Democracy and participatory governance are popular political notions in today’s world.

Fair
and free
elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless
the electoral
process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and
political rights and
freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective
of religion,
caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for
advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and
property of its
citizens.
While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their
commitment to
these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how
does one
create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and
participatory
governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of
many
rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as
an
instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others
selectively
employ some aspects of democracy to create a façade. Still others hold elections, establish
elected
legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and
the people
holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of
democracy is
created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and
substance of
democracy.
Professed Values and Operational Realities:
In Pakistan, the rulers, political parties and leaders and the civil society groups support
democracy at the
normative or conceptual level. The politically active circles demand representative governance
and
participatory decision making in the political and economic fields. They highlight fair and free
electoral
process, the rule of law, socio-economic justice and accountability of those exercising state
power as the
pre-requisites for a political system.
However, there are serious problems with these principles at the operational level in Pakistan.
Power
structure and style of governance often negated these principles. Most rulers, civilian and
military,
pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high
premium to
personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. .This
was coupled
with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-
economic system.
A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of
authoritarianism and
non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of Pakistani political
experience. The
redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells of authoritarian and military
rule, the
theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory governance has persisted in Pakistan.
None of the
two political trends has been able to overwhelm each other. If democracy could not function
on a
continuous basis, the authoritarian and military rule did not get accepted as a normal or
legitimate
political system. This engenders the hope that the over all commitment to democracy would
continue to
persist as one of the most cherished norms in the polity and a governance system that falters
on
democracy would not be able to cultivate voluntary popular support.
The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the
popular level.
A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the federal and
provincial
levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not bothered about the
interest and
welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political efficacy is reflected in the
declining
voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of voters maintain that their vote
does not
matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they express negative views about the
rulers as well
as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people have not given up on democracy. While
talking about
their ‘helplessness’ with reference to changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the
norms of
democracy and participatory governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They
are
therefore vulnerable to mobilization for realization of these norms and values.
The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution and
political
order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of the role of
the military3
bureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian governments, and authoritarian
and
narrow-based power management.
Pakistan’s political history can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant
style of
governance and political management:
1. Civilian political government: August 1947-October 1958
December 1971-July 1977
2. Direct Military Rule: October 1958-June 1962
March 1969-December1971
July 1977-December 1985
October 1999-November 2002
3. Selective use of Democracy by the Military (Post-military rule)
June 1962-March 1969
March 1985-November 1988
4. Military’s influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments
December 1988-October 1999
5. Military’s direct involvement in power management after the end of military
rule; constitutional and legal role for the military
November 2002-till the writing of this article
Historical Overview:
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a
parliamentary
system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal
government
exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers did not pay much
attention to
democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the
survival of the
state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state
reinforced
authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition
process These
included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India
and
Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the
troubled relations
with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal
government in
Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil
servants and
military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah,
the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of
Pakistan.
This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions
and
fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local
stature and
did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it
difficult for the
political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of
the early
years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took
8 ½ years to
frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties,
leaders and
regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of
violation of
parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was
unable to
assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.
4
The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of
the political
leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass
power. He
manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of
governments.
Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a
combined
military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/President Iskander Mirza
(1955-1958);
they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the
rise of the
bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of
democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers
along with
the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and
domestic
affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the
tottering civilian
government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of
power by the
generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have
either ruled
the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to
June 1962,
when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but
the 1962
Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s centralized and
authoritarian rule
which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the
state media
projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His government’s
political
management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and
the regions
and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was
then East
Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s
1962
Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in
Pakistan’s
politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for
socioeconomic
equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action
in
East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December
1971).
Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up of the original Pakistan
and the
establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political
setback forced
General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader,
Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in
what was
left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to
July 5, 1977)
against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the
military debacle
of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s command
structure.
However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate
the
military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian
methods to deal
with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the
pretext that the
government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief
of the Army
Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition
parties
welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of
direct
military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and
conservative
Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his
government’s
partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic
resistance to the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge
the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government obtained international financial and
diplomatic support
which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and
militancy,
undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and
processes.
These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far
reaching changes in
the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued
centrality to
governance and political management
5
In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top
commanders
closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and
security
matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their
professional
and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for
Benazir
Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif
(November 1990-July
1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian
government and the
top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders
depended on
their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of
Nawaz
Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders
during the
fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the
sidelines and
viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and
constitutional role for
the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it
could not
give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide
ranging
commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care,
education,
and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments
for civil
construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its involvement in
governance, its role
in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.
The Musharraf Model:
General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff since October 1998, assumed power after his
top
commanders dislodged the elected civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999.
He
designated himself as the Chief Executive and suspended the constitution to impose military
rule, avoiding
the use of the term of martial law.
General Pervez Musharraf carefully tailored the transition to constitutional and civilian rule in
2002. The
underlying consideration was his staying on as an effective President in the post-military rule
period and
the continuation of the policy measures adopted by his military regime. The transition process
was
deigned to share power with a section of the political leaders rather than transfer power to
civilian
political leaders.
He ensured his continuation in office before starting the transition process by holding a state
managed
uncontested referendum on April 30, 2002 to get him elected as President for five years. This
was followed
by the introduction of far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution to enhance his powers and
to give a
constitutional cover to the role of the top brass in policy making through the issuance of the
Legal
Framework Order (LFO) in August. Meanwhile a breakaway faction of the PML-Nawaz Sharif,
labeled as the
PML-Quaid-i-Azam, was co-opted for partnership. The PML-Q enjoyed state patronage which
enabled it to
emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly and it obtained a clear majority in
the Punjab
Provincial Assembly. The military regime’s major adversary, the PPP, came second in the
National
Assembly and obtained the largest number of seats (not an absolute majority) in the Sindh
Provincial
Assembly.
The Presidency and the intelligence agencies played an active role in creating the PML-Q led
coalitions at
the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had a majority to form
the
government. Thus, the National Assembly began to function on November 16 and General
Pervez
Musharraf took the oath as the elected President for five years. The provincial governments
were installed
in November-December and the Senate, upper house of the parliament, was elected in the last
week of
February 2003 and resumed functioning on March 12, 2003, which marked the full restoration
of the 1973
Constitution as amended by the LFO.
Pakistan thus returned to constitutional rule with elected parliament and provincial assemblies
as well as
elected governments at the federal and provincial levels. However, the political arrangements
were
dominated by the Presidency. President Pervez Musharraf not only exercised the enhanced
powers under
6
the LFO but he also continued as the Army Chief—an unusual combination in a democratic
polity-which
gave him an overriding clout in the polity.
The focal point of the post-2002 political order is President-Army Chief General Pervez
Musharraf who
functions as an effective ruler, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the Parliament. This
political
arrangement could be described as the Musharraf model of governance and political
management. The
effective powers are concentrated in President-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and his
army/intelligence
affiliates who command the political system both at the federal and provincial levels. The
establishment of
the National Security Council in April 2004 which provides a legal cover to the expanded role of
the top
brass of the military further reinforces the position of the President and the brass of the
military.
The Musharraf model emphasizes the unity of command, centralization, management rather
than
participation and the guardianship of the political process by the military. The elected
government and the
parliament have to function within the space made available to them by the top commanders.
The
political clout of the civilian leaders depends on their ability to work in harmony with the top
generals.
The parliament and the provincial assemblies have not been able to acquire an autonomous
and assertive
role in the polity. The effective power at both federal and provincial levels is located outside
the
parliament and the provincial assemblies. Consequently, the seekers of state power and
resources focus on
the presidency and its Army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates. The assemblies have done
limited
legislative work and their functioning has been marred by bitter exchanges between the
government and
the opposition, violation of parliamentary norms, the quorum problem and boycotts by the
opposition
parties. The members complain about the frequent absence of the ministers from the two
houses of the
parliament and the inadequacy of the answers by the government to their questions. The
assemblies have
to make a real effort to fulfill even the constitutional requirement of the minimum working
days in a year.
The prime ministerial changes in June 2004 (Zafarullah Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein)
and August
(Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein to Shaukat Aziz) demonstrated the weakness of the National
Assembly and the
ruling coalition led by the PML. The decision for these changes was made in the presidency and
the
National Assembly and the PML simply endorsed it. Jamali got his budget passed from the
parliament
which amounted to a vote of confidence for his government. Two days later, he had to quit
under pressure
from the Presidency. The PML accepted the change and his entire cabinet was reappointed
under the new
prime minister.
This system restricts the participatory opportunities for the mainstream political parties, i.e.
the PPP and
the PML-Nawaz, which are viewed as the major adversaries of the Musharraf dominated
political order.
The confrontation between the government and the opposition has increased over time. This
means that
the political process is not moving in the direction of consensus building and its support base
continues to
be narrow, limited to the co-opted section of the political elite.
The strains in the federal-provincial relations have increased because the provinces complain
about the
domineering role of the military dominated federal government. The federal government has
not resolved
many federal-provincial issues which have created a strong impression in the smaller provinces
that the
federal government was deliberately doing this to keep political and financial pressures on the
provinces.
Some of the major issues are the determination of the National Finance Commission
(NFC)Award on
distribution of revenues between the federal and provincial governments,, the construction of
dams for
storing water and power generation, the Greater Thal Canal issue, the share of the NWFP in
net profit of
hydel power generated in that province, the gas royalty for Balochistan, and the federal
government mega
development projects in Balochistan and the construction of new army cantonments in that
province. If
confrontation and bitterness persist in the political system and the competing political
interests do not
adopt accommodating disposition the sustainability of the present political system may not be
guaranteed.
Problems of Democracy
The major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times,
democracy and
participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.
7
Institutional Imbalance: Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of
independence
in August 1947. The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence
services, was
more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first
Interim
Constitution, 1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This
imbalance was
reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain.
First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after
independence. The
Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and
capacity for state
and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or semi-feudal
background, and
were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building the party as a viable
organization
capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also suffered from similar problems
of internal
disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were
unable to offer
a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests
within a
participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political
institutions or
processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.
Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by
hierarchy,
discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years of
independence led
the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s
security
problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the military’s
position in
the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated
a
substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The military’s position in
the polity
received additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances
in the mid-
1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by
Americans in
Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the military’s efficiency and strike power. Thus, the
degeneration
of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and
confidence of
the military.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of
the civilian
leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves
without the
support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and
the
military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they began to dominate
politics. In
October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political institutions and established its
direct rule, with
the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
The role of various civilian and military intelligence agencies expanded in the political domain
during the
military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985) when the military regime used the intelligence
agencies to
divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan
(1980-1989) and
the linkages between Pakistani intelligence agencies and their U.S. counterparts in the context
of the
Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistan’s intelligence
agencies. Some
of these agencies have been playing active political role since 1988, helping some political
parties and
groups while building pressure on others keeping in view the military’s political agenda. They
have
interfered in the national and provincial elections which has raised doubts about the credibility
of the
electoral process. Some of these agencies were active in politics during after the 2002 general
elections.
These were also instrumental to creating the ruling coalition at the federal level and in Sindh
and
Balochistan after the October 2002 elections. The active political role of the intelligence
agencies
weakens the autonomous growth of civilian political institutions and processes.
Political Consensus-building: The democratic process cannot become functional
without a
minimum consensus on the operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the
beginning point.
As the political process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and
political
advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the
polity. The
scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream
through the
democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political institutions
and processes
viable.
8
The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political
norms.
Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was
allowed to
fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of the
competing
interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy. Therefore, all
constitutions
turned controversial with the passage of time because they were violated by the power
wielders.
Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army
Chief which
made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be easily
set aside or
subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism and
participatory
governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in a partisan
manner by
employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building consensus.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national
issues has
hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The
dominant
elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing with
them. It is not
merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups manifest
intolerance and use
violence against those who question their views.
The steady growth of Islamic extremism and militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since
the early
1980s has stifled the free flow of ideas on the issues of national importance. It gave rise to
religious and
cultural intolerance and increased the level of civic violence. The rival extremist religious
groups did not
hesitate to use violence against each other. The major victims of these trends were social and
cultural
pluralism, political tolerance and accommodation of dissent. The participatory processes also
suffered as
the religious extremists gained strength in Pakistan. Such a political and cultural environment
is not
conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Political Parties and Leadership: Political harmony and democratic evolution
is facilitated
primarily by political parties and leaders. These are important instruments of interest
articulation and
aggregation and serve as vehicles of political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have
traditionally
been weak and unable to perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.
The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political
activities
under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor discipline
among the
members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of financial
resources. Political
parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and ideology.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a
national
movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological
confusion and a
crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not
present a better
alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League. Consequently,
the political
parties could not work for political consensus building and political stability and continuity.
Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake
dispassionate and
scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and
sloganeering
which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious,
scientific and
analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of the
parliament and
provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of quorum which
shows the
non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected houses in dealing with
the
national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and parliamentary secretaries are not
available in
the house to respond to the issues raised by the members.
The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either
floated by
the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these
enjoyed its
blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially the
setting up of
the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the establishment in party
politics.
Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League which was turned into the ruling
party in
1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy. He co-opted a faction of the Muslim
League which
ruled with his blessings after he restored civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General
Pervez Musharraf
9
has done the same by co-opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments
under its
leadership at the federal level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-
December 2002.
The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League
(pre-1971)
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political
eminence to the
establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the strong opposition
of the
military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won majorities in the 1970s
in the
Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of Pakistan. The military
transferred power
to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971. The PPP continues to face the
distrust of the
establishment.
The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally
been
ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited
experience of
working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which
undermines its role in
a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for pursuing a
limited
agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party because this
requires a viable
organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.
Islam and Politics: A predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani
political system
must have some relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise
nature of
relationship between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and
processes to be
set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to
establish a
puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the
Islamic
state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality,
socioeconomic
justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory
governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the
polity
rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. Another
debate
pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan: Did he
advocate an
ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links with Islam or a modern democratic
state that
viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics? Still another issue is how far the Two-
nation theory is
relevant to the post-independence period for shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as
a Muslim
state or an Islamic state?
General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative
interpretation of
the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made
several
administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by
the orthodox
and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious
extremism in
Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against
the notion of
participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and
political
rights as western implants in Pakistan.
The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military
regime of
Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing principle for
the
Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and punishments
introduced by General
Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA), a
conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in power. The rise of Islamic
orthodoxy has also
increased Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani
society.
The inconclusive debate on Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political
system adversely
affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject
democracy as a
western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to attain power and
then
implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of consensus on the precise
relationship between Islam and the Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and political system,
democratic
institutions and processes would not fully develop and become sustainable.
10
Military Rule and Constitutional and Political Engineering: The
repeated
assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in accordance
with its
political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic
institutions
and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire
supreme
legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the development of civilian institutions
and processes
and made it impossible for them to develop strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or
so, the
military returned the country to square one, promising to introduce a system designed to
respond to the
needs and aspiration of the people and reflected the operational political realities of the
country.
While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a
non-partisan
approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in
power and the
continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They engaged in
constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in 1962)) or by
making
drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests of the military
regime. Zia-ul-
Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the 1973 constitution in 1985 and
2002
respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process and to ensure that no political
party could
unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the military regime.
Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing
to play
politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their
continued stay
in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a section of the
political
elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim League. The strategy of
co-option
pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political
arrangements.
This strategy was adopted by the above named military rulers for replacing direct military rule
with new
political arrangements based on sharing of power between the top brass of the military and the
co-opted
political leadership. Another strategy adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding
of carefully
managed general elections to ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their
adversaries.
The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military
ethos of
hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective
consensus. These
institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and remained
closely
associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered in responding
to the
demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of democracy was
poor in the
post-military rule political arrangements.
Concluding Observations:
Democracy in Pakistan faced a host of difficulties which did not let the democratic principles,
institutions
and processes develop firm roots in the polity. Pakistan started with the parliamentary system
of
governance but the legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism, problems
encountered in the
setting up of the new state, the external security pressures and the fear of the collapse of the
state
adversely affected the prospects of democracy. Other factors that caused the problems for
democracy
included the crisis of leadership in the aftermath of the demise of Jinnah, failure of the Muslim
League to
transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party, fragmentation and
degeneration of the
political forces and the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite. Long before the first military
take over in
October 1958 the dominant elite were talking about the unsuitability of liberal democracy for
Pakistan.
Intermittent constitutional and political breakdown, the ascendancy of the military to power
and the
efforts of the top brass of the military to introduce a political system that protected their
professional and
corporate interests made it difficult to create participatory political institutions and processes
that could
command the voluntary support of the diversified political interests. The military elite
employed the
democratic principles in a selective manner and their policy of co-option of a section of the
political
leaders and exclusion of others accentuated polarization and jeopardized the prospects of
political
accommodation and consensus-building.
11
The experience suggests that democratic institutions and processes stabilize and mature if
their natural
evolution is not obstructed by partisan considerations. These must function in their true spirit
over time,
offering all citizens and groups an equal and fair opportunity to enter the political mainstream
and
compete for power and influence. This helps to build support for the political institutions and
facilitates
their sustainability. In Pakistan, periodic breakdown of the political order and repeated
military take-over
or attempts by the top brass to shape the political process to their political preferences did not
ensure
political continuity and the competing interest did not get equal opportunity to freely enter
the political
mainstream. .
Democracy and the autonomy of civilian institutions and processes has been the major casualty
of the
expanded role of the military. Whenever Pakistan returned to civilian and constitutional rule,
the quality
of democracy remained poor. It is a case of democracy deficit. The long term endurance of the
political
institutions and the prospects of democracy faces four major challenges in Pakistan: the non-
expansion of
participatory opportunities for those viewed as adversaries by the military dominated regime,
the poor
performance of the elected assemblies, failure to build consensus on the operational norms of
the political
system, and a drift towards confrontation, religious and cultural intolerance and extremism.
This does not mean that the people have given up on the primacy of the popular will,
participatory
governance, accountability of the rulers and governance for serving the people. The ideological
commitment to these principles persists which will continue to question the legitimacy of
nonparticipatory
and authoritarian governance and political management.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Manzooruddin (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press,
1980).
Burki, Shahid Javed, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (London: Macmillan, 1988).
Callard, Keith, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen, 1958).
Chaudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman, 1969).
Cohen, Stephen P. The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005).
-------------- , The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
Gauhar, Altaf, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang

http://www.fgu.edu.tw/~academic/up1/malayconference1/pape
rscollection.files/conferefncepapers/5-2.pdf

ISLAMIC CULTURE

Islamic culture is itself a contentious term. Muslims live in many different countries and
communities, and it can be difficult to isolate points of cultural unity among Muslims,
besides their adherence to the religion of Islam. Anthropologists and historians
nevertheless study Islam as an aspect of, and influence on, culture in the regions where
the religion is predominant.
The noted historian of Islam, Marshall Hodgson, noted the above difficulty of religious
versus secular academic usage of the words "Islamic" and "Muslim" in his three-volume
work, The Venture Of Islam. He proposed to resolve it by only using these terms for
purely religious phenomena, and invented the term "Islamicate" to denote all cultural
aspects of historically Muslim peoples. However, his distinction has not been widely
adopted, and confusion remains in common usage of these words.

PAKISTANI CULTURE

The society and culture of Pakistan (Urdu: ‫ ) ثقافت پاکستان‬comprises numerous diverse
cultures and ethnic groups: the Punjabis, Kashmiri and Sindhis in the east; the tribal
cultures of the Baloch and Pashtun in the west; and the ancient Dardic and Tajik
communities in the north. These Pakistani cultures have been greatly influenced by many
of the surrounding countries' cultures, such as the Turkish, Persian, Afghan, and Indians
of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
In ancient times, Pakistan was a major cultural hub. Many cultural practices and great
monuments have been inherited from the time of the ancient rulers of the region. One of
the greatest cultural influences was that of the Persian Empire, of which Pakistan was a
part. In fact, the Pakistani satraps were at one time the richest and most productive of the
massive Persian Empire. Other key influences include the Afghan Empire, and later, the
short lived but influential Mughal Empire.
Pakistan has a cultural and ethnic background going back to the Indus Valley
Civilization, which existed from 2800–1800 B.C., and was remarkable for its ordered
cities, advanced sanitation, excellent roads, and uniquely structured society. Pakistan has
been invaded many times in the past, and has been occupied and settled by many
different peoples, each of whom have left their imprint on the current inhabitants of the
country. Some of the largest groups were the 'Aryans', Greeks, Scythians, Persians, White
Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Afghans, Buddhists and other Eurasian groups, up to and
including the British, who left in the late 1940s.
The region has formed a distinct cultural unit within the main cultural complex of South
Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia from the earliest times, and is analogous to
Turkey's position in Eurasia.[1] There are differences in culture among the different ethnic
groups in matters such as dress, food, and religion, especially where pre-Islamic customs
differ from Islamic practices. Their cultural origins also reveal influences from far afield,
including Tibet, Nepal, India and eastern Afghanistan. All groups show varying degrees
of influence from Persia, Turkestan and Hellenistic Greece. Pakistan was the first region
of South Asia to receive the full impact of Islam and has developed a distinct Islamic
identity, historically different from areas further west.[1]

Diwan-e-Khas: The hall of special audience with the emperor

Bahauddin Zakariya
Ancient sites in Pakistan include: Zorastrian Fire temples, Islamic centres, Sufi Shrines,
Buddhist temples, Hindu and Pagan temples and shrines, gardens, tombs, palaces,
monuments, and Mughal and Indo-Saracenic buildings. Sculpture is dominated by Greco-
Buddhist friezes, and crafts by ceramics, jewellery, silk goods and engraved woodwork
and metalwork.
Pakistani society is largely multilingual, multi-ethnic and multicultural. Though cultures
within the country differ to some extent, more similarities than differences can be found,
as most Pakistanis are mainly of Aryan heritage or have coexisted side by side along the
Indus River for several thousand years, or both. However, over 60 years of integration, a
distinctive "Pakistani" culture has sprung up, especially in the urban areas where many of
the diverse ethnic groups have coexisted and in many cases, intermarried. Education is
highly regarded by members of every socio-economic stratum, with the country now
having a literacy rate of 55%, up from 3% at the time of independence. Traditional family
values are highly respected and considered sacred, although urban families increasingly
form nuclear families, owing to socio-economic constraints imposed by the traditional
culture of the extended family.
The past few decades have seen emergence of a middle class in cities such as Karachi,
Lahore, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Quetta, Faisalabad, Sukkur, Peshawar, Sialkot,
Abbottabad and Multan. Rural areas of Pakistan are regarded as more conservative, and
are dominated by regional tribal customs dating back hundreds if not thousands of years.

PAKISTAN ETHNIC RELIGIOUS CONFLIT

Pakistan's political and social history provides an interesting case study of the dynamics
of conflict formation as well as opportunities for researchers and academicians in the
field of conflict resolution and conflict management. At the outset, Pakistan faces a
myriad of ethnic and religious conflicts. The social environment plays an important role
in shaping and reshaping as well as intensifying these conflicts. Included in the social
environment are the very low literacy rates, a feudal agro-based economy, imbalanced
economic development, the inequitable distribution of power and resources, and a
pseudo-federal system.
The key factor in understanding conflict formation is the state structure. The dilemma of
state building and nation building came naturally to the postcolonial state at the time of
independence. A viable and effective state structure, in terms of the bureaucracy and the
military, was necessary to sustain the new nation-state and its independence. However,
the state structure came to manifest itself much more strongly over government and civil
society, with the result that the military and political processes became synonymous with
each other. Starting with the military regime of Ayub Khan, Pakistan has seen overt
military rule in the 1980s during the time of Zia-ul-Haq and at present with Pervez
Musharraf in power. The predominance of the bureaucratic-military nexus has resulted in
an overcentralized state structure, a negation of democratic politics, a weak civil society,
and religious and ethnic conflicts.
The state structure and the conflicts it generates can be explained with respect to three
levels of analysis: the domestic, regional, and international. At the domestic level, the
main debate includes the religious issue, the ethnic issue, and the crisis of governability.
At the regional front, the enmity with India over the Kashmir issue provides an
interesting case study of the legitimacy of the ruling establishment. At the international
front, the relationship with the United States is the key variable for understanding the
debate on democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan.
At the domestic level, an overcentralized state structure has tended to augment both
religious and ethnic conflicts. As far as religion is concerned, Islam played an important
role in the movement for Pakistan. Islam provided the ideological foundation for the two-
nation theory, which claimed the distinctiveness of the Hindus and Muslims and called
for a separate nation-state for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. It is interesting to
note that soon after the Partition of 1947 the Islamic factor sailed into oblivion as the
state managers acquired a secular tone. Pakistan's state structure since partition has
remained secular, with Zia's period being the exception when the Islamic factor played an
instrumental role. During Zia's rule, religion was used to provide legitimacy to an
illegitimate government and also to mobilize Islamic parties in the jihad against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Zia's reliance on a Sunni version of Islam alienated the
minority Shia community and one finds the prevalence of the Shia-Sunni conflict in
Pakistan ever since. Moreover, with the success of the Iranian revolution, Pakistan
became an important playground for the Sunni Gulf states and the Irani Shia state to play
out their rivalries against each other through their support of Islamic parties in Pakistan.
On the other hand, the ethnic factor has played an important role in Pakistan's political
history. Pakistan, being a multiethnic state, needed to evolve an adequate system of
representation and a just and equitable distribution of power and resources in order to
maintain ethnic peace and harmony. However, the dominance of the state structure,
especially the bureaucracy and the military, by one or two ethnic groups, tended to
augment ethnic tensions and violence. The most important in the context of Pakistan has
been the Bengali ethnic movement, which led to the breakup of Pakistan and rise of a
new state, Bangladesh, in 1971. The Bengalis nurtured serious grievances from the
Pakistani state structure, as they were not given adequate representation at the state level.
Moreover, since a working parliamentary form of government was nonexistent in
Pakistan, the Bengalis found themselves alienated and exploited. These grievances led to
a movement that called for federal autonomy. Later on, through grave violence that was
inflicted on the Bengalis, a separate state emerged. The violence done to the Bengalis
called into question the ideology of the two-nation theory, as one witnessed Muslims
inflicting violence and oppression on Muslims themselves. After the secession of East
Pakistan and its reinvention as the country of Bangladesh, other ethnic movements came
to challenge the Pakistani establishment. These were the Baluch Movement in the 1970s,
the Sindhu Desh Movement in the 1980s, and the Muhajir Qaumi Movement in the
1990s. The state used its force to brutally suppress all three movements with no room for
accommodation and compromise. It seems as if there was no lesson learned from the
separation of East Pakistan.
At the regional front, the enmity with India provides the causality for the justification of
the state structure and huge defense budgets. The Kashmir issue, a legacy of the colonial
period, has come to haunt relations between India and Pakistan. Three wars and a mini-
war in Kargil have been fought between the two nations, but still the Kashmir issue
remains unresolved. Pakistan insists on a just and fair resolution of the Kashmir issue
through the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, but the issue itself has
become instrumental in legitimating the incumbent regimes, whether military or
nonmilitary. Although India and Pakistan are implementing and have implemented a
regime of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to settle bilateral issues, the
nonresolution of the issue points to the issue being a lifeline for the state structures of
both the countries. In the case of Pakistan, when the host of social problems continue to
plague the nation-state, the important question is to concentrate and solve the dispute first
or to solve the immense amount of ethnic, religious, and class conflicts within the
country. The state structure, however, sees the dispute in a traditional manner, which
emphasizes the buildup of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles
to combat India. This comes at a tremendous cost as the defense expenditure helps to
sustain an illiterate, malnourished, and underdeveloped society and a social environment
that causes conflicts of various types.
At the international front, the relationship of Pakistan with the United States has served to
perpetuate military rule and the strengthening of the state structure at the expense of
 democratic institutions and a strong civil society. Pakistan's year of independence
coincided with the outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The United States, sensing a threat to its interests in the Middle East and South
Asia, immediately cultivated the friendship of Pakistan because of its geographical
proximity to the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The military and financial aid
provided to Pakistan by its foreign ally helped to sustain illegitimate and undemocratic
regimes in power. During the 1960s and the Afghanistan-USSR war in the 1980s, the
Pakistani military establishment played an important role in helping the United States to
procure its interests in the region. At present, history is repeating itself as an
undemocratic regime is being sustained as a result of the 11 September 2001 incident.
The present military regime—despite its undemocratic credentials—is following a liberal
line. Countrywide, local elections have been held with the aim of devolving power to the
common people and their representatives. Moreover, major constitutional changes have
taken place and general elections are scheduled in October 2002. More importantly, after
11 September, the military regime's main initiative has been with regard to the
eradication of the jihadi culture in Pakistan. This culture of Islamic fundamentalism was a
direct result of the Afghanistan war in the 1980s and its momentum grew with the rise of
the Taliban in 1994. President Musharraf has made it clear that jihadi groups will not be
tolerated and their linkages within the state structure of Pakistan will be rooted out.
The Pakistan of today stands at a critical juncture. First of all, there is a fear of fallout of
the Taliban in Pakistan. Second, the debt burden needs to be tackled for long-term
economic development in the country. Third, the state structure needs to be reformed to
guarantee adequate representation of all social groups within the society. Lastly, and most
importantly, problems of the common people need to be solved so that a benevolent and
peaceful social environment free of conflicts is established.

PAKISTAN IDENTITY

This paper will examine the relationship between Pakistan’s chequered democratic
history and the regionalist movements that have emerged. The relationship between
democracy and ethnic conflict is complicated and multifaceted. Democracy can
provide opportunities for ethno-national mobilisation and therefore exacerbate
demographic tensions between communities. Conversely it can provide the
opportunity for the expression and democratic resolution of tensions. Taking another
perspective, the absence of democracy may exacerbate ethnic tensions through the
reduced opportunity for the articulation of grievances. On the other hand it can
manage grievances through the accommodation of different communities within
non-elected institutions. There is no hard and fast rule, and the specifics of each
movement must be investigated. The relationship between democracy and ethnic
conflict is problematic in Pakistan. Pakistan has never been a consolidated
democracy; but there have been periods in Pakistan when the expression of
regionalist grievances has been possible. Even in these periods however, regionalist
parties have not performed well – Sindhi regionalist parties in particular. This is
staggering given the domination of the major institutions of state by Punjabis. In
addition, many of the major ethnic conflicts that Pakistan has experienced have been
during democratic interludes, for example, the secession of Bangladesh and 1973-8
war in Baluchistan. Therefore the paper’s aim is to problematise the relationship
between democracy and identity politics in Pakistan, through an understanding of
which groups have been co-opted, and more importantly, how and why.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Ex-Qiad Aazam Chair, Columbia University
Political and Defence Consultant
The founding fathers envisioned Pakistan as a democratic state upholding
representative governance, constitutionalism, civil and political rights and equal
citizenship for all. They maintained that such a polity would derive its ethical inspirations
from Islam.1
However, the founding fathers’ vision could not be fully converted into viable institutions
and processes. The political track record is marked by discontinuities, periodic
constitutional breakdown, military rule, absence of fair and free elections after regular
intervals, a selective enforcement of the rule of law and a poor tradition of accountability
of rulers. Pakistan experimented with two interim constitutions (1947, 1972) and three
regular constitutions (1965, 1962, and 1973). The current constitution (1973) was
thoroughly revised by the military governments in 1985 and 2002. This was in addition to
four phases of direct military rule when the constitution was either abrogated or
suspended. The military-dominated power elite consciously discouraged the
development of autonomous political and societal activity and engaged in constitutional
and political engineering to entrench themselves in power.
Several factors explain Pakistan’s failure to evolve viable participatory political
institutions and processes.2 A major contributory factor is the inability of the major
political interests to evolve a consensus on the relationship between Islam and the
Pakistani state and society in operational terms and the rapid rise of Islamic orthodoxy,
fundamentalism and militancy since the early 1980s against the backdrop of Pakistan’s
active involvement with the Afghan resistance to the presence of the Soviet troops in
Afghanistan (December 1979 to February 1989) and the subsequent development.
This paper argues that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and militancy (i.e.
the jihadi movement) in the 1980s and the subsequent years, constitutes a major
obstacle to Pakistan’s efforts to promote socio-cultural pluralism and create viable
participatory political institutions and processes. The democratic prospects have suffered
mainly due to the emphasis on literalist and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, threat
or use of violence by various extremist and fundamentalist groups for pursuing Islam
based partisan political agenda and Islamic-sectarian violence. These trends increased
socio-cultural intolerance and reduced the space for the autonomous functioning of
civilian institutions and process and stifled consensus building on the operational norms
of the polity through dialogue and accommodation.
Islamic extremism and militancy flourished in Pakistan mainly with the blessings of the
military regimes which used these groups to deflect participatory pressures and to seek
legitimacy because they did not always insist on participatory governance and civilian
supremacy. Most of them were willing to support any government that allowed them to
pursue their partisan Islamic agenda. These Islamic groups also served the foreign
policy agendas. At times, some civilian governments also appeased them to win over
their support to pressure their political adversaries. Consequently, the rising tide of
Islamic extremism and militancy undermined the prospects of democracy.
1
GROUP TYPOLOGY
Pakistan’s Islamic groups and leaders can be divided into three broad categories for this
study. First, several Islamic political parties function like other political parties, engaging
in political mobilization, contesting elections and working towards assumption of power.
A conglomerate of six Islamic parties, labeled as the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), is
currently ruling the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and shares power with the
ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in Balochistan. It is also represented in both
houses of the federal parliament and the provincial assemblies of Sindh and the Punjab.
The MMA supports the Taliban movement, sympathizes with the Al-Qaeda and it is
critical of Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. led global war against terrorism. However,
the MMA acknowledges the instrumental relevance of various facets of the modern state
for implementing an Islamic order on orthodox lines. Some Islamic political parties
operate independent of the MMA.3
Second, Islamic seminaries4 pre-date the establishment of Pakistan. However, these
proliferated in Pakistan during the last three decades. As institutions of Islamic learning,
Islamic seminaries inculcate extremely conservative and orthodox Islamic orientations
among their students who often develop a narrow religious worldview and question the
modern notions of state and participatory governance.
There are several Islamic groups who are not directly engaged in politics but pursue
literalist and fundamentalist Islamic perspective on societal and state issues. Like Islamic
seminaries they are critical of modern state system and participatory governance as
being contrary to the basis tenets of Islam. They talk of return to the “ideal Islamic order”
as it existed in the earliest period of Islam. A large number of Islamic seminaries are
formally linked with Islamic parties and make their students available for street agitation.
Similarly, some seminaries have linkages with the militant groups involved in
Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir and help their militant agenda. They also
provided volunteers to the militant Islamic groups, especially those fighting in
Afghanistan. Some of Islamic seminaries in NWFP and Balochistan would send a large
number of their students to Afghanistan to fight along with the Taliban against the
northern alliance during 1996-2001.
Third, a number of militant Islamic groups surfaced with reference to Afghan resistance
to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. These groups were patronized by Pakistan,
the U.S. and several conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the U.S. intelligence agency, CIA, for
training and equipping these groups so that these fought effectively against the Soviet
troops in Afghanistan. After the exit of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the U.S.
withdrew its support to these militant groups which continued to function in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Some of them devoted their attention to the insurgency in Indian-
administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s ISI continued to support them because their active
involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir served Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda.
Some of them extended their support to Islamic causes elsewhere. Their involvement in
Pakistan’s domestic affairs is limited mainly to mobilizing support for their external
agenda. Some militant organizations use their organizational skills to propagate their
perspective on Islam and periodically use violence against those who subscribe to other
perspectives on Islam. This causes Islamic-sectarian violence in Pakistan which
escalated as the militant groups gained strength. As religious hardliners, these militants
do not subscribe to the modern notion of governance and political management. They
advocate “jihad’ (holy war) in pursuance of Islamic causes any where in the world and
aspire to establish a truly Islamic order as articulated by them.
2
Islamic parties and groups falling in the first category maintain a favourable disposition
towards the electoral process and an elected parliament. They view them as instruments
for securing power which they plan to use for implementation of an Islamic order as
articulated by them. For them, democracy is not an ideal but has instrumental value to
the extent it facilitates the implementation of their religio-political agenda. If they come to
the conclusion that they cannot win or share power through the electoral process, they
may have a greater tendency to resort to extra constitutional means to pursue their
Islamic agendas.
Most groups and organizations, especially the militants, falling in the second and third
categories reject the modern notions of participatory governance, the electoral process,
assemblies and the existing legal and judicial system. Rather than offering a detailed
alternative Islamic political framework, they question the legitimacy of the modern
notions of governance and democracy and highlight the abstract Islamic principles or the
narratives of the earliest period of Islamic history as the foundations of a model Islamic
state.5 However, they hardly agree on the ways and means to interpret these principles
and historical narratives to build institutions and processes. They question each other’s
interpretation. Their denominational differences and mutual conflicts often produce
violence.
RISE OF ISLAMIC PARTIES
Islamic political parties have been functioning in Pakistan since the early days of
independence, although the roots of some of them can be traced back to the pre-
independence period. Some of the leading Islamic political parties like the JI, Jamiat-i-
Ulema-e-Hind, the Khaksar Movement, and Majlis-i-Ahrar, opposed the political
movement for the establishment of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. In the post
independence period some of these parties re-organized themselves and a couple of
new Islamic parties entered the political domain. They argued for making Pakistan an
Islamic state. The dominant political elite did not question the notion of Islamic state but
they diverged from the Islamic parties on its details
There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be set up under the rubric
of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a puritanical
Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the
Islamic state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the
principles of equality, socio-economic justice and the modern notions of the state, civil
and political rights and participatory governance.6 To them, Islam is a source of guidance
and provides the ethical foundations of the polity rather than a specific political structure
or a legal code for the modern times.7
While subscribing to a democratic political order Pakistan’s various constitutions created
a linkage between the Pakistani state and Islam. However, these constitutions rejected
the literalist and classical notion of an Islamic state which the Islamic parties often
advocated.
The Islamic parties expressed varying degrees of reservations on the Islamic nature of
the constitutions and they continued the advocacy of their notions of Islamic state. Three
major factors helped their activism. First, Islam was closely associated with the
establishment of Pakistan. The Muslim League invoked Islam in the pre-independence
period as a mark of special Muslim identity and an instrument for political mobilization.
Second, the Muslim League leadership was convinced that they could combine the
modern democracy with the principles and teachings of Islam. This sentiment was
reflected in the passing of the Objectives’ Resolution in March 1949. Third, the
fragmentation of the PML soon after the attainment of independence and the
unnecessary delay in constitution-making caused much political
3
confusion. This enabled the Islamic religious parties to insist on establishing an Islamic
political and economic order. However, they played a limited role in the power
management during 1947-1970 and performed poorly in the elections.
Islamic parties gained importance and won-over some state patronage during the
military government of General A.M. Yahya Khan (1969-1971). It relied on some of these
parties, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), to build support for the federal government in
East Pakistan. The military government also adopted the oft-repeated slogan of the
Islamic parties that the ideology of Pakistan is the ideology of Islam in order to counter
Awami League’s Six-point political agenda in East Pakistan that aimed at converting
Pakistan into a loose federation that granted unprecedented autonomy to the provinces.
The civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (December 1971 to July 1977) and the
Islamic political parties viewed each other as adversaries. The former adopted some
Islamic measures to take the wind out of the sails of the Islamic parties. However, these
measures proved counter-productive, adversely affecting the liberal credentials of the
Bhutto government and strengthening the Islamic parties, which spearheaded anti
Bhutto agitation in March-July 1977. The steps undertaken by the Bhutto government
included the designation of Islam as a state religion in the 1973 Constitution. 8 All
Pakistani constitutions assign a special place to Islam in the constitutional arrangements
but Islam was never declared a state religion until 1973. In 1974, the constitution was
amended to accommodate the demand of the Islamic parties and groups to include the
definition of a Muslim in the constitution, thereby declaring the Ahmadya Muslim sect as
a non-Muslim community. In 1977, the Bhutto government imposed a complete ban on
alcohol. These steps emboldened the Islamic parties that were hostile to the Bhutto
regime.
Islamic political parties made the maximum gains during the 11 years of General Zia-ul-
Haq’s military government (1977-1988). General Zia-ul-Haq’s domestic power
imperatives as well as the international and regional situation contributed to
strengthening their role.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government pampered the Islamic parties and encouraged
the orthodox and fundamental groups to enter politics in order to undercut the support of
his political adversaries. The JI either openly supported General Zia-ul-Haq or
maintained a cooperative interaction with him until the withdrawal of martial law in 1985.
His regime’s policy of encouraging religious orthodoxy encouraged all types of Islamic
parties and groups to get actively involved in the political fray. Several new religious-
sectarian and ethnic groups also surfaced, fragmenting the political process.
The regional and international context for rise of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy
was provided by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.
Pakistan willingly joined with the United States and some conservative Arab states to
strengthen Afghan-Islamic resistance to Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. These
countries provided financial resources, weapons and training to the Islamic groups
fighting against the Soviet troops. The international financial and diplomatic support
strengthened the Zia regime in the domestic Pakistani context which increased support
to Islamic political parties, seminaries and other orthodox Islamic groups. It gave special
attention to strengthening militant Afghan and Pakistani groups that were actively
engaged in resistance to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This boosted religious
orthodoxy in Pakistan and many such groups took advantage of the Afghan war by
getting hold of funds and weapons for advancing their partisan agendas.
4
General Zia-ul-Haq thus tilted the political balance in favour of orthodox and
conservative interpretation of Islamic polity. He made several administrative and legal
changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox and
conservative groups.9 The government made more funds available to Islamic seminaries,
causing their proliferation. It also encouraged political and social discourse on
conservative and orthodox lines and patronized Islamic militancy.
These developments strengthened Islamic extremist forces and increased religious and
cultural intolerance in Pakistan. Some of these groups functioned as religious and
cultural vigilantes and used or threatened to use coercion against those who did not
accept their vision of Islam. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in
massive propaganda against participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of
law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights describing these as western implants
in Pakistan.10
Commenting on the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy in Pakistan, President
General Pervez Musharraf wrote in his autobiography: “The entire decade of the 1980s
saw religious extremism rise, encouraged by Zia…. Actually, Zia, for his own personal
and political reasons, embraced the hard-line religious lobby as his constituency
throughout Pakistan and well beyond, to the exclusion of the huge majority of moderate
Pakistanis. Fighting the infidel soviet Army became a holy cause to the jihadis, and
countless Pakistani men signed up.”11
After the withdrawal of Soviet groups from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support
some Afghan resistance leaders and their Pakistan supporters to install a pro-Pakistan
government in Kabul; the Taliban were the last such group that emerged in Afghanistan
in 1994 and enjoyed Pakistan’s support. Pakistan also encouraged some Afghan war
linked groups and some new Pakistani militant Islamic groups to launch military
operations in Indian-administered Kashmir in support of the insurgency that ignited there
in 1989-90.
Despite the pro-Islam tilt in the disposition of the Pakistani state, the Islamic parties did
not perform well in the elections during the post-Zia period, 1988-1999. Two clear trends
emerged from the elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. First, Pakistan began to
move in the direction of a two major political parties system. The Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N) emerged as the leading
political parties but none could establish a government without winning over some
smaller parties. All governments during 1988-1999 were coalitions between one major
party (either the PPP or the PML-N) and some regional and smaller parties. Second the
Islamic parties performed poorly in these elections except when they entered into an
electoral alliance with the mainstream political parties. Some Islamic parties shared
power at the federal level in 1990 as part of the political coalition, Islamic Jamboori
Ittehad (IJI), dominated by the PML-N. However, the partnership with the mainstream
political party diluted the role of the Islamic parties. In 1993, the JI launched a massive
electoral campaign under the banner of Pakistan Islamic Front in a bid to show that it
could alone perform in the elections. The elections results were a major disappointment
for the JI.
The Islamic parties performed exceptionally well in the October 2002 general elections
organized by the military government of General Pervez Musharraf. This can be
attributed to the peculiar political and ethnic context in NWFP and the Pakhtun areas in
Balochistan in the aftermath of the U.S. military action in Afghanistan and the overthrow
of the Taliban government in Kabul. The Islamic parties also benefited from the policy of
the military government of General Pervez Musharraf to encourage them emerge as a
political force to counterbalance the mainstream political parties that openly challenge
his rule.
5
ISLAMIC PARTIES SINCE 2002
The Islamic political parties had the best-ever electoral performance in the October 2002
general elections in Pakistan. The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a conglomerate of six
Islam-oriented parties,12 won a clear majority in the NWFP Provincial Assembly and
formed the provincial government. In the Balochistan Provincial Assembly, The MMA
emerged as the 2nd largest party after the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League
(PML). Both joined together to set up a coalition government in Balochistan. It also won
some seats in the provincial assemblies of the Punjab (11 seats) and Sindh (8 seats),
assuming a nation-wide character.
At the federal level, the MMA came third in terms of seats in the National Assembly. It
won 45 general seats. It also got 18 seats in the indirectly elected upper house, the
Senate. This was for the first time that the Islamic parties got such a high representation
at the federal level and won seats in all provincial assemblies. Their performance was
outstanding in NWFP, followed by their performance in Balochistan. Most of their
representation in the National Assembly and the Senate came from these two
provinces.13
The MMA has now more members in the two houses of the parliament than ever before
and its Secretary General, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, is the leader of opposition in the
National Assembly.
The MMA supporters interpreted their electoral performance as the ascendancy of the
Islamic forces in Pakistan and that it would soon sweep the whole country. The MMA
success was also described as a mandate for implementing the Islamic alternative in
Pakistan.
The 2002 electoral performance of the Islamic parties can be attributed to a host of
factors. Some of these factors were peculiar to the political situation in NWFP and the
Pakhtun areas of Balochistan in the aftermath of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan
and the removal of the Taliban government in Kabul. The two major MMA parties, the
Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI-F) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) cashed on the widespread
anti-U.S. sentiments that pervaded NWFP and Balochistan in the aftermath of U.S.
military action in Afghanistan (October-November 2001) and the subsequent joint efforts
of the U.S. FBI and Pakistan’s security agencies to round up the remnants of Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in Pakistan. The MMA argued that Islam and Pakistan were under siege
by the West in general and the U.S. in particular.
Some these parties and other Islamic elements established an Afghanistan Defence
Council in October 2001 and launched street agitation against Pakistan’s support to U.S.
attack on Afghanistan. This agitation did not take off because the mainstream political
parties did not join them. However, it provided a good opportunity to the Islamic parties
to engage in popular mobilization on an anti-U.S. plank. They established the MMA for
contesting the October 2002 elections and returned to the twin themes of anti-
Americanism and Islam under siege for the election campaign.
Ethnic and cultural factors also contributed to the MMA’s electoral success. The shared
Pakhtun ethnicity with the Taliban created sympathy for them on account of their
sufferings due to U.S. attack on Afghanistan (October-November 2001). When the dead
bodies and injured people reached NWFP and Balochistan it caused much resentment
against the U.S. A good number of those killed or injured in Afghanistan were Pakistanis
(Pakhtuns and others) who had gone to Afghanistan to fight along with the Taliban.
Some of them were arrested by the Northern Alliance after it captured Kabul with the
support of U.S. troops. This caused resentment in the
6
Pakistani Pakhtun areas. The MMA successfully articulated these situational variables to
muster support in the elections.14
The decision of the six Islamic parties to join together to set up an electoral alliance, the
MMA, helped them to perform better in the elections. In the past, they often fielded
candidates against each other. But, in the case of the 2002 elections, they worked in
harmony with each other and fielded joint candidates.
The MMA also benefited from the decision of the military government of General Pervez
Musharraf to contain the role of the mainstream political parties – the PPP led by
Benazir Bhutto and the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif. These mainstream political parties
were viewed by the military government as its main adversaries and it used the state
apparatus to discourage them from popular mobilization in the run up to the general
elections. The constraints on these political parties and the sympathetic disposition of
the military government towards the Islamic parties also contributed to the MMA’s
success.
Despite the peculiar political situation in NWFP and Balochistan and the favourable
disposition of the military regime towards the MMA, it got about 11.10 percent of the
votes cast and came third in terms of seats in the National Assembly. However, as its
votes were concentrated in NWFP and Balochistan, it emerged as the major political
force in NWFP and the Pakhtun areas of Balochistan. It may be pointed out here that
despite the pressures of the military government, the PPP obtained the highest number
of votes in the National Assembly and got second place in terms of seats in the National
Assembly. In Sindh, the PPP emerged as the single largest party.
The MMA faces the dilemma of maintaining a balance between the imperatives of
sustaining power and the need to pursue an Islamic-ideological approach to politics. Its
decision in December 2003 to accommodate the Musharraf government on the Legal
Framework Order (LFO) by supporting the 17th constitutional amendment served its
power interests in NWFP and Balochistan. This was equally rewarding for the
government because the latter got the parliamentary approval for the changes in the
constitution and Musharraf’s election to the Presidency through an uncontested
referendum (April 2002). In return for this gesture, the federal government did not
contest the MMA’s monopoly of power in NWFP and power sharing with the pro-
Musharraf PML in Balochistan. However, this exposed the MMA to criticism that it had
diluted its ideological Islamic character to stay in power.
The MMA faces another dilemma. The smaller political parties in the alliance are
complaining about the domination of the alliance by its two major components, i.e. the JI
and the JUI-F, at the expense of smaller political parties, i.e. the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam
Samiul Haq group (JUI-S), Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith
(JAH). These smaller parties have lost interest in the MMA. The JUI-S and the JUP
virtually dropped out of the alliance and the JAH maintains a discreet distance from the
two major parties in the alliance. Another constituent party, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan
(TJP) maintains a low profile to avoid conflict. Internal disharmony has weakened the
MMA, although it continues to be the leading political power in NWFP and the Pakhtuns
areas of Balochistan.
The MMA leaders often criticize the pro-U.S. policies of the Musharraf government and
threaten to launch street agitation. Similarly, the Musharraf government criticizes the
MMA as a group of hard line and extremist Islamic elements. However, both sides avoid
a head-on collision in order to ensure the continuation of the political arrangements
which enables them to stay in power.15 This relationship faces new challenges because
the MMA opposes the federal
7
government’s military operations against the Islamic extremists and militants in the Tribal
areas, adjacent to Afghanistan.
The MMA’s Islamization has focused more on regulative and punitive aspects which
includes gender segregation in education, denial of permission to female patients to
consult male doctors, projection of Islamic culture in mass media, and removal of
postures and hoardings with female faces. Some of the MMA activists assumed the role
of Islamic vigilantes to enforce Islamic moral codes on the people. The issues of socio-
economic justice and alleviation of poverty have received less attention.
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND MILITANCY
A major set back to democracy was the steady growth of Islamic extremism and
militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since the early 1980s. As discussed in the
earlier section the Pakistani state encouraged these trends by extending support to the
hard line Afghan-Islamic resistance, especially the pro-Pakistan groups.
The close relationship between the Pakistani state, especially its intelligence agencies,
and the extremist and militant Islamic groups persisted after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan. The Pakistani military authorities launched these militant Islamic groups in
Indian-administered Kashmir to bolster the on-going insurgency. The continued state
patronage of Islamic militancy boosted their fortune in Pakistan and encouraged more
and more people to join such organizations. This caused the proliferation of militant
groups in Pakistan.16
Pakistan based Islamic militancy is sectarian in character. Most activists belong to
Whabi/Slalafi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith traditions of Islam, known for their hard line on
socio-political and cultural issues. The Bralvis or the Shia elements played nominal role
in militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir.17 They learnt to use violent means, especially
modern weapons, mainly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Some of them took to violence to
pursue their religious agenda within Pakistan and attacked and killed those who did not
share their perspective on Islam. This stepped up Islamic-sectarian violence in
Pakistan.18
Several Islamic-sectarian organizations engaged in targeted killing of the prominent
personalities of the opposite sect.19 This type of violence was also caused by
factionalism in the militant Islamic movement. Each major group produced breakaway
factions that functioned independent of the parent organization and often resorted to
violence against other sects in order to make their presence felt. 20 A good number of
Islamic-sectarian activists got military training in Afghanistan during the Taliban days or
they took refuge there when Pakistan’s security authorities decided to round them up.
Cultural and religious intolerance also increased as Islamic seminaries proliferated in the
1980s and the 1990s. Most seminaries had sectarian-denominational character and
inculcated a narrow straight-jacketed worldview among the students marked by religious
extremism and intolerance towards other perspectives on Islam. Some of these young
people joined militant Islamic groups that were fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In
other words, Islamic seminaries created a state of mind among its students, making
them vulnerable to the appeals for fighting a “holy war” to foil “Christian-Jewish
conspiracies” against Islam. Some of these young people were recruited by Islamic-
sectarian organization to pursue their sectarian agenda within Pakistan.
8
The rise of religious extremism and militancy undermined social and cultural pluralism,
political tolerance and respect for dissent. Such a political and cultural environment is
not conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law and gender
equality.
Most extremist and militant Islamic groups had no faith in modern democratic institutions
and processes and often described them as western implants in Muslim societies which
must be totally discarded. However, the Islamic political parties were committed to
democracy to the extent its processes enabled them to win the elections so that they can
argue that they have the popular mandate to create a fundamentalist Islamic political
order.
The government of Pakistan has taken stern action against extremist, sectarian and
militant Islamic groups from time to time. It banned such groups in August 2001, almost
a month before the terrorist attacks in the United States. New restrictions were imposed
on other groups in January 2002 and November 2003. It also arrested about 600 Al-
Qaeda activists from the Pakistani territory. Some Islamic extremist elements were
involved in two attacks on President General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003, and
an attack on the convey of the Army Corps Commander, Karachi, a three star general, in
June 2004. There were several other incidents of sectarian and religion oriented
violence,21 including suicide attacks on mosques and other religious places. The
religious places all over Pakistan are now closely guarded by the police or paramilitary
forces when some religious ceremony takes place.
The government does not pursue its counter-terrorism policy in a consistent manner.
Rather, it adopts a go slow policy after taking some stern action against extremist and
militant groups. Such a slowing-down saves the government-MMA relationship from a
total breakdown. The MMA would like to reverse Pakistan’s counter terrorism policies.
However, as an alternate, the MMA seeks flexibility in the government policy in order to
protect its support base which comprises mainly religious hardliners, conservatives and
Islamic seminaries. The slowing-down also enables Islamic extremists, militant and
sectarian groups to resurface and carry on their agenda after some time. Several
sectarian and extremists groups banned by the government in 2001 and 2002
resurfaced under new names in 2002-2003. Other extremist elements that had
voluntarily reduced their activities returned to the political stage.
The inconsistency in counter-terrorism policy has helped the new crop of the Taliban
fighters to shape up partly in Pakistani territories as a credible resistance to the tottering
Karzai government in Kabul. Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai is extremely critical of
Pakistan’s policy of ignoring the Taliban activity in Balochistan and the tribal areas of
Pakistan.22 However, he hardly admits that his government’s failure to establish its
control over most rural areas and the failure to pursue economic rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war ravaged Afghanistan have caused much alienation in Afghanistan.
A large number of these alienated people are willing to join hands with anti-Karzai
militant Pakhtuns, commonly described as the Taliban.
Further, the government does not extend the support base of its counter-terrorism
policies by cultivating the mainstream political parties and leaders. The liberal and
centralist political forces like the PPP and the PML-N are favourably disposed towards
the government’s counter terrorism policy. However, the government does not want to
bring them o board because they question General Pervez Musharraf’s domineering role
in the political process and demand that fair ad free elections should be held to establish
a genuinely representative political order in Pakistan. Musharraf is reluctant to accept
their demands and finds the MMA more accommodating if his administration shows
some flexibility towards Islamic political parties, Islamic seminaries and extremist and
militant Islamic entities.
9
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The linkage between Islam and the establishment of Pakistan created a space for the
political role of Islamic political parties, Islamic scholars and seminaries. They often took
exception to the modern notions of constitutionalism, participatory governance, the
electoral process, civil and political rights and equal citizenship. They advocated the
notion of Islamic state without putting forward the details of institutions and processes of
such a state.
Initially their role could be described as a lobby for implementation of their visions of the
Islamic state. They exercised a restraining influence on policy making by emphasizing
Islamic principles and teachings. This did not cause a serious problem for the state
because the dominant civil or military elite accommodated Islam in the constitutional and
legal arrangements, although they did not accept the literalist and puritanical notion of an
Islamic order as advocated by the religious elements. At times, the civilian elite adopted
part of their Islamic agenda to deflect their political pressure and win them over to their
side.
Their political clout increased when different military governments sought their
cooperation for pursuing domestic and foreign policy agendas. The Yahya military
regime mobilized some of these elements to pursue the federal government’s agenda for
countering the Awami League’s autonomy demand in the pre-1971 East Pakistan.
The position and role of the Islamic elements strengthened in the 1980s because they
became relevant to General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government’s domestic and foreign
policy agendas. In the domestic context, Zia’s military government mobilized
conservative and orthodox Islamic leaders and organizations to demonstrate its public
support and to neutralize the liberal political forces that questioned the legitimacy of the
military rule. It was a marriage of convenience between the military rulers and the
Islamic elements for serving their diverse agendas. Zia wanted to establish his popular
credentials and the conservative and orthodox elements wanted to use the state for
implementation of their visions of the state and the society.
For the first time General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government began to function as the main
instrument of enforcement of Islamic tenets in governance and political management as
articulated by these Islamic groups. This was a major shift in the role of the Pakistani
state and the government. In the past, the state played the role of an enabler and
facilitator for the Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with the principles and
teachings of Islam.23 With General Zia in power, the state became the enforcer of Islam,
which tilted the political balance in favour of the religious elements.
The developments in the regional and international context also strengthened the Islamic
elements in Pakistan and reinforced General Zia’s efforts to pamper them.
Pakistan’s direct involvement in the U.S. backed efforts to strengthen Afghan-Islamic
resistance to Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan helped the military regime to gain
international acceptability, secure international economic support and work closely with
orthodox and conservative Islamic elements. The Afghan war strengthened religious
orthodoxy and extremism in Pakistan. Later, these Islamic groups served Pakistan’s
political agenda in Indian-administered Kashmir. Their relevance to the foreign policy
agenda buttressed their position within Pakistan.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and militancy since the 1980s is a major
obstacle to Pakistan’s return to democracy. These are not the only factors that
undermine the
10
prospects of democracy in Pakistan. However, their resurgence has strengthened the
worldview and political ethos that are not conducive to growth of political and cultural
pluralism, religious tolerance, equal citizenship irrespective of religious differences, and
participatory governance.
Some of these groups are ideologically opposed to the modern notions of the state,
governance and political management as well as the electoral process and a parliament
elected trough such processes. Others invoke some democratic principles and
processes as instruments for obtaining power for enforcing an Islamic political and
economic order as articulated by them. There is hardly any commitment to democracy
as a desired political framework. They talk of the need of implementing an ideal Islamic
order but do not offer a detailed plan of action for setting up such a political order.
The hard line and extremist Islamic elements continued to wield political clout during
1988-1999 when civilian governments functioned in Pakistan for two major reasons.
First, the military continued to wield influence on policy making, especially on foreign
policy and security affairs. The military was the key player in shaping Pakistan’s policy
on Afghanistan, India including Kashmir, and the nuclear issue. This made it possible for
the military to sustain its relationship with the Islamic militant groups. Second, the
political governments were too weak to assert their primacy and often sought the
cooperation of the military to stay in power and projected themselves as the champions
of Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan. They also sought to win over some
of the Islamic elements. The return of the military to power in October 1999 under
General Pervez Musharraf reinforced this relationship. Had there been no terrorist
attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Pakistan would have continued with its
Islamic militancy card in foreign policy for an indefinite period.
The hard line, extremist and militant Islamic parties and other entities have performed
poorly in a relatively open and competitive political environment where different political
discourses are allowed to compete with each other. Their clout and role is likely to be
attenuated if the political system becomes relatively open, allowing a fair opportunity to
liberal and centralist political forces to engage in political mobilization. The military
governments of Generals Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf have consciously
undermined liberal and centralist political forces in order to protect their power interests.
Consequently, Islamic hard line and extremist groups and militant organizations are well-
entrenched. Their perspectives on social, political and foreign policies issues dominate
the political discourse, stressing the hostility of the West towards Islam and a militant
course of action to cope with external “conspiracies’ against Pakistan and Islam. These
groups also practice religious and cultural intolerance. The government discourages the
alternate discourse by the mainstream liberal and centralist political parties and societal
groups.
The political clout of Islamic hardliners can be contained by allowing liberal and centralist
political forces to freely engage in political mobilization. These trends can be
strengthened by holding fair and free elections that offer equal opportunity to all
competing political parties and interest. Pakistan’s experience suggests that a
democratic framework and an open and competitive political environment discourage the
Islamic extremist and hard line elements. Above all, the Pakistani state and its security
agencies should not prop up extremism and militancy for pursuing their domestic or
foreign policy agendas.
Political Complexities of
Humanitarian Intervention in
the Pakistan Earthquake
By Thomas Bamforth

Published on January 16, 2007

Aims and structure of this report

The aim of this paper is to provide a socio-political
introduction to the main issues that have been or may be
encountered by international agencies working in Pakistan
for earthquake relief post the October 8 earthquake in
Northern Pakistan. The report argues that humanitarian
agencies, despite pretences to neutrality, have fed into
existing political fault-lines and seeks to provide an overview
of how this has happened and to make recommendations on
how agencies might better navigate the political dimensions
of humanitarian relief in a sovereign nation under military
rule.

The report is divided into the following sections:

Introduction – humanitarian intervention in a sovereign state under a

military government
The military in Pakistan – a brief history
Sources of ethno-regional conflict in contemporary Pakistan
Political parties and the marginalization of civil society under military
rule
United Nations, the international community and military government
Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction – humanitarian
intervention in a sovereign state
A common and noticeable theme that emerges in
discussions with humanitarian relief workers is the
observation that Pakistan is a sovereign state. For many
workers, their previous experiences have to a large extent
been limited to ‘complex’ situations (where humanitarian
emergencies are the result directly or indirectly of armed
conflict) rather than natural disasters which are merely
‘complicated’. The typical CV of a relief worker includes
stints in Darfur, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor in which the
areas’ respective juridical status is undefined and which are
marked by the absence of a recognized or enforceable state
structure. In such situations, relief agencies can act under
the principle of an a-political humanitarian imperative with
comparatively little concern for state structures or the
political impacts of humanitarian intervention.

This is not the case in Pakistan. The October 8 2005

earthquake, while causing substantial damage and loss of
life across NWFP and PAK (including the loss of an estimated
10,000 military personnel) , has not significantly threatened
the government, state structure or the national economy.
International agencies have consequently found themselves
working with, and at the invitation of, the military-led
government. Overall coordination of the relief effort formally
lies with the Federal Relief Commission (FRC). Some
agencies describe their activities as extensions of the
government, while others, such as UNHCR, provide
‘technical advice’ to the government on camp management.
Organisations such as NATO operated under a 90-day
mandate in the form of a personal invitation from General
Musharraf rather than an invitation from the federal
parliament. Under the 1973 Constitution, held in abeyance
since 1999 , only parliament is sovereign and has the power
to extend such invitations. In addition, Pakistan has been
regarded as a ‘frontline state’ since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (and the region has been of extreme political
sensitivity owing to its geopolitical position since the days of
Kipling). Pakistan and India have fought three and a half
wars (1947, 1965, 1971), with the ‘half’ war being a
significant incursion by regular army forces into Kargil in
Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) in 1999. Between 1990
and 2001 Pakistan was under international sanctions as a
result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons and further
‘democratic’ sanctions were imposed as a consequence of
General Musharraf’s military coup d’état in 1999. Since
2001, Pakistan’s ‘frontline’ status has been restored, and its
military regime legitimized internationally, as a key ally in
the overthrow of the Taliban and in the ‘War on Terror’
against al-Qaeda.

Humanitarian agencies consequently find themselves acting

in a highly politicized international and domestic
environment. Despite the importance of emphasizing a de-
politicised ‘humanitarian space’, the presence of
humanitarian agencies plays into many of the political fault-
lines of contemporary Pakistan. These include relations
between the centre and the provinces, the ambivalent
constitutional status of Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK), legitimisation of military rule, sectarianism, civil
conflicts and insurgencies, devolution and the further
alienation of mainstream political parties. The politics of
earthquake relief may have significant future ramifications
for internal power struggles within Pakistan. This may in
turn affect the working environment for many international
agencies, especially those intending to remain in the country
into the reconstruction period. Further, a more politically
informed approach to disaster relief may produce
reconstruction strategies that will be more sustainable in the
longer term.

The military in Pakistan

Since its first military coup d’état in 1958, Pakistan has been
ruled either directly or indirectly by military governments.
Despite recurring elections, on no occasion has the
incumbent political party been voted out of office. Transfer
of power has proceeded by military intervention which, for
Pakistan’s last three elected Prime Ministers – Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif - has resulted in
execution and banishment respectively. In his 1999 speech,
General Musharraf, like previous coup leaders, justified his
actions on the basis of the corruption of the previous
regime. Berating what he termed the “sham democracy”
that had existed in Pakistan, General Musharraf issued a
Proclamation of Emergency in which the country’s 1973
constitution was suspended. In its place, clause (f) of the
Proclamation disposed that: “the whole of Pakistan come
under the control of the armed forces”. On the same day,
the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) No. 1 was issued
which provided that presidential orders would supersede all
other legislation, including the constitution. In 2002, seeking
to formalise a role for the military in the state, Musharraf
introduced the Legal Framework Order (LFO). The LFO
sought to undermine the position of Prime Minister and
move power away from the head of government to
strengthen the powers of the head of state. The substantial
powers that accrued to the President further undermined the
autonomy of the provinces. Under the LFO, the President
could: dismiss the National Assembly , approve senior court
appointments, and appoint provincial governors (with similar
powers at state level to those of the president). The role of
the military was given constitutional power through the
LFO’s establishment of the National Security Council (NSC),
a military steering committee, whose limited remit covers
“strategic matters pertaining to sovereignty, integrity and
national security of the state; and matters relating to
democracy, governance, and inter-provincial harmony”. In
addition, the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)
stipulates that presidential orders override all other
legislation, including suspending the constitution, and that
the actions of the military government are not subject to
legal challenge or review. The combined effect of the LFO,
PCO and NSC is to enure the centralisation of political power
and the dominance of the military over state and civilian
parliamentary structures.

Nonetheless, Pakistan retains a democratic façade. A

referendum on Musharraf’s continued rule and Parliamentary
elections were held in 2002 and supposedly non-party ‘local
bodies’ elections were held in 2005 for Union Council (town
councils) and District, Tehsil (sun-district) and city Nazim
(Mayor) and Naib Nazim (Vice-Mayor) positions.
Paradoxically, the stated aim of Musharraf’s military coup
was the re-establishment of ‘genuine’ democracy. In his first
address to the nation on assuming power, he stated: “this is
not martial law, but only another path to democracy. The
armed forces have no intention of staying in charge any
longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true
democracy to flourish in Pakistan”.

While the 1999 coup caught the crest of a wave of

disaffection with Nawaz Sharif’s corrupt and increasingly
authoritarian government, the trigger was political
maneuvering over Kargil. In response to stated government
policy of engaging in confidence-building measures (CBMs)
over Kashmir with India’s BJP government Musharraf, whom
Sharif had promoted over the heads of several more senior
generals to be Chief of Army Staff, authorized an incursion
into Kargil and Drass in Indian Administered Kashmir by
militants backed by regular forces. The ensuing military
disaster led to a face-off between the Prime Minister and
Musharraf over whether the affair had been militarily or
politically mishandled. While the Kargil affair may have
triggered military intervention, the basic fault line between
civil and military authorities had existed for some time with
growing concern in the army about negotiations over
Kashmir and the subordinate role for the military enshrined
in the 1973 Constitution, as evidenced by Prime Ministerial
interference in the choice of Musharraf as army chief.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the strategy of military
cooperation with elected governments came to and end as
the high command believed “that the coup would best serve
their personal interests and the corporate interests of the
armed forces”.

To achieve dominance over the domestic political landscape

and to demonstrate the regime’s democratic credentials
internationally, Musharraf followed the example set by
previous military rules in Pakistan: Generals Ayub Khan and
Zia-ul-Haq both of whom used the concept of plebiscitary
democracy to bypass established constitutional procedures
for the election of the heads of state and government. Ayub
Khan’s techniques of regime legitimization are in many ways
the model for Musharraf. The One Unit system sought to
undermine alternative power bases by dissolving the
separate provinces and creating a single province in
Pakistan’s Western Wing (the Eastern wing, now
Bangladesh, being more populous and separated by 900
miles of Indian territory). It also provided that the country’s
two wings would have legal parity, despite the fact that a
majority of Pakistan’s population lay in the East and
undermined the federal principal outlined in Pakistan’s
previous governing documents: the Government of India Act
1935 and the 1956 Constitution. Further, the One Unit
system sought to remove the apparently centrifugal forces
of provincial constituencies and political party power bases.
The ‘Basic Democracies’ system was introduced in 1958 and
provided for non-party elections in 80,000 constituencies
which would then form the grass roots component for more
easily malleable indirect elections to higher government
tiers. In this way, Ayub Khan, like Musharraf, sought to
remove the power of provincial governments and to
undercut the electoral basis for political party opposition to
military rule.

Musharraf’s devolution plan, introduced in 2000, sought to

achieve exactly the same ends as Ayub Khan’s Basic
Democracies – the political application of the military
principle of ‘unity of command’. The introduction of ‘grass
roots’ democracy was a substitute for democratization at
national and provincial levels. The purpose of devolution to
local government was to: depoliticize governance, create a
new political elite that would undermine established political
opposition, demonstrate democratic legitimacy to internal
and external audiences, and undermine the federal principle
in which the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy of
the provinces was constitutionally guaranteed. Further, while
the plan sought to emasculate the basis for electoral
opposition to the regime, it also provided for military control
of the administrative apparatus. The National Reconstruction
Bureau, the agency responsible for the design and
implementation of the devolution plan, replaced the posts of
District Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner with that of
the District Coordination Officer (DCO). While the former
traditionally controlled the executive, judicial, and revenue
functions of the district, under the new system the DCO
became subordinate to the elected District Nazim who
accrued judicial and revenue responsibilities. In this way the
administrative functions of local government have become
politicized and are part of a strategy to extend military
influence into the bureaucracy. In its own analysis of
devolution, the National Reconstruction Bureau noted that
“the end of the domination of the bureaucracy by one group
is a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of
administrative power by the Army and the creation of
conditions for national reconstruction”.

In large part, this drive to obtain and retain political control

is a product of economic imbalance as a result of military
spending. The prominence of the military’s role in Pakistan is
because of the threat – real, perceived and invented – of
Indian military strength and the dispute over Kashmir. As a
consequence, the country has the ninth largest military in
the world amounting to 620,000 people and a defence
budget of approximately 7% of GDP (this is educated
guesswork as the annual budget contains only one line on
defence expenditure, defence salaries are often entered
under the civil administration costs, and defence expenditure
is not open to parliamentary scrutiny). Combined
expenditure on health and education amounts to less than
3% of GDP. Major theatres of military operations are against
the Baloch tribal and sub-nationalist insurgents in
Balochistan, Kashmir where 250,000 army personnel are
stationed, and Wazirstan where 70,000 troops are deployed.
The army possesses, inter alia, 114 helicopters (sufficient to
provide the majority of logistical support for earthquake
relief operations) however approximately 80 of these remain
in Waziristan where it is thought that Osama bin Laden and
remnants of al-Qaeda may be hiding. The commanding
heights occupied by defence in the division of national
resources is further shown by the governments’ continued
decision to purchase US$1.1 billion worth of F-16 fighter
planes from the US, temporarily put on hold owing to the
earthquake.

The socio-economic ramifications of such high spending are

enormous. Pakistan’s human development indicators place it
behind other countries in the region such as India and Sri
Lanka. 28 million people live below the poverty line, two-
thirds of the adult population is illiterate, one quarter of
infants are underweight and malnourished. With the highest
population growth in the region, at 3.6% per annum,
Pakistan’s population growth outweighs its economic
performance. An estimated growth rate of 6.6% (revised
down to 6% as a result of the earthquake) is frequently
cited as an example of the government’s successful
economic management, along with its apparent control of
the current account deficit. However, were it not for the
economic boom in investment and soft loans that came after
September 11, and augmented by donor pledges for
earthquake reconstruction, it is thought that Pakistan’s
military-incurred debt burden would be economically
unviable. Further, Pakistan’s recent high growth rate and
rise in per capita income fails to address issues of
distribution. With a limited manufacturing sector, the
country’s source of export income is industrial agriculture
based in the Punjab (where the overwhelming majority of
the armed forces come from, and are compensated with
agricultural land). Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) and
the North West Frontier Province are less economically
developed and play a comparatively small role in the
national economy. It is significant that despite increasing
growth rates unemployment, particularly in urban areas,
also remains high.

A further consideration in the economic disequilibrium

caused by the state’s burden of military expenditure is the
stifling of the private sector. Property ownership and
possession of agricultural lands lies with both retired soldiers
and Pakistan’s traditional landed aristocracy. Economic and
investment planning is run largely by army backed
corporations who have monopoly rights in sections of the
economy that will be fundamental to reconstruction. The
Army Welfare Trust, Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen
Foundation (Air Force), and Bahria Foundation (Navy) have
expanded operations into the banking, airline, insurance,
real-estate, and manufacturing sectors. In transport and
construction, monopolization has forced out the private
sector and further concentrated economic control in army
hands. As Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s leading scholar of
defence economics, writes: “The military planners hope that
an economic revival would reduce external pressures to
decrease military expenditure. What must be realized is that
the military’s prolonged intervention in politics is detrimental
to economic progress and development”.

While the government’s stated objectives may be the

restoration of ‘genuine’ democratic government, the
establishment of extra-constitutional and parliamentary
bodies such as National Security Council (NSC) and the
manipulation of electoral and administrative systems would
suggest a serious attempt by the military to centralize and
consolidate political power. To some extent, this has
occurred before under Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. However,
international agencies working in this environment may find
themselves participants in an ongoing process of political
realignment aimed less at the establishment of transparent
democratic government than at the army’s quest for
complete political, administrative and economic control.

Sources of ethno-regional conflict

Despite concerted attempts to create a sense of overarching
national identity, Pakistan is marked by its ethno-linguistic
and ethno-regional diversity in which bargaining for political
power and the distribution of resources is based on
perceived communal interests. Communal divisions between
the major ethnic groups, Bengalis (up till 1971), Punjabis,
Sindhis, Urdu-speaking immigrants , Pashtuns, and Baloch,
and between these groups and the state have played a
significant role in the development of Pakistan (which is
itself is a product of the partition of British India along
ethno-religious lines in 1947). An “integrationist” approach
to national identity, combined with attempts to centralise
state political and economic power, led to a further
ethnically based partition of Pakistan in 1971.

Pakistan in 1947 was a composite of two wings separated by

900 miles of Indian territory – an ethnically and linguistically
homogeneous East Pakistan made up of Bengalis, and West
Pakistan dominated by the Punjab. Despite representing
54.2 percent of the entire population, East Pakistan was
subservient to the political and economic domination of the
West which derived much of its income and funds for
industrial development from the exploitation of Bengali (East
Pakistani) jute. Constitutional manipulation by both military
and military-guided civilian governments sought to
institutionalise the West’s dominance and the underlying
motivation for General Ayub Khan’s 1958 military coup was
to prevent the prospect of a Bengali majority in the National
Assembly. With the introduction of democratic elections and
the abolition of the One Unit system in 1970, the Bengali
Awami League gained a healthy majority of seats in the
central government to govern both West and East Pakistan.
The victory of a Bengali political party in a system of
government whose military, bureaucratic and economic
power was predicated on the dominance of the Punjab
meant that the military postponed the transfer of power. The
resulting civil unrest in Bengal and the attempt to suppress
opposition with the use of force led to a declaration of
Bengali independence which was achieved following the
India-Pakistan War in 1971. In the division of Pakistan and
the creation of Bangladesh, attempts to centralise power
through the manipulation of constitutional arrangements,
the neglect of both ethnic and provincial demands, and the
attempt to maintain the position of the military at the
expense of democratic and civilian decision-making
exacerbated ethnic divisions and led to a further state
partition along ethnic lines.

Similar forces are currently at play in Pakistan’s internal

politics. The Punjab dominates the military and represents
the wealthiest and most populous part of the country with
approximately 60% of the population. Its prosperity is based
on industrial agriculture which in turn is based on a constant
supply of water from the Pakistan’s only water source - the
Indus River system. Significantly, since the earthquake
discussion of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam and
Bhasha Dams in NWFP has intensified with reports that
funding for the mega-project has now been approved.
Recent reports that the government has abandoned the
Kalabagh Dam project in favour of the smaller and
comparatively less controversial Bhasha Dam indicate a
strategic retreat rather than a fundamental change in policy.
It is no coincidence that the approval came shortly after the
November 2005 donor’s conference in which US $6.2 billion
were pledged for reconstruction of the earthquake affected
region. Similarly, funding of Balochistan’s controversial
Gwadar Port project has also increased. At the same time,
however, there has been an intensification of military
activity in Balochistan, where the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan’s representative, Asma Jahangir, was fired upon
by members of the Frontier Corps when she went to
investigate deaths as a result of military action near the Sui
gas plant. In addition, almost 300 people have died as a
result of renewed military action in North Waziristan since
January 2006. These conflicts are ongoing, but their recent
intensification shows the extent to which the centre’s
appropriation of political and economic power, especially
through natural resource management, fuels ethno-regional
conflict in Pakistan.

With the bypassing of the National Assembly, the suspension

of the 1973 Constitution which established a Council of
Common Interests for the resolution of inter-provincial
issues, and the emasculation of provincial legislatures
through the devolution plan, there is no political mechanism
for the resolution of disputes between the provinces and
between the provinces and the centre. Consequently, as the
opposition Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz’s (PML-N’s)
spokesperson Siddiq ul Farooq has stated, in the context of
Pakistan’s water crisis the country should be on a “war
footing” and that the proposed Kalabagh Dam would
“endanger the federation”.

In a similar vain, the academic Kaiser Bengali has written

“water shortage is not just an issue of natural scarcity; it is
a socially generated scarcity as well, created as a result of
social and economic policies … Water scarcity is, thus, a
function of politics”. Pakistan is one of the most irrigated
countries on earth with 19 dams, 43 main canals with a
conveyance length of 57,000km all of which are dependent
upon the seasonal flows of the Indus. The centrality of this
irrigation system to Pakistan’s economy and society is
evident in that the country uses 80% of all water resources;
agriculture produces 22% of GDP, employs 50% of labour
force and represents 55% of exports. With a growing
economy combined with a rapidly growing population, it is
argued by some analysts that large-scale hydro-projects are
the best means of controlling the water supply in order to
increase agricultural production.

The complications, however, go to the heart of Pakistan’s

political and ethno-regional tensions. In Balochistan, whose
capital Quetta will run out of potable water within the next
20 years, the potential diversion of water resources is a
matter of both economic and personal survival. In Sindh, the
lower riparian province, the economy has already been
damaged by reduced water flow into the Indus Delta, which
has allowed the incursion of sea water and has caused the
salination of agricultural land. This has produced adverse
effects on coastal ecosystems causing desertification, soil
erosion and a deterioration in the quantity and quality of the
water supply to Karachi. In NWFP, the location of both the
Kalabagh and Bhasha Dams, serious concerns exist about
building such projects in an earthquake zone near to major
towns such as Nowshera. The three provinces (Sindh,
Balochistan and NWFP) further oppose the plan on the
grounds that it would contravene the 1991 Water
Apportionment Accord and give increase water resources
and the benefits of hydro-electricity to the Punjab. The drive
toward the construction of major hydro-projects feeds into
competition between provinces, each of which represents a
dominant ethno-linguistic group, and between the provinces
and the centre. It further contains similarities with the twin
props of the Bengali separatist movement: economic
exploitation and political under-representation.

The scarcity of water raises the potentials for conflict in

Pakistan due to its scarcity, inter-provincial tensions on
water-sharing and the issue of bilateral water sharing
between India and Pakistan (especially since the expiration
of the Indus Water Treaty between the two nations).
Furthermore, there are existing ethnic and regional tensions
that are drawing Pakistan into a state of civil conflict with
insurgencies expanding especially in the largest though least
developed province of Balochistan.

The province of Balochistan was forcibly amalgamated into

the Pakistani federation in 1948 and has been the venue for
five successive armed operations by the Pakistani army and
in response an equal number of insurgencies. The current
insurgency has spread to almost all the districts in the
province and erupted in response to the decades of
provincial marginalisation. The core issues of the Balochistan
conflict are lack of provincial autonomy and central control
of Baloch economic and natural resources. The conflict has
affected the industrial development in the region since the
populace is demanding social, health and educational
development before the pursuit of mega-projects. The
heavy-handed military crackdown of the Pakistani army in
Balochistan has displaced numerous people and swelled the
feelings of alienation amongst the Baloch people from the
Pakistani state. The conflict seems no sign of abating and if
anything is bound to spill into other provinces.

Another conflict that is increasingly engulfing the Pakistani

army and creating instability across in the country is the
presence of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the northern
tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan (North and South
Waziristan). These militant forces have been thwarting
military campaigns by the Pakistan army but these constant
clashes have displaced hundreds of people from the region.
In pursuit of eliminating these militants, the Pakistani army
has gone into the region is full force but the ensuing clashes
have primarily affected the local populace rather than
rooting out the militants.

With General Musharraf’s seizure of power in 1999, and in

the military’s attempts to gain a measure of political
legitimacy for itself, while undermining both provincial
autonomy and political parties (other than those sponsored
by the government), the military government is
manipulating precisely the same forces that have previously
threatened the stability of the state and repeating the same
mistakes that led to the break up of the country in 1971.

NWFP and Kashmir

Though not an immediate concern, there is likelihood that

dissatisfaction with the Pakistani government especially their
lacklustre performance in rescue and relief operations could
be the catalyst for a political agitation. There have already
been protests and violence in Muzaffarabad and Chikoti over
the forced removal of the affectees. Already there is
increased support for political and separatist groups that
advocate the rejoining of Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) with its Indian sister territory into a separate nation.

In NWFP, where the MMA government is increasingly

becoming estranged from the federal government and there
has always been groundswell support for Pashtun
nationalism, the Pakistani army’s performance should be
closely watched. Further, despite complaints from the army
about the effectiveness of the NWFP Government in
providing relief, much of this aid has been directed through
NGOs sponsored directly by the Islamist political parties that
make up the governing MMA coalition. Islamist relief
organisations have a free reign in relief work in NWFP,
which, as opposition representatives, is of concern to the
federal government. Should the government take concrete
steps to address the issue it could galvanize support for the
MMA and send its cadres out onto the streets.

In Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK), there is the

highest likelihood of political agitation and small-scale
violent outbreaks. With the Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) government sidelined especially after the earthquake,
no attempt to rebuild the civilian administration and a
complete lack of local control in the affairs of the state, the
sense of alienation and distance from Islamabad has been
compounded. Significant and controversial political issues of
immediate concern in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK)
are: moving the capital to Mirpur or rebuilding
Muzaffarabad, forming a national government in Pakistani-
administered Kashmir (PaK), holding elections, agitation by
opposition members of the Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) Assembly and the rebuilding of the district
governments. The World Bank/Asian Development Bank for
NWFP was directed towards Peshawar whereas the aid for
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) had to be channelled
through Islamabad since Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) is constitutionally barred from directly conducting
foreign trade or foreign aid negotiations unlike Pakistan’s
four other federating units (the provinces). This client
relationship that Muzaffarabad has with Islamabad will be
further played out when large sums of money for
reconstruction are spent without any real input from
Kashmiri politicians.

One of the possible concerns stemming out of Pakistani-

administered Kashmir (PaK) is the extension of an
insurgency in the region for complete independence from
Pakistan due to the client relationship and the lacklustre
performance of the Pakistani army and government in
earthquake relief and reconstruction operations. Most
Kashmiris on both sides of the border would prefer an
independent state in treaty agreements with India and
Pakistan but Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) over the
decades has been fractured into smaller administrative
regions for complete control from Islamabad. Balitistan and
the Gilgit Agency, both traditionally part of the Kashmir
region, have a separate status in Pakistan than the adjacent
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK). This decades long
process of political, economically and socially controlling
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) might have been
welcomed by the local citizenry were it not for the
constitutionally ambivalent status of the region that has
resulted in its neglect.

Political parties and the

marginalization of civil society
The main obstacle to internal state stability in Pakistan is the
absence of an empowered mechanism, such as the National
Assembly (parliament), which can be used as a means for
establishing negotiated resolutions to political and provincial
disputes. As Nasim Zehra, of Harvard University’s Asia
Centre, writes: “Pakistan’s repeated experience with [cyclical
crises] only point to one fundamental truth: that without a
credible state system and genuine democracy functioning
with an independent judiciary and an independent Election
Commission, Pakistan is unlikely to experience lasting
stability and internal harmony”. The 1973 Constitution
provided for a political mechanism for the resolution of
provincial disputes in particular. However, the National
Economic Council (NEC), which promised consultation with
the provinces in respect of financial, commercial, social and
economic policies, and the Council of Common Interests,
which had jurisdiction over complaints about natural
resource usage, including the use, distribution, and control
of water supply, have never been convened. Instead, the
changeover of political power proceeds by crisis of military
legitimacy (such as defeat in the Indo-Pakistan war in
1971), or military coups or dissolution of democratically-
elected governments in the case of Pakistan’s previous
Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz
Sharif.

Political change by crisis results from the emasculation of

political parties. Re-writing the political system and electoral
manipulations marked Pakistan’s electoral processes in the
2002 National Elections, the 2002 Referendum on military
rule, and the 2005 Local Bodies Elections. Official figures
state that in the 2002 Referendum a 94.7% yes-vote was
returned in answer to the question: ‘Do you want to elect
President Musharraf for the next five years for the survival
of the local government system, restoration of democracy,
continuity and stability of reforms, eradication of extremism
and sectarianism and for the accomplishment of Jinnah’s
concept?’. The 2005 Local Bodies Elections, in which 60
people died more than 500 were injured, were marred by
gerrymandering, government favouritism, and extensive
rigging including ballot stuffing, intimidation and seizure of
voting stations. Further, Pakistan’s main political opposition
figures, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif remain in exile in
Dubai and Saudi Arabia respectively. While the centre has
attempted to manufacture a replacement national political
party in the form of the Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-e-
Azam (PML-Q), this suffers from a lack of both internal
cohesion and popular support outside of some quarters in
Punjab. As a consequence, the government has relied upon
minority Islamist parties such as the Muthahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA) coalition and, to a lesser extent the Muttahida
Qaumi Movement (MQM), to prop up its electoral power
base. The military-led government under General Musharraf
has also cajoled, bribed or coopted other regional and
mainstream secular parties to splinter and some of their
members have formed micro-parties of the same name to
join in General Musharraf’s PML-Q coalition at the provincial
and federal level. The ostracisation of alternative political
leadership, the suppression of centrist and secular political
parties, and the attempt to de-politicise local elections have
seen the emergence of religious parties as an electoral force,
especially in NWFP and Balochistan. These manipulated
elections have laid the groundwork for the further
consolidation of political power by the centre in the
upcoming National Elections in 2007. As the Network for
Consumer Protection observes: “the problem confronting
Pakistan through its history is not primarily that of a weak
party system, but the absence of political dispensation
resulting in the denial of space to political parties to function
both in office and in opposition”.

For effective and relevant reconstruction in the earthquake

affected areas, a top down approach where the military
decides and executes reconstruction will result in a
rebuilding process that has no input from local stakeholders
and further marginalizes the role of civilian institutions in the
country. The reconstruction phase has barely begun and
there are almost daily reports of protests against the
dictatorial polices of ERRA, the complete control of the
Pakistani army in the distribution of compensation money
and the favouritism evident in handing out reconstruction
goods to pro-military groups and leaders for the benefit of
these groups members. What the Pakistani military-led
federal government fails to comprehend is that their
complete control of the reconstruction process, when it fails
to rebuild to the desires of the populace, will result in
exacerbated anti-military feelings and will give rise to
extremist forces that would be better suited to nurture this
resentment. Allowing mainstream political parties in
parliament and civil society groups to be involved in the
reconstruction phase will not only brings in broader
representation but also valid suggestions and experience of
these groups/organisations into the reconstruction process.

Political parties

This sub-section intends to convey the presence of

mainstream political parties within Pakistan and their
parliamentary coalitions. It is the below mentioned political
arties that have significant presence in the federal and
provincial assemblies which have been repeatedly
marginalized under the current military government
especially in the wake of October 8 2005 earthquake.

1. Pakistan Muslim League

The two largest Muslim League blocks are the PML – Nawaz
Sharif (PML-N) and the PML - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) both of
which claim direct descent from the All-India Muslim League
that was the political organization instrumental in the
advocacy and creation of Pakistan. Both are centrist parties,
slightly to the right of the Pakistan People’s Party, and
favour generally conservative pro-business platform based
on economic privatisation and deregulation. PML-Q,
however, is a military-created party whose leaders have
primarily defected from PML-N after the 1999 coup and
when bureaucratic, military and corporate patronage
switched to the newly established PML-Q. The popular basis
of the PML-Q lies in the Punjab and consequently it lacks the
national appeal of the PPP or the PML-N. Further, as an
artificial political creation reliant on state patronage and
direction the party has “little sense of common identity or
purpose”. As the ‘King’s Party’, the PML-Q now holds power
in the National Assembly and Punjab’s Provincial Assembly.
It also holds power in alliance with the MQM in Sindh and
the MMA in Balochistan.
There are some one-person only PML wings within the
national parliament but their support is limited to the
charisma of that one leader and that one person is the only
representative within the National Assembly.

2. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)

The PPP is a centre-left party that emerged in opposition to

Ayub Khan’s military government in 1967. Its rise to
prominence and power owed much to the charismatic, albeit
somewhat authoritarian, leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
whose populist Islamist socialist political platform included
economic equality, social justice and land redistribution.
While under Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, the party moved
closer to the political centre and advocated and more social-
democratic position in an effort to win corporate confidence
alienated by her father’s nationalisation program in the
1970s. The PPP’s 2002 Manifesto maintained that it four
tenets are: democracy, religious tolerance, equal economic
opportunity and what it termed ‘people power’. The PPP is
the largest single opposition party in Sindh, Punjab, and in
the National Assembly. It currently operates in partnership
with the PML-N in the Alliance for the Restoration of
Democracy (ARD) coalition.

The ARD is itself a sixteen-party coalition and is the largest

opposition group in the National Assembly though General
Musharraf did not allow the main constituent party, the PPP
to become the official opposition nor the ARD coalition. Its
political platform argues for the right of elected governments
to govern and for the withdrawal of the military from
political activity. The ARD charter further aims at enhancing
the powers of the Prime Minister, strengthening the
judiciary, and placing the military and intelligence services
under civilian leadership. Despite being the largest
opposition party, the MMA leader Fazlur Rehman was
appointed national opposition leader as a means of ensuring
the MMA continued support for the government.

3. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

The MQM represents mohajirs – primarily Urdu-speaking

Muslim migrants from India who arrived in Pakistan after
1947 – is has its power base among the urban middle and
lower classes in Sindh. The MQM governs in coalition with
the military-created PML-Q and receives government
patronage in opposition to the PPP, whose main voter base
is in rural Sindh. In response to the centre’s favouritism of a
self-confessed immigrant’s party, a number of Sindhi
nationalist parties have emerged calling for a separate state.
As with similar nationalist parties in NWFP and Balochistan,
Sindhi nationalist parties have been able to mobilise support
against the mohajir-Punjabi dominated centre in support of
provincial autonomy – especially with regard to the centre’s
proposals for hydro-projects such as the Kalabagh Dam and
Gwadar.

4. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)

The MMA is an alliance of six religious parties of which the
dominant forces are the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). JI came to
prominence as the preferred political party of Pakistan’s
conservative military ruler Zia ul Haq during the 1970s and
80s and was supported during the US-sponsored jihad in
Afghanistan. The JUI-F is somewhat more puritanical. It runs
the largest network of madrassahs in Pakistan and the
party’s ideology emphasises the establishment of a pan-
Islamic state along the lines of the seventh century Islamic
caliphate. The party is the largest within the MMA coalition
and its ethnic base is almost exclusively Pashtun. The MMA
itself evolved into a political party from the Pak-Afghan
Defence Council in 2001 in opposition to the US-led military
campaign against the Taliban. Its current prominence in
both NWFP provincial government and in the National
Assembly owes more to military support against the PPP and
PML-N than to inherent popularity. The MMA coalition is also
a fractious one in which smaller parties, emerging from the
now defunct Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (which took up the banner
of political Islam under the British Raj and opposed the
establishment of Pakistan), are sceptical of the ties between
the JUI-F and the government.

United Nations, the international

community and military
government
1. UN/INGOs and the military

The national and international humanitarian response to the

October 2005 earthquake has been profoundly influenced by
the pre-eminence of military men in Pakistan’s political and
administrative set-up. Other than raising issues of aid
accountability and transparency, long-term engagement of
the army will undermine the process of democratisation and
increase the jihadi threat to domestic and regional security.
Already, the role of jihadi and sectarian outfits in
humanitarian activities is a source of concern for people in
the Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) who are far more
moderate in their religion and amongst civil society groups.
As these groups gain legitimacy for doing relief work,
bolstered by the military’s support, religious radicalism that
feeds the jihadi movement and intra-Islam sectarianism will
increase. This is coupled with an almost complete exclusion
of the civilian administration and elected bodies from relief
and rehabilitation schemes especially at the district and
provincial level. Army officers represent the government of
Pakistan at every level of macro and micro decision-making.
As a result, jihadi groups emerged as the most effective
relief force in the quake-fit areas and filled the gap left by
the official institutions. By gaining credentials in the “heart
and minds” battle, the jihadi offshoots may substantially
strengthen their political base in the quake-affected areas of
Kashmir and NWFP. In the case of Pakistani-administered
Kashmir (PaK), the accentuated role of jihadi groups could
further exacerbate the political situation since regional
elections are to be held in June 2006 where secular
mainstream Kashmiri parties could be replaced by political
fronts of jihadi groups.

The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority

(ERRA) was appointed for carrying out post-disaster damage
assessment, reconstruction and rehabilitation of quake
affected areas. Led by the Pakistani prime minister and
responsible for undertaking every task linked to
reconstruction, the ERRA will make the military-led
government the key player in reconstruction at the expense
of the federal legislature and provincial assemblies. Instead
of empowering the affected local authorities, the ERRA will
be the perfect tool for weakening them. It is likely to
undermine the legitimacy of local bodies across the region.
The way the government will transfer the tasks to the
civilian authorities remains a concern of its survival strategy.
Strengthening its supremacy in the region by undertaking
every responsibility, the military is willing to control and
sideline any form of civil society in the region.

2. Transparency and accountability

Financial management of relief and reconstruction,

especially under ERRA remains a significant concern. In
Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions
Index of 158 countries, Pakistan rated rather poorly,
standing close to the bottom at 144. There are further
concerns that relief funds are concentrated in a single
account – the President’s relief fund – that is privately held
and not subject to scrutiny by parliament or any other
legally constituted body. This institutionalised secretism
extends to ERRA. Section 11 of ERRA’s funding charter
states that: “No suit, prosecution, other legal proceedings
shall lie against the Authority, the Council, The Board, the
Chairperson, or any member, officer servants, advisers,
experts or consultants in respect of anything done in good
faith”.

3. Compensation

This absence of accountability has impacted the

government’s compensation plans with accusations being
made that compensation is being used to shore up political
support. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
has called for an independent monitoring system given the
weakness of local authorities and the absence of meaningful
accountability standards in the distribution of compensation
payments: “Accusations of corruption in the distribution of
compensation and relief goods, of mismanagement and lack
of clear-cut policies also point to the urgent need for an
independently-controlled system of monitoring”.

4. Relations with ‘non-humanitarian organisations’

The close relationship between the military-led regime and

the international community on the ground created a bridge
between the international organizations and the Islamic
welfare organizations. By supporting the international relief
operations, the Pakistani government was able to establish
close ties with Islamic NGOs and to articulate the various
humanitarian spaces in regard to its own political agenda.
The confusion between both humanitarian international and
Islamic spaces was substantially encouraged by the military-
led regime. Moreover, it created the conditions to
marginalize effectively the role of the Pakistani civil society
in the operations. Currently under the military umbrella,
international organizations are facing a constant
contradiction on the ground between their traditional
mandate which aims at providing quality aid to every
affectee and the necessity to access survivors who live in the
Islamic-led refugee camps and the distribution of relief
goods.

Most of the Islamic organizations are currently registered by

the government as “non humanitarian organizations”. This
parameter has widely encouraged the international
organizations to set up relations and various forms of
cooperation ranging from assessments, relief and
distribution with the Islamic welfare branches in order to get
access to the affectees the Islamic organizations have in
charge. OXFAM provided various services such as water
sanitation in Jamat-ud-Dawa’s camps in Muzaffarabad in
order to comply with the international standards. UNHCR
provided “camp management training” in Mansehra to
spontaneous camp managers from Islamic branches among
others. IOM supplied Jamat-ud-Dawa (the renamed Islamic
militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba) and Al-Khidmat in Balakot.
After serving Pakistan’s strategic interests in the Kashmir
region for over a decade, the jihadi outfits see themselves
as extensions of the army and have a close working
relationship with local military commanders. The majority of
religious parties and their welfare wings operating in
affected areas are pro-military and receive goods and
assistance from the military-controlled relief operations in
the districts of NWFP and Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK). With upcoming elections in Kashmir in 2006, and
general elections in 2007, the prominence given to non-
humanitarian relief agencies as a result of the earthquake
may translate into greater political power at the polls for
jihadi groups and the Islamist parties whose ‘humanitarian
sub-groups’ are operating in the earthquake affected
regions.

The political use of jihadi groups and the ‘humanitarian

wings’ of Islamist political parties by the Pakistani army is in
line with the ‘axis of authoritarianism’ (Pakistani military,
Jihadi groups and Islamist political parties) that has
stemmed the democratic institution in Pakistan since its
conception. Rather than engaging mainstream secular
political parties; as General Musharraf claims he is doing
with his ‘enlightened moderation’ concept, the Pakistani
military has further nurtured extremist forces especially in
the earthquake-affected region. Pakistani-administered
Kashmir (PaK) is Pakistan’s most literate and politically and
religious moderate region but the earthquake devastated
most schools in the region. Under the watchful eye of the
Pakistani military, Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK)
could very well lose this status as madrassa schools are
spring up under the guidance of banned Islamist outfits and
there is resurgence to Islamisize the region. Pakistani-
administered Kashmir (PaK) is fermented by Islamist groups
as the next region to educate young men into extremist
ideologies to continue the jihad in Indian-administered
Kashmir along with other Muslim regions where these men
can be sent to fight for the rights of Muslims and to establish
an Islamic caliphate.

Conclusions and
recommendations
While the idea of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ and a-
political ‘humanitarian space are central to relief operations,
the UN and the international community nonetheless feed
into a complex and changing political environment through
their very presence. Working closely with the military and
jihadi groups only make them political actors whose
resources, wittingly or not, can be used to further domestic
political agendas. This is especially the case as we move
from the rescue and relief operations into the
reconstruction/rehabilitation phases. The following are some
measures that can be used by international organisations
working in Pakistan to counter their existing, if apparently
inadvertent, political partisanship:

Stress local partnerships with secular NGOs and civil society groups,
rather than ideological or missionary groups.
Develop mechanisms to empower locals (residents) and district
governments’ and consult them in the decision-making process
about reconstruction and rehabilitation in the earthquake-
devastated areas.
Seek to ensure that elected federal and provincial legislative bodies,
rather than the military, oversee and scrutinise relief and
reconstruction operations.
International Organizations must shift their approach from being
‘embedded’ with the military to one that involves effective
partnership with the civil society.
Demand that the official relief and reconstruction agencies are duly
constituted by parliament and contain civilian and cross-party
representation.
Ensure that there is proper accountability for the earthquake relief
funds by stressing on the Pakistani government to appoint an
independent monitor to review how the funds are disbursed.

PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRATIC HISTORY

Democracy and participatory governance are popular political notions in today’s world. Fair and free
elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless the electoral
process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and political rights and
freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective of religion,
caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for
advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and property of its
citizens.
While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their commitment to
these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how does one
create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and participatory
governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of many
rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as an
instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others selectively
employ some aspects of democracy to create a façade. Still others hold elections, establish elected
legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and the people
holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of democracy is
created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and substance of
democracy.

Professed Values and Operational Realities:

In Pakistan, the rulers, political parties and leaders and the civil society groups support democracy at the
normative or conceptual level. The politically active circles demand representative governance and
participatory decision making in the political and economic fields. They highlight fair and free electoral
process, the rule of law, socio-economic justice and accountability of those exercising state power as the
pre-requisites for a political system.
However, there are serious problems with these principles at the operational level in Pakistan. Power
structure and style of governance often negated these principles. Most rulers, civilian and military,
pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high premium to
personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. .This was coupled
with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-economic system.
A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of authoritarianism and
non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of Pakistani political experience. The
redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells of authoritarian and military rule, the
theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory governance has persisted in Pakistan. None of the
two political trends has been able to overwhelm each other. If democracy could not function on a
continuous basis, the authoritarian and military rule did not get accepted as a normal or legitimate
political system. This engenders the hope that the over all commitment to democracy would continue to
persist as one of the most cherished norms in the polity and a governance system that falters on
democracy would not be able to cultivate voluntary popular support.
The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the popular level.
A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the federal and provincial
levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not bothered about the interest and
welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political efficacy is reflected in the declining
voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of voters maintain that their vote does not
matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they express negative views about the rulers as well
as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people have not given up on democracy. While talking about
their ‘helplessness’ with reference to changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the norms of
democracy and participatory governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They are
therefore vulnerable to mobilization for realization of these norms and values.
The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution and political
order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of the role of the military3
bureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian governments, and authoritarian and
narrow-based power management.
Pakistan’s political history can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant style of
governance and political management:
1. Civilian political government: August 1947-October 1958
December 1971-July 1977
2. Direct Military Rule: October 1958-June 1962
March 1969-December1971
July 1977-December 1985
October 1999-November 2002
3. Selective use of Democracy by the Military (Post-military rule)
June 1962-March 1969
March 1985-November 1988
4. Military’s influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments
December 1988-October 1999
5. Military’s direct involvement in power management after the end of military
rule; constitutional and legal role for the military
November 2002-till the writing of this article

Historical Overview:
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a parliamentary
system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal government
exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers did not pay much attention to
democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the survival of the
state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state reinforced
authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition process These
included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India and
Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the troubled relations
with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal government in
Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil servants and
military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of Pakistan.
This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions and
fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local stature and
did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it difficult for the
political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of the early
years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took 8 ½ years to
frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties, leaders and
regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of
parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was unable to
assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.
4
The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of the political
leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass power. He
manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of governments.
Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a combined
military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958);
they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the rise of the
bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers along with
the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and domestic
affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the tottering civilian
government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of power by the
generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have either ruled
the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to June 1962,
when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but the 1962
Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s centralized and authoritarian rule
which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the state media
projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His government’s political
management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and the regions
and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was then East
Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s 1962
Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in Pakistan’s
politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for socioeconomic
equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action in
East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December 1971).
Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up of the original Pakistan and the
establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political setback forced
General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in what was
left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to July 5, 1977)
against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the military debacle
of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s command structure.
However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate the
military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian methods to deal
with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the pretext that the
government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army
Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition parties
welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of direct
military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and conservative
Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his government’s
partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic resistance to the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government obtained international financial and diplomatic support
which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and militancy,
undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes.
These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far reaching changes in
the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued centrality to
governance and political management
5
In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top commanders
closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and security
matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their professional
and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for Benazir
Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July
1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the
top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on
their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of Nawaz
Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders during the
fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the sidelines and
viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and constitutional role for
the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it could not
give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide ranging
commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care, education,
and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments for civil
construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its involvement in governance, its role
in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.

The Musharraf Model:

General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff since October 1998, assumed power after his top
commanders dislodged the elected civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. He
designated himself as the Chief Executive and suspended the constitution to impose military rule, avoiding
the use of the term of martial law.
General Pervez Musharraf carefully tailored the transition to constitutional and civilian rule in 2002. The
underlying consideration was his staying on as an effective President in the post-military rule period and
the continuation of the policy measures adopted by his military regime. The transition process was
deigned to share power with a section of the political leaders rather than transfer power to civilian
political leaders.
He ensured his continuation in office before starting the transition process by holding a state managed
uncontested referendum on April 30, 2002 to get him elected as President for five years. This was followed
by the introduction of far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution to enhance his powers and to give a
constitutional cover to the role of the top brass in policy making through the issuance of the Legal
Framework Order (LFO) in August. Meanwhile a breakaway faction of the PML-Nawaz Sharif, labeled as the
PML-Quaid-i-Azam, was co-opted for partnership. The PML-Q enjoyed state patronage which enabled it to
emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly and it obtained a clear majority in the Punjab
Provincial Assembly. The military regime’s major adversary, the PPP, came second in the National
Assembly and obtained the largest number of seats (not an absolute majority) in the Sindh Provincial
Assembly.
The Presidency and the intelligence agencies played an active role in creating the PML-Q led coalitions at
the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had a majority to form the
government. Thus, the National Assembly began to function on November 16 and General Pervez
Musharraf took the oath as the elected President for five years. The provincial governments were installed
in November-December and the Senate, upper house of the parliament, was elected in the last week of
February 2003 and resumed functioning on March 12, 2003, which marked the full restoration of the 1973
Constitution as amended by the LFO.
Pakistan thus returned to constitutional rule with elected parliament and provincial assemblies as well as
elected governments at the federal and provincial levels. However, the political arrangements were
dominated by the Presidency. President Pervez Musharraf not only exercised the enhanced powers under
6
the LFO but he also continued as the Army Chief—an unusual combination in a democratic polity-which
gave him an overriding clout in the polity.
The focal point of the post-2002 political order is President-Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who
functions as an effective ruler, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the Parliament. This political
arrangement could be described as the Musharraf model of governance and political management. The
effective powers are concentrated in President-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and his army/intelligence
affiliates who command the political system both at the federal and provincial levels. The establishment of
the National Security Council in April 2004 which provides a legal cover to the expanded role of the top
brass of the military further reinforces the position of the President and the brass of the military.
The Musharraf model emphasizes the unity of command, centralization, management rather than
participation and the guardianship of the political process by the military. The elected government and the
parliament have to function within the space made available to them by the top commanders. The
political clout of the civilian leaders depends on their ability to work in harmony with the top generals.
The parliament and the provincial assemblies have not been able to acquire an autonomous and assertive
role in the polity. The effective power at both federal and provincial levels is located outside the
parliament and the provincial assemblies. Consequently, the seekers of state power and resources focus on
the presidency and its Army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates. The assemblies have done limited
legislative work and their functioning has been marred by bitter exchanges between the government and
the opposition, violation of parliamentary norms, the quorum problem and boycotts by the opposition
parties. The members complain about the frequent absence of the ministers from the two houses of the
parliament and the inadequacy of the answers by the government to their questions. The assemblies have
to make a real effort to fulfill even the constitutional requirement of the minimum working days in a year.
The prime ministerial changes in June 2004 (Zafarullah Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein) and August
(Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein to Shaukat Aziz) demonstrated the weakness of the National Assembly and the
ruling coalition led by the PML. The decision for these changes was made in the presidency and the
National Assembly and the PML simply endorsed it. Jamali got his budget passed from the parliament
which amounted to a vote of confidence for his government. Two days later, he had to quit under pressure
from the Presidency. The PML accepted the change and his entire cabinet was reappointed under the new
prime minister.
This system restricts the participatory opportunities for the mainstream political parties, i.e. the PPP and
the PML-Nawaz, which are viewed as the major adversaries of the Musharraf dominated political order.
The confrontation between the government and the opposition has increased over time. This means that
the political process is not moving in the direction of consensus building and its support base continues to
be narrow, limited to the co-opted section of the political elite.
The strains in the federal-provincial relations have increased because the provinces complain about the
domineering role of the military dominated federal government. The federal government has not resolved
many federal-provincial issues which have created a strong impression in the smaller provinces that the
federal government was deliberately doing this to keep political and financial pressures on the provinces.
Some of the major issues are the determination of the National Finance Commission (NFC)Award on
distribution of revenues between the federal and provincial governments,, the construction of dams for
storing water and power generation, the Greater Thal Canal issue, the share of the NWFP in net profit of
hydel power generated in that province, the gas royalty for Balochistan, and the federal government mega
development projects in Balochistan and the construction of new army cantonments in that province. If
confrontation and bitterness persist in the political system and the competing political interests do not
adopt accommodating disposition the sustainability of the present political system may not be guaranteed.

Problems of Democracy
The major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times, democracy and
participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.
7
Institutional Imbalance: Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence

in August 1947. The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence services, was
more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first Interim
Constitution, 1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This imbalance was
reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain.
First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence. The
Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and capacity for state
and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or semi-feudal background, and
were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building the party as a viable organization
capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also suffered from similar problems of internal
disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were unable to offer
a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a
participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political institutions or
processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.
Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by hierarchy,
discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years of independence led
the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s security
problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the military’s position in
the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated a
substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The military’s position in the polity
received additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances in the mid-
1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans in
Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the military’s efficiency and strike power. Thus, the degeneration
of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and confidence of
the military.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the civilian
leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves without the
support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and the
military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they began to dominate politics. In
October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political institutions and established its direct rule, with
the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
The role of various civilian and military intelligence agencies expanded in the political domain during the
military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985) when the military regime used the intelligence agencies to
divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1980-1989) and
the linkages between Pakistani intelligence agencies and their U.S. counterparts in the context of the
Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some
of these agencies have been playing active political role since 1988, helping some political parties and
groups while building pressure on others keeping in view the military’s political agenda. They have
interfered in the national and provincial elections which has raised doubts about the credibility of the
electoral process. Some of these agencies were active in politics during after the 2002 general elections.
These were also instrumental to creating the ruling coalition at the federal level and in Sindh and
Balochistan after the October 2002 elections. The active political role of the intelligence agencies
weakens the autonomous growth of civilian political institutions and processes.

Political Consensus-building: The democratic process cannot become functional without a

minimum consensus on the operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the beginning point.
As the political process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and political
advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the polity. The
scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream through the
democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political institutions and processes
viable.
8
The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political norms.
Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was allowed to
fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of the competing
interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy. Therefore, all constitutions
turned controversial with the passage of time because they were violated by the power wielders.
Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army Chief which
made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be easily set aside or
subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism and participatory
governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in a partisan manner by
employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building consensus.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues has
hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The dominant
elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing with them. It is not
merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups manifest intolerance and use
violence against those who question their views.
The steady growth of Islamic extremism and militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since the early
1980s has stifled the free flow of ideas on the issues of national importance. It gave rise to religious and
cultural intolerance and increased the level of civic violence. The rival extremist religious groups did not
hesitate to use violence against each other. The major victims of these trends were social and cultural
pluralism, political tolerance and accommodation of dissent. The participatory processes also suffered as
the religious extremists gained strength in Pakistan. Such a political and cultural environment is not
conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Political Parties and Leadership: Political harmony and democratic evolution is facilitated

primarily by political parties and leaders. These are important instruments of interest articulation and
aggregation and serve as vehicles of political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have traditionally
been weak and unable to perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.
The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political activities
under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor discipline among the
members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of financial resources. Political
parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and ideology.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a national
movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological confusion and a
crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not present a better
alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League. Consequently, the political
parties could not work for political consensus building and political stability and continuity.
Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake dispassionate and
scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and sloganeering
which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious, scientific and
analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of the parliament and
provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of quorum which shows the
non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected houses in dealing with the
national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and parliamentary secretaries are not available in
the house to respond to the issues raised by the members.
The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either floated by
the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these enjoyed its
blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially the setting up of
the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the establishment in party politics.
Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League which was turned into the ruling party in
1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy. He co-opted a faction of the Muslim League which
ruled with his blessings after he restored civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General Pervez Musharraf
9
has done the same by co-opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments under its
leadership at the federal level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-December 2002.
The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League (pre-1971)
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political eminence to the
establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the strong opposition of the
military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won majorities in the 1970s in the
Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of Pakistan. The military transferred power
to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971. The PPP continues to face the distrust of the
establishment.
The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally been
ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited experience of
working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which undermines its role in
a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for pursuing a limited
agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party because this requires a viable
organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.

Islam and Politics: A predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani political system

must have some relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise nature of
relationship between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be
set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a
puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the Islamic
state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality,
socioeconomic
justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory
governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the polity
rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. Another debate
pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan: Did he advocate an
ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links with Islam or a modern democratic state that
viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics? Still another issue is how far the Two-nation theory is
relevant to the post-independence period for shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as a Muslim
state or an Islamic state?
General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative interpretation of
the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made several
administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox
and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious extremism in
Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against the notion of
participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political
rights as western implants in Pakistan.
The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military regime of
Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing principle for the
Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and punishments introduced by General
Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a
conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in power. The rise of Islamic orthodoxy has also
increased Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani society.
The inconclusive debate on Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political system adversely
affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject democracy as a
western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to attain power and then
implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of consensus on the precise
relationship between Islam and the Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and political system, democratic
institutions and processes would not fully develop and become sustainable.
10
Military Rule and Constitutional and Political Engineering: The repeated

assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in accordance with its
political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic institutions
and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire supreme
legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the development of civilian institutions and processes
and made it impossible for them to develop strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or so, the
military returned the country to square one, promising to introduce a system designed to respond to the
needs and aspiration of the people and reflected the operational political realities of the country.
While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a non-partisan
approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in power and the
continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They engaged in
constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in 1962)) or by making
drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests of the military regime. Zia-ul-
Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the 1973 constitution in 1985 and 2002
respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process and to ensure that no political party could
unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the military regime.
Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing to play
politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their continued stay
in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a section of the political
elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim League. The strategy of co-option
pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political arrangements.
This strategy was adopted by the above named military rulers for replacing direct military rule with new
political arrangements based on sharing of power between the top brass of the military and the co-opted
political leadership. Another strategy adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding of carefully
managed general elections to ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their adversaries.
The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military ethos of
hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective consensus. These
institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and remained closely
associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered in responding to the
demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of democracy was poor in the
post-military rule political arrangements.

Concluding Observations:
Democracy in Pakistan faced a host of difficulties which did not let the democratic principles, institutions
and processes develop firm roots in the polity. Pakistan started with the parliamentary system of
governance but the legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism, problems encountered in the
setting up of the new state, the external security pressures and the fear of the collapse of the state
adversely affected the prospects of democracy. Other factors that caused the problems for democracy
included the crisis of leadership in the aftermath of the demise of Jinnah, failure of the Muslim League to
transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party, fragmentation and degeneration of the
political forces and the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite. Long before the first military take over in
October 1958 the dominant elite were talking about the unsuitability of liberal democracy for Pakistan.
Intermittent constitutional and political breakdown, the ascendancy of the military to power and the
efforts of the top brass of the military to introduce a political system that protected their professional and
corporate interests made it difficult to create participatory political institutions and processes that could
command the voluntary support of the diversified political interests. The military elite employed the
democratic principles in a selective manner and their policy of co-option of a section of the political
leaders and exclusion of others accentuated polarization and jeopardized the prospects of political
accommodation and consensus-building.
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The experience suggests that democratic institutions and processes stabilize and mature if their natural
evolution is not obstructed by partisan considerations. These must function in their true spirit over time,
offering all citizens and groups an equal and fair opportunity to enter the political mainstream and
compete for power and influence. This helps to build support for the political institutions and facilitates
their sustainability. In Pakistan, periodic breakdown of the political order and repeated military take-over
or attempts by the top brass to shape the political process to their political preferences did not ensure
political continuity and the competing interest did not get equal opportunity to freely enter the political
mainstream. .
Democracy and the autonomy of civilian institutions and processes has been the major casualty of the
expanded role of the military. Whenever Pakistan returned to civilian and constitutional rule, the quality
of democracy remained poor. It is a case of democracy deficit. The long term endurance of the political
institutions and the prospects of democracy faces four major challenges in Pakistan: the non-expansion of
participatory opportunities for those viewed as adversaries by the military dominated regime, the poor
performance of the elected assemblies, failure to build consensus on the operational norms of the political
system, and a drift towards confrontation, religious and cultural intolerance and extremism.
This does not mean that the people have given up on the primacy of the popular will, participatory
governance, accountability of the rulers and governance for serving the people. The ideological
commitment to these principles persists which will continue to question the legitimacy of nonparticipatory
and authoritarian governance and political management.