1.

People v Malapo (294 SCRA 586)

Facts:
This is a case upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party hereto attached, hereby
accuses one Nixon Malapo of Salvacion, Iriga City of the crime of Rape. That sometime on the month of
September, 1991, the said accused, entered the house of one Nenita I. No, aunt of Complainant AMALIA
TRINIDAD who was then and there alone, and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Amalia Trinidad against
her will and consent and as a result she has become pregnant and delivered a baby at the Iriga City
Puericulture Center.
Amalia is seemingly an example of a pseudoretardate. She might have been deprived of intellectual
stimulations which explains her lag in cognitive development. She is still categorized within the normal
classification of children.
Amalia did not tell Nenita No, as to what happened to her at that time for she was threatened by the
accused-appellant that hell kill her if she ever told anyone. However on May 18, 1992, as she was about
to give birth to her baby she told Bernardita Marquinez that she had been raped by the accusedappellant.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant Nixon Malapo of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Amalia Trinidad the sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages.
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant
is alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in
September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the
presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991
only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of
impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia
had sexual intercourse with another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these.
Issue:
Whether or not the victim was already pregnant when she was raped by the appellant.
Ruling:
A textbook on pediatrics states that Infants delivered before the thirty-seventh week of gestation with a
birth weight of less than 2,500 grams (American) or 2,275 grams (Filipino) are considered premature. An
infant can therefore be considered a full-term baby if it weighs more than 2,275 grams even if it is born
before the thirty-seventh week which is less than 9.3 months. Since according to the medical certificate
Amalias baby weighed 2.4 kilograms or 2,400 grams, it was a full-term baby even if it was born before the
normal gestation period.
Article 166 of the Family Code provides:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164.
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant
is alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in
September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the
presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991
only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of
impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia
had sexual intercourse with another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these.
The testimony of Amalia, as corroborated by Nenita No and Bernardita Marquinez, leaves no doubt in our
mind that accused-appellant is the father of the child. Therefore, in accordance with Art. 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay support.
In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof that the child was fathered by
another man does not show that accused-appellant is not guilty, considering the positive testimony of
Amalia that accused-appellant had abused her.

2. People v Medina
FACTS:
At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party was held in the house of Sebastian and Delia Aguila in
Barangay Caingin, Balite, Batangas, to celebrate the awarding of a championship trophy to the basketball
team of Larry Andal. Among those present during the celebration were Andres Dalisay, Edgardo Silang,
Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano Aguila and appellant Alberto Medina. After a
while, Dalisay invited Andal to go home. The two left the house of the Aguilas, with Dalisay walking ahead

of Andal. While they were walking, Andal saw appellant, who was waiting along the way, stab Dalisay with
a "balisong" in the abdominal region. Dalisay held the hand of appellant. While they were grappling,
Dalisay was able to extricate himself and started to run away. Appellant chased him. When appellant
caught up with Dalisay, appellant stabbed Dalisay once more at the back. Dalisay fell to the ground. He
tried to get up and run, but he again fell down. Appellant stabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then
[a]ppellant fled from the scene.
Appellant set up insanity as a defense in the killing of the victim saying that the latter was about to pull
something from his pocket that is why he immediately took his balisong and stab the victim. He added
that while he was stabbing the victim, the latter looked like a devil with horns. Dr. Teresita Adigue, a
Doctor of Psychology and a holder of a Master's Degree in Clinical and Industrial Psychology and another
Master's Degree in Guidance and Counselling, and an accredited psychologist of the Philippine National
Police testified that based on the evaluation of accused-appellant, the latter has been shown to be
suffering from depression and was exhibiting homicidal tendencies, and that he did not know the
difference between right and wrong. The trial court rejected the appellants defense of insanity stating that
the testimony of appellant's sister that she had observed unusual behavior on the part of appellant did not
constitute sufficient proof of his insanity, "because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitute[s] insanity." Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, appellant was
attentive, well-behaved and responsive to the questions propounded to him in English even without
translation. He appealed the decision of the trial court to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant indeed suffered insanity.
RULING:
No. Appellant insists that the trial court gravely erred in refusing to consider Dr. Adigue as an expert
witness. He argues that Dr. Adigue, being an accredited psychologist of the Philippine National Police
since 1979 and a holder of a doctorate in psychology from the University of Calcutta, India, and a
master's degree in clinical and industrial psychology, deserves credence.
Appellant misses the point. More than her academic qualifications as a psychologist, what really matters
is the failure of Dr. Adigue's testimony to establish legal insanity on the part of the appellant. Verily, such
results do not prove the alleged insanity of the appellant. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of
the power to discern. More relevantly, said report does not support the claim that appellant could not
distinguish right from wrong. Thus, the trial court properly rejected appellant's defense of insanity. The
presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, for there is a presumption that acts penalized
by law are voluntarily. Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost
his reason or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will
always presume that he was in a normal state of mind. However, care must be taken to distinguish
between lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger
(passion). ". . . [I]t is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which
results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the
person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its
influence."
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting circumstance, Philippine case law
shows a common reliance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete deprivation of intelligence
not only of the will in committing the criminal act. In the present case, Dr. Adigue's testimony did not
establish complete deprivation of appellant's reason. Consequently, appellant cannot claim exemption
from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the instant case, however, the defense miserably failed to establish the deprivation of the appellant's
will when he stabbed his victim. Appellant testified that he thought the victim was going to pull out a
weapon, thus he beat him to the draw and stabbed him with his balisong. This statement shows that he
did not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment. While the victim appeared to him as a "devil with
horns," such perceptual distortion occurred only after he had dealt the fatal blows on the victim. The Court
cannot, therefore, appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor.
3. People v Bonoan
Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which
caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on the
ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the Psychopatic
Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of the defendants complete record of
mental condition from the hospital and defendants admission to the hospital for personal observation,
assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan may be discharged for
being a recovered case. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia only
occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish
the defendants insanity and finding accused guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was demented at the time of the commission of the crime.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently
exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital
for the insane.

In the case at bar, however, the SC is not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a
particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive
diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained of.
The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving
at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro
Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and
recurrence of ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no
control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act
according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the
polices doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson
4. People v Bascos
5. People v Formigones
FACTS:
From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife Julia Agricola,
and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find employment as
harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his
bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
which latter caused her death. When she fall ont he ground the defendant carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. He was convicted of parricide and was
sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel presented testimonies of two
guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined. They said that he behaved like an insane
person, that sometimes he would remove his clothes in front of others, would not take a bath, and
remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His counsel claimed that he is an imbecile therefore
exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to
be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from liability.
HELD:
No. The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up
the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor,
and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made
no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily
admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written
statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his
conviction.
In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. As to
the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife. He could distinguish right from wrong.
6. People v Mancao & Aguilar
FACTS:
This was an appeal by Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco Aguilar from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu in convicting them of the crime of homicide, alleging that the lower court erred
in not holding that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally liable.
The issue ensued when Crispino Mancao, accompanied by three men and several women,
inquired to Graciano Sedimo, Roberto Villelas tenant, and ordered the persons with him to
begin harvesting the corns. Roberto Villela then asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest
the corn. Crispino Mancao, replied that he was the one who ordered them to do so and started towards
Roberto Villela. The latter then asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the products.
Crispino Mancao struck him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is the order." Thus, Roberto Villela
dodged the blow and snatched the cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino
Mancao took hold of his bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded
off with a stick he had in his hand.
Upon being attacked, Roberto Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fightensued. A
man dressed in khaki immediately appeared after Mancao had shouted for help and struck
RobertoVillela a blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. Crispino Mancao then took
hold of RobertoVillela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him with his
sickle in the back as aa result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground unconscious.
Issue: Whether or not Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally liable.
Ruling:

No. A careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented by both parties,
and the consideration given the antecedents of the case and the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the criminal act, convince us that the accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator and
aggressor, Roberto Villela having done nothing but to defendant himself, first disarming the former of his
stick with which he was assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used after having been assaulted, and
later of his bolo which he used after having been deprived of his stick. Roberto Villela might have had the
advantage in the fight had not one of Crispino Mancao's laborers, dressed in khaki, come to his rescue,
upon his cry for help, and struck Roberto Villela on the thigh; then, another man wearing an undershirt
who stuck Roberto Villela several times on the left knee; and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar who
struck Roberto Villela several blows on the back with his sickle, one of which nearly severed his spine in
the lumbar region which later caused his death.
The defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, cannot be sustained.
While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive
him of his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives of
others, nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before,
during, and immediately after the aggression.
7. People v Taneo
Facts:
Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16, 1932, a
fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the house, among them
were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep and while sleeping,
he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded
her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that time, died five days later as a
result of the wound.
The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It appears
from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a
glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down and fight.
When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, had a severe stomachache
that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that when he fell asleep, he
dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila held his feet. That's why he got
up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down; he armed himself with a bolo
and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then, he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to
multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant acted while in a dream.
Ruling:
Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, werent voluntary in the sense of
entailing criminal liability.
The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none,
but that simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to
commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court
found not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of a
hallucination and not in his right mind.
Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only
seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased,
who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The
defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies.
And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
8. People v Gimena
9. People v Baid
Facts: That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental patient suffering [from] schizophrenia and put himself
on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will
and without her consent.
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of the case on the merits
proceeded. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr. Herminigilda
Salangad, the complainants attending psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the medico-legal officer

who examined the complainant. Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel
Reyes for medico-legal examination. She told him what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the
incident into writing and then gave her a physical examination. Accused-appellant testified in his behalf.
He stated that he had been a nurse-aide of the Holy Spirit Clinic since September 18, 1995.
He denied the allegations against him. He testified that, on the date and time referred to by the
complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters from the room where
complainant was staying.
On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited to give cigarettes to
patients. He further admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could enter the patients room anytime to check
their condition and see to it that the lights were turned off when they were not needed. He further stated
that he was not investigated by the police when he was invited to their headquarters. The trial court
rendered its decision finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape. Dr. Herminigilda Salangad,
the complainants attending psychiatrist and consultant at the Medical Center in Muntinlupa, the Perpetual
Help Medical Center, the Philippine National Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was presented as an expert
witness. According to her, complainant was, at the time of the incident, suffering from an undifferentiated
type of schizophrenia, described as having the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia but does not fit
the profile for paranoid, disorganized, or catatonic schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that complainant
seemed to shift from one type of schizophrenia to another.
It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been given
credence by the trial court. It is argued that: (1) there were serious inconsistencies between her sworn
statement and her testimony in court; (2) the prosecution failed to present witnesses to corroborate her
testimony; (3) complainant failed to identify accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-legal
examination were negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed that complainant had
sexual intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6) the probability was that her allegations
of rape were merely a product of her fantasy.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant, who is suffering from schizophrenia, can be qualified as a
witness?
Held: Yes. Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a
witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others
Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could
give responsive answers to them. Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a
rape victim (inappropriate affect) during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions,
her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise,
complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.
Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They show
that complainants testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the probative value of her
testimony, they reinforce it. In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other
patients were sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the commission
of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and place and the crime of rape can
be consummated even when the malefactor and the victim are not alone. The plausibility of an allegation
of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses presented during the trial, so much so that, if the
testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly established the commission of the crime, corroborative
evidence would only be a mere surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged accused-appellant guilty. In the
absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge, his findings as
to their credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on
the witness stand.

10. People v Lacena

11. Jimenez v Republic

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios is
impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of
the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was
found that there was no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios
in the case. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals
are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely
on Joels complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony
of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage
he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being
an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone
testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder
the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

12. Salita v Magtolis

13. Chi Ming Tsoi v CA
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their
first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair
at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination
to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was
disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences.
Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence
of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
14. Aurelio v Aurelio
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition,

respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time
of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 the petition.
Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that
the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC in an Order dated December 17, 2003. A review of the petition shows that it observed the
requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine.
There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the declaration of nullity filed by the private respondent is sufficient and has
complied with the ruling of the Molina case.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition
are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines,
namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition. 17
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was
stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family
backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of
their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the
same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring
about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other
hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The
incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and
incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged
in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under
Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina
guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their
evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing.
Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC
after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance
whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological
incapacity.
15. Te v Te
16. People v Cruz
17. Agustin v CA and Martin
18. Lucas v Lucas
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie
who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the
University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very

Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the
case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in
Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and
not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that areaimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biologicalsample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude
a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order
for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded
by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts
in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. Weagree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a

prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

19. Perla v Baring and Perla

20. De Villa v Director, New Bilibid Prisons