Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 83578
FACTS:
The petitioner is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar
salting" activities in the country.
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned
with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter
referred to as PADS Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157,
158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export
Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan
Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by
Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a
deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative
and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is
likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in
this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and
deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a
quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the
Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction.
The Court hereby declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are
hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal
RULING:
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that
it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936,
Earlier however, that is, on February 27, 1990, the PCGG, overruling
prosecutor del Rosario's order, gave the intervenors in I.S. Nos. 74 and
75 another period of five (5) days from notice within which to submit
their counter-affidavits and supporting evidence. Based on this action
the PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
of the Sandiganbayan which had not been resolved.
Several other complaints were filed by the Solicitor General with the
PCGG against petitioner for preliminary investigation petition, to wit:
(a) I.S. No. 80 which concerns the acquisition of the First United
Bank, now United Coconut Planters' Bank; (b) I.S. No. 81 concerning
shares of the United Coconut Oil Mills Inc.; (c) I.S. No. 83 regarding
the acquisition of coconut oil mills and certain indebtedness thereof;
and (d) I.S. No. 84 regarding settlement of an Anti-Graft suit in the
United States. All of these complaints were for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse
of coconut levy funds.
Whether under the circumstances of this case, it would be fair and just
for the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of the said
complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other duly authorized
investigating agency.
RULING:
Under Section 15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the
PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the
state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of
due process is that the person who presides and decides over a
proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not
intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair.
The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of
determining whether or not an information may be prepared against
the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt
of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial
Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the
authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2)
freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that,
as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima
facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze
order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it
and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured
under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.
Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is
concerned, it may be divided into two stages. The first stage of
investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the
fact-finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview
witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage
of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is
ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG
conducted the appropriate criminal investigation of petitioner and
intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it sequestered all the
properties of the petitioner after a prima facie finding that the same
The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier
instances, the PCGG had already found a prima facie case against the
petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of
the properties of petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in
collaboration with the Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the
evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated
civil complaint. Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series of
criminal complaints.
FACTS:
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school
Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista,
Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin,
Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named
committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for
May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer"
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father
as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students"
thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee
members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
Supervisor of the place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said committee of teachers falls within the
category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions
contemplated by Rule 65.
RULING:
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult,
if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial
acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard
thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ of
certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it,
that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should
be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making
their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...' "In State ex
rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following
statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure,
involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that
the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority,
and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called
committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the abovequoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before
tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it
is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority
to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however,
there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that
when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils
for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse
still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public
SMART
COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.
V.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
GR NO. 151908
NATIONAL
FACTS:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three
certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was
published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.
Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to
the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular
mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of
the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular
mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone units. The Memorandum directed CMTS operators
to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the
presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid
SIM card customers;
b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply
with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or
postpaid customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units
registered to somebody other than the applicant when properly
informed of all information relative to the stolen cellphone units;
d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all
other CMTS operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone
units; and
e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and
exhaustion doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that
petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where
the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect
of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies
where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of
a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.