Case 12-LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA

282 SCRA 125

Facts: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the
Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated
cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the twocomplaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued A.O.
52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Held: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in
a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or the law.There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a
party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with
a lawyer at his side.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side.Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by
the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for
reconsideration.

Case 13-Secretary of Justice vs Hon. Ralph lantion, October 17, 2000

Facts: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18,
1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to
the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies
of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the
petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States
in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad
duties under a treaty.
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in
our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The
duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide
with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international
law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation
is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of
the local state.

Case 14-Govt. Of the USA vs Guillermo Purganan, September 24, 2002

Facts:Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition
for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999. Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that Jimenezs
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted
the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the
court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15
June 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the issuance of
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.
Issues: Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued
Held: No. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest. At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely
further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this
early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

Case 15-Philippine Guardians Brotherhood vs COMELEC, April 29, 2010

Facts:The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a
motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13,2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9,

2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. According to Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC,upon verified
complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to
participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679
and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization. One of the arguments
cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy.One of the
reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, the
requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling
i n G . R . N o . 1 7 9 2 7 1 - B A N AT(Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that
the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.
Held:According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of
RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from
the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two
separate reasons for delisting.Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore, simply cannot stand. Its
basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote

Case 105-Republic Act No. 9745, Anti Torture Act of 2009

This law aims to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human
rights; to ensure that the rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners are
respected at all times; that no person placed under investigation or held in custody by any person
in authority or agent of a person in authority shall be subjected to torture, physical harm, force,
violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free will; and that secret detention

places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried
out with impunity, are hereby prohibited and to fully adhere to the principles and standards on
the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture set by the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
various international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), to
which the Philippines is a State party. Under Sec. 3, torture refers to an act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing
him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of
severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. Sec. 4 provides that
torture (physical and mental) shall include, but is not be limited to, the following: Physical
torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a
person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability
or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body. Per Sec. 5, other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not
enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to cause
suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of severity
shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or
punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of
health of the victim. Sec. 6 expressly declares that torture as a criminal act. No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture. An Order of
Battle or any order from a superior officer or public authority shall not be invoked as a
justification for the commission of torture. Sec. 7 commands that any confession, admission or
statement obtained as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that said confession, admission or
statement was made.