Again, Bushs
Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and towards Iran 21 Furthermore,

general words about terrorism are recontextualized by Obama to Iran: (20) So long as training camps operate, so
long as nations harbour terrorists, freedom is at risk (Bush 2002). (21) A nuclear armed Iran is completely counter
to Israels security interests. But it is also counter to the security interests of the United States (Obama 2012b).

Obama presents statements without

epistemic modality much more frequently than Bush. This suggests something about his
personal oratory style and shows that when this is constructed as part of a fearful scenario, the future
becomes a place where political actors can situate ideological utterances in order to
Over the course of my analysis it became clear that

exert power and control (Dunmire 2009). Another element of the hypothetical future strategy is reference
to altruistic motivations. A hypothetical future that benefts others through proposed action, allows the speaker to
avoid suggestions that their wider motives are self-interested (Reyes 2011). Bush refers to the invasion of
Afghanistan that happened shortly before his SUA02 in (22): (22) The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers
and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today
women are free, and part of Afghanistans new government (Bush 2002). David Morgan B011513 22 Chapter 1:

Many of the same themes can be seen in (23)

from Obama, relating to rocket fre from Palestinian militants in Gaza : (23) [A]s President, I
Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran

have provided critical funding to deploy the Iron Dome system that has intercepted rockets that might have hit
homes and hospitals and schools in that town and in others. Now our as sistance

is expanding Israels
defensive capabilities, so that more Israelis can live free from the fear of rockets
and ballistic missiles (Obama 2012b). In both (22) and (23) EEE can be identifed Bush refers to the
victims whilst Obama makes reference to civilian buildings. What is interesting in Obamas
speech is the connection to ballistic missiles that relates to wider discourses linked
to Saddam Husseins scud missile attacks on Israel in the 1991 Gulf War . This
technology is outside the capability of Gaza militants such as Hamas but is still
referred to here as it becomes intertextually linked to Obamas words as he
identifes Irans proxies shown in excerpt (5) 14, above. Further to altruistic references, the protection
of values is presented as a legitimising tactic, which is described by Van Leeuwen (2009) as moral
evaluation. The speaker uses a threat to value systems as a reason for social action (Reyes 2011). Excerpts (24)
and (25) show how many of the themes in Bushs language are picked up by Obama as he makes reference to Iran,
showing recontextualisation: (24) America will stand frm for the non-negotiable rights of human dignity: the rule of
law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious
tolerance (Bush 2002). 14 See page 15 David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and
towards Iran 23 (25) The United States and Israel share interests, but we also share those human values Shimon
spoke about: a commitment to human dignity, a belief that freedom is a right that is given to all of Gods children

semiosis here demonstrates the pervasiveness of the hypothetical

future strategy because, as Reyes (2011: 795) states, [t]hese legitimisations do not respond
to an ideological position, nor are they idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular
political actor (democrat, republican, liberal, or realist), they are simply presented as American.
This greatly facilitates the process of recontextualisation as it allows the actor to extend the
demonization of the abstract other to real perceived threats , such as Iran (Reyes 2011).
(Obama 2012b). The

Therefore, it can be seen how recontextualisation from a war on terror discourse can aid the construction of Iran as

hypothetical threats they pose suggested in strategy 2 can

make an audience accept the challenges Iran presents . However, the break between the
threat and the proposed action against it still needs to be traversed in order to
legitimise action. This is done by demonstrating rationality of the actions taken
against those threats. Strategy 3: rationality of the decision process The third strategy presents the
decision to conduct social practices as rationally considered, in order to present
them as the right thing to do (Reyes 2011). This process can only occur within a shared belief system of
society that defnes what is right. Therefore, actors can identify what is culturally considered as
an acceptable approach to decision making and situate their actions within this
operating system to legitimise action (Reyes 2011). David Morgan B011513 24 Chapter 1:
Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran A key element to this strategy is
the process of naturalisation that occurs, especially once a demonisation of the
other is complete via strategy 115. If a context is constructed where the threat of the other is just
the enemy in strategy 1, and the

the way things are, this belief system can be naturalised in society (Reyes 2011: 798). This allows the actor to
provide a limited catalogue of the options for action whilst presenting it as complete. Furthermore, a greater effect
is to demonstrate that these options have been produced through a diligent process of wider consultation. This

allows the reinforcement of the Us/Them binary by reassuring listeners that there is
support for proposed actions. The similarities between Bushs words in (26) and Obamas in (27) as he

talks about economic sanctions against Iran, are stark: (26) America is working with Russia and China and India, in
ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity. Together with our friends and allies from Europe to
Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of
freedom (Bush 2002). (27) Some of you will recall, people predicted that Russia and China wouldnt join us to move
toward pressure. They did. Many questioned whether we could hold our coalition together as we moved against
Irans central bank and oil exports. But our friends in Europe and Asia and elsewhere are joining us (Obama 2012b).

important discursive
device is to back up the legitimation of social action through stating the outcome to
the listener. Obama follows his statements in (27) with: 15 See Strategy 1: an appeal to emotions that
evoke a sense of fear David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and towards
Support can be stated but does not necessarily generate support in itself, so an

Iran 25 (28) That is where we are today because of our work. Iran is isolated, its leadership divided and under

demonstrates rationality based on success of the action

to show that the social practice produced an intended outcome. This is described as
instrumental rationality by Van Leeuwen (2007) and, gives the purpose of the social practice to the
listener. However, purposes are not synonymous with legitimations 16, so to achieve such
pressure (Obama 2012b). Excerpt (28)

acceptance a moralisation can be attached to the purpose to fully take advantage of the legitimation strategy. In

moralisation is stated as defence of the nation : (29) We

work closely with our coalition partners to deny terrorists and their state
sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of
mass destruction. All nations should know: America will do whatever is necessary to ensure our nations
both Bushs and Obamas language, this
will

security (Bush 2002). (30) I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made
clear time and time again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to

recontextualisation from Bushs

words that vaguely identifes state sponsors with the production of WMDs, with
Obamas words that simply sketch this scenario directly onto Iran. The turn towards
military action is representative of an ideological position that, it can be argued, has
infltrated the US executive. Excerpts 16 See page 6 - Literature Review David Morgan B011513 26
Chapter 1: Sketching the war on terror discourse onto Iran (29) and (30) show how morally acceptable
rationalisations can legitimate action because the possession of, or the progress
towards, a nuclear weapon is now linguistically linked to the US use of force. What
necessary action entails is withheld from the listener, but the practice is legitimised because society
accepts it on the basis of its morality, i.e. to defend the United States, which naturalises it as just the
defend the United States and its interests (Obama 2012b). This is clear

way things must be. Summary The analysis above demonstrates the recontextualisation of Bushs wider war on
terror discourse towards Iran by Obama in 2012. Furthermore, the linkage of the three strategies is clearly evident.

construction of the enemy in strategy 1 appeals to the listeners emotions,

allowing the development of hypothetical futures in strategy 2 based on the
enemies identifed characteristics. This picture of the other is bridged into the reality of social
The

practices by strategy 3, which demonstrates rationality of the decision making process. The analysis in this chapter
shows that where particular reference to emotions exists, as we would expect to see in discourse relating to the
September 11 attacks, highly persuasive textual structures have the potential to legitimise many forms of social

made possible by changes in the semiosis that corresponds to social

practices by altering one, two, or all three of its elements 17. 9/11 is a clear example
of how a social event caused the elements of the existing order of discourse to shift
by altering societys perception of the world. This facilitates new forms of social
action so that, where recontextualisation occurs onto 17 See Methodology David Morgan A Discourse of
action. This is

Legitimation: Beyond the war on terror and towards Iran 27 the Iranian issue, the practices legitimised by
reconfguration of the order of discourse in 2002 would be expected to reoccur where the same discourse informs

changes were indeed achieved in 2002, a war on

terror discourse would be naturalised as part of specifc social practices into a
linkage of, the worlds most dangerous regimespursueweapons of mass
destruction (Bush 2002), I will take no options off the tableaimed at isolating Iranand, yes, a military
the social events of 2012 and beyond. Where

However, in the case of a move towards

military action against Iran, if the war on terror discourse can be operationalised
in the international community such action could achieve greater support and
legitimation.
effort to be prepared for any contingency (Obama 2012b).

ISIS
The ISIS threat is hyped by the media
Timm 15
(Trevor Timm, Freedom of the Press Foundation, Our media's Isis threat hype
machine: government stenography at its worst, July 6 th, 2015, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/06/isis-cnn-terrorism-threathype-machine-government-pr, JAS)
If you turned on US cable news at any point last week, you might have thought this July 4 holiday would be our last
weekend on earth the supposed terrorist masterminds in Isis and their alleged vast sleeper cell army were going
to descend upon America like the aliens in Independence Day and destroy us all. CNN has led the pack in

whipping Americans into a panic over the Isis threat, running story after story with
government officials and terrorism industry money-makers hyping the threat,
played against the backdrop of scary b-roll of terrorist training camps. Former CIA deputy
director Mike Morell ominously told CBS last week that I wouldnt be surprised if we werent sitting here a week
from today talking about an attack over the weekend in the United States. MSNBC and Fox joined in too, using

graphics and maps right out of Stephen Colberts satirical Doom Bunker,
suggesting World War III was just on the verge of reaching Americas shores . Nothing
happened, of course. But it was an abject lesson in how irrational government fear-mongering
still controls our public discourse, even when there wasnt a shred of hard evidence
for any sort of attack, only a feeling that one might happen . The media totally bought
into this frenzy, despite the fact that the FBI and other intelligence agencies openly
admitted they did not have any specifc or credible threat information to hinge
the holiday-weekend warnings on. Naturally, we didnt fnd this out until several paragraphs down in
any of the articles about the subject, and on television it sometimes wasnt mentioned at all. Even when it was, the

lack of push-back or questioning was startling . For example, this report from NBC News:
Authorities told NBC News that they are unaware of any specifc or credible threat inside the country. But the
dangers are more complex and unpredictable than ever. You almost have to appreciate the amount of discipline it

no
evidence proving youre in danger, but you absolutely should be very afraid ! It was an
takes to write two back-to-back sentences like that without expressing even a hint of skepticism: we have

incredible turnaround from just a week before, even for the American fear-mongering machine. Following the
tragedy in Charleston, where a white supremacist terrorist killed nine innocent churchgoers, there was fnally!
widespread acknowledgement that the Islamic terrorism threat in this country is vastly exaggerated, and that white
supremacists actually kill many more Americans than Muslim extremists do. As Glenn Greenwald wrote at the time,

more likely to be struck by lightning, stung to death by bees or killed your own
falling furniture on you than you are by a Muslim terrorist . Yet there we were, less than a
week later, back to an Isis is going to kill us all mentality . Bill Maher complained this
you are

weekend that, Cable news is Isis best ally. And hes absolutely right. While CNN was by far the loudest and most
idiotic the dildo-laden Isis flag at Londons gay pride parade was only a particularly laughable taste of the

hardly any of the talkinghead experts bothered to ask whether our militarys continued bombing of the
Middle East might be exacerbating the chances of a terrorist attack on US soil,
rather than dissipating it. Journalist Adam Johnson went back a decade and found 40
other times the FBI and Homeland Security have issued similar threats around
national holidays or major events, none of which actually was followed by a terrorist
attack. Its more than a little disturbing how much CNN and others have seemingly grown to rely on these
networks alarmism all the cable news channels have happily played along. Yet

nebulous warnings to keep viewers hooked. As Johnson quipped on Twitter earlier this week, Can the FBI break its
terror-predicting 0-40 losing streak this weekend? Tune into CNN to fnd out! All of this doesnt mean that a terrorist
attack on US wont eventually happen. Simple math tells us that, no matter the precautions taken or the civil
liberties taken away, one may get through. But it is a rare event, and one which human beings have lived with

magnifying it and terrifying everyone, were only doing the

terrorists job for them. No one is suggesting we ignore the existence of Isis. The
savage attack on civilians in Tunisia was a deplorable tragedy, and the group
actively threatens many people in the Middle East. But even as we mourn the
victims and steel our resolve, the idea that we should upend our way of life based
on an extremely remote possibility that we, in the end, have no ability to control is
absurd. As for those vague terror warnings that didnt materialize over the weekend? Theyve been extended.
throughout our history. By

Even if ISIS is a threat, constructing extinction level threats

romanticizes and empowers terrorist groups and recruiting
processes
Fryer-Biggs 4/14 [Zachary Fryer-Biggs, national security reporter and Newsweek editor; Is The Media
Feeding the ISIS Monster?; Newsweek; 04/14/2015; accessed 07/14/2015; <http://www.newsweek.com/feedingisis-monster-321982>.]

stories
about the power of ISIS may actually help reinforce groups brand. The same goes for
speeches by American politicians. During a press briefng about ISIS last year, then-Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel mentioned the September 11 attacks three times, implying that
the jihadist group may be capable of devastating attacks inside the U.S. They are an
imminent threat to every interest we have, whether its in Iraq or anywhere else, he said. This is
beyond anything that weve seen. Moghaddan says Hagel and others have really
overreacted. Theyve used overblown rhetoric...focusing on aspects of ISIS that
actually romanticize the whole movement. For his part, President Barack Obama has been much
more measured, calling ISIS and its ideology a medium- and long-term threat to the U.S. But the whirl of
reports about ISIS spreading its tentacles across the worldfrom the Gaza Strip to New York Citys
Times Squarehas made the group look larger than life. In American and Canadian
rhetoric theyre being posed as an imminent threat, says Taylor. Theyre not just a rag-tag
[ISIS] provides a clearly defned identity that tells you what your mission is. Which is exactly why

bunch of hoodlums...and that helps lure those looking for a clearly defned mission.

Failed States
The definition of a state as failed is based in neo-colonial and
western understandings of statehood
Thiessen 15
(Ben Thiessen, Department of International Studies, College of Arts and Science,
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, Conceptualizing the Failed
State: The Construction of the Failed State Discourse, 2015, University of
Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal,
http://usurj.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/usurj/index.php/usurj/article/view/72, JAS)
Underpinning the whole discourse is a European or Western universalism. The
identifcation of failed states is achieved through the construction of a state/failed state
dichotomy built on a fxed, universal standard of what constitutes a successful state .
The state failure literatures promotion of African states as the deviant Other stems from
how it identifes failed states. The successful state standard constructed by this
literature is based on the concept of positive sovereignty, which is in turn based on
Max Webers ideal state. 14 The Weberian model is based on the classical European state ,
which has become the model for all other modern states . Given this, African states, failed and
nonfailed alike, are compared with a model of statehood that is based upon strictly European values, customs,
practices, 11 Daron Acemonglu, and James A. Robinson, The 2012 Index, Foreign Policy 194, (2012): accessed
November 9, 2013. http://web.ebscohost.com.cyber.usask.ca/ehost/detail?sid =2843741f-beb7-4217-9f895d506b7f1168%40sessionmgr15&vid=2&hid=28&bdata =JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=777
21357. See Appendix Figure 1. 12 Jones, 2013, 64. 13 Ibid., 64. 14 Hill, 146. organizations and structures. 15 Bear
in mind that the European model of state development was able to evolve and consolidate in the nearly four

believed the inability of certain

African states to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of
the Western norm has resulted in their failure, without considering the historical
context of decolonization and the process of drawing national boundaries in Africa.
Failed state analysts constitute the identities of failed African societies in relation to Western
societies, attributing negative characteristics to the former and positive to the
latter. The differences between these two categories of states are not simply portrayed as different, but failed
states are presented as abnormal in the pejorative sense . Within the narrative, one of the
hundred years following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Thus, it is

determining criteria of a successful state is the possession of positive sovereignty. The concept of positive
sovereignty is most closely associated with Robert Jackson but is based on Webers ideal state. 16 According to

positive sovereignty presupposes capabilities which enable governments to

be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively
sovereign government is one which not only enjoys rights of non-intervention and
other international immunities but also possesses the wherewithal to provide
political goods for its citizens. It is also a government that can collaborate with other
governments in defense alliances and similar international arrangements and
reciprocate in international commerce and fnance. 17 Given this, a successful state
not only has international legal or de jure recognition of its statehood, but the
government of that state also possesses the capabilities to project and protect
their authority throughout the entirety of their sovereign territory and enter into
Jackson,

collaborative agreements 15 Ibid., 148. 16 Ibid., 146. 17 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29. Conceptualizing the Failed
State Narrative (Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal 132 with other
governments. 18 This is what Jackson refers to as de facto statehood that distinguishes positively sovereign states
from negatively sovereign states. 19 Thus, the sovereignty of a positively sovereign state is both de facto and de

jure, whereas the sovereignty of a negatively sovereign state is solely de jure. According to this model,

negatively sovereign states do not control their territory, may be faced with armed
insurgents that render them unable to uphold its monopoly of violence and have
very little ability to implement policies or promote economic development . 20 However,
Jonathan Hill notes the positive/negative sovereignty binary does not precisely mirror the state/failed state binary:
while all successful states are positively sovereign and all failed states negatively so, not all negatively sovereign

proliferation of various categories of states from

quasi, weak, collapsed and failed that represents an important ambiguity within
the failed state narrative. In addition to the positive/negative sovereignty binary, failed states are
also examined through their inability to provide political goods to their citizens . This
states are failed. 21 This has aided in the

approach, as represented by authors such as William Zartman and Robert Rotberg, sees the state frst and foremost
as a service provider. 22 Both authors distinguish between a variety of services that states may provide, ranging
from security to rule of law, the protection of property, the right to political participation, provision of infrastructure
and social services such as health and education. 23 These services constitute a hierarchy where security is a
condition for the provision of all other services. Hill outlines two common elements of this approach. First, the failed
state is identifed as being either unable and/or unwilling to 18 Hill, 146. 19 Jackson, 27. 20 Stein Sundstol
Eriksen, State Failure in theory and practice: the idea of the state and the contradictions of state formation,
Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 232. 21 Hill, 146. 22 Eriksen, 230. 23 Ibid., 231. perform the
functions they should. The second is a defnition of what these functions are, namely, the provision of welfare, law

Underpinning the descriptions of failed states is therefore a

predetermined defnition of what constitutes a non-failed state or successful state.
Stein Sundstol Eriksen adds that this approach can be problematic in that viewing
the state as essentially a service provider can lead to the promotion of normative
prescriptions under the guise of positivism science: Instead of developing concepts
which are better suited to analyze existing states, the gap between ideals and
empirical reality is treated as justifcation for intervention which aims to close this
gap, and make empirical reality conform to the model. 25 The lack of congruency between
and order, and security. 24

the ideal and reality is taken to indicate a lack, not in the concept, but in the object to which it refers. According to

absence of certain features associated with statehood constitutes an

argument for changing the world to make it ft the concept of statehood . Hence, the
policy manifestations of the failed state narrative are ahistorical, decontextualized,
and based on a one-size-fts-all model . Eriksen warns that with this move, one moves away from the
this approach, the

domain of theory as a tool of understanding and moves towards the realm of normative theory. 26 Branwen Gruffyd
Jones identifes three characteristics of the discourse that determine its ahistorical nature and, thus, its inadequate

rich array of
descriptors functions in a manner which appears self-evident, acting by way of
tautology to form a substitute for historically informed social analysis and
explanation Second, state failure is characterized as being primarily of local origin The generic form of
explanatory power: First is the enormous proliferation of descriptive terminology This

explanation locates the causes of failure in terms of internal agencywith little serious regard to history, structure
and the international. Third, the analytical/descriptive approach operates through 24 Hill, 145. 25 Eriksen, 231. 26
Ibid., 232. Conceptualizing the Failed State Narrative (Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate

logic of comparison with an ideal and ahistorical notion of what

the state is or should be. 27 This comparative approach makes it extremely
difficult to adequately explain the development of individual states . The implication of both
perspectives is that any deviations from their defnitions of statehood can only appear as
a defciency. 28 Jones draws a linkage between the identifcation of some lack or
inferiority and the legitimation of imperial intervention . 29 In the colonial era,
distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized states legitimized formal
occupation. The current discourse of state failure, with its hierarchical categories of
weak, fragile, failed and collapsed, aids in legitimizing intervention by identifying
lack, inferiority and incapacity. 30 Rather than explaining why the socio-political problems of an
Research Journal 133 a

individual state have developed, this comparative approach merely highlights that African states are different and

are ahistorical and decontextualized in their analysis. Through this approach, states

are merely
identifed not by what they are, but what they are not, namely, successful in
comparison to Western states. 31 This raises questions as to how useful it is to start with such a
conception of statehood. The failed state narrative conveys Western conceptions of the polity; it
reactivates a developmentalist approach that considers the model of the Weberian
state as the appropriate institutional solution to restoring order and stability in
fragile contexts. 32 Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton observe: [there is a tendency to] abstract the
post-colonial state from its socio-historical context, leading to an inability to account
for historically specifc 27 Branwen Gruffydd Jones, The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a
critique of the failed state ideology, Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 2 (2008): 184. 28 Eriksen,
234. 29 Jones, 2008, 197. 30 Ibid., 198. 31 Hill, 148. 32 Nay, 328 .

ideologies and practices or the

social bases of state power that may constitute or sustain social order [There is] no
account of how a postcolonial state comes into being in the frst place, how it is constituted or reproduced. There is

tendency to reify the post-colonial state by abstracting it from the

international sphere. 33 Thus, for Bilgin and Morton, the overall result of analysis of the post-colonial failed
also a further

state ends up overlooking the historically contingent processes of state formation and more complex patterns of

language of the failed state discourse meshes

easily with a broader and deeply entrenched Western imagination of chaos and
anarchy in Africa: a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to be peaceful . 35
Furthermore, Jones argues, underpinning the apparent empirical precision and objectivity
of analyses of state failure in Africa are a set of features that betray the position of
this approach in a longer genealogy of imperial discourse . 36 Although the explicit language
state-civil society relations. 34 The conceptual

of race in its modern colonial form disappeared from legitimate international discourse with the demise of formal
colonial rule, the position of this new hierarchy of state capacity to governare now specifed with reference to a
general notion of the functional capacity of states, often combined with some sense of ultimate threat. 37 This has
been made possible by the language of good governance that resonates with already existing features of common

failed state discourse emerged not directly

from the colonial ideology of racial civilization but is the immediate predecessor of
the sanitized language of development and modernization . 38 The development and
sense about Africa. However, Jones notes that the

modernization discourse was born out of the processes of decolonization. Jones argues that it served to
legitimize the practices of Western governments 33 Bilgin and Morton, 63. 34 Ibid., 63. 35 Jones,
2013, 49. 36 Ibid., 50. 37 Ibid., 61. 38 Ibid., 61. Conceptualizing the Failed State Narrative (Thiessen) University of
Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal 134 and international organization in providing policy

advice
and technical assistance in a range of matters of political, economic and social
concern to newly independent countries, the new vocabulary helping to disguise
essential continuities with colonial relationships . 39 Neocolonial Underpinnings By ignoring
historical and contextual aspects, the dominant approach to failed states presents state failure as a
consequence of domestic weakness. This view of state failure as a predominantly internal or domestic
problem is reinforced by the various solutions to state failure offered by different
development actors and analysts. Under neoliberal globalization, formal democratization has been
represented as the political corollary of economic liberalization. This has been reflected in the adoption of
aid conditionally and structural adjustment programmes by international fnancial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in favour
of democracy promotion. 40 In this way, external actors are presented as benevolent,
restorative forces while the domestic sphere of failed states are perceived as
compromised, lacking in agency and, therefore, incapable of looking after
themselves. Furthermore, Hill argues, external actors are in no way implicated in contributing to or
exacerbating a states so-called failure. 41 The privileging of internal factors over external ones
not only leads the failed state discourse to ignore the interplay between domestic and

international contexts, it also means that the influence of external actors on sociopolitical crises are ignored. While failed states are framed as the result of domestic factors,
simultaneously, foreign governments and international development agencies and
organizations are portrayed as the only forces capable of rectifying these problems .
Labeling state failures is not just a rhetorical exercise; it is used to delineate the
acceptable range of policy options that can then be exercised against those 39 Ibid.,
62. 40 Hill, 149. 41 Ibid., 149. states. 42 As such, Western caretaker states see little relevance in the internationally
recognized sovereignty or local capacities of African nation-states. What results is a paternalistic defense of
Western imperialism in both its historical and contemporary forms. 43 As Michael Ignatieff argued months before
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Imperialism used to be the white mans burden. This gave it a bad reputation. But
imperialism doesnt stop being necessary just because it becomes politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and

Nation-building is the
kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era , a time when great powers believe
simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own
right to rule the world. 44 Explicit in Ignatieffs argument is the fact or need of imperialism as a set of
when they do, only outside help imperial power can get them back on their feet.

benevolent policies and practices oriented towards the Souths development of national security and human rights.
He frames Western intervention in the optimistic language of nation-building as opposed to recognizing the

violent and disempowering nature of their intervention . Sium adds that Ignatieff leaves
strategic moral and military space for the Wests intervention in the South as an exercise of its right to rule the

West awards itself narrative control over which

the worlds geographies require imperialism and which are permitted to participate
in acting it out. 46 42 Morten Boas, and Kathleen M. Jennings, Failed states and state failure: Threats or
world. 45 Through this self-appointed right, the

opportunities? Globalization 4, no. 4 (2007): 478. 2 Sium, 3. 44 Michael Ignatieff, Nation-Building Lite, New York
Times, last modifed July 28, 2002, accessed November 10, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/magazine/nationbuilding-lite.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 45 Sium, 3. 46
Ibid., 3. Conceptualizing the Failed State Narrative (Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research

categories of fragility and failed states cannot be isolated from the

conditions under which they emerged and entered the Western political lexicon on
issues like security and development. They were a product of the post-Cold War period,
created by Western actors based on an attempt to advance new strategic options in
security, defense, humanitarianism and international cooperation . It was also a key feature
Journal 135 The

of the George Bush administrations policy discourse on the war on terror by connecting the American foreign
policy agenda with the new national security strategy launched after 9/11. 47 Additionally, the relationship
established between state fragility, underdevelopment and security reflected the new development aid strategies
pursued by major multilateral organizations. It helped those institutions representing Western countries interests,
especially the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) and IMF, to develop a
new agenda towards non-performing countries after Western donors shifted towards performance-based allocation
mechanisms for distributing development assistance. 48 Oliver Nay argues it is for these reasons that the

rhetoric on failed and fragile states cannot be dissociated from the Western powers
military doctrines, diplomatic options and economic choices . 49 It provides grounds
for policy interventions to resolve regional conflicts, counter transnational terrorism
and combat international organized crime, or for interference in the internal affairs
of war-torn or poor countries. 50 The discourse on failed states becomes a policy
narrative that serves to justify peace-building and state-building interventions which
has contributed to the development of neocolonialism that involves international
domination that no longer relies on the military conquest of territory, but instead
results from the establishment, by the great powers and for a limited time, of
governance systems that bring together international organizations, Western
bilateral agencies and domestic authorities in countries rebuilding after 47 Nay, 330. 48
Ibid., 329. 49 Ibid., 330. 50 Boas and Jennings, 388. conflict or disaster such as Bosnia, Kosovo,
East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and South Sudan . 51 The emergence of the failed
state narrative has not primarily served the needs of populations suffering

from war situations and poor governance. Instead, it mainly reflects strategic and
financial concerns shared by a limited number of Western governments. It is
a policy label that fuels operational doctrines on international security and development and has been
instrumental in the production of legitimate discourse in international relations.

Fundamentalism - Securitization
Hegemonic discourse of patriarchal binarism the free world
vs. fundamentalist Islam is a barrier to embracing an
alternative peace
Milojevi 2 [Ivana Milojevi, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and
futures studies, and Visiting Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies
and Research, University of Novi Sad; Gender, Peace and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War;
University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic__Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Authors frst language is Serbian.

military-solution-oriented post September 11th discourse has also

become one more example of the dominance of malestream patriarchal perspective
especially when it comes to conflict analysis and resolution . The masculinist bias could easily be
found in predominantly masculinist rhetoric, patriarchal logic and the general
invisibility of women. While women have consistently been either invisible or only present as
objects of the inquiry (e.g. victimhood of Afghani women ), on the other hand, men have
been both real and symbolical subjects movers and shakers of our history and our present. From
terrorists to political, military and religious leaders, to heroic fre fghters and rescue workers - the life taker,
the decision-maker, the hero, the powerful one has almost always been a man. But most
importantly, the patriarchal worldview has the strongest grip on defnitional power . For
example, the patriarchal discourse has been present in the focus on abstract
categories, such as nations, free-world, fundamentalists , etc. It has also been
In addition, the created

present in the predominance of strategic discourse of national interest and national security and inductive
reasoning [that has] effectively removed people as agents embedded in social and historical contexts (True,

Binary thinking, considered by many feminists to be one of the main characteristics of

patriarchal reasoning has also roamed wild. Examples include free-world vs. totalitarian
states and either with us or against us choices on offer. In fact, as feminist authors in the area of
1996:210).

international relations have shown, all the key concepts central to how states and the international system currently
operate, such as power, sovereignty, security and rationality (True, 1996:225-236) embody a patriarchal worldview.

hegemonic patriarchal discourse that cuts

through all these categories seriously limits spaces for the emergence of alternative
strategies. That is, it can be equally embodied in neo-liberal, rationalist discourses or within
the worldview of the terrorists but also sometimes even in so called progressive and leftist
The main problem with this is that the existence of

approached. For example, the patriarchal worldview is embodied in Marxist understandings of historical change and
view that the violence is somehow the midwife of history. It may come as no surprise then that Marxists and neoMarxists are often sympathetic towards liberation movements that too often incorporate violent strategies into
their modus operandi. Of course, Marxs famous statement that the violence is the midwife of every old society
pregnant with a new one is one of the better examples of misusing womens experiences and interpreting them
from within a patriarchal worldview.

Fundamentalism = Islamophobia
Conflates all Muslims with stereotypical violent radicalism
Renold 2 (Leah, Professor of Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University.
"Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War. Pg 95)
When the term "fundamentalist" is used in the media in association with
Islam, it is rarely defined. Such usage suggests a common understanding of the
term. While most Americans are not familiar with the different schools of thought
within Islam, they are acquainted with fundamentalism in the Christian context,
where the term is used in common parlance to refer, often negatively, to a certain
brand of Christianity. When the term fundamentalism appears as an appendage of
Islam, the reading public can only assume that the same connotations associated
with Christian fundamentalism most also apply. Fundamentalism becomes a
blanket term, shrouding Islam in Western perceptions of fundamentalism.
In using the term, the media manages to associate large numbers of Muslim
people with certain attitudes and behavior of a backward and inherently
dangerous nature. In instances where the term fundamentalism is defned,
stereotypical images are only re-enforced, without specific mention of
historical, political, social, or theological developments within Islam.
Fundamentalism is applied as an essential term, implying that there is a
certain characteristic, a core essence of the phenomenon, which
transcends distinctions of specificity.

Should reject the term fundamentalism

Renold 2 (Leah, Professor of Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University.
"Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War. Pg 106 .
Are fundamentalists our enemy in the current crisis? Fundamentalism loosely
defned can refer to a great horde. There are millions of people in the world with
deeply entrenched religious worldviews. If we include as our enemy everyone
who fits into the vague stereotypical image of a fundamentalist, the
enemy looms very large. As globalization brings competing worldviews closer
and closer, there is a tendency, it seems, for people to want to affirm their
distinctiveness. Where we might think others would welcome the flood of images,
ideas, and products from the West, to many the onslaught of Westernization
threatens to bring about a disintegration of their own culture and identity. Thus we
see the rise of movements around the world that attempt to strengthen a collective
sense of uniqueness Religion, which is closely interwoven with other aspects of
society, is often held up as a badge of honor, as the defning characteristic of the
culture. Should we regard all these people, including those Americans who
place religion at the center of their worldview and their politics, as
enemies? In defning fundamentalists as enemies, are we saying that ,such people
have no place in the modem world? Are we denying them the right to selfidentity and the right to embrace a worldview of their own selection?
Must they embrace Western conceptions of modernity or else become

branded as fundamental enemies? Can freedom of thought be applied only

to expressions that correspond to the liberal Western ideology? Has liberal
thought become so imperialistic? Questioning the boundaries of Western
hegemony does not imply total relativity; it does not imply that the ideologies of
totalitarian governments, for instance, have an equal right of expression. It certainly
does not condone murder. But it should lead us to consider the implications of
and the ideology behind the targeting of worldviews that do not
correspond to our own, especially those that are branded fundamentalist.
It should lead us to abandon the use of the term fundamentalist as a
category into which we shove large numbers of Muslims.

Impacts

Turns Aff - Endless War

Threat construction obscures realistic perceptions of time,
creates self-fulfilling feedback loops, cedes political agency,
and causes endlessly justified nuclear war
Zulaika 12 [Joseba Zulaika, Professor and Co-Director at the Center for Basque Studies at the University of
Nevada, Reno; Mythologies of Terror: Fantasy and Self-Fulflling Prophecy in U.S. Counterterrorism pg 9-11;
Kroeber Anthropological Society; 03/08/2012; accessed 07/15/2015; <http://kas.berkeley.edu/documents/Issue_102103/2_Zulaika.pdf>.] Edited for gendered language
Self-Fulflling Prophecies

Time is the difference between science fction , where there is no

requirement of real time, and actual reality. It is the play with time that is most revealing of the
manipulations of associative magic, as shown in divination. The oracle, based on secret knowledge, reveals whether

Counterterrorist thinking has also a

peculiar relation to temporality, as threats are largely based on the inevitability of
waiting. Actual historical temporality becomes subservient to the feared future . If there
are no terrorist attacks, the counterterrorist can claim success in preventing them; but if
the attack does occur, then the counterterrorist can say I told you so, and argue that he
was right in his predictions. At this point terrorism foretold becomes prophecy fulfilled .
Such imperviousness to error in actual historical events points to a time warp that goes to
the heart of counterterrorist mythology . Such waiting implies in fact that historical time
has surrendered itself to a fateful future . The result of this passive temporality regarding
events we can do nothing to prevent is a fateful mindset in which the terror events
are closer to nature than society and politics, and there is hardly any point in looking into the intellectual
premises or subjective motivations that guide terrorist actions. The great political victory of the suicide
bombers is that they imposed on U.S. politics their own suicidal temporality of waiting
and a culture grounded on the oracular knowledge of secret intelligence, which then
justifed the War on Terror. The self-fulflling prophecy is, in the beginning, writes sociologist
Robert Merton, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which
makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity of the self-fulflling
prophecy perpetuates a reign of error . For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that
he was right from the very beginningsuch are the perversities of social logic (Merton 1968:477). It was false
that there was al-Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion, but then it became true after
the invasion. Anti-American radical Islamists could never afford to have anti-aircraft missiles, until the CIA
witchcraft has transpired and whether its danger looms ahead.

provided Stinger missiles to Afghan rebels battling the Soviets during the 1980s. Similarly, over forty countries are
currently developing drone technology to be used as military robots, with the likelihood that in a not far away future
they might fall in the hands of terrorists. Such self-fulflling prophecy of counterterrorist drones being used by

A central dimension of terrorism, and one that

is crucial to show its self-fulflling quality, has to do with threats and their perception and the
reactions they provoke. A threat plays with the sign as representing a future event, while we
never know whether the issuer actually means it or not, or whether he they might change his
terrorists, we are told, is not far away (Caryl 2007:58).

their opinion in the future. The Unabomber brought the traffic in California airports to a halt by simply sending a
letter to a newspaper with the threat of bringing down an airliner, while he sent another letter to another
newspaper admitting that the threat was a prank. The actual reality of the threat might be nothing but play -- a
zero that can yet have deadly serious consequences. Counterterrorism is a prime example of what Merton labeled
the Thomas theorem: If men defne situations as they are real in their consequences (Merton 1968:475). Once

defned as one of inevitable terrorism and endless waiting, what could happen
once a threat, whose intention or possibility is unknown to us, is
taken seriously, its reality requires that we must act on it . Terrorism is the catalyst
for confusing various semantic levels of linguistic, ritual and military actions . Anthropologists
the situation is

weighs as much as what is actually the case;

have examined phenomena such as divination, which manipulates the axis of time in a cultural context of magic
and witchcraft. They have compared pre-modern mystical notions of causation and temporality to our own modern
standards of rationality. The central premise of

counterterrorism thinking is

the oft-repeated formula that

it is not if, but when. Hypotheticals are premised with the conditional if if A, then B. What
characterizes basic counterterrorist knowledge about the next impending attack is that it
will happen. In a mind-set that parallels Azande witchcraft, the counterterrorist axiom of not if rules out mere
hypotheses.2 The revelations are thus unfulflled hypotheticals that will become real with
time. Counterterrorist projections are the equivalent to oracular certaintiesthe horror will happen no matter
what. This leads in pragmatic terms to the fatalistic attitude of disregarding actual
knowledge and not taking responsibility for actual decisionswhat does it really
matter what we decide since it is going to happen anyway and whatever happens is out of our hands? What

The practical aspect of this

temporality of waiting, in which the certainty of the impending evil is beyond any hypothetical (not if), is
that we need to act preemptively now against events that are to happen in the future. The rationale
behind nuclear deterrence was that developing armaments now, ready to strike at the push of a button,
guaranteed that they would not be used in the future. Many commentators saw in such logic the
quintessence of technological madness . But that was not enough. Since future nuclear
attacks by terrorists are only a matter of time, we must wage war now
preemptively even in a nuclear context, thus breaking the historic assumption
that nuclear arsenals were for deterrence, not for actual usage . Thus the formula of not if,
but when becomes a self-fulflling prophecy. The counterterrorist thinking makes it an
imperative that the war must start now against Saddam Hussein, against al-Qaeda, against
matters, therefore, is that we sort of divine what the course of action will be.

Iran, against all potential terrorists. This is how the American public, including the liberal media, accepted the
rationale to go to war against Iraq.

Turns Aff Increases Surveillance

Fear of terrorism used to justify increased surveillance
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

Lowering the risk of terrorism, particularly the

nuclear kind, is the quintessential reason that the mandarins of the national security
state have given for employing the most invasive national surveillance system in
history. Finding the needle in the haystack is how some describe the effort to discern terrorist plots from
telephone metadata and intercepted communications. But the haystack keeps
expanding, and large elements of the American population appear willing to allow
signifcant encroachments on the constitutional protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment. The fear of terrorism has produced this change in the American psyche
even though there is no evidence that the collection of such data has resulted in the
discovery of terrorist plots beyond those found by traditional police and intelligence methods. It is
doubtful that we shall soon (if ever) see a return to the status quo ante regarding
constitutional protections. This reduction in the freedom of Americans from the
prying eyes of the state is a major consequence of the hyping of terrorism, especially
The rise of the national surveillance state.

nuclear terrorism. This is exemplifed by the blithe conclusion in the previously referenced paper by Friedman and
Lewis (2014), in which readers are advised to be more proactive in supporting our governments actions to
ameliorate potential risks. The National Security Agency should love this.

Turns Case Increases Surveillance = Islamophobia

Security concerns are used to justify baseless profiling,
detention, and harassment of Muslims and those perceived as
such
LoCicero 14(Alice LoCicero, practicing psychologist at the Boston Medical Center, Domestic Consequences
of US Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism,
http://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPSYJ/TOPSYJ-8-32.pdf, 12/18/14)

Thirteen years after the 9/11 attacks, security concerns

have led to a monstrously huge security and intelligence apparatus in the
US. Citizens, as well as noncitizens, are still being profled, detained without
explanation, inconvenienced, and indeed, hassled without cause. More than
a decade after 9/11, even permanent residents of the US worry about
traveling outside the country. They fear being viewed with suspicion or
having difficulty returning to the country. Law enforcement has been
infltrating Muslim communities, aggressively seeking informants, or creating
fake terrorist plots and attempting to draw young Muslims in. Federal agents
interview thousands of young Arab American and Muslim men with no
individualized suspicion of criminal activity [12].
SECURITY OVER FREEDOM

War
Fear of terror used to justify war Iraq proves
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

Insiders in the George W. Bush administration have revealed that when the
administration was seeking internal support for the decision to attack Saddams
Iraq, there were disagreements over how the decision should be framed . Saddam had

been tagged as a supporter of terrorism, and he had begun a nuclear program that was halted as a result of the
Desert Shield campaign in 1991 but whose status of dismantlement required more verifcation following 9/11, a task
being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In a 2003 Vanity Fair telephone interview
conducted by Sam Tannenhaus with Paul Wolfowitz, transcribed by the Defense Department, in which the reasons

The truth is that for reasons that have

a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that
everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core
reason. He then elaborates, saying that among fundamental concerns the overriding one was the connection
for going to war again with Iraq were raised, Wolfowitz states:

between weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism (Defense Department, 2009). Recall also
Condoleezza Rices comment of not waiting for a mushroom cloud as a threat warning. So the IAEA investigation

President Bush made his speech, and the war was launched , ostensibly to
The war has
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, exceeding the number
who died at Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and has spawned the rise of offshoots of Al
Qaeda like the Islamic State, whose brutality matches or exceeds that of the original. All this has occurred
even though-as revealed by the failure to fnd weapons of mass destruction
following the war-Saddams nuclear program had been completely shut down in the wake of the 1991 Persian
was shoved aside,

prevent Saddam from manufacturing nuclear weapons that he might turn over to terrorists.

Gulf War.

Democracy
Governmental policies of fear that build support for the War on
Terror become autocratic and kill the potential for democracy
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

political leaders who manipulate public fears to gain

support for policies that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of
people. Racist fears helped Nazis obtain support for the oppression and ultimate
murder of millions of Jews, Slavs, homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi predations required a
war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive fear of communism built support for a war in
Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that country and another two million
lost on the killing felds of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of terrorism brought
on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of nuclear weapons, has become the source of
policies that threaten the destruction of American democracy because of a lack of
perspective in the public discussion of these issues.
Human history displays many examples of

Structural Violence
Fear of terror has caused us to ignore systemic structural
violence
LoCicero 14(Alice LoCicero, practicing psychologist at the Boston Medical Center, Domestic Consequences
of US Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism,
http://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPSYJ/TOPSYJ-8-32.pdf, 12/18/14)

Over the years since 9/11, fear of terrorism has morphed into what might be called
hysteria. By hysteria, I refer to two elements: Excessive fear, and inability to assess the fear
rationally. While the so-called Islamic State deliberately engenders fear, Americans fear of the socalled Islamic State group is disproportionate to the actual risk. That is not to
suggest that there is no danger from terrorism. Consider, however, tha t there is
much less palpable panic, much less news reporting, and much less money invested
in the dangers of smoking, alcohol use, automobile accidents, frearms, poverty, or
obesity, all of which kill far more Americans than terrorism. Terrorism hysteria is just
what terrorists want to create: Confusion, panic, paralysis, inability to create an
effective response.

Nuke War o/ws Nuke Terrorism

Nuclear weapons are a greater threat nuclear terrorism is
just fearmongering and unlikely
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle
for fear-mongering that is unjustifed by available data. The debate on nuclear
terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the
consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks . And the
historical record shows that the war risk is real . The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations
have demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a close call regarding
nuclear war. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive,

evidence of any terrorist group working

seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by
other means is virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by
terrorists requires signifcant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no
guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of
reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons,

a groups more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished.

it is reasonable to conclude that the

fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat.
While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence,

Islamophobia = Dehumanization
Their view of the terrorist other leads to the dehumanization of
Muslims
Merskin 4 (Debra Merskin, School of Journalism & Communication University of
Oregon, The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of
George W. Bush, 2004, MASS COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY,
http://web.asc.upenn.edu/usr/ogandy/C45405%20resources/Merskin%20the
%20construction.pdf, JAS)
links stereotypes of Arabs, enemy image construction, and ideology to the
rhetoric of President George W. Bush as delivered during fve speeches and a
memorial service subsequent to the September 11, 2001, attacks. 1 Spillman and
This article

Spillmans (1997, pp. 5051) model of enemy image construction is used as a framework for an interpretive textual
analysis (Chandler, 2002; Hall, 1975) that chronologically traces the development of the Arab enemy image in this

feelings and reactions to enmity can be described as a

syndrome, one that draws on a historically constructed foundation from which
stereotypes are built and enemy images emerge . The resultant extraction of an
enemy image reinforces ancient ideological dichotomies of good versus evil and us
versus them, rigidifying an agreed upon stereotype with referential function . Over time,
an enemy image, defned as a culturally influenced, very negative and stereotyped
evaluation of the other (Fiebig-von Hase, 1997, p. 2), is reinforced and reinvigorated via
the words of political opinion leaders and mass media representations . This study reveals
that the accumulation of historically, politically, and culturally cultivated negative
images of Arabs resembles the word choices and allusions used in the carefully constructed, post-September
11 speeches of President George W. 158 MERSKIN 1Rhetoric, as used in this article, is defned as di scourse
calculated to influence an audience toward some end (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 157). Bush. A
necessary part of this analysis is to bracket the historical question of guilt and innocence,
and focus on the recurring images that have been used to characterize the
enemy (Keen, 1986, p. 13). The analysis demonstrates how presidential verbal rhetoric was
built on and informed by cultural artifacts (movies, television, newspaper stories, and comics) and is
consistent with Spillman and Spillmans (1997) model of enemy image construction. There is a standard
repertoire of propagandistic words and images that serves to dehumanize the
other as part of the construction of an enemy image in the popular imagination and thus makes a retaliatory
rhetoric. This model posits that

backlash against human beings seem logical and natural. The results of this study are important for scholars,
governmental decision makers, media creators, and citizens. They add to the limited literature on the construction
of enemy images and Arab stereotyping in the media and extend and exemplify the Spillman and Spillman (1997)

evidenced by policies such as those enacted by the newly created

Department of Homeland Security, the Patriot Act, and detainment of suspects
without due process of the law, these fndings have human rights as well as foreign
and domestic policy implications (Feehan, 2003; Valbrun, 2003). MAKING ENEMIES Nations need
enemies. Governments use the idea of a common enemy as a method of social
control, of reinforcing values of the dominant system, and of garnering participation
in the maintenance of those beliefs (Keen, 1986; Spillman & Spillman, 1997). As a hegemonic device,
a common enemy can serve to distract attention and divert aggression and energy toward a
common threat. In addition, a common enemy is important in organizing evolutionary-based
survival strategies that rely on perceptual and behavioral patterns that are a fundamental
model. As

part of human nature. Differences in age, race, religion, culture, age, or appearance can be the characteristic(s)

evoke strong emotions and

reactions such as aggression, fear, hate, aversion, and expulsion. Xenophobic and
racist reactions create an artifcial binary opposition that is resolved through the
physical annihilation of one side by the other (Kibbey, 2003, paragraph 2). The resultant wethey dichotomy produces a kind of group think that supports separation of
particular racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural groups, positioning them as hostile and
alien. As Said (1997) pointed out, Sensationalism, crude xenophobia, and insensitive
belligerence are the order of the day, with results on both sides of the imaginary
line between us andthem that are extremely unedifying (p. xlviii). Cultural factors
also play an important role in forming and regulating human behavior as part of the
phenomenology of the hostile imagination (Keen, 1986, p. 13). Despite changing times and
that stimulate resentment toward other groups. The unfamiliar and strange

circumstances, the hostile imagination has a cerCONSTRUCTION OF ARABS AS ENEMIES 159 tain standard
repertoire of images it uses to dehumanize the enemy (Keen, 1986, p.
13).ThisprocessincludeswhatJungreferstoastheshadowarchetype,which,inthis case, becomes the archetype of the
enemy (Hyde & McGuinness, 1994, p. 86). In the collective sense, according to this theory, shadowy qualities and
unsavory characteristics are often projected onto other people resulting in paranoia,
suspiciousness,andlackofntimacy,allofwhichafflictindividuals,groups,andevenentirenations (Hopcke, 1989, p. 82).

development of the collective unconscious that

comes to support viewing others as enemies. They describe enemy image
construction as a syndrome of deeply rooted perceptual evaluations that take on
the following characteristics: Negative Anticipation. All acts of the enemy, in the past, present, and
future become attributed to destructive intentions toward ones own group. Whatever the enemy
undertakes is meant to harm us. Putting Blame on the Enemy. The enemy is
thought to be the source of any stress on a group. They are guilty of causing the
existing strain and current negative conditions. Identifcation With Evil. The values
of the enemy represent the negation of ones own value system and the enemy is
intent on destroying the dominant value system as well. The enemy embodies the
opposite of that which we are and strive for; the enemy wishes to destroy our
highest values and must therefore be destroyed . Zero-Sum Thinking. What is good for the
enemy is bad for us and vice versa. Stereotyping and De-Individualization. Anyone who
belongs to the enemy group is ipso facto our enemy . Refusal to Show Empathy.
Consideration for anyone in the enemy group is repressed due to perceived threat
and feelings of opposition. There is nothing in common and no way to alter that
perception (pp. 5051). STEREOTYPES AND PROPAGANDA First the image, then the enemy. (Keen, 1986, p. 10)
Spillmann and Spillmann (1997) explained the

Thought of as over-generalized, reductionist beliefs,stereotypes are collections of traits or characteristics that

present members of a group as being all the same. This sign ifying

mental practice provides

convenient shorthand in the identifcation of a particular group of people . As available
methods for organizing the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 81), stereotypes get hold of the few simple, vivid, memorable, easily
grasped, and widely recognized characteristics about a 160 MERSKIN person,
reduce everything about the person to those traits, exaggerate and simplify them,
and fx them without change or development to eternity (Hall, 1997, p. 258). Certainly, it
would be impossible to function in the world without simplifying visual and verbal
information to manageable units. As Gandy (1998) suggested, It seems likely that stereotypes
become part of our understanding of our surroundings from the frst moments of our
efforts to make sense of the world around us (p. 83). Stereotypes serve as building
blocks of the fortress of social tradition (Lippmann, 1922, p. 96). They are part of the
maintenance of social and symbolic order that facilitates the binding of people together as an us and sends those
who are not us into symbolic exile as them (Hall, 1997, p. 258). Once an

individual is constructed as

an outsider, this person is no longer thought of as having humanity. The intimidating

outsider is surely an animal in human form (Green, 1993, p. 327). In the absence of direct
personal experience, stereotypes serve as a way of flling in the blanks in terms of expectations (or lack thereof) of
those different from the individual imagining them. Construction of an enemy image becomes the mental
background for aggression, distrust, guilt, projection, identifcation with all evil, and stereotyping (Fiebeg-von Hase,

people and government of the United States, for example, have a long
history of selectively demonizing and dehumanizing others, including their own
citizenry, in the interest of acquisition and preservation of resources and power (Said,
1997; Takaki, 1993; Zinn, 1995). Worth (2002) pointed out that Americas discovery of an enemy who
is not merely an enemy, but evil, has impeccable historical credentials. In a long
history of responding to real and perceived threats, it seems clear that this large,
heterogeneous country defnes itself in part through its nemeses . Such bellicosity can serve
1997, p. 2). The

as a convenient tool for unifcation where differences among us can be minimized, erased, or overlooked with a
powerful them or other. (p. 1) Further, a joining of politics and religion is useful in propagating hegemonic

theologians and political rhetoricians frequently invoke

images of Satan (Pagels, 1996). This practice can be traced at least as far back as Luther, when rebelling
beliefs. To accomplish this, both

peasants were declared to be agents of the devil (Keen, 1986, p. 27). For purposes of this article, however, there
are ample examples in the recent past that can best be explained under the rubric of two structural factors tied to
enmity: (a) some

concrete facts that permit the enemy image to appear as plausible

and real and (b) the political system itself (Fiebig-von Hase, 1997, p. 24). Attitudes among
European-Americans that would permit extermination attempts of indigenous Americans,
enslavement of Africans, and Japanese internment are a few examples of the
extremes to which CONSTRUCTION OF ARABS AS ENEMIES 161 enemy construction
has reached. These beliefs are not simply erased over the passage of time. Rather, through the
messages of dominant social and cultural institutions, such as the government and
the media, selective versions of reality are presented in a way that provides
justifcation for past, present, and future action and reaction to constructed
enemies. The political system is the second structural source of social conflict and enmity (Fiebig-von Hase,
1997). In American bureaucracy, tension often arises between an individuals beliefs and
expectations of government and political control. In the guise of political rhetoric,
propaganda, defned in its broadest sense as the technique of influencing human
action by the manipulation of representations, is often used to ameliorate
psychological dissonance (Lasswell, 1934/1995, p. 13). Propaganda can be found in spoken, written,
pictorial or musical forms and has been used as a way of mobilizing sentiment around an idea, image, or product.

attains eminence as the one means of mass mobilizations that is cheaper

than violence, bribery, or other possible control techniques (Lasswell, 1934/1995, p. 17).
Moreover, it

Islamophobia = Cultural Homogenization

Media depictions of all Muslims as Arabs violently homogenize
all Muslims
Ridouani 11
(Driss Ridouani, School of Arts and Humanities Meknes, The Representation of
Arabs and Muslims in Western Media, 2011, Ruta,
www.raco.cat/index.php/Ruta/article/download/243531/326280, JAS)
sense of recognizing the real identity or rather identifying Arabs and Muslims is
really a problematic issue in Western conception . Roughly they do not discriminate among the
different ethnic groups, different races, different dialects, and even worse different religious beliefs. The Arab
world is so complex that it could not be compressed or simplifed in one term as it
has been ignorantly conceived by the West. However, a succinct analysis of the reason
why the West generalize the Arab world in one specifc term, in the sense that what
can be attribute to one person it can be related to All Arabs . Or Shaheen pointed out
Muslims are lumped together and our expectations are based more on stereotyping
than on empirical research, according to Esposito . All too often the "coverage of Islam
and the Muslim world concludes there is a monolithic Islam out there somewhere,
believing, feeling, thinking and acting as one." The stereotypical Muslim presented
to Americans resembles Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, Libya's Moammar Gadhaf, or
Iraq's Saddam Hussein; the imagery "has profoundly affected American perceptions of
Islam and the Middle East. The identity of Arab Muslims is unifed in one particular term; such
overgeneralization engenders very critical repercussions chiefly when the West fails
to notice the different ethnicities and different religious beliefs . When referring to the
The

geographical territory that expands from the very shores of the Atlantic Ocean in North Africa to the Gulf in Asia, the
Western media designates it racially as Arabs and religiously as Muslims, excluding thus radically the different racial
and religious minorities. Racially this territory includes Amazigh race especially in North Africa and religiously it

wonder why
the Western media overlook such multi-differences for which the Arab world is
reputed. Is it out of the West ignorance of the multi-race and multi-religion of this
territory? How can the West ignore these plain facts while it did subdue this territory for
more than half century (it lasted for more than a century i.e. Algeria)? To generalize the identity of
such large territory in two terms Arabs and Muslims is a deliberate and conscious
strategy which makes things easy for the West t stereotype both the race and its
religion. This population, despite its multi-race, multi-culture, multilanguage and multi-religion, is racialized as
coexists with Christians especially in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine. One may

Arabs and religionized as Muslims. Not surprisingly, these two terms are archetypes of negative attributes which

maintained clich that says, seen one seen em all

divests Arab Muslims from their diversity while compressing them in one individual .
The stereotypes created by the Western media do indeed have dangerous effect on Western public
in producing a holistic conception of Arabs and Muslims. Once a name of a political
or religious leader is invoked, allegedly all Arabs and all Muslims are incarnated and
personifed in that name. In view of the West, all Arabs think in the same way, react
in the same manner, respond holistically. In this respect, they are all, like Saddam Houssein, think
represent a threat for the West. The

and plan to destroy the world with mass-destruction weapons which G.W. Bush petromaniac is still looking for,

all Muslims organize and plot

terrorist acts, in other words they are all someone called Ben Laden. They are also
but he fnds petrol instead and he is satisfed and calmed down ;

all as religiously fanatic as Ayatollah, refusing to coexist with the other religions , be
they monotheist or polytheist. Despite the different races that are included under the banner of Islam (Arabs,
Persians, Asians etc.), in

view of the West all Muslims are Arabs. In other words, far from being a
Muslims are stereotypically embodied in one
persona which is endowed by all sorts of devilish deeds . Conclusion The Arab spectators will
multicultural, multiracial, and multiethnic groups,

not be surprised when watching a flm about Arabs, nor do the readers who go through the columns of newspapers
or magazines that treat a subject concerning Muslims, nor the listeners who follow the news that deal with Arabs,
because the Western media preserve unanimous stereotypes for the Arab Muslims whether they are televised,

problems are so amassed, so ramifed that they are

jeopardized and problematized. The question is not confned in a casual unnoticed
stereotypes and distortions of reality, but it is extended to the rationalization of the
issue. The Western media endeavour at whatever costs and power to legitimize the
prejudices and give the sense of credibility . It is noticeable, therefore, that the
Western media shore their claims up with evidences, arguments and facts in
order to demonstrate that the Arabs actions, thought and intention are
demonic. The Western media, then, is responsible for infusing and inculcating the Western public with biased
printed or broadcasted. These

and fabricated preconception about Arabs and Muslims. If the Western media change their minds towards the Arab
Muslims, they will get a reciprocally mutual response from their public.

Alternative

PIC
Vote negative to reject the discourse of the 1ac, you can
endorse the plan absent the representations that link The
affirmative should be held accountable for the rhetorical
choices they made in constructing the 1ac and the
justifications they offer for the plan, critical to argumentative
responsibility and in depth education. Calls to vote for the plan
in a vacuum are a reason to vote negative on presumption.
Clark 7 (Phillip G, Post-Doctoral Fellow in Ethics and Public Policy, Wesleyan University, "Understanding Aging
and Disability Perspectives on Home Care: Uncovering Facts and Values in Public-Policy Narratives and Discourse,"
Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue canadienne du vieillissement 26 (suppl 1) : 47 - 62 (2007) 47 doi:
10.3138/cja.26.suppl 1.47)

The development of a critical lens through which to examine policy

discourse requires an understanding of the role that values play in
framing and solving significant public policy problems . Policy makers often like to
believe that the provision of enough factual information about a complex social problem empirical data based on
careful research is sufficient to make informed choices from alternative ways of solving it. However, as Potter

every public policy problem consists of both an empirical

description of the state of affairs and a normative dimension in which
some cherished value or set of values is affected. Thus, the definition of any
social problem and a set of recommended solutions to it are also a function of
the interplay between facts and values. Values give us the questions to ask, and we gather
(1969) reminds us,

facts in our pursuit of answers to questions which, in turn, force us back on our original intentions in asking those

Values shape the facts in which we are interested, the

ways by which we seek to determine them, and the amount of credibility
we place on them. Similarly, facts may enhance, diminish, or otherwise call into question our values and
questions (Rein, 1983).

value assumptions. The relationship between empirical evidence and ethical interpretation may be made even more
apparent in cross-national comparative analyses, such as between Canada and the United States (Clark, 1993a,
1993b, 1999). This line of inquiry is especially important in the Canadian context because of the overt attention
devoted to values and values-language in the policy arena. For example, in their research on uncovering meanings

public policy statements, Iannantuono and Eyles (1997) draw attention to the
power of language used in policy discourse, suggesting the importance of
analyzing patterns and uses of language to construct and deconstruct the
world of public policy; or, as they put it, the meaning of words and the wording of meanings (p.
1611). Similarly, Fast and Keating (2000) state that the words we use, and how we use them, are
critical to both research and policy making (p. 2). For example, in empirical analyses the
numerical and technical language of science can be used to lend power and
authority to official pronouncements or positions. In contrast, values may be more
in Canadian

implicit in the type of language used in policy documents, and uncovering them may require explicit interpretive

Reflecting on the power of language used in policy discourse , Kenny

words used highlight some beliefs and values and
obscure others. The framing of the discourse therefore influences the
construction of meaning and the valuing of beliefs (p. 5). The tasks of
identifying the values underlying particular public policy problems and elucidating
proposed policy options in light of relevant moral principles have been described as
the role of public ethics by Jonsen and Butler (1975). Kelman and Warwick (1978) suggest a similar
analysis.

(2004) concludes, The

approach to analyzing the ethical dimensions of social interventions and present an explicit framework for doing so.

Importantly, there is a strong vein in Canada of using this approach to understanding the values underlying public

For example, Peters (1995) conducted an empirical study of public

opinion polls and augmented it with extensive focus group discussions of
the interrelationships between public policies and social values . She concludes
that values emerge from public discourse and are essential ingredients in
framing the ways in which policy options are stated and selected. Similarly, the
policies.

work on values in Canadian healthpolicy analysis by Giacomini and colleagues (2001, 2004) recognizes the
importance of values as drivers of policy development and implementation, though values, rhetoric, and discourse
are complicated. Stated values can be used as powerful imperatives or empty platitudes; they can be employed as
genuine guidelines or as confusing guideposts to obscure and obfuscate. Marmor, Okma, and Latham (2002)
recognize the suspicion with which social scientists have traditionally regarded the concept of national values,

values may play an important role in creating a

political community and in guiding its actions. Statements of values may
inspire, unite, even constitute a people (p. 2). Kenny (2004) states that public
policy is a moral endeavour that involves decisions about who we are and
who we desire to be as a country (p. 2).
but they also suggest that such

Alt Solves
Only a conceptual and representational mindset shift solves
a focus on multidimensional analysis, refusal of binarism, legal
justice over militarism, internal rogue resolution, productive
instead of coercive power, and an obligatory commitment to
peace outside the political realm
Milojevi 2 [Ivana Milojevi, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and
futures studies, and Visiting Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies
and Research, University of Novi Sad; Gender, Peace and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War;
University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic__Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Authors frst language is Serbian.

theoretical strategies work on redefning the way the events are

understood and explained. Recalling divisions, creating abstract categories of enemies,
and then embodying them in a particular group or person are problematized. This is because such
conceptualizing does not enhance communication but only creates circles of revenge
and retaliation. Rather, the main focus ought to be on understanding exactly who and exactly why did such
horrifc acts of violence. The analysis of the technicalities of the attack would be equally important
but not the only discourse used. There would be refusal to categorize some people as
quintessentially evil, although there would be a demand that they answer about their evil
actions and behaviors. If terrorism is basically about lawlessness, arbitrary use of military might
needs to be prevented, because it only confrms that the might is right and that
violence is the only language that they understand . The focus should rather be on bringing
those responsible for criminal actions to the International Justice Court, which would have its
Conceptual and

quarters in several locations in various world regions. Civilizational and cultural differences would not have equally
strong ground in discounting courts and justice processes themselves if they were seen as fair and balanced.

of enforcing the rule of law. In circumstances

where atrocity is allegedly made in the name of Islam it should be Islamic cultures and societies that could
most successfully address fundamentalists cultures of war that steam from their
own tradition as well as be more successful in bringing the perpetrators to justice .
Certainly,

Islamic countries are

not incapable

International Courts based in various regions of the world would enhance holy peace culture from within which

Fundamentalists doctrines would

loose some of their raisons dtre, some of the appeal that streams from addressing
genuine inequalities and grievances. The conceptual shift would also include refocusing from
power-over in the direction of power-for, power-to, power-with, power-within and
power-toward. This means a shift from coercive power to the approach that focuses on empowerment, on
enabling power to create positive change. It also means questioning both the validity but also
the efficacy of power-over as the mechanism for organizing world politics or solving
world problems (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:216). This redefnition is crucial because, as Peterson and
Runyan (1999:216) explain: If this model is used, world order looks less like a pyramid , where few are
on the top and many are on the bottom, and more like a rotating circle in which no one is
always at the top and no one is always at the bottom . Instead, all participate in complex
webs of interdependence. Interests, rather than being defned in opposition to each other, are
developed through relationships with others. Conflicts are resolved not by force or
its threat but in nonviolent interaction and mutual learning. Another conceptual shift is from
reactive to relational autonomy. When players in the world politics are seen in terms of reactive
would be seen as less threatening for the people of the region.
therefore

autonomy (values independence and order, promotes separateness and independence that is a reaction
against others, assumes that cooperative relations are virtually impossible without
coercion) expectations of hostile and competitive behavior are reproduced . (Peterson
and Runyan, 1999). This in turn generates uncooperative and defensive responses . On the other
hand, relational autonomy values interdependence and justice , basing identity within the
context of relationships rather than in opposition to them. It also assumes that cooperation typifes
human relations when they are relatively equal and that cooperation is destroyed in the presence
of inequality and coercion (Hirschmann, 1989, Sylvester, 1993, Peterson and Runyan, 1999). Seeing the
world in terms of its interconnectedness implies a commitment towards
equality, as an obligation. So far, the commitment to international conventions and
institutions has been on voluntary basis only and too often seen as some sort of harassment to
individualized and individualistic sovereign states . Terrorists, for their part, also obviously
defne power as power-over that is based on reactive autonomy , with the main goal of
reaching the top of the pyramid rather then questioning the structure that reproduces such
hierarchies. Underlining views on reactive vs. relational autonomy are different understandings of conflicts and
consequently how are conflicts to be resolved. For example, conflicts are usually presented in terms of
human nature seen in negative terms (competition, capacity for aggression and violence). According
to Eisler (2000) such a presentation streams from the dominator cultural paradigm , which
represents only part of the picture of what it means to be human. Both the capacity for violence and
capacity for peace are evolutionary features of human nature. The dominator
discourse represents only negative aspects of human nature as realistic , forgetting
about equally valid positive human characteristics such as capacity for sharing,
altruism, non-violence, peaceful conflict resolution, cooperation, caring, negotiation
and communication. (Eisler, 2000). More gender-balanced narratives on evolution and history
provide examples of not only warfare but also of long periods of peace (Eisler, 2000,
Boulding, 1990). Other fundamental concepts, such as sovereignty and strength are also defned
differently if we step away from dominant worldview . For example, an ecological
perspective sees the sovereignty of the Earth as preceding and still superceding
human sovereignties (Patricia Mische, 1989). This means that the sovereignty to nation states needs
to be balanced with subnational and supranational entities both with lived local
communities and the world as a whole. The nation-state is then simultaneously too big and too small to effectively
co-ordinate effective responses that would address direct and structural violence. But in other ways it is also just

actions are necessary at all and the every level of human organization .
redefnition of what constitutes strength prevents current seesaw of one-sided
ultimatums and shortsighted stubbornness as a response. Because, to be willing to negotiate with the
right because
The

opponents would not be seen as the sight of weakness but rather as that of strength. This would also be the case
with attempts to reconcile, continuously communicate, provide concessions, cooperate and accept mediation.
Unfortunately, current diplomacy is based predominantly on the strength of weapons
which dictates terms of engagement, priorities and issues rather then on true desire to resolve grievances to

when security is understood in

terms of both direct violence, such as war, as well as the structural violence, it is believed that
actions need to be taken not only in the realm of the political but also in
the realm of social and economical. As authors such as Jan Jindy Pettman (1996) have shown
common satisfaction of all stakeholders and parties involved. Of course,

security from womens perspective is more likely to be defned as security of employment, education, health and
security from domestic violence rather then in terms of a protection from an external threat to a nation-state.
Therefore, global security is also to be defned differently. It is only logical that t his

means neither
acquiring huge arsenals of weapons of mass-destruction nor their frequent use. But

the hegemony of patriarchal discourse assures that these alternative readings are
rarely taken seriously.

Answers To

AT Case Outweighs Discourse First

We should privilege discursive analysis
Bartolucci and Gallo 13
(Valentina Bartolucci and Giorgio Gallo, Department of Computer Science, University
of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, Terrorism, System Thinking and Critical Discourse Analysis,
August 16th, 2013, Systems Research and Behavioral Science,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sres.2206/pdf, JAS)
human activities
is really the manifestation of a perpetual flow, an open system in a dynamic steady
state [maintaining] itself in a non equilibrium state by taking in a continuous supply
of energy and exchanging components with its environment (Hammond, 2003, p.
116). A system is part of the environment in which it is situated and with which it has continuous interactions and
interchanges. Disregarding this, it may lead to poor understanding and to
misguided actions. Also within CDA, the context is of paramount importance. A discourse can only
be understood as located in a specifc context. The capacity to grasp the different
components of a system is shaped by the observers epistemic community . At this
purpose, CDA provides the researcher with an effective interpretative tool to analyze
language seen as a social practice and as embedded in a sociopolitical context . CDA
SYSTEMS THEORY AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS As mentioned earlier, a system of

draws on a functional theory of language and seeks to complement the linguistic analysis of texts with an
interdisciplinary approach directed at the deconstruction of the whole sociopolitical and historical contexts in which

focus of CDA, as Wodak (1996, 17)

states, is not upon language or the use of language in and of themselves, but upon
the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures . Specifcally, CDA
discourses are embedded (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 2001). The

aims at critically investigating structural relations of power, control and domination as constituted, expressed and

discourses are not seen as neutral

ways of describing the world but as ways of reproducing or challenging relations of
power and dominance in society. Discourse is thus intended as a practice not just of
representing the world, but of signifying the world , constituting and constructing the
world in meaning (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). The assumption of the neutrality of language is
challenged, and the attention devoted at exploring the implications deriving from
the use of particular words 3 The clock metaphor was used by Karl Popper in his paper Of Clouds and
legitimized in discourse (Weiss and Wodak, 2003). Within CDA,

Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and Freedom of Man (1972). Syst. Res. RESEARCH PAPER
Copyright 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 32, 1527 (2015) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2206 Terrorism, System

The
response to the September 11 attacks, culminated with the Afghan war, stems from
a narrow and limited vision of the events that could only be understood if it is
analyzed as located in a specifc discursive community,4 in this case the one
expressed by President George W. Bushs discourse. The US presidential discourse on
terrorism has been taken here as the framing discourse for its capacity of
dictat[ing] its employment everywhere in the world (Erjavec and Volcic, 2006, p. 298).
Thinking and Critical Discourse Analysis 19 and grammatical forms in specifc contexts (Taylor, 2001).

Following the 11 September 2001 events, truth was asserted and obedience exhorted, with the administration
imposing a lesser standard of evidence upon itself (Wolf, 2003, p. 5). The course of this conflict is not known, yet
its outcome is certain: Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not
neutral between them. 5 God told me to strike at Al Qaida and I struck them: then he instructed me to strike at
Saddam, which I did; and now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East (Bush to Abu Mazen. In

discourse, characterized by a limited range of effective rhetorical

devices and quite simple argumentative structures, has been extremely successful,
Blumenthal 2004). The

in being widely perceived as a selfevident truth towards which there is no room for
discussion and in building the necessary consent around the administration. At the
same time, its oversimplicity, unwarranted assumptions, cultural biases and heavy
moral charges hampered the capacity to understand the complexity of the events
and of the wider context in which they took place . The system was indeed seen as
closed, and there was a lack of appreciation of the fact that it was actually a system in continuous
dynamic exchange with a wider Muslim area containing groups and individuals
characterized by a common ideological base, outraged by the perceived oppression
of Muslims and sharing the aspiration for a reconstituted caliphate of which AlQaeda has become the symbol.6 The situation proved to be much more complex than expected, and
today, after 10 years from the Mission Accomplished speech, the war is still going on, and few analysts harbour

direct consequence of the idea of open system is that the

analysis of a system implies the choice of the elements and of the relations deemed
relevant with respect to the phenomenon under analysis . This is what is called the choice of
the boundaries. The same context in which the event originates is not objectively given
once and for all. It is us as observers who defne it and its boundaries . Indeed, the
optimism about its fnal result. A

boundary concept lies at the heart of system thinking: because of the fact that everything in the Universe is directly
or indirectly connected to everything else, where the boundaries are placed in any analysis becomes crucial

In choosing the systems boundaries, it is not only necessary

to look outward to the wider system of which ours is a subsystem but also to look
inward to the diverse components that can be found within it, being well aware that
each component is in itself a system containing other components . These two processes,
(Midgley, 2000, pp. 12829).

the outward one and the inward one, are almost limitless: it is always possible to fnd new wider super-systems or
smaller sub-systems. The outward process leads to the defnition of the boundary between the system and its
context, whereas the inward process leads to the defnition of the level of granularity of the system.7 In this
respect, the discursive community in which the 4 This community is often referred to with the label of neoconservative. 5 Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 20/09/2001. 6 Some of these groups are well organized and, within the common
motivation, have their proper agenda (see, for instance, the Salaf group Boko Haram in Nigeria or Pakistans Tehriki-Taliban); others tend to be amateurish, if occasionally lethal. These groups and individuals represent what Jones
(2012) calls the third and fourth tiers of Al-Qaeda. The more internal frst and second tiers are formed by the AlQaeda leadership and operatives and by a growing list of officially affiliated groups, such as Somalias al Shabab. 7
For instance, it is at this level that one decides whether a political organization should be considered as a unit in the
system representation or whether it is necessary to go deeper in the analysis, considering smaller units, such as the
different groups or factions that operate inside the organization. RESEARCH PAPER Syst. Res. Copyright 2013 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 32, 1527 (2015) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2206 20 Valentina Bartolucci and Giorgio Gallo

The same context in which the system is located is not

objectively given once and for all. It evolves over time, and even small variations of
it may have unpredictable and unexpected effects on the events unfolding within
the system. Thus, the way the systems boundaries are chosen by the observer is of crucial importance for a
observer is located plays a crucial role.

proper understanding of the system and for a correct interpretation of the events within it. In particular, the choice
of the boundaries shapes the idea we have of the situation in which a terrorist behavior arises and has deep effect
in how we tackle it. In fact, the choice of the boundaries depends also on the objectives and on the value system of
the researcher, being the analyst part of the wider system in which the events under analysis are located.

AT Experts = Terrorism Real

Governmental data is kept secret at best, their authors rely
on undetailed secondhand sources
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
A serious impediment to scholars, whether fully dedicated to terrorism studies or only occasionally participating in

The U.S. government has

neither released relevant data about terrorist plots nor funded the methodological
accumulation of detailed and comprehensive data that might shed some light on the
question of the turn to political violence. A funding contract officer once asked me,
Why should I fund the gathering of publicly available information? It seems that the
governments strategy has been to fund research, but withhold any detailed
evidence, which is still classifed. Data available to academics via popular
search engines are, at best, secondary sources coming from journalistic
investigation or, worse, erroneous claims by self-appointed experts. These
are mostly based on politically motivated government leaks and government claims
about terroristsoften made for political reasons. They tend to justify the
governments actions (providing the prosecutorial case in an upcoming trial), and obfuscate more
than they clarify.
such a study, is the lack of the availability of comprehensive and reliable data.

They rely on flawed news and press knowledge solely put out
by the government
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

Government statements and leaks provide fragmentary and biased information to

journalists. Unfortunately, since there is so little information, the press amplifes this
patchy information to the point of distortion through an echo effect, where repeats of the
claims are taken as corroboration for the original leak. One dimensional and
sensational portraits of alleged terrorists, packaged in the fvehundred-words-or-less
limit of a newspaper article or a television sound bite, dominate our understanding
of this phenomenon. Nor is there any incentive in the press to try to correct
erroneous initial information, which is forever memorialized on the Internet, now the
repository of all information, good and bad. Self-appointed cyber sleuths who constitute the vast
majority of so-called terrorist researchers create far-fetched theories about terrorists
and terrorism from these very fragmentary caricatures. Indeed, from such a distorted
foundation, anything is possible. Unfortunately, many scholars also rely on these government
officials statements, which are political, directed at a given audience for specifc
reasons, such as advocacy for ones department or agency, defending it before a Congressional inquiry, selfpromotion, or a request to increase its budget. These statements have a defnite spin and
present only one side of the issue, usually one as favorable as possible to the briefer. They deal in
generalities and ignore any inconsistent information. Usually, they are simply
misleading, but at times, they are outright lies, such as cabinet officers claiming that the U.S. did
not torture terrorist suspects27 or that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction to the United Nations. 28 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz guaranteed to the House Budgetary Committee that the Iraq War would not

cost much to the American public.29 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano declared, The system
worked when we narrowly escaped an airplane bombing catastrophe due to the ineptitude of the bomber. 30
Generally, government cabinet members try to be careful in their messages to the press because they know that

officials of lesser rank, who

originate most erroneous disseminated information, as the provider knows that the
press wont be able to check classifed information.
the press will scrutinize them. This same level of care is not present among

All of their terror evidence is written from a flawed perspective

that stems from the so called experts in the field of
terrorism
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

the post-9=11 money surge into terrorism studies and the rush of
newcomers into the feld had a deleterious effect on research. The feld was
dominated by laymen, who controlled funding, prioritizing it according to
their own questions, and self-proclaimed media experts who conduct their
own research. These experts still fll the airwaves and freely give their
opinions to journalists, thereby framing terrorist events for the public.
However, they are not truly scholars, are not versed in the scientifc method,
and often pursue a political agenda. They are not trained to detect or
analyze trends, but they certainly like to make sensational statements. They
cannot be relied upon to advance the feld of terrorism research, as they are
more advocates than objective scholars. The press plays a role in echoing
the most outrageous and sensationalist claims. Ultimately, new fndings
are not debated in the academy in a collegial way, but on television and the
Internet as arguments to advance political agendas. The voice of true
scholars is drowned in this hysterical cacophony of political true believers.
Overall,

Lack of terror experts has been a problem since the beginning

Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of
Sheffield, Disciplining terror how exports invented terrorism,
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-how-expertsinvented-terrorism?format=PB, August 2014)

The absence of specialized "terrorism experts" is apparent at the frst US

conference on terrorism, which was organized by the Department of State and the Cabinet Committee
to Combat Terrorism on October 24, 1972. Most of those brought in as experts at this
conference were called upon for their prominence in felds such as collective
behavior, social movements, or social psychology, rather than for their
expertise in the area of terrorism, per se. Nor did the presenters at this
conference include any of those individuals who would come to constitute
the core of the terrorism studies community in later years. Presentations were made
by Thomas Thornton, of the Department of State, and author of the oft-cited (1964) essay "Terror as a weapon of
political agitation"; sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz of Rutgers University; Karl Schmitt of the University of Texas;
Carl Leiden of the University of Texas and the National War College; Edward Gude of the Adlai Stevenson Institute
of International Affairs, who had written on counterinsurgency; and psychologist Sheldon Levy of Wayne State

University, who had served as co-director of the Assassination and Political Violence task force of the Violence
Commission under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.21 The relative position of the earliest conferences as outliers in
the later feld of expertise is evident in the network diagrams: while most of the other conferences form a dense
web of connections, this conference (labeled no. 2 in Figures 2.2 to 2.6) had very few ties to later events.

Terror authors are flawed and most are one time writers and all
are unqualified
Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of
Sheffield, Disciplining terror how exports invented terrorism,
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-how-expertsinvented-terrorism?format=PB, August 2014)
Furthermore, the self-identifed "terrorism mafa" constituted only a minor portion of those involved in some way in

There were a whole series of others,

traversing this very porous boundary of the nascent world of "terrorism
studies," coming in and making claims about terrorism and then
disappearing. A large fraction of those publishing in journals or presenting at
conferences had no particular background in the feld, and often would not
continue to do further work in the area.32 Thus, although I emphasize in this chapter the
the production of knowledge about terrorism at this point.

emergence of a terrorism studies community and the "terrorism mafa," the larger arena of terrorism expertise
continued to be dominated by people who were not (and perhaps did not want to be) terrorism experts in this
specialized sense. Of 1,796 individuals presenting at conferences on terrorism between 1972 and 2001, 1,505 (84
percent) made only one appearance.33 Similarly, a recent study of journal articles published on terrorism during

found more than 80 percent to be by one-time authors (Silke 2004b: 69),

and another study found that core journals in terrorism studies had
signifcantly higher rates of contributions from non-academic authors than
journals in political science or communications studies (Gordon 2001). These
factors all contributed to the structuring of a relatively uninstitutionalized
feld of terrorism expertise with highly permeable boundaries. In contrast to theories
the 1990s

of professions and scientifc felds, which often tend to presume that the social structures of expertise will be

the feld of terrorism studies has been

characterized by weak and permeable boundaries, a population of "experts"
whose backgrounds and sources of legitimation are highly heterogeneous,
composed of tightly bounded self-regulated units,

and a lack of agreement not just over how expertise should be evaluated but even over how to defne the central
topic of their concern.

Expertise is constructed in an interstitial space involving

multiple biased parties
Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of
Sheffield, Disciplining terror how exports invented terrorism,
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-how-expertsinvented-terrorism?format=PB, August 2014)
While the sociological literature on cultural felds, disciplines, and professional projects tends to highlight the

terrorism experts have rarely succeeded in

consolidating control over the production of terrorism discourse and terrorism
expertise. Rather than looking like a discipline or a closed "cultural feld/' terrorism expertise is
constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between academia, the state,
importance of institutionalization,

and the media. The boundaries of legitimate knowledge and expertise are
particularly open to challenges from self-proclaimed experts from the media and
political felds, and this has had signifcant consequences for the sorts of expert
discourses that tend to be produced and disseminated. Experts, however defned, were
not in control of the production of other experts, or the defnition of their object of "terrorism/' as illustrated in
the continual tension over whether terrorism should be approached primarily as a moral problem or as a
rational problem to be addressed through causal social-scientifc analysis.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism Real

Fear of nuclear terrorism has risen despite the lack proof for it
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

predictions of nuclear catastrophe at the hands of terrorists have

become an accepted part of the national security debate , overshadowing to some extent the
For nearly two decades,

concerns about proliferation of national nuclear programs. It appears that a belief in the effectiveness of deterrence
has assuaged the fears of many people about nuclear war waged by countries (whether justifed or not), while at

belief that terrorists cannot be deterred has raised nuclear terrorism

fears more than ever. These fears have been fanned in published predictions of
nuclear terror attacks (within a given 10- year period) by prominent persons in nuclear
security circles, or by informal polls, such as the one issued nine years ago by Sen.
Richard Lugar when he chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The poll
asked persons working in nuclear policy areas what they thought the risk was of a
nuclear terrorist attack over a 10-year period, with guesses suggesting a high threat
but based on no hard data that was provided or referenced.
the same time the

And, their scenarios are biased Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

When nuclear safety became subject to

government regulation, a question frequently raised during public and private
debates about regulation was formulated as: How safe is safe enough? Although the
risk of nuclear terrorism is very low, there is no public debate on the issue of
acceptable risk. No politician will publicly allow that we are or will ever be safe
enough from a nuclear terrorist attack. Indeed, reputations have been made and
enhanced in the public and private spheres by loud proclamations that we are not
safe enough and that more needs to be done if we are to avoid catastrophe. There
is no surer way for the national labs or the intelligence agencies to receive more
money from the Treasury than by hyping the terrorist threat, particularly if the word
nuclear can be attached to it, and by claiming that ones work is directly applicable
to mitigating the threat. And there is no surer way for politicians to give themselves
immunity from a charge of supporting wasteful spending than by citing their votes
as protecting the country from terrorism, nuclear or otherwise.
Distortion of national politics and government spending.

AT Framework Securitization
Our interpretation is that the judge is an educator evaluating
the systemic discourse of the plan and the world which it
creates.
1. Our interpretation is predictable the judge really is an
educator; and limited we can only critique discourse for
which a literature base exists
2. Even if they win their interpretation, they dont meet it
a rational policymaker considers the implications of the
plan for ethical concerns, policy equivalent of rejecting
the aff means we dont have to win the alt, just that their
scholarship is bad and would make the world worse
3. Discourse is the most educational rubric for evaluation,
representations are how we understand the world
The role of the ballot is to interrogate the discourse of the
1AC.
The criticism is an impact turn to their rhetoric: allowing them
to sever their reps would let them sever impact turns, which
are the only indisputable negative ground.
The 1AC is 10 seconds of plan 7:50 of justifications: Make them
defend those justifications.
We ought to place discursive analysis before policy
implementation, because discourse molds policy making
We need to prioritize discursive analysis: it has massive
implications for policy making
Jackson 07
(Richard Jackson, University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies, Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political and Academic
Discourse, June 21st, 2007, Government and Opposition,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x/pdf, JAS)
analytical approach employed in this study falls broadly
under the mantle of discourse analysis.3 A form of critical theorizing, discourse analysis
aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and social
THE ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSE The

processes. In particular, it is concerned with the politics of representation the manifest political
consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. Although
discourse theorizing is employed within a range of different epistemological
paradigms poststructuralist, postmodernist, feminist and social constructivist it
is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments . Broadly speaking, these include:4
an 3 For an insightful discussion of discourse analytic approaches in international relations, see: Jennifer Milliken,
The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods, European Journal of
International Relations, 5: 2 (1999), pp. 22554. See also: Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, Beyond Belief: Ideas and
Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, 3: 2
(1997), pp. 193237; Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse,
Ideology . . ., British Journal of Sociology, 44: 3 (1993), pp. 47399; and Albert Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on
Politics, International Organization, 50: 1 (1996), pp. 69108. 4 These shared commitments are explored in detail in
Milliken, The Study of Discourse. CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 395 The Author 2007. Journal compilation 2007

language as constitutive or productive of

meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signifcation that construct
social realities, particularly in terms of defning subjects and establishing their
relational positions within a system of signifcation ;5 an understanding of discourse as
being productive of subjects authorized to speak and act, legitimate forms of
knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense within particular
social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily
exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation ; and an understanding
of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, intertextual, open-ended,
requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to
destabilization and counter-hegemonic struggle .
Government and Opposition Ltd understanding of

Prefer our education claims its not 1940, kritiks are a thing
they should have used their infinite prep to pick better
advantage ground
1. Competing ideas: basis of learning and challenging
internalized biases that replicate the impact daily
2. Methodology gives us real world application
3. Education is the only real world skill roleplaying cedes
the agency we need; and fairness only matters in terms of
this single debate, make them prove in round abuse

AT Framework - Islamophobia
Our interpretation is that the judge is an educator evaluating
the systemic discourse of the plan and the world which it
creates.
4. Our interpretation is predictable the judge really is an
educator; and limited we can only critique discourse for
which a literature base exists
5. Even if they win their interpretation, they dont meet it
a rational policymaker considers the implications of the
plan for ethical concerns, policy equivalent of rejecting
the aff means we dont have to win the alt, just that their
scholarship is bad and would make the world worse
6. Discourse is the most educational rubric for evaluation,
representations are how we understand the world
The role of the ballot is to interrogate the discourse of the
1AC.
The criticism is an impact turn to their rhetoric: allowing them
to sever their reps would let them sever impact turns, which
are the only indisputable negative ground.
The 1AC is 10 seconds of plan 7:50 of justifications: Make them
defend those justifications.
We ought to place discursive analysis before policy
implementation, because discourse molds policy making
Alghamdi 15
(Emad A. Alghamdi, English Language Institute, King Abdulaziz University, The
Representation of Islam in Western Media: The Coverage of Norway Terrorist
Attacks, May 1st, 2015, International Journal of Applied Linguistics & English
Literature,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/259481741_The_Representation_of_Islam_i
n_Western_Media_The_Coverage_of_Norway_Terrorist_Attacks, JAS)
2. Theoretical Framework Media discourse has been a focus of critical analysis conducted by scholars from various

the
interest in media discourse to four major reasons: frstly, media is a rich source of
data that can be easily accessed for research and teaching; secondly, media usage
disciplines: linguistics, semiotics, pragmatics, and discourse studies. Garrett and Bell (1998) attribute

influences and reflects peoples use of and attitude towards language; thirdly,
media can give us a clear insight into social meanings and stereotypes conveyed
through language and communication; and fourthly, and most importantly, media
reflects and plays an essential role in forming and articulating cultural, political and
social life. In the literature, there are many theoretical and critical frameworks that provide
a powerful and practical approach to media discourse. These approaches implement either
completely or partially distinctive methodology in analyzing media discourse given the different theoretical grounds
they are based on and the different lens through which these approaches view media discourse (Wodak, 2001).
One of the most influential and widespread approaches is Van Dijks cognitive-structural model. Van Dijk is a leading
theorist and advocate of discourse analysis who has produced an extensive body of literature in the feld including,
but not limited to, the following books: Macro-Structures (1980), Handbook of Discourse Analysis (1985), News as

framework offers an interdisciplinary

approach in which (1) social functions, (2) cognitive structures, and (3) discursive
expression and production are all integrated to provide a comprehensive analysis of
discourse. Van Dijks (1988) framework is concerned with the relationship between the structures
of news, the process of news production, and the processes of news comprehension
on one hand, and the social practices within which these three elements are
embedded (Bell & Garrett, 1998). In this model, ideologies and opinions play an essential role
shaping and comprehending news texts. Van Dijk (2005) believes that the main social
function of ideologies is the co-ordination of the social practices of group members
for the effective realization of the goals of a social group, and the protection of its
interest (p. 24). Ideologies and opinions are both mental representations and beliefs, which do not usually
reflect personal but rather social, institutional, or political interest. Members of a particular society
tend to develop and maintain certain ideologies, which reflect the basic criteria that
give this particular society its social identity. Moreover, ideologies play an essential role in forming
Discourse (1988), and News Analysis (1988). Van Dijks (1988)

members of a particular societys perception of what is socially acceptable or unacceptable or right or wrong.

Ideologies, more importantly, determine the manner members of a society see and
represent themselves in regard to members of different societies. When interests of
two societies conflict, some societies ideologies encourage polarization in which a
distinction between the representations of Self and Others (We are Good and They
are Bad) would be a common thread in the opinions of that societys members . Thus,
van Dijk (1998b) stresses that opinions and ideologies a particular society perceive as a
truth should not make them factual in our sense (p. 30) As far as analyzing the structure of
the news is concerned, Van Dijk (1988a) sees news texts as consisting of macro and micro
structure. The macrostructure refers to the thematic structure (the overall content
of a text) and the schematic structure (the overall form of a text). The themes and
topics of news texts adhere to the relevance principle. Therefore, they are
organized or ordered hierarchically in which the more general theme precedes the
more specifc. Texts themes and topics are introduced to the text based on the
schematic structures of the text, which are the particular order of the small units
that a news text is built on. Van Dijk (1988a) suggests how news report is formed based on what he calls
News Schema Categories. News articles or reports start typically with one or more headlines, which are
distinguished by larger font. Headlines are followed by leads, which are typically the frst sentence of the article.
The role of headlines and leads is important in introducing the main or overall theme of the text. Van Dijk (1988a)
points out This is vitally important because the topic acts as a major control instance on the further interpretation
of the rest of the text (p. 34). The headline and lead are followed by Main Events (the main story of the news).
Main events may or may not be followed by Consequences which, depending on their severity, determine the
newsworthiness of the event. For better understanding of the news event, readers often require a Background.
Finally, there are categories such as Verbal Reactions usually by major participants in the news and Comments by
journalists or the newspaper. Comments can take the form of evaluation or expectation of subsequent events.
Microanalysis of news texts involves analyzing microelements such as lexical choice, clause grammar, and clause

combination, semantics, coherence between sentences or propositions and so forth. Analyzing such microelements
is fruitful in uncovering the implicit ideologies and opinions embedded within the discourse. In addition, other
helpful descriptive tools are commonly used in media discourse analysis. These are: referential and predicational
strategies, passivization, transitivity, scalar implicatures, quantifcation and modality. 2.1 Referential and
Predication Strategies IJALEL 4(3):198-204, 2015 200 At the micro level of discourse, word choice is a good indicator

Referential strategies refer to the

word chosen to refer to the agent of the story. For example, there is a signifcant
difference between saying a terrorist was arrested and a Muslim terrorist was
arrested. On the other hand, predictional strategies refer to the very basic process and
result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons , animals, objects, events,
actions and social phenomena (Wodak, 2001). 2.2 Transitivity and Passivization At the syntax level of
the discourse, Hallidays concept of transitivity is a powerful semantic concept, an
essential linguistic tool used recurrently in the analysis of representations (Fowler
70). In traditional grammar, transitivity refers to the syntactic difference between
transitive and intransitive verbs in which the former requires an object (a) Mark
broke the window and the later does not (b) Mark is swimming. On the other hand,
Hallidays semantic transitively focuses on the semantics of the sentence (Halliday,
of a journalists attitude towards an event or agent in the story.

1994): the two verbs above (broke vs. swim) designate two different actions. In sentence (a), the verb broke
designates an effect on other entity the window while in sentence (b) the verb swim designates an effect only on

semantic transitivity indicates the semantic relations between

the agent, object, and patient in which the agent (actor) does an action, which can
have an effect on object (thing) or patient (human). In passivization however, the role of the
agent is deemphasized while the role of the object or action is emphasized. 2.3
the actor. In other words,

Implicatures and Quantifcation The concept of implicatures, coined by H. P. Grice (1975), refers to cases where the
intended meaning of an utterance differs from what was actually said. Journalists may use implicatures in order to

Another
linguistic tool that journalists use to avoid being held accountable for their claims in
the news discourse is the use of quantifcation words such as some, many, almost
or nearly all. 2.4 Modality Modal expressions are endemic and frequently used in mass
media given their useful communicative or expressive functionalities . Fowler (1991)
avoid expressing directly or explicitly what they mean. The use of implication is common in journalism.

perceives modality as a comment or an attitude which can be divided into four categories: truth, obligation,
permission, and desirability. 2.4.1 Truth The speakers or writers use modal expressions (e.g. Will/not, Could/not,
Certainly) to signify judgments as a truth by indicting their strong commitment to what they perceive as true or to
predict the degree of likelihood of an event or actions they describe. 2.4.2 Obligation The speakers or writers use
modals such as Must, Should, and Ought to in order to stipulate an action that ought to be performed by a

Permission The speakers or writers use modal

expressions such as May and Can to give or bestow permission for someone to
perform an action. 2.4.4 Desirability The speakers or writers use model expressions to
indicate approval or disapproval of a statement. This modality is explicit in a range
of evaluative adjectives and adverbs (e.g. Right and Wrong).
particular person, organizationetc. 2.4.3

Prefer our education claims its not 1940, kritiks are a thing
they should have used their infinite prep to pick better
advantage ground
4. Competing ideas: basis of learning and challenging
internalized biases that replicate the impact daily
5. Methodology gives us real world application
6. Education is the only real world skill roleplaying cedes
the agency we need; and fairness only matters in terms of
this single debate, make them prove in round abuse

AT Perm Do Both
Their understanding of the world necessitates war and
violence too late for a perm, their values already influenced
their decision-making and understanding of the Other
Der Derian 1 (James Der Derian is Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University,
where he directs the INFO/tech/war/peace project (www.infopeace.org), and Professor of Political Science at
UMASS/Amherst, The War of Networks, Theory & Event,
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html

Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities .
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged
by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as
strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and transform them into kinetic
weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military
strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious,
possibly pathological level, a war of escalating and competing and imitative
oppositions, a mimetic war of images. A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and
representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played
out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance,
estrangement and hostility. It can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation,
assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between peoples , as well as
metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human from
god. It builds the fence that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confnes a whole people .
And it sanctions just about every kind of violence . More than a rational calculation of
interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive,
picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of
others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy and
Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to

mimesis is 'the
appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually
present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the symptoms -- or, as it was
be more powerful than the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical defnition of

once known in medical science, practice semiology.

AT Perm Plan w/out Reps that Link

you cant sever reps, perm cant reconcile the radical new
world of the alt with your terrorist explanations severance is
a voting issue because ____________________
Their understanding of the world necessitates war and
violence too late for a perm, their values already influenced
their decision-making and understanding of the Other
Der Derian 1 (James Der Derian is Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University,
where he directs the INFO/tech/war/peace project (www.infopeace.org), and Professor of Political Science at
UMASS/Amherst, The War of Networks, Theory & Event,
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html

Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities .
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged
by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as
strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and transform them into kinetic
weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military
strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious,
possibly pathological level, a war of escalating and competing and imitative
oppositions, a mimetic war of images. A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and
representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played
out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance,
estrangement and hostility. It can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation,
assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between peoples , as well as
metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human from
god. It builds the fence that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confnes a whole people .
And it sanctions just about every kind of violence . More than a rational calculation of
interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive,
picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of
others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy and
Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to

mimesis is 'the
appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually
present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the symptoms -- or, as it was
be more powerful than the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical defnition of

once known in medical science, practice semiology.

Refuse the policy Linguistic choices cannot be separated from

the policies they justify
McGregor 3 (Dr. Sue L. T. McGregor is Professor, Department of Education,
Mount Saint Vincent University, "Critical Discourse Analysis-A Primer,"
www.kon.org/archives/forum/l5-l/mcgregorcda.html)
Discourse and language can be used to make unbalanced power relations
and portrayals of social groups appear to be commonsense, normal, and

natural when in fact the reality is prejudice, injustice. and inequities.

Using just words, those in power, or wishing to be so, can misdirect our concerns
for persistent, larger systemic issues of class, gender. age, religion, and
-seem petty or nonexistent. Unless we begin to debunk their words, we
can be misled and duped into embracing the dominant worldview (ideology) at
our expense and their vain. Although the term discourse is slippery, elusive, and difficult to defne (Henry 62 Tator,

When discourse is effective in practice. evidenced by its

ability to organize and regulate relations of power. it is called a "regime of
truth" (Foucault, 1980). It is this regime. a system by which a political system is
controlled, that is revealed when we engage in critical discourse analysis.
2002), we must try.

How can we say we "empower individuals and families" if we do not teach ourselves. and them. how to debunk and
unveil the truth behind the regime?

AT Sageman Presses
Sageman has seen the government terror studies up close, our
author is way more qualified
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
Terrorism research is now mostly and secretly conducted within governments, specifcally within the IC, which has
not shared much information about terrorist plots with the academic community. One might reasonably ask whether
the intelligence community has developed insights into the turn to political violence of which the academic

During the past eight years, I was privileged to be a member of

the IC, with daily access to highly classifed information streams on terrorist threats,
and able to observe the developments in the ICs understanding of this turn to
violence.
community is unaware.

AT Intelligence Community Sources

Even the IC is in shambles
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

The IC has not been able to advance terrorism studies because of inherent
limitations in the process of collecting, disseminating, analyzing, and generating its
products for policy makers. Even more than the academic community, it functions
largely at the whims of politicians and their concerns, which set the frame and tone
of its research. The potential perversion of this system was illustrated by the requirements to fnd
justifcations for the invasion of Iraq and the widespread belief in the IC that Saddam Hussein did possess weapons
of mass destruction, when the UN inspection teams on the ground were casting strong doubts about this belief.

The processing of intelligence is also faulty. All source analysts are supposed to
have access to all information, but generally, they rely on disseminated intelligence
reports. These reports are already products crafted by a collector or an analyst and
contain inherent biases. For instance, raw information such as intercepted
communications or even interviews=interrogations of suspects are transcribed into
relatively short intelligence
reports that decontextualize
statements worthy of intelligence. I have compared such raw information and its
derived intelligence report, and observed that much is lost in the transcription . Not
infrequently, the reports read like a prosecutors brief, with the worst interpretation given full attention and

The bias is toward an

alarmist (and therefore worthy of attention and personal promotion) interpretation. 40
On topics of interest, several of these reports are then collected and summarized in
a fnished product warning consumers of new trends. These fnished products of
course further abstract from the raw data and again accentuate what may be new
and sensational, which is often more alarmist than necessary. Drowning in this
ocean of potential threats and false alarms, analysts have trouble identifying truly unusual
potentially disconfrming evidence casting doubt on the gist of the report is neglected.

occurrences indicative of an actual threat. For instance, while wives in custody disputes occasionally accuse their
husbands of being terrorists, it is very rare for parents to go out of their way to report their children to the IC.
Ideally, intelligence analysts should dedicate more resources to satisfactorily resolving the allegations in the second
scenario than those in the frst one. However, as was the case with the underwear bomber, this wont get done
because they are under pressure to process huge numbers of mostly false leads, which were erroneously generated
by the IC in the frst place. Throwing more analysts at the problem compounds the issue as it creates more false
leads for analysts who err on the side of security.

AT: But Islam is responsible for a lot of

violence/death
Islam is vastly superior if the criteria is violence
Cole 13 [Juan, Prof of History U of Michigan, Terrorism and Other Religions,
April 23, http://www.juancole.com/2013/04/terrorism-other-religions.html]
Contrary to what is alleged by bigots like Bill Maher, Muslims are not more violent than
people of other religions. Murder rates in most of the Muslim world are very low
compared to the United States. As for political violence, people of Christian heritage in the
twentieth century polished off tens of millions of people in the two world wars and
colonial repression. This massive carnage did not occur because European
Christians are worse than or different from other human beings, but because they
were the frst to industrialize war and pursue a national model . Sometimes it is argued that
they did not act in the name of religion but of nationalism. But, really, how naive. Religion and nationalism are
closely intertwined. The British monarch is the head of the Church of England, and that still meant something in the
frst half of the twentieth century, at least. The Swedish church is a national church. Spain? Was it really
unconnected to Catholicism? Did the Church and Francisco Francos feelings toward it play no role in the Civil War?

I dont
fgure that Muslims killed more than a 2 million people or so in political violence in
the entire twentieth century, and that mainly in the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 and the Soviet and
post-Soviet wars in Afghanistan, for which Europeans bear some blame . Compare that to the
Christian European tally of, oh, lets say 100 million (16 million in WW I, 60 million in WW II though
And whats sauce for the goose: much Muslim violence is driven by forms of modern nationalism, too.

some of those were attributable to Buddhists in Asia and millions more in colonial wars.)

Instances of Christian extremism are ignored prove Islam

isnt uniquely more violent
Cole 13 [Juan, Prof of History U of Michigan, Terrorism and Other Religions,
April 23, http://www.juancole.com/2013/04/terrorism-other-religions.html]
As for Christianity, the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda initiated hostilities that
displaced two million people. Although it is an African cult, it is Christian in origin
and the result of Western Christian missionaries preaching in Africa. If Saudi
Wahhabi preachers can be in part blamed for the Taliban, why do Christian
missionaries skate when we consider the blowback from their pupils ? Despite the
very large number of European Muslims, in 2007-2009 less than 1 percent of
terrorist acts in that continent were committed by people from that community.

AT: But they ARE religiously motivated

Every major empirical study undermines the supposed link
between Islam and terrorism.
Jackson 7 (Richard, (Department of International Politics, University of Wales,
The Core Commitments Of Critical Terrorism Studies European Political Science,
Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8
In addition, and contrary to widely held beliefs, every major empirical study on the
subject has thrown doubt on the purported link between religion and terrorism. The
Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, for example, which compiled a database on
every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all,
concluded that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism, or any one of the worlds religions. 85 Some of the key fndings of
the study that support this assessment include: only about half of the suicide
attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics
with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the
secular, MarxistLeninist Tamil Tigers, who committed 76 attacks; of the 384
individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43 per cent were
religious; there were 41 attacks attributed to Hizbollah during this period, of which
eight were carried out by Muslims, 27 by communists and three by Christians (the
other three attackers could not be identifed); and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can
be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign that has a secular
and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation. 86
Similarly, Sagemans widely quoted study compiled detailed biographical data on
172 participants of Islamic terrorist groups. Some of the relevant fndings of his
study include, among others: only 17 per cent of the terrorists had an Islamic
religious education; only 8 per cent of terrorists showed any religious devotion as
youths; only 13 per cent of terrorists indicated that they were inspired to join solely
on the basis of religious beliefs; increased religious devotion appeared to be an
effect of joining the terrorist group, not the cause of it; there is no empirical
evidence that the terrorists were motivated largely by hate or pathological
prejudice; Islamic terrorist groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there
are more volunteers than they can accommodate; the data, along with fve decades
of research, failed to provide any support for the notion of religious brainwashing;
and there is no evidence of any individual joining a terrorist group solely on the
basis of exposure to internet-based material. Interestingly, the data compiled in
these two projects also demonstrate that the notion that Islamic terrorism results
from poverty, disaffection and alienation is unsupported. In fact, both of these
studies show that the overwhelming majority of terrorists are middle or upper
class, of above-average educational standing, professionally employed, often
married or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities and generally
have good future prospects. Robert Pape concludes that the typical profle of a
terrorist resembles the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a
grassroots movement rather than a religious fanatic.

AT: Ableism K
Islamophobia isnt ableist. Youve confused the word Phobia
with the Suffix Phobia
Beck 12 (Laura, Editor at Jezebel, Nov 26, The AP Says No More 'Homophobia,"
'Islamophobia,' or 'Ethnic Cleansing', http://jezebel.com/5963481/the-ap-says-nomore-homophobia-islamophobia-or-ethnic-cleansing)
the AP has removed homophobia, Islamophobia, and ethnic cleansing
from their Style Book, explaining that "'-phobia,' 'an irrational, uncontrollable fear, often a form of mental
In the past few months,

illness' should not be used 'in political or social contexts,' including 'homophobia' and 'Islamophobia.' It also calls
'ethnic cleansing' a 'euphemism,' and says the AP 'does not use 'ethnic cleansing' on its own. It must be enclosed in
quotes, attributed and explained.'" Interesting. However, a commenter on Politico points out that "[ t]his

is

completely wrong. They have confused the WORD "phobia" with the
SUFFIX '-phobia'. The word "phobia" is just what they said: a technical
term denoting an extreme, debilitating fear. The suffix '-phobia', on the
other hand is much broader. It can mean not just fear of, but also dislike
of, aversion to, prejudice against, having a really bad (physical) reaction to, etc. Consider
'Anglophobia', 'Francophobia', 'hydrophobia', photophobia, etc. It has
become an all-purpose (suffix) antonym to '-philia'. (bibliophilia, bibliophobia)." Hmm...

Anti-Muslim isnt sufficient. We need to use the word

islamophobia - It is multifaceted & nuanced focusing on this
generates better analysis
Hammer 13 (Juliane, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, UNC Chapel Hill,
Center Stage, Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, p. 108-9)
Before proceeding in this direction, I want to offer some clarifcations on how I
understand and use the term Islamophobia. Literally meaning "fear of Islam,"
Islamophobia is not about innate or natural fear of Islam or Muslims.
Rather, it is an ideological construct produced and reproduced at the
nexus of a number of political and intellectual currents that need to be
taken into consideration and assessed critically in each instance or event
of Islamophobic discourse and practice. I see it at the intersection of the
following:

Shifts in domestic politics in which Islam and Muslims become tools

for renegotiating political allegiances, identities, and power structures;

Imperial wars as extensions of colonial and neocolonial projects;

Expressions of racism and bigotry in response to shifting demographic

and political constellations;

Negotiations of the nature and significance of feminism;

Political exclusion and discrimination as part of shifting state powers and

applications of liberal ideology;


Civilizational discourses on moral and cultural superiority of
"Western" powers, foremost among them the United States.
It might seem frustrating to fragment the neat and overarching framework inherent
in the ways in which Islamophobia is currently most often used in academic
analysis; and one could argue that such fragmentation is weakening the
political power of the intellectual critique of Islamophobia. However, it is
intellectually more honest to acknowledge that Islamophobia is not the
product of a conspiracy against Islam and Muslims, originating from one
source that can conveniently be pinpointed and called out. In what follows I
attempt to situate both the victims of Islamophobic discourse and those producing
and disseminating it within the nexus described above. This requires focusing on
specifc examples and identifying just how in each instance, several but not all of
these forces are at work. This kind of nuanced analysis can arguably be more
productive in empowering activist strategies that address the causes and
remedies for Islamophobia.

Aff Answers

No Link Discourse doesnt shape reality

Discourse cant shape reality 4 warrants
Roskoski and Peabody 94 (Matthew, Joe, Florida State University, A
Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&PeabodyLangCritiques)
Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically
deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical
support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds
one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond
the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits"
(Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support,
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However,
many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but
uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi
explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have
yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's
view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms
of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One
reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on frst glance it seems
intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that
this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not
appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems
profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language
"arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from
feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the
debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of
scientifcally valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that
valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up
to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical
support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies
performed on the Whorfan hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate
the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer
four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The frst reason is that it is impossible to
generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so
metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not
impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are
not, in that form, subject to scientifc investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two
reasons. The frst is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical frst principle
and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be
intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language
used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective
reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through
self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible
to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no

way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of

the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the
hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it
describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infnitely more so) that reality
shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation
does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are
very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to
have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists,
there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the
objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of
institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The
color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means
75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfans, one could only claim that
there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and
language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has
not, the hypothesis would still be scientifcally problematic because "we would have
difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our
thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes . If
language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages
would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful crosscultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is
never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be
expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his
articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and fnal objection is that
the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For
example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If
language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not
all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is
irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is
so, then the Whorfan advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker
distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple
meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate,
where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few
words.1

Alt Fails
Critical terrorism studies fails to meet tests of rigorous,
unique, considerate scholarship, allowing government cooption
Smyth et al. 9 [Marie Breen Smyth, Chair of International Politics at University of Surrey; Jeroen
Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham Universitys School of Government and
International Affairs; Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies; Critical
Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda pg 219; Routledge; 2009.]
Related to the above point, and as Ranstorp, Silke, Toros and Gunning, Sluka, and Breen Smyth note in this volume,

terrorism studies scholars to over-rely on

secondary sources and a simultaneous failure to undertake primary research ,
there is a more general and widely noted tendency for

particularly in terms of face to face engagement with individuals and groups widely described as terrorists.
Primary research which engages directly with the subjectivity of terrorists is still something of a taboo in terrorism
studies (Zulaika, 2008) although there have been some notable exceptions involving face to face interviews in
recent years (see, among others, Horgan, 2008, 2005; Stern, 2003; Bloom, 2005) and a great many terrorism
experts have never even met a terrorist. Although not all terrorism related research topics require primary

the notion that there is no need to engage ones research subjects

face to face would be unthinkable in cognate disciplines such as anthropology,
psychology, and criminology. Clearly, such a situation raises real questions about the
veracity and quality of much orthodox terrorism research , and a consequence of these
tendencies is that the literature frequently consists of analytically thin, narrative-based,
and descriptive accounts of terrorism. Another concerning issue in terrorism studies can be
described as what has in the Critical Security Studies literature been termed the fetishization of
parts problem (Wyn Jones, 1999; see Toros and Gunning, this volume). In the context of our feld, it
concerns the tendency to study terrorism separately from the social movements,
state structures, conflicts, history, contexts, and international relations within which
it occurs (see Gunning, Toros and Gunning, Dalacoura, this volume). This problem is, in turn, partly a
consequence of several other weaknesses, including the broader absence of social theory in
terrorism studies, rigid disciplinary boundaries and the lack of theoretical cross-fertilisation, and the tendency
to exceptionalise terrorist violence in relation to other forms of violence and political action. A more recent
trend is the so-called instant expert problem; that is, the extremely large number
of new terrorism scholars following 11 September 2001 who lack adequate
grounding in the existing literature, let alone detailed feld knowledge, and who can parade as
experts in the absence of accepted procedures for gate-keeping , particularly if they
reinforce the dominant views of orthodox terrorism studies (see Ranstorp, Silke, this volume). The broader decontextualisation and de-historicisation of terrorism which these tendencies
engender, again, has a distorting effect on terrorism knowledge and functions
ideologically to reify state hegemony.
research of this kind,

Perm Do Both
Perm do both its the only way to incorporate data and
appropriate safety measures while maintaining an ethical
decisionmaking calculus
Need to create linkages between academia and intelligence
analysts
Sageman 14 Their Author(marc sageman, independent consultant on national
security, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

we have a system of terrorism research in which

intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics
understand everything but know nothing. This critique is but the last of a long jeremiad going back
almost forty years about the poor quality of the research in the feld. 48 At this point, the government
funding strategy and its refusal to share accumulated data with academia has
created the architecture of the IC=academic divide preventing us from developing
useful and perhaps counter-intuitive insights into the factors leading people to turn
to political violence. The solution is obvious: we need more productive interactions
between the two communities.49 But this would require political courage and will. Meanwhile, we still
To draw my point to its extreme:

dont know what leads people to turn to political violence.

Even their critique cannot escape the power and influence of

the state perm is the best way to apply the removed
academia of the K to policy action
Smyth et al. 9 [Marie Breen Smyth, Chair of International Politics at University of Surrey; Jeroen
Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham Universitys School of Government and
International Affairs; Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies; Critical
Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda pg 220-221; Routledge; 2009.]
It also has a tendency, dissenters again notwithstanding, to reproduce a number of dominant myths about, among
other things, the role of religion in causing terrorism, the threat of the new terrorism and WMD terrorism, the non-

This
widely accepted terrorism knowledge provides a very poor foundation for
further research, policymaking, and public debate, and functions ideologically to reify
state power and promote particular partisan projects. In our view, many of the problems described thus
far are linked to a general failure by many scholars to adopt a critically reflexive
attitude which acknowledges the ontological instability of the terrorism label , remains
involvement of Western states in the practice of terrorism, and the effcacy of force-based counterterrorism.

cognisant of the effects of the cultural context on knowledge production in social science, is sensitive to the politics
and consequences of labelling, and recognises the ethical challenges and consequences of conducting research on

orthodox terrorism studies literature, particularly its

international relations-based sections, tends to treat terrorism as an objective,
ontologically stable phenomenon that can be studied in a politically disinterested and
unproblematic manner. In part, this particular criticism is rooted in an alternative ontology which
recognises the way in which terrorism is constructed as a subject through a series of
political violence. Instead, we fnd that the

identifable discursive practices which also naturalise particular responses to it . But,

even if one adopts a positivist ontology, there is nonetheless a frequent failure of many scholars to
appreciate and reflect upon the observable politics of naming with regard to terrorism, and an insuffcient
appreciation of the real-world consequences of different modes of representation
and defnition. A related weakness in the feld is the dominance of what can be called
problemsolving approaches to the study of political terror which fail to interrogate
the role of the status quo and existing power structures in perpetuating insecurity and violence
(Gunning, 2007a). The adoption of a problem-solving approach is in part a consequence of
the frequently compromising ethical-political relationships between states and their
security agencies, and some scholars and analysts engaged in the study of non-state terrorism (Ranstorp,
Raphael, this volume). This is the so-called embedded experts or organic intellectuals problem, whereby the

leading scholars constitute an influential epistemic community directly linked to

state power (see Burnett and Whyte, 2005; Jackson, 2007f). The dominance of this intellectual network is in
part maintained through the operation of closed, static, and selfreferential systems of knowledge production which
function to exclude scholars with dissenting or counter-hegemonic views (see Reid, 1993). But it is also a function of
the dominance of state-centric, realist perspectives among the leading scholars within the feld. A particularly
deleterious consequence of adopting a problem-solving perspective is the prioritisation of topics tailored to the
demands of policymakers for practically useful knowledge in the fght against terrorism, or, the securitisation of
research.

Policy relevance is crucial to keeping critical terrorism studies

alive condemning the state as a whole replicates the
binarism they critique just as much
Gunning 7[Jerome Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham Universitys
School of Government and International Affairs; babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical
terrorism studies pg 239-241; Symposium; Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political
Violence (CSRV), Department of International Politics, University of Wales; 2007.]

the notion of emancipation. As McDonald notes in this symposium,

contending critical schools approach this concept differently. Some denounce it as too implicated in
At the heart of the critical project lies

grand meta-narratives and normative projects, including past, and not so past, (neo)-colonial projects (Alker, 2004:

all critical projects derive from an

underlying conception of a different order (Wyn Jones, 2004: 21720; Alker, 2004: 192). Even some
202). Yet, an increasing number of voices have observed that

of those most critical of the term (notably Derrida, 1996: 82; see also Alker, 2004: 202; Wyn Jones, 2004: 219) have

To be critical, it seems, one has to have some normative notion of

what is wrong and how things should be different . This need not involve a predetermined
(re)-embraced the notion.

blueprint of utopia; indeed, such a blueprint is anathema to contemporary conceptions of critical. Or, with
Hutchings, because the notion of emancipation is itself authoritative and exclusionary, critical scholars must
always acknowledge that no normative position is nonexclusive or unchallengeable (Hutchings, 2001:90; see also

If emancipation is central to the critical project, CTS

cannot remain policy-irrelevant without belying its emancipatory commitment. It has to move
beyond critique and deconstruction to reconstruction and policy-relevance (Booth,
2004b; Williams and Krause, 1997). The challenge of CTS is to engage policy-makers as well as
terrorists and their communities and work towards the realisation of new paradigms, new
practices, and the transformation of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of
immanent critique. Striving to be policyrelevant does not mean that one has to accept
the validity of the term terrorism or stop investigating the political interests
behind it. Nor does it mean that all research must have policy-relevance or that one has to limit
ones research to what is relevant for the state , since the critical turn implies a move beyond
Wyn Jones, 2004:230; Booth, 2004a: 182).

statecentric perspectives.

End-users could, and should, include both state and nonstate

actors, as long as the goal is to combat both political terror and political structures encouraging terror. However,
engaging policy-makers raises the issue of co-optation . One of the fears of critical scholars is
that by engaging with policy-makers, either they or their research become co-opted. A more intractable problem is
the one highlighted by Rengger that the

demand that theory must have a praxial dimension

itself runs the risk of collapsing critical theory back into traditional theory by making
it dependent on instrumental conceptions of rationality (Rengger, 2001: 107). A related
problem is that by becoming embedded in the existing power structures, one risks reproducing existing knowledge
structures or inadvertently contributing to counter-terrorism policy that uncritically strengthens the status quo. Such

Engagement is
facilitated by the fact that, as counter-terrorism projects flounder, advisors to policymakers are increasingly eager for advice, even when it is critical. The problem is thus not access
dilemmas have to be confronted and debated; non-engagement is not an option.

per se, but the level of access and how advice is acted upon. Whenever I have addressed foreign affairs personnel,
the response to my research has been positive. However, according to those present, the advice they produce

Because of this
distance between critical academics and policy-makers, the advice becomes too
diluted. For obvious reasons, embedded terrorism scholars and traditional thinktanks have enjoyed a much
seldom influences official policy, as other more pressing concerns affect actual policymaking.

closer relationship with policy-makers, allowing them both more institutionalised and more direct access. This is

critical studies are inherently critical of existing power structures .

have also at times unnecessarily burned bridges by issuing blanket
condemnations of all things statist. It is important that critical scholars do not
indulge in the demonising of all state actors, in the same way they argue
against the blanket demonising of terrorists . This also extends to think-tanks with close
partly structural, since
Critical scholars

links to power: just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not invalidate it; conversely, a critical
study is not inherently good. Just as Halliday cri tiqued those who privileged voices from the South as somehow
more authentic, critical scholars must guard against either privileging terrorist voices or uncritically critiquing state

Critical scholars have to think carefully about

how to increase access to power without losing critical distance . The establishment of
dedicated critical journals, seminars, and conferences that actively seek to engage policymakers is one way forward, as are collaborative efforts with traditional conferences
already habitually attended by policy-makers . The creation of dedicated research centres and
or staterelated actors (Halliday, 1996: 21113).

thinktanks may similarly be necessary. But engaging policy-makers is not the only way forward; engaging terrorists
and suspect communities, as well as civil society actors more generally, is equally important. In the age of the

CTS must be at the forefront of

creating counter-hegemonic discourses. It can do this at universities. But it can also do this
through partnerships with suspect communities, or publicly challenging new laws
or directives, as many have already begun to do.
blog, alternative news websites and trans-national grassroots activism,

Permutation is mutually beneficial scores of knowledge are

lost without it, and critically minded experts solv
Gunning 7[Jerome Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham Universitys
School of Government and International Affairs; babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical
terrorism studies pg 237-238; Symposium; Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political
Violence (CSRV), Department of International Politics, University of Wales; 2007.]

To be critical in the frst sense, a critical feld must

explicitly challenge state-centric, problem-solving perspectives and call into question
existing defnitions, assumptions, and power structures. To be critical in the second sense, it must
attempt to be inclusive, to enable the convergence of not only explicitly critical
perspectives but also the more rigorous traditional, problem-solving perspectives of both
cognate and terrorism studies. Much of interest has been written by, for instance, those traditional
However, this introduces a fundamental tension.

conflict resolution scholars who have moved beyond a narrow military

understanding of security and placed violence in its wider social context (see also Toros, 2006). Similarly,
traditional scholars within terrorism studies have produced signifcant research that challenges
accepted knowledge and that we ignore at our peril (see also Gunning, 2007a; Jackson, 2007).
Research from outside terrorism studies, however strong in other aspects, is often marred by a
lack of familiarity with core insights from the traditional terrorism studies literature (see also Merari in Silke,
2004: 18891). Conversely, traditional terrorism scholars would beneft greatly from
exposure to cognate or critical perspectives. Further complicating this dynamic is that the term
critical is itself highly contested. Post-structuralists and Critical Theorists have a very different understanding of
what constitutes critical, or indeed of what the chief aims of a critical feld ought to be. Debates rage, for instance,
over whether a critical feld should attempt to be policy-relevant or whether it should focus solely on

important lessons can be learned from the critical turn

in cognate felds. Critical security studies (CSS) is of particular interest, since
terrorism studies emerged in part from security studies. Within CSS, there are widely different trends.
Williams and Krause for instance, propose an inclusive approach to bring together self-reflexive
perspectives that fall outside of the disciplines mainstream (Williams and Krause, 1997).
powerknowledge issues. In this respect,

Booth, conversely, advocates a more normative Critical Theory approach that demands not just critical selfreflexivity but a full-blown theory of CSS (Booth, 2004a). Booth holds that a feld without a coherent organising
theory is too eclectic to withstand internal contradictions. Krause and Williams argue that

too normative a

straightjacket will prevent the creation of a critical mass . Even though these internal divisions
have triggered rich and insightful debates, the impact of CSS has arguably been muted by them. CSS has
furthermore only partially succeeded in making security studies as a whole more
selfreflexive. Though the creation of a separate feld has highlighted the main felds
shortcomings and created space for critical approaches, it has also helped to create something of an
intellectual ghetto alienation that has left the rest of the feld to its original traditional tendencies. CTS has to
reflect upon how to proceed in the light of this experience . It must grapple with how to
create sufficient space for critical studies without ghettoising alienating itself and
leaving the mainstream to its traditional tendencies; how to ensure inclusion
of both critically minded traditionalists and the wide variety of critical
perspectives; and how to prevent itself from imploding under the burden of either internal divisions, or too
much eclecticism.

Squo Solves
There is limited public support for high-threat terrorism
analysis now, and the governments moves toward the war on
terror are decreasing into policing moves
Buzan 9 [Barry Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University; Barry Buzan on International Society,
Securitization, and an English School Map of the World; Theory Talks, an interactive forum for discussion of debates
in International Relations with an emphasis of the underlying theoretical issues; 12/19/2009; accessed 07/18/2015;
<http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html>.]

securitization. A threatsuch as terrorismneeds an audience to accept the

securitizing move as such. What happens if, as for instance the terror thermometer of the US, a threat gets
discursively sustained yet the threat- or securitization-level normalizes and people get used to
it? Is that desecuritization? In other words: whats the current status of the terrorism-securitization? I think the
current status of the terrorism securitization is indeed somewhat declining . I think I got
A question on

it right in 2006 when I wrote Will the Global War on Terror be the new Cold War? (International Affairs, 2006, read

the war on terror is not going to be a new Cold War in terms of a global
dominant macro-securitization which the US can use to structure alliances and
frame itself in a good position in global security concerns . Even in the US, nowadays,
the term war on terror hardly appears at all : in that sense, it is becoming desecuritized,
partly because many people are simply not coming on board with a continuous high
securitization of the war on terror. Rather, as Mary Kaldor has argued in Theory Talk #30, people
would rather treat this as a criminal matter involving policing . Yet, it is not taken off the
pdf version here):

register entirely, theres obviously still a problem there.

CounterTerrorism Good
Counterterrorism is necessary judge has a moral obligation
endorse the use of force against murderous terrorist acts
Beres 5 [Louis Rene Beres, IR lecturer and publisher on terrorist studies; Terrorisms Executioner; The
Washington Times; 05/30/2005; accessed 07/18/2015;
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/may/30/20050530-094029-7128r/?page=all>.] We do not endorse
gendered language

Our world is "normally silent in the face of evil . At worst, many are directly complicit in
the maimings and slaughters. At best, the murderers are ignored . In this unchanging world Israel
must soon decide whether to face the evil of Palestinian terrorism as a pitiable victim or
to use whatever reasonable force is needed to remain alive. The use of force is not
inherently evil. Quite the contrary; in opposing terrorist mayhem, force is indispensable
to all that is good. In the case of Israel, Palestinian terrorism is unique for its cowardice, its
barbarism and its genocidal goal. Were Israel to depend upon the broader international community for
relief- upon the so-called road map - its plea would be unheard. All states have a right of selfdefense. Israel has every lawful authority to forcibly confront the still-growing evil of Palestinian terror. Facing
even biological and nuclear forms of terrorism, it now has the clear legal right to
refuse to be a victim and to become an executioner. From the standpoint of providing security to
its own citizens, this right even becomes an obligation. Albert Camus would have us
all be "neither victims nor executioners," living not in a world in which killing has disappeared
("we are not so crazy as that"), but one wherein killing has become illegitimate . This is a fne
expectation, yet the celebrated French philosopher did not anticipate another evil force for whom utter
extermination of the Jews" was its declared object. Not even in a world living under the shadow of recent Holocaust
did Camus consider such an absurd possibility. But Israel lacks the quaint luxury of French philosophy. Were Israel to
follow Camus genteel reasoning, perhaps in order to implement Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the result would be
another boundless enlargement of Jewish suffering. Before and during the Holocaust, for those who still had an
opportunity to flee, Jews were ordered: "Get out of Europe; go to Palestine." When they complied (those who could),
the next order was: "Get out of Palestine." For my Austrian-Jewish grandparents, their deaths came on the SS-killing
grounds at Riga, Latvia. Had they made it to Palestine, their sons and grandsons would likely have died in

Failure to use force against

murderous evil is invariably a stain upon all that is good . By declining the right to act
as a lawful executioner in its struggle with terror , Israel would be forced by Camus' reasoning to
subsequent genocidal wars intended to get the Jews "out of Palestine."

embrace its own disappearance. Barring Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the Jewish state would never accept
collective suicide. Why was Camus, who was thinking only in the broadest generic terms, so mistaken? My own
answer lies in his presumption ofa natural reciprocity among human beings and states in the matter of killing. We
are asked to believe that as greater numbers of people agree not to become executioners, still greater numbers will
follow upon the same course. In time, the argument proceeds, the number of those who refuse to accept killing will

Camus' presumed reciprocity does

not exist, indeed, can never exist, especially in the jihad-centered Middle East . Here
become so great that there will be fewer and fewer victims. But

the Islamist will to kill Jews remains unimpressed by Israel's disproportionate contributions to science, industry,
medicine and learning. Here there are no Arab plans for a "two- state solution, only for a fnal solution. In
counterterrorism, Jewish executioners must now have an honored place in the government of Israel. Without them,
evil would triumph again and again. For Hamas, Islamichhad, Hezbollah and Fatah, murderedJews are not so much a
means to an end as an end in themselves. In this unheroic Arab Islamist world, where killingJews is both a religious

unwillingness
to use necessary force against terror will invite existential terror . Sadly,
killing is sometimes a sacred duty. Faced with manifest evil, all decent civilizations
must rely, in the end, on the executioner. To deny the executioner his their proper
place would enable the murderers to leer lasciviously upon whole mountains of
fresh corpses.
mandate and sometimes also a path to sexual ecstasy and personal immortality, an Israeli

Threats Real & Not Islamophobic

The threats of terrorism are real and there portrayal is not
Islamophobic
Weiss 12 (Rusty Weiss, Contributor at Newsbusters, Dear Media, Accurately
Portraying Muslim Rage as Muslim Rage is Not Islamophobic,September 18 th, 2012,
NewsBusters, http://newsbusters.org/blogs/rusty-weiss/2012/09/18/dear-mediaaccurately-portraying-muslim-rage-muslim-rage-notislamophob#sthash.HqV1hANi.dpuf, JAS) We dont endorse gendered or ablest
language
It isn't the act of
perpetrating violence upon the innocent. No, it's calling out that rage for everyone
to see. In Liberal Land, words speak louder than actions . The media on the left side of the aisle
This week we learned what really gets the liberal media in a ... well ... rage.

took more umbrage with a Newsweek article titled, Muslim Rage, than they did with the incidents that
demonstrated that rage - the killing of four Americans in Libya, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens, and the
hoisting of Islamist flags on sovereign U.S. soil. Outlets like Think Progress called the Newsweek cover, which
featured an image of a group of obviously agitated Muslims, Islamophobic. Newsweek for their part did not
apologize for their portrayal of events in the Middle East saying: "This weeks Newsweek cover accurately depicts
the events of the past week as violent protests have erupted in the Middle East (including Morocco where the cover

Rather than focusing on the real issues here, the liberal media is
doing everything in its power to avoid pointing the fnger at radical Islamists . They
image was taken).

point it at Mitt Romney for his statements, they point it at Newsweek, at the author, Ayaan Ali Hirsi, and they point
it at an obscure flm heretofore unknown to the general public. None of these are justifcation for the scene
currently spreading throughout the Middle East. And most assuredly, the rage is not a response to an anti-

The rage has been consistent

and perpetual, and it has long been evident prior to any version of any antiMohammad flm. During the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. At the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993. At the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. With
the USS Cole bombing in 2000. At the Fort Hood massacre in 2009. And of course,
September 11th. This to name a few. The rage is tangible, and it is very closely
associated with radical Islam. Giving terrorists built-in excuses such as an obscure
flm only serves to add fuel to their fre. Appeasement does not work . What the left clearly
needs are more people of reason, more people like Kirsten Powers who wrote: "... our leaders shouldn't let
our enemies know that when they kill our people and attack our embassies that the US
Government will act like a battered wife making excuses for her psychotic husband. Wake up: we weren't
attacked because of a movie made by an American. We were attacked because
there are crazy religious fanatics who hate the United States . We didn't ask for it." Say it along
with her - Crazy. Religious. Fanatics. Muslim rage. Do not fear it. Fearing words only serves to
embolden the enemy, and they know it. While we continue to fght over those
words, extremists continue to point their RPG's at our foreign diplomats, storm our
embassy walls, burn American flags, call for beheadings and public hangings, and
on and on. All the while, the media criminally continues to whistle through the graveyard .
That said, I would like to propose a change in how the media labels things of this nature. I'd like to redefne the
term Islamophobia. The phrase, much like the race card, has been overused by the
left and has been played out. It has outlived its usefulness. It no longer sticks as a
term of bigotry or intolerance toward radical Muslims. To quote the classic line from The
Princess Bride - I do not think it means what you think it means. Instead, the meaning should revert to a more
literal translation. Islam-phobia. The phobia involves those in the media continually
Mohammad flm, despite what the White House would have you believe.

capitulating to the radicals and terrorists killing in the name of their religion . The
phobia involves Democrats who continually bow down to the unreasonable demands of terror-linked domestic
organizations such as CAIR, or the ICNA, and are willing to release known terrorists in a foolish attempt to establish

liberals refuse to stand up to radical Islam, and it

is why the media refuses to accurately portray the level of rage being executed in
the name of the tenets of radical Islam. They are afraid. No more. Journalism is a profession.
Stop acting like amateurs. Stop being Islamophobes. At some point, you will have to grow a spine
when it comes to the threat of radical Muslim rage.
peace. The phobia equates to fear. That is why

Iran Threats real

History reliably proves Iran is a real threat
Byman 15 (Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Center for Middle East Policy
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, State sponsor of terror:
The global threat of Iran, February 11th, 2015, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/11-byman-iran-sponsorshipof-terrorism, JAS)
Iran's leaders have used terrorism since they took power in 1979 . Over 35 years later,
Iran continues to use terrorism and to work with an array of violent substate groups
that use terrorism among other tactics. Irans strategic goals for supporting
terrorists and other violent substate groups include: Undermining and bleeding
rivals. Iran uses insurgent and terrorist groups to weaken governments it opposes . In
the 1980s, this included bitter enemies like Saddam Husseins Iraq and also lesser foes like the rulers of Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Power projection. Tehrans military and economy are weakand with oil prices plunging and sanctions

Irans
regime sees itself as a regional and even a world power, and working with terrorists
is a way for Iran to influence events far from its borders. Irans support for the
Lebanese Hizballah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Hamas make Iran a player in the
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab disputes, and Irans backing of Houthis in Yemen
give it influence on Saudi Arabias southern border . Playing spoiler. Iran has supported
groups whose attacks disrupted Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian peace
negotiationsa victory for Iran, which sees the negotiations as a betrayal of the Muslim cause and as a means
of isolating the clerical regime in Iran. Intimidation. Working with violent substate groups gives
Iran a subversive threat, enabling Iran to press its neighbors to distance themselves
from the United States or to refrain from joining economic or military efforts to press
Iran. Such efforts, however, often backfre: because these states see Iran as meddling in their domestic affairs and
in place, this weakness is becoming more pronounced. Nor is its ideological appeal strong. Nevertheless,

supporting violence there, they often become more, not less, willing to support economic or even military pressure

Irans ties to terrorist groups, particularly the Lebanese

Hizballah with its global infrastructure, enable it to threaten its enemies with
terrorist retaliation. This gives Iran a way to respond to military or other pressure should it choose to do so.
Revenge. Iran also uses terrorism to take revenge . It has attacked dissidents, including
representatives of non-violent as well as violent groups, even when they posed little
threat to the regime. Iran attacked France during the 1980s because of its support for Iraq, and it has tried
directed at Tehran. Deterrence.

to target Israel because of its belief that Israel is behind the deaths of Irans nuclear scientists and in retaliation for
the 2008 killing of Hizballahs operational chief, Imad Mughniyah, which is widely attributed to Israel. Preserving

Tehran seeks flexibility and prepares for

contingencies. Irans neighbors have often proved hostile, and rapprochements short-lived. Iran seeks
ties to a range of violent groups that give it leverage that could be employed should
suspicion turn to open hostility. Iran, often working with Hizballah, has repeatedly
tried to use terrorism against an array of Israeli and Western targets and interests,
and this pattern has continued in recent years. Recent plots reportedly range from
plots against an Israeli shipping company and USAID offices in Nigeria in 2013 to
reconnoitering the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, for a possible attack. Hizballah
options. As a weak state in a hostile region,

operatives planned an attack in 2014 against Israeli tourists in Bangkok, and in October 2014 Hizballah operatives
were arrested in Peru for planning attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets there . The last
successful Iranian terrorist attack against the United States outside a theater of war was the 1996 strike on Khobar
Towers, which killed 19 Americans. In

2011, the United States disrupted an Iranian plot early in

the planning stages to bomb a restaurant in Washington frequented by the Saudi

ambassador. Although the target was the Saudi ambassador, the Iranian effort would also probably
have killed many U.S. citizens eating at the restaurant . Irans nuclear program complicates the
counterterrorism dilemma. It is too recent to draw frm conclusions, but Irans use of extra-regional terrorism
directly against the United States appears to have declined since negotiations over Irans nuclear program began in
earnest. Iran has not repeated any plot similar to the 2011 attack on the Saudi ambassador to the United States;
the 2013 Nigeria arrest is worrisome, but that occurred before negotiations became serious, and publicly available

An Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a more

dangerous force in the region, and preventing this should be a priority for any U.S.
administration. A nuclear weapon probably would embolden Iran. Iran could become
more like Pakistan: after Islamabad acquired nuclear weapons, it gained a shield from Indias
conventional superiority and became more aggressive in backing anti-India substate
groups.
information is incomplete in any event.

Iran has a rational incentive to shut down the Strait of Hormuz,

to gain leverage and humiliate America
Holmes 12 (James Homes, co-author of Red Star over the Pacifc, an Atlantic
Monthly Best Foreign Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare
officer, The Real Iran Threat, October 29th, 2012, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/the-real-iran-threat/, JAS) We dont endorse
gendered language
anti-access is neither novel nor especially radical . It is a method
the weak use to overcome the strong when the strong venture onto their home
ground. Coastal defenders can hope to win despite their overall inferiority. Or they can hope to prevail without
Yesterday we established that

fghting, persuading stronger yet far away powers that the costs of operating offshore exceed the payoffs from
doing so. If so, they can dissuade adversaries from making the attempt . They win by convincing
prospective antagonists to keep their distance. Iran, like China, wants to keep U.S. forces at bay. Can it do so?
Before undertaking warlike competition, Clausewitz urges strategists to survey each belligerents political stakes, its
strength and situation, and the capacity of its government and people, as well as the likely sympathies and actions

quick survey of these factors illuminates the differences between

Iranian and Chinese anti-access strategy. Leave aside the glaring disparities between the two
of third parties. A

coastal states populations, economic capacity, and other indices of material strength. The Islamic Republic clearly
cannot feld the imposing array of anti-access weaponry China does. But

Tehrans capacity for mischief-

making remains considerable. Look at the map . As it gazes eastward across the Pacifc Ocean,
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy must defend a broad, distended frontnamely the China seasagainst

U.S. forces must approach the Persian Gulf along

a narrow front. They must traverse the very predictable route through the focal
point at Hormuz. The Iranian military, accordingly, can simplify its antiaccess problem by closing the Strait of Hormuz. If Iranian commanders deploy their
limited military capabilities adroitly, they can threaten to pummel U.S. naval forces trapped
within the Persian Gulf while holding U.S. reinforcements at risk outside the Gulf ,
oncoming U.S. forces and Americas Asian allies.

along the Gulf of Oman approaches to Irans coasts. Am I predicting that Tehran can render the Strait permanently

think about the politics, rather than the hardware and tactics, of
access denial. Clausewitz observes that you can win wars in three ways: disarm your enemy,
rendering him powerless to resist your demands; show him hes unlikely to win; or convince him the
costs of winning will be exorbitant, far beyond the value he places on his political stakes. Defeating the
impassable? No. But

U.S. military outright probably lies beyond Iranian capacity, but Clausewitzs other options remain open to Tehran.

Tehran, that is, can put Washington on notice that it will pay a high if not
unacceptable price for access to the Gulf region. A U.S. president might hesitate before making a

decision of this gravity in times of strife; he might modify U.S. deployment patterns, forcing U.S. airmen and
seamen to fght inside the Persian Gulf from aircraft carriers and land bases outside the Strait of Hormuz; he might

Tehran would either prevail or, more likely, gain time to

accomplish its goals. That could be a win from the Iranian standpoint. Americans must
not assume the mismatch between U.S. and Iranian military capabilities guarantees
automatic victory in the Gulf. This barely scratches the surface of a large topic. But examining the
abjure the effort altogether.

geospatial aspects of strategy is always a good way to begin parsing such topics. In my next post well survey how
North Korea approaches the anti-access question.

Islamophobia Ableism Turn

Rhetoric of Islamophobia is ableist works to shame people
with phobic disabilities
Emily 11 (Why you shouldnt conflate bigotry and phobia, April 30,
https://eateroftrees.wordpress.com/2011/04/30/why-you-shouldnt-conflate-bigotryand-phobia/)
Phobias are real things that impact the lives of many people. Bigotry and oppressive
forces are also a thing that impacts the lives of many people. But theyre not the
same thing. At all. Specifcally phobias are when something or other produces an extremely strong unpleasant emotional
reaction, mostly fear or panic. You see a bee, and you completely freeze up and cant move because the bee is going to hurt you
(even though, logically, you know thats unlikely and if it did the pain would be annoying and not serious) Phobias are not generally
taken very seriously. This is a recurring problem; wherein people will try to expose you to your phobia for a variety of reasons,
possibly because they think you need exposure therapy and have decided to skip the informed consent stage. Or possibly because
they fnd it funny, or any variety of reasons. All of which are extremely ableist; at best trying to help you in a way that denies your
agency, at worst outright abuse. And further, people will often treat people with phobias very condescendingly. Insisting that you
should just magically get over it or that your emotional reaction is a sign of weakness or any other variety of derogatory treatment
for it. People will completely disregard the needs of their readers, and, for example, illustrate their writing with pictures of blood or
insects in ways that make it hard to avoid said pictures; assuming that their readers emotional safety is just a concern to be casually
tossed aside. (Further ignoring the fact, of course, that if you trigger your readers, they are unlikely to remain your readers.) The
thing is, the suffix -phobia is used for two completely different things. One thing is phobias; which are a mental process that is

Bigotry is hate. Its treating people

as less than human. Its systematically denying people basic rights and disrupting
their lives. But its not a phobia. Calling it one gives reasonability to the panic
defense; when someone claims that they just panicked because the victim of a hate
crime was different and that made them commit said crime. Because phobias do result in an
inability to think clearly, although they dont usually result in violence so much as hiding. Further calling bigotry a
phobia serves to make oppressors sympathetic. After all, their bigotry is just an out of control emotional
reaction. It says that they are the ones who are suffering, not the people who they are oppressing. Using -phobia to
discuss bigotry shames phobias as well. Telling people that their emotional reactions
are as bad as forces that systematically dehumanize and kill people on a regular
basis prevents people from being able to discuss their reactions without being read
as terrible people. It prevents people from being able to deal with their phobias in useful ways, whether by avoiding them
rather disruptive and tends to preclude clear thinking. The other is bigotry.

or by attempting to fnd treatment for them. It encourages people to hurt themselves by entering painful situations and ignoring the
pain, because the pain is seen as a manifestation of their own personal failures.

Using -phobia for bigotry is an

example of bigotry and is defnitely oppressive. This becomes especially a problem because occasionally
oppression and phobias overlap. If you spend your life shamed for expressing a personality trait or because of your mind, and are
constantly harassed and demeaned because of something about you, and see people around you who exhibit said trait be harassed
and treated as jokes or disguisting or terrible people, you can quickly develop a phobia of said trait. But then, when you have that
reaction, everyone around you uses the words to describe your reaction to describe the people who hate you. Whos oppression has
caused this reaction in the frst place. You have panic attacks when you try to transition because youve been bombarded by
messages that trans people are terrible and freaks. Only then, you cant talk about it. You cant say Oh hey I have a phobia of being
trans because transphobia isnt anxiety about stepping outside of prescribed gender roles, its oppression of people who do that.
Calling oppression of trans people transphobia is likely to be oppressive to trans people .

Fighting bigotry with

bigotry isnt just helping one group at the expense of another, its hurting the group
youre trying to help, and makes their oppressors sympathetic . This is, understandably,
problematic.

Use the ballot to reject ableist rhetoric

Cherney 11 (James, Wayne State University, The Rhetoric of Ableism,
Disabilities Study Quarterly, Vol. 31 No. 3, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606)

If we locate the problem in disability, then the ableist absolves his or her
responsibility for discrimination and may not even recognize its presence. If we
locate the problem in ableism, then the ableist must question her or his orientation.
The critic's task is to make ableism so apparent and irredeemable that one cannot
practice it without incurring social castigation. This requires substantial vigilance,
for ableist thinking pervades the culture. For example, as I write this, I am tempted
to use medical metaphors to explain the task and script something like "we cannot
simply excise the tumor of ableism and heal the culture, for it has metastasized and
infltrated every organ of society." Yet this metaphor relies on an ableist perspective
that motivates with the fear of death and turns to medical solutions to repair a body
in decay. Using it, I would endorse and perpetuate ableist rhetoric, just as I would by
using deafness as a metaphor for obstinacy ("Marie was deaf to their pleas for
bread") or blindness to convey ignorance ("George turned a blind eye to global
warming"). The pervasiveness of these and similar metaphors, like the cultural
ubiquity of using images of disabled bodies to inspire pity, suggest the scale of the
work ahead, and the ease with which one can resort to using them warns of the
need for critical evaluation of one's own rhetoric. Yet the task can be accomplished.
Just as feminists have changed Western culture by naming and promoting
recognition of sexism, the glass ceiling, and patriarchyadmittedly a work in
progress, yet also one that can celebrate remarkable achievementswe can reform
ableist culture by using rhetoric to craft awareness and political action.