Case Digest: Arroyo vs.

DOJ

G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the
JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the FactFinding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and
Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et
al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELECDOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection

clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec
was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however,
was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the
Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the
prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication
of the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty
of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses
as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution

because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain

persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the
Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there
were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It
is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.

Case Digest: Reyes v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House
of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on

May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate
of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was
without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En
Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings
in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not

necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be

heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of
the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that
she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following
grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a
voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside
in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one
is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the
place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to
the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189

G.R. No. L-42300

January 31, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant.
Generoso, Pelayo, Castillo, Braganza, Chavez, Doromal, Diaz and Capili for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After
due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal
disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with
section 432. of the Revised Administrative Code.
Said Section 432 reads as follows:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after failing to
make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings
for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to
permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated,
irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned.
And section 2642 provides:
Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled so to do, ...
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year and by
a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by
deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not
more than four years.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on
March 3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented

to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise
undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No.
18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to
vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the
State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early
stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of
suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic
ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the
audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally excluded
classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this
right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by
conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the
privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege
and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote
on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified
from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final
judgment to offer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a
plenary pardon.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had
already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general
election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for
crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on
the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and
rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the
disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is
that it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a prvilege and
not the denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative
practice are against such a view.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
AVANCEA, C.J., dissenting:
The appealed judgment affirmed by the majority members of this court sentences the appellant
for having voted in the general election held on June 5, 1934, in the municipality of Davao,
Province of Davao, being disqualified from voting. The appellant, in my opinion, was not
disqualified from voting.
The appellant was sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor in the
year 1910. This penalty carried with it, as an accessory, disqualification from the right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence. He began to serve his sentence on April 11, 1910. He
was granted a conditional pardon on July 31, 1913. Inasmuch as the accessory penalty of
disqualification from the right of suffrage was not expressly remitted in this pardon, it is
understood that he complied with and extinguished this part of the sentence on April 12, 1918.
Therefore, under the penalty imposed upon the appellant, he was not disqualified from voting
in 1934.
The majority, however bases its decision on section 432 of the administrative Code which reads:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
The language of the law is not clear whether the disqualification referred to therein is only for
the term of the sentence or for the entire life time of the convict. The majority however,
interprets this provision in the latter sense to which I do not agree, it being contrary to the spirit
thereof.
If the interpretation of the majority were correct, section 432 of the Administrative Code would
not harmonize with the latter provisions thereof (secs. 2636, 2637, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643,
2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2649, 2652, 2654, 2656, 2657, 2658 and 2659) on offenses relative to
elections and elective officers, imposing the penalties of imprisonment and disqualification
from the right of suffrage for a period not exceeding five and fourteen years, respectively.
Supposing that in one of said cases, for instance that of an election inspector who willfully signs
a false statement of the result of a ballot (sec. 2639), the penalty of imprisonment for more than

eighteen months is imposed upon him could be disqualified from voting during his entire
lifetime, in accordance with section 432, if the interpretation of the majority is correct, and it
would be to no purpose still to sentence him to him to the penalty of disqualification from the
right of suffrage for a period not exceeding fourteen years.
It cannot be said to harmonize these provisions, that the disqualification from the right of
suffrage should be imposed only when the penalty of imprisonment imposed therein less than
eighteen months because it is expressly required that both penalties be imposed in all cases.
Neither can it be said that section 432 governs all cases, in general, and sections 2336 et
seq. govern the specific cases referred to therein, because there would be no justice in the law.
One may be sentenced to more than eighteen months of imprisonment for having committed
the crime of serious physical injuries, for instance, through reckless negligence or in selfdefense, but without having used the means reasonably necessary therefor, and according to the
majority opinion he will be disqualified from voting during his entire who, abusing his position,
willfully commits a falsehood in connection with a ballot entrusted to him, after serving his
sentence which does not exceed fourteen years, will again be qualified to vote. This cannot be
the result countenanced by the law. If the law in more serious cases wherein an attempt is made
directly against the cleanliness of the election, not disqualifies the guilty party from the right of
suffrage for a period not exceeding fourteen years, it cannot be supposed that its intention is to
forever disqualify therefrom the party guilty of a crime which bears no relation to the exercise
of suffrage and which does not involve the degree of moral turpitude as in the other case.
I am of the opinion that this anomaly can be avoided only by interpreting section 432 in the
sense that the disqualification referred to therein is merely during the term of the sentence.