China Cards (UNCUT)

Heg
US IS THE HEGEMON NO CHANGES COMING

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
Notwithstanding this gradual shift in the global distribution of economic power, over
the course of the same decade the United States will nonetheless remain the
dominant regional and global military power, and by a massive margin. While
Chinas increasing defense spending will continue to close the gap, there is no
serious prospect of it reaching military parity with the U.S. before mid-century, if at
all. China, like the rest of the world, will remain justifiably mindful of Americas
overwhelming military power. This is a core assumption in Chinese strategic
thinking.
CHINA CHALLENGING THE US ALL OVER THE WORLD
%2021.pdf
The shifting balance of economic power is also beginning to be seen globally, where
Chinas economic presence in Africa, Latin America and Europe also challenges the
long-standing economic primacy of the United States. Chinas growing global
economic and political role will also begin to reshape international norms, rules and
institutions. It will reverberate across geopolitics, global trade, investment, capital
flows, reserve currency status, climate change, other environmental challenges and
global people movements. And it will also influence the great questions of war and
peace in the decades ahead.
HEGEMONIC ASSERTION ONLY RE-ENTRENCHES CHINAA

OBSTINANCE LEADS TO MORE INSTABILITY
%2021.pdf
Americans offer their own variations on the same theme concerning Chinese mirror
imaging. Nonetheless, the report argues that Chinese leaders have begun to form a
worrying consensus on what they believe to be the core elements of U.S. strategy
towards China, despite Washingtons protestations to the contrary. These are
reflected in the following five-point consensus circulated among the Chinese
leadership during 2014, summarizing internal conclusions about U.S. strategic
intentions: To isolate China; To contain China; To diminish China; To internally
divide China; and To sabotage Chinas leadership. While these conclusions sound
strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese conclusion

that the United States has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political
legitimacy of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy. They
are also based on a deeply held, deeply realist Chinese conclusion that the U.S.
will never willingly concede its status as the pre-eminent regional and global power,
and will do everything within its power to retain that position. In Beijing, this
assumption permeates perceptions of nearly all aspects of U.S. policy, from
campaigns on human rights, political activism in Hong Kong, arms sales to Taiwan,
and Americas failure to condemn terrorist attacks by Xinjiang separatists, to
support for Falungong and the Dalai Lama. As a result, senior Chinese interlocutors
conclude that the U.S. is effectively engaged in a dual strategy of undermining
China from within, while also containing China from without. American arguments
that U.S. policy toward China bears no comparison with the Cold War-era
containment of the Soviet Union are dismissed by Chinese analysts. China points to
the U.S. strategic decision to pivot or rebalance to Asia as unequivocal Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 15 evidence
of this. Beijing also points to Washingtons de facto support for Japanese territorial
claims in the East China Sea, and its alleged abandonment of neutrality on
competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in support of the Philippines,
Vietnam and other South-East Asian states at the expense of China, as further
evidence of containment. Finally, China adds the most recent examples of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) (which excludes China) and failed American efforts to
dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB. All the above, as seen from Beijing, are
designed to deny international space to China in policy domains ranging from hard
security, to economics and trade diplomacy. The report notes that the U.S. disputes
each of the above, and instead argues that Chinese foreign policy appears geared
for an attempt to push the United States strategically out of Asia.
CHINA DOESNT WANT THE US INVOLVED IN ASIA

%2021.pdf
The broad contours of Chinese strategic thinking on the future of regional
architecture are beginning to take shape: Asias security architecture should not
include the U.S. or its alliance structure, according to Xi; whereas the regional
economic architecture of the future is negotiable. Xis security architecture template
appears to be CICA. A revitalized Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),
including the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP) rather than the TPP, is his
preferred economic structure.
US HEG CAUSES CHINA MILITARIZATION

http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=538
China will almost certainly continue to build a stronger military, including a stronger
blue water navy, as well as nontraditional weaponry. That is natural for any growing
country. It is also in part a prophetic self-fulfillment resulting from a reaction to U.S.
strategic hedging, closer U.S. military relations with Chinas neighbors, and an
increasing sense of vulnerability in China owing to reliance on external markets for
energy and other commodities that drive its rapacious economy. The United States
is not yet in an arms race with China akin to that with the Soviet Union, but there
are plenty of Chinese strategists who believe that U.S. capacity to compete for
military superiority in Asia will be limited by both the United States more global
defense architecture and fiscal realities.
Climate Change
NO INHERENCY ALREADY WORKING BILATERALLY
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044
In the often fractious U.S.-China relationship, climate change has emerged as one of
the few areas of genuine bilateral cooperation. Both countries have developed a
long list of cooperative ventures in areas such as clean coal technology and electric
grid development and have adopted side-by-side pledges to reduce carbon
emissions (albeit at different paces and scales) with an eye toward providing
momentum to global climate change negotiations. To build upon this foundation of
cooperation, the two leaders should focus on the following three areas:
HFC AGREEMENT NEEDED NOW

https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
3. The United States and China should work together on an international consensus
to phase down Hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, under the Montreal Protocol as soon as
possible. HFCs are one of the fastest-growing and most-potent greenhouse gases in
the world. Phasing down the global production and use of HFCs could avoid half a
degree Celsius of warming by the end of the century. The most concrete outcome of
the June 2013 U.S.-China presidential summit at Sunnylands in California was the
agreement between President Obama and President Xi to work together to phase
down HFCs under some combination of the Montreal Protocol and the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change. That June 2013 climate agreement
should be considered a model for a new model relations effort and a blueprint for
proceeding on other more intractable issues. If that initial bilateral agreement leads
to successful multilateral action on HFCs, it will serve as a concrete example of U.S.
and Chinese leaders moving past historical divides and finding a new platform for
our two nations to take a global leadership role on one of the most important global
issues of the day.
STUFF TO DO
Some of the most significant opportunities for tactical cooperation lie beyond the
Asia-Pacific region. The just-completed second round of joint U.S.-China anti-piracy
exercises in the Gulf of Aden is a prime example. Other avenues for beyond-the-
region cooperation could include global sea-lane policing, an issue of great concern
to both nations and for the global energy market more broadly. Closer to home, the
United States and China could work together on joint projects related to climate
security, such as building more resilient infrastructure to protect local communities
from sea-level rise, which is an increasing concern in both nations. The two
countries should also expand the mechanisms for U.S.- China cooperation on shortlived climate forcerssuch as hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs; black carbon; and
methaneand work together on the research and development of alternatives to
global warming substances. Moreover, there is now the opportunity for the United
States and China to work together to establish and implement environmental best
practices for shale gas development.
CHINA HAS A 53% TARIFF ON US SOLAR

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945436/000094543616000321/a8kxsolarmaterialsrestruc.htm
The Company idled the Pasadena facility in December 2015 as the result of punitive
Chinese trade actions. China has imposed a 53.6 percent tariff on SunEdisons
polysilicon, pricing our American made polysilicon out of the market, thereby
preventing us from profitably operating the plant. Polysilicon production at the
Pasadena facility has stopped, and we intend to end seed production at the site by
the third quarter of 2016. As a result of these actions, we performed an impairment
analysis of the production assets and spare parts, which were impaired and written
down to their net realizable salvage value. Based on this value, we expect to report
$202 million of non-cash impairment charges in our fiscal 2015 fourth quarter
financial results. We also expect to report restructuring charges of $139 million in
our fiscal 2015 fourth quarter financial results related to contingent liabilities for the
termination of long-term supply contracts given that we will no longer be fulfilling
our purchase obligations under those contracts. This amount represents our best
estimate of the probable amounts to settle our obligations, and is based on
contractual terms of the agreements. We do not believe that the settlement of
these liabilities will be completed during 2016. Additional charges currently
estimated to be in a range of $10 million to $13 million related to the termination of
other remaining contracts will be recorded as incurred until final closure of the plant
occurs. Decommissioning activities for Pasadena are expected to take place in
2016, and we expect to report restructuring charges of $16 million in our fiscal 2015
fourth quarter financial results related to estimated clean-up and decommissioning
costs. We also expect to report other restructuring charges of $6 million in our fiscal
2015 fourth quarter financial results related to employee severance associated with
the Pasadena facility.
Human Rights
HUMAN RIGHTS KEY AFFECT ALL OTHER RELATIONSHIP
FEATURES
As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit, the vexing question
of human rights looms larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the
bilateral relationship like a low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with Chinas rights
record is only matched by Beijings displeasure with Washingtons judgmental
attitude. This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that have
made it difficult leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The
result is that the two countries have struggled to establish the lan and comfort
level required for solving problems where real common interest is shared.
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPORTANT TO US

Finally, the United States and China must address the set of issues involving values
and human rights. Americans continue to be concerned with Chinas lack of
enforcement of its own guarantees of individual justice and the treatment of
lawyers, writers, bloggers, protestors, and others seeking to make China a better
place. These concerns are generally not a direct source of conflict, but it is not
difficult to imagine that a particular case could become contentious. As President
Obama said in April 2012, We want China to be strong and we want it to be
prosperous, and were very pleased with all the areas of cooperation that weve
been able to engage in. But we also believe that that relationship will be that much
stronger, and China will be that much more prosperous and strong as you see
improvements on human rights issues.69
HUMAN RIGHTS NOT KEY IRRECONCILABLE IDEOLOGICAL

DIFFERENCES
Disagreement over human rights grows out of a more divisive problem that sits
unacknowledged like the proverbial elephant in the room. Because nobody quite
knows what to do, we are hardly inclined to recognize, much less discuss it: the
United States and China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and
antagonistic value systems. If we want to get anything done, we must pretend that
the elephant isnt there.
President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not heading in
any teleological direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that
China has its own model of development, one that might be described as Leninist
capitalism, with rather limited protection of individual rights. This is a model with
so-called Chinese characteristics, which, in the world of human rights, means that
China will emphasize collective welfare rights, such as the right to a better
standard of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle, rather than emphasizing individual
rights like freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion.
But if this is the model, then the United States and China are heading in divergent
historical directions. A host of new friction points now center around the
abridgement of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing
restrictions on civil society activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more
heavily censored media, more limited public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press,
and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more burdensome
forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of
governance and values.
HUMAN RIGHTS KEY TO ALL OTHER IMPACTS

https://freedomhouse.org/article/nine-groups-urge-united-states-raise-human-rightsdialogue-china
"Human rights in China are inextricably linked with the strategic and economic
interests of the United States," said Mark P. Lagon, president of Freedom House.
Human rights violations in China can harm American companies, increase the risk
of major instability, and harm American interests in the areas of the environment,
food safety, cyberattacks, and media and academic freedom. Repression has
worsened under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and discussion of such
abuses should be fully incorporated into each session of the S&ED.
CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE GETTING WORSE
https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-us-should-use-dialogue-halt-rightserosion#.VYMERvlVhBc
Since President Xi came into power the Chinese government has redoubled efforts
to criminalize online speech, silence journalists, and to insist that university
lecturers, academic researchers, and Communist Party members adhere to the
leaderships line. Urgent legal reforms have stalled, and the legitimate underlying
grievances of ethnic minorities, religious groups, and other vulnerable communities
have been exacerbated through repression rather than addressed. Draft legislation
on counterterrorism, national security, and the management of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reflect Beijings growing hostility domestically
and internationally towards independent civil society, the freedoms of association
and expression, and the rule of law. The worsening human rights environment and
the extraordinary damage done to Chinas civil society should be given greater
prominence in the bilateral relationship.
We share the US governments assessment that the human rights environment in
China is deteriorating. We appreciate US advocacy in pushing back against the draft
foreign NGO law and in support of human rights defenders in China, including the
five feminists detained this past spring for their planned advocacy around sexual
harassment.
NEED TO USE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

We question, however, whether the US is fulfilling its stated whole of government
approach on human rights. If well-executed, we believe such an approach could be
highly effective. Yet we know that multiple Cabinet members have met in the past
year with their Chinese counterparts, and there is little evidence to suggest forceful
advocacy by those US officials in support of human rights, sending decidedly mixed
messages about the importance the US places on this issue. For example, on the
same day in April, Secretary Kerry issued a statement calling on Chinese authorities
to release the five feminists, while Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Johnson, in a speech to Chinas elite police academy in Beijing, saluted them
despite their well-documented role in systemic human rights abuses. Such a lack of
consistency makes it easy for Beijing to choose only the messages it likes to hear.
The Strategic and Economic Dialogue presents an opportunity for the US to visibly
demonstrate its whole of government approachand use a tone as tough as
recent US commentary regarding the South China Seas, cyber, and trade issues
leaving no Chinese official uncertain about the importance of human rights to the
US. Given its proximity to Chinese President Xi Jinpings planned visit in September,
this Dialogue also affords particular leverage to press the Chinese government to
release unjustly imprisoned individuals, abandon problematic proposed laws, and
roll back abusive policies.
SHOULD CALL FOR PRISONER RELEASE
Publicly call for the release of individuals imprisoned for doing nothing more than
peacefully exercising their rights; doing so may bring them a degree of protection in
detention and will certainly bring their families a modicum of hope. We are aware
that there aredisturbinglythousands of cases from which to choose; we suggest
you prioritize those who represent particular communities targeted for reprisals,
including political reform advocate and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
prominent Uighur economist Ilham Tohti, Tibetan Buddhist leader Tenzin Delek
Rinpoche, veteran journalist Gao Yu, human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, and house
church Pastor Yang Rongli. As China has increasingly asked the US for assistance in
returning to China allegedly corrupt officials who have fled to the US, we hope that
US officials have on those occasions rejected such cooperation unless and until
individuals such as these activists are freed and able exercise their rights peacefully
inside China.
CHINA WONT CHANGE THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS BECAUSE OF US

HYPOCRISY
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/26/china-issues-report-on-terrible-u-shuman-rights-record/
U.S. and Chinese officials may have struck conciliatory tones at high-level talks this
week amid festering mutual mistrust, but their annual bickering over human rights
has resumed unabated.
A day after the U.S. State Department issued global human-rights scorecards that
included criticism of China, Beijing offered a scathing rejoinder that accused
Washington of showing not a bit of regret for or intention to improve its own
terrible human rights record.
Plenty of facts show that, in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights
defender, saw no improvements in its existent human rights issues, but reported
numerous new problems, said the Chinese report, published Friday by the
information office of Chinas State Council, the countrys Cabinet. While its own
human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights in
other countries in a more brazen manner.
Americas record remained blotted by rampant gun crime, racial discrimination, the
pernicious influence of money in politics, widening income and social inequality, and
state infringements of individual privacy, according to the State Councils latest
yearly assessment. Americas record remained blotted by rampant gun crime, racial
discrimination, the pernicious influence of money in politics, widening income and
social inequality, and state infringements of individual privacy, according to the
State Councils latest yearly assessment.
HR KEY TO OTHER ISSUES AND LARGER RELATIONS

Chinas human rights record is a longstanding bugbear in bilateral relations, though
officials and rights advocates in the U.S. have expressed growing concern over
Beijings diminishing tolerance for activism and dissent since Mr. Xi took power
more than two years ago.
US ANTI-BLACKNESS MEANS CHINA WONT CHANGE THEIR HR

PRACTICES
China has also been quick to point out what it describes as U.S. hypocrisy on human
rights. In its latest assessment, the State Council took particular aim at institutional
discrimination against ethnic minorities in the U.S., citing recent high-profile police
killings of black citizens that have stirred racial tensions, as well as reports of
disenfranchisement of minority voters in the 2014 mid-term elections.
CHINA MAKING STRATEGIC HR ADVANCES OVERALL POSITIVE

TREND
For its part, China has long defended its human-rights record by arguing that
individual rights sometimes need to be sacrificed for the more immediate needs of
social stability and economic growth. Just this month, Beijing issued a white paper
on its human rights record, touting its burgeoning television and film industry, legal
reforms and expanding access to public services, among other markers of economic
and social progress.
US HYPOCRISY PREVENTS CHINA HR CHANGES

http://www.newsweek.com/china-says-us-has-lost-credibility-rights-after-ferugsontorture-report-291223
China's foreign ministry said on Thursday that the United States has no right to
confront other countries on their human rights records when it faces problems with
racism and mistreatment of prisoners at home.
Both U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. ambassador to China Max Baucus
issued statements on Wednesday to mark International Human Rights Day in which
they mentioned cases such as the imprisoned Chinese Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said it was hypocritical of the United
States to do this considering its own poor record, in apparent reference to recent
protests over the killings of unarmed black men and a U.S. Senate report on the
torture of detainees after the Sept. 11 attacks.
"The United States has no right to pose as arbiters and at every turn point their
fingers at other countries' human rights as racism and mistreatment of prisoners
and other serious problems in the United States are facts now known to all," Hong
told a daily news briefing.
RESOLUTION OF US RELATION TO POC HAS TO COME BEFORE

CHINA CHANGES ITS HR VIOLATIONS
http://melanoidnation.org/americas-racism-in-the-international-spotlight/
The death of Michael Brown, whose killing sparked the unrest, is a stark reminder
for Uncle Sam that there are a lot of human rights violations on its own soil, says
Chinas official news agency Xinhua.
It should first fix its own problems before criticizing other countries.
Xinhua adds that few other countries are as self-righteous and complacent as the
United States when it comes to human rights issues, but the Ferguson tragedy is
apparently a slap in the face.
HERES WHAT THE AFF SHOULD SOUND LIKE:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-marshall/president-obamas-humanri_b_8197534.html
In summit discussions with President Xi Jinping of China, President Barack Obama
might want to open new lines of communication over human rights by reflecting
candidly on America's own failings, following a script something like this:
I know you don't like to hear about human rights from us. To your ears, it sounds like
lecturing, even hectoring. Even so, I've instructed our ambassador to keep raising
issues as merited. In our global society, we cannot close our eyes to human rights
issues, wherever they occur.
I'm hoping that you won't close your ears to what I have to say now. I thought I
would try addressing human rights in a different way--a way that you Chinese are
familiar with. I want to engage in a little self-criticism.
Since our Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights, the United States has
led the world in raising consciousness about the importance of human rights. But
I'm only too well aware that our practice has often fallen short. Historically, in the
case of slavery and the killing and uprooting of Native Americans, our practice has
been downright criminal, verging on genocidal.
We are still learning from our painful history and obviously have a long way to go.
Almost every day I see reports or videos of unjustified police shootings,
disproportionately against people of color. No other country in the world comes
close to our record.
Our criminal justice system discriminates against arrestees as well. With some 2.3
million people in jails and prisons, we may have even more people behind bars than
you do. A large percentage of them are serving long terms for nonviolent crimes,
especially drug offenses. African-Americans represent only about 13 percent of our
population but more than 40 percent of state and federal prisoners serving time for
drug offenses.
We don't usually think of drug arrests as a human rights violation, but the effects of
our drug policies on families, communities, and entire ethnic groups have been
downright devastating, creating a long-term underclass with minimal access to
education, jobs, and support services. I'm trying to reducing the length and disparity
of drug sentences, and to respect the right of states to decriminalize the sale and
use of marijuana, but I admit I haven't given this matter the attention it deserves.
Within our prisons, mistreatment continues at some institutions, but perhaps no
abuses are worse than widespread and prolonged use of solitary confinement. Tens
of thousands of prisoners are in some form of segregation at any given time. This
incredibly harsh form of punishment is considered by some authorities as a form of
psychological torture. It reflects badly on our country that it remains so widespread,
and looking back I wish I had led greater reforms in this area as well.
This won't come as any revelation, but our criminal justice system especially
penalizes the poor, who cannot afford rising bail costs, and who bear the brunt of
many municipal fines that are designed to raise local revenue. Reforms are taking
place in some jurisdictions following the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, but it remains a
widespread stain on our practice of justice.
The exodus of Syrian refugees to Europe has recently called the world's attention to
the plight of migrants. Our country has little to boast about on that score. In one
recent 12-month period, our customs and border protection forces arrested more
than 68,000 children who fled terrible poverty and violence in Central America and
Mexico.
I confess that my own administration has -- in response to political pressure over
immigration -- greatly increased the number of people detained and deported in
recent years. Even when families have good reason to seek asylum, we treat them
like criminals or national security threats. On the plus side, last year I signed an
executive order to give temporary legal status to more than 400,000 immigrants
who have lived in the United States for five years or more, or have legal children.
Our country is surprisingly backward on some issues of women's rights, including
the right to an abortion and even to contraception. As you know, ongoing struggles
with religious conservatives make these issues extremely contentious. We face a
potential shut-down of our government over the issue of federal funding of Planned
Parenthood clinics which provide basic health services to women -- even though
funding of abortion is already banned.
Finally -- and I could go on with many other issues -- I'm saddened and embarrassed
that at this late stage of my second term in office, the United States still holds more
than 100 prisoners without charge or trial at Guantanamo Bay. I would never have
imagined when I first took office that this blot on our record would remain. I am
pleased to say, on a related matter, that I did end the use of torture when I took
office, though critics still take me to task for not holding anyone accountable for
breaking U.S. and international law relating to this practice.
Why am I telling you all this? Because I know my government can't be credible
when it speaks up about human rights in China or any other country until we take
steps to address our own shortcomings at home. It's a lot easier for me to
righteously condemn your government's mistreatment of dissenters than for me to
look in the mirror at our own misdeeds, but if we aren't willing to do the hard work
of making change happen at home, we won't stand much chance of making change
abroad.
I know that if I just smugly sit here and tick off all the human rights problems in
China, as if we have none in our own land, you will consider me a hypocrite. Our
effective communication will end.
I don't expect any response from you now, but I hope you'll reflect on my words. I
challenge you someday to try a little self-criticism of your own -- not the rote kind
you and your father were subjected to during the Cultural Revolution, but a genuine
kind that leads to self-improvement and improvement of your nation. Thank you.
CHINAS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE US:

http://youngadultcatholics-blog.com/2015/05/23/redressing-americas-systemicdisregard-for-human-rights/
Last week, the United Nations felt compelled to address the gravity of this
phenomenon in light of recent incidents in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore,
Maryland. In a session of the global bodys Human Rights Council, during a periodic
review that is conducted for all respective member-states, the United States of
America was sternly rebuked for its human rights record regarding the abysmal
treatment of citizens of color by delegates from 117 countries. Various states,
through an extensive litany of recommendations, urged the United States, to:
Strengthen human rights education programs and training for all civil servants,
particularly for law enforcement and immigration officers, and combat impunity
concerning abuses against defenceless persons. (Costa Rica)
Adopt a national action plan to address structural racial discrimination.(Chile)
Undertake measures to combat racial discrimination, including adoption of a

National Action Plan to Combat Racial Discrimination as recommended by the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (South Africa)
Adopt and implement a national planfor the benefit especially of disadvantaged
minorities, which are Afro-Americans and indigenous peoples. (Cape Verde)
Invest further efforts in addressing the root causes of recent racial
incidents and expand its capacity in reducing poverty in neighbourhoods
experiencing sub/par public services, including access to adequate housing and
public safety. (Serbia)
Collaborate closely with marginalized communities to fix the
problems in the justice system that continues to discriminate against them
despite recent waves of protest over racial profiling and police killings of
unarmed black men. (Namibia)
Ensure a sustained human rights training for law enforcement
officers in order to curb killings, brutality and the excessive use of force
targeting racial and ethnic minorities, particularly African-Americans.(Democratic
Republic of the Congo)
Punish perpetrators of abuse and police brutality, which are increasingly alarming
and constitute irrefutable acts of increasing racism and
racial discrimination, particularly against African-Americans, Latinos and
women. (Cuba)
Respect indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities rights and
interests; fully consult with them on their land, autonomy, environment,
language and other issues; correct the historical injustice and offer
compensation. (China)
CHINESE GOV AFFIRMS HUMAN RIGHTS ARE UNIVERSAL

https://chrdnet.com/2015/08/concerns-in-chinese-civil-society-over-ineffective-uschina-human-rights-dialogue/
We hold the view that human rights are universal, and that such rights should not
be replaced or ignored by any government citing internal affairs, nor substituted
with subsistence rights and development rights. Nor shall human rights be
suppressed under the pretense of anti-terrorism and stability maintenance. It is
undeniable that previous China-US Human Rights Dialogues provided platforms for
the two governments to exchange views and drew public attention through the
media. Even so, these Dialogues did not substantially help improve Chinas human
rights situation, which, on the contrary, has deteriorated in the past two years.
HANDS OFF APPROACH IS BETTER ALLOWS US TO RESOLVE

OTHER ISSUES
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_
Harding.pdf
Despite the tightening of domestic political controls in China over the last several
years, most participants in the current debate place far less emphasis on promoting
human rights and political liberalization in China than there was in the past. None of
the proposals summarized so far argues for an extensive U.S. effort to democratize
China. Some explicitly say that it was always futile, provocative, and even
hypocritical for the United States to give human rights so prominent a place on the
bilateral agenda with China. Lyle Goldstein says flatly that human rights should not
be a major issue in U.S.China relations, and cites Australian analyst Hugh White,
Henry Kissinger, and Michael Swaine as believing that democratization should not
be the main goal of U.S. China policy. Instead, he suggests that a hands-off
approach will make it more difficult for Chinese leaders to discredit domestic
demands for political reform as being directed by the United States.56 The
paradoxical conclusion, then, is the less effort the United States expends, the
greater its chances of success in seeing eventual political liberalization in China
may be.
Similarly, although recommending a fundamentally different strategy toward China
than Goldstein, Blackwill and Tellis also believe that pressing for human rights
through high-level discussions was a waste of time and should be dropped from
future bilateral dialogues.57 And while Steinberg and OHanlon offer a balanced
summary of the debate over the role of human rights in U.S. policy toward China,
they also appear sympathetic to those who call for a non-confrontational approach
and who propose instead to continue dialogues on human rights and the rule of
law to make progress. They conclude that there is no support in any camp for an
active regime change strategy, given Chinas growing power and its economic
importance to the United States.58
HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE TIED TO OTHER ISSUES

https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_
Harding.pdf
To be sure, there are some exceptions to this generalization. Michael Pillsbury

argues that the United States should protect the political dissidents in China and
criticizes the Obama administration for downplaying human rights and failing to link
Chinas human rights record to issues Beijing cares about, such as trade relations.
59 Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute and William Inboden of the
University of Texas, while saying that the United States should continue its policies
of engagement and hedging, propose that a measured yet persistent push for a
free and democratic China should become the third prong of U.S. strategy toward
China. This can be done, they argue, by supporting the latent democrats in China,
including entrepreneurs, lawyers, and Christians, through the extension of both
official and unofficial dialogue to include them and through expanded information
and counter-propaganda campaigns. 60 Nevertheless, the issue remains whether
the Chinese government would permit these efforts to go forward, whether they can
proceed if the Chinese government blocks them, and whether their effectiveness
would warrant the costs and risks to other U.S. objectives.
HUMAN RIGHTS IS MERELY POLITICAL POSTURING

http://www.voanews.com/content/us-china-exchange-criticisms-on-humanrights/2837989.html
The U.S. State Department has accused China of wide-ranging and routine human
rights violations, prompting Beijing to shoot back with its own reportslamming
Washington's "increasingly grave" rights record.
The State Department's accusations against China were published Thursday as part
of a congressionally mandated annual report on the state of human rights across
the globe. The report covered the year 2014.
The 148 pages that dealt with China highlighted issues including the imprisonment
of activists and government critics, the repression of ethnic minorities, state
censorship, and widespread corruption within the Communist Party.
"Repression and coercion were routine," the report read, "particularly against
organizations and individuals involved in civil and political rights advocacy and
public interest issues, ethnic minorities, and law firms that took on sensitive cases."
In what has become an annual tradition, China issued a retaliatory report that said
the U.S. was "haunted by spreading guns [and the] frequent occurrence of violent
crimes, which threatened citizens' civil rights.
The report also mentioned the CIA's "cruel tortures" of terror suspects, government
surveillance programs, the "excessive use of force by police officers," and
"institutional discrimination against ethnic minorities."
The dueling reports were issued just days after senior U.S. and Chinese officials held
annual talks in Washington where the public statements mostly focused on bilateral
cooperation rather than criticism.
China has long complained about U.S. criticism of its rights record, saying such
statements represent inappropriate interference in Beijing's internal affairs. It also
argues it should not be held to the same standards as more developed countries.
CHINA CARES MORE ABOUT CRIMINAL REPATRIATION

http://www.albrightstonebridge.com/news/asgs-8-essential-questions-chinesepresident-xis-visit-us
Human rights issues in China have long been a source of bilateral contention, but
this year the scope of American concerns has broadened. In August, ten leading
U.S. senators wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to raise human rights
issues with President Xi, expressing alarm at the dramatic rise in detentions under
Xi and criticizing Chinas draft law on managing foreign non-governmental
organizations. The draft law, released this spring, has raised fears that many U.S.
NGOs, educational, commercial and cultural institutions might be forced to leave
China. Another issue that has come into public view in recent weeks is the
controversy over allegations that Chinese law enforcement agents have entered the
United States without official permission to seek to repatriate Chinese nationals
suspected of corruption. For its part, China will press the U.S. for repatriation of
Chinese criminal suspects who have fled to the U.S., including the brother of
disgraced former top aide to President Hu Jintao.
NO COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS = US LOSES CREDIBILITY

& EMBOLDENS CHINA
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21660552-america-struggles-maintain-itscredibility-dominant-power-asia-pacific-70-year
Yet China is behaving as if they doand so, perversely, is America. China insists the
series of bilateral disputes in the South China Sea is none of Americas business and
is not a topic for discussion at regional forums such as a 27-country one just hosted
by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur. America,
of course, disagrees, and has the backing of much of ASEAN for that. But it knows
that if it does start testing Chinese resolve by sailing into or flying over Chinas
notional territorial waters, it could soon be seen as reckless and provocative, and
find its regional support evaporate. So Americas inaction makes Chinas new facts
in the water look even more permanent and fosters the notion of relative American
decline.
A TiP-ping point
That impression is heightened by the sense that America is less strident than it was
in upholding its values of human rights, freedom and democracy. Cynics have
always suspected that these ideals were subject to political exigencies. Last month
they pointed to new evidence of this when the State Department promoted Malaysia
from the bottom tier of countries listed in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP)
report. It insisted this was because Malaysia was indeed cracking down on
traffickers. Most Malaysians (and Thais, whose country was denied a similar
upgrade) saw it as political: under American law a bottom-tier ranking would have
meant that Malaysia would have to be excluded from TPP. The perception that TPP is
so important to America to lead it to such distortions is damaging. It makes it look
as if the stable, transparent and rules-based order Mr Kerry said America was
promoting 70 years on from the war is one where America not only sets the rules,
but twists them when they get in the way.
US HYPOCRISY EMBOLDENS CHINA TO NOT RESOLVE HUMAN

RIGHTS ISSUES
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-12/24/content_22791546.htm
By pointing an accusing finger at the counterterrorism legislation and claiming it will

restrict human rights in China, the US is once again adopting the guise of a selfappointed champion of human rights to meddle in the internal affairs of another
country.
After the terrorist attacks on Sept 11, 2001, the US adopted a series of measures to
enhance its national security, and some of them were highly contentious both at
home and abroad.
Likewise, a series of attacks on civilians in China instigated by extremists in recent
years have compelled the Chinese government to take more forceful measures to
tackle extremism and terrorism on its soil.
The US' double standards and condescending manner will only erode its own
credibility and by linking the draft law with US trade and investment in China it will
harm bilateral cooperation, and thus hurt its own interests.
As such, the US really needs to use a fairer lens to look at China's forthcoming law,
so if not free of prejudice at all, it can view it in a more objective manner.
CP: CHINA/UNHCR PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREAN

REFUGEES
http://www.hrnkinsider.org/2015/12/china-responds-to-committee-against.html
Two weeks ago, the CAT directly asked why the UNHCR has not been provided access to the border
areas where North Korean asylum-seekers are likely to be found. In the concluding observations that
should be released on December 9, 2015, it would be a solid first step if the Committee recommends
that the government facilitate the UNHCRs presence in the relevant parts of Liaoning and Jilin
provinces and permit the UNHCR to operate there without restrictions or limitations on visas for key
personnel and with security guarantees for staff as well as for vulnerable persons seeking protection.
[15] If those persons applying for refugee status are not really eligible under international refugee and
human rights law, then UNHCR could affirm the position of the Chinese government. If they are
eligible, UNHCR could provide China with the technical assistance and support it needs to provide them
protection. Either way, this would be an enormous boost to Chinas credibility on efforts to address
torture and its human rights commitments more broadly. It is difficult to imagine a reasonable
argument explaining why the UNHCR has been denied access to the Yanbian Autonomous Korean
Prefecture or other areas populated by ethnic Koreans.[16] In reality, none has ever been given. In the
follow-up mechanism of the CAT, several recommendations are selected for particular attention over
the coming year.[17] Perhaps CAT members should consider making the plight of North Koreans in China
the subject of one of those recommendations.
CHINA REALLY BAD ON HUMAN RIGHTS GETTING WORSE

http://hotair.com/archives/2015/04/12/obama-destroys-the-democratic-partys-human-rights-legacy/
In China, an economic powerhouse that nevertheless remains a one-party

communist autocracy, America has tacitly consented to supporting the regimes
increased interest in total command and control. A series of moves to roll back
nascent freedoms of speech, religion, and expression in China in 2014 following the
rise of President Xi Jinping has led many to wonder if information technology and
free trade truly have the power to compel openness in closed societies. Chinas
repression of political activists, writers, independent journalists, artists and religious
groups who potentially challenge the partys monopoly of power has intensified
since Xi took office nearly two years ago, The Guardians Simon Tisdall reported in
December.
CHINA SEES HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICAL POSTURING FOR

OTHER ISSUES
http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/view/10.1057/9780333982976
Chinas reaction to criticism of its human rights practice has been nothing short of
hostile. Not only has the Chinese regime dismissed such criticism as a cynical
attempt by the West to meddle in its internal affairs an act which, it is claimed,
represents a serious violation of Chinas national sovereignty but it is also seen as
part of a wider conspiracy by the developed world, in particular the United States,
to contain a resurgent China in an effort to prevent it from assuming its rightful
place in the international community (Guo Qing, 1991, p. 18; GXB, 1991, p. 69; Xi
Laiwang, 1991; Sun Yinghua, 1992; Zhang Mingqian, 1992). The suspension of
bilateral and multilateral aid to China after June 1989, the linking of trade privileges
to Chinas human rights record by the US Congress, and the decision not to allow
Beijing to host the 2000 Olympics are all instances where, in the eyes of the
Chinese government, the West has been guilty of using human rights issues as a
tool of hegemony and power politics.
US WALKING THE WALK KEY TO SOLVING

http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1264165
US Secretary of State John Kerry says, Yes, the U.S. will press Cuba on human
rights- but quickly added that he will be meeting with top level cabinet members in
the Obama Administrators and with Human Rights Watch to discuss ways to address
the United States own human rights abuses and hypocrisy.
Addressing our own hypocrisy is important. We call out China, North Korea, Iran,
and many other countries for their human rights abuses. When the US points out
other countries human rights abuses and then fails to address our own abuses,
well, we lose credibility. When we bring those issues up during talks with other
World leaders, their eyes glaze over and we can see they just arent buying it. We
need to start walking the walk rather than just talking the talk. Simply paying the
whole idea of human rights abuses lip service isnt getting us anywhere.
Kerry said it was high time that the US faced the Worlds criticism over our own
abuses of human rights, here, in the United States and in every country where the
US has abused the rights of their citizens.
US LACK OF HUMAN RIGHTS CREDIBILITY HALTS DIALOGUE

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=16140&LangID=E
China said the work of the Council should focus on dialogue, cooperation, technical
assistance and capacity building. Country specific dialogues and mandates were in
opposition with this goal and with the United Nations Charter. Regrettably, the
United States and European countries had made false allegations against countries
of the South, including China. China pointed at human rights problems in the United
States, including torture, police violence and racism. In European countries, bills on
terrorism restricted freedoms, migrants suffered violations, and xenophobia was on
the rise.
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES HURT CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
http://www.capitalistreview.com/why-america-opposing-human-rights-abuses-by-beijing-wouldbenefit-china/
A campaign to pressure China into stopping its human rights abuses would be to
Beijings long-term benefit. Chinas 4,000-year history may have persuaded it that
order and repression to maintain that order are paramount for organizing a society.
Americas 240-year history, during which the government (with some exceptions)
tolerated and even encouraged dissent, suggests that the exact opposite is true.
China would prosper more than has been the case if it allowed alternate ideas to
enter the marketplace, to compete freely so that the best rises to the top.
HURDLE IS CULTURAL RELATIVISM NOT HYPOCRISY

http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/25/politics/obama-xi-jinping-white-house/
Xi said he was willing to have a human rights dialogue with the United States, but
as is customary with Chinese leaders, he pointed out that the concept of human
rights was seen differently in Beijing
"We must recognize that countries have different historical processes and realities,
that we need to respect people of all countries in the rights to choose their own
development independently," he said.
HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS IN US KEY TO REFORMS IN CHINA

http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/en_US/publications/articles_papers_reports/765
However, this does not mean that all is fine in the current international order and its
ethics. Far from it. For we know that the contemporary international order and its
ethics are also a targeta target, especially for not being democratic enough in its
values, or for not being true to its democratic values. Accusations of hypocrisy,
double-standards, self-serving policies, and of national interest primacy over human
rights, particularly directed at major democratic powers, are often mentioned to
express doubts about the ethics of the present international order or the
seriousness of its commitment to progressive ethics.
This is to say that it would be a mistake to remain idle, satisfied with the status quo.
Rather, we should be working on clarifying and improving the moral advantage that
liberal and democratic values continue to lend, despite their problems, to the
current international order and its ethics.
To do so, we have to push forward in at least four directions. First, the gap between
the reality of the current international system and liberal and democratic values has
to be reduced. This entails making international order, its (international) law and its
ethics less captive to the interests of the powerful, including the powerful
democratic countries. Second, the liberal and democratic values supporting a more
inclusive ethics of international order have to be extended and enhanced. Third,
liberal and democratic values have to be called upon at the international level in a
non-righteous way; they should be able to help draw the line between what is right
and what is wrong on the basis of a greater self-awareness. Fourth, the ethics of
international order needs to address better than is the case today the structural
violence, the embedded disparities of power between rich and poor, and the
damages they create.
Ultimately, pushing forward in these four directions amounts to making better,

stronger liberal democratic values and their traditions and ethics at the
international level as well as at the national level.
Econ
WEAK CHINA ECON LEADS TO ADVENTURISM, WAR WITH US
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/07/09/partnership-china-avoid-world-war/
The US government has little to gain and much to lose by treating the relationship
with China as a zero-sum game. In other words it has little bargaining power. It
could, of course, obstruct Chinas progress, but that would be very dangerous.
President Xi Jinping has taken personal responsibility for the economy and national
security. If his market-oriented reforms fail, he may foster some external conflicts to
keep the country united and maintain himself in power. This could lead China to
align itself with Russia not only financially but also politically and militarily. In that
case, should the external conflict escalate into a military confrontation with an ally
of the United States such as Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that we would be
on the threshold of a third world war.
ECON COOPERATION SOLVES CHINA-RUSSIA PACT AND

INEVITABLE WWIII
Both the US and China have a vital interest in reaching an understanding because
the alternative is so unpalatable. The benefits of an eventual agreement between
China and the US could be equally far-reaching. Recently there has been a real
breakthrough on climate policy on a bilateral basis. By taking the nonbinding
representations and promises made by the two countries at face value, the
agreement has made more credible some recent efforts to bring climate change
under control. If this approach could be extended to other aspects of energy policy
and to the financial and economic spheres, the threat of a military alignment
between China and Russia would be removed and the prospect of a global conflict
would be greatly diminished. That is worth trying.
CHINA ECON SUSTAINABLE
%2021.pdf
On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese
national power, on balance we should assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium
to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the period under
review. This takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent
slowing of the rate. It also takes into account lower levels of global demand for
Chinese exports, high levels of domestic debt, the beginning of a demographically
driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high levels of domestic savings, at
best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding private sector still

constrained by state-owned monoliths, and a growing environmental crisis. But it
also takes into account the vast battery of Chinese policy 8 Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 9 responses to each of
these and does not assume that these are by definition destined to fail.
Furthermore, if Chinas growth rate begins to falter, China has sufficient fiscal and
monetary policy capacity to intervene to ensure the growth rate remains above 6
percent, which is broadly the number policy makers deem to be necessary to
maintain social stability. It is equally unconvincing to argue that Chinas
transformation from an old economic growth model (based on a combination of high
levels of state infrastructure investment and low-wage, labor-intensive
manufacturing for export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the
services sector and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to
failure. This is a sophisticated policy blueprint developed over many years and is
necessary to secure Chinas future growth trajectory through different drivers of
demand to those that have powered Chinese growth rates in the past. There is also
a high level of political backing to drive implementation. The process and progress
of implementation has so far been reasonable. Moreover, to assume that Chinas
seasoned policy elites will somehow prove to be less capable in meeting Chinas
next set of economic policy challenges than they have been with previous sets of
major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain wrong. China does face a
bewildering array of policy challenges and it is possible that any one of these could
significantly de-rail the Governments economic program. But it is equally true that
Chinese policy elites are more sophisticated now than at any time since the current
period of reform began back in 1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy
responses when necessary. For these reasons, and others concerning the structure
of Chinese politics, the report explicitly rejects the China collapse thesis recently
advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the extreme for
Americas China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy
assumption that China will either economically stagnate or politically implode
because of underlying contradictions in its overall political economy. This would
amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis.
EZPZ SOLUTIONS
America and China should both continue to take down barriers to job-generating
investment in each others countries. America must continue to provide more
guidance about how Chinese firms can navigate the American regulatory system, as
we discuss below. For its part, China needs to continue to reduce barriers to market
entry, particularly in services. Having more individuals with stakes in each others
economies is stabilizing. Concluding a high-standards Bilateral Investment Treaty
will be an important step.
ECON KEY TO RELATIONSHIP BUT AT BRINK NOW

Economic relations. The U.S. economic relationship with China has been the glue
holding the countries together during difficulties in the overall relationship. Support
for trade and investment has, however, frayed as the relationship has become more
complex and internal dynamics have altered Chinas support for the role of foreign
institutions and investment in its economy. Recognizing these changed
circumstances is important, but so too is acting to restore a healthy trade and
investment relationship.
ECON KEY TO CHINA STABILITY RECESSION LEADS TO

ADVENTURISM, ADVENTURISM TO CONFRONTATION AND
MISCALC
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-waramerica
All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate
domestic crisis. But the Chinese Communist party does face a long-term
legitimation crisis. For decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive
economic growth, which is now slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive
Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a
complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly
educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leaderships crude attempt to
command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King
Canutes confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging.
They can almost certainly keep the lid on for several years but, as always happens
when necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point,
the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card,
perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one of Chinas
Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct
confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation
would be high. With angry, nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the
Chinese nor the American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear
weapons.
This is not idle scaremongering; its something the US military, intelligence and
thinktank communities think about all the time, in order to avoid it.
ECON KEY TO CHINESE STABILITY

https://www.aei.org/publication/time-for-realism-in-us-china-relations/
Americans are willing to overlook these failings as long as China remained the
goose that laid the golden egg. Yet this summer showed that Chinese prosperity,
the third of Rices goals, can be taken for granted. The stock market collapse over
the past few months is a sign of much deeper problems in the broader
economy. The official growth rate has been knocked down to 7 percent, but few
economists believe the figure, and it is entirely likely that China is already in
stagnation. That means, as trade figures showed, dropping industrial production and
shrinking imports. When the slowdown hits the pocketbooks of Chinas nouveaux
middle class, then social stability will be even more at risk.
ECON KEY TO HUMAN RIGHTS

http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-isupon-us-part-i/
In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common
interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human
rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint
and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010.
The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes
than at any time since normalization.
CHINESE SLOWDOWN SPILLS OVER TO EMERGING COUNTRIES

http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-path-economic-reform-lew-2015.html
The U.S. economy remains resilient and continues to be a major driver of the global
economy. We have seen steady growth in jobs and output, following on swift and
essential financial reforms and strong fiscal and monetary policies in response to
the financial crisis some seven years ago. Yet the U.S. cannot be the only source of
strength. This summers events demonstrate that Chinas economic policies can
have a significant impact on the global economy. While Chinas financial markets
remain domestically focused, a slowdown in its core economy raises concerns about
spillover to other economies, particularly emerging economies.
BIT GIVES STRONG SIGNAL TO BUSINESSES RAISES BIZ CON

http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-path-economic-reform-lew-2015.html
The Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations under way between the U.S. and China
present a tangible way for China to signal to businesses in America and the world
that it is serious about welcoming and protecting foreign investment. China relies on
partnerships with U.S. firms to take advantage of our cutting-edge technology. It
needs to provide fair market access and honor the rights associated with intellectual
property for these relationships to remain strong.
CHINA HARD LANDING HAS AN IMPACT RATING OF 20

ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIST NEED TO TAKE ALL STEPS TO
AVOID
https://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gr&articleid=2871
High probability, Very high impact; Risk intensity = 20
March 17th 2016Introduction

We assess the prospect of a sharp economic slowdown in China as our top risk
scenario.
Analysis
Continued deterioration in the country's services and manufacturing sectors, the
ongoing build-up of the country's debt stock (which is now equivalent to some 240%
of GDP), and continued capital outflows have highlighted structural weaknesses in
the economy and resulted in a (market-driven) depreciation in the renminbi's
exchange rate against the US dollar. The government's means to revive economic
confidence are limited. Its huge fiscal stimulus in 2009 led to a build-up of bad debt
that it is still seeking to curtail (especially in local government), and, despite the
People's Bank of China burning through US$108bn of reserves in December alone,
the renminbi has continued to weaken. Meanwhile, poorly managed official attempts
to shore up the stockmarket have highlighted concerns that the government's
promise to put a floor under economic growth might not be credible - as well as
showing the shallow nature of the government's commitment to allowing market
forces to play a role in raising productivity.
Conclusion
If China's economy slows by more than we currently expect, it will further feed the
ongoing global commodity price slump (especially in oil and, in particular, metals),
with a hugely detrimental impact on those Latin American, Middle Eastern and SubSaharan African states that had benefited from the earlier Chinese-driven boom in
commodity prices. In addition, given the growing dependence of Western
manufacturers and retailers on demand in China and other emerging markets, a
prolonged deceleration in growth there would have a severe knock-on effect across
the EU and the US - far more than would have been the case in earlier decades.
CHINESE ECON SLOWDOWN PRETTY MUCH INEVITABLE MANY

REASONS
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
Structurally, Chinas rapid growth in the post-Tiananmen era was driven principally
by one-off favorable factors or events, and not by the purported superiority of an
authoritarian state. Among these factors or events, the most important is the
demographic dividend, which provided a seemingly endless supply of cheap and
able-bodied young workers for Chinas industrialization. Besides their low wages,
young migrants from rural areas to urban centers can gain an instant and large
increase in labor productivity simply by virtue of being paired with operating capital,
without need for extensive educational preparation. Consequently, the mere
redeployment of the countrys excess rural labor force to factories, shops, and
construction sites in the cities can make the economy more productive. According to
Chinese data, an urban workers productivity is four times higher than that of a rural
peasant. In the past three decades, about 270 million rural laborers (excluding their
families) have moved to cities and now account for 70 percent of the urban work
force. Some economists estimate that about 20 percent of Chinas GDP growth in
the 1980s and 1990s came from the rural-urban labor relocation.5 But because
Chinas population is aging rapidly and the mass migration from rural to urban areas
has peaked, this one-off favorable structural factor cannot be replicated.
Another one-off positive shock that powered Chinas growth since Tiananmen was
its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In the 1990s Chinas
export growth averaged 15.4 percent per annum, thanks to its integration into the
global economy. But after its entry into the WTO, China achieved annual growth in
exports of 21.7 percent over the period 200208. Export-driven growth began to
slow after 2011. Between 2012 and 2014, export growth averaged 7.1 percent, a
third of the growth in the prior decade. In the first seven months of 2015, exports
contracted around 1 percent, the development that probably prompted Beijing to
devalue its currency.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Chinas long-term economic outlook is the
diminishing return from its investment-driven growth strategy. As a developing
country with relatively low stocks of capital, China initially benefited immensely
from a sustained rise in its investment rate. In the 1980s, China ploughed an
average of 35.8 percent of GDP into factories, infrastructure, and housing. The rate
rose to 42.8 percent on average in the 2000s and has reached 47.3 percent since
2010. Such massive increase in investment, accounting for more half of Chinas GDP
growth, has been the primary engine of economic expansion in the past two and
half decades.
However, investment-driven growth in the Chinese context has had three negative
consequences. One is the diminishing returns on investments, because each
incremental increase in output requires more investment, as measured by capital
output ratio (the amount of investment needed to produce an additional yuan of
GDP). In the 1990s, Chinas capital output ratio was 3.79. In the 2000s, it rose to
4.38. This trendgrowth requiring ever-rising investmentis simply not sustainable.
China is already investing nearly half of its GDP, an extraordinary number made
possible by state control of infrastructure development. The extent of overcapacity
and misallocation of capital are equally extraordinary.
Another harm inflicted on the economy is that investment squeezes out household
consumption (36 percent of GDP in 2013, compared with 60 percent in India),
causing a massive structural imbalance and making sustainable growth impossible.
That sustainable growth must come from moving away from export-led modalities
to domestic market growth, but it cannot set roots with household consumption so
artificially low.
The final cost of Chinas investment-led growth is that much of it has been financed
by credit and ploughed into industrial sectors already plagued with excess capacity.
With debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 280 percent of GDP today (compared with 121
percent in 2000), risks of a full-blown financial crisis have risen because the largest
borrowerslocal governments, state-owned enterprises, and real estate developers
have poor repayment capacity due to a narrow tax base (local governments),
overcapacity and poor profitability (state-owned enterprises), and a deflating
property bubble (real estate developers). If Chinas long-term economic woes are
purely structural, the countrys prospects are not necessarily dire. Effective reforms
could reallocate resources more efficiently to make the economy more productive.
But the success of these reforms critically hinges on the nature of the Chinese state
and its political institutions. Sustained wealth generation can only take place in
states where political power is constrained by the rule of law, private property rights
are effectively protected, and there is wide access to opportunity. In states
dominated by a small ruling elite, the opposite happens: Those in control of political
power become predators, using the coercive instruments of the state to extract
wealth from society, defend their privileges, and impoverish ordinary people.6
CHINA MUST REINVEST ITS INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS OR

FACE SLOWDOWN - #1 FACTOR
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Chinas long-term economic outlook is the
diminishing return from its investment-driven growth strategy. As a developing
country with relatively low stocks of capital, China initially benefited immensely
from a sustained rise in its investment rate. In the 1980s, China ploughed an
average of 35.8 percent of GDP into factories, infrastructure, and housing. The rate
rose to 42.8 percent on average in the 2000s and has reached 47.3 percent since
2010. Such massive increase in investment, accounting for more half of Chinas GDP
growth, has been the primary engine of economic expansion in the past two and
half decades.
ECON GROWTH KEY TO CCP LEGITIMACY

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
If long-term economic stagnation were to set in, the Chinese middle classs support
for the status quo will erode. Co-optation of the fast-growing middle-classanother
key pillar of the CPCs post-Tiananmen survival strategyhas been enabled by the
past quarter centurys economic boom. Chinas secular economic slowdown will
undoubtedly reduce opportunities, curtail expectations, and limit upward mobility
for members of this critical social group, whose acquiescence to the CPCs rule has
been contingent upon its ability to deliver satisfactory and continuous economic
performance.
China-US War
NO US-CHINA WAR FOR THE NEXT 10 YEARS
Indeed, military budgets are rapidly increasing both in Russia and in China, and they
remain at a very high level in the United States. For China, rearmament would be a
surefire way to boost domestic demand. China is already flexing its military muscle in the
South China Sea, operating in a unilateral and often quite belligerent manner, which is
causing justifiable concern in Washington. Nevertheless, it may take a decade or more
until a RussianChinese military alliance would be ready to confront the US directly.
Until then, we may expect a continuation of hybrid warfare and the proliferation of proxy
wars.
CONTAINMENT FAILS
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations
The blueprints for containment drawn from Cold War strategies used by both sides
against an expansionist Soviet Union do not apply to current conditions. The
economy of the Soviet Union was weak (except for military production) and did not
affect the global economy. Once China broke off ties and ejected Soviet advisers,
few countries except those forcibly absorbed into the Soviet orbit had a major stake
in their economic relationship with Moscow. Contemporary China, by contrast, is a
dynamic factor in the world economy. It is a principaltrading partner of all its
neighbors and most of the Western industrialpowers, including the United States. A
prolonged confrontation between China and the United States would alter the world
economy with unsettling consequences for all.
CONTAINMENT LEADS TO ESCALATION
Important domestic political considerations are involved for all parties. But if China
and the United States come to regard each others trade-pact efforts as elements in
a strategy of isolation, the Asia-Pacific region could devolve into competing
adversarial power blocs. Ironically, this would be a particular challenge if
China meets frequent American calls to shift from an export-led to a consumptiondriven economy, as its most recent five-year plan contemplates. Such a
development could reduce Chinas stake in the United States as an export market
even as it encourages other Asian countries to further orient their economies
toward China.
UNLIKELY
We conclude that while these historical examples can provide us with valuable
lessons, they do not point to inevitable hostility in the U.S.-China relationship.
Moreover, the modern era is different in important ways. Nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of most major powers provide a deterrent. Economic interdependence is
far deeper than at any time before. Threats such as climate change are shared, and
gaining territory is not the key to economic success to the degree that it was in
earlier times.
WONT HAPPEN
%2021.pdf
Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and Chinas neighbors have
concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security
interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of
direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next
decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to
occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world.
Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them
yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think
puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it
should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it
once was.
SCENARIOS FOR WAR

%2021.pdf
However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two scenarios: Either
an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval vessels followed
by a badly managed crisis; or Through a collision (accidental or deliberate)
between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously
Japan or the Philippines.
WONT HAPPEN CHINA KNOWS THEYLL LOSE AND THEY

ARENT FOCUSED ON MILITARY
%2021.pdf
For these reasons, the report concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in
the medium to long term remains remote. This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to
the idea of expanding Chinas regional and global footprint by economic and
political means. This is where he will likely direct Chinas diplomatic activism over
the decade ahead.
CHINAS NUKES ARE IMPROVING DEVELOPING SECOND STRIKE

CAPABILITIES
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
China is making significant qualitative improvements to its nuclear deterrent along

with moderate quantitative increases in the course of its efforts to build a more
modern nuclear force. Chinas nuclear doctrine is premised on the concept of a
lean and effective force guided by a doctrine of no-first-use of nuclear weapons
(although the exact circumstances under which China would use nuclear weapons,
what China would consider first use, and whether the policy may be reconsidered
have been subjects of debate). China has approximately 250 nuclear warheads,
according to unofficial sources. It has specifically invested in enhancing its theater
nuclear force and diversifying its nuclear strike capabilities away from liquid-fueled,
silo-based systems. Chinas DF-5 missiles have been equipped with multiple
independently-targetable reentry vehicles, confirmed by the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) for the first time in 2015; newer intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) in development could also have this capability, increasing Chinas ability to
penetrate adversary missile defenses and enhancing the credibility of its nuclear
forces as a deterrent. China is expected to conduct its first nuclear deterrence
submarine patrols using the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine by
the end of 2015, marking Chinas first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear
capability and presumably requiring changes to its de-alerting policy of keeping
nuclear warheads stored separately from missiles. China may also be developing a
nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile, the CJ-20, potentially introducing an airdelivered theater nuclear strike capability into its arsenal for the first time.
Importantly, as stated by Dr. Christopher Yeaw, founder and director of the Center
for Assurance, Deterrence, Escalation, and Nonproliferation Science & Education, in
his testimony to the Commission, China may also perceive its nuclear arsenal to be
useful in the political management of an unsustainable conventional conflict, in
which it would punctuate non-nuclear operations with tactical- or theater-level
nuclear strikes to seek deescalation on terms favorable to China. A key implication

of this approach for the United States is that China may escalate across the
nuclear threshold at a time and manner, and for a purpose, that we do not expect.
TURN WAR PREDICTIONS MAKE WAR MORE LIKELY

http://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/joseph-nye-us-china-relations
And then there are those who draw analogies to the geopolitical tensions that
brought on World War I, specifically how Germany surpassing Britain in industrial
power brought the order in Europe into question. In this respect Thucydides other
warning is important to bear in mind: the belief in the inevitability of conflict can
become one of its main causes. There is a possible scenario in which each side,
believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military
preparations in accordance with that assumption which then are read by the other
side as confirmation of its worst fears. Such a vicious cycle can be set in motion.
An accurate assessment of power relations is essential to prevent miscalculations in
policy. There remains a concern that as China grows more nationalistic, it faces the
dangers of hubris. Similarly, there is a risk that the United States will overreact to
fears of dangers posed by the rise of China and exacerbate the situation.
Fortunately, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to pursue any
overly ambitious dreams in the next several decades. Costs matter. It is easier to
indulge ones wish list for future expansion if you are looking at a menu with no
prices attached. Thus, if Chinese leaders try to match the United States in any
meaningful manner, they will have to contend with the reactions of other countries,
as well as with the constraints created by their own objectives of continued
economic growth and the pursuit of external markets and resources.
AVERTING US-CHINA WAR IS THE ONLY IMPACT THAT MATTERS

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/revealed-why-china-would-lose-war-againstamerica-12288
Lets not mince words: a U.S.-China war would be hell on earth. It would likely start
World War III. Millions maybe billions of people would die if nuclear weapons
were ever used in such a conflict. The global economy would likely face ruin thats
what happens when the worlds biggest economic powers start shooting at each
other. Thankfully the chances are remote it will ever happen. Yet, the threat of such
a conflict remains thanks to the many different pressure points in the U.S.-China
relationship. Forget the challenge of ISIS, Ukraine, Syria or whatever the flavor of
the moment is. The U.S.-China relationship and whether it remains peaceful or not
is the most important challenge of our time. Period.
Financial Reform
REFORM BENEFITS BOTH PARTIES US MUST LEAD
The areas for cooperation may prove to be wider than is obvious at first sight.
Cooperating with China in making President Xis financial reforms successful is
definitely in the common interest. Success would fulfill the aspirations of the everincreasing Chinese middle class. It may also allow Xi to relax some of the restrictions he
has recently introduced and that would, in turn, increase the probability that his reforms
will succeed and improve global financial stability. The weak point of his current
approach is that both implementing and monitoring the reform process are in the same
hands. Opening up the process to criticism by the media and civil society would greatly
improve the efficacy of his reforms. This is particularly true of Xis anticorruption
campaign. And if China followed this path, it would become increasingly attractive to the
US as a strategic partner.
Regional stuf
US-CHINA FAILURE LEADS TO ASIAN COLD WAR
If a bona fide attempt fails, the US would then be fully justified in developing a strong
enough partnership with Chinas neighbors that a ChineseRussian alliance would not
dare to challenge it by military force. That would be clearly inferior to a strategic
partnership between the US and China. A partnership with Chinas neighbors would
return us to a cold war, but that would still be preferable to a third world war.
MAJOR-COUNTRY-RELATIONS UNDERCUTS US PROJECTION AND

LEADS TO MULTIPOLARITY
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-chinarelationship-passed-the-14168
Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi
announced that Chinas proposed new model of major-country-relations
would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this
proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made.
Because U.S. leaders believe that the new model of major-country relations
is not in Americas best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed
Chinas proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its
power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework
alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount
of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of Chinas
proposal might give other states in the international system the impression
that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic
Thucydides trap. Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United
States to respect Chinas core interests as many Chinese and foreign
scholars have notedis a loaded statement. While the United States is not
opposed to respecting a states national interests, it tends to be unwilling to
respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for
the majority of Chinas core interests. In addition to traditional Chinese
national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, Chinas core
interests also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is
concerned that Chinas new model of major-country relations is a ploy
designed to trick the United States into acknowledging Chinas extensive
territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and longtime strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in
the weakening of the American-led hub-and-spoke security structure, a
security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security
Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that Chinas proposal
is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama
administration has been consistently opposed.
US-CHINA RELATION KEY TO ALL OTHER RELATIONS
Other countries want the United States and China to get along, yet they do not want
a Group of 2, or G-2. The U.S.-China relationship is only one link, though an
influential one, in a global network of many bilateral and multilateral nodes, all of
which are of critical importance to the overall peaceful global order.
Fast Track Bill

FTB BAD
The Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Partnerships, which are currently being negotiated,
could offer an excellent opportunity for a two-pronged strategy but the current approach
is all wrong. At present China is excluded; indeed the partnerships are conceived as an
anti-Chinese alliance under US leadership. The president has asked Congress to give him
and his successor authority for up to six years to negotiate trade agreements under fasttrack rules that would deprive Congress of its right to introduce amendments. The bill has
passed the Senate and at this writing is before the House. If the House approves,
President Xi may be presented with an apparent threat on his visit in September. This is
an appropriate response to Chinas aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and
elsewhere, but it leaves little room for an alternative approach. It would, as a result, be
difficult for President Obama to make a bona fide offer of strategic partnership.
It is to be hoped that the House will not authorize putting the bill on a fast track. Instead
of railroading the bill through Congress, it ought to be taken off the fast track. In that
case, Congress would have plenty of time to correct the fundamental flaws in the
proposed treaties that make them unacceptable as they are currently written. And that
would also allow President Obama to make President Xi a genuine offer of a strategic
partnership with China when he visits Washington in September.
US-China Relations
TIPPING POINT NOW
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168
Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most
realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a
point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this
point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more
challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two
great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard
power tactics. Thats especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the
single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While
there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is
necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain
unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to
move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to
cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in
the sand and preparing for the worst.
RELATIONS ARE POSITIVE NOW
%2021.pdf
By contrast, despite the difficulties, the U.S.-China relationship remains in decidedly
positive territory. Since 1972, U.S.-China relations have remained more functional
than those between the U.S. and the Soviet Union ever were, and have never
escalated to a comparable level of hostility.9 As noted above, both China and the
United States have private and semi-public strategic narratives about each other.
But as yet they do not have a shared strategic narrative between each other. Such a
common strategic narrative for U.S.-China relations may be difficult, but it is
certainly not impossible. And given the stakes involved for the future, it is
increasingly necessary.
STRONG RELATIONS KEY TO PREVENT MULTIPLE IMPACTS

The U.S. and China are deeply entangled, and that state is largely a good thing.
Deterrence of destructive military or cyber actions can rest on denial, punishment,
or entanglement. China and the U.S. would each suffer if they launched a nuclear
strike, or took down each others electric grid. That discourages such drastic acts. In
the economic realm as well, China cannot afford to dump its dollars onto world
markets because such an act would hurt them as much, or more than, it would hurt
the U.S. As Robert Keohane and I wrote about power and interdependence forty
years ago, where there is symmetrical interdependence, there is not much power.
RELATIONS KEY TO ALL IMPACTS

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10213.html
In this book, James Steinberg and Michael OHanlon stake out a third, less
deterministic position. They argue that there are powerful domestic and
international factors, especially in the military and security realms, that could well
push the bilateral relationship toward an arms race and confrontation, even though
both sides will be far worse off if such a future comes to pass. They contend that
this pessimistic scenario can be confidently avoided only if China and the United
States adopt deliberate policies designed to address the security dilemma that
besets the relationship between a rising and an established power. The authors
propose a set of policy proposals to achieve a sustainable, relatively cooperative
relationship between the two nations, based on the concept of providing mutual
strategic reassurance in such key areas as nuclear weapons and missile defense,
space and cyber operations, and military basing and deployments, while also
demonstrating strategic resolve to protect vital national interests, including, in the
case of the United States, its commitments to regional allies.
RELATIONS SOURING NOW
We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for
predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled,
today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to
see China as a threat to American primacy. In China, increasing fractions of the
elite and public see America as an impediment to Chinas achieving its rightful
international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability.
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative
of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National
Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: In
Beijings eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to Chinas rise American strategy
toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish
it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership. The American narrative, as Rudd
described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: Beijings long-term policy is
aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere
of influence spanning the region.
Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments
and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have
grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents
in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to
quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in
America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its
foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion,
and black hands unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.
What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both
countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of
intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will
enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts;
and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done?
RELATIONS ARE BAD AND GETTING WORSE ALL PERCEPTION

Nonetheless, the leaderships in our two countries also have headed in undesirable
directions in some of their remarks and actions. President Obamas February 18
instructions to White House staff disseminated publicly said: That is why we have
to make sure the United Statesand not countries like Chinais the one writing this
centurys rules for the world economy. Such remarks (later alternately softened
and hardened as domestic politics seemed to suggest) are unrealistic and
counterproductive, alienating the United States not only from those already
suspicious of America, but also from allies. This attitude contributed to the initial
U.S. decision to resist the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
eventual outcome in which fifty-seven nations, many American friends or allies,
agreed to become charter members of the AIIB despite initial U.S. preferences. For
an unnamed U.S. official to criticize, publicly, Britains constant accommodation of
China, saying that this is not the best way to engage a rising power,[2] erodes
influence with friends and competitors alike.
Similarly, Chinas senior leader set off alarm bells by saying that: Let people of Asia
run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of
Asia.[3] Earlier remarks in 2010 by another senior official set off reaction when
saying: China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and thats
just a fact. These remarks, whether made by Washington or Beijing, are unhelpful.
While Beijing and Washington now are using the rhetoric of competitors in polite
public discussion, increasingly strategic thinkers in both nations are acting on the
assumption that we are adversaries in the security realm. If one believes, as I do,
that in the final analysis perceived security threats trump economic and cultural
interests, this suggests that admittedly enormous shared economic and cultural
interests may not prevail over diverging security concerns.
There is more than one way for one nation to contribute to the security anxieties of
another nationOne is to identify perceived challenges to your own security and
then propose muscular ways to respond. Such voices are gaining strength in the
United States, though they are not yet policy. These views suggest that: the past
decades of engagement efforts with the PRC have created a national security
challenge for Washington, not a cooperative partner; that America needs a new
grand strategy relating to China that maintains U.S. primacy; that tighter export
controls and more allied unity are needed with respect to China; that more defense
spending and hardware deployments to the region are needed, along with further
allied cooperation on missile defense[4]; and, that responses that impose costs on
Beijing for cyber intrusions are required.[5]
US-CHINA RELATIONS KEY TO ALL OTHER RELATIONS

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-the-most-important-bilateralrelationship-in-the-world-today/
Our U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world
today. All major global issues intersect at the corner of Beijing and Washington,
D.C., and there is much for the two world leaders to discuss conversations best
done on a foundation of mutual respect, seeking win-win strategies that enhance
world peace and economic growth.
US HAS HR PROBLEMS GUNS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934.htm
On June 25 local time, the State Department of the United States released its
country reports on human rights practices once again, making comments on the
human rights situations in many countries while showing not a bit of regret for or
intention to improve its own terrible human rights record. Plenty of facts show that,
in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights defender, saw no improvements in
its existent human rights issues, but reported numerous new problems. While its
own human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights
in other countries in a more brazen manner, and was given more "red cards" in the
international human rights field.
The U.S. was haunted by spreading guns, frequent occurrence of violent crimes,
which threatened citizens' civil rights. Statistics showed that the use of firearms in
the U.S. was behind 69 percent of murders, while for robberies, the figure was 40
percent, and for aggravated assaults, 21.6 percent (edition.cnn.com). The excessive
use of force by police officers led to many deaths, sparking public outcry. An
unarmed 18-year-old African-American Michael Brown was shot dead by a white
police officer named Darren Wilson in Ferguson, a town in Missouri. After the grand
jury of both Missouri and New York decided to bring no charges against the white
police officer, massive protests broke out in more than 170 cities nationwide
(cn.nytimes.com, November 25, 2014).
HR ESPECIALLY BAD FOR POC

The U.S. is a country with grim problems of racial discrimination, and institutional
discrimination against ethnic minorities continued. Serious racial bias persisted in
the police and justice systems. Minority groups and indigenous people are subject to
unfairness in environment, election, health care, housing, education and other
fields. In August 2014, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, in its concluding observation on the periodic report of the U.S. on
the latter's implementation of relevant convention, slammed the U.S. for violating
the rights of ethnic minorities, indigenous people, immigrants and other minority
groups. It criticized the fact that members of racial and ethnic minorities continued
to be disproportionately arrested, incarcerated and subjected to harsher sentences
(tbinternet.ohchr.org).
VOTING RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HURT US CRED
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934_4.htm
The voting rights of racial minorities and other groups are under suppression. The
voting rights in the U.S. are restricted by economic income, race and other factors,
and many citizens were prevented from voting. Preliminary exit polls showed that
voters of African origins accounted for 12 percent in the 2014 midterm election,
down from 13 percent in the 2012 presidential election. Hispanic voters dropped
from 10 percent in 2012 to 8 percent and the proportion of Asian voters also
reduced to two percent from three percent (www.usatoday.com, November 5, 2014).
In 2014, the Supreme Court said that Texas could use its controversial new voter
identification law for the November election. Roughly 600,000 voters, many of them
black or Latino, could be turned away at the polls because they lacked acceptable
identification (www.dailymail.co.uk, October 18, 2014). Voting rights advocates were
up in arms over the socioeconomic and racial factors of these new restrictions
(www.upi.com, November 3, 2014). In addition, criminal disenfranchisement
removed massive swaths of society from the democratic process as a collateral
consequence of conviction. A striking 5.85 million Americans could not vote because
of a criminal conviction before. Many disenfranchised citizens lived in Iowa,
Kentucky, or Florida -- the three states with extreme policies of disenfranchising
anyone with a felony conviction for life (www.aclu.org, November 17, 2014).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Racial discrimination has been a chronic problem in the U.S. human rights record.
Facing discrimination in employment and payment, the ethnic minorities are
trapped in graver poverty. In 2014, multiple cases of arbitrary police killing of
African-Americans have sparked huge waves of protests, casting doubts on the
racial "equality" in the U.S. and giving rise to racial hatred factors.
Racial bias in law enforcement and judicial system is very distinct. Compared with
other ethnic groups, African-Americans are more likely to become victims of police
shooting. Police killings of African-Americans during law enforcement have
practically become "normal" in the U.S. According to an analysis of federally
collected data, young black males in recent years were at a far greater risk of being
shot dead by police than their white counterparts -- 21 times greater. The 1,217
deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012 captured in the federal data show that
African-Americans, age 15 to 19, were killed at a rate of 31.17 per million, while just
1.47 per million white males in that age range died at the hands of police
(www.propublica.org, October 10, 2014). Victims of the high-profile deaths caused
by police enforcement in 2014 were all African-Americans. The above-mentioned
Ferguson case exposed the feature, gravity and complexity of human rights
problems in the U.S. caused by the country's institutional racial discrimination,
highlighting the racial discrimination problem in the law enforcement and judicial
system. The protests staged around the U.S. were directed against violent law
enforcement and injustice, as well as the underlying problem of racial
discrimination. When commenting on the cases in Ferguson and other places, a
former senior American official said the U.S. criminal justice system was "out of
balance" (www.washingtonpost.com, December 4, 2014). Amid sweeping protests
against judicial injustice in relevant case, another fatal shooting of an AfricanAmerican man Rumain Brisbon by a white police officer took place in Phoenix,
Arizona. "It gives the impression that it's open season for killing black men," some
comments said (www.usatoday.com, December 4, 2014).
Ethnic minorities are targeted in law enforcement sting operations. The U.S. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives overwhelmingly targeted racial and
ethnic minorities as it expanded its use of controversial drug sting operations. At
least 91 percent of the people agents have locked up using those stings were racial
or ethnic minorities, and nearly all were either black or Hispanic
(www.usatoday.com, July, 20, 2014). Just under a quarter of Boston's population is
black, but black residents are 63 percent of those stopped-and-frisked by the Boston
Police Department (www.washingtonpost.com, October 8, 2014). African-Americans
are far more likely to be arrested than any other racial group in the U.S. More than
1,581 police departments across the U.S. arrest African-American people at rates
over three times higher than people of other races. At least 70 departments
arrested African-Americans at a rate 10 times higher than people who are not black.
According to reports submitted by Dearborn police, the arrest rate for AfricanAmericans, compared with the city's population, was 26 times higher than for
people of other races (www.usatoday.com, November 18, 2014). According to a

study by the Vera Institute of Justice, in Manhattan, race is a statistically significant
factor in most of the discretion points in criminal justice procedures, from bail
through plea bargaining and sentencing. A law professor with the Harvard University
has criticized that "blacks are not yet full citizens" and that deep rooted prejudices
have "made black people, particularly young black men, presumptive felons outside
the boundaries of full citizenship" (www.ft.com, August 17, 2014). UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, has urged the US
authorities "to conduct in-depth examinations into how race-related issues are
affecting law enforcement and the administration of justice, both at the federal and
state levels" (www.un.org, November 25, 2014).
Ethnic minorities are facing with discrimination in employment and payment.
Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that in October 2014,
unemployment rate with white Americans was 4.6 percent whereas the rate with
African-Americans was 10.7 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics report USDL-150158 www.bls.gov, February 6, 2015). In Texas, African-Americans, aged 18 to 34,
have an unemployment rate of 18 percent, while the rate of young white adults
stands at 7 percent (www.houstonchronicle.com, January 6, 2015). Religious
discrimination in employment is also serious. Muslims were least likely to be
contacted by employers, and atheists and pagans were also unpopular
(www.washingtonpost.com, June 18, 2014). Black workers are concentrated in lowprestige and low-wage occupations (www.msnbc.com, August 6, 2014). Major tech
companies have begun owning up to the fact that blacks and Hispanics are vastly
underrepresented in their ranks. African-Americans and Hispanics are missing on
the management teams of major technology companies. A survey found that of the
307 top executives at 22 companies, six are black and three are Hispanic. That's
less than 3 percent (www.usatoday.com, November 13, 2014). Only 1 percent of the
Google's tech workforce is black (www.washingtonpost.com, May 29, 2014).
Hispanic, Asian and African-Americans are also subject to prevalent discrimination in
salaries. A report from the American Institute for Economic Research revealed that
Hispanics earn $16,353 a year less on average than their colleagues who are not
Hispanic. In the same high-skilled positions such as computer programmers and
software developers, Asians make $8,146 less than whites and blacks $3,656 less
than whites. "At every point in the hiring process hidden bias trickles in"
(www.usatoday.com, October 10, 2014).
Poverty of minority groups is worsening. Overall 17 percent of all Americans are
Hispanic, but Hispanics are over represented among the poor, making up 28.1
percent of the more than 45 million poor Americans and 37 percent of the 14.5
million children in poverty. In the old age group (65 years or older), Hispanics have
the highest poverty rate of any racial or ethnic group. A total of 20 percent of
Hispanics in this age group are poor, compared with about 10 percent nationwide
(www.pewresearch.org, September 19, 2014). Nearly 60 percent of shelter residents
are minorities with African Americans three times more likely to be homeless
compared to the overall U.S. population. Black children under age 5 are 29 times
more likely to end up in an emergency shelter than their white counterparts
(www.christianpost.com, November 27, 2014).
Racial discrimination sows the seeds for race-related hate crimes. According to the
Southern Poverty Law Center, the number of domestic hate groups rose from 602 in
2000 to 939 in 2013. An annual Justice Department survey of crime victims found
that more than 293,000 hate crimes were committed in 2012. That's 800 a day.
Nearly 20 percent of the hate-crime perpetrators were 17 and younger
(www.usatoday.com, April 16, 2014). On April 13, 2014, Frazier Glenn Cross, a 73year-old white supremacist, shot and killed three people at two Jewish sites of
Greater Kansas City (edition.cnn.com, April 14, 2014).
2014 marks the 50th anniversary of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
According to a survey by the Pew Research Center, only 45 percent of Americans
said the U.S. had made substantial progress toward racial equality since the event.
A CBS News poll found that 46 percent of Americans said there would always be a
lot of prejudice and discrimination (www.pewresearch.org, April 9, 2014).
GENDER DISCRIMINATION HURTS CRED

The U.S. disregarded the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the
U.S., women's susceptibility to poverty, workplace discrimination, domestic violence
and sex harassment was worrying. The children's rights to life and health were
threatened under the pall of school violence, sex molestation, gun violence, and
hazardous work environment.
A large number of women and children lived in poverty. According to statistics,
about 42 million women (about one in three American women) and 28 million
children lived in poverty or were right on the brink of it (www.time.com, January 13,
2014). One in 30 American children were homeless, and child homelessness
increased in 31 states and the District of Columbia, according to a report released
by the National Center on Family Homelessness (www.theguardian.com, November
17, 2014).
Women were faced with wage discrimination. Nearly two-thirds of minimum wage
workers were women, and these workers often got zero paid sick days. The average
woman was paid 77 cents for every dollar a man makes, and that figure was much
lower for African American and Latino women; African American women earned only
64 cents and Hispanic women only 55 cents for every dollar made by a white man
(www.time.com, January 13, 2014). In virtually every job category, the average
woman earned less than the average man. Even in those low-paid jobs that tend to
be dominated by women, such as nurses, men earned more

(www.thinkprogress.org, April 8, 2014).
Reports of female soldiers getting harassed were on the rise. In an average day in
the U.S. military, at least 16 sexual assaults were reported. According to a RAND
survey, 13,000 incidents of "unwanted sexual contact," went unreported during the
12 months ending September 30, 2014 (www.usatoday.com, November 7, 2014).
According to a report released by the U.S. Department of Defense, there were a
total of 5,983 incidents of sexual assaults in the fiscal year ending in September of
2014, up by over 8 percent from the fiscal year ending in 2013
(www.america.aljazeera.com, December 4, 2014). Some 62% of female victims said
they faced repercussions for reporting assaults (www.bbc.com, December 5, 2014).
Domestic violence was prevalent. According to data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice, the estimated number of domestic
violence incidents per year was about 960,000. Women constituted 85 percent of
victims of domestic violence. On average, 3 females were murdered by their partner
each day, and 4 females and 3 children died each day as a result of abuse. Each
year, 2.1 million American women were assaulted by men (www.statisticbrain.com,
September 5, 2014). Since 2014, over 1,000 complaints concerning children in
foster care being mistreated in California languished past the deadline for
completing the investigations (The Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2014).
Issues of school gun violence and sexual harassment were grave. In the first six
weeks of 2014 alone, there were 13 school shootings including one eight-day period
in which there were four shootings in K-12 schools (www.everytown.org, February 5,
2014). On the afternoon of January 17, 2014, a boy and a girl, both aged 15, were
shot in two school shootings in Philadelphia (Washington Daily News, January 18.
2014). Sex violence in American high schools was astonishing. According to a
survey by the American Association of University Women, in a given school year, 58
percent of 7th-12th graders experienced sexual harassment. One in 5 high school
girls said they had been sexually assaulted at school, and 1 in 8 high school girls
said she had been raped. One expert said the survey had revealed the astounding
pervasiveness of this problem (www.america.aljazeera.com, November 14, 2014). A
culture of sex violence was casting a pall over American campus, but failed to be
dealt with properly by any American higher learning institutions (The Wall Street
Journal, September 30, 2014).
Child laborers were engaged in dangerous works. American Labor Law allows juniors
to work, as long as his or her parents consent and the work does not directly conflict
with school hours. That means, it is perfectly legal for a 12-year-old to work 50 or 60
hours a week in tobacco fields. Based on interviews with 141 child tobacco workers,
aged 7 to 17, in the country's four largest tobacco-producing states: North Carolina,
Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia, nearly three-quarters of children interviewed
reported feeling sick - with nausea, vomiting, headaches, dizziness, difficulty in
breathing, or other serious symptoms while working in tobacco fields. Many of these
symptoms were consistent with acute nicotine poisoning (www.politico.com,
September 16, 2014).
CASE CANT SOLVE ALL OF CHINAS GRIEVANCES NO

SOLVENCY
On June 25 local time, the State Department of the United States released its
country reports on human rights practices once again, making comments on the
human rights situations in many countries while showing not a bit of regret for or
intention to improve its own terrible human rights record. Plenty of facts show that,
in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights defender, saw no improvements in
its existent human rights issues, but reported numerous new problems. While its
own human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights
in other countries in a more brazen manner, and was given more "red cards" in the
international human rights field.
The U.S. was haunted by spreading guns, frequent occurrence of violent crimes,
which threatened citizens' civil rights. Statistics showed that the use of firearms in
the U.S. was behind 69 percent of murders, while for robberies, the figure was 40
percent, and for aggravated assaults, 21.6 percent (edition.cnn.com). The excessive
use of force by police officers led to many deaths, sparking public outcry. An
unarmed 18-year-old African-American Michael Brown was shot dead by a white
police officer named Darren Wilson in Ferguson, a town in Missouri. After the grand
jury of both Missouri and New York decided to bring no charges against the white
police officer, massive protests broke out in more than 170 cities nationwide
(cn.nytimes.com, November 25, 2014).
The U.S. used cruel tortures indiscriminately, notably those carried out by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). To acquire intelligence from suspects of terrorism
and extremism, the CIA used brutal methods, such as sleep deprivation,
waterboarding, long-term solitary confinement, slamming prisoners against the wall,
lashing, death threat and even "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding. United Nations
human rights convention institutions such as the UN Human Rights Committee and
the Committee Against Torture had raised their concerns over issues in the U.S.,
including terrible detention conditions for convicts awaiting execution, abuse of
brutal methods, secret detention, indefinite arbitrary detention, and illegal wiretapping which infringed citizens' privacy. These institutions called on the U.S. to
conduct swift, effective and fair investigations into all brutal behaviors and abuse of
forces of the police force (www.un.org).
The U.S. is a country with grim problems of racial discrimination, and institutional
discrimination against ethnic minorities continued. Serious racial bias persisted in
the police and justice systems. Minority groups and indigenous people are subject to
unfairness in environment, election, health care, housing, education and other

fields. In August 2014, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, in its concluding observation on the periodic report of the U.S. on
the latter's implementation of relevant convention, slammed the U.S. for violating
the rights of ethnic minorities, indigenous people, immigrants and other minority
groups. It criticized the fact that members of racial and ethnic minorities continued
to be disproportionately arrested, incarcerated and subjected to harsher sentences
(tbinternet.ohchr.org).
Money is a deciding factor in the U.S. politics, and the U.S. citizens' political rights
were not properly protected. Despite the highest midterm election spending in
history, general election voter turnout for the 2014 midterms was the lowest since
World War II. "Dark money" flowed into elections, and the voting rights of racial
minorities and other groups were intentionally suppressed. A few interest groups
with power were able to influence the government's decision-making. As a
renowned scholar pointed out sharply, the U.S. democratic system was experiencing
a crisis of representation. "Ordinary citizens feel that their supposedly democratic
government no longer truly reflects their interests and is under the control of a
variety of shadowy elites (Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014)."
Although the U.S. is the most developed country in the world, it is hard for the
economic and social rights of its citizens to be soundly ensured. In the process of
economic recovery, the income inequality continued to be enlarged, the basic living
conditions for the homeless people deteriorated, the health care system operated
terribly and the education rights of average citizens were violated. In October 2014,
the United Nations Special Rapporteurs criticized the unprecedented water shut-offs
in Detroit disproportionately affected the most vulnerable and poorest people,
violating their right of access to drinking water and other international human
rights.
American women and children's rights were not fully protected. Women were
discriminated at workplaces, and domestic violence was prevalent. Each year, 2.1
million American women on average were assaulted by men. Three females were
murdered by their partner each day, and four females died each day as a result of
abuse. In the U.S. military, reports of female soldiers getting harassed were on the
rise, and more faced repercussions for reporting assaults. Millions of American
children were homeless. Three children died each day as a result of abuse. School
violence and sex assaults were pervasive and gun shootings happened from time to
time.
National Security Agency and other intelligence-gathering apparatus of the U.S. for
a long time have spied on world leaders and civilians. The U.S. has not ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The U.S. government often takes an evasive
or uncooperative attitude toward the criticism of the United Nations Human Rights
Council, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of UN, the council's
working groups and special rapporteurs.
HR GETTING WORSE IN CHINA

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
Ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than six decades, China
remains an authoritarian state, one that systematically curtails a wide range of
fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly,
and religion. While there were a few modest positive developments in 2015
authorities, for example, reduced the number of crimes eligible for the death
penalty from 55 to 46 and issued directives guaranteeing students with disabilities
reasonable accommodation in university entrance examsthe trend for human
rights under President Xi Jinping continued in a decidedly negative direction.
CHINA DOESNT BELIEVE IN WESTERN HR CONCEPTION

Senior Chinese leaders, perceiving a threat to their power, now explicitly reject the
universality of human rights, characterizing these ideas as foreign infiltration, and
penalizing those who promote them. Freedoms of expression and religion, already
limited, were hit particularly hard in 2015 by several restrictive new measures.
CHINA BAD FOR GENDER

While the CCP is rhetorically committed to gender equality, its lack of respect for
human rights means that women continue to face systemic discrimination on issues
ranging from employment to sexual harassment. Family planning policies, which
control the number and spacing of children people can have, continue to impose
severe restrictions on womens reproductive freedoms. In October, authorities
announced an end to its decades-old one-child policy; couples may now have two
children.
In March, at least 10 womens rights activists were taken into custody by police for
plans to post signs and distribute leaflets to raise awareness about sexual
harassment in three Chinese cities. Five were soon released, but the others were
held for 37 days on charges of picking quarrels, sparking a widespread
international outcry. Though the five were released on bail, continuing restrictions
on their movements and police harassment led them to close their organization, the
Weizhiming Womens Center in Hangzhou.
In March, the Supreme Peoples Court and other agencies issued instructions
requiring judges to consider domestic violence as a mitigating circumstance in
criminal cases against victims of such violence. In August, Chinas legislature
reviewed a draft of the long-awaited Law against Domestic Violence. While a step in
the right direction, the draft falls short of international standards, particularly in its
definition of domestic violence. Cases of domestic violence in which local authorities
fail to respond appropriately continue to occur with worrying regularity. In July, for
example, a woman was killed by her husband during a mediation session in a police
station.
CHINA ABLEIST
China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in
2008, but persons with disabilities continue to face barriers and discrimination,
including lack of access to education.
More students with low vision and blindness took the national university entrance
exams, orgaokao, this year, following the Education Ministrys 2014 decision to
make Braille and electronic versions available. In April, the ministry also
promulgated new regulations requiring exam administrators to provide one or
more forms of reasonable accommodation, such as extending the time allowed
for completing exams and providing sign language services to students with
disabilities taking the gaokao. Given that other laws and regulations do not clearly
require education institutions to provide such students with reasonable
accommodation as defined in the CPRD, the April decision is a significant step
forward.
Regulations drafted in 2013 on access to education for people with disabilities have
still not been adopted. Official guidelines continue to allow universities to deny
enrollment in certain subjects if the applicants have certain disabilities.
Consequently, although more students with disabilities can now take the gaokao,
many universities continue to deny them entry to their chosen field of study or
entry to the university altogether.
The 2013 Mental Health Law stipulates that treatment and hospitalization should be
voluntary except in cases where individuals with severe mental health conditions
pose a danger to, or have harmed, themselves or others. In April, however, a
Shanghai court ruled against Xu Wei, the first patient ever to invoke the law to
challenge his confinement. Xu Wei has been held against his will for over a decade
for schizophrenia.
CHINA BAD ON GENDER AND SEXUAL IDENTITY
Homosexuality was decriminalized in 1997 and removed from an official list of
mental illnesses in 2001. There is still no law protecting people from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, however, and there is no legal
recognition of same-sex partnership.
A 2014 report by a Chinese lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)

organization revealed that very few Chinese textbooks portray LGBT people using
objective and non-discriminatory language.
In what could be a sign of growing social acceptance of same-sex relationships,
Chinese social media lit up with discussion and debate following the June US
Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage in the US. In July, a Sun YatSen University student donned a rainbow flag at a graduation ceremony and
received gestures of support from the chancellor; state media widely covered the
story.
LGBT groups and individuals continue to file lawsuits that challenge discrimination.
In April, a man sued his Shenzhen employer for firing him after a video revealing his
sexuality went viral online. In August, a university student in Guangdong Province
sued the provincial education department for officially approved textbooks that
depict homosexuality as an illness.
Diplomacy Framework/Major
Country Relations
CURRENT APPROACH WILL FAIL SOON
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168?page=2
Americas approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the
United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one
area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles
Chinas old shelving disputes and pursuing joint development strategy for Asia. As
this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it
is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later,
unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on
the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived
its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid
addressing Chinas demands that the United States acknowledge Chinas rise to
great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages
the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the new model of major-country
relations. China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic
stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great
power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or
implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition
continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into
conflict.
META APPROACH GOOD TO SOLVE OTHER ISSUES
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Over the course of our meetings, several important themes emerged. First, as one
expert noted, the very concept of a new model of major power relations changed
the tenor of our track II discussions. Searching for a new model is an inherently
positive framework, rejecting the debate over whether a rising power and an
established power are destined to clash. It provides an aspirational goal for a longterm process of seeking a peaceful path. While we debated the many areas of policy
where the United States and China do not agree, the group primarily focused on
how we can cooperate together and make the relationship more flexible and
durable, while seeking to manage the important areas where our interests do not
coincide.
MODEL OF MAJOR POWER RELATIONS = UNILATERAL US

CONCESSIONS
Chinas initiative to pursue a new model of major power relations, or a new model,
with the United States has met with some skepticism among American analysts.
Many of them, after reading early Chinese writings describing the idea, concluded
that the new slogan is primarily an attempt by China to push for unilateral
concessions.4
NEW META RELATION WILL NOT CHANGE ANYTHING

A new line of inquiry will not magically resolve existing U.S.-China differences, or
those of any other major power relationship, nor will it prompt either side to make
concessions that it otherwise would not. But what it can do is serve as a stimulant
for fresh thinking about pivotal power relations, remind us of the high stakes
involved, and make officials in all capitals, including Washington, D.C. and Beijing,
more sensitive to the ramifications of their actions.
NO META NOW
The United States and China have yet not articulated a clear understanding of how
they could continue to coexist in peace a decade or two down the road. Chinas rise
is a major geostrategic shift, and without a credible alternative, predictions for the
interaction between a rising power such as China and an established power such as
the United States tend to default to the historical pattern of inevitable violent
conflict, as we discuss in detail below. Until the United States and China develop a
shared vision for where they want the relationship to go, it is difficult to determine
what mutually beneficial policy steps they should take now.
NEW META NEEDED CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM SOLVES

%2021.pdf
This report seeks to add greatest value by attempting to chart a different course for
the future. It recommends a common strategic narrative to guide the U.S.-China
relationship, centered on the concept of constructive realismcommon purpose,
or . This framework has three parts: It is realistic
about recognizing areas of fundamental disagreement, while agreeing on common
protocols to manage these disagreements without imperiling the entire relationship;
It is constructive about those areas of difficulty in the bilateral, regional and
global relationship that the U.S. and China can engage on, therefore producing
tangible results over time, and gradually building political capital, diplomatic ballast
and incremental strategic trust which over the longer-term can be drawn upon to
deal with the more intractable disagreements described above; and Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 5 Building on both
these realist and constructive pillars, this report also advocates for an overriding
common strategic purpose for the relationship: to sustain, strengthen and, where
necessary, reform the existing regional and global rules-based order, against those
forces seeking to erode the order altogether, to the detriment of the U.S., China and
the broader international community. This common strategic narrative is radically
different from the private, or semi-private narratives each side may have about the
other. It is also designed to be equally explicable, understandable and acceptable in
both languages and in both political systems. In doing so, it seeks to avoid the ageold problem in U.S.-China relations of conceptual frameworks simply being lost in
translation. Critically, it offers a framework that is capable of managing both
strategic divergence and strategic cooperation at the same time, but still within a
common purpose of preserving a functional order for the future. It argues that the
latter has the singular advantage of meeting both countries fundamental but often
unstated need to avoid a return to the anarchic systems or non-systems that we
have seen in previous chapters of the sorry history of international relations
US KILLED MAJOR COUNTRY RELATIONS IDEA

%2021.pdf
It is against this unhappy background that, in 2013, Xi Jinping elevated the concept
of a new type of great power relationship as a centerpiece of his diplomacy
towards the U.S. Xi argued it was time to liberate the bilateral relationship from a
cold war mentality (lengzhan siwei ) and the politics of a zero sum game
(linghe youxi ). While disagreements inevitably arose over the definition of
Chinese and American core interests (hexin liyi ). the U.S. administration
initially welcomed the proposal. But this concept soon fell victim to a deeply
partisan debate within the United States on the administration conceding strategic
and moral parity to China and has since disappeared from the public language of
the administration. The report argues that mutual strategic misperceptions between
the U.S. and China, informed both by history and recent experience, are likely to
endure.
COMMON FRAMEWORK GOOD MAKES OTHER ISSUES

SOLVABLE
%2021.pdf
A common strategic framework for U.S.-China relations would offer many
advantages. First, in Washington, it would help provide strategic direction to
Government agencies competing for policy attention and space, as well as those
multiple agencies 9 The only exception which could be made would be the height of
U.S.-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War, which occurred in an
entirely different strategic context to the post-1972 world order. engaged in aspects
of the China relationship but not on a daily basis, thereby helping to provide policy
coherence in engaging on an interagency basis, as well as with Chinese
interlocutors; Second, in Beijing it would go beyond that because of the more
hierarchical nature of the political and bureaucratic decision-making process,
providing direction to the system at large; and Third, for both powers, a coherent
strategic framework would also inject additional positive ingredients: a common
determination to manage significant differences effectively in order to avoid
unnecessary confrontation; a common commitment to collaborate in difficult policy
areas with a view to resolving them; and a common sense of purpose to build
political capital and strategic trust over time. For these reasons, the report argues
that the ideational content of a common strategic framework for the relationship
should be: realist about those areas of the relationship which are not possible to
resolve within the foreseeable future; constructive about those areas that could
be resolved with high-level political effort at the bilateral, regional and global levels;
and guided by a common purpose to build strategic trust, step by step, over time,
not based on declaratory statements, but instead on common action in resolving
common problems.
NO FRAMEWORK CHANGE MEANS INEVITABLE WAR

%2021.pdf
However, these deep realist elements of the relationship should be matched by
constructive engagement between the U.S. and China in difficult areas of their
bilateral, regional and global relationship where true progress is possible. Otherwise,
there is a danger that unalloyed strategic realism will suffocate the relationship
altogether. Or worse. Given the generally bleak assumptions about each others
ultimate strategic intentions, there is the perennial risk of hyper-realism becoming
a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, resulting in crisis, conflict or even war.
CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM FOCUSES ON A FEW RESOLVABLE

ISSUES
%2021.pdf
Constructive realism in bilateral relations The following represents an indicative list
of those policy areas where both sides could commit to constructive collaboration to
resolve significant bilateral issues within a manageable time frame: The
conclusion of the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. This is because of the longterm transformative effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in each others
economies, and because of the direct interest in the future growth of each others
economies that this creates. This is in contrast to trade, which has a more transient
effect on the institutional underpinnings of an economic relationship; Agreement
on a joint strategy and joint intelligence task force to deal with terrorism in the
region from Afghanistan to Xinjiang. This should be without any American
equivocation concerning absolute condemnation of terrorist acts against Chinese
civilians by Xinjiang separatists and/or violent jihadists. This recognizes that
terrorist attacks against any civilian targets are universally unacceptable. 28 U.S.China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping The development
and agreement of a bilateral cyber protocol that elaborates rules of the road for
civilian and non-civilian use. The elaboration of a full set of military transparency
measures and protocols for the management of unplanned military incidents,
building on those agreed to in November 2014; and Agreement on a process for
Chinese and American progress on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), noting that Russia is already a ratification state, and that Chinas
position is that it would ratify if the U.S. Congress approves ratification.
CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM SOLVES SOME REGIONAL ISSUES

%2021.pdf
Constructive realism in the region A cocktail of fragile regional relations, fractious
great power relations, and a growing arms bazaar makes Asia an increasingly
dangerous neighborhood. Combined military budgets in Asia in 2014 for the first
time exceeded those in Europe. The following is an indicative list only of where
strategic trust could be built over time in the wider region: The development of a
joint strategy on the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean
Peninsula: This would necessarily involve security guarantees to the North under
whatever unified regime might replace it, and would also necessitate negotiations
on the future of any continued U.S. military presence on the Peninsula in the event
of denuclearization and reunification; This could only ever be achieved on the
basis of a grand strategic bargain driven by leaders. Failure to deliver an end to
the North Korean nuclear weapons program will result in the expansion of American
and allied Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs to deal with future threats from
North Korean missiles; The development of a parallel joint strategy on the
implementation of any Iranian nuclear agreement; A joint initiative to harmonize
in time the TPP, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and FTAAP
so that the region does not grow into different trading blocs that reinforce, rather
than reduce, existing geopolitical tensions and/or alignments; Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 29 The development of
a concept paper on the long-term evolution of an Asia-Pacific Community (APC,
yatai gongtongti ) in order to encourage habits of regional cooperation
around a concept of common security, as detailed below; and A U.S.-led effort, or
joint Allied effort including China, to resolve with Japan an accurate historical record
of Japanese armed aggression in Asia during the Second World War, in order to free
the region from the continuing and damaging political, diplomatic and security
policy impact of a war concluded 70 years ago.
SOLVES A LAUNDRY LIST OF PROBLEMS AND LEADS TO A

GREATER RELATIONSHIP
%2021.pdf
This brings us to the question of whether an overall common strategic purpose is
to be served by the U.S.-China relationship, and if so, given the vast differences
between the two countries and their different expectations of the international
system, what that common purpose or mission might be. De minima, one
common purpose is clear: to avoid conflict and war, and against the benchmark of
the cautionary tales of Thucydides Trap, this would be no small achievement.
However, another common ambition might be the preservation of a functioning
global order itself that is capable of effective global decision-making and dispute
resolution. China has a deep philosophical reservation, born of millennia of historical
experience, of chaos under heaven (tianxia daluan ). Whereas historically
this has applied to Chinas domestic arrangements to preserve the unity and good
government of the empire, Chinas now unprecedented global engagement creates
a new imperative for order in the international domain as well. Chinese interests are
now at stake in every region in the world. In some cases, these are not marginal,
but, in fact, are core interests of the Chinese state, such as a functioning global
energy supply and distribution system. Try as China might, it will be in no position to
rely on unilateral diplomatic or military effort to guarantee Chinese energy interests.
This therefore points to Chinas broader need for an effectively functioning global
order for the future, given Chinas expanding global interests and its inability to
secure those interests by purely national means. Securing a stable, effective global
order for the future, and avoiding global chaos under heaven of the type offered
by the proliferation of non-state actors such as ISIS, may well constitute the
beginnings of a common strategic purpose for China and the United States for the
future. This may be able, over time, to transcend the considerable ideational divide
that at present separates them on the question of precisely what sort of order that
should be. Furthermore, if the preservation and evolution of a functioning order
could become an animating vision for the future of U.S.-China relations, not only
could it provide a global dividend to the rest of the international community, it could
also provide an even deeper momentum for managing the more basic tasks
confronting the bilateral relationship: i.e. 36 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping avoiding conflict; managing ideational differences on
democracy, human rights and the rule of law; as well as the range of bilateral,
regional and global problem-solving referred to above. This question on future
Chinese and American collaboration in defending and enhancing the global order is
discussed further in the conclusion of this summary report.
DIPLOMATIC FRAMEWORK IS KEY TO SOLVING ISSUES
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National political leadership in both Beijing and Washington, and the leadership they
choose to deliver to the future direction of their bilateral relationship, can have a
major, and possibly decisive, effect on which of these scenarios, or blend of
scenarios, becomes the more probable. There is nothing determinist about the
future relationship between China and the United States. It is a matter for leaders to
decide on an approach, and to execute it, either con-jointly or separately. That is
why the narrative they use to describe their relationship to each other, and to their
respective political constituencies, is important. And that is where the current U.S.China relationship is lacking. This report has focused on one such possible scenario
for the future (namely the second scenario), and how it might in practical terms be
brought about. If a new approach of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose

is to have any real chance of success, it 40 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping will require a change in the political psychology or the
way of thinking of the relationship. As noted above, the Chinese call this siwei.
At present, the siwei between the two is overwhelmingly realist to the point that
it is almost Hobbesian in its fatalism. The Chinese equivalent would be to run
international relations according to the most pessimistic tradition of the Legalist
(fajia ). This permanently assumes the worst of the other party and over time
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The report does not argue for the abandonment
of skepticism in international relations. In fact, it argues for the retention of a realist
premise concerning the hard security issues that currently separate the U.S. and
China and will continue to do so for a considerable time. However, the report also
argues that we should leaven the realist loaf with a level of constructive cooperation
at multiple levels to build strategic trust over time. This will not require the
wholesale abandonment of traditional strategic thinking or siwei. But it will require
an adjustment to allow for the possibilities of constructive engagement changing
deeply grounded strategic mindsets over time.
CURRENT FRAMEWORK OUTDATED AND FAILS

The lack of clear understanding and trust between the two countries has hastened a
drift toward a self-fulfilling prophecy of strategic rivalry, even as the economic and
geopolitical stakes in U.S.-China cooperation become more deeply rooted and
fundamental. The relationship is no longer as asymmetric as it was when the basic
framework of U.S. policy toward China was formed, and the corresponding levers
the United States could pull to channel Beijings behavior are no longer as available
or effective. Yet the need to solve problems in the relationship has never been more
important, even as the United States faces a domestic political divide and grim
fiscal realities affecting its ability to manage multiple global crises and China stands
at an economic (and possibly political) crossroads in its own domestic development.
FRAMEWORK KEY, NOT THE ACTUAL POLICIES

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america
Here is the tragedy of a policy on which so much depends for us all. The United
States has a sophisticated policy community capable of generating the bipartisan
and multilateral grand strategy towards China that we need. Unfortunately it has
developed a way of doing politics which makes it impossible to sustain such a
strategy. To adapt a famous observation by putative special China envoy Bill Clinton:
its the politics that are stupid.
MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIP KEY TO MANY ISSUES
To inject balance into this somber portrait, there have been some significant and
positive recent developments in U.S.-China relations and Chinese foreign policy, not
least President Xi Jinpings oft-expressed desires to avoid conflict, emphasize
cooperation, and to pursue mutually beneficial outcomesa New Type of Major
Power Relationship. Other developments include: agreement to pursue a bilateral
investment treaty; some progress on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Vietnamese relations;
progress in the climate change area; somewhat improved military-to-military
exchanges; and, the recent and upcoming summits between presidents Obama and
Xi. Trade, finance, and other economic relations are making progress, and U.S.China student and cultural exchange is thriving, with one-third of ALL foreign
students in the U.S. from the PRC.
RELATIONS ARE BAD AND GETTING WORSE ALL ABOUT THE

FRAMEWORK PERCEPTION
Nonetheless, the leaderships in our two countries also have headed in undesirable
directions in some of their remarks and actions. President Obamas February 18
instructions to White House staff disseminated publicly said: That is why we have
to make sure the United Statesand not countries like Chinais the one writing this
centurys rules for the world economy. Such remarks (later alternately softened
and hardened as domestic politics seemed to suggest) are unrealistic and
counterproductive, alienating the United States not only from those already
suspicious of America, but also from allies. This attitude contributed to the initial
U.S. decision to resist the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
eventual outcome in which fifty-seven nations, many American friends or allies,
agreed to become charter members of the AIIB despite initial U.S. preferences. For
an unnamed U.S. official to criticize, publicly, Britains constant accommodation of
China, saying that this is not the best way to engage a rising power,[2] erodes
influence with friends and competitors alike.
Similarly, Chinas senior leader set off alarm bells by saying that: Let people of Asia
run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of
Asia.[3] Earlier remarks in 2010 by another senior official set off reaction when
saying: China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and thats
just a fact. These remarks, whether made by Washington or Beijing, are unhelpful.
While Beijing and Washington now are using the rhetoric of competitors in polite
public discussion, increasingly strategic thinkers in both nations are acting on the
assumption that we are adversaries in the security realm. If one believes, as I do,
that in the final analysis perceived security threats trump economic and cultural
interests, this suggests that admittedly enormous shared economic and cultural
interests may not prevail over diverging security concerns.
There is more than one way for one nation to contribute to the security anxieties of
another nationOne is to identify perceived challenges to your own security and
then propose muscular ways to respond. Such voices are gaining strength in the
United States, though they are not yet policy. These views suggest that: the past
decades of engagement efforts with the PRC have created a national security
challenge for Washington, not a cooperative partner; that America needs a new
grand strategy relating to China that maintains U.S. primacy; that tighter export
controls and more allied unity are needed with respect to China; that more defense
spending and hardware deployments to the region are needed, along with further
allied cooperation on missile defense[4]; and, that responses that impose costs on
Beijing for cyber intrusions are required.[5]
Maritime
MOST LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS
The problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous
and diverse, but if you are looking for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you
need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the territorial
disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the
United States are threatening Chinas territorial sovereignty. For China, because of
its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate regime survival in a way that
transcends all other quarrels and disagreements. The United States, on the other
hand, views Chinas territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese
expansionism, aggression against American allies and strategic partners, and a
threat to the guiding principles of the liberal world orderwhich the United States
views as crucial for the preservation of Americas global hegemonic power.
SCS KEY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW LEGITIMACY
In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island
construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities
have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that
China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and
negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed
Americas demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in
order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within
the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in
violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international
commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty
issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute,
as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal systema
cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order.
SCS DEFINES ALL OTHER ISSUES

Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the
Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, China mustnt tolerate rampant US
violations of Chinas adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands.
The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to
Washingtons level of provocation. The article further stated, If the US encroaches
on Chinas core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop
it. The article stated plainly, If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will
breach Chinas bottom line, and China will not sit idly by. Other reports from this
newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the
bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation
activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this
issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United
States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine
the relationship between these two great powers.
SCS IS ZERO SUM MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE

Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case, this issue is still
decidedly zero-sumwhich increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political
preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the
United States, the liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner
or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is
resolved through diplomacy or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical
influence of either one or both countries. Were the international institutions for
collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they ariseand
if China and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model
which addresses each countrys respective security concerns and encourages
effective collaborationit might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully.
But given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful
thinking. As there is currently no clear solution to this problem that would allow both
countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states
are pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each countrys level of commitment
and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome
of the geopolitical power struggle between China and the United States will almost
certainly be decided in the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South
China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary, it is the most
pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be forced
to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea,
geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.
CHINA WANTS BILAT ON MARITIME KEY TO SOLVING

Maritime issues are similarly vexing and, if not addressed, could lead to very
destabilizing incidents. China is embroiled with a number of countries in the region
in disputes over sovereignty of land formations in the South China Sea. For the first
time in its 45-year history, ASEAN did not issue a communiqu describing the
content of the discussion after a July 2012 meeting of foreign ministers in Phnom
Penh, reportedly because China pressured Cambodia to refuse to include language
on the groups discussion of maritime issues.56 China insists that these territorial
questions are matters for bilateral negotiations only. This break in protocol was a
troubling development and a striking contrast to the groups ideals of unity, leading
some observers to conclude that, China has decided that a weak and splintered
ASEAN is in its best interests.57
DAIYOUDIAO/SENNKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE LEADS TO

ESCALATION ON BRINK
Still, Chinas more-recent openness is encouraging. At the 2013 ASEAN Regional
Forum in July, the 10-member association and China issued a statement that said
the parties aim to reach a conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,
which will service to enhance peace, stability and prosperity in the region.58 This is
a very promising development, as a workable code of conduct between ASEAN and
China will help to reduce the tension that has developed in recent years in the
region. The pace of negotiations, however, has been disappointingly slow to date.
Similarly, diplomatic progress on the Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands issue has been
stalled, and Japanese and Chinese ships and planes are shadowing each other in the
area around the disputed islands that both countries claim.59 The potential for an
accident to quickly lead to an escalation in the situation cannot be dismissed.
MARITIME AGREEMENT GOOD
The United States and China should explore the idea of a multilateral maritime
security partnership in East Asia. As other nations, including China, build up their
naval capacity, it is only fair that they should help in collectively securing sea-lanes
that are as vital to them as they are to the United States.73 As a U.S. 60 Center for
American Progress | U.S.-China Relations Navy report suggests, Maritime forces will
be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective
security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open,
multi-polar world.74 The multilateral effort would not only have a positive effect on
combating nonstate actors, such as terrorists and drug smugglers, but also could
potentially reduce Chinese suspicions of American maritime activities. Furthermore,
it would give China a greater share in the cost of protecting sea-lanes, which the
United States has largely been responsible for up until now.75 Among other things,
participation in the maritime security partnership would be contingent on agreeing
to settle maritime territorial and resource disputes peacefully.
LOTS OF MARITIME STUFF TO DO

Some of the most significant opportunities for tactical cooperation lie beyond the
Asia-Pacific region. The just-completed second round of joint U.S.-China anti-piracy
exercises in the Gulf of Aden is a prime example. Other avenues for beyond-theregion cooperation could include global sea-lane policing, an issue of great concern
to both nations and for the global energy market more broadly. Closer to home, the
United States and China could work together on joint projects related to climate
security, such as building more resilient infrastructure to protect local communities
from sea-level rise, which is an increasing concern in both nations. The two
countries should also expand the mechanisms for U.S.- China cooperation on shortlived climate forcerssuch as hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs; black carbon; and
methaneand work together on the research and development of alternatives to
global warming substances. Moreover, there is now the opportunity for the United
States and China to work together to establish and implement environmental best
practices for shale gas development.
XI WILL REMAIN AGGRESSIVE IN MARITIME AFFAIRS
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In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached
unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to
de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines between the
two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility of accidental
conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the South China Sea,
where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with
Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and where mil-to-mil protocols are
undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal
predisposition to refrain from an assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to
submit them to any form of external arbitration.
US NEEDS TO ASSERT IN SCS

In addition, it is past time for the U.S. to act as the guarantor of regional stability
that it claims to be. That means sending U.S. ships and planes right up to the edges
of Chinas manmade islands in the South China Sea, something that Obama
Administration admitted in Senate testimony last week that it was not doing. By not
challenging Chinas territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and
sending a message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A China that knows we
will employ our military strength where it is most in question will be far more
circumspect in its attempts to undermine the rules of international behavior.
OCEAN CONSERVATION
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China intend to pursue actively cooperation on polar and
ocean matters, including projects related to ocean conservation and expanding joint
polar research efforts, and will work together on the proposal to establish a Marine
Protected Area (MPA) in Antarcticas Ross Sea. The two sides also plan to support
additional bilateral efforts in these fields, including ocean acidification monitoring
and a partnership between the coastal cities of Xiamen and Weihai in China and San
Francisco and New York in the United States to share best practices to reduce the
flow of trash into the ocean.
SCS ISLANDS HAVE ALREADY CAUSED CONFLICT
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/09/23/obama_taiwan_deter_china_1114
55.html
A bemused Beijing stayed on its course of building a counter-deterrent to U.S.
intervention in any future Taiwan crisis. As voices in the United States increasingly
questioned the wisdom of even the ambiguous commitment to Taiwan, Beijing
decided its strategy was proving effective and extended it to the entire region. In
2009, it announced a "nine-dash line" claiming 90 percent of the South China Sea as
Chinese waters and territory. Its aggressive claims have resulted in numerous
maritime clashes with other regional claimants as well as the United States. In
recent years, China has upped the ante by building up rocks and reefs, making
them large enough to support airfields and other military installations.
ACQUISCENSE, NOT AGGRESSION, INCREASES LIKELY HOOD ON

CONFLICT IN SCS
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-must-hold-firm-in-south-china-sea-dispute/
No sane Chinese or American official wants a major war between the two countries.
Nor would anyone in a responsible position on the U.S. side welcome even a limited
military conflict with China, for fear of miscalculation, escalation, and unintended
consequences, including the significant endangerment of economic relations.
American restraint is demonstrable in the South China Sea (SCS) but it has also
characterized the U.S. response to China-initiated situations in the East China Sea
and across the Taiwan Strait.
That prudent approach, however, is not sufficiently shared by Chinese government
and military leaders. Some seem willing to push the envelope to see just how much
aggressive behavior Washington will tolerate in the region. They appear prepared to
risk a direct clash at sea or in the air and expect the U.S. to make the necessary
efforts to avoid it for instance, to back away from exercising full navigational and
overflight rights.
Beijings belief in its new military prowess and in Americas failing will and
capabilities emboldens Chinese leaders to persist in their defiance even if planes or
ships collide, and potentially, if shots are actually fired. Chinese officials are
convinced that Washington fears escalation more than they do and that it will
accept a compromise resolution rather than take U.S. resistance to the next level.
INACTION EMBOLDENS CHINA AND HURTS US SOFT POWER

But if Washingtons present grasping for an SCS off-ramp leaves China in even a
marginally better position than the status quo ante, it will be seen not just in
Beijing as vindication of its more aggressive actions and evidence of faltering U.S.
resolve. America, and countries that depend on its security guarantees, will have
been taught a lesson. To pursue its regional and global ambitions, China will no
longer feel compelled to heed Deng Xiaopings caution to bide our time, hide our
capabilities.
The blow to U.S. prestige and security credibility will exceed that suffered after
the Scarborough Shoal incidentin 2012. Washington helped mediate a diplomatic
solution to the tense China-Philippines standoff, but then did nothing when China
violated the agreement and effectively seized the disputed reef from Americas
treaty ally. Washington rationalized that it had no interest in the actual outcome of
the sovereignty dispute as long as it was determined peacefully and bilaterally. Yet,
even that limited U.S. interest was defeated by Chinas unilateral quasi-military
action, and Washington accepted it rather than confront Beijing.
INACTION KILLS US PRESTIGE
In the unfolding crisis in the SCS, however, the U.S. no longer has the option to look
away. As Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared at the Shangri-La defense
ministers meeting last week, the United States has a direct and enduring interest in
freedom of navigation and overflight in all international waters and airspace.
Beyond self-interest, America has kept the maritime and aviation public commons
open to all nations for more than seven decades. Allowing China unilaterally to
carve out a gigantic exception to Washingtons global role in the vital SCS shipping
lanes would constitute an incalculable diminution of U.S. power and prestige.
INACTION REDUCES JAPAN CONFIDENCE

Beyond self-interest, America has kept the maritime and aviation public commons
open to all nations for more than seven decades. Allowing China unilaterally to
carve out a gigantic exception to Washingtons global role in the vital SCS shipping
lanes would constitute an incalculable diminution of U.S. power and prestige.
If American will not uphold its own proclaimed navigational and overflight rights, will
Japan believe it would be more willing to risk conflict with China by defending the
pile of rocks known as the Senkakus?
FULL DECLARATION OF SCS FREEDOM KEY ANYTHING LESS

FAILS
But anything less than implementation of Washingtons declaration of total and free
access to the waters and airspace of the South China Sea will be understood in
Beijing and capitals around the world as a further erosion of U.S. credibility. And
credibility is the very linchpin of Americas pivot to Asia. Loss of our most valuable
asset in confronting the increasingly non-peaceful rise of China will surely unbalance
the rebalance.
For regional and international security, it is important that at the denouement of the
current crisis, China will have taught itself a corrective lesson.
CHINA INCREASINGLY INVESTING IN MILITARY
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/maritime-asia-responding-to-the-china-challenge/
Chinas assertive rise is creating growing turbulence in maritime Asia. Despite a
slowdown in Chinas economic growth, Beijing is investing heavily in military and
paramilitary capabilities designed to project greater influence over the East and
South China Seas and beyond. More importantly, Chinese leaders are increasingly
willing to risk short-term reputational costs to maximize long-term gains with
respect to sovereignty claims.
CHINA MILITARIZING THE SCS

Chinas assertive behavior is manifested in myriad ways. It exploits ambiguous and
weak legal and diplomatic frameworks, from the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to institutions centered on the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). It conceals hard power behind the seemingly more benign
image of white-hulled coast guard and law-enforcement forces, even though it often
uses those forces as weapons, equips many of them with arms, and is deploying
them in both greater number and tonnage than any other nation in the region. It
mixes the carrots of trade and finance with the sticks of information warfare and
mounting military deployments and operations.
CHINAS SCS ACTIONS ARE A CHALLENGE TO US HEG

Individual actions by China can be viewed as discrete challenges to neighboring
states. But they are part of a larger pattern of challenging a post-World War II
regional order built by major stakeholders, including the United States, Japan, and
many others. By developing the military wherewithal in the form of anti-access and
area-denial (or A2/AD) capabilities, China seeks to erode Americas preponderant
military position that undergirds the regional order. Change and adaption are
necessary, of course, but they should not come at the expense of accepted rules
and norms of behavior. That is why even more disturbing than Chinas military
buildup is Beijings assault on the rule of law and the principle of settling disputes
peacefully. Chinas unwillingness to join the Philippines in seeking international
arbitration as an ideal means of clarifying fundamental points of law under UNCLOS,
coupled with Beijings foot-dragging with regard to a binding Code of Conduct, are
bad omens for the entire region. Other claimant states should not be ignored
because of their small size, and no one country should be allowed to decide that the
worlds maritime powers should be excluded from protecting some of the worlds
most important international waterways.
TIME TO CONTEST IS NOW INACTION LEADS TO CHINESE

AGGRESSION
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-must-challenge-china-in-south-china-sea/
China acts because the only power able to prevent such action, the United States,
does nothing. Washington should contest Chinas claims, both physically and
historically. At the very least, Washington should challenge the historical basis for
Chinas myriad claims to demonstrate that, on the historical record, China is a paper
tiger.
CHINA IS NOT BENEVOLENT WE NEED TO CHALLENGE IN THE

SCS
In sum, we cannot know the future destiny of China, nor the final aims of Chinese
leaders bent on achieving the China Dream. But whatever the exact goals of
Beijing, the consequences of continuing down the current path should be clear: a
looming China that carves out an ever-larger sphere of influence so that it can
determine who uses the maritime and air commons of the Asia-Pacific region.
Whether you consider Chinas growing internal suppression of political rights and
free speech, or its use of tailored coercion in the East and South China Seas, relying
on the benevolence of future Chinese leaders is a high-risk strategy. Hence, the
policy imperative is to find a way to safeguard national interests and regional order
in the face of Chinas expanding challenge to both.
NEED CONSISTENT STRATEGY NOT JUST REACTION

The U.S. governments policy response to a more able and willing China continues
to evolve along with China itself. Yet much of the official U.S. approach is derivative
of the Obama administrations policy of comprehensively rebalancing to the AsiaPacific regiona policy that encompasses economic, diplomatic, and security
instruments of power. Critics of the so-called pivot to Asia fault it on a number of
grounds. One such complaint is that in shifting priority focus to Asia the United
States has neglected new security threats to Europe and the Middle East. While
some of that concern has been corrected, moves to increase military engagement in
places like Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and the dispatching of two military brigades to
Europe, only exacerbate a second area of concern regarding the rebalance policy:
namely, its inconsistency and incomplete follow-through. Finally, some critics grant
that the administration is minding U.S. interests and influence in the Asia-Pacific
region, but they still lament the lack of results and the relative ineffectiveness with
respect to dissuading Chinas cabbage and salami-slicing tactics in maritime Asia.
Clearly the United States needs a strategy, not merely a collection of reactive
policies. That strategy in turn needs a long-term focal point to keep it on course,
and to reassure allies and friends about Americas determination to remain a vital
and permanent Pacific power. To be compelling, however, the United States must
found its strategy on comprehensive power and unstinting engagement. Finally,
Washington policymakers must be equally adept at imposing costs on bad behavior
while daily investing in forging a successful regional architecture. Above all else, the
United States seeks to work with all nations on creating a region that is inclusive,
open to free trade, and rooted in the rule of law.
REGIONALISM CANT CHECK CHINA US IS KEY
Meanwhile, bad behavior such as the militarization of islands in the South China Sea
should incur costs. One might imagine aggressive actions by China being met with
international cooperation to prevent the flow of certain advanced technologies, such
as those associated with quantum computing, to China. But beyond legal remedies
and the possibility of targeted sanctions, the best response remains building up a
regional system based on the interests and values of like-minded countries opposed
to unilateral changes to the status quo through coercion and force.
Put differently, these economic and diplomatic pillars are necessary, if insufficient,
means of bolstering regional order. The United States also needs to invest
adequately in its own defenses and in security cooperation. Washington must not
allow the desire for strategic partnership and cooperation with large neighboring
states to interfere with a clear-eyed and persistent focus on building of defense
capacity. All countries deserve to have a minimal level of self-defense capacity, and
large countries such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and
others can and should be keen to offer assistance.
INCREASED PRESENCE MEANS MORE ALLIANCE BUILDING

An effective security posture also requires the further strengthening of Americas
alliances. The 2015 U.S.-Japan defense guidelines put that alliance on a course to
achieve greater operational integration, including cooperation in the domains of
cyber space and outer space. Likewise, the U.S.-Australian alliance has never been
stronger, and sending Marines and Air Forces for regular rotational training in
Australia might provide a model, albeit on a smaller scale, for the U.S.-Philippine
alliance to emulateespecially now that the Supreme Court has ruled on the
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
Building partnership capacity is vital for most countries in the region, including the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and others. Vietnams strategic
relationship is invaluable to the United States, and Washington welcomes Vietnams
contributions to maintaining regional peace and stability (for instance, including
Hanois support for U.S. freedom of navigation operations recently off Triton Island,
the same island near where China has deployed a deep-sea oil platform). If SAMs in
the Paracels and radars in the Spratlys are intended to be a response to measures
to uphold international law, then surely they will only create the kind of regional
security environment that Beijing professes to fear.
TIME TO ASSERT IS NOW IF WE WAIT FOR NEW PRESIDENT

CHINA WINS
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/22/time-for-america-to-step-up-in-the-south-chinasea/
Americas challenge to Chinas unilateral claims to the international waterways of
the South China Sea is long overdue. Chinese strategists have repeatedly told
foreign observers that they believe Beijing has a strategic window until U.S.
President Barack Obama leaves office and before a new president adopts a tougher
approach in which to assert their exceptional claims in maritime Asia. During his
current visit to Southeast Asia for regional summits, President Obama should make
clear that Chinese coercion to revise Asias established order will not succeed on his
watch, and deploy more elements of Americas diplomatic and military toolkit to
match his words with action.
CHINA WILL BACK DOWN

In fact, China has more to lose in any military confrontation than does the United
States. America is richer, more powerful, has more allies, and enjoys a more
resilient political regime than that monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party.
President Xi Jinping must know that a foreign conflict could unleash the kind of
nationalism within China that could ultimately target his regime itself; after all, this
is how previous dynasties have fallen.
NOW IS KEY NO MORE INCREMENTAL LOSS
Chinas strategy to date building artificial structures and claiming the surrounding
waters as national territory has been to salami-slice. Beijing has secured
incremental gains below the threshold of any actual conflict, while Washington is
distracted elsewhere.
It is time for America to call Chinas bluff with a more robust and proactive strategy
to deter further attempts to redraw the map of Asia. Rather than ceding the
initiative to Beijing in the South China Sea through a reactive and purely localized
policy, the Obama administration needs to demonstrate that continued military
aggression in maritime Asia could endanger Chinas wider interests.
STOPPING CHINA IN SCS KEY TO REGIONAL STABILITY

One-third of global trade flows through the South China Sea. Control over it would
not only threaten East Asias economic lifeline; it would position Chinese naval and
air power at the mouth of the Indian Ocean. To prevent Chinese revisionism from
upending the regions delicate balance of power, the U.S. and its allies must raise
the costs and call into question the benefits of further Chinese encroachments on
Asias existing territorial order.
HARD POWER KEY 4 REASONS
Soft power aside, the primary instrument for defending Asias fragile status quo
must be American military strength. The United States must be more creative with
its superior military toolkit in defending the existing liberal order.
First, Washington must back its words with action. Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter says U.S. forces will operate wherever international law allows. American
forces must systematically challenge Chinas self-declared Air Defense Identification
Zone over the East China Sea, and its Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea,
challenging Chinas ability to enforce its questionable claims.
Second, the United States should encourage its allies to undertake similar patrols
through Southeast Asias maritime commons. Japan and Australia are considering
doing so; Indias increasingly powerful navy should do the same as part of its
ambitious Act East policy. The United States and its allies should undertake joint
exercises in the South China Seas international waters, challenging Chinas claims
to control access to them.
Third, the United States should work with its allies to help them deploy the same
kind of anti-access and area-denial capabilities that China is developing to exclude
foreign forces from Asias regional commons. These include missile defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and more sophisticated patrol and combat aircraft.
The goal is not to present China with an offensive military threat, but rather to cast
doubt on the viability of aggressive Chinese military operations.
Fourth, the United States must focus more intently on the military dimensions of its
pivot to Asia. American forces are concentrated in Japan and South Korea, a legacy
of 20th-century conflicts; they should be dispersed across the region. This could
include permanent bases in the Philippines and Australia, a more active rotational
presence in countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, and an increase in the operations
tempo of submarine and surface patrols.
IMPROVED HARD POWER IN SCS REASSURES ALLIES

Washington also must invest in systems to defeat Chinas anti-access and areadenial capabilities, including directed-energy weapons, stealth bombers and drones,
and theater missile defenses. This would enhance deterrence and restore Asian
allies confidence that the United States will not pursue an over-the-horizon
offshore balancing strategy that leaves regional partners in the lurch in the event
of conflict. The lifting of the sequester caps on defense spending with the recent
budget deal in Washington should make targeted enhancements to Americas
military posture in Asia more viable.
SCS KEY TO ASIA AND WORLD PEACE

Chinas militarization of the installations it has built in the South China Sea, and its
expansive claims to control nearly that entire international waterway, are not simply
a challenge to peace and security in Southeast Asia. They are a test of the global
rules that underpin the liberal international order. For that reason, Washington
should also consider putting Chinas broader interests at risk should it continue to
militarize the South China Sea.
US CAN EASILY THREATEN CHINA
Chinas economic lifeline runs westward across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf,
and eastward across the Pacific, all areas where the U.S. Navy remains
predominant. Chinas economic health requires an open international trading order
and the countrys access to the dollar-based financial system. Chinas core interests
would be undermined by stronger American military partnership with Taiwan, and
greater U.S. support for the rights of restive Chinese citizens in Tibet, Xinjiang, and
Hong Kong.
Geographic proximity may mean China has the upper hand in a localized dispute
over the South China Sea. But if leaders in Beijing understand that their interests
beyond Southeast Asia are at risk, they may find that the costs to Chinas global
position outweigh the prospect of narrow gains closer to home. Ironically, China has
more to lose than any other country from the threat it is posing to the ground rules
of an international system that has until now facilitated its rise to prosperity
and power.
CHINESE MILITARY BUILDUP STRENGTHENS US ALLIANCES

http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/china-blunders-but-unites-its-rivals/67233?
utm_source=aah1&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=pp&utm_content=inf_80_92
_2&tse_id=INF_1797e568439b47a6b98e2032ef997737
The lingering myth of the Chinese governments infallibility recently suffered a
grievous blow when officials botched efforts to stabilize the countrys stock market
for the second time in less than a year. But while everyone seems focused on
thatstory, and the increasingly jittery markets in other countries, few have noticed
exactly how much China has begun flexing its military might and driving
neighbors into the arms of its chief global rival, the U.S. Everyone is dialing 911
and hoping the U.S. will answer, says Ralph Cossa, president of the Honolulu-based
Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, a foreign policy
research institute.
CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO CHECK THE US SOON

http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/concrete-steps-for-the-u-s-in-the-south-chinasea/
Together, these factors leave a significant power gap in the South China Sea. While
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are all increasing their spending
on maritime assets, their efforts will need to be sustained for at least another
decade to provide the countries with both the assets and the crews capable of
sustaining presence in their claimed waters of the South China Sea. Mira RappHooper is right to highlight the need to expedite U.S. capacity-building efforts
for maritime domain awareness. That said, Chinas 35 years of economic growth,
and 20 years of 10 percent or more annual growth in military spending allows it to
fill the gap. If current trends continue, the future strategic landscape in the South
China Sea will be considerably different, and unlike today, it will no longer be open
to interpretation.
CHINA USES COMMERCE TO COERCE THEY CANT CONTROL

SCS
Recent events certainly suggest that the Chinese are consolidating their claims in
a de facto, if not a de jure way. But is it really so bad for the United States if China
controls the fisheries and resources of the South China Sea? After all, China asserts
it does not seek to impede the free flow of commerce in the South China Sea.
Despite Chinas stated commitment to uphold open commerce, it has demonstrated
both its capability and willingness to utilize economic tools punitively to further
national objectives. For example, China halted exports of rare earth elements,
necessary for batteries and other high-end electronics, to Japan during a 2010
dispute over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. At the time, China
controlled 93 percent of the global supply of rare earths.
OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE STAKE IN SCS US NEEDS TO CHECK

CHINA
China has a legitimate interest in preserving the continued flow of commerce
through the South China Sea, with a large share of its imports flowing through those
waters. However, Japan and South Korea have the same interest in the free-flow of
commerce, and are even more import-dependent for many resources than China.
Approximately 50 percent of annual global merchant shipping traverses the South
China Sea. Should China have control of the waters of the South China Sea, there is
no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strong-arm tactics used against
Japan to secure its objectives.
Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to the maritime
commons will require a far more comprehensive set of activities from the United
States.
NEED HARDPOWER TO BE SUCCESSFUL

The first need, as noted by several contributors at War on the Rocks, is that the
United States will need to pursue policies that demonstrate to China that its actions
in the South China Sea risk escalation. As long as China sees little risk of escalation
in its actions, it will have little reason to refrain from provocation.
Second, my colleague Zack Cooper is right that the United States needs gray hulls
for gray zones. To be truly effective, the United States (and countries in Southeast
Asia) will also need more hulls so that they are present more often for more time.
Doing so will require the United States to carefully consider what the rules of
engagement are, and the latitude given to ship commanders.
US KEY
Lastly, the United States must present a vision for what a vibrant and open South
China Sea could look like. Currently, zero-sum national interests combine with
resource and political constraints to impede countries bordering the South China
Sea from working together to achieve positive outcomes. The United States must
partner with littoral states to build the case that countries in the region have more
to gain working together than they have to lose.
If the United States is unwilling to commit to these actionsor a comparably
ambitious slatethen we should all begin to adjust to a South China Sea that is
controlled according to Chinese, rather than international, law.
NOW IS KEY LEVERAGE WILL ONLY DECREASE

http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
We are in the midst of an intensifying competition in Asia. The main driver of this
competition is an ever-more powerful China determined to set the rules of
engagement around its vast periphery. The South China Sea is the locus of rivalry. In
seeking to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, China may well believe it is
simply reclaiming its historic position as the dominant regional power. It may also
think that its actions are defensive, designed to protect its security, access to
resources, and vital sea lines of communication. But it realizes that the postWorld
War II order largely built by the United States still obstructs this objective. Thus,
many Chinese hope to displace the United States while gradually dominating its
neighbors in a manner unlikely to trigger any decisive or timely response. This is
effectively Chinese regional hegemony in slow motion. In Washington, too often the
urgent crowds out the important. If we wait for the important changes presently
underway in Southeast Asia to develop on their current trajectory, the United States
and its allies and partners will soon not only lose substantial leverage over the rules
and norms of behavior in this region but also may well face larger security risks in
the future.
US ALREADY RAMPING UP IN SCS

http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-chinasea/8/
Efforts by the Obama administration to enhance Americas strategic position in
Southeast Asia have been considerable: expanding and diversifying U.S. force
posture, strengthening our alliances, building partner capacity, engaging regional
institutions and providing forward-deployed U.S. forces with the newest and most
advanced capabilities. Accompanying this has been intensive diplomacy in the
region, including with China. And yet none of this has been sufficient to stop or
deter China from proceeding apace with its land reclamation activities.
US NOT FOCUSED ON ASIA NOW
For starters, China policy has to compete right now with serious and immediate
national security threats in the Middle East and Europe. Im the first to defend the
rebalancing to Asia and have argued that the pivot deniers dont really know what
theyre talking about. Still, theres no question that crises elsewhere are attracting
U.S. government attention and resources.
CHINA CONTROL OF SCS REALLY BAD US HEG AND INTL LAW

Over $5.3 trillion of commerce flows through the South China Sea every year, $1.2
trillion of which transits U.S. ports. That is eight percent of Americas annual
economic output and represents millions of U.S. jobs. Should China obtain control
over this vital piece of the global commons, it could achieve unnerving leverage
over Asia and undermine Americas leading role in the region and the world. It
would also constitute a crippling blow to international law.
ACT NOW
The long-standing and bipartisan U.S. policy of forbearance toward China has run its
course. Resisting Chinas assertions will now require a much higher tolerance for
risk. That risk-taking should begin with legal, diplomatic, and public diplomacy
actions where the United States, its partners, and the global community can do
much more.
SCS ISLANDS THREATEN REGIONAL STABILITY
For the first time in the 21st century, the status quo in East Asia is under severe
pressure. Chinas so-called gray zone activities most notably its confrontational
air and maritime actions and its building spree in the South China Sea undermine
regional security. To date, U.S. responses have failed to deter Chinese coercion
against frontline states, such as Japan and the Philippines. If the United States
wishes to uphold the status quo, it will have to accept more risk in the gray zones.
ISLANDS ARE CHINESE IMPERIALISM ONLY US CAN CHECK

Chinas recent coercive actions point to the shortcomings of traditional deterrence
by the United States and its allies and partners. It is time for U.S. leaders to admit
this simple fact. Chinese leaders appear to believe they can continue coercive
activities without incurring significant risk. U.S. leaders remain focused on
constructing a cooperative relationship with China by avoiding conflicts and
deescalating crises. Meanwhile, most of Chinas neighbors lack the capabilities
necessary to counter Chinese coercion on their own.
Chinese risk-taking, U.S. risk-aversion, and the relative weakness of Chinas
neighbors have resulted in a successful campaign of Chinese coercion. During the
Cold War, Thomas Schelling described the importance of the threat that leaves
something to chance, but the current U.S. approach leaves nothing to chance.
When China instigates crises, U.S. actions appear designed to return to the status
quo ante without imposing substantial costs on Beijing. Therefore, without a
significant change in U.S. policy, Beijing is likely to continue to seize this window of
opportunity to change the status quo.
If U.S. leaders are serious about countering Chinese coercion, they will have to
accept more risk. For too long, Beijing has set the terms of the gray zone
competition by leveraging its strengths against its neighbors weaknesses. Yet,
despite its recent successes, China itself has many gray zone vulnerabilities.
Through careful management of vertical and horizontal escalation risks, the United
States can exploit these asymmetries to deter further Chinese coercion.
US HARDPOWER KEY TO STOPPING CHINESE COERCION

Raising escalation risks can be an effective deterrent if carefully designed and
calibrated. U.S. policymakers should focus their counter-coercion efforts on domains
in which the United States and its allies and partners hold relative advantages,
whether political, military, legal, economic, financial, or diplomatic. For example,
despite Chinas rapid military modernization, the U.S. military retains an
asymmetric advantage in maritime power projection capabilities. China has
attempted to sideline U.S. naval forces by utilizing Chinas robust paramilitary
forces to paint involvement of U.S. gray-hulled vessels as unnecessary escalation.
But in the face of mounting Chinese coercion, the United States should consider the
use of gray hulls in gray zones.
Chinas coercion campaign is unlikely to end without external intervention. Allowing
Beijing to dictate the terms of the competition in the East and South China Seas
enables continued coercion and undermines regional and international order. The
time has come for the United States to stop playing along.
SCS ISLANDS ARE DESTABILIZING AND ILLEGAL
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/high-stakes-for-australia-in-limiting-chinas-southchina-sea-incursions-20150521-gh6nwv.html
China's South China Sea gambit is fundamentally different from the challenge posed
by its establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. The AIIB presents a
potential threat to global economic governance but it does not endanger peace and
stability or violate international law. Actions taken by China in the South China Sea
are destabilising and in some cases are in breach of the United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention.
CHINESE ISLANDS IN SCS IS IMPERIALISM

between war and peace there is an ever-widening no mans land of assertiveness,

coercion, and distrust. Especially within the gray zones of maritime Asia there is
increasing competition over the rules, rule-making, and rule enforcement. The
United States appears to be experiencing a slow erosion of credibility. A reemerged China is recasting itself as a maritime power, calling at times for an
exclusionary Asia for Asians architecture, and using its comprehensive
instruments of power to unilaterally change facts on the ground, in the sea, and in
the air. Left unchecked, rising maritime tensions will further undermine American
influence, jeopardize the sovereignty of neighboring states, and sink the general
postwar regional order.4
CHINA WINNING THE PR WAR

So while China is not an enemy, it is very clearly a fierce competitor. Tapping into
global trends, China is able to make common cause with Russia and others to foster
the natural forces of multipolarity that in turn promise to give China greater latitude
over how to deal with its neighbors.5 Leveraging its growing position as the number
one economic partner with virtually all countries in Southeast Asia, China is able to
portray Americas military power as a potential liability and source of confrontation.
Relying on a full complement of policy tools, China is able to promote initiatives
often no more than slogans thrown out at rapid speed to find out what if anything
sticksto advance its ascending power at the expense of others. China is, simply
put, out-maneuvering the United States. In recent months, Beijing has sought to
alter the dominant perception that China is being exclusionary and seeking its own
set of rules; and it has been partially succeeded in portraying the United States and
its allies in that unfavorable light. Thus, Chinese interlocutors currently have among
their talking points the notion that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is
inclusive and good, while the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact is exclusionary
and bad. This is nonsensical, but the United States is partly to blame for allowing
such a false narrative to develop.
US CRED IS ERODING BC OF SCS
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Maritime
%20Strategy%20Series%20Capstone.pdf
No responsible official desires war. Policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo,
Seoul, Taipei, Canberra, and throughout Southeast Asia are unanimous on this point.
Yet between war and peace there is an ever-widening no mans land of
assertiveness, coercion, and distrust. Especially within the gray zones of maritime
Asia there is increasing competition over the rules, rulemaking, and rule
enforcement. The United States has been at the center of regional post-World War II
order-building and security maintenance, but it appears to be experiencing a slow
erosion of its credibility. A re-emerged China is recasting itself as a maritime power,
calling at times for an exclusionary Asia for Asians architecture, and using its
comprehensive instruments of power to unilaterally change facts on the ground, in
the sea, and in the air. Left unchecked, rising maritime tensions will further
undermine American influence, jeopardize the sovereignty of neighboring states,
and sink the general postwar regional order. This study is meant to contribute to
thinking about how to preserve a peaceful system based on the rule of law.
MILITARY PRESENCE IS KEY TO ALLIANCES

The first military measure, presence, involves the maintenance and qualitative and
quantitative strengthening of forward-stationed or rotational forces. It also includes
the redistribution or dispersal of naval, air, land, amphibious, and, in the context of
this report, even coast guard forces. Arguably the most important signal of
reassurance to Americas regional allies in recent years has been the articulation of
a rebalancing policy that would gradually move toward having 60 percent of naval
and air assets home-ported in the Asia-Pacific.9 Presence also includes
arrangements to have forces in new areas, such as Marines and air forces rotating
through Northern Australia; new rotational forces that might accompany the new
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines; and the
augmentation of presence where some forces are already accustomed to operating
(more littoral combat ships in Singapore, for instance). Key leadership meetings,
both civilian and military, are essential to underscoring the durability and strength
of America as an Asia-Pacific power. This presence, outside of Guam and Hawaii, is
predicated on the continuation of strong alliances and the willingness to grow
security partnerships.
BUILDING CAPACITY REDUCES IMPERIALISM FROM US AND

CHINA
Partnership capacity-building is essential if regional actors are to have a chance to
assert their own territorial sovereignty claims without feeling the duress of majorpower coercion. Capabilities that might provide greater A2/AD and domain
awareness are too many to enumerate here. However, illustrative examples are
multilayered command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) to help build a common operating picture;
amphibious warfare; mine warfare; and low-cost offshore patrol aircraft and vessels.
Allied and partner capacity-building requires greater education and training,
contingency exercises, key leadership visits, and arms and dual-use technology
transfers and cooperation. By bolstering the defense capabilities of allies and
partners, the United States can checkmate Chinas assertiveness or at least deny
Beijing an outright change to the regional balance of power through coercion.
CHINESE ISLANDS ERODE US POWER PROJECTION
One does not have to gain access to classified PLA plans to understand the potential
purpose of such island fortifications: they extend Chinese power projection
capability and they erode American power projection capability. In the event of
Mainland attempts to coerce Taiwan, for instance, the United States will have a far
more difficult time demonstrating support for Taiwan than it did when it was able to
dispatch two aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait during the 1995-1996 crisis.
Moreover, the potential runways and other facilities in the Spratlys and Paracels
create the infrastructure that will give China a genuine ability to try to impose air
and sea control, not to mention an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). When
China suddenly declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013, it was
not long before it was obvious China could not enforce such a declared area.12
Through land reclamation, the PLA will be more able to create vital control over who
can go where in the South China Sea, thereby raising future costs on U.S. attempts
to patrol in international waters within Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Significantly, China will be better poised to create a ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) sanctuary, something it may wish to establish as part of an enhanced
nuclear posture. An SSBN bastion strategy would provide a more survivable, mobile
nuclear deterrent force capable of threatening the United States with an assured
second-strike capability. Although the aim is not to use nuclear weapons, the main
effect could be to undermine Americas nuclear umbrella over regional allies,
thereby hastening the pace of Chinese dominance over the region. Here in Asia, as
elsewhere, perceptions often matter as much or more than reality.
RISKS FROM GIVING UP ARE GREATER THAN RISKS FROM

CONFRONTING
A few former U.S. officials and noted experts contend that the United States must
not let the South China Sea hijack our relations with China. I agree. The question is
not whether or not to accommodate a rising China but whether and how to draw the
line on certain types of bad behavior.13 But the risk of a catastrophic fissure is
small, not least because China does not want that to happen. Instead, my esteemed
colleagues should instead consider the consequences of not standing up for allies
and partners. If misdeeds and bad behavior incur no penalties, if actions have no
consequences, then there is very little incentive for any power to bother with
standards, codes of conduct, and international law. In short, the challenge is not the
risk of war (as opposed to inadvertent incidents, which remain all too real a
problem), but instead how to embrace the contradiction of mostly supporting U.S.China cooperation but sometimes lowering the boom when it comes to clarifying
what constitutes violations of regional norms. The real risk is that an unchecked
China will realize domination of its near seas for all the irrational and rational
reasons suggested above. After all, China managed to exercise what some consider
a case of textbook extended coercion on the United States during the 2012 crisis
over Scarborough Shoal. In that crisis, Washington walked its ally in Manila down
and convinced it to de-escalate but did nothing to prevent China from moving in to
exercise permanent control over the disputed shoal, which lies well within the EEZ
of the Philippines. From this vantage point, we appear ready to let China hijack the
South China Sea out of the untested fear that Beijing will forfeit its interest in
cooperation with the United States and other regional states.
ISLANDS BEING BUILT FOR GLOBAL GOOD AID AND RIGHTS

It is interesting to listen to Chinese officials struggle to explain their assertive
actions. One line of argument is that China is building up submerged land features
to sustain ports and runways as a global public good; indeed, said Admiral Wu
Shengli, China would be happy to open up the artificial islands for international
cooperation, such as for humanitarian assistance and search and rescue, when the
conditions are right.10 Yet another line of argument is that the previous actions
undertaken by Vietnam and the Philippines requires China to build up their own
facilities, even though the scale of what China has done is an order of magnitude
beyond what other neighbors have done. Moreover, in keeping with Chinas desire
to issue ambiguous and plausibly denial threats, at least one Chinese official has
said that the facilities on these submerged features and rocks were essential to help
maintain the quality of life for soldiers i.e., hinting to U.S. officials that they
intend to build up radars, runways, docking facilities and military garrisons on these
outposts.11
ASEAN COUNTRIES DONT WANT US HELP
Yet even ultra-cautious Malaysia, which enjoys the largest trading relationship with
China among any ASEAN member state, managed a show of unity in April of this
year, declaring that reclamations in disputed waters in the South China Sea had
eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security and stability.15
This recent declaration is a reminder what unites ASEAN members: namely, the fear
of meddling by outside powers. For the past several years, China has been the main
concern. The Philippines and Vietnam have been on the frontiers of Chinas
assertiveness in the South China Sea. Even so, attempts by the United States to
provide military reassurance and presence, or to offer assurances to particular
members such as the Philippines, incur a predictable backlash out of fear that
Americas stabilization efforts may also roil the region. That is why it is incumbent
on U.S. officials to calibrate efforts to strengthen our access and security
cooperation in Southeast Asia with a sharp understanding of how far the region will
go based on the balance of political forces. In 2010, Southeast Asian states turned
to the United States to provide a clear counterweight to Chinese assertiveness; but
most of those official entreaties were behind closed doors and seldom to their own
publics.
ASEAN DOESNT WANT US HARDPOWER HELP

The majority of ASEAN members, particularly its maritime members, are at least
quietly advocating that the United States remains firmly footed in the region, while
simultaneously building out a wider network of security partners. On the other side,
almost all ASEAN countries prefer non-confrontational ways to deal with China.
United in both is the consensus fear that larger outside powers will run roughshod
over Southeast Asian interests. Chinas flirtation with tailored coercion over the past
several years has yielded a number of united front statements, including the April
response to the Great Wall of Sand reclamation efforts of China. But ASEAN unity
can also be aimed at the United States, should we allow China to maneuver us into
over-reacting or losing the battle of narratives over the best approach for defining
and address the problems.
SHIPS TO THE SCS IS A PUNCH IN THE NOSE TO CHINA

In addition to these indirect ways to impose costs on bad behavior, the United
States should create a more propitious environment for occasional, more direct
responses to tailored coercion or other unilateral changes to the status quo. Timely
and geographically meaningful exercises, not unlike the recent U.S.-Philippines
amphibious exercise near Scarborough Shoal, should be conducted periodically so
as to convey both concerns and capability. Likewise, the United States should give
careful consideration to the right time to conduct freedom of navigation operations
(FONOPs), including one perhaps to illustrate that submerged land featureseven
when they have been built up into artificial islandsearn no claim to territorial
waters or airspace. This type of activitya punch in the nose against aggression
must be emplaced in a careful diplomatic framework in which the United States is
poised to emphasize both its engagement and hedging dimensions of policy.
BASICALLY THE COUNTERPLAN:
The second way to counter Chinas provocative moves in the South China Sea is to
deny China the benefits of salami slicing tactics and coercion. The principal and
easiest way to do this is by building greater capacity, both a minimal coastal
defense and defense capacity, among the regions maritime powers. A putative
common operating picture for the region as a whole can be augmented by
advancing bilateral cooperation on maritime domain awareness. Most of this
cooperation will happen on a bilateral basis, although in some cases countries can
derive benefit by working with U.S. allies (e.g., on coast guard capacity) or through
mini-lateral exercises among three or more countries. Some specific steps that
Congress might take to foster capacity building and otherwise help deny China
political gains from maritime coercion are as follows: Congress should request from
the Department of Defense a clear long-term capacity-building plan for Southeast
Asian maritime countries. This should encompass plans for building capacity,
bilaterally and multilaterally, including ways to leverage the natural development of
an Asian power weba loose network of intra-Asian relations. Among the highlights
of any bilateral plans ought to be a clear blueprint for how to move forward with the
Enhanced Cooperation Defense Agreement with the Philippines. Here we should
consider not just rotational forces but human capacity building, literally supporting
the Philippines as it seeks to develop future strategic concepts. We undertook a
similar program in the early 1990s with Japan, and today Japans Ministry of Defense
is awash with strategic depth. Similar plans of action with Vietnam should be spelled
out, particularly as the United States builds on a strong foundation of strategic
dialogue. Indonesia remains a looming opportunity, and President Joko Jokowi
Widodos maritime fulcrum should be seized as an open door for expanded maritime
cooperation. In all these cases, as well as with others, we must be mindful to
approach cooperation in ways that can be absorbed and sustained. Bear in mind
there will be political pressure on these capitals to dilute cooperation with the
United States in order to balance national interests with China. The final leg of the
policy response should focus on engagement and, more broadly, doubling down on
serious implementation of a comprehensive policy of rebalancing to Asia. This must
begin with economic and diplomatic approaches and be undergirded by a quiet and
sustained strength. Economically, this means the completion of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and Trade Promotion Authority, which are essential for our future
prosperity and security. But it also mean going back to the drawing board to think
through a long-term development initiative that gives the United States a more
effective and positive approach to development rather than being portrayed as an
obstacle to development. Any objective analyst standing back and looking at recent
U.S. development initiativessuch as the Lower Mekong Initiative and the attempt
at building energy plants in Pakistanand comparing them with the major promises
of China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, would be forced to conclude
that China is the rising power and America is in steep decline. But our failure of
imagination, our failure of bipartisanship, and our failure of execution should now
give way to a creative, serious, long-term way to demonstrate anew why the United
States and its allies and partners have so much to contribute to problem-solving,
human development, and regional integration. It takes nothing away from China but
rather emphasizes our soft power offense.
NOT CONTAINMENT
Countering bad behavior is not the same thing as containment; neither is using a
mixture of hard and soft power instruments to impose costs on bad behavior going
to prompt the South China Sea to hijack U.S.-China relations. Only China can contain
China and only China can derail U.S.-China relations by underestimating our resolve
to ensure that stability and prosperity are not undermined by unilateral changes to
the status quo through coercion or force. Some highly respected colleagues have
called to halt activities that perpetuate the continued emergence of China; I would
modify that call to more narrowly circumscribe what is within our power: namely, to
preserve our interests by seeking cooperation through strength, putting forth a

positive vision that continues to appeal to and mobilize most of the region, and yet,
in seeming contradiction, being willing to impose costs on behavior that falls outside
of rules, norms and standards.
CONFRONTATION BETTER THAN ACQUIESCENCE

Living with contradiction requires a constant recalibration to retain the proper
balance depending on the circumstances. It means continuing to seek to grow
positive engagement with China even when this seems unlikely to make a major
difference. First, it may achieve practical ways to avoid unintended consequences.
Second, it messages to the rest of the region our positive, inclusive, rules-based
vision for the region. Some will be uncomfortable with that, but I would suggest that
their alternatives are imprudenteither too bellicose or too accommodating. The
dynamic tension between engagement and hedging will not always yield least
confrontational way to pursue our goals; but it remains the most realistic means of
protecting regional order and our interests, and is far preferable to tilting so far
toward one-sided accommodation that the order we are purported to be upholding
is hollowed out from the inside.
HARD POWER FAILS WITHOUT SOFT POWER CHANGES
But cost-imposition and bigger muscle moves must be emplaced within a larger
diplomatic framework of comprehensive policy in which each move is designed to
support a larger political objective. That objective relates to Americas long-term
interest in being integrated into the most dynamic region in the world. The IndoAsia-Pacific region will be the locus of economic and military power in this century.
We can ride with this trend or put our heads in the sand. We can build on our
historic post-World War II role in erecting a system by which most, including China
have thrived or we can accept to the gradual diminution of our considerable
influence and position and accommodate ourselves to a reduced role and stature in
the world, ceding at the same time our ability to respond to external events. The
main reason we can cooperate through strength is because the pursuit of an open,
rulesbased system does not genuinely threaten China but in fact continues to
support it. We have convergent and divergent interests. We should never stop trying
to maximize convergent interests. But when we have divergent interests, we should
not pretend that they do not exist. China will not stop pressing its favorable
narrative and points, many of which will be contradictory and based on half-truths;
neither should the United States let up in pressing its interests, and vision, all the
while ensuring that we have the capabilities to back them up. The aim, once again,
is to win the peace, not catalyze a war. But preserving prosperity and stability
does not mean always averting confrontation.
SCS ISLANDS KEY TO CHECK US IMPERIALISM

http://www.spartacist.org/english/spc/185/china.html
Since the beginning of the year, Chinese dredging and construction have created
2,000 acres of new land, and are transforming seven shoals and reefs into islands
with landing strips, an airport tower, a deepwater harbor and lighthouses.
Developing reefs and islands in the South China Sea is an important defensive
measure for Chinathe most powerful of the remaining countries where capitalism
has been overthrownagainst the U.S. and Japanese imperialists, who have been
pursuing the military encirclement of China. As the Chinese Foreign Ministry has
pointed out, these developments, located near a major shipping channel that is key
for the Chinese economy, will improve navigational safety in the area and aid
maritime search and rescue operations.
US ALLIES ARE US LACKIES
We defend Chinas development in the Spratlys against the U.S. and Japanese
imperialists and their local regional capitalist lackeys, such as the Philippines,
Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, all of whom have their own claims in the Spratlys. We
also oppose the treacherous role being played by the Vietnamese Stalinist
bureaucracy, which has aligned itself with U.S. imperialism against China.
CCP KEY TO COMMUNIST CREDIBILITY

The establishment of the Chinese workers state was a historic gain for the working
class internationally. We stand for the unconditional military defense of China and all
the other deformed workers statesVietnam, North Korea, Laos and Cuba. At the
same time, we give no political support to the ruling Stalinist bureaucracies, which
undermine the workers states by politically suppressing the proletariat and seeking
to accommodate the imperialists.
CHINA HAS RESTRAINT, NOT US
Contrary to the American propaganda barrage, the Chinese military has shown
remarkable restraint while standing its ground. Imagine Washingtons response if
Chinese planes were carrying out surveillance over Californias Santa Catalina
Island! While increasing military pressure on China, U.S. imperialism is also bringing
economic pressure to bear and promoting counterrevolutionary political forces like
Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement.
JAPAN IS IMPERIALIST
The Japanese imperialists have aggressively joined the U.S.s military provocations.
The U.S. and Japanese ruling classes have their own distinct and competing
interests, but they are united in their determination to bring capitalist
counterrevolution to China. In April, the U.S. and Japan announced an agreement
that will increase the involvement of the Japanese military in regional disputes. The
U.S. has encouraged Japan to extend its naval patrols to the South China Sea, and in
July, Japan will take part in the U.S. and Australian war games there.
SCS IS REALLY IMPORTANT

The Spratly Islands lie along the shipping route that connects East Asia to the Indian
subcontinent and, beyond that, to the Near East. Half of the worlds merchant
tonnage passes along this route, including 80 percent of Chinas crude oil imports.
Moreover, the South China Sea has proven reserves of at least seven billion barrels
of petroleum and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, as well as rich
fisheries that account for some 10 percent of the worlds catch. Although the Spratly
archipelago consists of tiny specks of land, many of which are under water at high
tide, and has no indigenous inhabitants, the islands are claimed by four capitalist
countries as well as the Vietnamese and Chinese deformed workers states. Almost
every one of these countries has carried out construction in the Spratlys.
VIETNAM AND CHINA ARE NOT REAL COMMUNISTS WE NEED A

REAL REVOLUTION TO SUPPLANT THEIR LEADERSHIP
But in recent years, Vietnam has made its own pact with the devil. As part of
growing ties between the two countries, U.S. warships have regularly visited
Vietnamese ports. One factor driving this thaw is Vietnams appeals to the U.S. in its
territorial conflicts with China. On June 1, Vietnamese defense minister Phung
Quang Thanh and Ashton Carter jointly announced an expanded military agreement
that allows for common combat operations. Carter promised $18 million in U.S. aid
for vessels for Vietnams Coast Guard, which has a history of confrontation with
Chinese forces in the South China Sea.
The fact is that the ruling bureaucracies in the Chinese and Vietnamese deformed
workers states are cut from the same cloth. Their treacherous alliances with the U.S.
imperialist mass murderers follow from their anti-Marxist perspective of building
socialism in (only) one country. First put forward by Stalin in 1924 as an expression
of the outlook of the consolidating conservative bureaucracy in the Soviet Union,
this dogma represented the repudiation of the revolutionary, internationalist
program that animated the 1917 Bolshevik Revolutiona program that was upheld
by the Left Opposition under Leon Trotskys leadership and subsequently by the
Trotskyist Fourth International. Stalinism meant seeking to placate the imperialist
powers by showing the bureaucracys determination to head off any threat of

workers revolution in the capitalist countries.
Capitalist counterrevolution in the Soviet Union in 1991-92a historic defeat
prepared by decades of imperialist economic and military pressure as well as
Stalinist misruleremoved what had been the most substantial counterweight to
the U.S. in its aim of world domination and emboldened the U.S. imperialists to run
roughshod over working people and the oppressed around the world. The CCP
regimes support to the anti-Soviet crusade helped create a world where China is
now front and center, a strategic target of the U.S. bourgeoisie. If the forces of
capitalist counterrevolution succeed in China, this would be an unmitigated disaster
for the workers and peasants of China and a grave defeat for working people
worldwide. It would pose an immediate threat to the survival of the Vietnamese
workers state.
The task faced by the Chinese and Vietnamese working classes is the overthrow of
the Stalinist bureaucracies through proletarian political revolutions, establishing
regimes based on workers democracy and the perspective of international
extension of the revolutions. If revolutionary workers and peasants governments
were in power in Beijing and Hanoi, their territorial conflicts would be easily
resolved, with both countries sharing technology and resources and cooperating in
mutual defense against imperialism.
ASIA PIVOT IS IMPERIALIST ONLY COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

CAN STOP CAPITALISMS INEVITABLE ADVENTURISM
In 2010, the Obama administration announced that a pivot toward Asia would be
a top priority. This military rebalancing has been constrained by the U.S.s
continued involvement in the slaughter in Afghanistan and in the Near East.
Nonetheless, as the recent American aggression in the South China Sea makes
clear, Washingtons strategic goal remains to destroy those countries where the
capitalist system of exploitation has been overthrown. As part of the struggle to
mobilize the U.S. working class against its capitalist rulers, we demand: All U.S.
troops and bases out of Asia!
The pivot toward Asia has included a growing U.S. military presence in the
Philippines. Seized in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippines was one of
the first colonies of the rising U.S. imperialist power. U.S. forces brutally suppressed
anticolonial uprisings in the colony, slaughtering up to half a million Filipinos
between 1899 and 1902. After gaining formal independence following World War II,
the Philippines remained a semicolonial U.S. vassal, serving as a linchpin of its antiCommunist machinations in the region. The U.S. is pushing for an enhanced
defense cooperation agreement that would allow even more U.S. troops, planes
and ships to flood into Filipino military bases.
Workers from the U.S. to Japan to the Philippines must be won to the defense of the
deformed workers states as part of the struggle to overthrow their own capitalist
ruling classes. To smash the U.S. imperialist war machine will require an American
workers revolution. The Spartacist League/U.S. is dedicated to building the party
that can lead such a struggle as the American section of a reforged Fourth
International, world party of socialist revolution. The victory of proletarian
revolutions on a world scale will eliminate forever the drive for war inherent in the
global capitalist system and, by eliminating the exploitation of man by man, lay the
basis for unimagined material abundance to fulfill human needs.
IR CLAIMS ARE US HYPOCRISY

http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/04/fishing-in-troubled-waters-the-u-spushback-against-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
The purpose, according to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, was to
demonstrate that the U.S. will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an
exception. It was specifically a challenge to Chinas interpretation of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as it pertains to territorial
waters.
UNCLOSeveryone should be awarewas signed in 1994 and ratified by 163
countries (including China). It is the fundamental set of documents establishing
international laws pertaining to international or contested waters. The convention
has not however been ratified by the U.S. so the U.S. remains a non-signatory.
Nevertheless, when it criticizes Chinas actions in the South China Sea it tends to
reference UNCLOS.
(Repeat: The U.S. has not committed to the observance of UNCLOS. But it demands
others do so. This is a good example of the U.S. exceptionalism Obama actively
champions.)
SCS ISLAND BUILDING IS LEGAL
In June Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken, addressing something called the
Center for a New American Security, called Chinas island-building activities a
transgression. He called on the world to unite against Chinas island building, and
demanded its cessation in accordance with the rule of law.
But there is in fact nothing illegal about building up maritime possessions you claim
as your own. Another nation may challenge you, as when PRC warships clashed with
Vietnamese transport ships in the Spratlys in 1988. (Right was established by
might; 70 Vietnamese died and some reefs changed hands.) But if you can acquire
control over reefs you can surround them with as much concrete as you want.
ALLIES SEE SCS AS IMPERIALISM

Washington and some of its regional allies see all this construction as provocative.
Blinkenas though striving to conjure up memories of the Sino-Soviet alliance of
the 1950s strangely oddly compared it in his think tank speech to Putins
imagined provocations in Ukraine!
SCS IS A MASK FOR ECONOMIC ISSUES
I dont think island militarization is the issue. I think the cause of mounting South
China Sea (and East China Sea) tension is more fundamental. The U.S. is not
concerned with the construction of artificial islands (in a broader or narrower
definition), or even with Chinas claims to a 12-mile territorial waters limit around
some islands, so much as with Chinas rise as a global economic competitor.
ANTI-CHINA SENTIMENT STILL CONTROLS POLICYMAKING

Similarly, there are people who have a hard time letting go of Cold War-era images
of an aggressively expanding Red China. In the 1960s we were warned that China,
already bordered by other Asian communist bloc countriesNorth Korea,
Mongolia, North Vietnamwould, if South Vietnam were to fall, be able to expand
communism to all those fellow-Asians in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines, etc. (This sensationalistic prediction, recalling the Yellow Peril Kaiser
Wilhelm II had warned of in 1895, was called the domino effect.)
CHINA IS CAPITALIST
State Department functionaries who have been to China repeatedly know that its a
capitalist country much like the U.S. It has been for some decades now. It competes
with the U.S.but not in the realm of ideology. Its certainly not trying to spread
communism anywhere; its leadership has indeed been won over by the teachings
of Harvard Business School.
SENDING SHIPS TO SCS HURTS CRONY CAPITALISM

On the other hand, there are surely also within this the ten-percent of the onepercent of the people who steer U.S. policy alongside the Sinophobic war mongers
some so personally invested in China and the preservation of its status quo that
they would never want to provoke confrontation in the South China Sea.
SCS IS JUST CAPITALIST COMPETITION

The role of the nation-state and its ruling cabinet in committing nations to war is
changing due to globalization. Lenins famous pamphlet on Imperialism, the
Highest Stage of Capitalism was written almost a century ago, in 1916. In it, he
depicted modern war as a result of contending blocs of bourgeois-led states, driven
by the logic of capitalist competition, to re-divide the worlds markets and resources
from time to time.
It has been indispensable reading for a century. It certainly helped shape my
understanding, as a young man, of the Vietnam War and U.S. wars and
interventions that followed. But its hard to understand the recent conflicts in the
Middle East in terms of inter-imperialist competition. The incipient proxy war in Syria
is not fundamentally about U.S.-Russia contention over Syrian markets and
resources.
Nor is it, and the other ongoing conflicts from Afghanistan to Libya, rooted in a
struggle between capitalism and socialism. It is about State Department plans
(which despite the embarrassments and career setbacks of their authors, never die)
for regime change in the Middle East versus primarily secular forces.
But maybe whats going on in the South China Sea is best understood in terms of
old-fashioned capitalist competition. Theres a lobby in Washington urging
confrontation with China as a good in itself. Chinas now the number one investor in
African mineral resources. Its arguably morphed from a socialist republic into a
capitalist-imperialist state different from, but in some ways fundamentally similar
to, the U.S.
CHINA IS HISTORICALLY IMPERIALIST AND IS REVIVING THAT

NARRATIVE THROUGH THE SCS
Kings from Korea to Annam to Central Asia sought the Chinese emperors seal of
approval; it was the premise for trade and friendship. Slavish acknowledgment of
the Chinese emperors preeminent status (as Son of Heaven) brought many
advantages in a geopolitical system totally unlike the early modern European
concept of equal states. The current rulers in Beijingunlike the emperors of old
do not feel the need to confer legitimacy upon anyone else; on the contrary, they
emphasize Chinas principle of non-interference in other countries affairs.
But they have surely inherited the expectation that other, neighboring nations so
indebted to China culturally would defer to China on territorial issues andas a
matter of courserecognize Chinas maritime boundary as indicated in the ninedash map of 1947,endorsed by the Republic of China (Taiwan) as well as the
Peoples Republic.
It might in part reflect Han chauvinism and the history of (bullying) Chinese
interactions with Vietnam and with Malay peoples. But theres no doubting Beijings
contention that the Chinese claims have the deepest historical roots. In her fine
book, When China Ruled the Seas, Louise Levathes describes the voyages
undertaken by colossal Chinese fleets of Zheng He between 1405 and 1433, which
reached the coasts of India and Africa. They also of course visited the Paracels and
Spratlys. The South China Sea was then, more than ever, unquestionably ruled by
the (Ming) Empires maritime forces, its islands frequented and sometimes settled
by its subjects. China did, in fact, once rule the seas. That is the undoubted and
relevant history.
US PRESENCE KEY TO COUNTER CHINESE IMPERIALISM

Washingtons closest allies are doing likewise. Japan, which occupies the Senkaku
(Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea claimed by China, is seeking support from
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei in its clash with the PRC. In June 2014
Japans Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told ASEAN countries that Japan would (in turn)
back them in their own territorial disputes with Beijing.
(Presumably this meant that regardless of the historical documentation China might
adduce, Tokyo would take the others side simply as a matter of policy.)
A year earlier Abe had written an op-ed in which he warned about the South China
Sea becoming Lake Beijing and advocated a diamond alliance between Japan,
Australia, India and U.S. to prevent China from building upon its claims.
SCS KEY TO CHINESE IMPERIAL NARRATIVE
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-controlsouth-china-sea-hainan
It would be wrong to conclude that the Chinese position merely consists of
cosmological bluster, even if it is true that there is plenty of that. Beyond the often
glorified and euphemised imperial past, when neighbours reputedly prostrated
themselves before the emperor in order to enjoy the privileges of trade, China
draws on far fresher sources of motivation. Beijings attitudes toward the South
China Sea, like much of the countrys behaviour as an emerging superpower, is

bound up in an entirely modern Chinese obsession: overcoming the humiliations of
the recent past.
Since Sun Yat-sen, the early-20th-century founder of the Republic of China, every
modern leader has harboured dreams of restoring the country to the position it
enjoyed before imperial China was ripped asunder by Britain (and France) in the
opium wars, and then trampled by Japan in a series of degrading wars that began in
the 1890s. For Chinese leaders of the 20th, and now 21st century, that means
restoring lost territories: most obviously Taiwan but also the Diaoyu islands. Just as
important are the rights China is convinced or has convinced itself it deserves to
the South China Sea.
IMPERIALISM DA SOLVED BY K ALT

http://www.lalkar.org/article/2284/us-imperialism-stokes-war-in-the-south-china-sea
The working class movement and all anti-imperialists throughout the world have an
absolute duty to stand resolutely alongside the Peoples Republic of China in its just
struggle against US imperialism and in defence of its sovereignty, independence
and the hard-won gains of the Chinese people.
In this context, at its Congress held in November 2014, the Communist Party of
Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) (CPGB-ML) passed the following resolution:
Defend the Peoples Republic of China against US-led imperialist aggression
This congress notes that US imperialism today openly takes the Peoples Republic of
China as its main potential and strategic adversary. Hence the US war drive against
China, as well as Russia, is a fundamental aspect of the contemporary world
situation and many localised conflicts and crises need to be viewed against this
strategic background.
This congress believes that it is the US war drive against China that lies behind the
proclamations by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton of a so-called pivot to Asia a
policy that is being aggressively pursued by US imperialism.
Congress notes that as part of this pivot, US imperialism is increasingly attempting
to mobilise as many neighbouring countries, and Asian-Pacific countries in general,
as possible to oppose, harass and encircle China.
Congress believes that it is in this context that US imperialism has aggressively and
increasingly intervened in the territorial disputes among some Asian countries
concerning the South China Sea, thereby seeking to turn bilateral issues into an
international crisis so that they might fish in troubled waters.
This congress notes that US imperialism rolled out this approach with a speech by
Hillary Clinton at an international conference in Hanoi, where she declared that the
US had a national interest in maintaining the freedom of navigation in the South

China Sea this despite the fact that no Asian nation has ever threatened such
freedom of navigation.
US SCS INTERESTS ARE ENCIRCLEMENT

http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/asia/china/4216-iea211215
On 21 November, US President Barack Obama said at an ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) conference that countries in the region should cease the
reclamation, construction and militarisation of disputed areas in the South China
Sea for the sake of regional stability. The dispute, which relates to the ownership
of several island archipelagos in the area, has its roots in the aftermath of the
Second World War but has intensified in recent years as a result oil exploration in
the area and the crucial shipping lanes that run through the sea. Obamas words
were primarily directed at Chinas building of military and civilian facilities in the
Spratly Archipelago, a development which was challenged only the week before his
speech by the over-flight of two armed B-52 bomber planes. China has laid claim to
a large portion of the area as far south as the Malaysian coast, denoted by the
nine-dash line and based on its historical claims to many of the islands. However,
these claims overlap with those made by other countries in the region, including
Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Brunei.
This must be seen in a wider context as part of an ongoing attempt by US
imperialism to encircle China, which it sees as a threat both economically and
militarily. The US has not chosen to engage in the same sabre-rattling towards
Indonesias moves to militarise the Natuna archipelago, which includes the
deployment of warships and fighter jets. Similarly the US has grown closer to
Chinas southern neighbour, Vietnam, which only a couple of decades ago was
subject to an extensive US economic embargo, rivalling the one that still exists
against Cuba. Now it is a member-state of the new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
free trade agreement the US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter described as as
important to me as another aircraft carrier. This agreement represents a huge step
forward in achieving the US pivot to Asia strategy, in which it is re-orienting its
military towards a future conflict with China. It also represents a victory for US
investors in further opening up the land, labour and markets of Asia to imperialist
exploitation.
SCS INTERFERENCE IS IMPERIALISM
http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/asia/china/4148-cs231115
The escalation of the South China Sea territorial disputes represents the latest front
in the conflict between imperialism and any nation that attempts to protect its
economic independence..
US IMPERIALISTS WANT CONFRONTATION W CHINA

http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/asia/china/4148-cs231115
Sections of the US ruling class have no intention of attempting to seduce China or

any section of its bourgeoisie; they want confrontation. US businesses are
demanding sanctions against China for cyber and commercial espionage, which the
Chinese government denies involvement in. The US military are demanding action
against China for building islands in the South China Sea which they claim will be
used for military purposes. US military expenditure is still over four-times that of
China. Japans defence ministry has asked for a record military budget for 2016 and
its parliament has passed a law allowing its troops to fight abroad for the first time
since the Second World War. China said that it regretted the Japanese move but that
it would strengthen its military capability to deal with any threat. For China, a stable
environment has been necessary for its economic rise. With its military pivot to
Asia, US imperialism seeks to contain China and end that stability.
ONLY A DECREASE IN HARDPOWER CAN RESOLVE

http://www.solidarity.net.au/imperialism/imperialist-tensions-on-show-over-southchina-sea/
Crisis and conflict wont be averted through dialogue between the US and Chinese
militaries. Geopolitical conflict is built into a system based on competition. Only by
weakening imperialismincluding Australias own militarismcan the growing
tensions be prevented from spiralling into war.
CHINA DOESNT HAVE RIGHTS TO ISLANDS
Another tactic is for China to play the history card, or, in the case of the South China
Sea, the historical rights card. Offering up an artificial island for regional
cooperationan island that under international law is not clearly Chinas and which
would also not engender even a territorial claim if it were originally a submerged
land featureis a way for China to take one more wild stab at buying acceptance of
its vague claims of historical rights. But as Bill Hayton has shown in his exemplary
volume on the history of the South China Sea, the concept of sovereignty is
relatively new, historical contact is not the same thing as modern sovereignty, and
contemporary international law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea established a different basis for determining sovereignty.7
CHECKING CHINA FOSTERS ASIAN MULTI-POLARITY

Despite the foregoing characterization of Chinese strategy, we should not assume
that the current leadership in Beijing has a detailed blueprint for action. If that were
true, then hoary phrases such as the Great Rejuvenation and the China Dream
would be accompanied by far more detailed objectives. Indeed, there have been
important research efforts to demonstrate the challenges Xi faces in governing a
modern, diverse, and ultimately fragile China. Bearing in mind Chinas sources of
insecurity and its vulnerabilities will be critical in fashioning an effective posture to
dissuade China from a course that relies more on unilateral coercion in favor of a
course more rooted in multilateral cooperation.
SCS ISLANDS IMPROVE CHINESE POWER PROJECTION AND

PRESTIGE
Because the United States and others throughout the region seek to maximize
cooperation with a reemerging China while minimizing conflict, we are caught
between a rock and hard place as to how to handle brash acts of forcefulness such
as the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea. China is well on its way to
doubling the preexisting land mass in that sea, seeking to make its ambiguous ninedash-line claim to most of the South China Sea which, in its most expansive
forms, the U.S. government has stated has no basis in international law8 a de
facto reality. It also refuses to participate in the current case lodged by the
Philippines before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, thereby calling
into question Chinas interest in abiding by international law. Australian academic
Alan Dupont describes what China is trying to do as terraforming its way to control
over the South China Sea.9 Chinas strategic intent may be as simple as a desire to
exercise greater capability over its near seas, consistent with its growing power,
capability, and confidence and infused by a sense of historical injustice, nationalism,
and political exigency.
PLAN SMACKS OF IMPERIALISM

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-russia-navy-joint-sea-2015-asia-pivotblowback/
To Chinese and Russian eyes, surrendering control of offshore waters to the U.S.
Navy looks like surrendering control to the Royal Navy and fellow imperial powers a
century ago. Historical memory is especially acute for China, which lost control of its
seaboard and internal waterways to waterborne conquerors. But Russia endured
traumas of its own: It watched the Imperial Japanese Navy demolish the Russian
Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. China and Russia hope to
banish such memories while turning Spykmans logic of nautical supremacy to their
advantage. If successful, theyll stiff-arm the United States in Asia while projecting
power into NATO waters.
LOW PROB HIGH IMPACT RISK ECONOMIST RATES OUR

SCENARIO AN 8
Tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) over disputed islands have escalated in
recent years.
Analysis
Since 2014 reports have proliferated about dredging work by Chinese vessels,
seemingly focused on turning reefs, atolls and rocks in disputed parts of the SCS
into artificial islands and, in some instances, military bases. This work has profound
territorial implications: according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
uninhabitable rocks have a 12mile territorial zone, while habitable islands have
12mile territorial waters and a 200mile exclusive economic zone. In 2015 China's
efforts were focused primarily on the Spratly Islands, which comprise 100 small
islands and reefs, subject to competing territorial claims from China, Malaysia,
Vietnam and the Philippines. However, in February 2016 it was also revealed that
China had deployed surface-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands further to the
north, prompting an official protest from Vietnam, among others. With China already
mired in multiple island disputes elsewhere, including with South Korea and Japan,
there is a risk that China's growing assertiveness will lead to a military build-up in
the region, which in turn raises the danger of an accident or miscalculation that
might lead to a wider military escalation.
Conclusion
Any worsening of the row could seriously undermine intra-regional economic ties,
and potentially interrupt global trade flows and simultaneously depress global
economic sentiment more broadly.
JAPAN MOVING TOWARDS REMILITARIZATION

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-about-make-fatal-mistake-the-southchina-sea-12905
Chinas paranoia also has likely deepened because of recent moves by
Washingtons principal East Asian ally, Japan. Not only has Tokyo taken steps to
weaken the commitment to pacifism in the countrys constitution, it has become
involved militarily outside its immediate neighborhood. Earlier this month, Japan
and the Philippines conducted joint naval maneuvers in the South China Sea. Tokyo
also is moving to establish new maritime ties with Vietnam.
US PRESENCE PROVOKES CHINA WILL LEAD TO MILITARY

ESCALATION (OR MILITARY ESCALATION INEV)
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-about-make-fatal-mistake-the-southchina-sea-12905
Washingtons unsubtle backing of Chinas rivals is encouraging them to take
uncompromising stances that they may be incapable of enforcing without direct U.S.
military involvement. That is especially true of the Philippines. Responding to
prodding from its U.S. protector, Manila has announced ambitions to build a large
naval base on its western coast near the disputed Spratly Islands to press its
territorial claim there. Such a move would further escalate tensions.
PLAN BAD DE-ESCALATION KEY

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-about-make-fatal-mistake-the-southchina-sea-12905?page=2
Instead of becoming more deeply entangled in the South China Sea quarrel, the
United States needs to take a step back. It is one thing to make clear to Beijing that
Washington will never countenance China transforming 80 percent of that area into
Chinese territorial waters. It is quite another matter to implicitly back rival
claimants and become a military participant in the underlying feuds. Yet the United
States has already done the former and seems poised to do the latter. Such a
course is likely to exacerbate an already dangerous security environment, and
perhaps even more worrisome, create the prospect of a direct military confrontation
between the United States and China. Such an outcome would benefit no one.
CHINA-JAPAN WAR DRAWS IN US
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250
One way a U.S.-China war could commence is by Washington getting sucked into a
regional war in Asia. Looking beyond a straight-up U.S.-Chinese great-power war
there is another clash in Asia that could be almost as terrifyingand would likely
draw in America: a China-Japan war in the East China Sea.
US OBLIGATED TO HELP JAPAN DEFEND SENKAKU ISLANDS

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250?
page=2
Whatever the scenario, as long as China and Japan are at each others throats in the
East China Sea and America continues to assert that since the Senkaku Islands are
administered by Japanmeaning that they fall under the protective umbrella of
the U.S.-Japan alliancethe possibility of conflict between Beijing and Washington is
always possible. In fact, if China and Japan were to come to blows, there are many
situations in which Washington would be compelled to act and back its treaty ally by
waging a kinetic struggle against Beijingall the more reason for America to help
find mechanisms to cool tensions in the East China Sea over the long term.
CHINESE AGGRESSION SOLIDIFIES US ALLIANCES IN PACIFIC

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/limits-soft-power-south-china-sea
Though ASEAN itself may never serve as a vehicle for countering Chinese
assertiveness, China's regional posture is spurring member states to strengthen
military ties with each other and with outside powers, namely the United States and
Japan. Since the beginning of the year, several bilateral security ventures have been
announced among various Southeast Asian states. These have primarily involved
Vietnam and the Philippines, but also Malaysia, Indonesia (two states with more
limited overlapping claims that Beijing works hard to keep on the sidelines) and
Singapore. China is also compelling domestic naval and coast guard buildups, to
varying degrees.
ASEAN COUNTRIES MILITARIZING BC OF CHINESE SCS

AGGRESSION NOW
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/limits-soft-power-south-china-sea
Though ASEAN itself may never serve as a vehicle for countering Chinese
assertiveness, China's regional posture is spurring member states to strengthen
military ties with each other and with outside powers, namely the United States and
Japan. Since the beginning of the year, several bilateral security ventures have been
announced among various Southeast Asian states. These have primarily involved
Vietnam and the Philippines, but also Malaysia, Indonesia (two states with more
limited overlapping claims that Beijing works hard to keep on the sidelines) and
Singapore. China is also compelling domestic naval and coast guard buildups, to
varying degrees.
Vietnam's buildup has been particularly pronounced. Its defense spending increased
by nearly 60 percent between 2010 and 2014, and it has developed sophisticated
maritime and missile capabilities. Washington partially lifted its 40-year ban on
lethal arms sales to Vietnam in October 2014, and Communist Party General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong made a historic visit to Washington earlier this year.
But since the buildup still pales in comparison to China's military modernization
drive, the shift in Hanoi's strategic outlook is more concerning to Beijing.
China Status
INCREASE STATUS SOLVES THE REST IDEALISM, NOT POLICY,
KEY
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-continuing-impasse-of-us-china-relations/
From a cultural perspective, U.S.-China interactions are difficult because the two
nations do not sing the same tune. Xi likes to talk about lofty principles and express
vision on a large scale. He sees the U.S.-China relationship as complicated; but like an
entangled fishing net once the head rope is pulled, the meshes will open. In other
words, if the two nations leaders can grasp the key link, they can set the complicated
issues in order; and from Xis view, the key link is strategic trust and mutual respect.
RESPECT KEY
Second, strategic trust must be based on mutual respect. On this point, Xi insists that
China has suffered a respect deficit from the United States. In other words, the U.S.
challenge to Chinas form of government, its quest for territorial integrity, and Chinas
rightful place in the world, all of which are Chinas core interests. Xi reminds the
United States that China is now more powerful and deserves due respect accordingly.
US POLICY MAKING DOESNT UNDERSTAND THIS SHIT
To Americans, Xis figurative speech is difficult to comprehend. The United States is a

problem-solver and action-oriented. Instead of engaging in obscure talk, Americans like
to tackle specific issues. Indeed, Obama prepared a laundry-list of problems for Xi, such
as Chinas cyber-hacking and espionage, unfair trade practices, currency and stock
market manipulation, human rights violations, assertive behavior in East and South
China Sea territorial disputes, reckless encounters with U.S. military in the Western
Pacific, and so on. He began talking about the problems even at Xis arrival ceremony at
the White House. For the United States, solving these practical problems is the best way
to improve U.S.-China relations.
NOT RESPECTFUL AND VERY DISMISSIVE NOW

Xi came to the Washington of the West on the same day Pope Francis made his
historic visit to the Washington of the East. U.S. attention was all on the lovable Pope.
The Chinese presidents arrival did not even make any of the major U.S. network news
broadcasts.
Xis delegation included 15 of the richest Chinese. They represent a combined wealth of
more than $1.3 trillion, about the size of South Koreas GDP (2013 measures), the 13th
largest economy in the world, and were ready to spend. Indeed, for their first purchase,
they bought 300 Boeing passenger planes, the largest single order on record.
Unfortunately, this was not enough to attract any American attention. The Chinese
delegation, like many Chinese tourist groups nowadays, was left to spend their money at
the gigantic Seattle Outlet Mall.
When Xi Jinping finally arrived in Washington DC, he was once again ignored as U.S.
attention was focused elsewhere. House Speaker John Boehner had suddenly
announced his resignation. His earlier-than-expected move had instantly become the
talk of the town in Washington. When Xi and Obama came to meet the press, U.S.
journalists could not help but to turn the presidential joint press conference into a U.S.
domestic politics forum. Xi stood by the podium awkwardly watching Obama talk about
domestic politics.
There was no joint statement following the Xi-Obama meetings. This was an apparent
disappointment for Xi. Worse, the two sides were left to provide their own account of
what had taken place in the presidential meetings; and there were oddly large
inconsistencies. The Chinese side listed 49 consensuses as the accomplishments of
Xis visit to the United States whereas the U.S. side listed fewer items and had them in
a different order. (Concerned readers are left to figure out the agreements.)
The biggest difference was on Xis model for major-country relations. The Chinese
foreign minister claimed that Xi and Obama had an extensive discussion of the new
model. The No. 1 item on the Chinese list states that the two sides commended the
important outcomes of the meeting at Sunnylands in 2013, the meeting in Beijing in
2014, and the meeting in Washington in 2015 between the two presidents, and agreed to
continue their efforts to build a new model of major-country relationship between China
and the United States based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation. However, the
White House documentation has no record of Obama discussing the model with Xi and
there is no mention of the Chinese initiative in any of the statements and releases either.
We dont know which side is telling the true story. Yet one can see that the different
accounts are clearly bumps in the U.S.-China power transition. As this journey
continues, the Chinese side will continue to press for mutual trust and respect; and
insist that practical issues will go away if they have the strategic commitment from the
United States. The U.S., however, always goes after specific problems in the two nations
relations; and believes that trust and respect can only come from measurable
cooperation. This journey will continue to be bumpy if the two nations continue to talk
past each other with neither side willing to break the impasse.
STATUS KEY
The desire for statusto be known and recognized as a great powercan also lead
to tension. In the example we discussed above, Germany desired all of the
trappings of being a great power, including a mighty naval fleet and colonies, as
well as a greater say in regional affairs. These were all seen by Great Britain as
direct threats to its status as an imperial power. China has been a bit more
circumspect since the reform era began, but it also sees itself as returning to a
natural position of great influence. While not directly threatening American
leadership or the Western order, China has called for a greater say and acted more
assertively to defend its national interests in recent years. An increasingly
nationalistic Chinese public cheers on many of these actions. On the U.S. side, while
Americans themselves are not troubled by the idea of a stronger China per se, they
are concerned about Chinas growing military capabilities.
XI MOTIVATED BY CHINAS INTERNATIONAL STATUS: HIS

NUMBER 1 ISSUE
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf
Xi is driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive
role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country:
first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring Chinas place as a respected great
power in the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself
from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing the partys future as the continuing
political vehicle for Chinas future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist
and a Party loyalist. He is deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese
history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party
itself.
US IS TROLLING TOO HARD NO RESPECT

http://shanghaiist.com/2016/02/15/liu_xiabo_plaza.php
A proposal to change the name of the plaza in front of the Chinese Embassy in
Washington D.C. to "Liu Xiaobo Plaza," after the famous Chinese Nobel Prize Winner
and jailed political dissident, continues to gain steam in the United States Congress.
The bill, unanimously approved by the Senate last week, would change the
Embassy's address from "3505 International Place" to the more controversial "1 Liu
Xiaobo Plaza."
Party mouthpiece The Global Times has called the move "no big deal" while also
detailing why it is such a big deal:
The apparently provocative move intends to outrage and unsettle China. But this is
no big deal. In addition to anger, it will enable us to learn more about the US from
another perspective: the US has big problems in abiding by the rules and keeping
self-respect and its Congress acts so rashly.
The US has been at its wits' end in dealing with China as it is reluctant to employ
military threats or economic sanctions that may backfire. The only option for
Washington seems to be petty actions that disturb China. But these can help China
better understand what vile characters it will meet during its rise and face whatever
awkwardness comes by dealing with them.
This latest move by Congress cannot change the fact that Liu jeopardized China's
national security and was sentenced to jail. The rise of China is being confronted by
external forces like the US. Whether Liu feels proud of such turbulent embraces
from the West or not, he has become a tool of the West against China.
The not terribly political subtle bill was proposed by Republican presidential
candidate and Texas senator Ted Cruz, as a show of solidarity with Chinese
dissidents. It still must make it through the House of Representatives and be signed
by the president before it becomes law and the Chinese Embassy thinks about a
move.
Liu Xiaobo, is perhaps the most famous jailed Chinese dissident. He is currently
serving an 11-year prison sentence due to his involvement in the manifesto Charter
08, which called for 19 changes to made to China's government, including the
elimination of one-party rule. In 2010, on his fourth year in detainment, he was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to non-violent protest and
human rights.
AT: Thats propaganda, theyre lying, etc.

YOU BUY THE IMPERIALIST, SINOPHOBIC NARRATIVE OF CHINA
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf
Chinas worldview, as for all nation-states, is deeply shaped by its past. In Chinas
case, this means one of the worlds oldest continuing civilizations, with a continuing
written language and literary tradition over several thousand years. For China, the
mark of history is profound, as are the scars of collective memory. This applies to
Chinas philosophical tradition; its core, continuing values; its historical experience
of its neighbors and those which invaded it; and its cumulative perceptions over
time of the United Kingdom, the United States and the collective, colonizing West.
China also takes great pride in its civilizational achievements; the glories of its
imperial past; and the resilience of its people across the millennia, celebrating the
material and cultural achievements of the Han () people. Within those
achievements, China has also generated a self-referential body of philosophical
thought and way of thinking (siwei ) that does not readily yield to the
epistemological demands and intellectual taxonomies of the Western academy. And
within this philosophical system, Confucianism in its various forms lies at the core.
Westerners may find Chinese public formulations arcane. But that is the way the
Chinese system conducts its official discourse, in which case we have some
responsibility to understand what these formulations really mean, rather than once
again simply dismissing them as propaganda.
US STANCE IS INFANTILIZING
The American debate, on both sides of the political divide, often describes China as
a rising power that will need to mature and learn how to exercise responsibility
on the world stage. China, however, sees itself not as a rising power but as a
returning one, predominant in its region for two millennia and temporarily displaced
by colonial exploiters taking advantage of Chinese domestic strife and decay. It
views the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural,
political, and military affairs not as an unnatural challenge to world order but rather
as a return to normality. Americans need not agree with every aspect of the Chinese
analysis to understand that lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its
need to grow up and behave responsibly can be needlessly grating.
Status is the impediment to relations
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/11/24/uschina_relations_thucydides_t
rap_108717.html
So in the long run, the US seeks a modus vivendi with a rising, peaceful China. The
two countries annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue and growing trade figures
underline that objective (bilateral trade has grown by 7,550% 1985-2014). But read
Lawrence Summers latest piece for The Washington Post: the worldincluding
Chinais unprepared for Chinas rise. Summers believes the US still has serious
questions to answer in relation to the relationship. Does it want a more prosperous
China or a less prosperous one? Does it have a coherent picture of its preferences in
terms of Chinas policy choices? Does it have a sensible picture of future
architectural arrangements?
Similar questions exist in the strategic field: does the US want a stronger China
whose weight is felt more around the region or a weaker China whose weight is felt
less? For the USand Australiathe answer, of course, varies depending on what
sort of great power China turns out to be. In the South China Sea we see a coercive
power, not a consultative onea power unwilling to accept international arbitration.
Nationalisms a potent driver in Chinese foreign policy at the moment. Moreover,
Chinas growing weight is felt most starkly along the Eurasian rimlands, in ways that
are corrosive of the current strategic order. The contests in the East China Sea and
South China Sea arent really about rockstheyre about hierarchy in a future
regional security environment.
CHINA IS ACTING OUT NOT ABOUT STATUS

A China suffering from economic stagnation and turmoil at home is unlikely to be a
responsible player in global affairs. In fact, it already isnt, despite Rices desire.
Just days before Xis visit to Obama, his government has formallyarrested an
American citizen on charges of spying. This sends a clear message to Obama about
Beijings regard for diplomatic niceties. Far more serious, of course, is the
unprecedented cyber espionage conducted by Chinese hackers, undoubtedly
controlled or supported by the government, against U.S. citizens and businesses.
The hack of the Office of Personnel Management compromised the sensitive data of
tens of millions of Americans. In response,Washington is toying with signing a
cybersecurity pact with Beijing that will do nothing to stop such aggression. Add
on Beijings claims over the South China Seaand its attempt to dominate contested
waters, its refusal to pressure North Korea, and its campaign to seek out Chinese
expats in America and coerce them to return home, and the picture of bonhomie
between America and China is itself a product of the kind of reductive reasoning
and lazy rhetoric denounced by Rice.
And theres a second level of complication: the US and China have to work out their
relationship in full view of the regiona region which includes a number of US allies
who dont want the US to treat China as a peer. They worry that its doing so would
imply a marginalisation of the hub-and-spokes structure.
LOST
TIT-FOR-TAT US RATIFY LOST CHINA DEVELOP MARITIME
RELATIONS W ASEAN
1. Along with other nations, the United States and China should continue to develop
commonly accepted international rules and guidelines in areas where they currently
are lacking, including in regional maritime relations, cyberspace, and outer space. In
areas without shared guidelines, misunderstandings are more likely to surface.
International standards on issues such as conduct in outer space and online could
be important vehicles for reducing potential bilateral clashes. In the maritime
domain, while there is already a robust body of international law, the United States
should seek to ratify the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, while China should make
as rapid progress as possible toward developing a Code of Conduct with ASEAN. The
United States and China should build on recent bilateral naval cooperation in the
Gulf of Aiden and the 2014 Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, invitation that was
extended to the Chinese navy to foster deeper maritime cooperation and lay
groundwork for new rules and guidelines for resolving disputes and avoiding crises.
US RATIFICATION OF LOST KEY TO REGIONAL STABILITY

China and the United States also have disagreements on issues such as surveillance
in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ. The fact that the United States has not
ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, is unfortunate,
though America does abide by the rules of the treaty as they mirror customary
international law.60 The United States seeks to preserve open access to sea-lanes
to encourage free trade, and it has maintained a large naval presence in the Pacific
for this reason. The Chinese military, however, sees this U.S. presence as a potential
threat.61 For this reason China has significantly built up its naval forces and
concentrated on anti-access/area-denial systems that could potentially limit how
close to China the United States can operate.62 There are signs that a classic
security dilemma is developing here, which could lead to a destabilizing regional
arms race if allowed to fester.
NEED TO RATIFY LOST UNLIKELY NOW
On territorial disputes and maritime conduct, China and ASEAN should continue
their work toward a code of conduct in as rapid a timeframe as is possible. The
United States needs to ratify UNCLOS; unfortunately, given the political dynamics in
Congress, this may prove difficult. The United States will also continue to encourage
China and Japan to reduce tensions and establish means of communication so that
minor skirmishes do not escalate to something more serious.
KEY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND DE-ESCALATION

%2021.pdf
The U.S. should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China did
so in 1996, although in 2006 it voiced reservations concerning the applicability of
the conventions dispute-resolution mechanisms to its own maritime claims. If the
U.S. ratifies, and undertakes to apply UNCLOS mechanisms to its own outstanding
maritime claims, China should consider submitting its claims to UNCLOS. Both
UNCLOS and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have proven to be effective
dispute resolution mechanisms for other states in the region with outstanding
maritime and territorial claims. By doing so, China would demonstrate to the world
that it is voluntarily submitting controversial claims to international law. It would
also fundamentally deal with many continuing geopolitical tensions in East Asia,
particularly if all parties commit in advance to accepting the final jurisdiction of the
tribunal; and
RATIFICATION KEY TO ARCTIC CLAIMS
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chinas_undeclared_arctic_foreign_pol
icy.pdf
There are eight self-declared Arctic states, five with sovereign territory within the
Arctic circle. The sovereignty of the remaining territory within the Arctic Ocean is
currently disputed; with rival claims for extended seabed rights submitted to the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by Russia, Canada, Norway,
Denmark/Greenland. The United States has signed, but not ratified the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), so is currently unable to make a claim.
Apart from UNCLOS, there are a range of international agreements and
organisations that govern Arctic affairs including the International Maritime
Organisation, the Svalbard Treaty, the International Seabed Authority, and the Arctic
Council.
LOST KEY TO SCS

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assess
ing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/
In the maritime domain, ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea would
better enable the United States to work with other countries to push back against
Chinas unlawful actions in the South China Sea. Until the United States does so, we
stand outside the international system and have a limited capacity to leverage
international law to counter Chinese actions.
Disasters
REGIONAL COOPERATION SOLVES BEST
The United States and China should look for opportunities to coordinate regional
activities. For example, the United States and China could develop regional
mechanisms for coordinating better on development assistance. They should
consider supporting a permanent multilateral hub in Asia for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. That would provide opportunities for operational level
cooperation and would greatly benefit the victims of disasters.
CAN DO
Officials should build bilateral and multilateral crisis-management mechanisms,
especially with regard to maritime conduct. For example, the U.S. military and the
PLA could set up a video link to connect senior military officials
SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT
The United States and China, along with Japan and other key Asian actors, should
also consider establishing a permanent multilateral outpost for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Such a center would become a concrete symbol of
cooperation and could greatly assist in coordinating actors in the region, both
civilian and military, when disaster strikes.
WORKING TOGETHER NOW
The United States and China decided to expand cooperation on humanitarian
response to disasters. The United States and China plan to participate
constructively in the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The two sides plan to
expand existing cooperation on disaster response through increased support to
multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations International Search and
Rescue Advisory Group. The two sides intend to conduct capacity building
cooperation for the post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal through mechanisms
that promote collaboration between the international community and the
Government of Nepal.
North Korea
MAKE KJU DISAPPEAR CHINA CAN DO
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/trump-kim-jong-un-219068
I mean, this guys a bad dude, and dont underestimate him, Trump said, referring
to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whom he didnt mention by name. Any young
guy who can take over from his father with all those generals and everybody else
that probably want the position, this is not somebody to be underestimated.
Trump maintained that China has control over North Korea and the U.S. has control
over China thus China should do that, he said.
China has control absolute control over North Korea. They dont say it, but
they do, Trump explained. And they should make that problem disappear. China is
sucking us dry. Theyre taking our money. Theyre taking our jobs. Theyre doing so
much. We have rebuilt China with what theyve taken out.
BILAT KEY TO NUCLEAR FREE KOREA

Washington and Beijing should engage in a dialogue on a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula. North Koreas nuclear program is a major and mutual security challenge,
and our ability to find a new-model approach to that challenge is hindered by
mutual doubt and suspicion about U.S. and Chinese long-term interests and future
intentions. There are significant areas of overlapping interests between our two
nations on this issue and a focused dialogue on the future of the Korean Peninsula
can advance a more stable and mutually beneficial security outcome. Participants in
this dialogue may include not only diplomats but also those in charge of security
and military affairs of the two governments. Such a dialogue would not be designed
to seek a bilateral solution to the Korean nuclear deadlock but to work alongside the
Six Party process and pave the way for a practical multilateral mechanism that will
guarantee a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula in the long run.
ESCALATION UNLIKELY (XI WONT GO TO BAT FOR KJU)

%2021.pdf
More remote contingencies remain for conflict between the U.S. and China, notably
on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan. On North Korea, this is improbable in the
extreme given Xi Jinpings dissatisfaction with Kim Jong-Un over his continuing
nuclear program, and his concern that a nuclear crisis on the Peninsula would
fundamentally derail Chinas 20 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations
Under Xi Jinping economic transformation. Under Xi, U.S.-China strategic dialogue
on North Korea is deepening, but anything is always possible on the part of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, as are the consequences for
regional stability. As for Taiwan, the period of six years of political and economic
engagement between Beijing and Taipei under Ma Ying-jeou s (Ma Yingjiu )
administration may be coming to an end. If the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) wins the Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2016, and if it
were to flirt again with the idea of a referendum on independence, Xi would likely
take a harder line than his predecessors. And for the U.S., the provisions of the
Taiwan Relations Act have not changed.
Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a
nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine Chinas economic rise.
Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate
period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S.
This explains Xis determination to oversee the professionalization and
modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and
war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and
would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S.
would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice
not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength.
Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of Chinas military expansion and modernization is
not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in
Chinas immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American
strategists as to their ability to prevail.
XI IS US BEST SHOT TO REUNIFY KOREA

%2021.pdf
For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and
policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States,
albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for Chinas future, and
his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of Chinas one-party state.
When, therefore, Xi uses the term win-win (shuangying ) to describe his
desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of
Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political
collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and
security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi
Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions
are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is
capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic
bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as
creatively as it can while it still lasts.
CHINA DOESNT WANT KOREA UNIFIED

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/could-north-korea-become-thebreakthrough-in-the-us-bilateral-relations-with-china/
China has two major reasons not wanting to see the Pyongyang regime collapse. First it would have
to deal with a massive refugee problem as Koreans flee north into China. Second, presumably the
Seoul government will take over and unify the entire peninsula. This would mean potential American
military presence all the way to the border of China.
WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM KOREA IF NORTH KOREA COLLAPSES

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/could-north-korea-become-the-breakthrough-in-theus-bilateral-relations-with-china/
Up to now, Washington has been badgering Beijing to fix the problem and make Pyongyang behave
but has offered nothing that would help Beijing get out of the conundrum.
But there is something the US can offer to China that would help China exert pressure on North
Korea more effectively. Namely, the US can promise to immediately withdraw all its troops from the
Korean peninsula when and if the Pyongyang government collapses and the South Korea government
were to unify the peninsula.
It would take a lot more mutual trust in the bilateral relations than currently exists between China
and the US before Beijing would accept the promise of American withdrawal as realistic. However
once confidence has been established, the Pyongyang government would find much less room to be
the bad actor. It would either have to behave or face extinction.
CHINA HAS GOOD REASONS TO SAY YES TO REUNIFICATION

Obama could point out to Xi that since China normalized its relations with South Korea (to the
consternation of the North) in 1992, South Korea has become an important economic partner of
China and the bilateral relations have been cordial without one-sided demands like those from the
North.
If the Korean peninsula were to unify under Seoul, China would have a friendly neighbor and enjoy a
stable relationship. With peace and stability being the common goal of China and the US, there
would be no further reason for an American military presence.
REUNIFICATION GOOD FOR US BUDGET AND ASIAN STABILITY

When realized, there are two important benefits for Obama in addition to reining in North Korea.
First, with sequestration, Obama is facing a shrinking defense budget. He still has a war budget on al
Qaeda that needs to be fed. He does not have the funds to deploy troops in the Pacific where the US
faces no threat. More importantly, Obama should be thinking about his legacy to history. By
brokering a lasting peace with China and become partners in developing a stable Asia Pacific, Obama
would be remembered for altering the disastrous warpath toward self destruction embarked by the
previous Bush administration and putting America back on a path to prosperity.
Communities of Interest
MANY POTENTIAL TIES COMMUNITIES NOT WELL DEFINED
AND CONNECTED NOW
The U.S.-China relationship would benefit from creating more communities of
interest to serve as a ballast for the relationship. While a growing number of people
in both societies have various projects and engagements with their counterparts in
the other people-to-people contact, many more do not and that gap is particularly
acute at the subnational level. More work is needed to bring our subnational
commercial and public spheres closer together. Local leaders in both nations are
already working to develop state-to-province and city-to-city business networks, and
we should promote those types of local-level commercial exchanges. We can
supplement existing local initiatives, such as state-province trade initiatives, by
pairing them with local-level educational exchanges. For example, exchanges
between grade school teachers and other local-level community professionals in the
United States and Chinaparticularly if focused on second- and third-tier cities in
the heartlands of both nationswould build deeper understanding of what types of
cooperation can be mutually beneficial. The two societies should carry out the
memorandum of understanding on U.S.- China High-Level Consultation on Peopleto-People Exchange, or CPE, agreed by the two governments in November 2013, to
promote future cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and
technology, sports, and youth and womens issues. The 100,000 Strong Initiative
announced by President Obama in late 2009 to send 100,000 American students to
China has already helped some 68,000 Americans study in China.5 Meanwhile, the
Chinese government has also provided scholarships to some 10,000 Chinese
students to purse PhD programs in the United States while inviting more than
10,000 Americans to China to visit or study.6 We should highlight these productive
exchanges when possible.
EXPANDING COMMUNITIES NOW

The United States and China announced two new initiatives to expand the dynamic
and positive people-to-people interaction that is the foundation of our bilateral
relationship: (1) A 2016 U.S.-China Tourism Yeara cooperative tourism initiative led
by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the China National Tourism
Administration to expand and shape travel between our countries. This year of
collaboration will include events to promote travel between the two countries,
support progress on market access, and advance initiatives for both the United
States and China to ensure a quality visitor experience for increasing numbers of
travelers to and from both nations. (2) A One Million Strong initiative led by the
100,000 Strong Foundation that aims to have one million American students
studying Mandarin by 2020. One Million Strong goals include doubling the number
of Mandarin language teachers in the United States through a major investment in
teachers colleges; employing technological tools to engage students in underserved
and underrepresented communities; and creating 100K Strong States, a
subnational consortium of U.S. governors committed to expanding Mandarin
language-learning in their states.
Tourism
TOURISM COULD BE GREATER US CAN SOLVE UNILATERALLY
The United States and China should further encourage tourism, especially Chinese
tourism to the United States. More tourism will create jobs and increase
understanding, and Chinese tourists visiting the United States will also help address
the trade imbalance. The United States should examine whether it can safely
streamline further the processing of tourism visas. While great progress has been
made, there may be other steps that the U.S. State Department can take to
facilitate visa processing, shorten waiting times, and build goodwill without radically
altering quotas or existing regulations
Food Safety
US CAN SOLVE
Washington and Beijing should explore the potential for public-private partnerships
to address difficult issues. For example, food safety is emerging as a major concern
for U.S. imports from China and for Chinese consumers as well. Both nations would
benefit from strengthening Chinas food safety system, and American companies
could play a role in that process. American companies, well-versed in food safety
and energy efficiency, could partner with Chinese government entities to streamline
regulatory implementation in these areas and others.
The United States and China decided to enhance cooperation on global food
security. The two sides intend to enhance communication and coordination with the
government of Timor Leste and share lessons learned in agricultural development
and food security while exploring prospects for further cooperation. Separately, the
two sides intend to explore opportunities to cooperate on climate smart agriculture
to produce more and better food for growing populations, while building the
resilience of smallholder farmers. Such efforts may include technical cooperation,
such as on climate friendly irrigation and mechanization for smallholder farmers in
Africa to advance our shared interest in addressing the impact of climate change
and enhancing food security.
BIT
BIT IMPORTANT
The United States and China should make the Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT,
negotiations a top priority. A high-standard BIT will make investing in each others
economies easier while still allowing both sides to continue to safeguard national
security in procedures that should be as transparent as possible. It is notable that
China agreed to national standards and negative-list conditions for future BIT
negotiations, and Beijing should be commended for taking that important step. We
should keep this momentum moving forward toward the establishment of a highstandards investment agreement that will serve the interests of both nations.
BIT =/= JUST REGULAR TRADE
%2021.pdf
The conclusion of the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. This is because of the
long-term transformative effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in each others
economies, and because of the direct interest in the future growth of each others
economies that this creates. This is in contrast to trade, which has a more transient
effect on the institutional underpinnings of an economic relationship;
BITS SUCK
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2409&context=law_and_economics
Although it is certainly at least partially true that the United States was concerned
with the development of international investment law and hoped that these treaties
would help American investors, there are several reasons to doubt that this
investment-centric view of the U.S. BITs program is the fully story. First, U.S. BIT
negotiators have warned treaty partners that they should not expect a wave of new
investments as a consequence of these agreements (Alvarez 2010, 621 n.69;
Vandevelde 1998a, 212), which is evidence that U.S. officials themselves are aware
that the economic impact of these agreements is likely quite limited. Second, if the
United States were motivated by a desire to promote the development of
international investment law and to protect American investors, it would have
entered into a BIT with any country that would agree to its terms. This, however,
was not the case (Vandevelde 1993, 169-70). Third, there is scant evidence of any
pressure from American interest groups on the United States to ratify the BITs that it
has signed, suggesting that U.S. investors are not eager to avail themselves of any
new opportunities or protections that BITs may provide. Fourth, evidence suggests
that U.S. BITs do not have a positive impact on investment flows between the United
States and partner countries (Peinhardt and Allee 2012; Yackee 2008). Fifth, there is
reason to believe that BITs do not influence companies investment decisions
(Yackee 2010), which calls into question whether BITs are negotiated to provide
increased protections for capital exporters.
BITS ARE DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

Given the limited interest inand evidence ofthe investment benefits of BITs, it is
worth reconsidering why the United States actively pursued a BITs program for three
decades. I argue that the dominant narrative misses the mark: the United States did
not primarily form BITs to promote and protect investments abroad, but instead to
improve relationships with politically important developing countries. BITs have
been used in this way because they have several features that make them an
appealing foreign policy tool: they do not necessitate outlaying funds, require the
United States to make only redundant obligations, are easy to sell politically, and
take minimal effort to negotiate given their standardized nature. Having a BIT with
the United States is attractive politically to the governments of many developing
countries as well. Potential BIT partners are frequently eager to sign these treaties,
even though they are warned that the agreements likely will not lead to new
investments, because the treaty provides domestic 4 political benefits to the
countrys government. Since international relations are a repeated game, a new
treaty partner would thus likely reciprocate by extending political benefits to the
United States in order to receive favorable treatment again in the future. The
implication of this theory is that investment considerations will not explain which
countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that looking solely at
the investment consequences of the treaties ignores many of their potential
benefits. Instead, it is my contention that political considerations will better explain
which countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that BITs should
be evaluated at least in part based on whether they have generated political
dividends.
BITS IMPROVE RELATIONS 4 WAYS
Taken together, this evidence suggests the United States may have had other
motivations for negotiating BITs generally, and for picking which countries to
negotiate them with specifically. My theory is that, counter to the conventional
narrative, the United States BITs program was not used primarily as a means of
influencing the development of international investment law and protect American
investments abroad, but instead as a means of improving relationships with
politically important developing countries. The foundation of this theory is the idea
that there are four features of BITs make them a particularly useful foreign policy
tool from the United States perspective. First, BITs are inexpensive. Unlike other
tools that can be used to improve alliancessuch as foreign aid BITs do not
require the United States to outlay funds. Second, BITs require the United States to
only make redundant promises (or at least they were initially seen by U.S.
policymakers that way (Gann 1985, 374)). That is to say, investors with capital in
the United States are already given access to U.S. courts, and the government
believed that it was unlikely to expropriate foreign investment in any event.6 Thus,
the promises extracted from the United States were things the government had
already pledged to do and thus created no new obligations. Third, BITs are easy to
sell domestically. To both the United States Congress and the public, these treaties
can be presented as a way to ensure that American investors are protected and
given the same legal rights abroad that America extends to foreigners. Fourth, there
is a standard model in place so that negotiating additional BITs requires relatively
little effort.7
BITS LEAD TO RECIPROCATION

Since BITs produce a benefit for the foreign government, it would be reasonable that
the United States would enjoy an improved relationship with that country in the
short term after the agreement was signed. This is because states are engaged in
repeated interactions. After the United States gave a political benefit to the foreign
state, it would be prudent for the new treaty partner to reciprocate so that the
United States would provide it other forms of favorable treatment in the future. The
benefits that the treaty partner should be expected to provide to the United States,
however, would likely be relatively modest. This is because signing a BIT likely
would not produce large political benefits for the foreign government, and as a
result, the foreign government would be unlikely to pay a large price for receiving it.
CHINA SAYS YES 3 REASONS
http://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-InvestmentTreaty.pdf
The United States and China recently began negotiating a much anticipated, highlevel bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that is intended to significantly increase
reciprocal capital flows. The United States believes that a BIT will help level the
playing field for U.S. companies because many lucrative sectors in China are either
completely closed to foreign investment or are subject to substantial restrictions.
The United States also believes that a BIT will bring new business opportunities for
U.S. companies in China and encourage Chinese companies to establish new

companies or acquire existing companies in the United States, which in turn will
spur American job growth. Although the benefits to the United States are often
touted, there is little analysis in the media or commentary about the benefits of a
BIT for China. As a one-party state, China may decide to eschew a BIT with the
United States not only for economic reasons but also for political, strategic, and
policy reasons. This Article identifies three key strategic objectives that China might
be able to achieve under a U.S.-China BIT: (1) expansion of the reach and influence
of Chinas massive state-owned enterprises; (2) acquisition of U.S. technology and
intellectual property; and (3) evasion or mitigation of the effects of border measures
imposed by the United States on imported goods from China. All three objectives
are crucial to Chinas long-term global strategy of becoming a leading power in
international business and trade.
BIT HELPS BOTH COUNTRIES ECONOMIES

With much fanfare, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC or
China) have re-entered into negotiations concerning a highlevel, bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) designed to further open both markets to foreign direct
investment (FDI).1 For present purposes, FDI means the acquisition of a lasting
ownership interest with management control in a business entity located in one
nation by a business entity of another nation.2 Examples of FDI include when
Corporation A, based in the United States, forms a joint venture in China with a
Chinese company;3 when A establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary in China;4 or
when A acquires a Chinese company.5 Although the United States and China, the
worlds two largest economies, share an immense trade volume in goods, they have
comparatively low levels of reciprocal FDI flows due to legal and political barriers.6
Proponents of a BIT argue that it will clarify the rules for investment in both
countries while removing some of these existing barriers.7 As a result, a BIT may
increase reciprocal FDI flows between both countries. Higher levels of investment
trade between the worlds two largest economies will also stimulate the entire
global economy.8
For the United States, a BIT could create new business opportunities. FDI outflows
(i.e., U.S. companies that invest capital in China) and FDI inflows from China into the
United States should increase.9 For the past twenty years, many U.S. companies
have considered a presence in China to be an imperative. Thus, it is no surprise that
U.S. private investment in China is estimated at over $60 billion from 2000 to
2010.10 Nevertheless, many U.S. companies continue to feel confined by the
restrictions of the current Chinese FDI legal climate and the uneven nature of the
playing field.11 At present, all U.S. FDI outflows to China are governed solely by
domestic Chinese law.12 As a result, U.S. companies often find that certain
potentially lucrative business sectors are either completely closed to U.S.
investment or are subject to burdensome restrictions.13 Another common complaint

is that the Chinese government tends to discriminate against foreign companies,
including U.S. companies, in granting investment opportunities.14 A well-designed
BIT could create new investment opportunities for U.S. companies in China by
allowing U.S. companies to invest in sectors that are now restricted.15 A BIT may
not only create new opportunities for U.S. FDI in China, but it could also increase
Chinese investment in the United States.16 In 2012, China, the worlds second
largest economy, accounted for only $4 billion or approximately two percent of the
$175 billion inbound FDI in the United States.17 By comparison, the United States
imported $440.4 billion in goods from China in 2013.18 The revenues earned by
China through exports provide a vast source of capital that can be used as FDI in
the United States.19 The low levels of FDI inflows from China suggest that there are
real or perceived market barriers to Chinese FDI in the United States as China is
using the bulk of those earnings to invest in safe nonequity instruments, such as
U.S. Treasury bonds.20 Greater transparency and flexibility under a BIT could result
in an increase in FDI inflows from China and many benefits for the U.S. economy.21
In 2013, Chinese-owned companies provided more than 70,000 full-time jobs in the
United States, an eight-fold increase from 2007.22 Increased inbound FDI from
China could augment American job creation even further.23
China wants BIT 3 reasons
While the economic benefits to the United States are widely known, the benefits to
China are not so commonly recognized. On a market level, China could enjoy new
business opportunities and see an increase in its FDI outflows and inflows similar to
those of the United States. For China, however, increased business opportunities
cannot be the sole motivation for entering into a BIT.24 Any analysis of Chinas
decision to enter into a BIT must consider, in addition to business reasons, factors
that relate to the interests of Chinas Communist Party leadership. The Communist
Party governs China and exercises control over all aspects of the State,25 including
state-owned and private companies.26 The Party endeavors not only to increase
commercial gain but also to achieve strategic national policy goals.27 The StateParty might use state-owned enterprises (SOEs),28 now among the largest
multinational companies in the world,29 to further Chinas own national strategic
interests through a U.S.-China BIT.30 Chinas strategic interests in a BIT, however,
appear to have received little attention in the U.S. media and academia compared
to the glowing reports concerning the potential economic benefits to the United
States from a U.S.-China BIT.31 This Article identifies three strategic interests that a
BIT will promote for the State-Party in China. First, a BIT may allow China to expand
the reach and influence of Chinas SOEs, which are likely to benefit most from the
BIT. China has a national policy of promoting SOEs to become national champions
that can compete with the worlds largest multinational companies.32 Three of the
ten largest companies by revenue in Fortunes Global 500 are from China.33
Furthermore, China leads the list of newcomers to the Global 500 in 2014 with
seven of the twenty-three new companies.34 U.S. federal laws subject FDI by
Chinese SOEs to scrutiny and allow the United States to block such investments
unilaterally to protect U.S. national interests.35 In addition, U.S. politicians can
informally pressure U.S. and Chinese companies to abandon various FDI projects.
For example, in 2005, the U.S. Congress, citing national security concerns,
pressured a Chinese stateowned oil company to withdraw its bid to purchase
Unocal, a U.S. energy company.36 The United States concern is that SOEs, as
instruments of the State and the Communist Party, make their decisions in
accordance with policy goals of the State-Party, which may threaten the economic
viability of U.S. firms at home and abroad.37 China asserts, on the other hand, that
SOEs make decisions based solely on commercial considerations.38 Part I.B will
examine this issue in further detail.39 For now, it is important to emphasize that
once China enters into a BIT with the United States, it could become more difficult
for the U.S. government to block FDI by Chinese SOEs in the United States. Under
the 2012 Model BIT, used by the United States in negotiating all of its BITs, China
will acquire rights and protections not currently enjoyed under U.S. law.40 These
new rights and protections could prevent the United States from unilaterally
blocking FDI projects by Chinese SOEs.41 Moreover, not only does the Model BIT
contain important new rights and protections for foreign investors, but it also offers
a dispute resolution mechanism in which the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international tribunal, resolves investment
disputes through binding arbitration.42 In other words, while the United States
currently has the final say on whether to approve a Chinese investment (just as the
Chinese government has the final say over FDI in China), once a U.S.-China BIT is
effectuated, the final determination could be in the hands of a neutral international
tribunal. Second, a BIT could help China achieve another major national goal the
acquisition of advanced technology and innovation.43 When China invests in the
United States, China may either set up a greenfield investment (i.e., a new
company)44 or acquire an existing U.S. company through a mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) transaction.45 As M&A is the most common mode by which FDI
occurs today, China will likely acquire existing U.S. companies instead of setting up
greenfield investments.46 When China acquires an existing U.S. company, China
obtains not only the tangible assets (the bricks and mortar) of the company, but
also its intangible assets, such as its portfolio of intellectual property (IP) rights
protected by statute (i.e., patents and trademarks), trade secrets, know-how, and
confidential business information. In a recent transaction, Huawei Technologies, an
SOE and a leading information technology giant, purchased certain intellectual
property assets of 3Leaf Systems, an insolvent U.S. technology firm, for $2
million.47 Leading U.S. officials, including the Secretary of the Treasury, argued that
Huaweis acquisition of U.S. technology would pose a threat to U.S. national security
interests.48 Under pressure, Huawei withdrew its application to acquire the IP.49
Once a BIT enters into force, however, it may be more difficult for the United States
to block the acquisition of U.S. IP by Chinese SOEs. A BIT might facilitate the
acquisition by Chinas SOEs of U.S. technology and allow China to further its
national goal of becoming a global leader in technology innovation.50 Third, a BIT
could allow China to accomplish an increasingly important objective: to evade or
mitigate the effects of border measures imposed by the United States on imported
goods from China. Currently, the United States aggressively pursues a wide array of
trade sanctions against imports from China, including anti-dumping duties,
countervailing duties, quantitative restrictions (quotas), and safeguards.51
Moreover, the increasing use of border measures, including double remedies, to
prevent the growth of the expanding U.S. trade deficit with China52 evinces a
general reluctance on the part of the U.S. government towards Chinas trade
practices.53 There are even bills pending in Congress that threaten to subject every
import from China to punitive trade sanctions.54 Trade measures are imposed on
imports from China at the border and are administered by U.S. Customs
authorities.55 While trade sanctions are authorized by the agreements of the World
Trade Organization (WTO),56 any particular U.S. action may be challenged both in
the United States57 and before the WTO.58 A BIT would allow China to establish or
acquire U.S. business entities that will manufacture some of the goods that are now
the target of U.S. trade sanctions imposed at the border. Of course, goods that are
manufactured in the United States are not subject to border measures imposed on
imports.59 In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan followed a similar strategy, successfully
shifting manufacturing operations to the United States to avoid the effect of U.S.
quotas on imports of automobiles from Japan.60 Under a U.S.-China BIT, China may
be able to emulate this strategy.
CREATES MARKET ACCESS 3 WAYS

Part II of this Article discusses how several of the protections in the Model BIT could
create market access that is currently unavailable for FDI from Chinese SOEs and
other firms, including private companies. Part II also explains how these features of
a BIT could help China achieve three important strategic objectives: penetration by
SOEs into the U.S. market, acquisition of U.S. technology, and evasion of U.S. border
measures that apply to imported goods from China.144
BIT NOT HAPPENING BECAUSE ITS NOT AT THE TOP OF THE

AGENDA
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-china-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-next-week/
BIT negotiation has been a slow process because it has not been at the top of the
political agenda for some time, reentering substantial talks at the 2013 China-U.S.
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In addition, opening up investment poses both
economic and political security challenges. This is because companies with key
technologies may leak knowledge to the foreign country, crowd out domestic firms,
or use the invested firm to spy on local activities. The negative list associated with
the BIT prevents firms from investing in critical sectors, but the aim is to whittle
down the negative list to expand the playing ground for investors.
US-CHINA BIT IS LOW NOW

http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investmentdialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf
The United States and China are the two largest economies in the world. They are
among the worlds largest trading nations, and they serve as both the destination
and the source of the worlds largest fl ows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Both
countries participate in a range of regional economic arrangements on trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacifi c region and other parts of the world. Yet when it
comes to direct investment in each others economies, China and the United States
are among the worlds underperformers. That situation could change with the
successful conclusion of the negotiation of a US-China bilateral investment treaty
(BIT).
CHINA WANTS BIT SOME HURDLES IN THE WAY - QPQ
Since the breakthrough of 2013, both the United States and China have been
optimistic that they can strike a deal in the near future. Both sides hope to expand
investment from what seems to be an artificially low level, removing barriers to
trade, establishing protections for private investors in China, and improving the
investment environment in both countries. A BIT has long been desirable. Direct
investment between the two countries is paltry when compared with US and
Chinese investments in other parts of the world. US foreign direct investment (FDI)
stock in China was $54 billion in 2012, less than 2 percent of total US FDI,1 while
Chinese FDI in the United States was $47.5 billion in 2014, less than one-tenth of
Chinas total outward stock.2 There is clearly pent up demand for more bilateral
investment, which a US-China BIT could facilitate. Large hurdles are in the way,
however. The United States feels that Chinas application of its antimonopoly law
(AML) favors Chinese private and state-owned firms when assessing large mergers
as well as alleged anticompetitive behaviors. Moreover, they feel Chinas stateowned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy unfair advantages ranging from cheap land, lowinterest loans, subsidized inputs, to favorable regulation. The United States has
backed US businesses in their pushing back against imports from Chinese firms it
believes are unfairly subsidized, including using countervailing duties on products
imported from those firms. A US-China BIT would have to address all these US
concerns: subsidies and other unfair advantages for SOEs, and uneven application
of competition policy, which US groups argue tilt the investment playing field toward
China. Many experts disagree about whether state-owned and state-supported
enterprises are fading in importance in the Chinese economy. But few would argue
that they are going away altogether. For a successful BIT, however, China will have
to address these US concerns. The United States would like to see provisions in the
treaty that ensure Chinas SOEs act in accordance with commercial considerations
only. These include confi ning SOE behavior to normal business practices of private
fi rms and certifying that special powers handed to SOEs are covered in the BIT,
such as when SOEs control ports, ensuring they provide services equally, including
for import licenses and fees charged. Making sure SOEs treat imports the same as
domestically produced products and services when making procurement decisions
is also a priority, as well as increasing the transparency of SOE actions. The United
States would also like assurances that Chinas antimonopoly regulators will not
unfairly target US fi rms when assessing anticompetitive practices. We describe
these issues more in depth later.
DOING BIT IMPROVES BILAT TRUST AND ECON

US offi cials are keen to ensure that what is promised in the BIT in terms of market
access for foreign fi rms in China, and the behavior of SOEs, is realized in practice.
US offi cials and businesses want answers to the following questions: Do SOEs
escape strict review from MOFCOM in mergers and acquisitions? A clearer
understanding of Article 7 of AML is needed. Are foreign fi rms being unfairly
targeted for their pricing practices? Where do SOEs get their fi nancing, at what
rates? Are SOEs selling products to domestic fi rms at the same price as they charge
foreign fi rms? Who really has control of each SOE, who is giving directives, and how
is ownership split? Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, stated in a speech at the China Development Forum Economic Summit
in March 2014 that SOEs must feel suffi cient pressure from competing private fi
rms in order to innovate and adapt to the modern business environment.
Antimonopoly authorities must look beyond consumer price protection and focus on
the broader role of monopolies and oligopolies. SOEs may be suitable for certain
industries, for example, utilities, but they can create unnecessary barriers to
investment and competition in fi nance, media, information technology, and
transportation. Posen posited that dominant SOEs in the service sector may limit
business opportunities for smaller enterprises and thereby undermine the overall
vitality of the economy. Opening the banking sector will allow alternative forms of fi
nancing, consistent with the goal announced in the Third Plenum of the 18th
Chinese Communist Party Congress of encouraging loans to small businesses. Posen
also recommended that corporate governance of SOEs and large Chinese
corporations be improved, including reforms to corporate tax law, shareholder
rights, auditing, and outside directors. The Third Plenum also opened the door to
private ownership of some SOEs. These steps would go a long way toward
establishing good relations between foreign fi rms and the Chinese government. A
robust US-China BIT can improve trust and increase investment.
BIT KEY TO SERVICES GROWTH

The United States and China have a signifi cant opportunity to foster growth
through increased trade in business services. Many of these activities can be
provided at a distance. Sizable gains to trade appear to be available to the United
States and China in this area due to differences in current factor endowments.
Existing barriers to service trade in China are signifi cant. For example, C. Fred
Bergsten, Gary Hufbauer, and Sean Miner (2014) report that a China-US trade and
investment agreement (and the accompanying reduction of trade barriers in China)
could generate $218 billion in additional US service exports to China by 2025. These
additional exports would help foster growth in the United States and would
constitute lower-cost intermediate inputs to Chinas manufacturing and service
industries, enabling faster growth in China too. The potential for a mutually benefi
cial relationship between rapidly growing countries like China and business service
providers in the United States is large. While services can be traded through various
modes, the ability to establish a physical presence in a large market is important for
the delivery of many service activities (even those that are predominantly digital).
Increasing foreign fi rms access to China through a US-China BIT is an important
precondition to increasing service trade.
ALREADY COMMITTED TO BIT
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/fact-sheet-us-chinaeconomic-relations
President Obama and President Xi recognize the importance of economic relations
at the core of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. The two Presidents commit to
deepen bilateral economic ties. To this end, the United States and China commit to
pursue policies that promote more open and market-driven bilateral and
international trade and investment. This includes pursuing a high-standard and
comprehensive bilateral investment treaty that embodies the principles of nondiscrimination, fairness, openness, and transparency. The Presidents also commit to
work together to address global economic challenges, to deepen the cooperation
between the two sides under the framework of the G20, and improve and
strengthen the rules-based international economic system.
US STRONGLY COMMITTED TO BIT NOW

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/fact-sheet-us-chinaeconomic-relations
The United States and China commit to continue to pursue Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) negotiations as a top priority in their economic relations, devoting all
the resources necessary toward the achievement of a high-standard and

comprehensive BIT that embodies the principles of non-discrimination, fairness,
openness, and transparency. U.S. and Chinese leaders commit to actively work to
advance the negotiations to ensure they are achieving these objectives. The two
sides commit to periodically report to their respective leaders on the status of the
negotiations to ensure that maximum and continual progress is being achieved,
with a first report following the exchange of proposed negative lists early in 2015.
BIT GOOD
https://www.uschina.org/reports/bilateral-investment-treaties-what-they-are-andwhy-they-matter
A high-quality US-China BIT would give American companies better access to
Chinas market, and equal rights as Chinese firms. These guarantees would provide
American companies with a better opportunity to expand in China the worlds
second largest economy, with a middle class that will soon be larger than the
population of the United States. US companies overwhelmingly invest in China to
reach these customers not export back to the United States. In fact, according
to US government statistics, American companies in China sell only 7 percent of
goods they make in China back to the United States the rest is sold in China or
other foreign countries.
In addition, a BIT with China would also help bring more foreign investment to
America and create new opportunities here for American workers. US government
analysis shows that foreign investment not only supports 5.6 million jobs in the
United States one-third of which are in the manufacturing sector but that US
companies with foreign investments pay employees more on average than their
counterparts without overseas investments.
Chinese investment in the United States remains relatively small compared with
investments from other foreign countries. In fact, USCBC analysis shows that the
United States and China have less than a 5 percent share of investment in each
others markets. Since these are the two largest economies in the world, that means
there is significant room for growth.
A BIT is an essential tool for facilitating this growth, making the United States more
competitive internationally, and creating a stronger economy here at home. A BIT
also represents the most important single tool we have to address many of the
level-playing field issues US companies face in China.
BIT IS KEY TO COOPERATION NOT COMPETITION

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/06/24/forget-the-tpp-lets-talk-about-thebit-with-china/#8e2c1777c53a
Dealing with China is unavoidable
China is a part of the American economic equation and U.S. policy makers must find
ways to acknowledge this fact. The BIT will not compensate for violations of
international trade laws or immediately remedy the portion of the trade deficit
attributable to China. It would, however, create a new set of rules to give U.S.
investors greater ability to access a market with enormous potential and provide a
certain set of remedies if they are not accorded fair treatment. Chinas President Xi
is establishing relationships around the region, including strong new economic
partnerships with both Russia and India and has established a bank to compete with
the U.S.-led World Bank. In light of global economic and geopolitical realities as well
as our own best interest, our posture toward China should be one of thoughtful,
strategic engagement rather than one of adversarial retreat. A high standard,
carefully negotiated BIT presents one opportunity for such engagement.
BIT BAD RACE TO THE BOTTOM
http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/EC-Statements/The-Crisis-of-U.S.Manufacturing-in-the-Age-of-a-Global-Race-to-the-Bottom
Too many corporations, however, appear ready to double down on the failed
model of U.S-China trade relations through their advocacy of a U.S.-China Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT). Today, almost half (46%) of all Chinas exports come from
enterprises significantly funded by foreign investment. The proposed U.S.-China BIT,
with its special rights for investors and absence of labor and environmental
protections, reinforces the current dysfunctional and unbalanced model of U.S.China trade.1
Transparency is also a problem when it comes to Chinese investments in the United
States. Chinese state-owned enterprises are on a buying spree, with tens of billions
of dollars in announced acquisitions in recent weeks. These investments may pose
significant risks to U.S. national and economic security, but insufficient information
is available to make a determination. The current draft BIT does nothing to address
these transparency issues.
China also is seeking to reject the basic rules of economics and have the United
States, the EU and other countries grant them Market Economy Status. Granting
China Market Economy Status would undermine the most effective tools we have to
respond to Chinas unfair trade practices. A cursory review of the Chinese
governments interventions in its stock and currency markets over the last several
months demonstrates the degree to which China remains a non-market economy.
Government leaders in the United States, the EU and elsewhere should make it
clear that Chinas status will not be altered as long as it continues its current level
of state intervention in its economy and state support for its global firms. Should the
EU grant China Market Economy Status, the United States should reconsider
proceeding with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
negotiations.
BIT KEY TO WHOLE RELATIONSHIP

http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateralinvestment-treaty-matters/
A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China would benefit the economies of both
the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and
investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the
United States and China is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It
provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without
threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the
world stage, its important for the United States to work with China and to support
their entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions.
BIT IS CRONY CAPITALISM LOOK AT ITS MAIN BACKERS
To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the
Paulson Institutewith its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council
and the China Development Reform Foundationconvened a US-China CEO
Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both
countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade
Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese
Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level
opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for
increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China
continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade.
BIT is worth $50 billion at least
A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening
of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the
consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious
plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more
consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for
Chinese companies investing in the United States.
And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one,
it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in
China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage
more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese
governments going out initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn,
would create jobs and opportunities for American workers.
There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the
United States and China. So far, Chinese actual investment in the United States,
less than $4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China
invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the
United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs.
US investment in China, more than $50 billion, no doubt would increase as the
playing field becomes more level.
6 BENEFITS
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties
U.S. BITs provide investors with six core benefits:
U.S. BITs require that investors and their "covered investments" (that is,
investments of a national or company of one BIT party in the territory of the other
party) be treated as favorably as the host party treats its own investors and their
investments or investors and investments from any third country. The BIT generally
affords the better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment for the full
life-cycle of investment -- from establishment or acquisition, through management,
operation, and expansion, to disposition.
BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments and provide for
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation when expropriation
takes place.
BITs provide for the transferability of investment-related funds into and out of a host
country without delay and using a market rate of exchange.
BITs restrict the imposition of performance requirements, such as local content
targets or export quotas, as a condition for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, or operation of an investment.
BITs give covered investors the right to engage the top managerial personnel of
their choice, regardless of nationality.
BITs give investors from each party the right to submit an investment dispute with
the government of the other party to international arbitration. There is no
requirement to use that country's domestic courts.
CHINA SIGNALING THAT THEYRE OPEN TO BIT

https://www.uschina.org/media/inthenews/editorial-china-chomps-bit
For those who wonder whether China's new leader Xi Jinping will follow through on
promises to restart economic reforms, an important indicator passed almost
unremarked last month. At the Strategic and Economic Dialogue talks with the U.S.,
the Chinese made two key concessions that should make it possible to fast-track a
bilateral investment treaty, or BIT.
DECREASES TENSIONS
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303532704579476720853893300
Nor are business benefits the only advantage to a U.S.-China investment treaty.
There would also be considerable political advantages to concluding a deal. The
difficulties faced by each country's investors in the other's economy have created
significant friction between Washington and Beijing over the years. This is the case
both when Chinese investments in the U.S. generate political controversy, and when
American companies discover they aren't allowed to invest in booming Chinese
industries. An investment treaty would help ratchet down such tensions by
improving market access and ensuring greater predictability.
CFIUS AMENDMENT CP
The debate over security issues is heavily shaped by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency group that assumes
responsibility when investment in sensitive areas of the economy comes in the form
of foreign acquisition of a US company.1 Established in 1975, CFIUS is led by the
Treasury Department. Its purpose is to ensure acquisitions of US fi rms by foreigners
do not harm US national security, and its procedures have been amended and
revised many times in response to concerns raised by overseas investors. The
record of CFIUS is that it has approved far more investments than it has rejected,
although in some cases the investors have retreated before decisions were made
because of concerns that CFIUS would rule against them or in some cases because
of political protests and criticisms of investments in the US Congress. One result is
that CFIUS has become a kind of whipping boy for foreign investors who want its
procedures to be more effi cient, timely, and transparent. The United States and
China have continually sparred in the area of national security reviews for bilateral
investment. The current negotiations on an investment treaty between the two
countries cover a wide range of topics. The US-China bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) could be an opportunity to clear up issues relating to security reviews,
although both sides may end up disappointed. Chinas grievances stem from some
high profi le acquisition attempts launched by Chinese fi rms that were ultimately
unsuccessful because they ran into political obstacles from the US Congress or the
CFIUS. But the high-profi le cases have skewed public perception and now some see
CFIUS as an unfair barrier to Chinese investments in the United States. The Chinese
will look to accomplish two things in the BIT. First they would like to ensure greater
transparency in order for Chinese fi rms, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
to have a clearer understanding of the decisions criteria in a CFIUS review. Second,
they would like CFIUS to apply the same criteria to a Chinese fi rm trying to acquire
a US fi rm as it would to a British fi rm doing the same. This is called most favored
nation (MFN) treatment.
CFIUS SHIELDS CONGRESS FROM PUBLIC AND COMPANIES

A closer look at how CFIUS operates and initiates its investigations reveals that
notices to CFIUS have increased substantially and so have the percentage of cleared
investments. Since 2008, any entity controlled by a foreign government must notify
CFIUS of an intended acquisition. This is not the case for private companies,
although it is generally a good idea for them to do so. Clearance by a CFIUS review
can help shield the foreign fi rm from congressional or public criticism.
BIT BAD FOR ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.
gov/files/documents/Thea%20Lee%20ISDS%20briefing%20Ways%20and%20Means
%20120215.pdf
The United States now has several decades of experience with Bilateral Investment
Treaties, as well as investment chapters in trade agreements that include many of
the same provisions as those in BITs namely, investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS), expansive definitions of investors and investment, and vague standards
such as Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST) and Fair and Equitable Treatment
(FET) that are not found in U.S. law. We have seen a dramatic increase in the
number of global investor challenges in recent years, as well as an expansion of the
scope of these cases, in troubling ways. If TPP is adopted as negotiated, we can
expect these problems to be significantly exacerbated -- with permanent and
negative consequences for the global environment and public health, as well as
democratic decision-making.
BIT MEANS CHINA REBALANCES ECON

http://www.randlereport.com/maxtemplates/default/style/home/tabid/39/article/126027/1.aspx
A formal BIT agreement would make it easier for China to rebalance its economy.
And it is certainly in a position to do so. As opposed to basing most of its economy
on exports and domestic investments in infrastructure, the Chinese now want to

rebalance their economy through domestic consumption, services and better
technology. In other words, China wants to be more like the U.S. And, as mentioned,
with a newly established middle class that is larger than the entire population of the
United States, Chinese officials are making the right move. A Bilateral Investment
Treaty signed between the two countries will be another wise move.
Mechanisms
OFFICER EXCHANGE GOOD
The U.S. military and the Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA, should consider further
exchanges of military personnel. More frequent contact will lead to more
understanding and a more mature relationship. American participants suggested
that these exchanges should include low-ranking officers and students so
participants can build trust as they move through their careers in their respective
countries.
MILITARY COOPERATION LAUNDRY LIST
Creating additional, consistent forums for regular dialogue between military
officials, especially at lower levels and including military academies, should be a
major goal in the near future. There are many areas of cooperation that could be
expanded, including counterpiracy efforts; U.N. peacekeeping operations, or UNPKO;
joint humanitarian, disaster-relief, and search-and-rescue exercises; multilateral
military exercises or exercises hosted by third countries; professional military
educational exchanges; maritime law enforcement; fisheries protection; taking
steps to counter nuclear proliferation; and international terrorism.76 Humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief especially present ready opportunities for further
expansion. U.S. and Chinese forces have already participated in a number of
dialogues and activities dealing with humanitarian assistance, including disastermanagement exchanges held in Beijing, Kunming, and Chengdu, as well as a joint
indoor war game to practice humanitarian rescue and disaster relief in case of an
earthquake and consequent nuclear leaks, which was held in Chengdu.77 Using
robust exchanges along these lines could build momentum for further cooperation
on other areas. Counterpiracy and search-and-rescue exercises are other areas ripe
for cooperation. The recent counterpiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden is a good
foundation to build upon. China should continue to join other multilateral military
exercises.
MILITARY COOP LEADS TO GREATER COOP

The Strategic Security Dialogue is an important forum that brings civilian and
military leaders from both sides together to discuss particularly neuralgic issues and
should also be continued. But actually implementing projects together should also
be the focus now. The United States and China share many security concerns, such
as the Korean peninsula, pathogens, climate change, energy, humanitarian
assistance, sea-lane security, disaster response, drug trafficking, and cybersecurity.
If America and China work together more closely and concretely on these discrete
challenges, they may be able to develop what we call tactical trust. Perhaps tactical
trust can evolve into strategic trust over time.
BUREAUCRACY TO BUREAUCRACY EXCHANGE

As Washington and Beijing examine bilateral frameworks, both countries should pay
particular attention to ministerial-level and subnational opportunities for
cooperation. The current relationship between the United States and China is quite
dependent upon connections between very high-level leaders. While a strong
rapport at the highest levels is critical and highlights dedication to the relationship
by both countries, the bureaucracies must also be able to make progress on their
own. CAP would like to see cabinet-level officials on both sides deepen cooperation.
That can be difficult on issues involving multiple bureaucracies with conflicting
interests. Climate policy, for example, can involve up to eight different
administrative agencies on the Chinese side, and leadership involvement is often
required to break through ministerial-level logjams.
MILITARY COOPERATION FAILS
Key to managing this situation is ensuring that U.S. and Chinese militaries (and
other militaries in the region) cultivate better direct relations and an ability to
manage crises if and when they occur. The United States has been pushing for
closer military-to-military relations for years and has made some good progress.
However, efforts to create a structure based on conflict avoidance are hampered by
a variety of factors, including the imbalance in objectives (China is not at this point
seeking reciprocal ability to patrol the U.S. coast, for example); a fundamental lack
of trust between military establishments; and the fact that the Peoples Liberation
Army embraces non-transparency as a strategic tenet.
APPOINT NEW AMBASSADOR

The China expert Orville Schell suggests that the next US president should appoint a
high-level special envoy to China. President Hillary Clinton, he argues tongue only
half in cheek would have the perfect candidate in Bill Clinton, who has the prestige
of a former president, the experience, and negotiating skills. President Marco
Rubio could offer the job to Jeb Bush, whose father was US envoy to Beijing in 1974
75 and whose brother, George W, presided over a good relationship with China.
INSTITUTIONS AND STUFF KEY ALTERNATIVE IS UNILATERAL

ACTIONS THAT RAISE TENSION
More specifically, what might the United States and China do?
First, we need to begin an admittedly long process by which our two countries,
along with others, can create inclusive economic and security institutions regionally
and adapt post-World War II global and regional institutions to the new distribution
of power in the world and in the Asia-Pacific. The IMF voting share issue should be
low hanging fruit. While all this will take time to achieve, absent this, the U.S.,
China, and others will seek to unilaterally augment their own security, construct
parallel economic and security institutions, and we will see the United States and
China drift into progressively more adversarial positions.
Beijing and Washington need something like a Fourth Communiqu laying out
such a vision. We dont need fifty pointswe do need one or two major points. The
first things to say would be that the world has changed, the distribution of power is
changed, balance and stability is our joint objective, and that the primacy of any
one nation is insufficient to achieve balanced stability. Second, such a document
should say that the two countries will work with each other, and others, to build and
adjust current economic and security institutions to reflect the new realities. In
short, we seek to build what Dr. Kissinger called a Pacific Community.
MILITARY TO MILITARY COOPERATION KEY TO RULES BASED

SYSTEM AND STABILITY
The Asia-Pacific region faces mounting geopolitical competition. Rules and rulemaking are occurring against the backdrop of tailored coercion and the fear of
hybrid warfare. It is not enough to recognize the breaking of rules through coercion
or intimidation; the preservation of a rules-based system requires doing something
about such behavior. But what to do? We contend that engagement, backed by a
variety of tools that would impose costs on bad behavior, deny unilateral actions
from achieving their purpose, or offset unilateral actions to ensure they do not shift
the balance of power, constitutes the right toolkit for preserving rules in maritime
Asia. First, the United States should seek to further institutionalize military-tomilitary and high-level civilian-led engagement with China. At the same time, the
main goal ought to be achieving more effective cooperation, not just more contacts.
The United States must insist on following through with ongoing negotiations over
operational safety procedures between surface naval forces and ensure that the two
sides have completed a similar memorandum of understanding to help avoid midair
collisions by the end of 2015. More generally, discussions and agreements should
include both military and paramilitary forces operating in the East and South China
Seas not allowing China to pretend that white-hulled ships with arms are different
from many gray-hulled naval vessels that are lightly armed
CHINA IS THE MOST IMPERIALIST

The Chinese government is relentless in pushing a narrative of victimhood, of
pushing blame onto others who lack sufficient respect for Chinas size, historical
rights and putative indisputable sovereignty. But the claim that China has
pursued a pattern of increasingly assertive behavior is an empirically based
observation. Indeed, in their essay Chinas Tailored Coercion and Its Rivals Actions
and Responses: What the Numbers Tell Us, Christopher D. Yung and Patrick McNulty
offer dispassionate documentation of Chinas recent pattern of maritime
assertiveness. In their examination of more than 1,200 actions undertaken by the
six claimants in the South China Sea, Yung and McNulty show that China has been
the most active user of military, paramilitary, economic, administrative, and
diplomatic instruments of coercion.
Space
SPACE IMPORTANT TO US AND CHINA
Some of the most worrisome issues in the current U.S.-China relationship are in
areas that lack common rules and institutions, such as cyber espionage and outer
space, where there are no established procedures or independent bodies to manage
such disputes.
US-CHINA LACK OF AGREEMENT RISKS ESCALATION AND

MISCALC
It is the areas and issues that lack institutions, or where there is not a set of
common rules, that are often the most contentious and vulnerable to
misunderstandings and disputes. Outer space is one such realm. Concerns over
Chinas anti-satellite program grew following a successful test of its capabilities in
2007, which created thousands of pieces of space debris that still linger.53 A year
later in 2008, the United States tested its own capabilities on a defunct satellite,
albeit at a lower altitude, which meant that the debris from the U.S. test burned up
harmlessly in the atmosphere. These two tests show that there are dangerous
possibilities of escalation and that potential harm can come about even from testing
these capabilities. But there seems to have been some progress in recent months. It
was welcome news that space has played an increasing role in security talks
between the United States and China and even better to read reports that China
may have agreed to talks on an international space code of conduct.54 While
these discussions are apparently still in the early stages, a senior State Department
official remarked that on space issues, the Chinese have displayed more
transparency than they have in the past.55
SPACE PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS NEED TO ACT NOW TO

ESTABLISH NORMS
As discussed above, new realms of interaction such as cyber and space, and others
yet to be discovered, are particularly vulnerable to conflict because common rules
do not yet govern them. Additionally, we cannot rule out the ever-present possibility
that mistakes, accidents, and/or misperceptions can trigger a dispute. The time for
action is now, before such an incident occurs. More robust military-to-military

communications, as we discuss below, can help prevent unintentional clashes.
CHINA HAS A GOOD SPACE PROGRAM COMMITTED

Based on decades of high prioritization and sustained investment from its
leadership, China has become one of the worlds preeminent space powers,
producing numerous achievements and capabilities that further its national security,
economic, and political objectives. Chinas space program involves a wide network
of entities spanning its political, military, defense industry, and commercial sectors,
but unlike the United States it does not have distinctly separate military and civilian
space programs. Rather, top CCP leaders set long-term strategic plans for science
and technology development, coordinate specific space projects, and authorize
resource allocations, while organizations within Chinas military execute policies and
oversee the research, development, and acquisition process for space technologies.
Chinas military also exercises control over the majority of Chinas space assets and
space operations.
Chinas space activities are driven by military, economic, and political objectives.
First, Chinas military strategists and analysts recognize that space forces are
crucial to Chinas military modernization, enhancing functions such as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); environmental monitoring; communications;
and position, navigation, and timing (PNT). These are particularly relevant to Chinas
antiaccess/area denial strategy for preventing or impeding U.S. intervention in a
potential conflict in the Western Pacific. Second, Chinas space programs are
expected to yield economic and commercial benefits, and China has specifically
aimed to capture 15 percent of the global launch services market and 10 percent of
the global commercial satellite market by 2015, although these efforts have
produced mixed results. Finally, space achievements provide CCP leadership with
significant domestic political legitimacy and international prestige and influence,
and enable China to collaborate on a range of bilateral and multilateral space
activities. China has notably engaged in cooperative efforts with Brazil, Russia,
Ukraine, Venezuela, and the EU, and initiated the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization.
CHINA STRONG
China is pursuing a broad array of counterspace capabilities and will be able to hold
at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime if these capabilities
become operational. Chinas 2007 test of the SC-19 direct-ascent antisatellite
(ASAT) missile destroyed an aging Chinese satellite and sparked worldwide criticism
for creating dangerous orbital debris. The test demonstrated Chinas ability to strike
satellites in low Earth orbit where the majority of U.S. satellites reside. Chinas 2013
DN-2 rocket test reached the altitude of geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites,
marking Chinas highest known suborbital launch to date and the highest worldwide
since 1976; this indicated China is developing the capability to target higher orbits
which contain U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and most U.S. ISR
satellites. Since 2008, China has also conducted increasingly complex tests
involving spacecraft in close proximity to one another; these tests have legitimate
applications for Chinas manned space program, but are likely also used for the
development of co-orbital counterspace technologies. Computer network operations
against U.S. space assets attributed to China have likely been used to demonstrate
and test Chinas ability to conduct future computer network attacks and perform
network surveillance. Finally, China has acquired ground-based satellite jammers
and invested heavily in research and development for directed energy technologies
such as lasers and radio frequency weapons.
Chinas space program has also progressed in the areas of spacebased command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR), space-based PNT, space-based communications, and space launch
functions. China now has approximately 142 operational satellites in orbit, with
approximately 95 of these owned and operated by military or defense industry
organizations. Chinas current system of C4ISR satellites likely enables its military to
detect and monitor U.S. air and naval activity out to the second island chain with
sufficient accuracy and timeliness to assess U.S. military force posture and cue
other collection assets for more precise tracking and targeting. Chinas regional PNT
satellite system, known as Beidou, became operational in 2012, with global
coverage expected by 2020. When completed, this system will provide PNT
functions, essential to the performance of virtually every modern Chinese weapons
system, independent from U.S.-run GPS. Although it lacks a designated civilian
space program, China since the mid-1990s has incrementally developed a series of
ambitious space exploration programs, categorized as civilian projects. China is one
of three countries, along with the United States and Russia, to have independently
launched a human into space, and has launched ten Shenzhou spacecraft and the
Tiangong space lab in recent years as part of its human spaceflight program. In the
programs next phase, scheduled for completion by 2022, China plans to launch a
permanent manned space station into orbit. Chinas lunar exploration program has
featured several lunar orbiting missions with multiple Change spacecraft and the
landing of a lunar rover, Jade Rabbit, in 2014. China plans to land and return a lunar
rover in 2017 and become the first nation to land a spacecraft on the Moons dark
side in 2020. Beijing is likely also conducting research for a manned mission to the
moon and a mission to Mars, although neither project has yet received official
approval.
BAN ON WORKING W CHINA -> LOSE SPACE DOMINANCE

Chinas space activities present important implications and policy questions for the
United States. Space capabilities have been integrated into U.S. military operations
to such an extent that U.S. national security is now dependent on the space domain,
and Chinas 2007 antisatellite missile test in particular has been described by
General John Hyten, commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command, as a wakeup
call to the U.S. military regarding the vulnerability of its space assets. In the
economic realm, U.S. providers of commercial satellites, space launch services, and
GPS-based services may face increased competition as China seeks to expand its
foothold in these markets, benefited by the blending of its civilian and military
infrastructures and by government funding and policy support. U.S. export controls
have also prompted many European countries and their industries to pursue space
systems that are free of U.S. technologiesand therefore restrictionsin order to
reach the Chinese market. Finally, Chinas achievements in space will provide
Beijing with greater prestige in the international system and expand its growing
space presence, concurrent with declining U.S. influence in space; the United States
currently depends on Russian launch vehicles to send humans into space, and the
International Space Station is scheduled for deorbiting around 2024. Moreover,
given current Congressional restrictions on U.S.-China space cooperation, the United
States would not participate in any space program involving China, which raises
concerns that reduced U.S. investment in its manned space program could result in
the continued erosion of its technological edge and a shift of influence within the
international space community.
CHINA WILL CHECK US IN SPACE
As Chinas developmental counterspace capabilities become operational, China will
be able to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime.
China is testing increasingly complex co-orbital proximity capabilities. Although it
may not develop or operationally deploy all of these co-orbital technologies for
counterspace missions, China is setting a strong foundation for future co-orbital
antisatellite systems that could include jammers, robotic arms, kinetic kill vehicles,
and lasers.
CHINA CHALLENGING US IN SPACE

Chinas rise as a major space power challenges decades of U.S. dominance in space
an arena in which the United States has substantial military, civilian, and
commercial interests.
US IS BLOCKING BILATERAL COOP W CHINA OUR LAWS
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf
In his own words, Wolf developed the Amendment to limit new collaboration with
China until we see improvements in its human rights record, as well as a reduction
in its well documented cyberattacks and espionage efforts against the U.S.88
Significantly, Representative Wolf has publicly opposed any involvement of NASA
with CNSA on both moral and security grounds. What concerns me most about the
Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is being led by the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe that the PLAs space program
will be any more benign than the PLAs recent military posture.89 Direct bilateral
cooperation with an agency controlled to at least some degree by Chinas military
given its repressive historycould tarnish NASAs image and diminish both its
ethical high ground as a paragon of science and exploration, and its credibility as a
trustworthy and peaceful agency.90 To address these concerns, Section 1340(a) of
the 2011 Appropriations Act stipulated: None of the funds made available by this
division may be used for [NASA] or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy,
program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such
activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of
this division.91
CHINA MOVING INTO SPACE ONLY PROBLEM W COOPERATION

IS OLD CONGRESSIONAL LAW
http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html
There's a growing debate over whether China and the Unites States should
cooperate in space, and the dialogue now appears to focus on how to create an
"open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese astronauts to make trips to the International
Space Station (ISS).
Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House, but
progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. Specifically at question is
how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from
engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China regarding space.
Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long
march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own space station in the 2020s.
Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China
collaboration in space.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP KEY

It will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space
cooperation, said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science and
international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in
Washington, D.C.
"The first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get
current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked," Logsdon told Space.com.
"Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States
and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most
dramatically, human spaceflight."
POWERFUL SIGNAL
Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back
in 1975 serves as a history lesson.
"A similar initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be
a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work
together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said.
MOVE IS MERELY POLITICAL NO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

FROM PARTNERSHIP
While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens
into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about
equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted.
"China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than
the converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage
in space cooperation with China is political, not technical."
SPACE RACE NOW COOPERATION DEFUSES

"It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space," said Joan
Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island.
Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval
War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
"The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race
between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be
inclusive in ISS space partnerships," Johnson-Freese said.
Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part,
has spurred China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be
the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited."
SPACE STYMIED BY NON-TECHNIAL ISSUES HURTS US CRED

Apollo-Soyuz demonstrated that space can be a venue to build cooperation and
trust during difficult political times, when they are most needed, and without
dangerous technology transferal, Johnson-Freese said. "However, that
demonstration has gone unheeded regarding China," she noted.
Johnson-Freese said the reasoning given by those who have stonewalled
cooperation in space with the Chinese "often has little to do with space or national
security." Rather, "space is merely a token for complaints about China in other
areas, such as human rights," she said.
Other countries are eager to work with China in space, Johnson-Freese said, and
"the U.S. merely appears petulant" in its refusal to engage in any meaningful way
with China in space.
EU AND CHINA ALREADY WORKING TOGETHER
The European Space Agency (ESA) and China have blueprinted a work plan, said
Karl Bergquist, who's in charge of relations with China within the ESA international
relations department in Paris. [How China's First Space Station Will Work
(Infographic)]
ESA and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) signed a framework agreement in
December 2014, Bergquist said.
Since then, the two agencies have established three working groups: space
experiments and utilization; astronaut selection, training and flight; and space
infrastructure to analyze and propose concrete cooperation areas of mutual interest,
Bergquist told Space.com.
Outgoing ESA Director Jean-Jacques Dordain and CMSA Director Yu Tongjie met May
27 to continue strategic cooperation on long-term objectives and implementation
steps.
"As you can see, we are still in the early phases of the cooperation between ESA
and CMSA," Bergquist said, "but the idea is to identify a concrete cooperation plan
which then could be submitted for approval to the ESA member states."
US CAN WORK W CHINA MULTILATERALLY

Logsdon said ESA, or even the Russian space agency, could serve as somewhat of a
"middleman" to facilitate Chinese access to the International Space Station.
"If China were to fly its Shenzhou spacecraft to the space station, it would dock to
the Russian port and Putin's Russia has been making friendly noises towards
China," Logsdon said.
Dordain has been a strong advocate for incorporating China into mainstream
spaceflight activities, Logsdon said. Dordain's term of office ends June 30. The
incoming leader of ESA is Johann-Dietrich Wrner, who is currently chairman of the
German Aerospace Center's executive board.
"It is not clear either how much leverage Europe would have on this issue or
whether Dordain's successor will share this view, but with U.S. backing, Europe
could serve as an American surrogate," Logsdon said.
Logsdon said it is worth remembering that the U.S. congressional prohibition
regarding China is on bilateral U.S.-Chinese cooperation.
"Starting the cooperation on the multilateral International Space Station may offer
an escape route from current limitations," Logsdon said.
CONDITIONS GOOD FOR COOPERATION NOW
http://www.space.com/30337-chinese-experiment-international-space-station.html
A Chinese experiment is being readied for launch toward the International Space
Station (ISS) in what could be the forerunner of a larger space-cooperation agenda
between the United States and China.
NanoRacks, a Houston-based company that helps commercial companies make
use of the space station, has signed a historic agreement with the Beijing Institute
of Technology to fly Chinese DNA research to the orbiting outpost next year. No
commercial Chinese payload has ever flown to the orbiting lab before.
Space-policy experts said they viewed the agreement as a significant step in
shaping possible future joint work by the two spacefaring nations.
ONE LAW PROHIBITS US-CHINA SPACE ENGAGEMENT

Over the past few years, the law has prohibited NASA and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from cooperating with China on space
activities.
That prohibition was originally signed into NASA-funding appropriations bills by
Republican Congressman Frank Wolf (Virginia), who chaired the House
Appropriations Commerce-Justice-Science subcommittee before retiring last year.
The final law that Wolf put in place P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, which is in effect today states that no funds
may be spent by NASA or OSTP to "develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or
execute a bilateral policy, program, order or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company unless such activities are specifically authorized by law after the date of
enactment of this act."
US-CHINA SPACE COOPERATION HELPS HUMAN RIGHTS, SPACE

DEMILITARIZATION
The NanoRacks agreement with the Chinese spurred reactions from several spacepolicy experts, such as Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs
at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
"Past U.S. policy of trying to isolate Chinese space activities, toward [the goal of]
influencing, or pushing, China to change its policies in areas from human rights to
the development of anti-satellite capabilities hasn't worked and in some cases
has been overtly counterproductive to U.S. interests," Johnson-Freese said.
As a result, Johnson-Freese told Space.com, "changing our approach in ways that do
not involve technology transfer seems a rational action."
It is in U.S. interests to better understand how China's decision-making process
works, to have China act as a responsible player in space and to have a group
within China advocate for nonaggressive policy toward the United States in space,
Johnson-Freese said.
US LONE HOLDOUT
"Given that the rest of the world is working with China in space, being the lone
holdout has not worked in our favor in any of those areas," Johnson-Freese said.
"Hopefully, this experiment on the ISS will be a positive step forward toward all of
those goals."
NANORACKS NOT A CHANGE TO POLICY

"I see this [China/NanoRacks agreement] as a commercial arrangement that has
potential scientific benefits and [that] complies with existing laws and regulations,"
said Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington
University in Washington, D.C.
"Whether it's a precedent for future activities remains to be seen," Pace told
Space.com.
COOPERATION WITH CHINA CHECKS RUSSIA
Statements by U.S. politicians show that there may be an interesting "chess
playing" factor in America's dealings with China.
Some U.S. lawmakers have said they don't want the Russians to have a clear, open
field with the Chinese. Better to have the U.S. engaged in working space deals with
China, they say but how best to evolve and work with China within the Wolf
amendment?
US-CHINA DIALOGUING ON SPACE ALREADY

As for future U.S.-China space relations, the first "U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation
Dialogue" is slated to take place in China before the end of October.
Last June, the United States and China decided to establish regular bilateral,
government-to-government consultations on civil space cooperation.
That agreement came out of the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, held June 22-24 in Washington, D.C, with Secretary of State
John Kerry taking active part in the discussions. The two sides held in-depth talks on
major bilateral, regional and global issues.
More than 70 important outcomes resulted from the dialogue, including a number of
space items.
Aside from putting in place a "Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue," the two sides also
decided to have exchanges on other space matters, including satellite-collision
avoidance, weather monitoring and climate research.
The agreement signed by Kerry reflects State Department activities with China,
which are not prohibited by law.
LAW HAS DISRUPTED NASAS ABILITY TO RESEARCH

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/
The 2011 NASA/OSTP ban on bilaterally working with China was the brainchild of
Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), chair of the House Appropriations CommerceJustice-Science (CJS) subcommittee until he retired last year. The two-sentence
clause imposing the ban was inserted into the NASA appropriations bill. Referring to
China as an evil empire in 1999, Congressman Wolf is a long and proud Dragon
Slayer. As an evangelical Christian he was and continues to be particularly
focused on Chinese human rights and freedom of religion issues. Linking those
obviously legitimate concerns to Chinese-U.S. space relations, however, has proved
problematic for several reasons.
In 2013, Bo Jiang, a Chinese national and contractor working on optics at NASA
Langley, was arrested at the airport before leaving for China, on suspicion of being
in possession of classified materials. Besides porn, nothing illegal was found on Bos
computer. He pled guilty to violating NASA computer use rules, but was cleared of
all espionage charges. Suspicion first fell on Bo after Rep. Wolf declared at a press
conference that anonymous NASA employees had alerted him about security
concerns. At the same press conference, Wolfcalled on (which equates to directed
since he controlled their budget) NASA to take down all public information for a
security review, including the voluminous NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
that contains virtually the sum-total of NASAs scientific studies, and begin a
massive review of all foreign nationals at NASA NTRS came back online with
almost zero changes. NASA, highly technical administration that it is, employs and
contracts a large number of foreigners, and the disruption was enormous. Besides
employing a high number of foreign nationals, NASA scientists also regularly work
with scientists from other countries, including China.
LAW CAUSES INSTITUTIONAL RACISM TOWARDS ASIANS

The 2011 NASA/OSTP ban on bilaterally working with China was the brainchild of
Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), chair of the House Appropriations CommerceJustice-Science (CJS) subcommittee until he retired last year. The two-sentence
clause imposing the ban was inserted into the NASA appropriations bill. Referring to
China as an evil empire in 1999, Congressman Wolf is a long and proud Dragon
Slayer. As an evangelical Christian he was and continues to be particularly
focused on Chinese human rights and freedom of religion issues. Linking those
obviously legitimate concerns to Chinese-U.S. space relations, however, has proved
problematic for several reasons.
In 2013, Bo Jiang, a Chinese national and contractor working on optics at NASA
Langley, was arrested at the airport before leaving for China, on suspicion of being
in possession of classified materials. Besides porn, nothing illegal was found on Bos
computer. He pled guilty to violating NASA computer use rules, but was cleared of
all espionage charges. Suspicion first fell on Bo after Rep. Wolf declared at a press
conference that anonymous NASA employees had alerted him about security
concerns. At the same press conference, Wolfcalled on (which equates to directed

since he controlled their budget) NASA to take down all public information for a
security review, including the voluminous NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
that contains virtually the sum-total of NASAs scientific studies, and begin a
massive review of all foreign nationals at NASA NTRS came back online with
almost zero changes. NASA, highly technical administration that it is, employs and
contracts a large number of foreigners, and the disruption was enormous. Besides
employing a high number of foreign nationals, NASA scientists also regularly work
with scientists from other countries, including China.
Paranoia
Wolfs scrutiny of NASA was such that paranoia set in, resulting in a better safe
than sorry attitude among NASA employees about avoiding Chinese. There was a
joke that if a NASA employee was on a DC Metro car with an Asian, he or she better
switch cars. But erring on the side of caution proved problematic as well. When
NASAs Ames Research Center excluded Chinese scientists from a conference and
American scientists consequently boycotted the conference in protest, Wolf
chastised Ames for applying the bilateral ban to a multilateral conference, and
NASA was left to humbly apologize.
REPEAL KEY TO UNDERSTANDING CHINAS DUAL USE TECH

Beyond issues related to individuals are the even more-important strategic issues
that flow from a ban on U.S.-China bilateral dialogue. It has always been in the best
interests of the United States to use all tools of national power to achieve its spacerelated goals, as stated in the U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Strategy,
and National Security Space Strategy. Wolfs restrictions on space cooperation
constrain U.S. options. The United States could learn about how the Chinese work
their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating
procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use
of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S.
analysis.
WOLF ACT IS POPULAR IN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC

Though Wolf retired in 2014, the new House CJS chairman, Rep. John Culbertson (RTX), has said he agrees with Wolfs position. The final law that Wolf put in place, and
which remains in effect (P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015), bans funding by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of
any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China
or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by
law after the date of enactment of this Act. Supporting an anti-China agenda
accrues not insignificant domestic support among some voter constituencies. And
so Congress continues to act as though a bilateral snub by the U.S. will somehow
change Chinese policies, deny them technology, or perhaps just hurt their feelings.
SPACE SANCTIONING FAILS ONLY HURTS US

It has repeatedly been demonstrated though that sanctions, denying a country
things that it wants, only works when all countries possessing whatever the
desired thing cooperate in denial. If the rationale for snubbing China is to deny it
space-related technology, it should be considered that other space-faring nations do
not share U.S. views toward China. Other Western countries have shown themselves
eager to work with and sell to China, with restrictions and enforceable controls on
dual-use technology, negating the effectiveness of U.S. actions. That leaves only
defending the moral high ground the U.S. as a democracy doesnt work with
communist authoritarian governments as a rationale for the Congressional
position.
CURRENT SPACE CONGESTION COOPERATION FAILS NO TRUST

In space, the ultimate goal of all U.S. strategies is for the U.S. to benefit from a
sustainable space environment. Risks to the space environment stem from
congestion (the U.S. owns more 40 percent of the satellites in orbit), space debris,
naturally occurring space objects, and debris potentially created by anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons. In recognition of its inability to deal with the space debris issues on
its own, the U.S. already works with China and 11 other countries on the InterAgency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC), which has done remarkable
work at the scientific and technical level in identifying issues and suggesting
mitigation approaches. Their suggestions are largely ignored, however, due to lack
of trust at the political level. Building trust takes dialogue.
CURRENT COOPERATION FAILS DUAL USE TECH IS INHERENTLY

NON-CIVIL
Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, will have a
challenging task in identifying areas for civil space cooperation with China, given
the dual-use nature of space technology and the domestic Kabuki accompanying
Wolfs enduring ban. But acquiescing to talk about civil space cooperation is likely
the carrot required to get to what the U.S. really wants to talk about space
security.
SPACE COMPETITION RHETORIC INCREASING

The rhetoric of space competition has been escalating rapidly. Chest thumping,
accusations and curious lingo such as offensive counterspace from Congress and
the Pentagon do little to build trust. Preventing that escalating rhetoric from
evolving into military confrontation that would jeopardize U.S. interests is the job of
the State Department. Therefore, it makes sense that State, with larger, strategic
objectives beyond those of individual members of Congress or military services
inherently needing threats to justify enhanced budget requests, would step in to fill
the void created by the 2011 legislative action.
COOPERATION OPPONENTS HAVE GIVEN UP NO FIGHT

Notably, the usual and most vocal critics of U.S.-China space cooperation have been
largely silent, perhaps indicating that while unwilling to support the dialogue, the
need is becoming recognized. The State Department has indicated that NASA and
other space-related agencies will be invited to the dialogue, and it will be up to
them to get the requisite clearances from Congress. Whether Congress grants these
will be indicative.
BILATERALISM WITH CHINA KEY
The next meeting between the U.S. and China is scheduled for October 2015. It will
take all of Frank Roses considerable talents with China and domestic political
communities to move a space agenda forward. But if sustainability of the space
environment is the ultimate goal, it is not one that can be pursued unilaterally, or
without China.
CHINA IS GOOD SPACE CITIZEN

Since its irresponsible high-altitude ASAT test in 2007, China has become politically
correct when testing ASAT technology, and now says it is testing missile defense
technology, like the U.S., Russia and India, given the similarities of the required
capabilities. Chinas July 2014 missile defense test has been of particular concern to
the U.S., and perhaps convinced the State Department that it was time to step in
and pursue the best interests of the United States.
SPACE KEY TO MILITARY
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
The question before the Commission concerns how the United States (U.S.) can
achieve stated U.S. goals regarding space security given a rapidly expanding and
increasingly sophisticated Chinese space program. 1 The importance of protecting
the space environment and U.S. space assets in orbit, assets which provide
information critical to the U.S. civilian and military sectors and overall U.S. national
security, has required that goals be considered and reconsidered at many levels and
within multiple communities of the U.S. government. Therefore, it is appropriate to
begin by referencing the multiple and nested U.S. strategies related to or
referencing space, specifically the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2010
National Space Policy (NSP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
2011 National Security Space Strategy (NSSS)2 for analytic parameters.
US-CHINA COOPERATION KEY TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE

In line with promoting responsible, peaceful and the safe use of space other
elements requiring focused attention include resilience for military systems,
increased transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs), increased space
situational awareness (NSP, pp. 11-12) and a non-binding International Code of
Conduct for Space Activities as supported by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
5 Air Force Space Command chief General William Shelton6 and Strategic Command
chief General Robert Kehler7 in 2012. Strong international norms can also be a
strong deterrent, further compelling pursuance. The interrelated nature of the
strategic approaches requires implementation of all elements. Pursuing deter,
defend and defeat through counterspace measures alone not only decreases the
potential of strategic success, but can be counterproductive in much the same way
export control laws consequent to the 1999 Cox Committee Report proved to be.8
Further, due to the global commons9 nature of the space environment and the
importance of sustainability of that environment, the U.S. must seek common
ground with China in areas of common interest. Consideration of what China is
doing in space and why is useful in identifying these common interests.
CURRENT CIVILIAN USE ONLY DIALOGUE IS USELESS TOO

MUCH DUAL USE TECH. ONLY FULL BILATERALISM SOLVES
Because of the largely dual-use nature of space technology, virtually any space
activity can be deemed as military. Therefore it is (relatively) easier to know what
China is doing in terms of space activities than why. A co-orbital rendezvous and
proximity operation satellite in space can, for example, be observed. Whether the
satellite is intended for such benign operations as assessing damage to another
satellite, or whether for nefarious purposes such as ramming into another satellite,
or both, can rarely be determined based on hardware. A multiplicity of views
regarding underlying drivers for space activity in China, just as there are in the
United States, further complicates assessments. China is a country of such size, and
with a rapidly increasing number of media and internet outlets for expressing views
and dispersing information, that evidence can be found for almost any
assessment, thereby accommodating the substantiation of preconceived
assumptions as analysis. Consequently, analysis of intent through written
statements inherently involves speculation and so careful scrutiny of sources
backing such speculation becomes especially imperative.11 Unquestionably though,

the best way to assess intentions is through dialog and cooperation.
SPACE COOPERATION KEY TO CHINESE STATUS

The motivations behind initial Chinese space efforts and the more recent decision to
pursue human spaceflight within the context of Chinas internal history is examined
by Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis in the 2009 publication A Place for Ones Mat:
Chinas Space Program from 1956-2003. 24 Using Chinese-language sources, the
authors central observation is that China understood efforts in three major areas -launching satellites, launching communications satellites specifically and human
spaceflight -- each as efforts to be a measure of national accomplishment
necessary to qualify for inclusion among the major spacefaring countries that set
the rules. Equity appears to have been the principal concern of Chinas political
leadership.25 In that respect, China was and continues to seek recognition as a
regional and global power. As a space-faring nation, China seeks to be a stakeholder
in setting the rules for space. Whether as an equal a place for their mat among
other powers or the dominant regional power or as a usurper of U.S. power is a
question about which analysts often disagree. Chinas most recent Space White
Paper from 2011 again places Chinese space activities in the context of overall
national development strategy.
Domestic pride and international prestige, economic development (including skilled
jobs and expanded science and engineering educational programs), and dual-use
technology development are all proven reasons for pursuing human spaceflight
programs, as demonstrated in the United States with the Apollo Program. China is
well aware that the United States enjoyed multiple benefits in all of these areas
through the Apollo Program, and all today motivate Chinas commitment to longterm space exploration programs, including human spaceflight. An ambitious, multifaceted space program continues Chinas traditional heritage of undertaking big
projects, like the Great Wall and the Three Gorges Dam, to demonstrate national
prowess. Space activity continues that tradition, now with a techno-nationalist bent.
LACK OF COOPERATION ONLY HURTS US
The 1999 Cox Committee Report and consequent State Department interpretations
of export licensing regulations were intended to impede Chinese space activities by
denying China technology, in effect, to isolate Chinese space activities. Instead,
China has worked with other countries that have been more than willing to expand
and increase their own aerospace business sector market share, or China developed
indigenous capabilities. Parts of U.S. regulations that categorized such items as
communications satellites as weapons systems and pointedly handicapped the U.S.
satellite industry rather than stunting Chinese space activities held until 2013.
SPACE PRIMACY TRANSFERRING TO CHINA

China is not a partner in the International Space Station (ISS), although for a long
time it eagerly sought inclusion. Arguments against Chinese inclusion initially
focused on China having little to contribute, in terms of financial support, hardware
or knowhow. When that situation began to change, considerations of ideology and
technology transfer issues were raised. Opponents considered the U.S. working with
an authoritarian communist government as inappropriate, although the U.S. has
pragmatically worked with unsavory governments in other areas of the world when
it serves U.S. realist interests. When all else failed, potential technology transfer
issues were raised to block Chinese inclusion. Not being included has supported
arguments within China to build their own space station. Chinas planned space
station will de facto replace the ISS when ISS reaches the end of its operational
lifetime, conferring both technonationalist and leadership connotations to China.
China is already courting other countries along those lines
UNILATERAL SPACE PRIMACY HURTS INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS
The primacist strategy adopted by the U.S. after 9/11 and embedded in the 2002
National Security Strategy was not limited to terrestrial policies, but space policies
as well. The 2003 Air Force Transformational Flight Plan, including plans for orbiting
weapons, and the 2004 follow-up Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace
Operations, indicated that space was seen as the fourth battlespace. The United
States vigorously pursued small satellite technology similar to the BX satellites
China is developing and the U.S. sees as threatening. An Air Force official was
quoted in the trade publication Inside the Pentagon about the Air Force XSS
program that XSS-11 can be used as an ASAT weapon.32 Actions and rhetoric
supported the idea that the United States was moving beyond seeking space
superiority, an advantage over other countries by some potentially minimum
amount, to space dominance, the unchallengeable ability to control the space
environment.33 That potential was of concern to a number of countries, including
allies, not just China. An editorial ran after the release of the 2006 U.S. National
Space Policy in The Times (London), titled "America Wants it All - Life, the Universe,
and Everything,"11 stating that apparently space was no longer the final frontier,
but the 51st state of the United States. The editorial went on to say that, "The new
National Space Policy that President Bush has signed is comically proprietary in tone
about the U.S.'s right to control access to the rest of the solar system."34 That same
newspaper ran an article entitled "Son of Star Wars takes out toxic satellite with
$30m space attack" after the destruction of US-193 in February 2008. While not
challenging U.S. motives explicitly, the article cynically stated the satellite's
destruction had been "broadcast" by President Bush "as a safety measure" and "the
Pentagon celebrated its $30 million Star Wars-style interception in space."35
WORKING WITH CHINA BAD IMMORAL AND NO GAIN

At the highest levels of government, President Barack Obama met with thenChinese President Hu Jintao in January 2011. Part of their joint statement addressed
the desire for deepened dialogue and interaction in space, which many people
interpreted as a new willingness on the part of the United States to work with China.
But cooperation was not to be. As of April 2011, NASA funding legislation prohibits
any joint scientific activity between the United States and China that involves NASA
or is coordinated by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral
activity with China. The publicly stated rationale behind the legislation was stated
by Congressman Frank Wolf in a 2011 interview. We dont want to give them the
opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from
dealing with them, Wolf said. And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. Would
you have a bilateral program with Stalin?36 Congressman Wolfs 2013 letter to
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden provides another perspective on rationale,
having to do with potentially using the promise of space cooperation as a means to
seek meaningful progress in China on freedom of religion and human rights. 37
Nonetheless, the potential for technology transfer, nothing to gain and ideology
have been consistent threads of rational for U.S. policies toward China regarding
space.
SPACE SANCTIONS ONLY HURT US CHINA WILL DEVELOP TECH

OR GET IT FROM EUROS ANYWAY
Congressmans Wolfs perspective assumes that working with the United States
would give China opportunities in terms of surreptitiously obtaining U.S. technology
otherwise unavailable to it. But we live in a globalized world. Attempting to isolate
Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China and other
countries into developing indigenous space industries totally beyond any U.S.
control than they might not have done otherwise, and arguably reap more
political and prestige benefits from doing so that if they had gotten the same
technology from partnering with the U.S. The only outcome of the past two decades
of strict export control there is hard data on is the damage to the U.S. commercial
space sector.
COOPERATION MEANS UNDERSTANDING SOLVES ANALYSIS

VULNERABILITY
Second, Wolfs rationale assumes the United States has nothing to gain by working
with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could learn about how they
work their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard
operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the

intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability
in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and
solve problems together, perhaps, a space science or space debris project where
both parties can contribute something of value, builds trust on both sides, trust that
is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the others
cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal risk of
technology sharing. Perhaps most importantly, cooperation would politically
empower Chinese individuals and institutions who are stakeholders in Chinese
space policy to be more favorably inclined toward the United States. A cooperative
civil and commercial relationship creates interests that could inhibit aggressive or
reckless behavior, as opposed to Chinese space policy being untethered to any
obligations, interest or benefits it might obtain through cooperation with the United
States.
WORKING WITH AUTHORITARIANS NECESSARY CHINA NOT

THE EXCEPTION
Wolf further stated that the United States should not work with China based on
moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with
authoritarian and/or communist regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime
when it has served American interests, and continues to do so today. That is the
basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer
not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with Putin when it benefits us to do so.
Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few regimes to
work with at all in the Middle East. The U.S. provided supported Saddam Hussains
regime in the Iran-Iraq War.4
SPACE SANCTIONS WONT CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA

Chinese politicians are interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being
accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations as a sign of
regime legitimacy. But it is unrealistic to expect withholding U.S. cooperation on
space issues can influence regime change in China. A similar approach was
considered with the Soviet Union, and it failed. Further, in terms of the U.S. doing
China a favor by working with it, perhaps ironically many Chinese space
professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them
down. American politics are viewed as fickle and without the will to see programs to
completion. This view is reflected in changing European views regarding space
leadership. A 2013 piece in Germanys Der Spiegel suggested that Europe is
thinking of redirecting its primary space alliance from the United States to China,
due to Chinas rising power status in space.
EUROS ON BRINK OF LEAVING US TO WORK W CHINA

Chinese politicians are interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being
accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations as a sign of
regime legitimacy. But it is unrealistic to expect withholding U.S. cooperation on
space issues can influence regime change in China. A similar approach was
considered with the Soviet Union, and it failed. Further, in terms of the U.S. doing
China a favor by working with it, perhaps ironically many Chinese space
professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them
down. American politics are viewed as fickle and without the will to see programs to
completion. This view is reflected in changing European views regarding space
leadership. A 2013 piece in Germanys Der Spiegel suggested that Europe is
thinking of redirecting its primary space alliance from the United States to China,
due to Chinas rising power status in space.
SPACE UNIPOLARITY NOT SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION OR

FAILURE
The question of whether China is challenging U.S. leadership in space has received
considerable media attention in the form of a U.S. China space race, prompted
largely by perceptions of declining U.S. space leadership. The U.S. civil space
program is not dying, military space activities continue to expand, and no country is
doing anything in space that has not already been done by the United States. But
having started with such a spectacular accomplishment as the Apollo Program, it
has been difficult to maintain the public enthusiasm required to fund further space
spectaculars, such as a human spaceflight mission to Mars. Although not completely
unsupportive, the U.S. public treats the space program as expendable to other
government programs. The reality is that space, as with other areas of international
relations, will likely be a multipolar environment in the future.42 Americas unipolar
moment is over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with rising partners such as
China, the perception of its space leadership will continue to decline as well. That is
not to say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space
activity. If only by virtue of a heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in
select areas. But the days of total leadership are over. It will be a tough pill to
swallow for those who crave exceptionalism but if we are unwilling to pay the
price tag, then swallow it, we must.43 In that respect, China has not usurped the
perception of U.S. space leadership, it is being ceded to them.
COOPERATION KEY TO SPACE DEBRIS
This rebuttal to Congressman Wolfs views assumes that the United States has a
choice regarding whether or not to work with China. If, however, sustainability of
the space environment upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military
specifically relies upon for advantages is to be maintained, the space debris issue
alone requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option. While missile
defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since
2007, the potential threat to the space environment in non-test circumstances has
become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the
frightening realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With
regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has done nothing further in
space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United
States. Mankinds dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best
interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment.
PLENTY OF COMMON GROUND ISSUES CHINA SAYS YES

China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the Inter-Agency Space
Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) only days after its 2007 ASAT test that
significantly worsened space debris, resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of
embarrassment. There is a certain (understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which
has the most sophisticated government space tracking abilities, at being able to
warn China of potential collisions between its own space junk and its own
satellites.44 More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the IADC indicates
recognition of need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant
issues, particularly the space debris issue.45 These are the type of common
ground issues that provide opportunities to work with all spacefaring nations to
protect the congested, contested and competitive space environment.
LACK OF COOPERATION LEADS TO ARMS RACE
Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward
identifying common ground among all space-faring nations, and resiliency for
military systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and
commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise, just as efforts to isolate
Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control,
the unintended consequences of a principally deter, defend, defeat strategy could
trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at
significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
NON-WEAPON COOPERATION ISNT PERCEIVED BY POLITICIANS

With regard to the resilience, specifically the purview of the Department of Defense
(DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), resilience has faced
resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms
control, just too difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored
approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as
a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders. He stated, While everyone
recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from
low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target.
So it doesnt attract much interest from senior leaders.47 Counterspace, however,
offers that sexy option.
REPEAL KEY TO INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION

And while the U.S. has rhetorically supported the European led efforts toward an
International Code of Conduct, continued Congressional restrictions regarding
bilateral U.S.-China space cooperation sends a powerful signal regarding U.S.
seriousness regarding its intent to work with all space faring nations for the good of
the space environment. Anything less than a comprehensive effort to constructively
deal with issues related to the space commons can yield limited success at best.
REPEAL KEY TO SPACE ENVIRONMENT
Regardless of various interpretations of Chinese intent, the United States must
pursue all policy goals of the NSS, NSP and NSSS. That will inherently involve
working with China in some areas, and pursuing a full range of approaches to policy
goals. The sustainability of the space environment is as key to protecting assets as
is protecting assets from hostile actions. They are inherently intertwined.
COOPERATION WITH CHINA KEY SANCTIONING FAILS

Policies attempting to constrain, contain and control Chinese space activities have
been repeatedly demonstrated of limited value. The most viable way for the U.S. to
stay ahead of China in space capabilities is to focus on what it does have control
over; its own programs. Funding, acquisition processes, strengthening the industrial
base, cultivating and supporting science, technology, engineering and math (STEM)
education programs and opportunities, resilience and broad based research and
development will yield as much or more gain toward achieving U.S. space policy
goals are key in the regard. To summarize, the U.S. cannot control Chinese space
ambitions; even influence is limited. Nor can the U.S. control space in the same
way that it can control airspace. Yet space is a global commons the sustainability of
which is critical to U.S. national security. Consequently, cooperation with China in
areas of shared interests is in the best interests of U.S. national security. In order to
protect U.S. assets and achieve stated U.S. goals, all approaches stated in the
nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. Full
implementation of U.S. space strategies is the prudent way forward.
BIG PROJECTS KEY TO CHINA STATUS

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/business/international/in-china-projects-tomake-great-wall-feel-small-.html?referrer=&_r=0
China has always had this history of mega-projects, said Huang Yukon, an
economist and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
a think tank based in Washington.
Its part of the blood, the culture, the nature of its society. To have an impact on
the country, theyve got to be big.
DONT WORK WITH CHINA STEAL OUR TECH AND LEGITIMIZE

THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/04/spending-bill-prohibits-us-chinacollaborations
"We don't want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology,
and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them," says Wolf. "And frankly, it
boils down to a moral issue. ... Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?"
The language in the spending bill says that no government funds can be used by
NASA or OSTP "to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a
bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate,
or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company." It
also prevents any NASA facility from hosting "official Chinese visitors."
Wolf says that he singled out NASA because China's space program, although
nominally independent, "is run by the People's Liberation Army." But the inclusion of
OSTP is meant to cast a much bigger net, he adds. "It addresses everything, the
entire bilateral relationship on science and technology with respect to NASA and
everything that involves OSTP," he says. "It's the whole ball of wax."
US HAS LOST CRED ON SPACE ALREADY INTERNATIONALLY

AND DOMESTICALLY
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Johnson-Freese.pdf
The United States leadership role in space is by no means moribund, yet the
perception of absolute U.S. space leadership has clearly declined. A 2013
HuffPost/YouGov poll indicated that almost half of the American public thinks the
United States is losing its supremacy in space.1 This shift in perception can be seen
internationally as well. A 2013 piece in Der Spiegel suggested that Europe is
thinking of redirecting its primary space alliance from the United States to China, as
Chinas global rising power status now extends to space.2 Is it possible to change
this perception? The answer, regrettably (but realistically), seems to be no. Though
the American public still supports the space program, the country is no longer
willing to allocate the levels of funding needed to deliver the space spectaculars of
yore, spectaculars that engender perceptions of leadership. As a result, perceptions
of U.S. primacy in space exploration will continue to decay. Contributing to the
problem are unrealistically high expectations, formed during the height of the U.S.
space program. Both the Apollo Program and, to a lesser degree, the space shuttle
programs, created expectations of space spectaculars on a regular basis. Similar
expectations are now difficult, if not impossible, to meet. The generous funding the
Apollo Program received was an anomalya function of the Cold Warand it was
not without cuts toward the end. Such vigorous financial support is not likely to be
repeated in the near future, and the American public will not be willing to bear the
costs of such a program again, particularly in an era of financial instability. Although
the International Space Station (ISS) continues to be the National Aeronautics and
Space Administrations (NASA) flagship for human spaceflight activity, the United
States has relied on Russia for transportation to and from the ISS since the space
shuttle stopped flying in 2011. This has created the perception that the United
States depends on others in spacea space hitchhiker rather than program leader.
Furthermore, todays NASA projects are no longer rousing the interest of the
American public. NASA is currently working on missions that involve capturing an
asteroid, developing a solar electric propulsion system, flying commercial
spaceflights that include crewed missions to alleviate reliance on the Russians, and
a menu of other sciencerelated missionsbut none of these have captured much
attention. It also has a largely aspirational Mars programaspirational because of
significant underfunding.3
US SPENDING WAY MORE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES

It is true that governments are not the only space actors, and NASA is not the only
U.S. space player. The U.S. national security space budget continues to surpass that
of all other countries combined, though at a lesser margin than in the past.4 The
private space sector is increasing its overall presence as well, though it suffered
setbacks in 2014 with the crash of Virgin Galactics SpaceShipTwo and Orbital
Sciences Antares rocket launch failure.5,6 Nevertheless, government activity, with
NASA as the face of the U.S. space program, remains the basis on which space
leadership is judged, if for no other reason than historical habit.
SPACE LEADERSHIP NOT SUSTAINABLE
The culture of American exceptionalism makes it difficult to give up the space
program all together. While some perceptions of decline might be tempered by
cooperation with countries like China, that option has been held hostage by U.S.
politics and is unlikely to change in the near future. Unless countries such as China
and India essentially halt their space programs (an unlikely scenario), the United
States will tacitly lose its perceived space leadership over the next ten years.
SPACE PART OF THE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IDENTITY

The culture of American exceptionalism makes it difficult to give up the space
program all together. While some perceptions of decline might be tempered by
cooperation with countries like China, that option has been held hostage by U.S.
politics and is unlikely to change in the near future. Unless countries such as China
and India essentially halt their space programs (an unlikely scenario), the United
States will tacitly lose its perceived space leadership over the next ten years. The
idea of American exceptionalism has been evident throughout the nations history.
Andrew Bacevich wrote in The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism
that from its founding, America has expressed through its behavior and its
evolution a providential purpose.7 American settlers believed that the New World
was a blessed place, and that they had been conferred special rights and
responsibilities. Even recently, President Barack Obama delivered a 2013 speech
claiming that the United States has been, and always will be, the one indispensable
nation in world affairs. Itswhy America is exceptional.8 The positive side of
exceptionalism is manifested in many ways. From early policies of Give Me Your
Tired, Your Poor, to national-effort programs such as the Hoover Dam and Apollo,
America showed itself to be a can-do country. America has long been admired by
people from other countries for such efforts. However, Americans widespread belief
in their own exceptionalism also allows for policies and actions that might otherwise
be considered self-serving or profligate. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski describes exceptionalism as a function of fear and ignorance. [American
exceptionalism] is a reaction to the inability of people to understand global
complexity or important issues like American energy dependency, Brzezinski says.
Therefore, they search for simplistic sources of comfort and clarity. And the people
that they are now selecting to be, so to speak, the spokespersons of their anxieties
are, in most cases, stunningly ignorant.9 Bacevich posits that Americans
insistence on seeing themselves as exceptional has resulted in a public belief that
the United States has an endless line of global crediteconomically, politically, and
culturally. While Americans glorify the rights inherent to democracy and freedom,
they also can ignore the corresponding responsibilities and costs. Ideas of American
exceptionalism have created conflicting mandates, whereby the public desperately
wants to preserve U.S. power and prestige, yet consistently instructs public officials
not to pay for it. In space, that translates into inadequately funded aspirations.
SPACE POPULAR BUT DONT WANT TO SPEND
A 2014 Pew Research Center/Smithsonian Magazine poll on American public
attitudes toward space exploration showed that Americans are keen for space
exploration but disinclined to spend money on it.10 This is not a new attitude. Even
when America triumphantly leapt into space with the Apollo Program, enthusiasm
for actual space expenditure was lukewarm. Benjamin Wormald with the Pew
Research Center notes:
PEOPLE DONT CARE AND WONT SPEND FOR SPACE

Space exploration may be desirable, but it is expendable according to voters
spending priorities, and politicians prioritize accordingly. Since Apollo, many studies
and panels have attempted to convince the American public to increase space
spending. The Space Studies Board of the National Academies of Science has
released four revitalizing studies since 2009,12 with arguments appealing to
economics, the human spirit, excitement, and leadership, but these have had little
impact on public attitudes.
SPACE PRIMACY = LOTS OF SOFT POWER
Leadership in space is still considered an indicator of national technological
prowess, which translates into geostrategic influence. The United States benefited
greatly from the considerable geostrategic influence generated from the success of
the Apollo Program. Apollo was an early soft power tool, an example of leadership
that drew admiration from nations around the world. Today, however, that global
space-related admiration is largely directed at other countries, primarily China, with
its highly visible human spaceflight and robotic lunar program.
BILAT COOPERATION KILLS SPACE RACE NARRATIVE

Although China sought to be part of the International Family of Spacefaring Nations,
a euphemism for inclusion in the ISS partnership, the United States has blocked
Chinas efforts and rejected any sort of space cooperation during the George W.
Bush administration. Though President Obama specifically mentioned space
cooperation in the official joint statement during his visit to China in 2011,15
Congressional Committee Chair Frank Wolfe (R-VA) blocked any bilateral cooperation
focused policy changes through provisions in the 2011 NASA appropriations act.16
That legislative barrier means that cooperation with China as a method to keep it
from usurping space leadershipif there is no race, there is no winneris not
viable. Further, public perception of activity and commitment often defines
leadership, rather than actual or potential capabilities. Consequently, either the
United States must outpace China with activity of public interest, such as human
spaceflight or firsts in the record books, or ceding the perception of unilateral
leadership will become inevitable. Given the evidence regarding a gap between
what the public wants and what it is willing to pay for regarding space activity, the
chances that the United States will again be able to perform the space spectaculars
on a regular basis that the public seems to require as criteria for leadership are low.
LOSS OF SPACE LEADERSHIP INEVITABLE WITHOUT BILAT COOP

Although China sought to be part of the International Family of Spacefaring Nations,
a euphemism for inclusion in the ISS partnership, the United States has blocked
Chinas efforts and rejected any sort of space cooperation during the George W.
Bush administration. Though President Obama specifically mentioned space
cooperation in the official joint statement during his visit to China in 2011,15
Congressional Committee Chair Frank Wolfe (R-VA) blocked any bilateral cooperation
focused policy changes through provisions in the 2011 NASA appropriations act.16
That legislative barrier means that cooperation with China as a method to keep it
from usurping space leadershipif there is no race, there is no winneris not
viable. Further, public perception of activity and commitment often defines
leadership, rather than actual or potential capabilities. Consequently, either the
United States must outpace China with activity of public interest, such as human
spaceflight or firsts in the record books, or ceding the perception of unilateral
leadership will become inevitable. Given the evidence regarding a gap between
what the public wants and what it is willing to pay for regarding space activity, the
chances that the United States will again be able to perform the space spectaculars
on a regular basis that the public seems to require as criteria for leadership are low.
US SPACE UNIPOLARITY IS OVER
The U.S. space program is not moribund, military space activities continue to
outpace other countries, and no country is doing anything in space that has not
already been done by the United States. But having started with a space
spectacular of the Apollo Program variety, it is difficult to continue that kind of
momentum, particularly when the public sees space activity as a good thing to do,
but as expendable when ranked against other government supported programs. The
reality is that space, as in other areas of international relations, will be a multipolar
environment in the future. Americas unipolar moment is over in international
relations, and its incontrovertible space leadership is ending as well. That is not to
say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space activity. If
only by virtue of a naturally heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in
select capacities. But the days of total leadership are over. Without the necessary
funding and political support, the United States leadership in space will continue to
declineeffectively a victim of its own success. It will be a tough pill to swallow for
those who crave exceptionalismbut if we are unwilling to pay for space program
funding, the challenge to American exceptionalism will remain.
LACK OF COOPERATION CAUSES CONGESTION, CONTESTATION,

AND COMPETITIVITY IN SPACE
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-spacerhetoric/
The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) refers to the space
environment as increasingly congested, contested and competitive.[4] Simply by
virtue of the increased number of spacecraft in orbit certain space orbits are
becoming more crowded, or congested. The United States, however, has more
spacecraft creating that crowded situation than any other nation. As of January 31,
2015, the United States has 528 satellites in orbit, compared to Chinas 132,
Russias 131 and all other nations combined 434. Unless, however, it is the U.S.
expectation that other countries would consider the unfettered use of space as a
U.S. entitlement, it is perhaps neither unexpected nor unreasonable that space is
increasing congested, and perhaps then by extrapolation contested and
competitive.
SPACE RELATIONS ARE BAD NOW

http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-space-rhetoric/
Since a 19th century formulation known as the Caroline test, preemptive selfdefense has been upheld as within the bounds of customary international law if the
necessity is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. Prevention, however, are actions taken in the short term
to fend off a longer-term, potential threat. As with Iraq, preventive actions are
frequently referred to as preemptive, for political and legal justification. Given the
ambiguous, dual-use nature of space technology and the difficulties that come into
play with determining accountability for actions taking place hundreds, maybe
thousands of miles in space, the potential for error in determining, anticipating and
reacting to the activities of others is significant.
Chinese space hawks are doing their share to up to provocative and bombastic
rhetoric as well. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Chief General Xu Qiliang
stated in 2009 that competition between military forces in space is a historical
inevitability.[7] Though quickly contradicted by then Chinese President Hu Jintao,
Qiliang continued to advance through the military ranks to the vice-chairmanship of
the Central Military Committee, the first air force officer to do so.
Overall, and in keeping with the government proclivity for tri-part descriptors, the
space environment between the U.S. and China is one where misunderstanding,
misinterpretation and mistrust prevail.
CURRENTLY ON COURSE FOR SPACE WAR NEED TO

COOPERATE NOW TO CHANGE
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-spacerhetoric/
The policy shift appears to coincide with the 2014 Chinese missile defense/ASAT
test. Rhetoric since then, as space analyst Victoria Samson at the Secure World
Foundation phrased it, has been part of an effort to prime the pump[9] to a policy
heavily skewed toward military operations. Specifically, space control, a term
with a historically military, offensive connotation, has become the buzzword in
national security space discussion. That term had been widely used by the George
W. Bush administration, but put aside by the Obama Administration in favor of
strategic restraint, a policy that included a full spectrum of policy options,
including counterspace operations as well as diplomatic, multilateral approaches to
shape the space environment. The latter now seem to have been deemphasized at
best, or simply left in the dust.
It is likely that the tone of space rhetoric will continue on its current course, focusing
on military answers to challenges and threats. While those solutions are a necessary
part of maintaining the space environment so it is available for all responsible space
faring nations to use, they are necessary but not sufficient answers. Rhetoric and
accompanying action must also include earnest efforts to shape the space
environment.
Professor of Global Diplomacy John Stoessinger, writing about Vietnam, considered
the word tragedy. He asked whether it was an example of Greek tragedy, the
tragedy of necessity, in which the feeling aroused in the spectator is What a pity it
had to be this way or of Christian tragedy, the tragedy of possibility, in which the
feeling aroused is What a pity it was this way when it might have been
otherwise.[10] Space war neednt be inevitable. It is not a Greek tragedy.
ASTEROID DEFENSE IS A PUBLIC GOOD COOPERATION NEEDED

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2009/12/asteroid-deflection-as-apublic-good.html
I wrote this post over the weekend but given Paul Samuelson's classic contribution
to public goods theory and to economic textbooks it seems to also fit today.
In Modern Principles we use asteroid deflection as our example of a public good.
Aside from memorability, the example has two virtues as a teaching tool. First,
asteroid deflection is a true public good for all of humanity which raises free riding
issues on a worldwide scale. Second, asteroid deflection is an example of a public
good that is currently provided neither by the market nor by government. Thus the
example underlines the fact that public goods are defined by their characteristics
nonexcludability and nonrivalryand not by whether they are publicly provided, a
point of confusion for many students.
The example may seem fanciful but Tyler and I are quite serious about
the importance of asteroid deflection. Large asteroid hits are rare but if a large
asteroid does hit, billions will be killed. As a result, sober calculations suggest that
the lifetime risk of dying from an asteroid strike is about the same as the risk of
dying in a commercial airplane crash. Yet we spend far less on avoiding the former
risk than the latter.
A new report from the National Academy of Sciences discusses efforts to detect
near earth objects (NEOs). Progress is mixed:
The United States is currently the only country with an active, governmentsponsored effort to detect and track potentially hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs)
Congress has mandated that NASA detect and track 90 percent of NEOs that are
1 kilometer in diameter or larger. These objects represent a great potential hazard
to life on Earth and could cause global destruction. NASA is close to accomplishing
this goal.
Congress has more recently mandated that by 2020 NASA should detect and track
90 percent of NEOs that are 140 meters in diameter or larger, a category of objects
that is generally recognized to represent a very significant threat to life on Earth
if they strike in or near urban areas.The administration has not requested and
Congress has not appropriated new funds to meet this objective.[Thus] the
current near-Earth object surveys cannot meet the goals of the 2005
NASA Authorization Act
Moreover, detection is only the first step towards deflection.
As a classroom discussion starter I like the video embedded below. The jovial
attitude of the announcers contrasts amusingly with the topic while subtly
illustrating some of our biases in perception yet the video does cover the main
points about the worldwide risk, the fact that asteroid deflection is a public good
and it hints at the free rider problem. I do doubt the bit about the riches available
from asteroid mining. Enjoy.
NO LINK SPACE COOPERATION IS NOT PERCEIVED

http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/muted-response-from-critics-as-statedepartment-prepares-for-space-talks-with-china
Five weeks ago, the State Department announced agreement on a U.S.-China Civil
Space Dialogue that will begin in October, a short three months from now. With all
the hyperbole that usually surrounds discussions of U.S.-China space cooperation, a
firestorm of outrage from critics and exuberance from advocates might have been
expected, but the reaction has been almost nonexistent.
The muted response from critics is all the more surprising since the State
Departments announcement came in the midst of news that China hacked into the
Office of Personnel Managements computer system, stealing data on more than 22
million current and former government employees and their relatives.
IMPORTANT REPUBLICANS DONT WANT REPEAL

Former Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), a strong critic of China for many reasons, including
human rights, was largely responsible for creating that prohibition several years ago
and continuing it in subsequent appropriations act. He chaired the House
Appropriations Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) subcommittee that funds NASA and
is now retired, but his successor, Rep. John Culberson (R-TX) holds similar views and
continued the prohibition in the FY2016 CJS bill that passed the House in June.
SMALL SCALE COOPERATION DOESNT GROW DOESNT

INCREASE RELATIONSHIPS
Outside of Congress, the most outspoken critics of potential U.S.-China space
cooperation do not appear to have publicly commented either
(SpacePolicyOnline.coms repeated attempts to contact one of them also yielded no
results.) Eric Sterner, a Fellow at the Marshall Institute, however, offered his views
in a July 27 op-ed published by Space News. While agreeing that a dialogue could
be valuable in areas such as collision avoidance, debris mitigation and science, he
sees little compelling reason for those discussions to evolve into civil space
cooperation. He disagreed with those who argue that cooperating in space leads
to better geopolitical relationships on Earth, noting that Russias participation in the
International Space Station did not dissuade its leaders from invading Ukraine.
BAN ONLY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICS, NOT INTERNATIONAL

GOALS
A leading advocate of cooperation praised the decision. Joan Johnson-Freese, a
professor at the Naval War College who has written books about the Chinese space
program, told SpacePolicyOnline.com that the congressional ban largely serves
domestic political goals and the State Departments announcement seems to be a
recognition that in geopolitics, dialogue is always better than no dialogue. She
added that working with China on a space science project, for example, would allow
the United States to learn more about their decision making processes and
standard operating procedures, a not inconsequential benefit.
ALREADY COOPERATE ON ENVIRONMENT AND COLLISION

AVOIDANCE
http://spacenews.com/op-ed-china-talk-and-cooperation-in-space/
The U.S. and Chinese governments already discuss satellite collision avoidance and
conduct joint research into greenhouse gas monitoring, severe weather monitoring,
space weather and climate science. This cooperation seems to produce little fruit. It
certainly has not affected Chinese behavior vis--vis its relationship with the United
States. Indeed, last fall, hackers in China attacked a U.S. partner to these
cooperative relationships, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
leading the agency briefly to stop making satellite weather data available to the
public. If this is what it means to cooperate with China in space, the United States is
better off without it.
ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH CHINA IS NOT FRUITFUL NO

REASON TO EXPECT PLAN WILL CHANGE
The U.S. and Chinese governments already discuss satellite collision avoidance and
conduct joint research into greenhouse gas monitoring, severe weather monitoring,
space weather and climate science. This cooperation seems to produce little fruit. It
certainly has not affected Chinese behavior vis--vis its relationship with the United
States. Indeed, last fall, hackers in China attacked a U.S. partner to these
cooperative relationships, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
leading the agency briefly to stop making satellite weather data available to the
public. If this is what it means to cooperate with China in space, the United States is
better off without it.
LOTS OF ADVANTAGES FOR CHINA

It is clear what the Chinese might seek from institutionalizing and deepening a
cooperative civil space relationship with the United States. Accelerating Beijings
learning curve when it comes to space technologies and operations, intelligence
collection, technology transfer and political prestige all flow from working with the
worlds most advanced space power.
CHINA SAYS YES
Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems
developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this
and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and
defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit.
WILL BENEFIT CHINESE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

The Defense Department notes that Chinas advanced technology acquisition
strategy continues to center on its civil-military integration policy as a means to
leverage dual-use technologies to improve its defense industries. Despite

improvements to its own indigenous technology development and industrial
capacity, China continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western
dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. These acquisitions
manifest in the form of joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and close business
partnerships with, and technology imports from, highly developed countries,
primarily of the West, that offer access to critical advanced technology sectors.
Consequently, the administration appears poised to put the U.S.-Chinese civil space
relationship on a path that could eventually benefit the Chinese defense industry as
soon as the congressional restrictions expire.
SPACE COOP DOESNT SOLVE WAR

Unfortunately, a countrys space behavior appears to have little affect on its
terrestrial actions. Russias multidecadal human spaceflight partnership with the
United States did not prevent it from invading and destabilizing Ukraine when it
moved toward a closer relationship with the European Union, many of whose
members are Russian partners in the International Space Station. Space cooperation
has not, and will not, prevent the continued worsening of the security environment
in Europe, which flows from Russian behavior on Earth, not in space.
Space cooperation with China is similarly unlikely to moderate its behavior. Tensions
in Asia derive from Chinas insistence on pressing unlawful territorial claims in the
Pacific, most recently by transforming disputed coral reefs into would-be military
bases. Ironically, civilian space technology has proved critical in documenting these
aggressive moves.
To further demonstrate the civil space cooperation does not promote cooperation on
Earth, we need look no further than recent history. The NASA administrators visit to
China in the fall of 2014 nearly coincided with Chinas hacking of NOAA, with whom
Beijing has a partnership in studying climate change.
Military confrontation flows from the interaction of hard power in pursuit of
competing national interests. Space cooperation falls into the realm of soft power. It
has value in strengthening relationships among like-minded states with similar
interests. Chinas aggressiveness toward its neighbors, its human rights record and
its cyberattacks on the United States strongly demonstrate that it and the United
States are not of like minds. This is not the result of insufficient space cooperation,
but of divergent national interests. The United States is a status quo power; China is
not.
Further cooperation is bad ideological differences
A U.S.-China dialog on space matters can be valuable. Both countries have interests
in collision avoidance, debris mitigation and promotion of the open language of
science. Greater transparency into Chinese antisatellite activities, of which there are
many, would be welcome by many in the international community. There is,
however, little compelling reason for those discussions to evolve into civil space
cooperation.
With that in mind, congressional oversight will be critical to ensure that the State
Departments regular bilateral governmental consultations do not take on a life of
their own or create misguided momentum toward an institutional partnership of
space programs.
The Apollo 17 astronauts left a plaque on the moon that read, May the spirit of
peace in which we came be reflected in the lives of all mankind. It is not a
sentiment China shares. Until Beijing subscribes to that philosophy, the U.S.-Chinese
space agenda should remain in the realm of conversation and information
exchanges, staying away from true cooperation.
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE SUPPORTS THE BAN

http://blog.chron.com/sciguy/2013/12/love-planetary-science-dying-to-exploreeuropas-oceans-meet-the-man-who-can-make-it-happen/
So do you support Rep. Wolfs policy that prevents NASA from working with the
Chinese space agency?
Yes. We need to keep them out of our space program, and we need to keep NASA
out of China. They are not our friends.
BILATERAL COOPERATION HELPS

DISASTER/ENVIRONMENT/OCEAN/LAND
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-space-cooperation-awelcome-dialogue-begins/
Working together on civilian-Earth observation activities would likely involve sharing
data on complex Earth-system processes relevant to everyone on the planet. There
are frequently data gaps in the models designed to address these complex
processes, gaps that can be closed by sharing data. Better models would yield
positive benefits to both countries in fields like disaster management,
environmental studies, coastal and marine planning, and sustainable land use.
Everybody wins.
SOLAR FLARES AND GEOMAGNETIC STORMS
Space-science cooperation has long been discussed as potentially valuable and

viable for two reasons. First, it can be an area of cooperation where technologytransfer concerns can be minimized. Although it would likely begin only with data
exchanges, ideally data exchanges could lead to more extensive projects so that
Americans can learn more about Chinese decision making and foster positive
constituencies within China. Further, space scientists in both countries are
notoriously like stepchildren when it comes to funding allocations. Working
cooperatively could enable scientists in both countries to do more with their limited
funds. One area of space science with practical application is space weather being
able to anticipate solar flares and geomagnetic storms that are potentially
damaging to satellites in orbit and negatively affecting ground facilities and
operations, and thereby be able to protect against those effects. Space weather
predictions are based on fundamental scientific research on solar-terrestrial
physics.
COOPERATION LENDS TO BALANCING, CHINESE STABILITY, AND

SPACE STABILITY
There are some fundamental questions about the U.S.-China relationship that might
prove useful in guiding future policy. Does it support or go against U.S. interests to
keep its friends close and enemies closer? If the answer to that is yes, then either
way, the U.S. should pursue expanded opportunities to work with China in space. Is
in the best interests of the United States to have China stable, or imploding? If the
answer is stable, then we inherently must learn to work with China in areas of
mutual interest. Is the sustainability of the space environment in the interests of the
United States? If it is, there is no choice but to work with China on a variety of space
issues. A second meeting is scheduled for 2016 in Washington, D.C. Hopefully real
progress will be made in advancing cooperation in at least one of the areas initially
broached at the recent September meeting.
Space cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was judiciously used as a
mechanism to build broader areas of trust during the Cold War, and Post-Cold War
years. The United States knows how to successfully conduct space diplomacy. It is
an aberration that today it has to be done in secret so as not to draw the
sensationalist ire of politicians and pundits. Fostering cooperation is an integral part
of the Space Act that created NASA. Ironically, perhaps through the continued,
unintended help of Hollywood the public will recognize the wisdom of allowing
NASA, OSTP and the State Department to do their jobs, and begin to take an active
role in demanding inclusive space cooperation.
ACTUAL COOPERATION WILL CAUSE A FIRESTORM OF SPECIAL

INTERESTS
Plans for this recent U.S. China Dialogue on Civil Space was first announced last
June, consequent to the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue. As online space-policy analyst Marcia Smith stated regarding the Sept 28
meeting, details are scant.[1] Mainstream media coverage has been virtually nonexistent. Most likely, flying under the radar has been okay with the U.S. State
Department, which chaired the Beijing meeting along with the Chinese National
Space Administration (CNSA). Otherwise, critics would have undoubtedly trotted out
their litany of reasonsranging from human rights and freedom of religion to
concerns, some valid and some overblown, about technology transferwhy the
United States should scrap one of its most valuable policy tools, diplomacy, and not
communicate with the Chinese regarding space. Thats the kind of convoluted
reasoning that resulted in a legislative ban since 2011 on bilateral cooperation cum
communication between NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) with China. Careful to stay within Congressional guidelines, that legislation
left it to the State Department to chair the recent Beijing meeting.
SPACE DEBRIS IS AN AREA OF EASY COOPERATION

Apparently also, according to the media note, space debris and satellite collision
avoidance were discussed, in acknowledgement that those issues cannot be
handled solely on a national basis and are critical to maintaining the sustainability
of the space environment. Since the United States has more assets in space and is
more dependent on those space assets in both civil and military operations than
any other country, it behooves the U.S. to pursue all potentially valuable avenues
available to protect the space environment. It is in U.S. interests. Given the
increasing number of Chinese assets in space, sustainability of the space
environment is in Chinese interests as well. Countries cooperate where both have a
vested interest.
CHINA WANTS COOPERATION OLD LAW IS THE ONLY HURDLE

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/asia/china-space-mckenzie/
China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United
States, the country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive
interview.
Fifteen nations including the United States, Russia and Japan cooperate on
International Space Station missions, but China's involvement has always been a
non-starter because of longstanding resistance from U.S. legislators.
US LAW LOCKS CHINA OUT OF SPACE COOPERATION

INTERNATIONALLY
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/05/world/china-space/
But the modern race to the stars is not just about money, it's driven by
technological advances and cooperation.
The International Space Station (ISS) houses a veritable United Nations in space
with 15 countries contributing including the U.S., Russia and Japan.
But not China.
China's 21 astronauts are locked out of the ISS, largely because of pressure from
U.S. legislators.
In 2011, Congress banned NASA from working bilaterally with anyone from the
Chinese space program on national security concerns.
But a recent exhaustive report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission says China's improving space capability "has negative sum
consequences for U.S. military security."
"China is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as a government that seeks to take our
intellectual property, national secrets and treasure and thus Congress is not willing
to partner with them," says CNN space and aviation analyst Miles O'Brien.
"I think it is ultimately a mistake."
PRC USES SPACE PROGRAM AS A MEANS TO THE END OF

MILITARIZING SPACE
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the United States-China Economic Security

Review Commission, it is a privilege to present testimony concerning Chinas
strategic and military ambitions in outer space. While China pursues a growing
commercial, deep space and space science agenda, the foundation of its space
program remains the pursuit of military advantage for the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA). Chinas space endeavors are subordinate to the PLA. While the PLA does not
offer public briefings or budget information about its space combat programs, there
is a considerable body of secondary literature presumably based on strategy or
doctrine, which has long appeared to justify the development of a PLA capability to
wage war in space. Occasionally, however, statements by top officials appear.

According to Chinese press reports on 5 December 2012, newly elevated Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General Xi Jinping gave a speech to a Second
Artillery (SA) audience. Almost nothing of the content of that speech was reported,
until the late 2014 surfacing of a journal article by SA veteran General Sun Mingfu.
In that speech, General Sun said that President Xi made clear the need to enhance
the build-up of ground-based anti-satellite combat force to ensure the timely
formation of combat capability, and to accelerate the development of strategic
anti-missile capability. This article quickly disappeared off of its hosting web page
and a famous Chinese military-technical blog KKTT that gave it prominence soon
disappeared as well.
REPEAL WILL BE DONE ANYWAY WITHOUT PLAN

http://gbtimes.com/china/nasa-chief-says-ban-china-space-cooperation-temporary
NASA administrator Charles Bolden has said the United States should work with
China on human spaceflight projects or find itself frozen out of future international
space exploration.
NASA has been effectively banned by Congress from any bilateral cooperation with
China since 2011, and China has not been allowed to join the 15-nation
collaborative International Space Station project.
However Mr Bolden, speaking on a panel of heads of space agencies at the 2015
International Astronautical Congress in Jerusalem on Monday, believes this state of
affairs is temporary.
"The reason I think that where we are today is temporary is because of a practical
statement that we will find ourselves on the outside looking in, because
everybody...who has any hope of a human spaceflight program ... will go to whoever
will fly their people, Reuters reported Bolden as saying.
Chinas own representative, Xu Dazhe, the head of the body which oversees the
countrys space activities, welcomed Boldens words, saying, "China has no
difficulties in our cooperation policies with other agencies.
PRCS ENDGAME IS SPACE HEGEMONY
On 14 April 2014, Xi was reported to have given a speech before a PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) audience in which he called for an integrated air and space capability.
This phrase was also used by former PLAAF commander General Xu Qiliang during
the 2009 PLAAF 60th anniversary, and by military academic commentators which
listed space weapons the PLA should acquire. Perhaps Xi Jinping also gave the
PLAAF specific space warfare preparation guidance. While there has been some
discussion in the PLA of a new service or a Space Force, today it appears that
current services of the PLA are being encouraged to develop individual space
combat capabilities. Based on an accumulation of data, it is possible to conclude
that the PLAs apparent goal is to exercise denial and then dominance in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) and then to extend control into the Earth-Moon system. Since the early
1990s China has developed four, possibly five, attackcapable space-combat
systems. China may be the only country developing such variety of space weapons
to include: ground-based and air-launched counter-space weapons; unmanned
space combat and Earth-attack platforms; and dual-use manned platforms. It is also
important to consider that the PLAs projection into space is an integral part of
Chinas development of military capabilities to dominate the Asia-Pacific region, and
then to project power globally into the 2020s and 2030s. The PLA requires
increasing space control in order to assure that space-based Information
Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) systems can provide targeting and other and
support for missile, air, naval and ground forces, future intercontinental Prompt
Global Strike (PSG) forces, and for the forces of client/partner states. Sustaining
superiority in LEO, in turn, will require control of the High Ground, or the Moon and
Deep Space.
UNCHECKED CHINESE HAS MANY IMPACTS

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaderships intertwined pursuit of global
military power and dominant space power has three main motivations: 1) to help
sustain the power position of the CCP; 2) to aid the CCPs pursuit of economicpolitical dominance in key regions to best assure resource/commercial access; and,
3) to eventually displace the United States from its position of global leadership.
Space power will also be used to support new Chinese-led or promoted antiU.S./anti-democratic coalitions as it will be used to crush democratic threats to its
rule, beginning with the democracy on Taiwan.
CHINA REJECTS STABILITY AND RESTRAINTS KEY TO CCP

IDENTITY
As with the former Soviet Union, Chinas pursuit of regional and then global military
power is not rooted in an existential threat, but in the CCPs fears for its power
position. This requires a CCP-led rejuvenation of China, entailing mobilization for
greater power, ever more control over its own people, and then increasing control
over others. Another result is Chinas choice to be hostile to Western rules or
concepts that may constrain Chinas power. This justifies an essential Chinese
rejection of American or Western conceptions of transparency and restraint, or
verifiable weapons control in space which might constrain its power.
SPACE COOPERATION HAS NO IMPACT TERRESTRIAL WARS

MORE IMPORTANT
For the United States, cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but
it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts
which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with
Chinese space officials, especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns
over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this juncture, before
China has achieved levels of space dominance, it is crucial to link any real
cooperation with China to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S.
security.
COOPERATION BAD
Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space
corporations, or government institutions at this time presents two risks. First it could
encourage China to advance an illusion of cooperation with the U.S. and the West
while differences on Earth become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to
deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S. options and
actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any new access
for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors.
CHINA WILL LEVERAGE SPACE POWER
Chinas increasing space power, however, like its growing economic and political
power, cannot be contained. Russia appears ready to greatly expand space and
military cooperation with China as part of a larger strategic alignment, while the
European Space Agency is edging toward greater cooperation with China. These
attractions may only increase if China has the only LEO manned space station in the
mid-2020s. Already a top commercial space service and technology provider, China
will use its gathering space diplomacy tools to aid its pursuit of economic, political
and military influence in critical regions like Africa and Latin America.
CP: DEMOCRATIC COALITION TO CHECK CHINA IN SPACE

In addition, as the PLA moves substantially out to deep space, the Moon, or to the
Lagrangian Points, it will be necessary for the U.S. to consider a compensating
presence that is affordable, attractive to a coalition of democracies, and helps to
deter China from seeking strategic advantage. Strategic priorities would suggest
that a presence on or near the Moon is of greater importance than going to Mars. A
multinational government-private presence on the Moon is one option, as is the
likely less expensive option of a far cis-lunar presence to further develop manned
deep space capabilities.
COOPERATION BAD
As was the case with the former Soviet Union, relative peace on Earth or in space
will not truly be possible until China evolves beyond its Leninist dictatorship. In its
final years, the Soviet Union was on the cusp of deploying multiple space combat
systems despite years of U.S.-Soviet space diplomacy. Real space cooperation
between Russia the West became possible only after the fall of the Soviet Union,
and may again become threatened by Russias slide into authoritarian aggression.
Substantive cooperation with China in space offers no assurance that China will
change its threatening behaviors on Earth or in space, but does create opportunities
for China to exploit U.S. and Western space technology to gain potential military
advantages.
CHINA SPACE PROGRAM KEY TO CCP STABILITY
Fears for political survival and ambitions for global leadership remain the basis for
Chinas current surge for global military power and space power. The greatest
impetus for the most recent phase of PLA modernization and buildup was the shock
of the 1989 Tiananmen rebellion -- the only time the Partys power position was
actually threatened by popular, though unorganized, reformist and democratic
demands. In addition to ruthlessly crushing any potential for democratic dissent, the
transitioning CCP leadership of Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin decided to begin the
broad military and space modernization and buildup we see today.
CHINA WILL GET OFF THE ROCK BY 2050 WITHOUT US

Chinas political-diplomatic and military space power will be increased by the
completion of a dual-use manned space station in the early 2020s and perhaps new
small and large reusable dualuse unmanned and manned space planes. If the ISS
winds down in the early 2020s it is increasingly apparent that Russia may seek
significant space cooperation with China, replacing its space relationship with
Washington. By the early 2030s, the new date for the completion of its 100-ton-plus
payload heavy SLV, China may be taking its first steps on the Moon and building
toward permanent bases by the 2050s or 2060s. Chinas push for the Moon is
prompted by a quest for prestige and to control areas that may yield potential
economic/resource benefits. The PLA can also be expected to seek military benefits
from its Moon presence. Should Chinas emerging space and terrestrial power
increasingly constrain U.S. power, then Europe and India may be tempted to
increasingly bandwagon with China, especially in space.
CHINA WILL HAVE MOON BASES BY 2050 MORE US

COMPETITION WILL ONLY SPEED THIS UP
Provided the CCP survives to expand its power, by 2030 China will require
increasing space power in order to support its expanding global projection forces on
Earth, and because military competition in space will have become more intense,
largely due to Chinas continued development of space combat capabilities. It is
likely that an expansion in the number of space combat programs by individual
services will have prompted the PLA to create a unique Space Force. While
Chinas first manned forays to the Moon may not occur until soon after 2030, plans
will have advanced significantly toward the creation of a permanent Moon Base by
2050 or sooner. A proliferation of its space combat systems around the Earth will
push China to seek increasing advantage, setting the stage for its strategic-military
development of the Moon.
CHINA WILL PARTNER WITH RUSSIA LEADS TO SPACE HEG

AND SPACE COLONIZATION
As mentioned earlier, absent a fundamental change in the character of the CCP or

its evolution in a pluralistic direction, China is unlikely to accept negotiated limits on
its expanding space power. Furthermore, Russia, provided its authoritarian antiWestern character increases, may have to seek a far more deeper military
relationship with China, assuming Beijings hunger for Russian resources can be
satisfied short of taking its territory. Space technology may become Russia strong
suit in its military relationship with China, provided it can sustain Chinese funds to
insure its space sector remains competitive. Since early in the last decade Russia
has been considering its post-ISS future in space, considering alternate space
station designs, Moon and initial Mars missions, manned architectures and next
generation spaceships, perhaps to include nuclear propulsion. While Chinas
preference may be to develop its national space capabilities, as it has done
repeatedly regarding weapons technology it could begin broad space technology
cooperation with Russia to accelerate next generation capabilities.
CHINA DEVELOPING SPACE WEAPONS NOW

A potential Chinese leap-frog technology advance was briefed at the 2014
International Astronautical Congress (IAC) in Toronto attended by this analyst. A
Chinese engineer briefed a paper proposing that Chinas next generation data relay
satellites use optical or laser data links, which could phenomenally increase data
transfer rates. The major technological obstacle was to develop an optical/laser data
transfer to Earth receivers that could overcome atmospheric distortion. If

successful, such data transfer rates could go far to enable an intimate level
streaming tactical imagery of targets for very distant hypersonic Prompt Global
Strike systems, space bombing platforms, perhaps in multiple simultaneous combat
theaters. The kicker: the engineer noted this satellite could begin development to
construction in 2016 or 2021. China may be the only country investing in this
capability
Occasional statements from Chinese military academics and academic engineering
articles point to Chinas interest in developing a range of future space combat
capabilities. Asian military sources told this analyst in 2008 that an initial PLA ABM
system could emerge in the early 2020s. This might happen even sooner. Chinesedeveloped ABM/ASAT capable missiles may become smaller and deployable on
aircraft, ship and submarine platforms. In a December 2013 journal article,
engineers from the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics, a
leading Chinese laser weapon research body, proposed it would be possible by the
mid-2020s for China to loft a 5-ton laser-armed space combat platform. A key
enabling technology would be large membrane mirrors. It should be considered that
by the mid-2030s might China be able to halve the size of possible laser space
combat platforms so as to launch more in a single SLV.
PLA WANTS MOON FOR MILITARY AND RESOURCES

As it controls the rest of Chinas space program, the PLA also controls Chinas Moon
program. As it has done throughout its space program, the PLA can be expected to
seek dual use benefits from Chinas presence on the Moon. Over a decade ago,
Chinese Moon program leader Dr. Ouyang Ziyuan, highlighted the Moons military
value and the need for China to be able to secure vital resources, perhaps Helium-3
to power future fusion energy reactors. Writing on 31 January 2015 on the website
of the CCP Central Committees journal Quishi (Seeking Truth), the Chairman and
CCP Party Secretary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation
(CASC), Lei Fanpei, stressed that "We will adhere to the path of developing militarycivil integration in our coming demonstration of deep space exploration, manned
moon landing, heavy launch vehicle and other major programs, and are of major
significance both to the nation's longterm development and to the task of building
the nation into a strong space power." This is a strong indicator that the PLA will use
its Moon and Deep Space program for military gain. While some Western analysts
may scoff at the idea of the Moon having military value, perhaps PLA planners have
decided otherwise.
PLA PLAYING THE LONG GAME
What if, in about 100 years, breakthroughs in space propulsion make it possible to
reach Mars in weeks, versus months or years? Should the Earths economy come to
be dominated increasingly by access to resources on Mars, then the Moon and the
Langrangian Points become the nearest parking garages to support that
commerce. So from a very long term perspective it may be attractive to the PLA to
secure a dominant position on the Moon in order to have the option to secure
access to other potentially strategic positions in the Earth-Moon system.
CP REVITALIZE SPACE PROGRAM

The degree to which China, with possible Russian help, obtains space control will
most likely be determined by the degree to which the United States rises to defend
access to space by the democracies and deters attacks by China and Russia. From
the perspective of the 2015 policy balance in Washington, this will require a
fundamental political shift to emphasize a commitment to sustaining a broad
rebuilding of U.S. power to include space power. It will also require a constant
investment in the futures technologies. There must be a deep search for what will
succeed the systems viewed as the next wave of space power: micro and nanosat
constellations; mega membrane-based deep-space surveillance satellites;
hypersonic cross-air and glide vehicles; liquid-fueled 100-plus ton payload SLVs;
solid state lasers; $1 -$20 million space launch services; and, strategic position on
the Moon.
CHINA MILITARIZING SPACE NOW
After nearly 25 years of continuous development of its current ASAT systems, China
shows little inclination to consider constraints on its space combat system
development. So far China has demonstrated four, possibly five, ASAT systems;
ground based lasers, two ground launched ASATs; and both an unmanned and a
possible manned co-orbital interceptor. It is reasonable for the United States to
conclude that it needs to develop appropriate capabilities to deter the CCP/PLA from
starting a shooting war in space. This should include capabilities that produce rapid
symmetrical effects following Chinese attacks against U.S. space assets. It may not
be necessary for the U.S. to match every Chinese space combat development, but
the U.S. may require its own variety of space combat capabilities.
MULTINATIONAL SOLVES BETTER US TAKES LEAD

As it seeks to deter via retaliation and resilience, the U.S. must also be investing in
strategic-positional deterrence, or simply put, make sure it can contest the high
ground-- which for the near term means the Moon. For the U.S. to bypass the Moon
and simply invest in a Mars program that many take many decades to materialize,
and leave China to build dominance over the Moon, would constitute strategic
myopia for the United States. Under national policies of civil-military integration
China likely seek military benefits from its presence on the Moon, perhaps to include
developing options to block U.S. access to Mars. Essential to exercising the option to
build a Moon or Cis-Lunar presence would be the development of the heavy lift
Space Launch System (SLS), and encouraging private companies to develop more
efficient medium-heavy lift SLVs. While the U.S. government may not necessarily
require a program to physically return to the Moon, it should retain the means to get
there if required, and it should actively encourage multinational government-private
initiatives to build an unmanned or manned Moon presence.
MULTINATIONAL MOON CHECKS CHINA AND RUSSIA MAKES

PEACE
This could offer a new broad international program to succeed the ISS. It has the
advantage of allowing space-faring nations with interests in deep space, like India
and Japan, to own this project from the beginning and to leverage their
participation to develop respective national capabilities such as heavy SLVs. A large
multinational Moon program could create positive pressures for Russia and China
play nice and, depending upon relations on Earth, advance an opportunity for
peaceful cooperation that may offer a better chance to challenge Chinas
spacenationalist policies. If this does not work, then the West will have secured a
presence on the Moon that can at least offer options to respond to possible Chinese
or Russian military exploitation.
CHINA WANTS TO COOPERATE IN SPACE

China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with
the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of
responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its
behavior on Earth, or in space, Chinas basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out
the Americans. They are relying on Chinas accumulation of space power to
convince enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China
must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in
both economic and military realms.
CHINESE WILL USE ESPIONAGE EMPIRICALLY TRUE

A 29 September 2014 editorial in the prestigious Aviation Week and Space

Technology noted, It is absurd that the U.S. Navy can conduct joint exercises with
the Chinese navy but Congress bars NASA from working directly with Chinese
engineers and scientists. Well, to the shock of the U.S. Navy and its allies, when
China accepted its first invitation to participate in the 2014 multilateral RIMPAC
exercises, it brought along its own ELINT ship to record everybodys electronic
emissions a threatening response demonstrating essential hostility to the intent
of inviting Chinas participation. This simply does not bode well for cooperation in
space either. To boot, the U.S., Russia and Europe all have had their sad experiences
with Chinese espionage targeting their respective space sectors. According to the
testimony of a Chinese solid fuel rocket motor engineer interviewed by this analyst,
what they learned from the Martin Marietta solid satellite kick motor used on a
Chinese SLV in the early 1990s has enabled all of their solid rocket motors for their
new ballistic missiles now targeting the United States and its allies with nuclear
weapons. Europes Galileo navigation satellite program wanted China to be a
partner, but when China obtained the technology it needed, it left and built its
Compass system. At the 2007 Moscow Airshow, Russian space officials explained
their attempt circa 1998 to promote business and cooperation by selling
internships or access, to some 200 Chinese engineers, to Russian space
companies. The Russians did not sell space station tech to China, but they now
know why the Chinese space station looks like theirs.
SPACE SUBSERVIENT TO ALL OTHER ISSUES DONT SELL THE

FARM FOR THE COW
A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in space
with China cannot be separated from Chinas ambitions on Earth or out into space.
Likewise, for the United States to wall off space cooperation with China and to
treat it as a special realm only plays into Chinas game. As long as it is ruled by
the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan,
militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like
Pakistan, become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and
Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It is imperative
for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering Chinas
expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to U.S. security than is
space cooperation with China.
CHINA USES SPACE PROGRAM FOR SOFTER POWER, HARD

POWER, AND STATUS HEGEMONY
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Pollpeter_Testimony.pdf
China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. It seeks increased influence and
independence from foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving Chinas
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political system. Over the long
term, China seeks to transform the international system to better suit its interests,
but seeks to integrate itself into the existing international system over the short
term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment into one in
which it is dominant. Chinas pursuit of space power is intended to carry out this
strategy. China views the development of space power as a necessary move for a
country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, Chinas goal is to
become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry
that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a
comprehensive, long-term approach to its space program that emphasizes the
accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By
placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing
ample funding, the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its
space program can prosper. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it
is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to
become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as
the United States is in space.
CHINA SPACE HEG ABOUT PERCEPTION CATCH UP INEVITABLE

Chinas efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic,
and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership. Even if U.S.
space power continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid advance in
space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in
space. At its current trajectory, Chinas space program, even if not the equal of the
U.S. space program, will at some point be good enough to adequately support
modern military operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that
will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control
of its own destiny.
CHINA WILL WEAPONIZED SPACE KEY TO FUTURE WARS

Chinas space program assists the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to
achieve information superiority, defined as the ability to freely use information and
the ability to deny the use of information to an adversary. Based on their analysis of
U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical
component in making the PLA into a force capable of winning informatized wars
and recognize the role space plays in the collection and transmittal of information
and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary. Indeed, nearly every
Chinese source describes space as the ultimate high ground, leading many
Chinese analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the
preeminence of the space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will
become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and
controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the
initiative is to achieve space supremacy.
CHINA STRONG
China has made impressive progress in space technologies since 2000. China now
has nearly a full range of satellites to accomplish a variety of missions. These
include remote sensing satellites with various resolutions and covering various
spectrums, a satellite navigation system, communication satellites, and robust
human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs.
CHINA HAS COUNTERSPACE TECH DEPLOYED NOW

The PLA also recognizes that it must deny the use of information to its opponents.
Chinese analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR capabilities by
potential adversaries, especially the United States, requires the PLA to develop
capabilities to attack space systems. According to the U.S. Defense Department,
China has a broad-based development program for counterspace technology that
consists of jammers, direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directedenergy weapons, and
co-orbital spacecraft.1 Chinas development of counterspace weapons appears to
be aimed at developing an all-around capability to threaten satellites with a variety
of weapons at all orbits.
SPACE RACE AT TIPPING POINT NOW

Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such
statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily,
diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States
is in space. Despite Chinese statements that it is not in a space race, Chinas space
program has generated concern both in the United States and in Asia. As Clay Moltz
writes, There is a space race going on in Asia, but its outcomepeaceful
competition or military confrontationis still uncertain. He concludes that although
there are still reasonable prospects for avoiding negative outcomes in spaceAsia
is at risk of moving backward, motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and
hindered by poor communications on security matters.40 As a result, Chinas
progress in space technologies, whether in relative or absolute terms, has
implications for the United States and its neighbors. As Chinas space program
increases in capability, it can be expected to wield this power in ways that,
according to Bonnie Glaser, not only persuade its neighbors that there is more to
gain from accommodating Chinese interests but also deter countries from
pursuing policies that inflict damage on Chinese interests.
INCREASED FUNDING KEY TO MAINTAINING SPACE HEG

First, if the United States is to remain the leading space power then it must continue
to invest in both its civilian and military space programs. Although innovation is
affected by many factors, nothing can get done without adequate funding. This fact
has not been lost on the Chinese government, which is taking a broad-based, wellfunded approach to its space program.
SPACE KEY TO CHINAS REGIONAL HEG
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter
%202%2C%20Section%202%20-%20China%27s%20Space%20and
%20Counterspace%20Programs.pdf
China has become one of the top space powers in the world after decades of high
prioritization and steady investment from its leaders, indigenous research and
development, and a significant effort to buy or otherwise appropriate technologies
from foreign sources, especially the United States. Chinas aspirations are driven by
its assessment that space power enables the countrys military modernization and
would allow it to challenge U.S. information superiority during a conflict. As the
Commission has documented in previous reports, China has asserted sovereignty
over much of the East and South China seas, as well as Taiwan, and is engaged in a
course of aggressive conduct to enforce those claims against its neighbors. Among
other purposes, Chinas space and counterspace programs are designed to support
its conduct as part of its antiaccess/area denial * strategy to prevent or impede U.S.
intervention in a potential conflict. China also believes that space power drives the
countrys economic and technological advancement and provides the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) with significant domestic political legitimacy and
international prestige. Although Chinas space capabilities still generally lag behind
those of the United States and Russia, its space program is expanding and
accelerating rapidly as many other countries programs proceed with dwindling
resources and limited goals.
SPACE KEY TO CHINAS DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY


SPACE DRIVES CHINAS ECON AND TECH INNOVATION

China focused on info tech
In the early 1980s, China set out to transform its military from a large infantrybased army designed to fight protracted wars into a smaller, well-trained, and
informationized force.* China accelerated this effort in 2004, when the PLA
formally institutionalized the concept of informationization. 30 Since then, the
PLA has based its preparations for military struggle on the strategy of winning
local wars under the conditions of informationization, ac cording to authoritative
PLA documents.* 31 This requires China to narrow the technology gap between the
PLA and the worlds most advanced militaries through a focus on information
technology and on developing and procuring new, high-tech communications and
data fusion systems for battle space management and for longrange, accurate
weapons. At the operational level, PLA writings identify information superiority as
the key factor in all antiaccess/ area denial tasks, which includes the fielding of an
integrated air defense and the coordination and synchronization of strikes against
an adversarys forces. According to Chinas most recent Science of Campaigns, an
authoritative document on PLA campaigns published by Chinas National Defense
University, the struggle for . . . information superiority has infiltrated into each
campaign phase . . . and become a decisive condition for seizing the battlefield
initiative. 32 PLA strategists and analysts recognize that space forces are crucial to
the PLAs transformation into an informationized force as well as its ability to
achieve information superiority during a conflict. According to Dean Cheng, senior
research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at the Heritage Foundation,
these PLA analysts have specifically noted that more and more essential data . . .
is gathered from or transits through satellites. They assess that space systems
now provide a majority of battlefield communication, battlefield surveillance and
reconnaissance, weather condition assessment, and precision guidance functions,
rendering space dominance an essential component of realizing information
dominance. 33 The PLA has accordingly developed space capabilities in pursuit of
achieving these and other functions, including ISR, ballistic missile warning, space
launch detection and characterization, environmental monitoring, satellite
communication, and position, navigation, and timing. Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance. Space-based systems can monitor areas of interest to help
provide Chinas political and military leaders with information on an adversarys
location, disposition, and intent; assist in tracking, targeting, and engaging an
adversarys forces; and provide a means to conduct battle damage assessment.
They also can provide situational awareness and warning of attack. Ballistic
Missile Warning. Space-based systems, in conjunction with ground-based systems
and operators, can provide Chinas political and military leaders with timely warning
and characterization of foreign ballistic missile events and nuclear detonations to
support threat/non-threat determination and followon decision making. Space
Launch Detection and Characterization. Space-based systems, in conjunction with
ground-based systems, can provide information necessary to assess both foreign
and domestic space launches. Launch detection data can be used to evaluate
events that could directly or indirectly threaten Chinas space assets so the PLA can
achieve timely warning and take appropriate countermeasures. This capability also
can support analysis of Chinas domestic space launches. Environmental

Monitoring. Space-based systems can provide data on meteorological,
oceanographic, and space environmental factors that affect PLA operations.
Additionally, space capabilities can provide data to assist the development of
forecasts, alerts, and warnings regarding factors in the space environment that may
negatively impact Chinas space assets, space operations, and their terrestrial
users. Imagery capabilities can provide Chinese planners with current information
on sub-surface, surface, and air conditions, allowing PLA commanders to avoid
adverse environmental conditions or take advantage of other conditions to enhance
operations. Such monitoring also can support intelligence preparation of the
operational environment by providing PLA analysts with information necessary to
assess potential adversary courses of action. Satellite Communications. Satellite
communications can provide the PLA with the ability to establish or augment
telecommunications in operating areas that lack suitable land infrastructure.
Potential PLA applications of satellite communication technology include providing
instant global connection between deployed forces and the Central Military
Commission, transmitting critical intelligence between echelons of command, and
tying sensors to weapons systems. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT).
Space-based PNT assets can provide information PLA forces can use to more
effectively plan, coordinate, and execute operations. Precise and reliable PNT
information is essential to the performance of virtually every modern Chinese
weapon system.34 The PLA can apply precision timing to synchronize operations
and conduct attacks from stand-off distances, thereby allowing Chinese forces to
avoid threat areas and defend against opposing naval forces from a position as far
as possible from the Chinese coast. Analysis of authoritative Chinese documents
indicates Beijing believes space superiority would be critical to almost every
component of its military operations (particularly long-range precision strikes)
during a potential Taiwan Strait conflict and against the United States and other
potential adversaries in the region.35 In 2009, then PLA Air Force Commander and
current Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang said space had
become a new commanding height for international strategic competition and
having control of air and space means having control of the ground, oceans, and
the electromagnetic space, which also means having the strategic initiative in ones
hands. 36 Chinas 2015 defense white paper * affirms the importance of space in
Chinas strategic calculus: Outer space has become a commanding height in
international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space
forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have
appeared. . . . China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with
security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve
its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.
CHINA DEVELOPING COUNTERSPACE TECH AGAINST US

The PLA also is pursuing a robust and comprehensive array of counterspace
capabilities. China has not published an officially endorsed document describing its
counterspace strategy and doctrine and likely is still developing its tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Since the early 2000s, however, PLA doctrinal
publications and military writings on space warfare * and Chinas demonstrated and
developmental counterspace capabilities indicate Chinas program is primarily
designed to deter U.S. strikes against Chinas space assets, deny space superiority
to the United States, and attack U.S. satellites.38 These purposes are likely driven
by three security-related assessments: The PLA assesses that obtaining and
demonstrating the ability to damage or destroy the satellites an adversary
considers essential to its national security and military operations could deter that
adversary from attacking Chinas space assets, potentially in the event of a conflict
arising from Chinas coercive actions in its near seas. According to a PLA writing on
space deterrence, it is necessary to display ones own power to the enemy so that
they perceive the deterrent force, and also to get them to realize that this force is
capable of creating loss or consequences that would be difficult for them to accept.
39 Moreover, Chinas military strategists perceive counterspace capabilities to be a
more credible and flexible deterrent than nuclear and conventional capabilities, as
the threshold for the use of counterspace capabilities is lower because it would not
involve a significant loss of life.40 Beijing recognizes that its satellites are vital for
its commercial and civil sectors and that disruptions to these systemseven for
short durationscould contribute to internal instability by harming Chinas economy
and government operations.41 The PLA assesses U.S. satellites are critical to the
United States ability to sustain combat operations globally. PLA analysis of U.S.
military operations states that destroying or capturing satellites and other
sensors . . . will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it
difficult] for them to bring their precision-guided weapons into full play. 42 In
another study, the PLA estimated that the United States developed a
comprehensive surveillance system comprising approximately 50 satellites as well
as unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft during its participation in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign in Kosovo. The same study estimates space
systems provided 70 percent of U.S. battlefield communications during the
campaign, 80 percent of its battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, and 100
percent of its meteorological data, and did so 24/7 through all weather
conditions.43
SPACE KEY TO CHINESE ECON

Senior Chinese government and aerospace officials publicly tout the economic and
commercial benefits of Chinas space program, highlighting four areas in particular:
market creation and spin-off technologies, satellite application technologies,
commercial launch services, and satellite exports Chinese analysts assess that
Chinas space program has had a transformative impact on the countrys national
economy. In their view, the demand created by large, complex space projects
involving numerous government and commercial entities and utilizing a wide range
of technologies can spur advancement in areas such as computers,
microelectronics, precision manufacturing, automatic control, new energy, and new
materials. Moreover, they assess that Chinas space program provides demand for
skilled labor and expanded science and engineering educational programs. These
analysts point to the U.S. Apollo program as the best example of the transformative
impact a national space program can have on a countrys economy.45
SPACE KEY TO LEGITIMACY
Like other space powers, China uses its space program to enhance its international
prestige and influence. Analysis of authoritative Chinese documents indicates
Beijing believes successful space activities, particularly human spaceflight, provide
important geo-strategic benefits, such as bolstering Chinas international image,
promoting a role for China on the world stage commensurate with what it sees as its
growing international status, and increasing Chinas ability to influence international
policy generally and international space policy specifically.65 For example, as China
moves from a regional to global PNT service provider, Beijing could use the Beidou
system as leverage to obtain more influence over PNT-related decisions in
international and regional organizations such as the International
Telecommunications Union,66 the International Committee on Global Navigation
Satellite Systems, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization. The CCP also uses Chinas space program
to rally public support, a move indicative of the partys larger strategy to legitimize
itself by convincing the Chinese people it is delivering economic growth and a better
quality of life while restoring China to its rightful place as a world leader following
the countrys so-called century of humiliation from the mid-19th to the mid-20th
centuries. Mr. Pollpeter explains: The CCP is now communist in name only, and its
continued legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and nationalistic benefits
in an informal social contract with its citizens: the CCP agrees to increase the
standard of living and develop China into an internationally respected country, and
the people agree not to rebel. By developing a robust space program and
participating in high-profile activities such as human spaceflight and lunar
exploration, the CCP can demonstrate that it is the best provider of material
benefits to the Chinese people and the best organization to propel China to its
rightful place in world affairs.67 China collaborates with other countries on a range
of bilateral and multilateral space activities, including satellite development, space
exploration, human spaceflight, space object surveillance and identification, and
space R&D.68 Many of these engagements are designed to facilitate Chinas
acquisition of new technologies from technologically-advanced states and to
promote the export of Chinas space technologies to states with space programs
lagging behind its own.69 Others are intended to help China achieve a level of
space situational awareness that enables the PLAs offensive and defense space
missions and supports Chinas orbital debris detection, mitigation plans, and
operations.
CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM KEY TO REGIONAL POWER

PROJECTION AND ECONOMIC ENTANGLEMENT
With its headquarters located in Beijing, APSCO is Chinas primary entity for
multilateral cooperation on space. China led the founding of the formal,
membership-only organization in 2008 as a successor to the Asia-Pacific Multilateral
Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications organization.70 Aside from
China, APSCO has seven other member countries,* all of which have less advanced
space programs than that of China. APSCO members hold conferences, engage in
joint training efforts, and cooperate on multilateral research and development
projects. 71 These efforts allow China to position itself as a purveyor of space
technology and expertise to lesser-developed states; China has, for example,
donated ground systems and will provide remote sensing data to other member
countries. 72 Chinas leaders also likely use Beijings central role in APSCO to
promote the export of its space technology and services in order to gain support for
its space goals in the Asia Pacific region, as well as to obtain supplementary data
and geographic coverage for its space situational awareness efforts.
RELATIONS STAGNATED NOW

Limited U.S.-China space cooperation began in the late 1970s, when the two
countries signed a space exchange agreement and a memorandum of
understanding on space technology cooperation.193 U.S.-China cooperative space
activities increased between 1990 and 1999, when the United States looked to
China for satellite launch services. Following the loss of the space shuttle Challenger
in 1986, which effectively ended the United States plan to launch future military
and commercial satellites aboard space shuttles, the United States faced a shortage
of satellite launch facilities and began contracting launches out to other countries,
including China. During this period, China launched a total of 19 U.S.-manufactured
commercial satellites. Cooperation ended in 1999 when Congress passed a law
prohibiting the launch of U.S. satellites by China, following revelations that several
U.S. companies involved in the Chinese launches had illegally transferred potentially
sensitive military information to China and that China had stolen classified
information on advanced U.S. nuclear weapons technology.194 Since this decision,
aside from limited instances of cooperation, U.S.-China space relations have
stagnated due to ongoing U.S. government concerns about Chinas efforts to illicitly
procure U.S. space technology.* Washington also remains wary of Chinas intentions
as a growing space power, particularly with respect to Chinas lack of transparency
regarding its intentions in space and Chinas focus on developing counterspace
capabilities to restrict U.S. freedom of movement in space.
CHINA WANTS THE BAN REMOVED HUGE TO OVERALL

RELATIONS
The law further applies this limitation to any funds used to effectuate the hosting
of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA. It only
allows for NASA to engage in activities which NASA or OSTP have certified pose no
risk of resulting in technology transfer, data, or other information with national
security or economic security implications to China or a Chinese-owned company,
requiring the certification to be submitted to Congress 14 days beforehand.199
Language added in 2013 requires that these activities also not involve knowing
interactions with officials who have been determined by the United States to have
direct involvement with violations of human rights. 200 Under this law, NASAs
administrator has still been able to meet with Chinese counterparts in China and in
official multilateral settings, and visits by Chinese nationals to NASA facilities are
permitted if certified and presented to Congress as required.201 The law has
notably disallowed participation by Chinese astronauts in missions to the
International Space Station, though Chinas noninvolvement in the program
predates 2011.* 202 Additionally, a ban mistakenly placed by NASA officials on
Chinese scientists participation at an international NASA conference in 2013 was
misattributed to the law.203 Chinas pursuit of enhanced bilateral space
cooperation has included efforts to persuade the United States to lift these
restrictions, with a 2013 commentary in state-run PLA Daily specifically calling for
the removal of the Wolf Clause that bans China-U.S. space cooperation,
terming it a huge roadblock in terms of bilateral cooperation and mutual benefits.

204
US AND CHINA WILL NOT WEAPONIZED SPACE

The two sides reaffirmed that avoiding orbital collisions serves their common
interest in exploring and using outer space for peaceful purposes, noting that
further consultation is needed on the process for resolving an orbital close
approach and that such a consultation should aim to ensure timely resolution to
reduce the probability of accidental collisions. The two countries determined to
continue bilateral government-to-government consultations on satellite collision
avoidance and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities as part of the
U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue.
NO RISK OF TECH STEALING
Other observers have suggested it is possible for the United States to improve
space cooperation with China while also protecting U.S. security interests and
supporting the U.S. space programs development. In his testimony to the
Commission, Philip Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Affairs of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, argued, there are other areas such as many scientific applications and
manned space flight where the United States can share information and
experiences without compromising national security and can benefit from growing
Chinese investments in space capabilities and Chinas potential contributions to
international space cooperation. 211
COOPERATION TOO RISKY

Although the United States and China continue to pursue opportunities to
collaborate on space endeavors, such cooperation is not without its potential
hazards. Mr. Cheng advised the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
Technology, and Transportation that the United States should proceed with caution
as it considers expanding space cooperation with China: While the United States
should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is
vital that cooperation occur with full understanding and awareness of whom we are
cooperating with, and that such cooperation serve American interests. In the case of
[China], the combination of an opaque Chinese space management structure, a

heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set of
capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits
from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. To this end, it is
essential to recognize a few key characteristics of Chinas space program. First, that
China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and therefore is not
necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, there is an
assumption that [China] is still in the early stages of space development, and that
we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the Chinese
space program is closely tied to the [PLA]. . . . Therefore, any cooperation with
[China] in terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. Third,
that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, is a source
of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the
United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination,
suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and [China] will
confront serious obstacles, and entail significant risks.210
SPACE KEY TO CHINAS NATIONAL SELF-IMAGE

Chinas improving space capabilities are challenging U.S. superiority in the
information and space domains. A senior official at the PLAs Academy of Military
Science underscored Chinas ambition to rival the worlds top space powers
following Chinas 2007 antisatellite test: [If there is going to be] a space
superpower, its not going to be alone. . . . It will have company. 212 In 2013,
Central Military Commission Chairman and Chinese President Xi Jinping said the
dream of space flight is an important part of the strong country dream and the
space dream is an important component of realizing the Chinese peoples mighty
dream of national rejuvenation. 213
SPACE KEY TO US ECON AND HEG
Space activities are critical to the United States technological advancement,
scientific discovery, security, and economic growth. As outlined in the Obama
Administrations 2010 National Space Policy, the utilization of space has
transformed every aspect of U.S. society, and the benefits of space permeate daily
life in the United States: Satellites contribute to increased transparency and stability
among nations and provide a vital communications path for avoiding potential
conflicts. Space systems increase our knowledge in many scientific fields, and life
on Earth is far better as a result. The utilization of space has created new markets;
helped save lives by warning us of natural disasters, expediting search and rescue
operations, and making recovery efforts faster and more effective; made agriculture
and natural resource management more efficient and sustainable; expanded our
frontiers; and provided global access to advanced medicine, weather forecasting,
geospatial information, financial operations, broadband and other communications,
and scores of other activities worldwide. Space systems allow people and
governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty,
navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance.214 Space capabilities also
have enhanced U.S. security and have been a key element of warfighting for more
than 30 yearsto the extent that U.S. national security is now dependent on the
space domain. According to the joint DODIntelligence Community National Security
Space Strategy, published in 2011: Space capabilities provide the United States and
our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military
operations, and homeland security. Space systems provide national security
decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a decision advantage by
enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. Moreover, space
systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as well as
supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification. Space systems are also
critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor
long-term environmental trends.215
US BUILDUP LEADS TO CHINA BUILDUP

The United States sustained success in integrating space capabilities into its
military operations has encouraged China to pursue a broad and robust array of
counterspace capabilities to deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy U.S. space
systems and their supporting infrastructure. This program includes direct-ascent
antisatellite missiles, computer network operations, ground-based satellite
jammers, and directed energy weapons. China also appears to be developing coorbital antisatellite systems, which have not been a significant concern for the
United States since the fall of the Soviet Union.
CHINA SPACE GROWTH HURTS US ECON
In addition to the implications it poses for U.S. military interests, the rapid
expansion of Chinas space industry could also have economic consequences for the
United States. First, Chinas persistent global marketing of its commercial satellite
and space launch services has the potential to cut into U.S. market share in these
areas, though it has had little effect on established satellite manufacturers or the
international launch market thus far. Although Chinas current effort focuses on
growing its satellite exports to lower-income buyers, it almost certainly will
eventually expand to higher-end markets, following a business plan similar to that of
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Chinas launch service costs compare
favorably with those of Arianespace, the major European provider, and may match
those of SpaceX, the low-cost leading U.S. private firm, as described earlier. In
addition, according to one former European space executive, China has broken into
the launch services market by offering prices at as low as three-quarters of the
launches cost, suggesting heavy government assistance on top of low initial costs
will enable China to successfully compete for broader market share in the future.
Furthermore, China often packages its satellite exports and launch services
together, and also reaps cost and experience bene fits from blending its civilian and
military space infrastructure, which is expected to provide additional competitive
advantages. An executive for U.S. company SpaceX, which has led a resurgence in
U.S. commercial launch market share after U.S. organizations were priced out of the
market until recently, stated in 2013 that the company views China as its main
competition. However, in a July 2015 meeting with the Commission, the China Great
Wall Industry Corporation asserted that it is unable to compete with Western
counterparts due to U.S. export controls, indicating that obstacles remain despite
Chinas cost advantages.221 Second, Chinas designation of the Beidou satellite
navigation systemplanned to provide global service by 2020as national
infrastructure, and introduction of preferential policies to promote its place in
Chinas domestic satellite navigation market, will directly impact the market share
of GPS and related products within China.222 While GPS usage provides no
revenues to the United States, Beidou is also intended to foster development in
downstream industries such as mobile internet applications, which may affect U.S.
firms market share in these industries.223 Third, U.S. International Trafficking in
Arms Regulations (ITAR), altered by the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act to
no longer include exports of many satellites and satellite technologies but still in
force for China, have prompted many European countries and their industries to
pursue ITAR-free exports in order to reach the Chinese marketby definition
necessitating the exclusion of U.S. technologies from these products. Mr. Nurkin
testified to the Commission that concern over U.S. export controls on space-related
items and confusion over which items are on the list of banned items for export and,
importantly, which ones will be in the future, has led international industry,
especially the European space industry, which has far less severe export guidelines
for space technologies, to endeavor to design ITAR-free solutions, effectively cutting
out U.S. based suppliers of ITAR-restricted items from international supply chains.
224 Mr. Nurkin suggested that export control reform should focus on increasing
protection on a small number of systems and technologies that the United States is
and should be unwilling to offer on the open market instead of focusing on the
many technologies that China probably already has access to from foreign partners,
particularly Europe.225 In May 2015, General James Cartwright, former vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Honorable Sean OKeefe, former NASA
administrator, reiterated that U.S. ITAR regulations are not currently in line with the
pace of technological innovation and are therefore in need of reform in order to
protect the U.S. space industrys global competitiveness.
CHINA SPACE PROGRAM HAS PERCEPTUAL MOMENTUM

STATUS WILL OVERTAKE US SOON REGARDLESS OF TECH
Chinas thriving space programs have important political implications as well, most
importantly in their potential to present a future challenge to the United States
position as a leading space power. Chinas human spaceflight program may be
repeating many of the same accomplishments the United States achieved in the
1970s, but it also is tempering U.S. superiority in civilian space capabilities and
lessening U.S. influence in the international space community. Roger Handberg,
professor at the University of Central Florida, testified to the Commission that
psychologically, momentum appears to be moving in Chinas favor with the
possibility of actually moving ahead of the United States over the next two
decades. 227 China is gaining sway among lesser space nations by sharing space
technologies, supplying training and financing for developing satellites, and
providing launch services. Beijings push into new space markets could undermine
U.S. efforts to prevent countries from obtaining certain dual-use space technologies.
China is developing capabilities that could allow it to compete in sending humans
and other payloads to the Moon and beyond, even as the United States now
depends on Russian launch vehicles and sites to send humans into space.228
Chinas new space station, slated for completion in 2022 while the deorbiting of the
International Space Station is scheduled for 2024, will provide Beijing greater
prestige in the international system and expand its growing space presence
concurrent with declining U.S. influence in space. Not only will China have the only
space station in orbit, but it also will have the ability to choose its partners and
determine the countries with which it will share technologies and experimental data.
In this sense, the space station likely will serve as a diplomatic tool China can
leverage to execute its broader foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, given current
Congressional restrictions on U.S.-China space cooperation, the United States would
not participate in Chinas space station program barring changes to annual
appropriations legislation. For the first time in decades, the United States could be
without a constant human presence in space.
CHINA WILL OVERTAKE OTHER COUNTRIES IN SPACE ONLY

ONE W FUNDING AND PURPOSE
prioritization and steady investment from Chinas leaders, indigenous research and
from foreign sources, especially the United States. Although Chinas space
capabilities still generally lag behind those of the United States and Russia, its
space program is expanding and accelerating rapidly as many other nations
programs proceed with dwindling resources and limited goals.
LAUNDRY LIST (CHINAS PROGRAM LEADS TO:)

Chinas aspirations in space are driven by its judgment that space power enables
the countrys military modernization, drives its economic and technological
advancements, allows it to challenge U.S. information superiority during a conflict,
and provides the Chinese Communist Party with significant domestic legitimacy and
international prestige.
CHINA HAS INTL COOP NOW US REFUSAL HAS NO EFFECT

China likely has capitalized on international cooperation to acquire the bulk of the
technology and expertise needed for most of its space programs. China probably
will continue to pursue close cooperation with international partners to overcome
specific technical challenges and to meet its research and development objectives
and launch timelines.
CHINAS SPACE PROGRAM LINKS TO A LOT OF IMPACTS

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space
%20Dream_Report.pdf
For Chinas military, the use of space power can facilitate long-range strikes, guide
munitions with precision, improve connectivity, and lead to greater jointness across
its armed forces. Economically, space technologies can create markets for new
technologies and result in spin-off technologies for commercial uses that will
make its industry more competitive. Politically, space power provides carrots and
sticks that China can use to influence the international situation. Internally, Chinas
rise as a space power is designed to demonstrate to the Chinese people that the
Chinese Communist Party is the best organization to lead the country.
FULLY CHALLENGING US NOT KEY ONLY PERCEPTION THAT

CHINA IS CATCHING UP
%20Dream_Report.pdf
Nevertheless, Chinas efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a
military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S.
leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests. Even if U.S. space power
continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid advance in space
technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At
its current trajectory, Chinas space program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space
program, will at some point be good enough to adequately support modern military
operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that will serve its
broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of its own
destiny.
CHINAS SPACE PROGRAM KEY TO ECON

%20Dream_Report.pdf
Chinas rise as a space power also appears to have potential negative economic
consequences for the United States, although that impact will be felt more in the
long-term. China has embraced its space program as a driver of economic growth
and technological advancement that can help change its economy from a low-cost
manufacturer to a high-tech competitor. According to Chinese analysts, investments
in space technologies can produce a ten-fold return. The demand created by space
projects can spur advances in high technologies that not only can be applied to
other uses but also can create new markets. The creation of high technology space
products is also intended to support the development of other industries through
the introduction of spin-off technologiestechnologies originally developed for the
space industry that have found a civilian application. Progress in space technologies
can create new markets, such as satellite communications, radio and television,
remote sensing data, and satellite navigation products as well as those related to
new materials and information technology. Space can also aid economic growth
directly through commercial launch services and satellite exports. Because of U.S.
export control laws, China realizes that it must also develop satellites for other
countries if it is also to provide commercial launch services. China aims to capture
10 percent of the worlds commercial satellite market and 15 percent of the global
space launch business by 2015.
SPACE COOPERATION DOESNT IMPROVE OVERALL RELATIONS
%20Dream_Report.pdf
The importance of Chinas space diplomacy should not be overstated, however.

Cooperation in space do not drive relations on Earth. International cooperation on
space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an
indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. Although Chinas
increasing space power does play a role in advancing its diplomatic interests, there
is no evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas
besides space.
CHINAS PROGRAM ACCESSES MANY ADVANTAGES

%20Dream_Report.pdf
Chinas rise as a world power has been accompanied by its rise as a space power.
Chinas ambition to become a space power is driven by a belief in the benefits of
space power to contribute significantly to Chinas national power. China regards its
space program as an important expression of its comprehensive national power and
is intended to portray China as a modernizing nation committed to the peaceful
uses of space while at the same time serving its political, economic, and military
interests.2 It contributes to Chinas overall influence and provides capabilities that
give China more freedom of action and helps maintain national security. Indeed,
China has the ultimate goal of transforming itself from a major space power to a
strong space power on par with the United States and Russia. In recent years,
China has made important progress across a broad range of space technologies,
including launchers, satellites, lunar exploration, human space flight, and
counterspace technologies.
CHINAS RISE PRESENTS MANY PROBLEMS FOR US HEG
%20Dream_Report.pdf
The rise of Chinas space program presents military, economic, and political
challenges to the United States. As the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states,
Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging
threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and
enable global economic viability. 3 Chinas efforts to use its space program to
transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may thus come
at the expense of U.S. leadership in both absolute and relative terms.
CHINA COOPS WITH DEVELOPING WORLD COUNTRIES

SOLIDIFIES POWER PROJECTION
%20Dream_Report.pdf
China has also been able to use its space program to further its diplomatic
objectives and to increase its influence in the developing world and among secondtier space powers. China conducts numerous international cooperative activities
that provide leadership opportunities, improve bilateral relations, and open up

avenues for technology transfer.
CHINA PERCEIVES SPACE DEVELOPMENT AS KEY TO STATUS

AND GROWTH
%20Dream_Report.pdf
The importance of the space program is rooted in the importance of the role high
technology plays in Chinas development. According to one researcher, building
China as a strong space power is the only way that China can rejuvenate to have
wealth and power. 36 According to this view, space technologies are both high risk
yet a high value added strategic industry that places great demands on a countrys
research and development apparatus across many different industries.37 As a
result, the development of space technologies is both a display of a countrys
technological capability and by extension a display of its military, economic, and
scientific capabilities, but also a necessary move for a country that wants to
strengthen its national power.38
MASSIVE ECONOMIC BENEFITS

%20Dream_Report.pdf
In addition to military utility, China has also embraced its space program as a driver
of economic and technological advancement. Chinas 2006 space white paper
states: Since the space industry is an important part of the national overall
development strategy, China will maintain long term, steady development in this
field. 91 China sees much potential in developing the space market. Revenue from
the global space industry increased 7 percent to $304.31 billion in 2012. This is a 63
percent increase from $186.64 billion in 2005. Of this amount, 26 percent, or $78.44
billion, is made up of government space budgets, which increased just 1 percent in
2012. The largest portion of the space economy is commercial satellite services,
which accounts for 38 percent of global space activity or $115.97 billion. This
includes telecommunications, earth observation, and positioning services.92 China
has identified four areas in which its space program brings economic benefits: 1)
Creating a market for high technology; 2) The development of spin-off civilian
technologies; 3) The use of satellite application technologies; and 4) The export of
satellites and commercial launch services.
SPACE KEY TO INTERNAL STABILITY
%20Dream_Report.pdf
The Chinese government also uses its space program for domestic and international
political gain. Space programs are described as an indicator of a countrys
comprehensive national power and as a measure of a countrys rank in the world.
The Chinese leadership believes that major powers have large space programs, and
to be considered a major power one must have the trappings of a big power. This
sentiment was most evident in the approval of the human spaceflight program,
when many in the top leadership voiced support for the program based on its effect
on prestige.112 The space programs effect on prestige is also directed inward. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now communist in name only, and its continued
legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and nationalistic benefits in an
informal social contract with its citizens: the CCP agrees to increase the standard of
living and develop China into an internationally respected country, and the people
agree not to rebel. By developing a robust space program and participating in highprofile activities such as human space flight and lunar exploration, the CCP can
demonstrate that it is the best provider of material benefits to the Chinese people
and the best organization to propel China to its rightful place in world affairs. China
conducts numerous cooperative activities with other countries and states that it
holds international exchanges and cooperation to promote inclusive space
development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, peaceful utilization and
common development. 113 China pursues cooperative activities for a number of
reasons. These include improving its international position, increasing its influence
among less developed countries, and technology transfer. This section details
Chinas major multilateral and bilateral space cooperation activities.
WOLF LAW EFFECTIVELY KILLS ALL BILATERAL SPACE

COOPERATION
%20Dream_Report.pdf
The law, however, did allow NASA to engage in activities which NASA or OSTP have
certified pose no risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other
information with national security or economic security implications to China or a
Chinese-owned company but that any certification shall be submitted to the
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate no
later than 14 days prior to the activity in question and shall include a description of
the purpose of the activity, its major participants, and its location and timing. 199
Since the passage of the law, NASA activities with China have been curtailed, and
no additional visits between NASA and CNSA have occurred in a bilateral setting. In
2013, however, Wolf accused NASA of not abiding by the notification clause when
NASA hosted Chinese officials at the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
(CEOS), a multilateral body made up of 23 countries to ensure international
coordination of civil space-based earth observation programs and promote the
exchange of data to optimize societal benefit and inform decision making for
securing a prosperous and sustainable future for humankind. 200 NASA, on the
other hand, argued that the restrictions and reporting requirements for Chinese
participation at NASA sponsored events only applied to bilateral events and did not
apply to multilateral events such as CEOS.201 This issue came up again in 2013
when Chinese researchers were initially banned from attending a conference at

NASAs Ames Research Center on the use of NASAs Kepler space telescope to
search for exoplanets. The ban attracted international attention and prompted many
attendees to threaten a boycott of the conference. 202 The uproar resulted in a
clarification from Congressman Wolf in a letter to NASA Administrator Bolden that
Chinese nationals were able to attend the conference as it was multilateral in
nature.203
SPACE IS KEY TO HEG AND CHINA IS CATCHING UP

%20Dream_Report.pdf
Chinas space program has made the most progress in addressing its national
security needs. According to former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the United
States is entering an era where American dominance on the seas, in the skies, and
in spacecan no longer be taken for granted.And while the United States
continues to maintain a decisive military and technological edge over any potential
adversary, our continued superiority is not a given. 611 Chinas improving space
capabilities has negativesum consequences for U.S. military security and require
the United States to prepare to confront an adversary possessing space and
counterspace technologies. Chinese analysts assess that space-based information
will become a deciding factor in future wars, that space will be a dominant
battlefield, and that in order to achieve victory on Earth, one must first seize the
initiative in space. This will require China to achieve space supremacy, defined as
the ability to freely use space and to deny the use of space to adversaries.
Moreover, the assessment that space is the dominant battlefield has led PLA
analysts to conclude that war in space is inevitable. In making this assessment,
Chinese writings are reminiscent of U.S. writings on space during the 1950s and
1960s. This includes a universal belief that space is the strategic high ground, and a
prominent role for manned military space missions, including the use of manned
military space planes, space stations, and lunar bases.
CHINA SPACE TECH HURTS US ECON
%20Dream_Report.pdf
Chinas rise as a space power also appears to have potential negative sum
economic consequences for the United States, although it appears to have had less
of an immediate effect. For example, Chinas entrance into the commercial satellite
sector so far has had little effect on established satellite manufacturers. The
satellites sold to Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Bolivia, and Laos were part of a
competitive package that included launch services, training for local operators, and
low-cost loans through its export-import bank. Indeed, Chinas approach to satellite
exports has been to target countries unable to afford satellites from more
established, higher-priced satellite manufacturers. In this way, Chinas satellite
manufacturing is following a business plan similar to that used by Chinese

information technology giant Huawei, which first entered into lower-priced, but
underserved, markets to gain experience and build up its technology before moving
into the higher-end markets of Europe and the United States. Moreover, some of
Chinas commercial launches have been for Chinese state-owned enterprises that
may have no choice but launch their satellites on Chinese rockets. As a result, China
has had only a minor effect on the international launch market since many of its
customers would not have been able to afford non-Chinese satellites.
CHINAS SPACE GROWTH CONTRIBUTES TO HARD AND SOFT

POWER
%20Dream_Report.pdf
Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and
economic capabilities, it can also work to increase Chinas soft power. According to
Joseph Nye, soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people
by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract,
and attraction often leads to acquiescence. 629 Although measuring the effects of
soft power is difficult, Nye writes that it rests on the ability to shape the
preferences of others. 630 Chinas burgeoning space program is used as one of the
many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, and political power. It reinforces
the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well and also a
country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more
attractive, especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions.
SPACE SOFT POWER NOT IMPORTANT

%20Dream_Report.pdf
The importance of Chinas space diplomacy should not be overstated, however.
Relations in space do not drive relations on Earth. International cooperation on
space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an
indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. Although Chinas
increasing space power does play a role in advancing its diplomatic interests, there
is no evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas
besides space.632 As its space power increases this may change. China, for
example, could have more of a say in international technical organizations such as
the International Telecommunications Union over rules governing satellites and
satellite frequency issues, but as yet this is unrealized.
CHINA CAN CHALLENGE US EASILY PERCEPTION KEY
%20Dream_Report.pdf
Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid
advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S.
position in space. The real question concerning U.S. competiveness may not be
whether Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their U.S. competitors, but
whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry that can offer
moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete
effectively in the market. Similarly, a Chinese space program that can provide a
good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of military intervention for an
adversary may be all that is necessary.
SOLVING COMPETITION KEY

%20Dream_Report.pdf
Moreover, what is unwritten in Chinese analyses is that as China becomes more
invested in space capabilities it takes on the same vulnerabilities as the United
States. Although China would not have the same asymmetries as the United States
in a conflict in the Western Pacific, the goal of having a global, 24- hour, all-weather
remote sensing capability and spending nearly $1 billion per year until 2020 to
establish a global satellite navigation system and associated technologies indicates
that China is devoting significant effort and resources to establish a system that is
similar in architecture to that of the U.S. militarys space program. With this
trajectory, China will have as much to lose as it has to gain from the management
or mismanagement of the outer space global commons. It is in this vein that some
sort of strategic accommodation that ameliorates the worst effects of competition
could be achieved.
SPACE IS US ACHILLES HEEL AND CHINA KNOWS
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/08/us-national-security-and-risingchina
Space. Space is tremendously important. China is already a first-tier space power.
Theyre launching satellites which can jam satellites; theyre launching satellites
which have operational arms which can pull other satellites out of orbit. A number of
years ago, they exhibited the ability to launch satellites with a kinetic quality, the
ability to hit other satellites. By 2020, theyll have the capacity to destroy or
severely disrupt Americas space architecture in every orbital regime.
Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment testified before the House Armed Services
Committee earlier this year that we cannot overstate the difficulty and the burden
that the U.S. is going to have to maintain information dominance. Our whole military
depends on our satellite structure. If those are struck downour command, our
control, our real-time intelligencewere deaf, dumb, and blind basically.
There are tremendous civilian implications to having the ability to attack the space
architecture as well, because our civilian infrastructure is also dependent on it. Its
the Achilles heel, really, and weve just begun to grapple with the problem. Its
going to take an enormous effort, and its not budgeted for at all now.
COOP KEY TO COLONIZATION

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1
Its a mistake to think that NASA, or American companies, have all the knowledge
needed to extract resources from the Moon or asteroids without cooperating with
other nations, including China.
TALKING W CHINA ALREADY CONSIDERED BOLD NON UNIQUE

The Obama Administration has apparently decided that with nothing to lose
politically, it intends to make strategic and sometimes bold foreign policy moves
before leaving office, in spite of obstructionist roadblocks: normalizing relations with
Cuba, negotiating a nuclear treaty with Iran, and talking with the Chinese about
space among them. It is ironic that talking has become a bold policy move.
Joan Johnson-Freese in Found in Space: Cooperation
WOLF VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS

Congressman John Culberson, who is opposed to dialogue with China in the peaceful
uses of outer space, responded to a request for information from Space Policy
Online about the first US-China Civil Space Dialogue held September 28, 2015 in
Beijing by affirming his role enabled by the so-called Wolf Amendment. He said, I
intend to vigorously enforce the longstanding prohibitions designed to protect
Americas space program. NASA responded to Rep. Culberson that they had acted
within the law. However, NASA had not informed him about the meeting and its
contents. Clearly, this is a separation of powers issue where the Executive Branch
has the responsibility of pursuing foreign policy and does not have to ask
permission of the House Appropriations Committee to engage in dialogue with
China.
US DEDICATED TO SPACE
By an overwhelming margin, Congress passed the US Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, whose intent is to stimulate commercial space development
including mining the Moon and asteroids. This is a major step forward and
demonstrates the commitment of the Obama Administration and of Congress to
commercial development of space. With the law now in place, the space industry is
expected to see the following:
Simplification and Improvement in licensing procedures for space launch by private

parties;
Government support for commercial space development through the renamed
Office of Space Commerce, a unit of the US Department of Commerce;
Clarification of issues relating to transport of astronauts via commercial crew
vehicles;
Extension of the life of ISS to 2024 and affirmation of policies regarding governance
of the ISS National Laboratory; and
Clarification of rights to explore and collect space resources.
While the law entitles the US citizen to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the
asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, it
does not confer exclusive rights to do so and, in fact, acknowledges that the
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits this:
SEC. 403. DISCLAIMER OF EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY It is the sense of
Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby
assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the
ownership of, any celestial body.
US TIED W CHINA IN SPACE MINING TECH

Exclusive mining rights will need to be defined within an international regime that
governs territory, such as the Moon, to which sovereign rights do not apply under
the Outer Space Treaty. Insofar as lunar water has been identified as a possible
resource to reduce the costs of reaching Mars, this issue will need to be resolved
before the lunar water can be mined. China is among the states that show interest
in lunar water.
No country or company has mined the Moon or an asteroid, or has had industrial
operations of any kind in space. Mining technologies may, in fact, be more
advanced in countries such as Australia and Canada than in the US. In fact, space
mining conferences held in Australia and in Canada have attracted significant
attendance by mining companies and the equipment industries that serve them.
Notwithstanding the ambitious plans of Deep Space Industries and Planetary
Resources, it is not at all clear that they will possess superior technology for space
mining to other potential competitors including from China, India, Japan, Korea,
Russia, or the EU. No one has yet processed materials in space other than lab-scale
experiments. China and India, which have both mounted large-scale industrial
projects, may have a body of industrial process know-how that is already
competitive with US capabilities to process asteroid or lunar materials into products.
There are multiple other aspects of industrial development in space where
knowledge and technologies exist somewhere in the world where the US may not
have an inherent competitive advantage.
The future that is being created through the new law will create more competitive
opportunities for US commercial space companies. But, this legislation cannot
guarantee them superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared
infrastructure in cislunar space that can reduce communications, transportation and
operating costs.
REPEAL WOLF KEY TO SPACE COOPERATION AND SPACE

COLONIZATION
The Wolf Amendment is counter to US national interests

Clearly sensitive technologies need to be protected. But, protecting US intellectual
property is not known to be a domain where the House Appropriations Committee of
the US Congress has recognized expertise or where it has been invested with any
specific authority. Additionally, NASA is a relatively tiny domain in the vast territory
of advanced technology under development by the US. The Wolf Amendment, in
fact, offers no protection of American technology but instead empowers members of
a Congressional committee with no relevant expertise or authority to play a foreign
policy role.
Congressman Culbertson clearly recognizes that space technology is key to
addressing major challenges facing not only the US, but the entire world community.
To bar the United States from participation in global initiatives in the peaceful uses
of outer space because China is also involved is, at best, is an overemotional
response to the potential for illicit technology transfer with a totally inappropriate
instrument.
Far more relevant to US national interests would be for Rep. Culbertson to support
developing more effective strategies to advance US commercial interests in space.
Otherwise, the Chinese, not bounded by ineffective legislation, will eat our lunch.
No one has yet developed the technologies for ISRU whether on the Moon, the
asteroids, Mars, or beyond. Yet ISRU technologies are central to the whole idea of
asteroid and lunar mining. If the Chinese can work with everyone else on the planet,
but the US can only work with a short list as approved by the Appropriations
Committee, it should be expected that the Chinese, drawing on the knowledge base
of the entire world, will advance more quickly. We have no lead in ISRU, and our
lead in other domains of space technology may not be particularly relevant to this
challenge.
It is time for Congress to wake up to the emerging commercial space future and
work to fully unleash our commercial space potential rather than complaining about
a very high level meeting in Beijing where common challenges in the peaceful uses
of outer space were discussed with NASA experts present.
TOO MANY ALT CAUSES TO US SPACE DETERIORATION

To fully unleash US (and other participating countries) commercial space potential,
the following challenges need to be addressed:
Negotiation of internationally recognized policies to govern commercial activities in
space, including mining rights on the Moon and other policies required to conduct
commercial activity beyond Earth orbit.
Development of technologies that enable cost-effective ISRU operations with the
goal to achieve major reductions in costs.
Development of infrastructure that contributes to reduced risk and costs of
activities in space including communications, energy, logistics, and transport
facilities, and potentially other services that enable sustained operations in space at
lower cost and risk.
Development of sources of financing for space exploration and long-term industrial
and commercial development in space that leverage partnership between public
and private investment and make possible projects with long planning horizons and
extended time to positive cash flow.
Development of markets for ISRU production, space manufacturing, and related
research and innovation, support services, and commercial activities through publicprivate partnerships, infrastructure investment by governments, and investment
schemes that address value chain development and not just individual products.
Build broad public support through global celebration of major space
accomplishments like Sputnik, the Apollo Moon landing, the launch of ISS and other
events. Open opportunities for research and development not only in existing major
spacefaring powers but also for smaller countries and developing countries as well
as for universities. Place particular emphasis on opening opportunities for
entrepreneurial action by small business. Reach out to schools and communities
with opportunities to take part.
US-CHINA BILAT KEY TO R&D AND INTL COOPERATION

China is a country with which the US has very extensive commercial, academic,
financial, cultural and strategic ties. GE, IBM, Caterpillar, and numerous other major
US corporations have extensive R&D operations in China. But the US has no legacy
of collaboration with China in space in space, even dating back to the International
Geophysical Year in 1957 where China chose to not participate due to its perception
of US meddling. China was not invited to participate in ISS. And the Wolf
Amendment seeks to even prevent dialogue with China on the peaceful uses of
outer space.
China is both a developing country and a rapidly growing advanced industrial
economy with significant financial, industrial, and knowledge resources. China also
has a profound understanding of economic development and the role of education,
research, innovation, and technology commercialization as evidenced by its
sustained, rapid economic development. China appears to be an excellent potential
global partner, together with the US and the EU, to lead a global campaign to open
the space frontier to peaceful commercial development for the benefit of all
humanity.
SOLVENCY ADVOCATE STEPS

To engage China as a strategic partner in the opening of the space frontier the
following actions are needed:
The Wolf Amendment needs to be annulled.
The Administration needs to take steps to engage China in space collaboration. In
the longer term this would include measures such as the Space Development
Investment Bank. Immediate steps would include collaboration on remote sensing
for disaster relief, space debris research, and space situation awareness.
Appropriate steps in the intermediate term would include measures such as opening
ISS and its successor facilities to China.
The International Lunar Decade could provide a unifying framework for international
collaboration in space development through 2030.
ISS KEY TO COLONIZATION
http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/burns/remarks/2014/219501.htm
First, we should encourage more countries to participate in the activities of the
International Space Station. The Station remains the leading space platform for
global research and development. The Station is the foundation for future human
exploration to an asteroid, the Moon, and ultimately Mars. And it is a lasting
testament to how much more we can accomplish together than we can on our own.
COOPERATION NOT COMING WOLF WILL NOT BE OVERTURNED

As one of the worlds oldest and most active space powers, the United States has
been involved in bilateral and multilateral projects with most other major
spacefaring nations with one notable exception: the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC). The PRC and its national space program, the China National Space
Administration (CNSA), have remained strangely isolated from the rest of the
worlds forays into space. Deep-seated U.S. suspicion against their policies and the
recent enactment of the restrictive Wolf Amendment suggest that this is unlikely
to change in the near future. To examine the impact of this problematic legislation,
this Note will begin by considering the origins and development of the uniquely
isolated Chinese space program in Part I, from the period of SinoSoviet cooperation
after World War II through Chinas first successful taikonaut3 and on to the Change
lunar module and ongoing construction of the Tiangong space station. In Part II, this
Note will examine the modern relationship between the United States and China,
with particular focus on incidents that demonstrate the difficulties they face in
moving toward a shared future in space.
REPEAL WOLF KEY TO CHINA COOPERATION AT ISS

One of the most visible examples of Chinas continuing isolation in the international
space forum is the International Space Station, a triumph of collaboration and
scientific visionand one in which China has never had the opportunity to
participate. Initially, perhaps, this was a result of Chinas selfimposed isolationism
with regard to its space program and the widespread perception of the early ISS as
a U.S. station; more recently, however, China has expressed clear interest in
becoming a partner on the space station, and at least several other countries are
amenable to the idea.69 However, NASA may not have a choice in the matter. When
in 2012 the five ISS partners70 expressed interest in reaching out to other countries
(such as China) for ISS participation,71 then-U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA)
wrote a scathing letter forbidding it. NASA, Wolf wrote, should make clear that
the U.S. will not accept Chinese participation in any station-related activities
because the Chinese civilian space program is directly run by the Peoples [sic]
Liberation Army (PLA), and that I believe that any effort to involve the Chinese in
the space program would be misguided, and not in our national interest.72 Despite
Chinas successes with Tiangong, it is tellingand problematic that one of the
most powerful spacefaring countries in the world cannot be included in a project as
triumphant and inherently nonmilitary as the ISS. While China is growing into its role
as a significant entity in space exploration, it remains a kind of outsider in the
international space community, unable to participate fully in the cooperation that
has marked the decades since the end of the Cold War. Chinas continued isolation
in space appears even stranger in light of the historic political tensions that were
put aside to allow the United States and Russia to cooperate in the ISS project in the
early 1990s.73 Only a few years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
dissipation of the threat of nuclear holocaust, the United States was able to
cooperate with Russia in order to successfully launch the first ISS module, the
Russian Zarya, in 1998 (largely thanks to mutual budgetary crises).74 Considering
the historical significance of the ISS as a beacon of international cooperation that
would have been unimaginable a decade earlier, Chinas exclusion seems even
bleaker. What has made the possibility of peaceful cooperation with China so
apparently untenable to Congress?
US MISTRUST IS CULTURALLY EMBEDDED (RACIST)

As evinced by the above examples, fear ofand resistance tothe concept of
cooperation with China in space is nothing new. The U.S. governments continued
perception of China as a state that poses a significant technologicalespionage
threat indicates the un-confronted cultural and social issues that create a gulf
between the United States and China, which may be, morally or in the interest of
national security, unbridgeable. If American-made communications satellites could
not even be launched by a Chinese rocket in 2013, it is perhaps not surprising that a
statutory provision prohibiting bilateral aerospace cooperation was able to gain
traction in Congress.
WHAT IS THE WOLF AMENDMENT
Such is the nature of the Wolf Amendment included in each annual appropriations
act governing the budget of NASA since 2011. Nicknamed for its drafter, former
Congressman of Virginia Frank Wolf, this budgetary stipulation forbids involvement
by NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) in any bilateral program or
forum with China. These appropriations acts grant funding to federal programs and
regulate the allowable uses for that funding.80 Through them, Congress has the
authority to delegate the annual budget for NASA (in addition to many other
government agencies and programs) and how it can and cannotbe spent.
LOTS OF REASONS TO NOT COOPERATE

In his own words, Wolf developed the Amendment to limit new collaboration with
China until we see improvements in its human rights record, as well as a reduction
in its well documented cyberattacks and espionage efforts against the U.S.88
Significantly, Representative Wolf has publicly opposed any involvement of NASA
with CNSA on both moral and security grounds. What concerns me most about the
Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is being led by the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe that the PLAs space program
will be any more benign than the PLAs recent military posture.89 Direct bilateral
cooperation with an agency controlled to at least some degree by Chinas military
given its repressive historycould tarnish NASAs image and diminish both its
ethical high ground as a paragon of science and exploration, and its credibility as a
trustworthy and peaceful agency.90 To address these concerns, Section 1340(a) of
the 2011 Appropriations Act stipulated: None of the funds made available by this
division may be used for [NASA] or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy,
program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such
activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of
this division.91
WOLF AMENDMENT DOESNT VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Unsurprisingly, there was immediate backlash against the restrictions of the Wolf
Amendment, with Presidential Science Advisor and Director of OSTP John Holdren
defying the new statute to participate in the bilateral U.S.China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue in early May 2011. After an investigation by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) at Congressman Wolfs request, Holdren was found to
have violated Section 1340 of the 2011 Appropriations Act (that is, the Wolf
Amendment) by participating in the conference.96 Inresponse, Holdren and OSTP
argued that the provisions of the Wolf Amendment prohibiting bilateral activities
with China represented an unconstitutional restriction on the Presidents powers to
make foreign policy, and that Congress had overstepped its bounds by using its
appropriations power to infringe upon the Presidents explicit constitutional
authority.97 The GAO, however, was not persuaded. It is not our role nor within our
province to opine upon or adjudicate the constitutionality of duly enacted statutes
such as section 1340, the opinion states, adding that legislation signed by the
President after being passed by Congress is entitled to a heavy presumption in
favor of constitutionality.98 As a result, the GAO found the OSTP in violation of
Section 1340 and thus the Antideficiency Act,99 which sets forth conditions and
penalties for misuse of congressional appropriations.100
WOLF DOESNT RESTRICT MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

INCLUDING CHINA
Congressman Wolf himself has not spoken to the wording change, and his
statements on the purpose of the Act apparently conflict. In an April 2014 speech at
the Space Policy Institute, Wolf stated: [O]ur subcommittee has had strong
oversight of NASAs security, including a provision to limit its bilateral cooperation
with the Chinese space program, which is run by the Peoples Liberation
Army.... .... . . . [However] it is important to note that the congressional restriction
does provide several venues for the U.S. to maintain its dialogue with Chinese
counterparts as well as opportunities for limited engagement. For instance, the
language only restricts bilateral cooperation, not multilateral venues where
representatives from all countries participate. .... . . . So there is some flexibility for
NASA when it comes to China.120
CONGRESS SEES MULTINATIONAL COOP WITH CHINA AS A

WORKAROUND CAUSES FUNDING AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
However, in the March 2013 hearing with Administrator Boldenand in contrast to

his (Wolfs) statements to the Space Policy InstituteCongressman Wolf insinuated
that the 2013 Appropriations Act was meant to be strictly construed. Wolf asked
Bolden: Are you aware of any incidents in which NASA has encouraged an external
entity, as they did down at NASA Langley, to undertake with its own funds a
cooperative activity with China that would be prohibited using NASA funding? And
are you going to be clarifying that with the contractors? Because there was almost a
workaround to get around the subcommittee language.121 Bolden took severe
umbrage to the veiled criticism, replying: I respectfully disagree with the implication
of what you just said.... Lesa [Roe, the Director of NASA Langley] and her people are
not attempting to use contractors as a workaround to the rules. . . . As a matter of
fact, we really feel that we have been fully complying with the law, that our
processes are strong.122 Evidently, Wolf and the other members of the House
Appropriations Committee were concerned with the possibility that NASA might use
such a workaround to engage indirectly with the CNSA, and wanted to prohibit
such actions. This seems the most salient explanation for the wording change, and
would align Wolfs continuing insistence that the Amendment is meant to prohibit
bilateral conduct only with the apparent tightening of the congressional noose with
regard to funding allocations.
WOLFS INTERPRETATION NOT RELEVANT

At this point, however, it must be considered that Congressman Wolfs personal
interpretation of the statute no longer controls; the plain language of Section 532
does restrict multilateral interaction. The widespread confusion and misapplication
of the Amendment between 2011 and 2013 are damning evidence; if the
international space community could not parse the wording of the old legislation, it
seems unlikely that they will be any less liberal in applying the new, stricter
language. The heart of the problem lies in the misapplied focus that Wolf and other
members of the House Appropriations Committee have granted to the Amendment.
Congressman Wolf, in many of his statements concerning the Amendment,
emphasizes the bilateral/multilateral nature of a given activity to determine whether
it should be considered prohibited.123 However, this is not the heart of the issue.
Although bilateral coordination is unarguably banned in both the 2011 and 2014
versions of the Amendment, the true focus has consistently been on the issue of
officialness, not number of parties or even the nature of the activity.
Solvency advocate solvin thangs
However the 20142015 Wolf Amendments are interpreted, they will still have
resounding effects for U.S.China space-industry relations. Although a complete ban
of all visitors of Chinese nationality would be an almost unthinkably direct political
affront, even the blanket ban on CNSANASA cooperation that is the facial purpose
of the statute will have repercussions. The moratorium on bi- or multilateral industry
communications created by the 2013 Appropriations Act will severely constrain
information transfer between both space agencies, effectively blinding NASA to the
Chinese space programs current endeavors as well as the reverse (although
considering how closed-mouthed CNSA is about even public projects, it is likely that
this effect will hit NASA harder than China). Additionally, such a measure could
cause the already tenuous trust developed with the CNSA to deteriorate. Blocking
the United States and NASA from cooperating with one of the major space powers of
the worlda country with demonstrated ambition and an increasing capability to
achieve dominance in spacemay hobble us beyond recovery, at least for the next
generation of space advancements. Space exploration is no longer the province of
individual nations operating alone, and international cooperation is both widespread
and necessary. Just as the international sharing of such sensitive and cutting-edge
technology is a valid national security concern, so too should be rejecting the
contributions of a major developing power, especially considering the relative
political stagnation of space exploration in the United States and the burgeoning
enthusiasm for it in China. Although it is impossible to predict what the future will
hold for the space explorers of tomorrow, it seems fully necessary to initiate
cautious, but optimistic, cooperation with China in space: inviting them as a party to
the ISS, certainly, and potentially opening the door for future jointor even bilateral
projects. The Hughes/Loral debacle limited the U.S. communications-satellite
industry for decades,130 and its consequences have only recently been corrected in
part; Congress must take care not to make the same mistakes with regard to other
U.S. investments in space. Isolating NASA from a country that is both a space
superpower and one of the largest economies in the world will only hurt the United
States in the long run. China has a long history of self-sufficiency in space, and it is
demonstrably capable of overcoming the challenges posed by having to reinvent
the wheel (or, as it may be, the rocket) because its global neighbors have
historically been too afraid of its military capabilities and ambitions to share what
they know. Would a free flow of technologyif not launching systems or ballistic
information, then at least those many nonmilitary elements of space travel,
exploration, and studytruly hurt the United States? Or would it pique the desire of
the Chinese citizens to be free from their repressive government and experience the
freedom of a democratic society? If NASA is truly the pinnacle of American
ingenuity, courage, optimism, and grace, then (sensibly) open communication
between the scientists and engineers in the CNSA can only inspire the latter to
demand better for themselves, their country, and their space program.
ISS COOPERATION KEY TO LONGEVITY AND SUCCESS

http://iias.asia/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL63_10.pdf
In summary, the transformation of foreign policies and space program objectives,

from the start of the twentieth century to the modern space age, has been closely
aligned with the state of political affairs, particularly national security. Concerns that
contributed to Chinas isolation with the ISS included their economy, foreign
policies, ideology, and military aims. Chinas steady progress has strong
implications for the ISS, particularly as ISS administration and support continually
adopts innovative technical, commercial, financial, and cooperative solutions.
Earlier involvement with China could have greatly improved the ISS life span and
technical capabilities, improved U.S.-Chinas cultural/political relationship, and
relieved some financial strain on the Project. The likelihood that China would have
accomplished significant developments in space as well as provided the ISS
meaningful contributions is plausible considering the history of both nations
tenacity to succeed.
SPACE COOPERATION IS PERCEIVED AS A SERIOUS, LONG TERM

COMMITMENT HELPS CYBER AND SOUTH CHINA SEA
DISPUTES
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/For-the-firsttime-Chinese-research-to-fly-on-6422696.php
Chiao, the former NASA astronaut, said the U.S. space agency should be a party to
those discussions.
"China is going forward, with or without us," he said. "They will go to the moon. The
United States is the natural leader of the international coalition to explore space,
since we have the experience and resources to be the leader. But we cannot ignore
China. Otherwise, we'll be left with maybe flying a few formation flights of Orion
with a small boulder around the moon, while China lands on the moon."
Much as the NASA-Russia bond in space has helped the two countries weather
geopolitical tensions such as the Ukraine invasion, U.S.-China space cooperation
could ameliorate political tensions between the countries over hacking and the
South China Sea.
Mike Suffredini, who manages the International Space Station, said in an interview
in 2014 that if NASA can work with its former Cold War enemy, Russia, it ought to be
able to work with its largest trading partner.
"If we could take the partners we have, and grow that with the people who want to
go into space, I would tell you that you could probably decrease your national
security budgets," Suffredini said.
"I don't believe that's going to happen tomorrow, but if you make a commitment to
go to the far reaches of space, you've made a long-term commitment," he added.
NO COOPERATION COMING WOLF AMENDMENT EXTENDED

THROUGH 2016
http://www.leonarddavid.com/u-s-china-space-agenda-action-items/
Regarding the China and U.S. space agenda items, Marcia Smith, space policy
analyst at SpacePolicyOnline.com commented:
NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) have
been prohibited by law from dealing with China on space cooperation on a bilateral
basis for several years, Smith noted.
The prohibition was originally inserted in the appropriations bills that fund NASA by
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), who chaired the House Appropriations Commerce-JusticeScience (CJS) subcommittee before retiring last year, Smith explained.
The final law that he put in place (P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015), which is in effect today, Smith added, states
that no funds may be spent by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan, promulgate,
implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any
Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by law
after the date of enactment of this Act.
The new House CJS chairman, Rep. John Culberson (R-TX), agrees with Wolfs
position and the prohibition is continued in the House-passed version of the FY2016
Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations bill (H.R. 2578), Smith said.
CHINA SPACE PROGRAM FUELED BY US ANTAGONISM

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/what-is-china-up-to-inspace/5312534
China is already the world's third major space-faring nation and is likely to be
number one within a matter of decades. According to space analyst Brian Harvey,
US antagonism toward Chinas space endeavours has only spurred the country on,
writes Antony Funnell.
WOLF AMENDMENT IS THE CROWN JEWEL OF ANTAGONISM

TOWARDS CHINA (IN SPACE)
The United States Congress, Harvey points out, has long had an openly hostile
attitude toward China and its interests in space. 'This is essentially driven by
American politics. There is a very strong sentiment against China. We know that
there's a lot of respect for the Chinese at NASA and among the American space
community,' he says. 'The problem is the Congress.'
'The Congress is implacably hostile to a Chinese presence in space, to the point

where, under what is called the Wolf Amendment, Chinese space officials may not
even set foot in NASA facilities. The administrator of NASA is prohibited from any
cooperation with the Chinese in space,' says Harvey, adding that that heightened
level of antagonism has also had serious ramifications for US and European firms
hoping to do business with Beijing's space program.
WOLF BAN SPURS CHINESE

One effect of the United States' strict ban on collaboration with China has been to
force Chinese engineers and scientists to be more self-reliant. They've learned to
work on their own. Beijing has plans to build its own space station by 2020 and to
send an unmanned mission to Mars around the same time. It has also publicly
announced its intention to undertake crewed flights to both the Moon and Mars in
coming decades.
SPACE COLONIZATION TAKES TOO LONG AND DOESNT SOLVE

http://singularityhub.com/2014/10/05/elon-musk-is-right-colonizing-the-solarsystem-is-humankinds-insurance-policy-against-extinction/
Astrophysicist and Astronomer Royal, Martin Rees, has said, I think its very
important not to kid ourselves that we can solve Earths problems by mass
emigration into space. Theres nowhere in our solar system even as clement as the
top of Everest or the South Poleso its only going to be a place for pioneers on cutprice private ventures and accepting higher risks than a western state could impose
on civilians.
In other words, maybe some people will venture beyond the Earth and Moon. Even
live out subsistence-level lives on other planetary bodies. But a civilization growing
out of Musks million isn't likely. At least not until we can engineer on grander scales
terraform Mars, hollow out asteroids, build rolling bubble cities on Mercury.
SPACE COLONIZATION NEEDED EXISTENTIAL THREATS END

THE GAME AND THERE ARE MANY EXISTENTIAL RISKS
http://singularityhub.com/2014/10/05/elon-musk-is-right-colonizing-the-solarsystem-is-humankinds-insurance-policy-against-extinction/
Why blow billions of dollars on space exploration when billions of people are living in
poverty here on Earth?
Youve likely heard the justifications. The space program brings us useful
innovations and inventions. Space exploration delivers perspective, inspiration, and
understanding. Because it's the final frontier. Because it's there.
What you havent heard is anything to inspire a sense of urgency. Indeed, NASAs
struggle to defend its existence and funding testifies to how weak these
justifications sound to a public that cares less about space than seemingly more
pressing needs.
Presumably, this is why SpaceX founder Elon Musk, in afascinating interview with
Ross Andersen, skipped all the usual arguments in favor of something else entirely.
Space exploration, he says, is as urgent as easing poverty or diseaseits our
insurance policy against extinction.
As we extend our gaze back through geologic time and out into the universe, its
clear we arent exempt from natures carelessly terrifying violence. We simply
havent experienced its full wrath yet because weve only been awake for the
cosmological blink of an eye.
Musk says an extinction-level event would, in an existential flash, make our downto-earth struggles irrelevant. Good news, the problems of poverty and disease
have been solved, he says, but the bad news is there arent any humans left.
Weve got all our eggs in one basket, and thats a terrible risk-management
strategy. We should diversify our planetary portfolio to insure against the worst
and soon.
Musks line of reasoning isnt completely novel. It's what led science fiction writer
Larry Niven to say, The dinosaurs became extinct because they didnt have a
space program. And it drives Ed Lus quest to save humanity from a major asteroid
hit.
But while we may spot and potentially derail asteroids, not every cosmic threat can
be so easily predicted or preventeda blast from a nearby supernova; a gamma ray
burst aimed at Earth; a period of extreme volcanism. Any of these could wipe us
out.
Musk says he thinks a lot about the silence weve been greeted with as our
telescopes scan the sky for interstellar broadcasts from other civilizations.
Given the sheer number of galaxies, stars, and planets in the universeit should be
teeming with life. If even a tiny percent of the whole is intelligent, there should be
thousands of civilizations in our galaxy alone. So where are they?
This is known as the Fermi Paradox, and Musk rattles off a few explanatory theories
(there are many). But he settles on this, If you look at our current technology level,
something strange has to happen to civilizations, and I mean strange in a bad way.
It could be that there are a whole lot of dead, one-planet civilizations.
That something strange might be an evolutionary self-destruct button, as Carl

Sagan theorized. We developed modern rockets at the same time as nuclear
weapons.
But the Fermi Paradox and its explanations, while philosophically captivating,
havent settled the question of intelligent life. SETIs Seth Shostak cautions, The
Fermi Paradox is a big extrapolation from a very local observation. That is, just
because we don't see compelling evidence of galactic colonization around here
doesn't mean there is none.
But even without the Fermi Paradox, our planet's geologic record is enough to show
that, as Sagan phrased it, Extinction is the rule. Survival is the exception.
RUSH TO COLONIZE GLOSSES OVER FEAR OF DEATH

https://www.academia.edu/12123803/Selling_space_colonization_and_immortality_A
_psychosocial_anthropological_critique_of_the_rush_to_colonize_Mars
Facing our own mortality is not easy. Proponents of immortality might enjoy the
perspective of Bekhterev, the personality is not destroyed by death, but, having
manifested itself throughout its lifetime in all its various forms, lives on, and lives
eternally [10:80]. He is suggesting that through our interactions with people and
how we behave during our limited time here, we will achieve a sense of immortality,
in some shape or form, (e.g. children, research, environmental advocacy, etc.) even
if we physically do not. I am not suggesting that everyone needs to overcome their
fear of death or that we should not colonize other worlds, but we must look at the
issues fully and thoroughly before moving forward. Some space entrepreneurs want
to get out there and colonize Mars as quickly as possible, but hopefully they can
realize that taking the time to work through some of the previously stated
consequences might be more important than adhering blindly to their ideologies.
Williams's suggests: Young scientists, rather than working on serious
environmental challenges on Earth, dream of Moon or Martian bases to save
humanity, fueling the prophesy of our planetary destruction, rather than working on
solutions to solve the problems on EarthIt would be wise and prudent for us as a
species to focus our intellectual and technological knowledge now into preserving
our spaceship for the long voyage through the stars, so that once we have figured
out how to make life on Earth work in an environmentally and politically sustainable
way, we can then venture off the planet into the final frontier of our dreams
[111:8].
NON-COLONIZING, FEAR MONGERING NARRATIVES CAN BE

MADE ABOUT SPACE DEVELOPMENT
file:///C:/Users/swedej/Desktop/Selling_space_colonization_and_immortali.pdf
Marketers and space advocates need to rethink their narratives and strategies.
Inspiration can be used in marketing outer space without the use of old explorer
narratives based on torture, death and wealth acquisition, and without selling fear
to get their points across. Author William E. Burrows writes, [t]he wherewithal to
protect Earth should be multidimensional and imaginative. That means outgrowing
the tendency to concentrate only on immediate danger and broadening the defense
against the wider array of potential threats. This requires resolve and tools. The
latter are in place or could be put there. But there is no resolve [17:39]. I propose,
at the very least, companies conduct more medical research in analog
environments, as well as further examining data gained from the ISS and future
Mars rover missions. Think tanks can also be helpful in understanding and
mitigating potential problems, such as personality conflicts and cultural
misunderstandings. Being cognizant will lead to more well-rounded research, both
quantitatively and qualitatively to prepare for the colonization of Mars. Companies
can put together interdisciplinary consulting teams to look into both the ethical and
cultural aspects of society and how their actions may impact the mission to Mars, in
order to lessen the effect of a diluted cultural agenda. Perhaps these organizations
can find ways to prevent negative outcomes by being somewhat diligent about their
decisions. Manned missions to Mars need to wait until researchers have had the
time to examine the potential problems thoroughly.
Popular culture offers a good analogy for the race to Mars. During the episode
Forces of Nature (S7E9) from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the Enterprise crew
is warned that traveling through a certain region of space may be problematic for
other space faring people, as well as people living on a nearby planet, but they
decide to start exploring anyway. Eventually, the crew learned that their actions
were harmful to others because they did not spend the time to think about the
consequences of their actions. Captain Jean-Luc Picard reflects at the end of the
episode, I spent the better part of my life exploring space. I have charted new
worlds, I've met dozens of new species. And I believe that these were all valuable
ends in themselves. And now it seems that, all this while, I was helping to damage
the thing that I hold most dear [104]. Maybe we can take a lesson from this
imaginative tale. If we truly love and care for space, ourselves, and our humanity,
then let us take the time necessary to do research to avoid unwanted predicaments.
My hope is that we will go ahead into the future with patience and insight. Stephen
Cave suggests: I find it helps to see life as being like a book: Just as a book is
bounded by its covers, by beginning and end, so our lives are bounded by birth and
death, and even though a book is limited by beginning and end, it can encompass
distant landscapes, exotic figures, fantastic adventuresthe characters within it
know no horizonsit makes no sense for you to fear what is outside of those covers,
whether before your birth or after your death. And you needn't worry how long the
book is, or whether it's a comic strip or an epic. The only thing that matters is that
you make it a good story [20]. For those of us who dream of living on other worlds,
if we do not make it to Mars in our lifetime, let us help with the preparation by
contributing to those humans that will go in the future. We can create our own
stories of adventure so that future generations can go to Mars in a positive way.
Until then, why not make the most of the time we have here? Our pale blue dot is
not such a bad place to live.
THIS IS NOT A CRITIQUE OF RISK THIS IS A CRITIQUE OF HOW

WE APPROACH RISK
However, not all risk is destructive. Health clinicianSteve Morgan [79] suggests,
[w]e take risks with theintention of achieving positive gains, because we see astron
ger potential for opportunity than for failure
wetake risks in order to achieve or experience specificdesires, such as to

be informed, exercise choices, makedecisions, hold some control over direction
or our owndestiny.
Therefore, risk itself is not the direct problem, butthe way in which
we take risks is what needs to beaddressed. We need to slow down and do the
research inorder to lessen the risk as much as we can before ourfellow humans go
off-world or else, as a result of impa-tience, they may experience sickness
and quite possiblydeath. Risk is involved in space travel. However, if I was
anastronaut, I would be more comfortable knowing that I amnot
going to get cancer within
a year of leaving Earthbecause researchers have figured out a way to protectastron
auts against significant radiation. Additionally,another reason for sending people
to Mars is for scientificresearch, so how useful would I be if I died soon afterarriving?
I would prefer to collect data for a few years atleast, to make my trip worth it.
SPACE COLONIZATION DOESNT CHANGE HUMAN VALUES

Another discourse that contributes to the romanticizationof space is the idea that
many problems will disappear oncewe colonize and in turn, everyone will feel
united. Schulze-Makuch and Davies suggest,
establishing a permanentmulticultural and multinational human presence on

anotherworld would have major beneficial political and socialimplications for Earth,
and serve as a strong unifying anduplifting theme for all humanity
[98:3621]. Where is theevidence for this? Would there truly be a sudden collapse
of racist attitudes around the world due to a multi-nationalpresence on Mars? Mars
One [70] alsofeeds intothis utopianideal by stating on their website,
[e]xploring the solar

system as a united humanity will bring us all closertogether.
How so? And in what ways?If we look at the historical evidence of colonization
onEarth, there is no reason to believe the colonization of Mars will unify humanity. In
an academic conception of
afuture society, human nature is a huge, confoundingvariable. Sociologist B.J. Bluth
suggests that when peoplemoved to the New World
[a]ttitudes, values, and ways

of living underwent significant alteration, and societiesevolved with many members
who could not be happy orcomfortable in their old homes
[13]. In truth, a small fewBritish colonizers went back to England after settling
in Jamestown because their lives were not as they imagined,with many of their
fellow colonizers dying from disease[106]. Despite this, space advocates hold onto
that colonialstory for reference, asserting that the New World wasbetter.
SPACE COLONIZATION IS STEEPED IN WHITENESS

The concept of inclusivity is also a romanticized idealcarried over to the narrative of
space colonization. In themarketing world, there is an issue with a lack of diversity
inadvertising. Angus Tucker was quoted in Strategy magazineas saying:
[t]here are tons of white men [in the advertisingindustry] Yeah, I'd say that is a
problem. It can be afairly narrow socio-economic vision through which youevaluate
work. In any kind of country, that would beproblematic, but I think in a multicultural
society likeours, the risk is you end up speaking with a voice that
isultimately relevant to a much narrower group of people
(2013:22).Knowing that the marketing industry is not inclusive,how can space

marketers claim to be inclusive to human-ity when the majority of decision makers
are white men?Alice Gorman asserts that,
[t]he interests of largely white,male Americans are assumed to be universal human

goals
[40:164]. The consequence of this can lead to an

incrediblylimited perspective, not to mention when the rhetoricincludes that
colonization is best for humanity.
However,not all of humanity is represented, only a very smalldemographic of limited
genders and races. Jenny Reardonand Kim Tallbear suggest,
it is commonplace to believethat if one is doing
scientific
work, then it will benefit allhumans. It is not the norm to suggest that practices
mustbe responsive to the possibility of causing social harms
[92:S241]. There may be practices that ideologically

seemto help others, but in reality, could be detrimental. Tocreate a more balanced
perspective, perhaps listening tothe points of view of those who are not in power
might bemore effective in creating an inclusive atmosphere. Bluthwrites that,
developing countries often have differentdesires and respond to different goals, all
of which are anintrinsic part of their emotional make up
Where are the non-space faring nations in these deci-sions? How about the underprivileged and those who aremarginalized? Where is their voice in this
inclusive
narra-tive? During the 1700s
[c]ommercial prospects placedscience arguably within the general public interest,

though
in fact the benefits of mercantile expansion and imperialismaccrued overwhelmingly
to small elites
[88:34]. Those whoare in power (whether government organizations or corporations) that make claims that humanity can be united arethey themselves far
from being diverse or inclusive. WhenPhilosopher, Stephen Cave, talks about the
pursuit of immor-tality he says,
a time when millions do not even haveclean drinking water, can seem like just
another expressionof the selfish ideology of exploitation that teaches that thewhole
world exists only to shore up the survival of a fewprivileged individuals
[19:77]. Therefore, claiming that thepursuitof colonizing Mars is forthe benefitof all
humanity isa falsehood
RUSH TO COLONIZE MARS REIFIES THE FEAR OF DEATH

TherushtoMarsoffersthesymbolicaspectofimmortalityas heroes and martyrs for

those volunteering their
lives. Journalist Mollie Hemingway thinks we should becomfortable with people
dying in space, saying
It wouldbe wonderful if nobody died in our efforts to explorespace. But building a

program around that goal is no wayto accomplish anything of note
[46]. I agree that evenwith the most preparation possible, there might still
becasualties. However, beliefs including being
comfortablewith people dying
and that safeguarding human lives willnot
accomplish anything of note
are detrimental. I assertthat to be comfortable with people dying takes away

someof the value of human life, and this belief can lessen theimportance we place
on the safety of astronauts because
people will die anyway,
or we see them as something tobe easily discarded. Social psychology tells us that
if wethink of people as objects, they become
lesser than
andare more prone to harm that is typically limited to non-human objects [44:193].
To see people as disposable is
adangerous belief. Canadian Astronaut Bob Thirsk, saidabout the Mars One project,
I don't think we're ready
we don't yet have the reliable technology to support aone-way trip to Mars
It's naive to think we're ready tocolonize Mars
it'd be a suicide mission
[57]. The IOM'sethical responsibilities include ensuring
that all feasiblemeans will be taken to reduce astronaut risks to the

lowestachievable levels
[54:11]. Humanity needs to take sometime to do the research needed so that

people's lives andmissions can proceed as
safely.Within the space community, there are people whoadvocate scientific truth.
These advocates claim to preferthe
hard facts
over fantasy. In
Cosmos
, Carl Sagan writes,
[t]he suppression of uncomfortable ideas may be common in religion and politics, but it is not the path toknowledge; it has no place in the
endeavor of science
[96:74]. But yet, in the same breath, scientists and spaceadvocates push towards
their own idea of an afterlife as ametaphor: colonizing space. The idea of
immortality or theafterlife through space colonization gives some people apurpose
by lessening the uncomfortable feeling that thislife might be all there is. What would
happen if theseadvocates and/or candidates were made aware of theirpossible
quest for immortality as an underlying motiva-tion? Would they accept the
hard facts
of what we knowof biology, human cognition and behavior reactions

basedon fear? Might they realize that we all die and thatperhaps death is not such
an aversive state? Stephen Cavesays,
the fear of death is so deeply embedded in us
when we bring out into the open the ways in which it canunconsciously bias us, then
we can at least start to try tominimize the influence it has
[20]. Space colonizationneeds to be looked at with as much clarity of mind

aspossible, before deciding to rush to Mars based on humanfear while putting
people's lives in danger.
REPEAL KEY TO COOPERATION AND COLONIZATION SETS

MOMENTUM
http://time.com/3916379/buzz-aldrin-china-space-partnership/
Id like to call attention to and expand upon several points recently raised by Jeffrey
Kluger, editor at large for TIME magazine, in his first-rate article: The Silly Reason
the Chinese Arent Allowed on the Space Station. Let me add my voice of support
for the U.S. to initiate dialogue with China on the countrys inclusion in the
International Space Station program. Doing so, however, requires not only White
House leadership, but also bi-partisan support in Congress to roll back public law
that bans NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China.
Its all about inclination. In this case, Im not just talking about the inclined orbit of
an object circling Earth, but also a will to lean forward and encourage collaboration
in space.
Working with Chinaas weve learned with other space powerspresents scientific
gains and boosts safety factors for all those engaged in human spaceflight. But
there is much more.
All 21st century spacefaring nations need to take stepping stones that lead to
humanitys bold leap to the Red Planet. For my part, I have spent considerable time
orchestrating Cycling Pathways to Occupy Marsby initiating government-private
sustained human presence around Earth and the Moon, including design assistance
of several lunar bases for all international and commercial uses as a prelude to
human activity on Mars.
REPEAL KEY TO COOPERATION AND FUTURE SPACE

COLONIZATION
http://time.com/3916379/buzz-aldrin-china-space-partnership/
Lets consider some key facts.
China is readying their Tiangong-2 space lab to be lofted around 2016. Once that
facility is in Earth orbit, it will be followed by a piloted Shenzhou-11 spacecraft and
first use of the Tianzhou cargo craft to rendezvous with and support lab operations.
A core segment for a larger, multi-module space station is also on their agenda, to
be placed in Earth orbit around 2018. That station is expected to be fully
constructed around 2022. China is itself taking strides to make their orbiting outpost
available to other countries.
It is time that America take stock in and re-examine our goals and objectives in
space. Let us recommit to objectives that make the most sense. History does not
make itself. But unfortunately it is not just made by actions but also inaction.
I am resolute in my vision that Earth isnt the only world for humanity anymore. The
first humans on Mars will herald a remarkable milestone. Indeed, Ive been a global
envoy carrying a message: On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Apollo 11s
touchdown on the Moon on July 20,1969, the U.S. president in 2019she or hecan
utter these words: I believe this nation should commit itself, within two decades, to
commencing an America-led, permanent presence on the planet Mars.
Americas space program can be placed on a trajectory that spurs increased global
space cooperation. The International Space Station is one tool that can be used for
this prospect. Lets all look beyond the here and now. By working collaboratively we
can attain the vision and the will to reach for even larger goals all the way to the
distant dunes of Mars and beyond.
Cooperation key to solving Chinese counter-space
http://time.com/3901419/space-station-no-chinese/
Even if all of the fears were well-foundedeven if a Chinese Death Star were under
construction at this moment in a mountain lair in Xinjiangforbidding the kind of
international handshaking and cooperating that is made possible by a facility like
the ISS is precisely the wrong way to to go about reducing the threat. The joint
Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975 achieved little of technological significance, but it was
part of a broader thaw between Moscow and Washington. That mattered, in the
same way ping pong diplomacy between the U.S. and China in 1971 was about
nothing more than a gameuntil it was suddenly about much more.
Well before the ISS was built and occupied, the shuttle was already flying American
crews to Russias Mir space station. Russia later became Americas leading partner
in operating and building the ISSa shrewd American move that both offloaded
some of the cost of the station and provided work for Russian missile engineers who
found themselves idle after the Berlin Wall fell and could easily have sold their
services to nuclear nasties like North Korea or Iran.
The technology aboard the ISS is not the kind that a Chinese astronaut with ill will
would want to or need to steal. And more to the point, if theres one thing the men
and women who fly in space will tell you, its that once they get there, terrestrial
politics mean nothing at allthe sandbox silliness of politicians who are not relying
on the cooperation of a few close crewmates to keep them alive and safe as they
race through low Earth orbit. From space, as astronauts like to say, you cant see
borders. Its a perspective the lawmakers in Washington could use.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INCLUDING CHINA

NECESSARY FOR SPACE COLONIZATION
http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasaadministrator-charles-bolden-2186627
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden says a manned mission to Mars will happen in
the 2030s, but unlike the Apollo moon missions in the 1960s and '70s, it will take an
international coalition -- including Russia and China -- to get there.
America remains the unquestioned leader when it comes to space exploration, but
in a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday, Bolden said future efforts will
look like the International Space Station, an international effort that has kept
humans continuously living and working in space for the past 15 years.
LOW EARTH BILATERAL TRUST KEY TO COLONIZATION

http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasaadministrator-charles-bolden-2186627
Conspicuously absent from NASA's international partners is China. Politics have
stymied this relationship following a ban included in the 2011 U.S. Federal budget.
There are some loopholes that have allowed Bolden to collaborate with the Chinese
Academy of Science on Earth science research. NASA also provided China with lunar
imagery that helped the Chang'e 3 mission select a landing site. Air traffic
management is another area of cooperation. "Its critical to partner with China,"
Bolden said.
Space exploration is peaceful, but the area above Earth could become a source of
contention as more countries send satellites into orbit. More partnerships would
lead to a safer orbit.
"If were partnered with the Chinese, as we are with other nations, I think they
would be much less prone to do something that puts low-Earth orbit in jeopardy,
like, you know, anti-satellite stuff. Now, that may be a nave thought, but I think
that's what gives me hope, that the more we can have many nations working
toward a common goal, the better off well be," Bolden said.
US CANT UNILATERALLY COLONIZE
http://spacenews.com/op-ed-align-u-s-space-policy-with-national-interests/
In a world in which space capabilities are increasingly global, no one state will be in
a position to impose rules unilaterally for the exploration and development of space.
Similarly, the diversity of competing national interests in space makes it unlikely
that a single international space authority or even a new space treaty will emerge
anytime soon. Thus, the task for the United States, if it wishes to influence how
space is developed and utilized, is to create attractive projects and frameworks in
which other nations choose to align themselves, and their space activities, with us,
as opposed to others. Just as the United States shaped the postwar world with a
range of international institutions, so we should look to the creation of new
arrangements to advance our interests, values and freedoms in space.
COOPERATION MAKES MOST SENSE SOLVES LEADERSHIP AND

FEASIBILITY
China is planning to deploy its own space station in less than a decade, about the
same time that the International Space Station may be ending. If China is able to
offer pragmatic opportunities for space cooperation on its own space station or as
part of efforts to send humans to the moon, and the United States cannot, then
other countries will likely find it attractive to forge closer relationships with China.
Such a shift in international space influence away from the United States and
toward China will, no doubt, impact a wide range of U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests, both in space and in other arenas.
The United States retains several advantages in space, however. We have decades
of experience and close relationships with almost every spacefaring nation on a
wide range of projects. The entrepreneurial energy of the private U.S. space
community, both large and small, is a source of admiration by and occasional
puzzlement to the international space community.
At the same time, a proud history and a nascent private industry cannot alone
substitute for national and international leadership in space, and they likely cannot
survive, much less thrive without it.
Both international cooperation and private-sector initiative are necessary aspects of
any effective American strategy in space, but are not by themselves sufficient. A
focused national strategy is also needed to provide a coherent context for both
cooperative agreements and private ventures.
COOPERATION LEADS TO GOOD RELATIONS AND PEACE

The next steps beyond low Earth orbit will require international partners for practical
and political reasons. Therefore, it makes sense to ask what our partners would like
to do, and what they are capable of doing in the future. The answer is the moon
with Mars and other destinations in the distance.
A U.S. commitment now to lead a multinational program to explore the moon would
be a symbolic and practical first step as well as a means of creating a broader
international framework for space cooperation.
At the same time, the geopolitical benefits of improving relations with growing
space powers through greater U.S. engagement could support more-ambitious
space exploration efforts than science alone might justify. Providing commercial
cargo delivery to the lunar surface would be an attractive post-ISS market for U.S.
industry; the volume and duration of that market would be enormously more
attractive to industry than that for the ISS alone could ever be.
The moon is not just a destination, but also a means of answering questions,
creating capabilities, training organizations and forging new relationships to serve
the interests of the United States and its allies.
COLONIZATION BAD: https://doctorlinda.wordpress.com/2013/07/24/thefrontier-metaphor-still-worrisome/ http://fusion.net/story/111409/why-the-mission-tomars-imperative-message-bothers-me/
SPACE COOP NOT PERCEIVED BY PUBLIC

http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf
Unlike cyber security issues, Chinas space activities have not prompted a broad
level of public discussion and debate. US assessments have remained the province
of a small community of specialists. China was the third country to launch a man in
space in 2003 and has been accelerating its activities in space for the past decade.
The Department of Defense May 2013 assessment of Chinas military capabilities
noted that in 2012 China conducted 18 space launches and expanded its spacebased
SPACE PROGRAM IS IMPORTANT FOR CCP LEGITIMACY

It is plausible that China has a mix of domestic prestige, strategic, economic and
political motivations. For domestic audiences, a sophisticated space program
culminating in a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade would be a huge
political boost for the regime and ratification that its focus on economic
modernization without political reform is the right course.
COOPERATION SOLVES MISCALC

It would be advisable and it is likely that the United States and China will begin to
engage in deeper bilateral or multi-lateral discussions or negotiations that could
establish certain codes of conduct in space. Slow but tangible cooperation would
contribute to common understandings and thus reduce the likelihood of
misunderstandings and surprise. At the same time, both sides are most likely to
enhance offensive US-China strategic competition in space is a struggle between
asymmetric powers. 111 and defensive capabilities to seek military advantages as
part of their overall strategies. The US-China relationship in space, as on the ground
and at sea, will be a mix of cooperation and competition. Hopefully, as Kissinger
reasoned, foolish actions will be avoided that could have profound negative effects
on both societies
UNCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY MAKES MISCALC MORE LIKELY

General statements delivered in national strategies without presidential or cabinet

secretary-level reinforcement do not have the same effect. National strategies tend
to be vague purposely and are not associated clearly with consequences. Ambiguity
in deterrent threats, often held up as strategically artful, actually may encourage
opponent miscalculation and lead to greater risk taking. Take, for example, the
Obama administrations declaratory policy for space, issued in 2010: The United
States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all
responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of selfdefense, deter
others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to
the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack
them.13 It is unlikely that the threat to employ a variety of measures strikes fear
into the hearts of opponents. Imprecision is defended as necessary since giving
opponents explicit redlines would tell them what they could do with impunity. This
ignores the likely conclusion that opponents, judging from their actions, had already
deduced an implicit redline: that in peacetime, Washington will do nothing against
actions that fall below the threshold of the use of force. While Washington believes
that imprecision reinforces freedom of action, opponents may judge that the
generality of US declaratory policy reflects a deeper indecision as to how
Washington will respond to malicious actions against satellites.
WOLF AMENDMENT ONLY THING STOPPING US-CHINA

COOPERATION
http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-space-coop
Since April 2011, NASA has been legally prohibited from any cooperative activities
with China, at the insistence of Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) while he was Chairman
of the subcommittee responsible for NASA funding. Rep. John Culberson (R-Texas)
took over the role of Chairman after Wolf left Congress. Culberson has publicly
stated his desire to continue the ban, which reads, in part:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or
execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after
the date of enactment of this Act.[16]
NASA solicitations allow foreign participation via non-U.S. organizations, subject to
NASAs policy of no exchange of funds, in which each government supports its own
national participants and accounts for associated costs. Foreign nationals are
permitted to support NASA research if they are legally employed by a U.S.
organization and that organization follows U.S. export control restrictions. This
allows, for example, foreign graduate students at a U.S. university to contribute to
NASA space research activities.
However, the prohibition in place against China is significantly more restrictive, as
stated in a NASA solicitation: Proposals must not include bilateral participation,
collaboration, or coordination with China or any Chinese-owned company or entity,
whether funded or performed under a no-exchange-of funds arrangement.[17]
COOPERATION BAD 3 REASONS

The reasons Rep. Wolf gave for imposing the restrictions on NASA, and the reasons
Rep. Culberson gives for extending them, are straightforward and threefold:
-China is militarily a threat to the United States

Chinas military is growing more sophisticated and is increasing its reliance on
space assets as a force multiplier. In addition, it is developing counterspace
weapons to deny potential adversaries access to their military space assets.
Shutting down the flow of space technology is intended to increase the cost and
limit the capability of Chinese military space systems.
-The United States has nothing to gain by cooperating with China

Chinas civil space program is intended to be a source of pride for the Chinese
people and evidence to the international community that China has emerged from
its Third World, technologically stunted past. However, China is just now duplicating
what other nations accomplished in the 1960s and 1970s. Limiting cooperation with
China makes it difficult for the Chinese to innovate and make significant advances.
Further, cooperation with China would be a one-way street: the Chinese would gain
technology and stature, while the United States would give up its technical
advantage and cede its leadership role. In addition, cooperation would increase
Chinas economic competitiveness to the detriment of the U.S. space industry.
-Chinas government does not respect basic human rights for its people
Chinas restrictive policies are severe and do not reflect Western values of human
rights. Cooperation would imply tolerance of these policies.
THOSE 3 POINTS ARE GARBAGE

The rationale against cooperation seems at first glance to be compelling, but there
are counterpoints to each of the rationales for not cooperating with China.
-China is militarily a threat to the United States

The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly
makes sense to carefully restrict access to technologies that would uniquely and
substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military
threat, but excessive efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of
the United States.
Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of Chinese
military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire the necessary
capabilities either from the international space community or by developing the
capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral
to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in
the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances
we anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space
manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive in
the world market.
China is increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and
European nations. This supports the technological advancements and economies of
those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry, which is hurt in two ways: it
cannot compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to
international missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese
participation in or access to those missions.
As the Chinese increase their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to
employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military
space systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other
means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese may be less inclined to
develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital
intercept, since this could lead to a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese
recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.
-The United States has nothing to gain by cooperating with China

Chinese space technology certainly lags U.S. space technology. But extreme
applications of restrictions hurt the U.S. space industry in dealings with the rest of
the world. In addition, cooperation provides benefits beyond technological
innovations. There are more scientific problems in the world than scientists
available to address them. Most space science research programs today are
international endeavors. U.S. space science missions typically include European,
Japanese, or other nations instruments and collaborators, and similarly many, if not
most, international research missions include U.S. instruments and collaborators.
Chinese researchers, both indigenously trained and those who study abroad, could
contribute significantly to a wide range of challenging problems (such as the
underlying mechanisms responsible for global warming, a topic inherently global in
scope and requiring data that can be obtained only from space). Similarly, simple
space-based technological applications can improve quality of life around the world
and do not require rocket science to accomplishfor example, increased maritime
monitoring for search and rescue of ships (and aircraft) in distress. We should
encourage Chinese cooperation in such endeavors.
-Chinas government does not respect basic human rights for its people
The United States has a long history of engaging its enemies to pursue change. The
most recent example is the about-face in the U.S. relationship with Cuba. Isolation
complicates opportunities to have effective give-and-take dialogue.
Even when the broader posture is to restrict trade or other exchanges, at times the
United States has made space or science an exception, thus opening doors to an
adversary and providing valuable ways to learn more about how the other side
perceives the United States and the motivations and actions it uses to counter the
United States. A classic example is U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the 1970s, which gave
the United States valuable insight into the tightly closed Soviet space industry. This
cooperation during the Soviet era later opened the door to Russian cooperation,
eventually enabling the United States to complete the ISS and giving the Russians
access to a station after Mir was no longer available. More recently, when sanctions
were imposed on Russia after it began supporting Ukrainian separatists, the
restrictions did not include U.S.-Russian cooperation in the International Space
Station, avoiding an interruption of ISS operations.
US LEADERSHIP AND CHINA INCLUSION KEY TO

COLONIZATION
Working with the Chinese is consistent with the U.S. position that space exploration
belongs to the people of the world, not one country or another, particularly if this
openness were extended to all emerging spacefaring nations. Truly ambitious
human space exploration, such as a human mission to Mars, will be incredibly
challenging and expensive, and may be possible only through international
cooperation and significant and obvious U.S. leadership.
Cyber
CYBER IMPORTANT TO US AND CHINA
Some of the most worrisome issues in the current U.S.-China relationship are in
areas that lack common rules and institutions, such as cyber espionage and outer
space, where there are no established procedures or independent bodies to manage
such disputes.
CURRENT CYBERDEFENSE INADEQUATE
The United States is ill prepared to defend itself from cyber espionage when its
adversary is determined, centrally coordinated, and technically sophisticated, as is
the CCP and Chinas government. The design of the Internetdeveloped in the
United States to facilitate open communication between academia and government,
and eventually expanded to include commercial opportunitiesleaves it particularly
vulnerable to spies and thieves. As the largest and most web-dependent economy
in the world, the United States is also the largest target for cyber espionage of
commercial IP.
The Chinese government also imposes heavy-handed censorship on Internet
content and social media. These restrictions on free expression and access to
information and news have driven from the Chinese market those U.S. companies
unwilling to follow the authoritarian dictates of Beijing. The Chinese government has
also begun to censor material originating outside its borders by directly attacking
U.S.-based information providers. The Chinese government has infiltrated a wide
swath of U.S. government computer networks; the U.S. government response to the
challenge has been inadequate. Federal agencies are not governed by a uniform
system for defense against cyber intrusions. Other than to acknowledge an
unrelenting series of assaults on its networks, the Federal Government has yet to
devise adequate defenses, while top U.S. intelligence officials have grudgingly
praised Chinese hackers for their bold ingenuity.
NO HACKBACKSIES
The U.S. reaction to the increasing number and sophistication of foreign cyber
espionage and malicious network attacks has been mostly defensive. U.S. law does
not allow retaliatory cyber attacks by private citizens and corporations, nor does it
appear to allow counterintrusions (or hack backs) for the purpose of recovering,
erasing, or altering stolen data in offending computer networks. International law
has not kept up with developments in cyber warfare, and no international consensus
exists on how to attribute or appropriately respond to cyber attacks. However, a
policy discussion on the issue of offensive and retaliatory cyber operations has
begun.
CYBERSECURITY AGREEMENTS KEY

Cybersecurity also has major implications for both America and China in the
economic and security realms. The U.S. government sees Chinese cyberhacking as
a major and still growing national security threat but has been careful to draw a
distinction between traditional espionagesuch as the U.S. activities revealed in the
recent National Security Agency, or NSA, scandaland corporate espionage. U.S.
intelligence agencies strongly believe that they have solid evidence that Chinas
military and intelligence services engage in corporate espionage, whereby they
obtain information from U.S. private-sector enterprises and pass that information on
to Chinese companies to give them a competitive edge. This differs markedly from
normal intelligence operations aimed at securing government or military secrets or
preventing attacks on domestic or allied targets. For this reason, the cyber realm is
almost certain to be a key point of tension going forward and could feed mistrust
between the China and the United States. As then-National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon put it when relaying President Obamas message to President Xi at the
Sunnylands summit, if its not addressed, if it continues to be this direct theft of
United States property, that [cybersecurity is] going to be very difficult problem in
the economic relationship and [is] going to be an inhibitor to the relationship really
reaching its full potential.
Both sides, however, also have overlapping concerns in cyberspace, including
reducing the incidence of cybercrime by nonstate actors. As President Obama
stated at the Sunnylands summit, What both President Xi and I recognize is that
because of these incredible advances in technology, that the issue of cybersecurity
and the need for rules and common approaches to cybersecurity are going to be
increasingly important as part of bilateral relationships and multilateral
relationships.64 Cybsersecurity was also a major topic at the Strategic Security
Dialogue, held alongside the recent Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington,
D.C. in July 2013.65
CYBER PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS NEED TO ACT NOW TO

ESTABLISH NORMS
As discussed above, new realms of interaction such as cyber and space, and others
yet to be discovered, are particularly vulnerable to conflict because common rules
do not yet govern them. Additionally, we cannot rule out the ever-present possibility
that mistakes, accidents, and/or misperceptions can trigger a dispute. The time for
action is now, before such an incident occurs. More robust military-to-military
communications, as we discuss below, can help prevent unintentional clashes.
US-CHINA AGREEMENT KEY TO CYBER MARKET AND GLOBAL

ECON OVERALL
On cybersecurity, it is clear that, at a minimum, a common set of guidelines is
needed to prevent cyber concerns from derailing interstate commerce. If companies
around the world perceive a high risk that their proprietary intellectual property and
other internal data could be stolen by government actors conducting international
cyber espionage and handed over to their competitors, this will negatively impact
global research, investment, and commerce. Every nation shares the responsibility
to provide a modicum of security and investigate offenses within their own borders.
That responsibility should include providing cybersecurity for private companies and
individuals that are either operating within their borders or being targeted by actors
operating within their borders. If companies in the United States have solid
evidence of illegal cyber intrusions originating from China, the Chinese government
should have mechanisms in place to review and investigate those claims. Likewise,
the United States should have mechanisms in place to address complaints from
Chinese companies. As the worlds largest economic powers, it is in U.S. and
Chinese interests to address these cyber economic concerns before they further
damage our bilateral economic relationship and the global economy more broadly.
To do that effectively, China and the United States will need to forge some type of
common understanding about what types of practices are not acceptable and
develop common institutions for addressing those problems in a mutually agreeable
fashion. Given the scope of these challenges, multilateral approaches will be
needed, but as the United States and China are the worlds economic leaders,
bilateral dialogue is also critical.
CYBER SECURITY AMBIVALENT NOW

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/23/the-five-most-important-issues-inu-s-china-relations/
Cybersecurity, which has been a simmering point of dispute at every dialogue, will
become even more heated in light of the recently disclosed hack of the OPM
personnel database, as well as the database containing security background data
for nearly every federal employee and military member. The United States, while
not directly accusing the Chinese government, has claimed that the hack was the
work of Chinese actors. Couple that with the indictment of five Chinese military
personnel for cyber-espionage against U.S. corporations and labor organizations in
order to gain economic advantage, and there is little doubt that the meetings will be
fairly rancorous.
Still, not everything on the cyber front is gloomy. The United States and China have
made a great deal of progress in cooperating on cyber-tracking of illicit movements
of funds and people. The Chinese will be pressing hard to get the United States to
cooperate in disrupting the illegal flow of cash from China to the United States, and
in repatriating both the funds and the fugitives who stole them. This discussion will
likely bleed over into the human rights arena, as evidenced by the case of Yang
Xiuzhu, who is wanted on corruption charges and applied for asylum in New York
after being detained by Interpol.
CYBER ESCALATION IS CHINAS FAULT NEED TO ACT NOW

As for cyber, it is Beijing that has caused this crisis, and no U.S. administration
should be negotiating a pact with the wolf in the sheep pen. First, we should be
thinking of financial sanctions and diplomatic freezes as punishment for aggression
already committed and that to come.
It also is past time to throw some cyber elbows to show we wont simply sit and take
whatever fouls China decides to commit. There is no question that the U.S. is
probably more vulnerable that China on the cyber front, but we are steadily being
led down the path towards a real cyber Pearl Harbor (such as the shutting down of
our energy grid) by our unwillingness to show that we can play the same game. Its
a discomfiting thought, but that is the world we have let ourselves be trapped into.
WORKING TOGETHER ON CYBER NOW
The United States and China agree that timely responses should be provided to
requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities.
Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a manner consistent with their respective
national laws and relevant international obligations, with requests to investigate
cybercrimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity
emanating from their territory. Both sides also agree to provide updates on the
status and results of those investigation to the other side, as appropriate.
The United States and China agree that neither countrys government will conduct
or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade
secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify and promote
appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international
community. The United States and China welcome the July 2015 report of the UN
Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications

in the Context of International security, which addresses norms of behavior and
other crucial issues for international security in cyberspace. The two sides also
agree to create a senior experts group for further discussions on this topic.
The United States and China agree to establish a high-level joint dialogue
mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. China will designate an
official at the ministerial level to be the lead and the Ministry of Public Security,
Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, and the State Internet and Information
Office will participate in the dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and
the U.S. Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue, with participation from
representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Intelligence
Community and other agencies, for the United States. This mechanism will be used
to review the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and
assistance with respect to malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either
side. As part of this mechanism, both sides agree to establish a hotline for the
escalation of issues that may arise in the course of responding to such requests.
Finally, both sides agree that the first meeting of this dialogue will be held by the
end of 2015, and will occur twice per year thereafter.
IR theories
REALISM: CONFLICT IS [NOT] INEVITABLE
Undergirding all realist thought is the idea that the international system is anarchic,
with no overarching law or enforcing authority to govern state relations. How
powerful a state ismeasured by a variety of factors, including economic and
military variablesessentially determines its standing in the world. States are
rational actors that have survival as their main goal. Much of realist thought on
great power transitions stems from hegemonic stability theory, which suggests A
New Model of Major Power Relations | www.americanprogress.org 39 that the
international system is more likely to be stable with the presence of one world
power, the hegemon, and feature a corresponding lack of stability when the
hegemon declines or outright loses power. Building off of hegemonic stability theory
is power transition theory, which suggests that the possibility of serious conflict
emerges when a rising power and declining power approach a crossover point in
terms of national strength, though how this is measured is up for interpretation.27
The rising power becomes frustrated that the status quo is biased toward the
declining power, while the declining power sees its window of opportunity to check
the rising power closing.28 For this reason, the chance of war increases when the
states have roughly similar, but not necessarily equal, capabilities.29 China is
obviously rising both economically and militarily, and it is likely that friction with the
United States and other major powers will persist as it continues to expand. Some
offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, believe that this will make conflict with
the United States inevitable, unless America is willing to step aside.30 Randall
Schweller, professor of political science and social behavior at Ohio State University,
believes that, though China has worked within the current international system to
regain its great power status, it will be difficult to further integrate into the world
order because of the insular and defensive character of Chinese politics and
nationalism.31 Other adherents of realism such as Cornell University Professor
Jonathan Kirshner, however, suggest that China will not necessarily challenge the
United States and conflict is not inevitable.32 Chinese policymakers can learn from
the lessons of previous rising powers and, contrary to the view of Mearsheimer and
others, conclude that achieving regional hegemony carries unacceptable levels of
risk.
LIBERALISM: CONFLICT UNLIKELY
As opposed to realisms emphasis on anarchy and power being the sole determinant
of relations between countries, liberal internationalists discuss other factors that
influence state behavior, such as international organizations and economic
interdependence. Liberal internationalists believe that international organizations,
such as the United Nations and World Bank, provide a forum for dispute resolution
and negotiation that has a positive impact on conflict levels and increases
cooperation between states. Political scientists Sara Mitchell and Paul Hensel show
that international institutions have a very positive effect on mediation, even on the
thorniest issues such as conflicts between states. 33 Liberal international- 40 Center
for American Progress | U.S.-China Relations ists also believe that economic
interdependence reduces the chance of conflict by increasing the costs of conflict
a country is less likely to attack another if in so doing it will harm its own economy.
In addition to economic interdependence, there is also the idea of security
interdependence. Similar to economic interdependence, security interdependence
has become more profound in the era of globalization. As Center for American
Progress Senior Fellow Nina Hachigian wrote previously, Newly virulent threats
profoundly affect pivotal power relations. Terrorists and pathogens represent big
challenges that must be faced globally by all.34 While the interactions between
states when working on these challenges can encourage further cooperation, there
is always the risk of states freeloading off the investments made by others. 35
International institutions, however, not only encourage cooperation and make
communication between states easier, they also introduce enforcement
mechanisms as a way of preventing freeloading, though these obviously vary from
institution to institution. Economic interdependence has created strong incentives
for both sides of the U.S.- China relationship to search for ways to reduce tension
and conflict when problems emerge. Bilateral trade rose from around $8 billion in
1985 to $536 billion in 2012, and those numbers only continue to increase.36 As
scholars have pointed out, Chinese membership in international institutions has
increased dramatically since Chairman Mao Zedongs death.37 China has also
refrained from attempts to significantly change institutional rules and continually
stated its desire to rise within the current international system, albeit with
adjustments for its enhanced stature.
CONSTRUCTIVISM: NO DETERMINATION
Advanced most notably by political scientist Alexander Wendt, constructivism holds
that it is possible for states, through repeated interactions, to form collective
identities and interests.38 In addition to interactions between states, the rise of
common othersissues or threats that cannot be faced by one state alone, such
as climate changereduce states ability to act unilaterally and encourage
cooperation.39 Over time, this leads states toward greater degrees of collective
identity and reduced conflict. Of course, the inverse is also possible. Just as
repeated interactions of a positive nature can lead to collective identities and

interests, repeated negative interactions and preconceived negative images breed
hostility, mistrust, and possible conflict. A New Model of Major Power Relations |
www.americanprogress.org 41 Many constructivists believe that Chinas increasing
participation in international institutions will eventually lead to shifts in strategic
culture, behavioral norms, and conceptions of national identity that preclude conflict
with the United States.40 Constructivism, however, also suggests that negative
frames of the opposing side can create hostility that the facts of the relationship do
not justify.
NEW REALISM KEY TO REJUVENATED TALKS

It is time for a new realism in U.S.-China relations. Such realism begins with an
official acceptance that we are locked in a competition with China that is of Beijings
choosing. Our economies may be increasingly interconnected, but no longer can
U.S. officials quail at responding to Beijings provocations out of fear that trade
relations will be harmed. It is time for high-level U.S.-Chinadialogues to be reset, to
use a term once in favor in the Obama Administration, and conducted not as an
unearned gift to Beijing, but only when there are concrete goals to be achieved. A
state that acts increasingly in violation of global norms of behavior is not one that
should be rewarded with pomp and circumstance by U.S. leaders.
NEW REALISM PUTS BALL IN CHINAS COURT AVOIDS MANY

IMPACTS
The point of the new realism is not to force a conflict with China. It is to avoid one.
Only steady strength, a firm response, and a willingness to speak the truth will show
Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders that America is no better friend and no worse
adversary. The choice lies entirely with the Chinese leadership. So far, they have
ignored Susan Rices earnest exhortations, and instead shown a dangerous
willingness to undermine the very peace that has allowed their country to grow so
much. By acting in our best interests, we will also help deflect China from a path
that increasingly looks like one that will result in far greater risks to stability,
prosperity, and peace.
G20 CP
G20 SUCKS
The United States agrees with China that the international system needs reform.
The actors and issues are changing faster than the bureaucracies are able to keep
up. For instance, there were no routine, high-level leadership summits that included
all major powers until 2008. The Group of 8, or G-8, excluded China and India. The
U.N. Security Council excluded Japan and India. The establishment of the Group of
20, or G-20, in 2008 as a major global leaders forum has filled that void. The G-20
has played a key role in bringing existing and emerging powers together to discuss
the most pressing economic issues of the day. Through it, China and the United
States have played significant roles in stemming the global financial crisis and
implementing banking reforms, among other accomplishments. The G-20 provides a
setting in which leaders can try to assign responsibility for reform to every major
economy in a fair way that allows progress to continue. Because of its early success,
expectations of what the G-20 can accomplish often outstrip what it can deliver. Yet
it remains a key fire station for crisis management and addressing global economic
challenges, as well as a steady reminder to capitals that their individual actions
affect the globe.
G20 IS A GOOD FORUM FOR BILAT
CAP and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR,
conducted a joint study, entitled The US-China Study Group on G-20 Reform, and
produced a variety of recommendations to strengthen the G-20 as an institution. As
noted in that study: With greater cooperation through the G-20, there is an
opportunity for China and the United States to further strengthen both that forum
and their bilateral relationship. Such cooperation can contribute to the development
of a new type of major power relationship.70
Human Trafficking
Middle East
SOLVE ONGOING CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Finally, there are regional issues that attention from outside major powers can help
to solve. Chief among these is the Middle East. Given Chinas and the United States
status as the largest and second-largest oil importers, respectively, both have a
major interest in peace and stability in the region. There are four areas in particular
on which America and China both must find common ground to help find a solution.
The first is the Iran nuclear crisis. Both China and the United States want to avoid
the sort of regional instability that could arise as a consequence of Iran acquiring a
nuclear weapon, whether due to airstrikes on Iranian facilities or an arms race with
Iran and its neighbors. Another area is the IsraeliPalestinian peace process in which
China, with U.S. encouragement, has been playing a greater role in recent months,
with the former hosting both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in May 2013.66 President Xis four-point plan
for peace, which he released after those meetings, shows that China and the United
States are largely on the same page with regards to the framework for a solution.67
A third area is the ongoing crisis in Syria. The United States and China must take
mutual actions to promote an end to the civil war that has already killed more than
130,000 Syrians.68 And finally, the United States and China should find ways to
promote investment and economic development in Egypt, as well as the
development of an inclusive society, to reduce tensions and help get Egypt back on
track.
WORKING TOGETHER ON AFGHANISTAN NOW
The United States and China decided to maintain communication and cooperation
with one another on Afghanistan to support peaceful reconstruction and economic
development in Afghanistan, support an Afghan led, Afghan owned reconciliation
process, and promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China, and
Afghanistan. Together with Afghanistan, the United States and China will co-chair a
high-level event on Afghanistans reconstruction and development on the margins
of the UN General Assembly on September 26. This event will convene
Afghanistans neighbors and the international community to discuss the importance
of continuing robust regional and international support for the Afghan government
and regional economic cooperation. The United States and China jointly renew their
call on the Taliban to enter into direct talks with the Government of Afghanistan.
The United States and China also noted their mutual interests in supporting peace,
stability, and prosperity in neighboring countries of Afghanistan, and to working in
partnership with these countries to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and
the region.
IMF CP
QUOTA REVISIONS NEEDED CHINA ALREADY APPROVED
Member states pledged to accept a revision in the quota system, discussed above,
that would give far more weight to China. This has yet to be approved by the U.S.
Congress.72 We would recommend that the Obama administration push this
forward as quickly as possible, as it is another demonstration that the current
international order is fair and embraces emerging powers. For its part, China should
help empower the IMF to monitor issues of currencya critical task in a global
economy. China should also continue to carry out its plans to move to a market
determined floating exchange rate, reduce controls on portfolio capital flows,
liberalize foreign direct investment in financial services, and liberalize interest rates.
Consult CP
TRANSPARENCY KEY
In the areas of outer space, oceans, and cyberspace, the United States and China
must work with the rest of the international community toward a common set of A
New Model of Major Power Relations | www.americanprogress.org 59 rules that can
guide behavior. Transparency is crucial. By being straightforward about their plans
and activities in these areas, both the United States and China will help overcome
strategic tensions between the two sides.
Nuclear Policy
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Just as important may be establishing a dialogue on nuclear weapons, which China
has been reluctant to do to date.78 Even the United States and the Soviet Union,
mortal enemies during the Cold War, were able to have regular dialogues on nuclear
forces and strategy.79 One possible confidence-building measure when it comes to
space is the United States and China notifying each other of certain satellite
launches. Greater transparency on Chinas military budget would also help the
relationship.
XI IS US BEST SHOT TO DENUCLEARIZE
%2021.pdf
For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and
policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States,
albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for Chinas future, and
his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of Chinas one-party state.
When, therefore, Xi uses the term win-win (shuangying ) to describe his
desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of
Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political
collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and
security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi
Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions
are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is
capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic
bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as
creatively as it can while it still lasts.
CHINA IS SECRETIVE
China is secretive about the details of its official nuclear policy, leading to
uncertainty regarding key principles of its nuclear weapons doctrine. Key elements
of Chinas nuclear policy, such as its no-first-use pledge and presumptive dealerting policy, may be under reconsideration but are unlikely to change officially.
CHINAS NUCLEAR ARSENAL IS FOR DETERRENCE

The chief roles of Chinas nuclear arsenal are to deter an adversary from
undertaking a nuclear first strike and to reduce the pressure on China to yield to an
adversarys demands, or desist from aggression, under threat of nuclear attack.
Chinas belief that its nuclear arsenal would deter an adversary from taking a
conventional fight into the nuclear realm could encourage it to be more adventurous
in its risk-taking during a crisis because it may not sufficiently fear the prospect of
nuclear escalation.
CHINA DEVELOPING SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITIES
China is pursuing a credible second-strike capability with an emphasis on
survivability against an adversarys first strike. By diversifying its nuclear strike
capabilities away from solely land-based systems in silos, China seeks to ensure its
ability to absorb a nuclear strike and retaliate in kind. Examples of this
diversification include road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and potentially air-launched land-attack cruise missiles.
CHINA UPGRADING SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITIES

China is developing cruise missiles that are increasingly difficult for the U.S. military
to detect and defend against. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has fielded its first
ground-launched landattack cruise missile, and also appears to be developing air-,
ship-, and submarine-launched cruise missiles with land-attack and antiship
missions. China is in the midst of improving the qualitative aspects of its cruise
missile technologies; in the meantime, the quantitative strength of its cruise
missiles poses a formidable challenge to existing U.S. Navy defenses.
COOPERATING NOW
The United States and China commit to deepen their cooperation on nuclear
security and to work together to make the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by
President Obama next year a success. The two sides plan to hold an annual
bilateral dialogue on nuclear security, with the first meeting of the dialogue to be
held prior to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.
US SHOULD CHANGE NUCLEAR POSTURE OTWARDS CHINA

http://cogitasia.com/nuclear-weapons-and-u-s-china-relations-a-way-forward/
Maintaining stability in U.S.-China nuclear relations will be critical to the interests of
the United States and those of its allies and partners in the coming years. Nuclear
weapons are by no means central to the U.S.-China relationship, but maintaining
stability is nonetheless essential because of the catastrophic consequences of a
nuclear war. At present, nuclear dynamics between the United States and China are
relatively stable, but the changing conventional military balance in the region, the
current sources of tension and possible conflict, and the expansion of the quality
and quantity of Chinas nuclear arsenal raise serious questions.
The United States should, therefore, work to enhance nuclear stability with China
through a series of bilateral and unilateral policy and posture adjustments that
would enhance crisis stability and arms race stability, while also laying the
groundwork for future bilateral and multilateral nuclear engagement.
3 POLICY INITIATIVES TO CHANGE
Because the current nuclear dynamics are broadly stabilizing and should be
sustained, the Working Group recommends a robust but realistically tailored
program of engagement and dialogue on nuclear issues that reinforce Chinas
nuclear restraint and advance U.S. interests in stability, dialogue, transparency, and
progress toward arms control. In concert with efforts to improve dialogue, the
United States should adopt three policy initiatives.
First, the United States should plan, procure, and posture its forces and base its own
policy on the assumption that an attempted U.S. disarming first strike, combined
with U.S. missile defenses, could not reliably deny a Chinese nuclear retaliatory
strike on the United States. This recommendation is based on a hard-nosed
judgment that the United States cannot realistically hope to deny Chinas secondstrike capability and a failed attempt to build capabilities to do so would be costly
and counterproductive. Members of the Working Group differ, however, on whether
the United States should explicitly and publicly acknowledge a state of mutual
vulnerability with China. Some believe that such a step would have positive
stabilizing benefits on Chinas nuclear policy, while others fear that public and
formal acknowledgment will achieve little more than raising questions from nervous
allies.
Second, the United States should specifically and publicly tie the development and
deployment of its national missile defenses oriented to East Asia to North Korea,
making it clear that it will continue to adjust the size and scope of its capabilities in
accordance with the development of the North Korean ICBM threat. To minimize
Chinas reactions to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, the United States
should seek to quell Chinas concerns as much as possible by making its program as
transparent as prudence and security allow and by making it clear that the United
States has no intention of using BMD to negate Chinas long-range nuclear deterrent
capability. The Working Group notes, however, that Chinas significant shorter-range
conventional missile capability, especially those ballistic and cruise missiles that
threaten U.S. military forces in the region, are a legitimate and necessary target for
the development of U.S. theater missile defenses.
Third, the United States should strive to maintain, and in important respects
strengthen, its extended deterrent structure in the Pacific. Especially important will
be the translation of admirable rhetoric about a restoration of U.S. attention to the
Asia-Pacific region and promising first steps in the evolution of the U.S. regional
force structure into sustained and concrete investments of resources, time, and
energy. In the military realm, this means making significant investments in the kinds
of capabilities that can maintain U.S. military advantages in the region, particularly
conventional capabilities designed to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
operations. The United States should also ensure that it can provide a credible
extended nuclear deterrent by investing in a fleet of next-generation strategic
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a new heavy bomber capable of carrying
nuclear ordnance, and a new nuclear cruise missile.
NOT TIME FOR ARMS TALKS YET

As a practical matter, the Working Group argues that time for formal arms control
talks with China is not yet ripe. China remains deeply and consistently resistant to
involvement in any such negotiations or framework for several reasons. Still, this
situation should not preclude the United States from continuing to refer to arms
control as a possible long-term goal with China. To this end, the United States
should continue to urge Chinese participation in multilateral efforts, such as the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and propose a verifiable multilateral
agreement that bans the deployment of new fixed-site ICBMs with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
NUCLEAR EASING IS DUTY OF BOTH US AND CHINA
The relationship between the United States and China will be of tremendous
geopolitical consequence for the 21st century. Even though conflict mercifully
seems unlikely at this point, it cannot be ruled out and might become increasingly
likely if we are unwise or unlucky. With both sides possessing and appearing set to
retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously
dangerous and quite possibly devastating. Finding ways to minimize the possibility
of war and the use of nuclear weapons is therefore a primary responsibility of
political leaderships on both sides of the Pacific.
BMD SUCKS DOESNT PROTECT AGAINST CHINA

http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227
In fact, American BMD against North Koreas small arsenal is necessary to increase
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea, but it is not capable of
preempting the Chinese arsenal. One reason is that the effectiveness of BMD
systems is debatable even for the advanced U.S. interceptors, whose extensive
testing has not provided conclusive about how they would operate in real conflict
environments. Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College
has characterized BMDs as expensive and incomplete in their coverage. American
BMD systems can only intercept a small number of nuclear warheads (the ratio is
five interceptors for one warhead), while both the United States and China possess
large strategic and conventional missile arsenals, which can be used
interchangeably in a conflict scenario to penetrate missile defenses. The Chinese
Second Artillery Forces modernization has rendered it a massive source of
firepower that American BMD systems could never hope to counter. Adding decoys
and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles, it becomes
obvious that on a cost-exchange ratio, BMD forces are not only ineffective, but also
a much more expensivenot to mention technically unreliableoption than landbased ballistic missiles, whose technology is extensively tested, reliable and
relatively cheap. That said, building and deploying a large number of interceptors is
not only strategically suboptimal, but also financially challenging, given both
countries budgetary constraints.
BMD KEY TO CHECK NORTH KOREA
In fact, American BMD against North Koreas small arsenal is necessary to increase
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea, but it is not capable of
preempting the Chinese arsenal. One reason is that the effectiveness of BMD
systems is debatable even for the advanced U.S. interceptors, whose extensive
testing has not provided conclusive about how they would operate in real conflict
environments. Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College
has characterized BMDs as expensive and incomplete in their coverage. American
BMD systems can only intercept a small number of nuclear warheads (the ratio is
five interceptors for one warhead), while both the United States and China possess
large strategic and conventional missile arsenals, which can be used
interchangeably in a conflict scenario to penetrate missile defenses. The Chinese
Second Artillery Forces modernization has rendered it a massive source of
firepower that American BMD systems could never hope to counter. Adding decoys
and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles, it becomes
obvious that on a cost-exchange ratio, BMD forces are not only ineffective, but also
a much more expensivenot to mention technically unreliableoption than landbased ballistic missiles, whose technology is extensively tested, reliable and
relatively cheap. That said, building and deploying a large number of interceptors is
not only strategically suboptimal, but also financially challenging, given both
countries budgetary constraints.
SUSPICION IS HIGH BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF

BMD
North Koreas recent nuclear test has brought prominence to China-U.S. nuclear
relations, which seem to have taken a downturn, with damaging effects to strategic
stability. Despite a decade of candidly exchanging views through Track II dialogues,
both countries have failed to convince each other that their respective ballistic
missile defense (BMD) and hypersonic weapons programs are not threatening. As a
result, both keep investing in expensive and technically questionable strategic
systems, each threatening to pull the other into a spiraling qualitative arms race.
American officials numerous assurances notwithstanding, China remains suspicious
of the U.S. BMD program. As much as the U.S. has named the DPRK (and previously,
Iran) as the main targets of its limited BMD capabilities, China insists that ballistic
missile defenses decrease the security of its own nuclear arsenal. Specifically,
Chinese experts are concerned about their country being subject to American
coercion, mainly due to Washingtons nuclear superiority, which married to BMD and
hypersonic weaponsConventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)puts Chinas
retaliatory capability at stake. Wu Chunsi, director of the Institute of International
Strategic Studies at SIIS, argues that missile defense makes Chinas No-FirstUse doctrine increasingly difficult to maintain because it gives the United States a
double advantage in both offensive first-strike capability and credible defensive
capability. The main concern is that hypersonic weapons could facilitate a
preemptive strike against the Chinese arsenal, which, after an attack, would be
seriously weakened and less capable of successfully penetrating U.S. BMD systems.
BMDS PROVIDE NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES

The Chinese concerns, however, overestimate American BMD and CPGS capabilities,
while underestimating the power of the Chinese deterrent, recently reinforced by its
undersea component. The main objective behindChinese undersea deterrence was
to achieve greater quietness for submarines and more assured penetrability for
SSBN-launched missiles. With an undersea deterrent and an enhancedand more
survivableland-based nuclear arsenal, China should feel more secure about its
retaliatory strike. In other words, the strategic stability between the two countries
appears to be stronger, not weaker. In this context, BMD systems should not
influence strategic balancing between the United States and China, since they do
not provide a significant strategic advantage to either Beijing or Washington.
PERCEPTION KEY CHINA ESCALATING BECAUSE OF BMD NOW

But the development of threat perception is not always clear-cut, and perceptions
often lead to real policy outcomes. While American BMD systems and the prospect
of South Korea deploying missile interceptors on its soil have dominated discussions
of U.S.-China strategic relations, less attention has been given to Chinas missile
defense capabilities. In fact, China conducted its latest ground-based, mid-course
intercept test in July 2014, following two similar tests in January 2013 and January
2010. Due to Chinas opacity on such issues, there is much speculation surrounding
its intentions regarding missile defense development and deployment, while the
true sophistication of Chinese missile defense technology remains unclear.
Nevertheless, there are strong indications that Chinese efforts to develop such
systems are not only here to stay, but are built to counter U.S. programs rather than
other regional countries BMD efforts, such as India, as some pundits advocate.
Lora Saalmans extensive research on the topic supports this idea. In an article
entitled Chinas Evolution on Ballistic Missile Defense, Saalman presents the rise
of a vivid Chinese discourse, which reflects the belief that the ultimate means of
counteracting US ambitions and forestalling political or military coercion is the
possession of similar [BMD] systems. Therefore, since 2002, a great volume of
Chinese writings focusing on BMD began to gravitate from more passive
countermeasures to more active ones, with the most notable rise occurring in
kinetic energy studies. The fruit of these studies and the manifestation of Chinas
intent to move forward with BMDas a countermeasure to American BMDare its
three missile defense tests.
HYPERSONICS ALSO CAUSED BY US BMDS

http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227?
page=2
Chinas pursuit of hypersonic weapons also comes as a response to the deployment
of American BMD systems and CPGS capabilities, and showcases how gaps in
perceptions translate into further investments in expensive strategic systems for
both countries. The Bush administration first pushed towards conventional global
strike options; the Obama administration embraced the concept. According to
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report, the Pentagon has undertaken a study
on the combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and
precision-attack capabilities, including penetrating platforms as well as standoff
weapons, whose results will inform the FY1217 defense program. Its obvious that,
especially after hypersonic weapons survived sequestration despite their plethora of
testing failures, U.S. political and military circles appear to be deeply invested in
their further development.
CHINA DEVELOPMENT OF HYPERSONICS LEADS TO ARMS RACE

page=2
One explanation for this is Chinas effort to develop its own hypersonics. In fact,
Congressmen Howard Buck McKeon, Randy Forbes and Mike Rogers expressed
U.S. concerns over Chinas development of hypersonic weapons in aletter stating
that other competitor nations push towards military parity with the United States.
Any doubt over further funding of the program evaporated after multiple Chinese
tests of hypersonic glide vehicles, which confirmed Chinas pursuit of similar
systems. After the Chinese tests, Congress prioritized hypersonic weapons programs
with boosts to funding and testing. And it goes further: the Obama administration
asked for funding for a next-generation nuclear cruise missile that could be coupled
with a hypersonic glide vehicle. While China is scared of an American preemptive
strike, the United States fears that China will seek parity.
If the trend described above continues unchanged, then both countries will find
themselves irrevocably trapped in a spiral of qualitative arms competition, which
will inevitably cast an even darker shadow over the relationship. Nevertheless, the
prospect of an arms control deal appears to be remote for now, for several reasons.
First, there is deep mistrust over each others future intentions. China deciphers U.S.
policies in the region as laying the foundation for a containment strategy, while
Washington regards Beijing as a revisionist state that will attempt to change the
regional status quo when the opportunity arises. Second, even if the United States
considered concessions for an arms control agreement, its regional allies, especially
Japan, would not welcome such an option. Uncertainties over intentions and allies
objections make any deal a dauntingalbeit not impossibletask.
Cold War history has taught us that arms control deals are feasible but take a lot of
time, political capital and, most importantly, good timing. For instance, the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed after the Soviet Unions
decision to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in eastern Europe.
Paradoxically, this gesture opened an opportunity for talks that eventually led to the
first Cold War treaty that sought the elimination of intermediate ballistic missiles,
instead of only establishing ceilings. In todays East Asian strategic environment,
history suggests that the U.S. move to deploy THAAD systems in South Korea might
lead Beijing and Washington to understand that their policies could be irreversibly
detrimental for regional stability. Within this context, policy communities in
Washington and Beijing should seize the opportunity and start considering their
acceptable levels of cost for the research, development and deployment of BMD
systems. The political cost and security dilemmas generated in the region need to
be carefully examinedbetter late than never.
ARMS DEAL UNLIKELY NOW
page=2
If the trend described above continues unchanged, then both countries will find
themselves irrevocably trapped in a spiral of qualitative arms competition, which
will inevitably cast an even darker shadow over the relationship. Nevertheless, the
prospect of an arms control deal appears to be remote for now, for several reasons.
First, there is deep mistrust over each others future intentions. China deciphers U.S.
policies in the region as laying the foundation for a containment strategy, while
Washington regards Beijing as a revisionist state that will attempt to change the
regional status quo when the opportunity arises. Second, even if the United States
considered concessions for an arms control agreement, its regional allies, especially
Japan, would not welcome such an option. Uncertainties over intentions and allies
objections make any deal a dauntingalbeit not impossibletask.
GETTING RID OF BMDS MEANS CHINA SAYS YES
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-armsrace-15227?page=3
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama administration proposed
strategic stability dialogues with China, but progress has been limitedmainly due
to Chinas reluctance to join. North Koreas recent nuclear test puts greater pressure
on the two countries nuclear relations, but can also work as a catalyst to resume
official discussions on nuclear issues. Calling anew for high-level nuclear discussions
might be a good way to go. If China remains adamant in its objection to get involved
in high-level strategic dialogues, it not only risks a deterioration of its relations with
South Koreawhich it so painstakingly and successfully has been building since
Park Geun-hye assumed officebut it will also miss the opportunity to gain better
insights and understanding into the systems, raise its concerns in a formal setting
and prove that it is not using the issue to divide the allies. The United States will
need to consider Chinese concerns over the number of interceptors. This will pave
the way for a mutually agreeable figure that will allow Washington to reassure its
allies, especially through enhancing stability on the Korean peninsula. Also, if the
United States is serious about its pledges to China that its BMDs do not target
Beijing, then proceeding to talks over potential arms controls will be tangible proof
of its claims, especially if Chinese concerns and choices start significantly altering
the strategic environment.
NOW IS KEY
page=3
Track II diplomacy dialogues have paved the way for official conversations. Hence, it
is time for both China and the United States to come to the negotiating table, save
themselves from expensive technologies whose feasibility and effectiveness in real
conflict environments is highly questionable and prevent a further deterioration of
their strategic relationship. It will take time, effort and skills, so the sooner the talks
start, the better.
Trilateral CPs
EXPAND TO INCLUDE OTHERS
Trilateral security dialogues involving China and the United States could also help to
broaden economic opportunity and address security tensions. Trilateral frameworks
involving critical regional partnerssuch as a Japan-China-U.S. dialogue and an
India-China-U.S. dialogueare worth considering. A Japan-China-U.S. dialogue on
energy and climate change, for example, could prove fruitful for all three nations. In
the aftermath of the Japanese nuclear disaster, Japan is facing new challenges to
meet its energy and climate needs, and that could open new opportunities for
trilateral cooperation on issues such as clean energy deployment, nuclear safety,
and natural gas trading. Any such trilateral discussions would have to be very
carefully managed and well-prepared but could create new networks for
understanding and stability.
Transparency
TRANSPARENCY KEY
Second, both nations need to find ways to be more transparent about their policies
and intentions toward the other. China, for example, could be more forthcoming
about its military doctrines and plans, something the region will want as Chinas
military capacity grows. America could find ways to be more transparent on policy
toward inward foreign direct investment, for example. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, process serves an important national
security role, but there are opportunities for increasing the transparency and
predictability of that process. President Obamas SelectUSA initiative, which offers a
single contact for foreign entities seeking to invest in the United States, is a helpful
step. In our view, China has more work to do here, since the United States has a
more open political process. Closed decision making does not reassure other nations
or contribute to bilateral and multilateral understanding about intentions. One way
to improve bilateral transparency is to expand and deepen the bilateral institutions
that create a predictable and transparent framework for interactions between both
nations and also create platform for resolving disputes. The U.S.- China Bilateral
Investment Treaty currently under negotiation is one example of this type of
framework. The Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiation process shows how hard this
is to accomplish when countries have different values and political systems, but the
United States and China should be trying to create such mechanisms where both
can.
State/Local CP
CAN BE DONE
At CAP, we would also like to see more regional agreements, such as the recent
climate agreement signed80 between California and Chinese province of
Guangdong, which was based primarily on shared local needs rather than nationallevel political guidance. We could foresee similar agreements on energy issues
being of particular interest to local governments in both nations, such as green-job
training, clean energy investment incentives, energy-efficiency incentives, building
more resilient infrastructure to protect local communities from sea-level rise, or
hydraulic-fracturing safety. Forums where mayors and governors could meet would
facilitate this type of cooperation. Overall, the United States and China need to
reach a next phase of the relationship whereby cooperation becomes even more
routine.
Disease
SHOULD WORK TOGETHER ON DISEASE PREVENTION CHINA
KEY
%2021.pdf
The U.S. and China, within the framework of UN reform, should launch a joint
initiative, in partnership with other member states, on the reform of a single UN
institution as a test case for how the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system
as a whole could be lifted. There are a number of candidate institutions for reform.
But given recent crises in the management of globally communicable diseases, and
the security implications for all states in preventing and handling such crises
effectively, the WHO presents an obvious case for conjoint effort. China has
extensive experience in the field, with its medical corps having worked across the
developing world for over half a century. The excellence of U.S. medical research
and treatment facilities in dealing with globally communicable diseases is well
recognized. The opportunity for immediate collaboration in more effectively dealing
with this major global public good is clear.
WORKING TOGETHER ON HEALTH NOW

The United States and China decided to enhance concrete cooperation in public
health and global health security, accelerating full implementation of the World
Health Organization International Health Regulations and assisting at-risk countries
to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. The two sides plan to
jointly work with the African Union and African Union Member States in the
establishment of the Africa Center for Disease Control and Prevention and
collaborate with partner governments in countries in West Africa to strengthen
national public health capacities in the wake of Ebola, including strengthening the
capacity of the cadres of public health and front line health workers. The two sides
intend to enhance communication and exchanges regarding aid for health in West
Africa. The two sides plan to continue to support and contribute to the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
Central Asia
NO COOPERATION NOW
China and the United States appear to share similar priorities in Central Asia, such
as promoting economic growth and connectivity and preventing the spread of
extremism and terrorism. Yet Beijing and Washington pursue these goals in very
different ways, which could make meaningful cooperation in the region challenging.
In particular, while the United States seeks to encourage democratization and
discourage corruption in government and business, China supports the regions
authoritarian governments and is more tolerant of the regions widespread
corruption.
CHINA SPECIFIC STUFF BUT NO MENTION OF US STUFF
CHINA NATIONALISM CORRODES CENTRAL ASIAN STABILITY

rap_108717.html
Similar questions exist in the strategic field: does the US want a stronger China
whose weight is felt more around the region or a weaker China whose weight is felt
less? For the USand Australiathe answer, of course, varies depending on what
sort of great power China turns out to be. In the South China Sea we see a coercive
power, not a consultative onea power unwilling to accept international arbitration.
Nationalisms a potent driver in Chinese foreign policy at the moment. Moreover,
Chinas growing weight is felt most starkly along the Eurasian rimlands, in ways that
are corrosive of the current strategic order. The contests in the East China Sea and
South China Sea arent really about rockstheyre about hierarchy in a future
regional security environment.
Taiwan
US-TAIWAN RELATIONS STRONG NOW
U.S.-Taiwan relations in 2015 remained strong, despite the lack of substantive
progress on bilateral trade and investment negotiations and the absence of major
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 2011. In 2014, annual bilateral trade reached a
record high, increasing by 6 percent to $67.4 billion, while Taiwan became the
tenth-largest trading partner of the United States, passing both India and Saudi
Arabia. U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military contacts also increased in 2014. That year,
over 3,000 DOD personnel conducted visits to Taiwan, a 50 percent increase over
visits in 2013. Seven years of cross-Strait rapprochement have been beneficial to
the United States by reducing cross-Strait tensions and allowing U.S. policymakers
to address other priorities in the U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships.
Nonetheless, Chinas military exercises and military modernization are still largely
directed toward its mission to eventually reunify Taiwan with the Mainland. Taiwans
focus on indigenous weapons platforms and asymmetric capabilities, along with its
expanded defense engagement with the United States, has served to improve its
ability to inflict costs on China should it decide to use force against Taiwan, but the
cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in Beijings favor. With Taipeis
stagnating defense budget and capabilities and Chinas improving antiaccess/area
denial capabilities threatening to keep U.S. forces farther from Chinas shores,
Beijing has increasing advantages in a Taiwan contingency, raising the cost for the
United States to take action in a crisis or conflict.
STRONG AND CLOSE NOW
The United States and Taiwan share a close relationship based on common
democratic values, strong commercial ties, and a U.S. commitment to aid in
Taiwans defense. U.S.-Taiwan trade is at a record high, underlying Taiwans
increasing importance as a close economic partner. Furthermore, the United States
continues to support Taiwans defense through increasing military-to-military
contact and other discreet defense cooperation.
CHINA WAY MORE POWERFUL

Chinas military modernization continues to focus on its ability to conduct military
operations against Taiwan and deter the United States from defending Taiwan in a
potential conflict. Although Taiwan has improved its defense capabilities through a
combination of domestic production and acquisition of arms from the United States,
the cross-Strait military balance of power continues to shift strongly in Chinas favor.
UNILATERAL POLICY CHANGE SOLVES DETERRENCE AND WAR
55.html
During Xis visit, the president can unilaterally announce a landmark decision that
won't require either the concurrence of the U.S. Congress (which would support him
on this issue in any event) or reciprocal action by the government of China. On his
own, Obama could declare publicly that the United States will defend Taiwan against
aggression or coercion from China.
For the first time since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter unilaterally terminated
the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, Beijing would know with certainty that any
use of force against Taiwan would mean conflict with the United States. Since
China's leaders are not suicidal, such a presidential declaration would prevent
potentially disastrous Chinese miscalculation. This is the same kind of deterrence
President Dwight Eisenhower achieved when he entered into the 1954 treaty with
the Republic of China.
STRONG TAIWAN POLICY MEANS WAR

55-2.html
Advocates of the policy status quo assert that a clear statement of U.S. commitment
to Taiwan would increase the risk of conflict in two ways. First, they argue, it would
unnecessarily provoke China by challenging its core interest in absorbing Taiwan
into the reconstituted Chinese empire. (Tibet, East Turkestan, Hong Kong, and
Macao already having been returned to the Motherland).
Second, it is asserted, a clear U.S. security commitment would provide a shield
behind which Taiwan could relax its own already limited defense preparations and
rely on the Seventh Fleet to fend off China, while recklessly moving toward formal
separation from China (particularly given the likely victory of the independenceminded Democratic Progressive Party in the 2016 election).
AMBIGUITY LEADS TO MISCALC

55-2.html
The potential risks of a declarative statement of U.S. commitment to Taiwan must be weighed
against the risks of continuing with a policy of diplomatic equivocation. Ambiguity regarding U.S.
intentions has already led China, and its North Korean ally, into disastrous miscalculations. As
Henry Kissinger has written about the Korean War, "We did not expect the invasion, China did not
expect our response."
TAIWAN KEY TO REGIONAL SECURITY

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/09/23/obama_taiwan_deter_china_111455-2.html
Moreover, as noted, Taiwan's fate is no longer just about Taiwan. America has five
treaty allies and a range of friends and partners in the region who look to the United
States to ensure East Asia's security in the face of an increasingly powerful and
assertive China. If U.S. resolve is seen to be faltering regarding Taiwan, with its
special historical ties and shared democratic values, the entire region could be
rendered defenseless against Chinese economic and military pressure. Then
Communist China will have achieved without a war what Imperial Japan tried to do
through war - its own Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
CLARITY KEY DETERS CHINA

55-2.html
If a clear and firm American commitment to South Korea's defense could deter even the infamously
volatile sequence of Kim regimes from repeating their June 1950 mistake, surely the more mature
and seasoned Chinese leaders, with far more to lose, would not seriously challenge such a U.S.
guarantee for Taiwan. Diplomatic coyness is no substitute for clearly communicated strategic
resolve.
General Impacts
LAUNDRY LIST (WAR, RELATIONS)
What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to
deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring
superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time.
If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere
in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putins neo-imperialist Russia and
the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison.
Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without AmericanChinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the
next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a
partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.
Thucydides Trap
NOT INEV
rap_108717.html
The good news is that the Thucydides trap isnt inevitable: rising powers arent doomed to
clash with established ones. Economic interdependence and nuclear weapons lessen the
prospects of war. And military manoeuvring in the South China Sea is still about signalling, not
conflict. But the bad news is that some form of clash seems increasingly likely. The US cant
move to offshore balancing without spooking its own allies; but Chinas idea of the US as an
outsider implies just such a shrinking role for the US in Asia. Troubled waters lie ahead.
NYE SAYS NO THUCYDIDES TRAP = NO TRAP

In the 1990s, I wrote that the rapid rise of China could cause a global conflict similar
to that described by Thucydides in his monumental study of the disastrous
Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. Thucydides concluded that the rise of
Athenian power instilled a fear in Sparta that set in motion an escalation of tensions
and conflicts.
Today, I think that such a scenario of overt conflict between China and the United
States is unlikely in the current environment. There are, however, analysts who
insist that China cannot rise peacefully.
EXPERTS AGREE NO TRAP

So asserted Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama, during a
speech yesterday at George Washington University on the eve of Chinese President
Xi Jinpings state visit to Washington. In an address designed to tout the arc of
progress in Sino-U.S. relations, Rice chastised the lazy rhetoric that says conflict
between the U.S. and China is inevitable.
Rice may have set up her straw person, but no serious Asia watcher either predicts
or desires a clash with China. However, even by the measuring stick of her own
aspirations noted above, China today is falling far short of the mark, raising serious
questions about the future of its relationship with the United States.
Peacekeeping
In recognition of the critical role UN and regional peacekeepers serve in maintaining
international peace and security, the United States and China affirm to further increase their
robust commitments to international peacekeeping efforts. The Chinese side appreciates the
U.S. sides holding of the Leaders Summit on Peacekeeping, and welcomes the new
contributions to be announced by the United States to support peace operations. The United
States welcomes the new contributions to be announced by China to support UN peacekeeping
efforts. The United States and China recognize the need to deepen the partnership between
the African Union and the United Nations on peace operations. Both sides look forward to an
enhanced discussion with the African Union and other partners to further explore proposals to
this end. Both sides decided to continue discussions to deepen cooperation on capacity
building for troop- and police-contributing countries.
Animals
COOPERATING ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING NOW
The United States and China, recognizing the importance and urgency of combating
wildlife trafficking, commit to take positive measures to address this global
challenge. The United States and China commit to enact nearly complete bans on
ivory import and export, including significant and timely restrictions on the import of
ivory as hunting trophies, and to take significant and timely steps to halt the
domestic commercial trade of ivory. The two sides decided to further cooperate in
joint training, technical exchanges, information sharing, and public education on
combating wildlife trafficking, and enhance international law enforcement
cooperation in this field. The United States and China decided to cooperate with
other nations in a comprehensive effort to combat wildlife trafficking.
Poverty
WORKING TOGETHER ON POVERTY NOW
The United States and China are committed to advance sustainable and inclusive
international development as laid out in the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, through expanded cooperation to end poverty and hunger and the
promotion of inclusive economic growth, and protection of the environment. The
two sides intend to communicate and cooperate in implementing the Agenda and to
help other countries achieve common development goals.
Terrorism
WORKING TOGETHER ON COUNTER-TERRORISM NOW
President Obama and President Xi decided to continue expanding law enforcement and anticorruption cooperation, including by enhancing coordination and cooperation on criminal
investigations, repatriation of fugitives, and asset recovery issues. The United States and China
welcomed recent progress on repatriating Chinese fugitives and illegal immigrants through
charter flights and look forward to continuing this cooperation. The United States welcomes
Chinas commitment to consider joining the OECD Working Group on Bribery as a participant in
the near future. As a new aspect of the Joint Liaison Group's role as the primary mechanism for
law enforcement cooperation, both sides committed to discuss the mutual recognition and
enforcement of forfeiture judgments. The two sides condemn all forms of terrorism and
committed to expand exchange of information to counter the transnational flow of foreign
terrorist fighters. The United States and China held a Counter-Improvised Explosive Devises
(IEDs) Workshop on September 14 in Washington, DC, decided on principles for furthering
efforts to counter the threat posed by IEDs, and committed to hold a follow-on workshop in
China.
CHINA COUNTERTERRORISM IS A GUISE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialogue-counterterrorism-orcounter-productive
This week, China and the United States convened another counterterrorism dialogue
in Beijing. On the surface, their expressed intentions are positive: joining forces to
counter terrorism, partly by encouraging peace and economic development.
Yet its hard to see the dialogue giving adequate attention to human rights
violations committed under the guise of counterterrorism.
All governments have an obligation to provide public order and prevent crime. But
as China increasingly treats peaceful dissent as a threat to national security,
its insistence that many such incidents rise to the level of terrorism is cause for
concern. And through this dialogue the US risks giving its imprimatur to Chinas
approach.
Since the bilateral counterterrorism dialogue was suddenly resurrected in July 2014,
Chinas already-problematic approach to terrorism has hardened significantly. This
has included reverting to Mao-era tactics of public sentencing rallies, using state
media to label individuals as terrorists before any semblance of a judicial process,
and sentencing to life in prison prominent Uighur economist and peaceful
critic Ilham Tohti on charges of separatism. By the end of 2014, Chinese courts
had convicted more than 700 people on charges of terrorism or separatismin
opaque proceedingsthe Criminal Procedure Law denies terrorism suspects basic
defense protections, including access to family members and lawyers, and allows
suspects to be held for months in undisclosed locations.
In January 2015, Beijing released a draft counterterrorism law that expands state
powers with no commensurate accountability or defense for the accused. In July,
Chinese authorities pressured Thailand into forcibly expelling more than 100 ethnic
minority individuals from immigration detention despite the fact that credible
allegations of criminal conduct against them was produced; Chinese state media
broadcast images of these people hooded and handcuffed, and referred to them as
terrorists shortly after their flight had landed.
CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM IS INCONSISTENT

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialoguecounterterrorism-or-counter-productive
The US track record on counterterrorism, including dubious domestic prosecutions,
has undercut Obama administration efforts to raise human rights concerns abroad.
Its position toward China and terrorism has been woefully inconsistent. In a
November 2014 interviewwith the Xinhua news agency, President Barack Obama
inexplicably repeated Beijings insistence that certain groups, such as the East
Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), whose very existence is debated, are a
threat to China. He then noted that bilateral cooperation would depend upon the
action China takes at home, but failed to identify specific steps that should be
taken, and did not identify any of those imprisoned in violation of their rights in the
name of counterterrorism in China. US officials suggest it is Chinas abusive
practices that prevent greater cooperation on terrorism.
COUNTERTERRORISM WITH CHINA FAILS
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialoguecounterterrorism-or-counter-productive
What then is the utility of the China-US dialogue? But there seems to be little reason
for the US to proceed until China takes some meaningful steps, including providing
information about prosecutions, radically rewriting the draft counterterrorism law,
ensuring terrorism suspects have lawyers of their own choosing, allowing free media
access to regions where terrorist attacks have taken place, and ceasing its hunt
for refugees. Holding formal dialogues while Chinese counterterrorism laws and
practices are heading in the wrong direction is simply counter-productive.
HR GETTING WORSE IN CHINA OUTSIDE INTERVENTION

NEEDED
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/china-reverse-downward-rights-spiral-0
President Xi Jinping has vowed to eradicate corruption, maintain economic growth,
and promote the rule of law in China, said Sophie Richardson, China director. But
Xis China Dream has been a nightmare for rights advocates as they face Orwellian
laws, indefinite detention, and torture, with little hope for redress. Their dire plight is
only made worse by the worlds inaction.
US LACKS HR CREDIBILITY US DOESNT ADHERE TO THE

RULES THEY ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE
Tetik 14 Damla Cihangir-Tetik (Ph.D Candidate in Political Science, Sabanci
University/Istanbul as well as Project Coordinator for Transparency International
Turkey), November 13, 2014, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS
FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS OF TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERS,
http://idsmagazine.org/human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-as-foreign-policytools-of-transatlantic-partners-by-damla-cihangir-tetik/
Regarding human rights protection and democracy promotion, the discrepancy of the West argument reached its
peak with the war on terrorism policy of the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Western democracy promotion and
human rights norms deteriorated with the US-led operation in Afghanistan in order to fight against global terrorism
and with the invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain. Additionally, the treatment of prisoners by the US officials in
Guantanamo Bay, Bagram in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib was perceived as aggressive, paternalistic, neoimperialist and a combination of all those by the rest of the international community (Burnell 2010, 2). Importantly,
the EU and especially the US are faced with an important credibility problem at the moment concerning their efforts
towards international human rights protection and democracy promotion in the rest of the world. Credibility refers
to the fact that democratization is hardly ever the only foreign policy goal of those governments who provide
democracy assistance (Burnell 2010). As Bermeo explains, even though the US has spent hundreds of millions of
dollars on democracy and good governance in Egypt, its military aid, which is much more higher than the ones for
democratization, increases the scepticism towards the priority of the US in Egypt (Bermeo 2009). Democracy
promotion can therefore only succeed if it is embedded within the overall set of foreign policies of the promoting
country and if the promoting country itself adheres to the rules, norms and values it claims to want to become more
widespread (Burnell 2010). Similarly, concerning international human rights protection, the US fails to
accede to the ICC with others including China , India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and
this discourages these states and also the others from engaging in
activities that promote human rights
(Muftuler-Bac and Peterson 2014). As a result, at the
it is not expected from the US to be a global leader of human rights protection and democracy promotion
internationally.
moment
CHINAS ANTI-TERRORISM PROTECTS HUMAN RIGHTS

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/961023.shtml
The anti-terrorism law clearly addresses the concern. According to the law, "terrorist
activities shall be punished in accordance with the law and human rights shall be
respected and safeguarded to protect citizens' lawful rights, interests and freedom."
It means the process of carrying out the law will be regulated, and violations of
people's legal rights will be prevented, which is an important principle of the newly
adopted law.
The law strikes a balance between strengthening of counter-terrorism measures and
the respect and protection of human rights.
For one thing, quite a few clauses in the law have specified that legal rights of
citizens and organizations must be respected and protected.
For another, given the definition of "terrorism" in the new law - proposition or
activity that "infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government
organs and international organizations," effectively preventing and cracking down
on terrorism itself amounts to safeguarding human rights.
CHINAS ANTI-TERRORIST LAWS VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/961023.shtml
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China on Sunday
passed the country's first-ever Counter-terrorism Law with an unanimous vote,
which will take effect on January 1, providing legal support to the nation's antiterrorism action as well as cooperation with the international community.
From the first draft to the final approval, the law has drawn criticism from the West
over possible infringement of human rights and freedom of expression. The US
State Department spokeswoman Gabrielle Price said last week that the law "would
lead to greater restrictions on the exercise of freedoms of expression, association,
peaceful assembly, and religion within China."
US TREATMENT OF POC MEANS THAT CHINA DOESNT TAKE HR

VIOLATIONS SERIOUSLY
http://for-the-masses.com/wordpress/womens-history-month-profileattorneyassociate-professor-author-michelle-alexander
Some of the most high profile cases that we have witnessed over the years gave me
an even more clear understanding of the works of the criminal justice system. From
jury selection, prosecutors, public defenders, judges, law enforcement officers, and
prisons. In summing this up, the criminal justice system isnt made for Black people
to receive justice (thats evident in the lack of prosecution from officer who shoot
unarmed Blacks), but ensures that Black people are imprisoned at a rate that makes
China scoff at the United States, and its hypocrisy. One expects China or even
Russia to have one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, and they are
nowhere near the rate of the United States.
The United States Prison Population is at 2, 193,798 compare to China whos
population is at 1,548,498 and Russias prison population is at 874,161. Its
embarrassing that countries like China and Russia have a lower rate of incarceration
compared to the United States who advocate human rights and democracy yes
thats hypocrisy.
US JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM HURTS MINORITY GROUPS IN

CHINA
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/the-u-s-just-botched-yet-another-chance-topress-for-human-rights-in-china/
On top of this, the United States committed to enhance counterterrorism
cooperation with China. Such an agreement gives credibility where it is manifestly
not due, given Chinas proposed counterterrorism law, which is nothing more than a
legal veneer for human rights abuses.
Although China does suffer a number of deadly and apparently politically motivated
attacks directed against the general population, the Chinese government long has
manipulated the threat of terrorism to justify its crackdown on the 10 million ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province. U.S. officials will no doubt insist that it is better to have
discussions that create opportunities to raise precisely those concerns. But clearly
whatever concerns the United States raised at last years counterterrorism dialogue
were brushed aside in the drafting of this law. The United States should set far
higher standards for China to meet before engaging in any sort of cooperation on
this issue.
Tibet
CHINA BAD TO TIBET
The 6th Tibet Work Forum meeting in late August, held to determine central
government policy for the region for years to come, emphasized the imperatives of
security and stability, but authorities failed to address systematic ethnic and
religious discrimination and restrictions, or the profound socioeconomic changes
brought by massive re-housing and resettlement campaigns in which Tibetans were
compelled to participate.
Central government authorities continue to deploy officials in villages and
monasteries and have expanded surveillance mechanisms to the grassroots level, a
development which appears to have contributed to more frequent arrests of local
community leaders, environmental activists, villagers involved in social and cultural
activities, and writers and singers whose works are considered sensitive.
In July, Tenzin Delek Rinpocheone of Tibets highest-profile political prisoners
died in detention. In violation of the relevant regulations, authorities refused to
release his body or investigate the circumstances of his death. Also in July, Lobsang
Yeshe, a village head imprisoned for his role in a local anti-mining protest in May
2014, died in prison following reports that he had been mistreated. Another high
profile prisoner, a young Lhasa NGO worker Tenzin Choedrak, died in December, two
days after he was abruptly released early from detention.
Protests, particularly against mining and land acquisition, continue despite threats
from local authorities. Security forces beat and arrested peaceful protestors in
Chamdo in April and in Gannan in June. Following mass protests against mining in a
supposedly protected part of Qinghai in 2014, mining operations were reportedly
closed down, although the reasons for this remain unclear. After public outcry over
corruption in the school exam system, authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region
and Qinghai introduced tighter regulations and prosecuted offenders.
Seven more Tibetans self-immolated in 2015, bringing the total since 2009 to 143.
Xinjiang
CHINA BAD FOR XINJIANG
Xinjiang, home to 10 million Uighurs, continues to be the site of pervasive
discrimination, repression, and restrictions on fundamental human rights.
Opposition to central and local policies has been expressed in peaceful protests, but
also through violent incidents such as bombings, though details about both protests
and violence are often scant as authorities keep an especially tight hold over
information in Xinjiang.
Chinese authorities in 2015 continued the counterterrorism campaign they launched
in Xinjiang in mid-2014, deploying more security forces to the region, and
implementing new laws and regulations that further criminalize dissent and restrict
religious practice for the regions Muslim ethnic Uighur population. Since mid-2014,
authorities have detained, arrested, or killed increasing numbers of Uighurs alleged
by police to have been involved in illegal or terrorist activities, but the authorities
claims are impossible to verify independently. In June, a group of people attacked a
police traffic checkpoint in Kashgar with small bombs and knives. Between 18 and
28 people reportedly died, including 15 suspects killed by police as well as several
bystanders.
Xinjiang authorities promulgated comprehensive yet vaguely worded new religious
affairs regulations in January. Those prohibit extremist attire and ban activities
that damage the physical and mental health of citizens. In recent years, authorities
have used similar official and unofficial directives to discourage or even ban civil
servants, teachers, and students from fasting during Ramadan. In March, a Hotan
court convicted 25 Uighurs of endangering state security for their participation in
illegal religious studiesin this case, private religious classes.
Hong Kong
CHINA BAD TO HONG KONG
Although Hong Kong is guaranteed autonomy in all matters other than foreign
affairs and defense, and enjoys an independent judiciary and other civil liberties,
Beijing appears to be encroaching on the rights to political participation, expression,
and assembly there.
In June, Hong Kongs legislature rejected a Beijing-backed proposed electoral reform
package for the regions chief executive. The proposal, which would expand the
franchise but allow a Beijing-dominated nominating committee to screen out
candidates it did not like, was opposed by many Hong Kong residents and in 2014
had sparked the months-long Umbrella Movement protests.
About 1,000 people were arrested in connection with the Umbrella Movement,
though most were released without being prosecuted. Authorities have charged
student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung, among others, with unlawful assembly, and
inciting others to take part in an unlawful assembly, despite those laws
incompatibility with international freedom of assembly standards. The Independent
Police Complaints Council said it had received 159 complaints from demonstrators
alleging police assault and abuse that it deemed required investigation, but the
only police who had been arrested at time of writing were police caught on film
beating pro-democracy protester Ken Tsang.
Concerns about freedom of expression in Hong Kong persist, especially for media
seen as critical of Beijing. In January, an attacker threw a Molotov cocktail outside
the residence of pro-democracy media owner Jimmy Lai. No one was injured, but no
one was arrested. In August, two assailants of former Mingpao editor Kevin Lau
Chun-to were sentenced; one admitted that they had been paid to stab Lau to
teach him a lesson.
In July, Reverend Philip Woo Siu-hok was summoned to Shenzhen by religious affairs
authorities to warn him against preaching to mainlanders who come to Hong Kong.
International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW KEY TO RELATIONSHIP AND ALL IMPACTS
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/21/national-security-advisorsusan-e-rices-prepared-remarks-us-china
Many of our concerns stem from a common root. Steps that erode the international system or
that slowly eat away at a rules-based order and universal rights or that give one nation an
unfair advantage are detrimental to all. This is true whether we are talking about maritime
concerns or cyberspace or human rights. China cannot expect to wield influence selectively
or lead only when its convenient, opting in or out of international norms at will. Everyone has
to play by the same rules, regardless of size or power, because thats the way everyone can
compete and be treated equally.
Africa
US POSITION ON AFRICA HURTS RELATIONS AND CREDIBIILTY
http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-U.S.-China-SummitDecoding-a-Tower-of-Babel.pdf
It is in the context of this evolving, confused American policy that we encounter U.S.
presidential
(and presidential candidate) statements and actions that increase friction with Beijin
g and reduce
U.S. credibility. The opening months of 2015 saw the Obama administration seeming
ly trying to
derail Chinas attempt to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with
substantial
Western and other participation, only to have 57 nations, many of them Washington
s allies, sign on
with Beijing in April. We find Obama trying to sell the already fully defensible TPP tra
de agreement
by saying, Thats why we have to make sure the United States and not countries l
ike China is
the one writing this centurys rules for the worlds economy. Similarly, we have the
U.S. president
giving an interview to the BBC just before traveling to Africa noting that Chinese lea
ders are not
accountable to their constituencies, [and] have been able to funnel an awful lot of m
oney into
Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that are being extracted from Africa.
You cant use Beijing as an allpurpose punching bag and expect cooperation.
Arctic
US IS CHAIRPERSON OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL BEST WINDOW
TO ACT
http://chinaus-icas.org/node/78
The United States agenda as chairman of the Arctic Council starting this year is reported to focus
on addressing climate change, improving energy access to remote Arctic regions as well as
environmental protection. The emphasis on climate change and environmental protection,
beyond geopolitical competition and sovereign rights claims, makes a global consensus on Arctic
governance possible, and increases the potential for cooperation between the five Arctic states
(or eight polar states) and non-Arctic players including international organizations and individual
states, e.g. China.
CHINA INTERESTED IN THE ARCTIC

http://chinaus-icas.org/node/78
Chinas interests range from participating in Arctic governance affairs, promoting bilateral
diplomacy in the Arctic area, accessing potential resources to exploiting shipping opportunities
and undertaking polar research. Chinas march towards the Arctic region is a low profile one,
however, its Arctic strategy is just beginning and it still faces many challenges, one of which is
the skepticism from some Arctic coastal states on Chinas intention in the Arctic. Being aware of
the fact that China does not want to get involved in the Arctic states territorial and maritime
competition, and for many occasions reiterates that its interests in polar shipping and resources
development will be governed by relevant international laws, the skepticism mainly focuses on
whether Chinese potential involvement in the Arctic will have an environmental impact. This
concern may be addressed through its active involvement in the Arctic research.
ARCTIC KEY TO CHINAS HEG AND ECON

icy.pdf
The Arctic is central to Chinas future strategic oil and mineral needs. Access to
polar resources, as well as Arctic sea and air routes, is crucial to Chinas future
economic, political, and military expansion as a global great power. China is
engaged in a five-year assessment (2012-2016) of polar resources and governance
that will help refine its existing polar strategy, policy direction, and organizational
arrangements.
SHOULD WORK TOGETHER ON AREAS OF AGREEMENT
icy.pdf
The United States will find some, though not all, aspects of Chinas Arctic policy
match its own interests both in the Arctic region and globally. Partnering with China
in the Arctic where possible, and developing in-depth knowledge of Chinas Arctic
interests and objectives, will strengthen U.S. ability to give meaning to the concept
of the United States and China developing a new type of great power relationship.
CHAIRING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL KEY NOW IS THE TIME

http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-usand-china
With Chinas presence more visible on every continent including Antarctica, is there
room for Sino-U.S. areas of cooperation at the top of the world? The Nordic states
and Canada have already established Arctic policy and research ties to China. With
the U.S. chairing the Arctic Council through May 2017, now is the opportune
occasion for the U.S. to develop a collaborative strategy, on a range of Arctic
research and policy issues.
5 AREAS OF COOPERATION CHINA SAYS YES
http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-usand-china
Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the U.S. and
China:
First, since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change, Arctic climate change
research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries. We
are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue, so
inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and
glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions. Working together on
WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is
another fruitful course ahead.
Second, focus joint discussions on Arctic marine safety and strategies to protect the
Arctic marine environment. Implementation and future enforcement of the
mandatory IMO Polar Code for ships operating in polar waters (to come into force
Jan. 1, 2017) is a topic of national interest to both maritime states. Bilateral
cooperation could also include identifying the range of marine conservation
measures, such as marine protected areas, and studying how these measures might
mesh with future commercial voyages in the Arctic Ocean.
Third, maritime law enforcement, specifically related to fisheries, in northern waters
is of practical and operational concern. The two coast guards have agreements in
place and have worked together in the Pacific; extending this enforcement
collaboration builds trust and resilience when marine operations become more
complex. An agreement signed in Oslo in July by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) barring their fishing fleets from
the central Arctic Ocean will surely require the engagement of non-Arctic states who
have deep-water fleets such as China. Engaging China early in Arctic fisheries
discussions on a bilateral basis with the U.S., or among the Arctic five, can be an
effective strategy to minimize future disagreements.
Fourth, the wide gap in Arctic marine infrastructure identified in the Arctic Councils
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009) demands critical attention by the major
maritime states. China-U.S. cooperation on infrastructure can identify potential
public-private partnerships, discuss strategies for much-needed Arctic observing
systems, and study port and maritime communications requirements. The U.S. can
also foster Chinas engagement within the Arctic Council on matters related to
Arctic search and rescue, and Arctic oil spill preparedness and response, as it is
plausible Chinese-flagged commercial ships will sail in Arctic waters.
Fifth, joint Arctic marine research is an arena with much promise. Joint
oceanographic research between the U.S. and China would attain global attention
and herald an era of close collaboration in Arctic Ocean research highly relevant to
global climate change. Joint icebreaking research ship operations in Arctic icecovered waters could provide unique and lasting cooperative experiences for the
Chinese and American operating agencies, as well as key links between our
research funding organizations.
China and the U.S. have an obligation and opportunity to work together on a range
of cooperative issues to maintain the Arctics future as a peaceful, safe and secure
region, as that new frontier opens. Both nations must be proactive in Arctic matters
within their already existing dialogue and in international organizations including
the Arctic Council.
First Strike
China developing second strike now
Why submarines are a game changer. Ballistic missile submarines can act as first- or
second-strike weapons. Because submarines are hard to detect, they can be used to launch a
first strike with little or no warning. As a second-strike weapon, they are more likely than
land-based missiles to survive an enemy first strike and be able to retaliate. But regardless
of whether they are intended to fulfill a first- or second-strike role, ballistic missile
submarines deployed on deep-water deterrence patrols are not compatible with Chinas
current nuclear posture and will contravene the very foundations of Chinas No First Use
pledge: The storage of warheads will be decentralized; warheads will be mated with missiles;
missiles will be on a higher level of alert than other components of the nuclear arsenal; and
targeting data will be stored onboard the submarines.
However, submarine-launched ballistic missiles are arguably the most efficient way of
deploying nuclear weapons for any country that wants a credible deterrent. All of the legally
recognized nuclear powers except China possess and deploy nuclear-armed submarines, and
other nuclear states are increasingly looking to submarines to provide the foundations of
their nuclear deterrent. Even the United States has argued that its submarine forces are so
effective that they alone could counter the Russian nuclear threat. China is looking to
field five Type 094 submarines in the very near future, each armed with a dozen missiles
and deployed in a similar fashion to the United Kingdoms Continuous At Sea Deterrence
program, which always has at least one submarine on patrol. Arms control expert Jeffrey
Lewis calculates that each Chinese sub is able to conduct patrols lasting approximately 60
days, or about 300 days total for all five submarines, which provides near-continuous at-sea
deterrence (the time required to refit each submarine after its patrol may hinder year-round
coverage). This would ensure a high survivability rate of nuclear weapons (even while taking
account of claims that the Type 094 is not the quietest submarine) and a force comparable
with other states recognized survivable forces.
SUBS MEAN CONVENTIONAL WARS FAIL

http://thebulletin.org/chinas-nuclear-submarines-end-no-first-use8900
The military application of nuclear weapons. This leads to the most important result
of Chinas nuclear submarine deployment: Not only will it be able to deter a first
strike, but it will also prevent a conventional conflict from escalating into a nuclear
exchange. This is crucial for China, which wants to be able to use its conventional
forces and dual-use weapons without running the risk of receiving a nuclear strike in
retaliation. This brings thousands of conventionally armed ballistic missiles into
play, giving China greater anti-access/area denial capabilities and greater coercive
power in resolving sovereignty issues that plague international relations in the
Pacific region.
SUBS MEANS CHINA WILL NOT BE CHECK IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

http://thebulletin.org/chinas-nuclear-submarines-end-no-first-use8900
Nuclear doctrinal change with conventional implications. The policy of ensuring a
survivable strategic nuclear threat allows for the continued militarization of the
Chinese state and for its expansion of influence in the Pacific. This expanded
influence is made further possible by a post-Cold War, casualty-averse environment
in which even the largest of nuclear arsenals can be deterred by a truly lean and
effective force. Ballistic missile submarines are the realization of Chinas dream of
a nuclear force that protects China not only from nuclear exchange, but also from
conventional coercion: Finally, a true minimum deterrence will be reachedthe
quality and quantity of Chinese nuclear weapons will be enough to deter its
adversaries from initiating a first strike. It is a level of deterrence that is recognized
not only by the rest of the world but also by China itself. Some Chinese nuclear
developmentssuch as the continued modernization of the DF-5 A and B missiles,
whose silo locations are widely known and would not survive a first strikeare
questionable on strategic ground, but the deployment of ballistic missile submarines
on deterrent patrols is nothing but a logical progression for a nuclear armed state.
GMO
CHINA TOO STRICT ON AGRICULTURE GMO IMPORTS HURTS US
ECON AND CHINESE HUSBANDRY MARKET
https://newhouse.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/newhouse-leads-letterurging-fair-trade-china-us-alfalfa-exporters
Today, Congressman Dan Newhouse (R-WA) led a bipartisan letter, signed by 17

House Members, to U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman requesting that he
raise the issue of Chinas import ban on GMO alfalfa with Chinese trade authorities
in order to help protect the hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of U.S.
jobs provided by national alfalfa production. According to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Franklin and Grant Counties in Central Washington are two of the top 10
alfalfa producing counties in the United States.
The Members wrote in the letter U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman:
Since China opened its market to U.S. alfalfa hay in 2006, rising exports of this
commodity have been a great trade success story. American exporters are
projected to sell 1.2 million tons of high-quality alfalfa into the Chinese market in
2015, and as Chinas demand for milk and dairy products grows, its need for the
highest-quality feed will grow as well. It is crucial that American farmers and
exporters are able to continue exporting into this market, and ensuring this should
be a top priority of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Unfortunately, recent developments have imperiled the ability of U.S.
exporters to meet Chinese demand for alfalfa, potentially putting hundreds of
millions of dollars and thousands of U.S. jobs at risk. We urge you to prevail upon
China to accept reasonable world-class import policies for U.S. alfalfa a top priority
in ongoing negotiations with China.
The Members continued in the letter:
At a time when China is investing billions in its own GMO research, we are
concerned that this heightened testing is an attempt to shut American producers
out of a key export market. We urge you to make the retention of this market
apriority for the Administration in bilateral negotiations with China, including the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, as well as other trade-related
negotiations. Unfortunately, this approach by the Chinese could ultimately impact
many other U.S. crops. We look forward to working with you to ensure that
American farmers and exporters are able to compete on a level playing field.
RECENT CHANGES KEY NEED TO PRESSURE CHINA

As Chinas middle class has grown in recent years, so has its demand for milk and
dairy products. China lacks the type of land and climate to produce enough quality
feed for its growing livestock industry, which in the last decade has led to enormous
growth for U.S. alfalfa hay and other animal feed exports to China. From just 2013 to
2014, U.S. alfalfa exports to China grew more than 30%, totaling $234 million with
no signs of slowing.
China currently has an import ban on GMO alfalfa, which U.S. producers have
respected and complied with for years. Traditionally, China has permitted a
reasonable level of trace amounts of GMO in shipments, to account for false-positive
tests, residual material from prior shipments, and other anomalies. This is standard
in most of U.S. export markets, even those that prohibit GMO crops. However, in the
last year, Chinese inspection authorities have imposed duplicative testing that
requires an absolute zero level, and have been dumping entire shipments for any
positive test at enormous expense to U.S. exporters.
CHINESE GMO BAN KILLS AG MARKET
Since China opened its market to U.S. alfalfa hay in 2006, rising exports of this
commodity have been a great trade success story. American exporters are projected to
sell 1.2 million tons of high-quality alfalfa into the Chinese market in 2015, and as
Chinas demand for milk and dairy products grows, its need for the highest-quality feed
will grow as well. It is crucial that American farmers and exporters are able to continue
exporting into this market, and ensuring this should be a top priority of the U.S. Trade
Representative and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Unfortunately, recent
developments have imperiled the ability of U.S. exporters to meet Chinese demand for
alfalfa, potentially putting hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of U.S. jobs at
risk. We urge you to prevail upon China to accept reasonable world-class import policies
for U.S. alfalfa a top priority in ongoing negotiations with China.
Since 2001, China has prohibited imports of Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) crops,
although it has waived this prohibition in certain circumstances. Of concern is the fact
that, beginning in 2014, China has applied destination testing of alfalfa for GMO traits.
Now, not only are exporters required to sample, test, and ship alfalfa that is 100% nonGMO, but on the receiving end destination tests may still detect a Low Level Presence
(LLP) of GMO traits that may not have originated at the farm. This change to destination
testing happened without sufficient warning and threatens to shut out an unreasonably
high percentage of the U.S. alfalfa crop, which has recently expanded to meet Chinese
market demand.
Most of our other trading partners, even those who also prohibit GMO alfalfa (which has
been approved by the FDA), accept that in many cases, a miniscule amount of GMO
traits are unavoidable for much of the crop. U.S. exporters are cognizant and
responsive to the requirements of our trading partners, and make every effort to grow
conventional crops without any GMO traits for export. However, certain environmental
factors (runoff, bee pollination, etc.) sometimes make this impossible. Trading partners
such as the European Union accept that a LLP of the products DNA showing GMO traits
is considered a technical zero. China previously did as well, but recent testing
changes have resulted in U.S. alfalfa with a technical zero percentage of GMO traits
being rejected at a very great expense to U.S. exporters.
At a time when China is investing billions in its own GMO research, we are concerned
that this heightened testing is an attempt to shut American producers out of a key
export market. We urge you to make the retention of this market apriority for the
Administration in bilateral negotiations with China, including the Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade, as well as other trade-related negotiations. Unfortunately, this
approach by the Chinese could ultimately impact many other U.S. crops. We look
forward to working with you to ensure that American farmers and exporters are able to
compete on a level playing field.
CHINA RESTRICTIONS KEY

http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/download/2015%2520Viewpoint.pdf
Chinas market remains restricted or closed to the export of certain key U.S. crops.
This includes a ban on American beef and restrictions on rice imports. Non-tariff
measures also hurt U.S. competitiveness by making it more difficult for exports to
enter China, increasing risks and therefore adding costs to traders. For example,
American exporters face lengthy approval processes for Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMO) which potentially limits the volume and type of crop exported by
the U.S. companies. Although China has recently approved strands of genetically
modified corn and soybeans and is generally welcoming of GMOs, it has a zero
tolerance policy for certain crops. The Chinese government approval process for
new strains of GMO crops is also time-consuming. Meanwhile, public confidence in
GMOs is withering due to a paucity of clear and correct information from the
government. The Chinese government has made significant reforms to the countrys
food safety regulatory framework. However, implementation and enforcement of
rules at the local level is often inconsistent. Foreign companies face greater scrutiny
from the public and oftentimes invest more resources than local companies on
compliance issues. Increased training and capacity building of local officials
understanding of food safety standards, as well as testing regimes and standards
continue to be key issues. As a result, many food safety regulations are
implemented at the place of import, putting heavier compliance responsibility on
foreign import companies.
3 SOLVENCY STEPS
http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/download/2015%2520Viewpoint.pdf
To improve market access in the Agricultural Industry, AmCham Shanghai
recommends that: 1) The U.S. Government continues to press China to lift bans on
American agricultural products including beef and rice, and approve more strands of
GMOs for import. 2) The U.S. Government increases cooperation and coordination
with relevant Chinese government agencies on food safety and food import policies.
Better coordination between technical agencies such as the USDA and the Chinese
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)
can alleviate misunderstandings and help American companies to improve their
position in this rapidly expanding market. 3) The U.S. Government encourages
China to engage more with American agricultural companies and seek industry
input on draft laws and regulations. American agricultural companies have
extensive experience and knowledge on food safety issues. We applaud the Chinese
government for its efforts to solicit industry opinions on relevant laws and
regulations in 2014 and encourage the government to continue to find ways to
engage with industry on these issues.
CHINA WANTS US GMO LAW REFORM
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/cloned-in-china-beijing-aims-for-biotechdominance/
China has the potential to become a major biotechnology exporter; however,
international GMO regulations often stand in the way, failing to distinguish between
different product creation methods.
Traditional GMOs add DNA to products, whereas gene-editing removes or shuts off
certain genes. Despite this difference, (especially given public discomfort with the
idea of added DNA) regulations in major markets such as the U.S lack finesse.
Currently, whether cloned Tibetan mastiffs or gene-edited micro-pigs, such products
cannot be exported to the United States a major drawback for Chinese companies
trying to access the U.S market, itself one of the largest consumers of GMO
products.
Prof. Max Rothschild from Iowa State University explains the dilemma by stating that
the FDA should be grappling with this major difference [added vs. removed DNA]
as to how it will affect regulatory policy and whether gene-edited organisms should
be regulated in the same way as more traditional GMOs.
In recognition of the industrys growing role in bilateral trade, biotech issues are
increasingly coming to the fore in China-U.S talks. On November 23rd, the 26th U.SChina Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade was held. As a result of said
meeting. China has made pledges to move quickly on outstanding approval
procedures for existing biotech products.
Pressure from both Chinese and American biotech companies has seen Beijing and
Washington initiate the Strategic Agricultural Innovation Dialogue (SAID) to promote
GMO trade, and simplify biotech approval. This adds to last years agreement for
the U.S and China to station food inspector staff in each others countries.
GMO LAW REFORMS POPULAR WITH INTEREST GROUPS

http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/cloned-in-china-beijing-aims-for-biotechdominance/
U.S Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack was among the attendees, and was urged
by the U.S Biotech Crops Alliance (USBCA) to push for mutual expedited approval for
biotech products. The USBCA called on Vilsack and Washington in general to foster
an enabling environment for biotechnology, and push China to adopt a predictable
manner with regards to biotech approval.
Chinas commitment to work with Washington bodes well for export-orientated
Chinese companies. As regulatory barriers are overcome, Beijing is set to reap the
rewards of biotechs brave new world.
CHINA COMMITTED TO BOOSTING GMO MARKET GROWTH

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/china.php
The agriculture biotech industry is supported by the central government of the

Peoples Republic of China (PRC or China) as an emerging sector of strategic
importance.[1] According to Chinas 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and
Social Development for 20112015 (12th Five-year Plan), the country will speed up
the innovation and application of biotechnology breeding in agriculture, develop
new biological variety with important application value and independent intellectual
property rights, and foster a large and strong modern seed industry.[2]
Based on the 12th Five-year Plan and other plans supplementing it, the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) released the 12th Five-Year Plan for Development of Agricultural
Science and Technology (Agricultural S&T Plan), which provides more details on the
development of agricultural science and technology. In this Plan, the MOA proposes
to strengthen research involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs).[3] Major
research projects on breeding new varieties of GMOs will continue to be carried out
in the 20112015 period, according to the Agricultural S&T Plan.[4] The plans also
incorporate biosafety assessment and management as focus areas of biotech
industry development.[5]
CHINESE BANS DISRUPT US GMO MARKET

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gmo-china-insight-idUSKCN0J90DU20141125
Chinas barriers to imports of some U.S. genetically modified crops are disrupting
seed companies' plans for new product launches and keeping at least one variety
out of the U.S. market altogether.
Two of the world's biggest seed makers, Syngenta AG and Dow AgroSciences, are
responding with tightly controlled U.S. launches of new GMO seeds, telling farmers
where they can plant new corn and soybean varieties and how can the use them.
Bayer CropScience told Reuters it has decided to keep a new soybean variety on
hold until it receives Chinese import approval.
Beijing is taking longer than in the past to approve new GMO crops, and Chinese
ports in November 2013 began rejecting U.S. imports saying they were tainted with
a GMO Syngenta corn variety, called Agrisure Viptera, approved in the United
States, but not in China.
The developments constrain launches of new GMO seeds by raising concerns that
harvests of unapproved varieties could be accidentally shipped to the world's
fastest-growing corn market and denied entry there. It also casts doubt over the
future of companies' heavy investments in research of crop technology.
The stakes are high. Grain traders Cargill Inc [CARG.UL] and Archer Daniels Midland
Co, along with dozens of farmers, sued Syngenta for damages after Beijing rejected
Viptera shipments, saying the seed maker misrepresented how long it would take to
win Chinese approval.
CHINA IS A HUGE MARKET FOR GMOS

China is a key market for the $12 billion U.S. agricultural seeds business and for
global grain traders and accounted for nearly 60 percent of U.S. soybean exports
and 12 percent of corn exports two years ago. Nearly 90 percent of corn in the
United States is genetically engineered, according to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, as farmers embrace technology that helps kill weeds and fight pests.
CURRENT SYSTEM FAILS NEED COOPERATION W CHINA
Controlled launches, however, are at best a temporary fix because they are costly,
complicated and risk accidental contamination of other export grains, said Jim
Sutter, chief executive of the U.S. Soybean Export Council.
"The long-term solution is to work with our partners in China and build confidence in
the process in the way we want it to work," he said. "Easier said than done."
CHINA COMMITTED TO GMO RESEARCH

http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/can-the-chinese-government-get-itspeople-to-like-g-m-o-s
In China, which has one-fifth of the worlds population but just seven per cent of the
worlds arable land, food security is a national obsession. Pesticides and enhanced
fertilizers no longer improve crop yields as markedly as they once did, and staple
crops, such as rice, may not grow as reliably in the temperature extremes brought
on by climate change. As a result, the government has begun to invest heavily in
research on genetically modified crops. Last fall, the Communist Partys Literature
Research Office published the text of a speech that President Xi Jinping had given
before the Central Rural Work Conference, an agricultural-policy body, calling on
domestic scientists to boldly research and innovate, [and] dominate the high points
of G.M.O. techniques. The most recent Five Year Plan names biotechnology,
including enhanced agriculture, as one of seven Strategic Emerging Industries.
CHINESE MISTRUST GMOS

Zhang Qifa, one of the few scientists who did receive such experimental permission
in 2009, for Bt rice, which expresses a gene from the bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis that repels insect pestshas endured public attacks and threats to his
personal safety. In 2010, as Zhang was delivering a lecture on G.M.O.s at China
Agricultural University, in Beijing, a man in the audience threw a ceramic mug at
him, narrowly missing. A woman in the audience yelled: Zhang Qifa is a traitor!
Public anxiety about G.M.O.s has been stoked by people and organizations from
across the ideological spectrumby Greenpeace; by a Maoist group called Wu You
Zhi Xiang (Utopia); by popular TV anchors speculating about horrible illnesses; and
by expressions of general anti-Western sentiment. An online survey by the China
Daily revealed that eighty-four per cent of respondents believe that genetically
modified foods are unsafe.
KEY TO MARKET IS CHINESE PUBLICS OPINION
The mixed messages over G.M.O.s reveal profound divisions within Chinas
government, as well as an uncharacteristic sensitivity to public opinion. Much of the
research has been funded through the Ministry of Science and Technology, with a
mandate to elevate Chinas scientific prowess to world-class status. But the licenses
for testing and final commercial approval are granted by a joint-ministerial
conference made up of representatives from twelve agencies; it is convened by the
Ministry of Agriculture, which is subject to State Council influence and the
imperative of maintaining social stabilitythat is, avoiding public unrest. Put
simply, the problem mostly lies in the rising resistance of the public to G.M.O.s,
which has made the political leadership hesitant to go ahead with
commercialization, Cong Cao, an expert in Chinas science policy at the University

of Nottingham, in the United Kingdom, told me. President Xis speech noted the
schism: We must be bold in studying [genetic modification, yet] be cautious in
promoting it.
PUBLIC TRUST KEY TO GMO MARKET IN CHINA

This mistrust makes it difficult to introduce new food technologies, even if China
needs them. If the government says that G.M.O. food is safe, Chinese people wont
readily believe it, Sam Geall, an anthropologist at the University of Sussex who has
been conducting field research recently in Beijing, told me. For the past eighteen
months, Geall has been studying public opinion regarding G.M.O.s in China. The
chasm of credibility and the lack of a trusted referee make it hard for the public to
sift rumor from fact, he said: This may be the clearest example where public
opinion in China has likely played a role in stalling or stopping an innovation
pathway that the government backs, for better or worse.
Infrastructure
CHINA ALREADY INVESTS IN US RAIL
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2015/09/unlikely-saviour
But in one important area, that obsession seems to be working to Americas benefit.
Last week brought news of a big Chinese investment in what could become the first
high-speed rail line in America. Construction on a 230-mile line between Los
Angeles and Las Vegas will begin as early as next autumn, announced a Chinese
Communist Party official. China Railway International USA, a consortium led by
Chinas national railroad, will provide an initial capital investment of $100m for the
line, which will first run from Las Vegas to the town of Victorville, about 80 miles
from Los Angeles, and which officials hope will later connect to the citys downtown.
US WILL NOT FUND RAILS
High-speed rail has many advocates in America. But the country that once thrived
on its transcontinental railways has fallen hopelessly behind Europe and Asia
following years of disinvestment and closures. The trouble is that the government
has demonstrated a stubborn unwillingness to bring the network into the 21stor
even mid-20thcentury. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama
proclaimed: Within 25 years, our goal is to give 80% of Americans access to highspeed rail. But Republican governors of three states slated for big rail projects
cancelled those plans and returned the money to the federal government. Jeff
Denham, the chairman of the House of Representatives subcommittee in charge of
railroads said last year: High-speed rail can be a good idea; I just think it should be
left up to the private sector. Even states that stand to benefit most from such
investment seem ambivalent. Kevin McCarthy, the House Majority Leader, who
represents perpetually congested California, told the Wall Street Journal: "I will do all
that I can to ensure not one dollar of federal funding goes to boondoggles like
California's high-speed rail."
CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT GOOD

Mr Kunz is happy to take the money where he can get it. And the American
economy will benefit from improved transportation infrastructure, regardless of
funding source. Commuters, too, will appreciate the convenience of an 80-minute
train ride from Victorville to Las Vegas, considering the drive can take up to four
hours. Still, American industry is missing out. No one thinks the investment in the
rail line will be a big money spinner for China Railway International USA.
Transportation isnt supposed to make money, says Mr Kunz. Instead, China is
taking a strategic step to boost its own industry. After investing in more miles of
new high-speed rail than any other country in the world, it has developed the
engineering know-how to build tracks and trainswhich it now hopes to export to
overseas markets. The United States is one of more than 20 countries where China
aims to build a market for its rail industry.
INFRASTRUCTURE IS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN

http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/09/11/chinese-investment-translates-to-americanjobs/
Chinese FDI does raise national security concerns, according to the U.S.-China
Economic Security Review. While its 2014 annual report highlights that for the first
time, FDI from China into America surpassed FDI from the U.S. to China, it warns of
possible national security risks associated with SOE investments in critical
infrastructure. Past national security investment deals involving Chinese companies
include the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bid in 2005, telecom
giant Huaweis bids in 2007 and 2011, and the Ralls Wind Corporation bid in 2012.
In short, all bids faced heavy U.S. scrutiny and did not move forward.
CHINESE INVESTMENT INTO US INFRASTRUCTURE GOOD

http://chinaoutlook.com/blogs/us-infrastructure-made-china/
The United States offers an unparalleled investment opportunity for China. Only the
US can absorb such a large amount of capital: the US presents a massive
opportunity for infrastructure spending. Neglected for years, US bridges totter,
roads crack, and airports face wide scale delays due to the lack of capacity.
Sanyal pointed out that the Mumbai Airport is much more modern than New Yorks
LaGuardia; such neglected infrastructure presents a great investment opportunity.
This suggests that whilst infrastructure investing in China faces diminishing returns,
infrastructure in the US provides potentially higher profts for Chinese investors. For
the US, this will create a massive defcit and for China a surplus. However, if not
squandered and executed effectively, the infrastructure spending in the US should
pay for itself and beneft both countries in the long term.
AMERICAN INFRASTRUCTURE IS UNDERINVESTED AND BOGGED

DOWN
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/201509/26/content_22004970.htm
The infrastructure contrast between China and the United States is stark and
growing ever more so. Although the US invested as much as 4 percent of its annual
GDP in infrastructure during the 1950s and 1960s, that number is down to just 2.4
percent today. The result of the disinvestment is troubling and can be seen
everywhere in the country.
American airports and harbors, for instance, are overburdened with far more traffic
than they can accommodate, and more than 4,000 dams are at risk of failure.
Roadways are congested and deteriorating, resulting in accidents and traffic jams
that force commuters to spend more than 4 billion hours each year driving to and
from work.
In addition, bridges have decayed to such a point that repairing them would cost
approximately $140 billion. Worse yet, the country's aging infrastructure poses a
direct threat to human health and the quality of life.
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, more than 1.2 trillion gallons
of untreated sewage leak into US waterways each year from antiquated sewer
systems, some of which use components that are 200 years old.
For all of these reasons, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has awarded
a grade of D+ to the United States, based on the condition and performance of its
infrastructure. In its report, the ASCE identified a "pressing need for modernization"
and noted the "significant backlog of overdue maintenance" across various
infrastructure systems. The ASCE calculates that correcting these problems will
require the US to invest roughly $3.6 trillion by 2020 in critical upgrades and
repairs.
US LOSING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE BECAUSE OF

INFRASTRUCTURE UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The enormity of this problem is harming America's ability to compete economically

with China and other countries. This fact is not lost on President Obama, who visited
China late last year while participating in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and
G20 summits. After taking note of China's newly modernized airports, electrical grid
and broadband systems - among many other developments - he observed, "The one
thing I will say is that if [the Chinese] need to build some stuff, they can build it. And
over time, that wears away our advantage competitively."
USFG SHOULD INCREASE INVESTMENT NOW KEY

That moment is now at hand. For the United States to remain a global superpower
with a first-class economy, the federal government must dramatically increase and
expedite funding for infrastructure. Although the US House of Representatives
recently voted for a bill that would extend funding for highway repair and
transportation programs over the short term, Congress has not passed a long-term
transportation bill in 10 years.
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT SUPERCHARGES ECON

This is because lawmakers tend to resist spending on infrastructure programs out of
the misguided belief that doing so would raise the federal deficit and harm the
fragile American economy further.
In reality, the opposite is true. Experts have found that spending just $1.3 billion on
American infrastructure in 2015 would create tens of thousands of domestic jobs in
construction and related industries. In addition, such an investment could add $2
billion to the nation's real economic growth and reduce the deficit by $200 million
for the year.
Then, once completed and operational, the new infrastructure would enhance the
economy's productive capacity, resulting in even more growth in long-term
employment. This increase in economic activity and employment would provide a
much-needed boost in tax revenues.
In addition, the improvement to transportation systems would allow faster
movement of goods and services throughout the country, lowering prices for
consumers and raising profits for companies.
INFRASTRUCTURE KEY TO ADVANTAGE
Since the 1960s, however, American investment in large-scale public works has
fallen dramatically. Meanwhile, China, India, and other countries have been forging
boldly ahead with serious investment in transit systems, airports and numerous
other projects. There is a strong correlation between a nation's economic growth
and its investment in infrastructure, as the Chinese government fully recognizes.
Given this fact, and Americans' deep frustration with the state of their own
country's infrastructure, it's time for Congress to open the public purse and once
again make a long-term commitment to modernizing the nation. Otherwise, the
United States will simply rest on the laurels of yesterday's public-works
achievements while China and other up-and-coming nations quietly pass it by.
US INFRASTRUCTURE KEY TO GLOBAL ECON

http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/why-the-world-needs-the-us-to-invest-ininfrastructure/
Only a revival in US infrastructure investment can create a sustained global

economic recovery. The US has the necessary scale to absorb Chinas surplus, and
its inadequate infrastructure provides plenty of avenues for fruitful investment.
CHINA HAS OVERINVESTED DOMESTIC INFRASTRUCTURE HAS

FUNDS TO INVEST IN US INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS A GOOD
IDEA
http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-capital-is-on-the-move-1421896110
Chinas dominance is driven by the fact that it saves and invests nearly half of its
$10.5 trillion economy. However, it is difficult to fruitfully deploy $5 trillion in a
country that already has brand new infrastructure, suffers excess manufacturing
capacity in many segments and is trying to shift to services, a sector that requires
less heavy investment. Moreover, China is ageing very rapidly and its working age
population is already declining. This is why one should expect Chinas domestic
investment rate to decline sharply over the next decade.
As the current account is the difference between the investment and savings rates,
the decline in investment would generate large external surpluses unless savings
also decline. The experience of other ageing societies such as Germany and Japan is
that investment rates fall faster than savings rates. Both these countries have
consequently run large, persistent surpluses. However, given Chinas size, the scale
of capital outflows could be so large that they could hold down the long-term cost of
capital around the world even if all the major central banks tighten monetary policy.
As the experience of three decades of yen appreciation shows, an appreciation of
the Chinese renminbi will not correct the surplus and perversely may even add to it
(after all, an appreciating currency further depresses investment in the tradable
sector).
Can emerging markets take advantage of this cheap capital? In recent months,
there has been a chorus arguing that the global economy needs a sharp increase in
investment, particularly in infrastructure. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry
Summers published a Financial Times column titled Why public investment really is
a free lunch while IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde argued that an
investment boost is needed by the world economy to overcome a new mediocre.
THIS PLAN IS A GREAT IDEA DEAL WITH IT
http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-capital-is-on-the-move-1421896110
In others words, a sustained revival in global economic growth boils down to a
revival of infrastructure investment in the US. The country has the necessary scale
to absorb Chinas surplus and the poor state of its infrastructure provides many
avenues for fruitful deployment of capital. The irony is that the IMFs new mantra
ultimately leads us back to large global imbalances. Far from decrying this as a
major failure of global policy co-ordination, economists should accept imbalances as

the natural state of being and try to manage the resultant distortions.
CHINESE INVESTMENT INTO US FUELS GLOBAL GROWTH

http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1618300/chinese-capital-exportsmay-be-boon-us-infrastructure
If Chinese capital can be put into self-financing infrastructure in the US and, where
possible, elsewhere, global growth would rise. But this requires the US to decide to
borrow money, effectively from the Chinese, and use it for public investment. Hardly
seems a sure thing, as political propositions go.
It may be a choice between bridges and bubbles.
TALKS ABOUT BUBBLES
http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1618300/chinese-capital-exportsmay-be-boon-us-infrastructure
Now remember, when you have a glut of capital, a few things reliably happen. Asset
prices rise because capital seeks a return, interest rates stay low, for the same
reason, and you have a tendency for bubbles to develop. That means that even if
Western central banks were able to raise interest rates, flows of capital from China
might keep rates low and give rise to bubbles anyway.
INVESTMENT HAS GREAT ROI ALLEVIATES US DEBT

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9b591f98-4997-11e4-8d6800144feab7de.html#axzz42tp5CV6y
All of this makes the IMFs recently published World Economic Outlook a remarkable
and important document. In its flagship publication, the IMF advocates substantially
increased public infrastructure investment, and not just in the US but much of the
world. It asserts that when unemployment is high, as it is in much of the
industrialised world, the stimulative impact will be greater if investment is paid for
by borrowing, rather than cutting other spending or raising taxes. Most notably, the
IMF asserts that properly designed infrastructure investment will reduce rather than
increase government debt burdens. Public infrastructure investments can pay for
themselves.
Why does the IMF reach these conclusions? Consider a hypothetical investment in a
new highway financed entirely with debt. Assume counterfactually and
conservatively that the process of building the highway provides no stimulative
benefit. Further assume that the investment earns only a 6 per cent real return, also
a very conservative assumption given widely accepted estimates of the benefits of
public investment. Then, annual tax collections adjusted for inflation would increase
by 1.5 per cent of the amount invested, since the government claims about 25
cents out of every additional dollar of income. Real interest costs, that is interest
costs less inflation, are below 1 per cent in the US and much of the industrialised
world over horizons of up to 30 years. So infrastructure investment actually makes it
possible to reduce burdens on future generations.
MORE INFRASTRUCTURE MEANS MORE DEBT CAPACITY

It ignores the fact that by increasing the economys capacity, infrastructure
investment increases the ability to handle any given level of debt. Critically, it takes
no account of the fact that in many cases government can catalyse a dollar of
infrastructure investment at a cost of much less than a dollar by providing a tranche
of equity financing, a tax subsidy or a loan guarantee.
1 TO 3 RETURN ON INVESTMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

INVESTMENT
When it takes these factors into account, the IMF finds that a dollar of investment
increases output by nearly $3. The budgetary arithmetic associated with
infrastructure investment is especially attractive at a time when there are enough
unused resources that greater infrastructure investment need not come at the
expense of other spending. If we are entering a period of secular stagnation,
unemployed resources could be available in much of the industrial world for quite
some time.
EVEN THE IMF AGREES INFRASTRUCTURE IS A FREE LUNCH

What is crucial everywhere is the recognition that in a time of economic shortfall

and inadequate public investment, there is for once a free lunch a way for
governments to strengthen both the economy and their own financial positions. The
IMF, a bastion of tough love austerity, has come to this important realisation.
Countries with the wisdom to follow its lead will benefit.
CHINA COULD SPEND ON WELFARE INSTEAD

http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/11/china-could-have-massive-investment-in.html
As China pursues its own rebalancing efforts towards a consumption-driven growth
model, it will seek to expand welfare of the Chinese people through social security,
healthcare and other financial benefits in order to alter peoples conservative
savings behavior and encourage them to consume more. In this case, China could
begin to absorb its excess savings to support its welfare expansion program, rather
than lend to the outside world.
NEED TO STEER CHINESE EXCESS CAPITAL INTO US

INFRASTRUCTURE ALTERNATIVE IS GLOBAL SLOWDOWN AND
ASSET BUBBLES
https://etf.deutscheam.com/AUT/DEU/Download/Research-Global/c6762d18-6b364911-9a0a-c2f08a899705/The-Wide-Angle.pdf
Chinas domestic investment currently generates a disproportionate share of global
investment. However, as the pace of investment slows, the country is likely to
generate large current account surpluses over a prolonged period. This will
transform China from being the factory of the world to being the investor to the
world. We do not think a real appreciation of the CNY would correct these surpluses
but could perversely add to them. How the world absorbs Chinas large current
account surpluses will define the next round of economic expansion. We feel that
the scale of capital outflow from China could be so large that it may keep long-term
capital cheap even if the worlds major central banks tighten monetary policy. This
is the context in which we should evaluate the IMFs new call for an increase in
public infrastructure investment. India could be a beneficiary of this era of cheap
capital as it tries to replicate the East Asian model, but it is not likely to absorb a
substantial portion of Chinas excess savings. Similarly, even if Germany increases
domestic investment, the most we can expect from Europe is that it does not add
further to the global savings glut. Thus, a revival of infrastructure investment in the
US is key to a sustained revival of global economic growth. This would lead us back
to a period of large symbiotic imbalances which we dub as Bretton Woods Three.
Far from decrying this as a failure of global policy co-ordination, economists should
accept imbalances as the natural state of being and try to manage the
accompanying distortions. However, if Bretton Woods Three fails to take off for
whatever reason, we should reconcile ourselves to a long period of mediocre
growth. Cheap capital, in this scenario, will continue to support asset prices and
depress yields. History suggests that some of this cheap money would inevitably
find its way into trophy assets.
WOULD NEED 450 BILLION PER YEAR TO SOLVE BASIC

INFRASTRUCTURE
https://etf.deutscheam.com/AUT/DEU/Download/Research-Global/c6762d18-6b364911-9a0a-c2f08a899705/The-Wide-Angle.pdf
The above table is an assessment by the ASCE of how US infrastructure has
deteriorated between 1988 and 2013. As someone who lives in Singapore but
travels frequently by the US, I am not at all surprised by the assessment. So how
much would it cost to fix all this? The ASCE estimates that at 2010 prices, it would
need USD3.64 trillion (USD3.95 in todays prices). Notice that this is just backbone
infrastructure spending and ignores other forms of investment such as industrial
capacity, housing and so on. Assuming that the infrastructure spend is spread till
2020, ASCE estimates a spending of USD 454bn per year in 2010 prices (USD494bn
in todays prices) and a funding gap of USD 201bn (i.e. USD219 in todays prices).
CHINA STILL NEEDS INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-idUSKCN0SC04W20151018
Increased infrastructure investment is key to stabilizing China's economic growth, a
top state advisor said on Sunday, while calling on the central bank to lower the cost
of financing for companies and increase overall credit.
"Keeping relatively high growth of infrastructure investment is key to stabilizing
economic growth" since property and manufacturing investment remains weak, said
Yu Bin, head of the micro economy research department at the State Council's
Development Research Centre.
China needs to speed up its 172 hydropower projects, develop 800 million mu (53
million hectares) of high-standard agricultural land and increase investment in rural
roads, Yu said.
ONLY POLITICIANS AND TARIFFS ARE STOPPING CHINESE

INVESTMENT INTO US INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN WOULD
STIMULATE MUTUAL GROWTH
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/
For its part, China castigates the U.S. for its irresponsible fiscal trajectory, its
political opposition to Chinese investment in American companies and
infrastructure, and its export-control laws, especially those restricting the export of
technologies with potential military applications.
We believe its time to turn the typical exchange of economic critiques on its head.
The two countries have largely been engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, each
blaming the other for its own failings, exerting pressure on the other to accede to its
demands, and too often waiting for the other to act first. In fact, it is in each
countrys self-interest to meaningfully address the criticisms made by the other.
The greatest American threat to Chinas economic future is the possibility that
Americas economic success could come to an end; the greatest economic danger
China poses to the U.S. is the chance that Chinas economy fails to grow. By
contrast, if each country gets its own house in order and thus succeeds
economically, that should diminish economic insecurity, which generates friction,
and increase confidence about the future, which fosters a constructive relationship.
As former U.S. Treasury secretaries with long experience working with China, we
believe each country should undertake significant reforms. Seriously considering
each others criticisms is a good way to begin.
the united states has enormous long-term strengths, including a dynamic and
entrepreneurial culture, a strong rule of law, flexible labor and capital markets, vast
natural resources, and relatively favorable age demographics. But China is right to
say that improving Americas long-term fiscal outlook is a prerequisite to
sustainable growth. Well-structured fiscal reforms could contribute to growth and
job creation now while reducing the burden of debt in the future. Some argue that
the government could create jobs and increase demand in the short term through
public investment in infrastructure or other sectors, while simultaneously taking
steps to improve the countrys long-term fiscal trajectory. Others argue that the
nation could create more well-paying jobs by reforming its tax code for individuals
and corporations, reducing the distortions that undermine economic
competitiveness while raising necessary revenue.
Chinese investors could help the United States speed growth now without worsening
its long-term debt problem. The U.S. has vast infrastructure needs and a paucity of
public capital. But byzantine regulatory and policy barriers too often discourage
private investment in major projects. A more streamlined and welcoming
environment for domestic and foreign investment in infrastructure projects would
create jobs and boost competitiveness.
STATES CP
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/
Much of the effort to attract Chinese investmentwhether in infrastructure or
manufacturing or agribusinessneeds to come from outside Washington. States
and cities have a choice: they can continue to be passive recipients of occasional
Chinese investment, or they can design more-systematic approaches to seeking
Chinese capital, and the jobs and competitive advantages that accompany it. In
Ohio, Michigan, and California, for example, proactive governors are attracting
Chinese investment and creating high-quality jobs in sectors like auto parts and
clean energy.
EVEN IF ALL CHINESE INVESTMENT WENT TO US IT STILL

WOULDNT SOLVE
http://chinainvestin.com/index.php/en/invest-in/reports/403
At a minimum, more than $8 trillion in new investment will likely be needed in U.S.
transportation, energy, and wastewater and drinking water infrastructure from 2013
through 2030otaling some $455 billion per year.
According to data from the American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation,
Chinese outward investment reached $85 billion in 2013, a dramatic increase from a
mere $10 billion in 2005. The U.S. has been the No.1 destination, luring more than
$14 billion of investment last year alone.
US IS ALREADY #1 INVESTMENT DESTINATION FOR CHINESE

At a minimum, more than $8 trillion in new investment will likely be needed in U.S.
transportation, energy, and wastewater and drinking water infrastructure from 2013
through 2030otaling some $455 billion per year.
According to data from the American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation,
Chinese outward investment reached $85 billion in 2013, a dramatic increase from a
mere $10 billion in 2005. The U.S. has been the No.1 destination, luring more than
$14 billion of investment last year alone.
POLITICIANS WANT OUTSIDE INVESTMENT

As Fuyao Glass recognized the benefits of purchasing an existing plant in the U.S.,
other Chinese manufacturers should seriously consider investment or acquisition of
U.S. based facilities or firms. The current political environment in the United States
is supportive of outside investment.
THE TIME IS RIGHT TO OPEN FOR CHINESE INVESTMENT IN

INFRASTRUCTURE
http://rhg.com/reports/assessing-the-opportunity-for-chinese-participation-in-usinfrastructure
The United States is poised to undertake the most significant expansion and
modernization of its infrastructure since the 1950s. Unlike previous infrastructure
booms, this new period is taking place in the context of significant pressure on
public budgets and a dramatically changed global economy that boasts new players
in global trade and investment. Rhodium Group was one of the lead contributors to
a new report by the US Chamber of Commerce that assesses the opportunities for
China, the largest of these new players, to participate in US infrastructure build-out.
This note summarizes the key figures and findings from this report.
Capital funding needs for US infrastructure over the next two decades are massive:
We project $8 trillion in capital investment demand to keep US energy, transport,
and water infrastructure alone in a state of good repair from now until 2030.
Great opportunities for foreign participation: With dwindling public funding sources,
the need to expand private funding means there is significant opportunity for
foreign investors to participate in US infrastructure build-out.
A good match for Chinese firms, but commercial and political hurdles exist: US
infrastructure offers attractive opportunities for Chinese investors and suppliers.
However, there are several commercial and political hurdles specific to Chinese
participation which make some modes of investment and participation more
realistic than others.
8 TRILLION FOR ENERGY, TRANSPO, WATER

The US is approaching a period of massive infrastructure build-out, and quantifying
the economic opportunity is a first step towards assessing the possibilities for
private participation. In the forthcoming report, we project required capital
investment needs in US energy, transport, and drinking water and wastewater
infrastructure (water-related infrastructure) for the years 2013 through 2030.
At a minimum, we estimate that more than $8 trillion in new investment will be
needed in these three sectors over the 18 year outlook periodtotaling some $455
billion per year. In all cases we project required investment using conservative
assumptions, so a much higher amount of investment will likely be necessary.
Investment in energy infrastructure accounts for 57% of the total projected need,
followed by 36% for transport and 7% for water-related infrastructure (Figure 1).
SUCH A GOOD DEAL!
There is significant opportunity for foreign investors to participate in US
infrastructure build-out. Given Chinas external portfolio and the growing
capabilities of Chinese firms in infrastructure-related activities, it will be a
particularly interesting opportunity for Chinese investors and suppliers. The most
straightforward way for Chinese firms to participate in US infrastructure build-out is
via financial investment providing capital either via debt or equity investments.
Such investments would help China in its goal to diversify its global portfolio in
terms of both geographies and asset classes. Currently, Chinese institutional
investors and firms have large and growing capital pools, but their balance sheets
show a high degree of home biasthat is, almost all of their investments are in
the domestic economy. Greater uncertainty about domestic growth in China has
increased awareness of the risks of maintaining domestically concentrated
portfolios and the benefits of global diversification. At the same time, the returns for
low-risk investments have fallen precipitously across the globe in light of
quantitative easing and a flight to safe haven assets since the financial crisis (Figure
2).
For Chinese investors, financial investments in infrastructure projects in advanced
economies offer relatively safe returns and a longer-term investment horizon.
Investments in capital-intensive infrastructure projects also have the advantage of
allowing for the passive investment of large amounts of money without the need for
constant managerial supervision. This provides a particularly attractive opportunity
for cash-rich Chinese funds that are looking to go out and invest abroad. Chinese
money managers and sovereign investors are known to already have significant
equity and debt holdings in mature markets, but because there are no disclosure
requirements for smaller stakes, it is impossible to provide an accurate snapshot of
current exposure to infrastructure-related positions. However, bigger stakes usually
are disclosed, and these have increased substantially in recent years. For example,
in 2012, the China Investment Corporation (CIC), one of Chinas sovereign wealth
funds, purchased an 8.68% stake in British water utility Thames Water and a 10%
stake in Heathrow Airport Holdings, the firm that owns Londons Heathrow Airport,
for $726 million.
The US infrastructure sector also offers opportunities for Chinese firms as providers
of infrastructure goods and services. Owing to the past 30 years of Chinas
infrastructure boom, many Chinese firms now have significant economies of scale
which, when combined with low labor costs, enable them to offer construction
materials at globally competitive prices. Chinas infrastructure boom and
educational priorities also have grown the size, capabilities, and experience of the
countrys engineering corps. Chinese firms have thus become increasingly
competitive in the market for such infrastructure-related services such as civil
engineering, construction services, contract management services, and operations
and maintenance or life-cycle management services.
PLAN SOLVES MAIN PROBLEM US POLITICAL AND INVESTMENT

HURDLES
While Chinese participation in US infrastructure is a good commercial fit, several

hurdles and specific firm-level disadvantages limit the opportunities. These
limitations are rooted in the lack of experience of Chinese firms beyond borders and
political and regulatory realities on both sides.
With regard to policy and politics, Chinese investors will have to deal with US
national security concerns and adverse reactions to foreign ownership. While the
United States has a longstanding policy of openness to foreign investment, certain
proposed transactions that result in Chinese ownership of existing infrastructure
projects or businesses may face scrutiny from CFIUS or political opposition. On the
Chinese side, a rigorous outbound investment approval process and state conditions
on outbound investment (e.g. state owned investors or banks conditioning
investments on other state owned firms obtaining service or supply contracts) can
stand in the way of greater participation in US infrastructure. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) typically requires separate approvals from the National
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange, and relevant industry regulators. For financial
investments, Chinese investors need to have a specific government mandate for
overseas investment or to obtain a quota under the Qualified Domestic Institutional
Investors Program (QFII).
For Chinese providers of goods and services, certain commercial and operational
challenges also diminish the prospects of participation in US projects. First, as a
result of several high-profile cases of defective Chinese products in recent years, US
buyers have exhibited growing concerns over the safety and quality of Chinesesourced products. For infrastructure in particular, it is critical that parts and
components are safe, of high-quality, and durable. Second, although Chinese
construction service providers have operated successfully in developing economies,
lack of experience operating within foreign and often complex regulatory
environments in developed economies and managing labor relations are primary
commercial impediments.
PLAN NEEDED FOR LONG TERM SOLVENCY

Although extensive opportunities for Chinese participation in US infrastructure exist,
there are lots of hurdles to overcome. In the short term, passive financial
investment as the largest and most straightforward target with manageable
commercial and political challenges is the most easily embraced form of potential
participation, particularly in projects with US partners and low national security
sensitivity.
Chinese participation through export of goods and services is already growing, but
long-term success will depend on two factors. First, Chinese firms need to expand
their US presence via foreign direct investment and build local operations with US
workers and ties with local economies. Second, China needs to converge with
international legal norms and practices to alleviate concerns and meet certain
regulatory requirements for the provision of goods or services by foreign parties to
public work projects. Reforms that create more certainty with regard to legal
remedies and greater transparency would help to create trust in Chinese products
and services abroad. In addition, China needs to make efforts to join relevant global
governance rules and frameworks. For example, certain procurements by US
government agencies are limited to products from a list of designated countries,
including parties to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).
Successfully completing Chinas accession to the GPA would be a requirement for
Chinese firms to access those projects.
GOOD FOR BOTH PARTIES
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
Our study found that Chinese participation in U.S. infrastructure would enable the
United States to leverage Chinese capital, industrial capacity, and infrastructure
experiences, while allowing China to help support and capitalize on the coming
wave of U.S. infrastructure redevelopment. Such cooperation would strengthen the

relationship between the two nations and enhance global stability and prosperity.
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING IS BECOMING CRITICAL NEED

EXTERNAL FUNDING TO SOLVE
The United States is poised to undertake the most significant expansion and
modernization of its infrastructure since the 1950s.1 Unlike previous infrastructure
booms, this new period is taking place in the context of significant pressure on
federal, state, and local budgets, suggesting that substantial private capital will be
necessary to finance the new infrastructure investments. This expansion is also
taking place in a dramatically changed global economy that boasts new players in
global trade and investment. The most important of these new players is China. As
the United States second-largest goods trading partnerand with a large and
growing pool of available capitalChina is well positioned to participate in and
benefit from U.S. infrastructure expansion and modernization.
PLAN SOLVES HURDLES TO INVESTMENT

Although extensive opportunities abound for Chinese participation in U.S.
infrastructure, the firms most likely to succeed will be those that anticipate and
develop strategies to address likely challenges, including the following (some of
which apply to all foreign parties): National Security Concerns. While the United
States has a longstanding policy of openness to foreign investment, certain
proposed transactions that result in Chinese ownership of existing infrastructure
projects or businesses may raise national security concerns and face scrutiny from
CFIUS or political opposition. In particular, investment in the electricity grid,
upstream and midstream oil and gas assets, airports, and seaports are likely to be
viewed as highly sensitive from a national security perspective and are susceptible
to political scrutiny. Among the factors that can be closely examined by CFIUS or
attract public attention are: state control of Chinese investors, whether an entity is
motivated by commercial or political interests, financing of the transaction, and
concerns over cyber espionage or the proximity of a project to military bases or
restricted airspace. Adverse Reactions to Foreign Ownership. Chinese investment
in U.S. infrastructure may also generate strong local reactions against foreign
ownership of core domestic assets even where national security is not implicated.
Such reactions often center on concerns that decisions affecting the public will be
left in the hands of foreign powers, and these concerns have been raised even for
foreign investors from close U.S. allies. These problems are best addressed through
a thoughtful public outreach and education program. Many statesespecially those
pursuing PPPsare aware of the political problems that foreign participation may
generate and may serve as helpful partners in navigating the political and
regulatory challenges surrounding foreign investment.
PLAN CANT SOLVE SOME US HURDLES TO INVESTMENT

Quality Control and Product Safety. Chinese firms seeking to sell goods for
infrastructure projects may face concerns about quality control and product safety
as a result of high-profile defective products cases in recent years. Inadequate
Legal Remedies. Given concerns about product quality and safety and the limited
legal cooperation between the United States and China, there may be concerns
about the availability of legal remedies against Chinese suppliers in the case of
damage from faulty products. After-Sale Service. In addition, because Chinese
firms have mostly served overseas markets through export channels rather than
through establishing operations abroad, they often lack established capabilities to
provide after-sale service and maintenance, which may be a vital component to
winning contracts for infrastructure projects.
PLAN CANT SOLVE CHINESE HURDLES TO INVESTMENT
In addition to U.S. laws and regulations, Chinese firms and their U.S. counterparts
must plan for any legal and regulatory requirements governing outbound
investment from China: Chinese Outbound Investment Approvals Process. Chinese
parties must first gain approval from their home regulators before they invest or
move funds overseas. Under current law, direct investments typically require
separate approvals from the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange, and relevant industry regulators. For financial investments, Chinese
investors need to have a specific government mandate for overseas investment or
to obtain a quota under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors Program
(QFII). State Conditions on Outbound Investment. It also is not uncommon for
stateowned investors or banks to condition investments or loans on other stateowned firms obtaining service or supply contracts, which can add additional
complexity to the potential transaction.
PLAN SOLVES
As a summary point, we put forth the following suggestions for Chinese partiesas
well as their U.S. counterpartscontemplating participation in U.S. infrastructure.
We direct these points to potential transactions that will involve direct investment,
but many of them apply in equal force to potential providers of infrastructure goods
or services. Understand U.S. national security concerns. Investors should

anticipate the natural security concerns associated with investments in strategic
sectors and U.S. businesses. As described above, certain infrastructure sectors are
likely to be viewed as more sensitive from a national security perspective. Chinese
participation in these sectors will require additional attention and preparation
beyond that required for typical opportunities. Understand the regulatory
landscape. In connection with a long-term strategy to develop and grow their
position in the U.S. marketplace, investors should consider what approvals are
required in connection with particular transaction structures. For some investors,
greenfield projects may offer an attractive opportunity. Prioritize transparency
and legal compliance. Increased corporate transparency and broader legal
compliance policies will benefit Chinese parties contemplating investments or other
participation in U.S. infrastructure. Taking such steps will likely facilitate regulatory
reviews and help to preempt potential political criticism. Likewise, given the
posttransaction compliance concerns that are frequently voiced in connection with
potential Chinese investment, the ability to demonstrate a strong compliance
program and culture to U.S. authorities will enhance prospects for successful
investment. For example, having sound written policies and procedures for export
control compliance and anticorruption compliance, including training materials for
employees, reflects an understanding of U.S. regulatory interests and could
enhance a Chinese investors reputation.
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE GOES TO OIL AND GAS

We project total 20132030 capital investment needs for energy infrastructure of
$4.6 trillion, with average annual investment of $258 billion. Investment in oil and
gas infrastructure accounts for 60% of this total ($2.8 trillion), while electricity
infrastructure accounts for 37% ($1.7 trillion), biofuels infrastructure for 2% ($98
billion), and coal infrastructure for 1% ($55 billion).
TRANSPO ONLY NEEDS 163 BILLION PER YEAR BRIDGES AND

HIGHWAYS
Transport infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by a mix of
private and public sector entities. Some modes, like highways and mass transit, are
primarily operated by state and local governments, and they are financed by a
combination of state funds, local funds, and user fees. Other modeslike passenger
rail (Amtrak), airports, and seaportsrely on a combination of private and public
financing. We project 20132030 capital investment needs in transport
infrastructure of $2.9 trillion, with an annual average of $163 billion. More than half
of this investment will be required to meet highway and bridge capacity needs.
34 BILLION PER YEAR FOR WATER

For the water sector, we considered total 20132030 capital investment needs in
drinking water and wastewater (also known as clean water) infrastructure. We
project total needs of $608 billion, with 55% ($333 billion) required for drinking
water and 45% ($275 billion) required for wastewater. We project average annual
water infrastructure investment needs of approximately $34 billion, with $18.5
billion annual investment required for drinking water and a $15.2 billion annual
investment required for wastewater.
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE = WATER AND TRANSPO, NOT

ENERGY
Opportunities for participation in U.S. infrastructure differ depending on whether the
relevant infrastructure assets will be or are publicly owned, which we refer to as
public infrastructure, or privately owned, which we refer to as private
infrastructure. Public infrastructure assets are owned by the federal government, a
state or local government, or a governmental agency or authority formed and
capitalized by a combination of the foregoing. As a general rule, nearly all water
infrastructure and most, but not all, transport infrastructure in the United States
constitutes public infrastructure, while most energy infrastructure constitutes
private infrastructure. Though privately owned, assets that constitute private
infrastructure still serve public purposes and thus invite significant government
involvement. Whether infrastructure assets are public or private frequently
determines the applicable financing, operational and ownership structures, and the
extent of government regulation over their assets, their operations, and the
qualifications of their private owners. We describe below many of the principal
structural and legal considerations affecting each of the two categories of
infrastructure.
GOV DEFUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE NOW DOESNT HAVE

MONEY TO SUPPORT
A public owners first option to fill the gap between a projects sources and required
uses of funds is to look to its own coffers or to federal funds20 that may be
contributed or loaned to the project. However, recent years have seen a significant
downward trend in the budgetary capacity of states to self-finance infrastructure
expenditures. Among the factors contributing to this trend are large, unfunded
pension obligations in several states, which affect states abilities to finance long-
term projects, and near-term budget shortfalls, which affect states abilities to
address current infrastructure needs.
NO FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE NOT SEEN AS A PRIORITY BY

STATES
The ability of states to self-finance public infrastructure projects may remain
constrained in the medium term even if state revenues return to pre-recession
levels. State budgets are likely to favor the restoration of services cut during and
since the recession over infrastructure investment. Available funds will be affected
by structural changes in the economy, such as the growing number of Medicaid
beneficiaries.23 And asset renewal needs, if left unaddressed, may continue to
grow, further diverting funds from greenfield projects
STATE RESTRICTIONS ARE INCREASING

In addition to these federal provisions, state and local governments are empowered
to impose further restrictions on the purchase and use of foreign materials. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed this principle in the context of
transportation materials when it held that the Pennsylvania Steel Products
Procurement Act, which imposes more stringent restrictions on foreign steel than
the Buy America Act, was not preempted by federal law.55 In addition to stricter
requirements for domestic goods, many states and municipalities also have adopted
state or local geographic preferences. Nearly all the states implement some form of
geographic preference in competitive public procurements. These local preference
laws take a variety of forms: Percentage Price Preferences. To name a few
examples, Louisiana offers a 10% price preference for steel rolled in state; Illinois
recognizes a 10% preference for bidders using Illinois coal; and Alaska affords up to
a 7% preference for in-state timber. Tie-bid Preferences. Nearly all states formally
recognize a preference for in-state offerers in a tie-bid scenario. Absolute
Preferences. Among other states, North Dakota requires contracts for highway grade
stakes to be awarded to in-state work activity centers; Ohio mandates that major
term printing contracts be completed in state; and Minnesota requires
governmentpurchased all-terrain vehicles to be manufactured in state. Reciprocal
Preferences. At least 35 states have adopted a form of reciprocal preference law,
a type of retaliatory legislation that gives preference only to residents of states that
have not enacted local preference laws. Although often criticized as unsound
economic policy, geographic preferences have been increasingly adopted in recent
years by legislatures seeking to protect local jobs and business interests from the
effects of a challenging economic environment.
CHINESE IN GOOD POSITION TO INVEST IN US

One role for Chinese players considering participation in U.S. infrastructure is as a
financial investor. Chinese institutional investors and firms have growing capital
pools, but their balance sheet shows a high degree of home biasthat is, almost
all of their investments are in the domestic economy. Greater uncertainty as to
domestic growth in China has increased awareness of the risks of maintaining
domestically-concentrated portfolios and the benefits of global diversification.80 At
the same time, the returns for low-risk investments have fallen precipitously across
the globe in light of quantitative easing and a flight to safe haven assets since the
financial crisis (Figure 7).For international investors, financial investments in
infrastructure projects or firms offer relatively safe returns and a longer-term
investment horizon. Investments in capital-intensive infrastructure projects also
have the advantage of allowing for the passive investment of large amounts of
money without the need for constant managerial supervision. This provides a
particularly attractive opportunity for cash-rich Chinese firms that are looking to go
out and invest abroad. For most of the past three decades, Chinese entities have
not been very active investors in the debt and equity markets discussed in Part I.
Nevertheless, Chinese entities have recently become an important source of capital
for developed economies through these channels, and they are poised to grow in
importance in the United States.
CHINA CAN INVEST NOW
In addition to opportunities for Chinese companies, high-net-worth individuals may
also invest in U.S. infrastructure through the United States EB-5 program, which
provides foreign investors with U.S. residence permits in exchange for investments
of more than $1 million (or $500,000 for certain targeted employment areas) that
create 10 or more U.S. jobs. The funds may be channeled through special
government-licensed regional centers, such as the Inland Empire Center in
California, which focuses on solar energy infrastructure projects.84 Beyond
acquiring stakes in existing companies and assets, Chinese firms have recently
begun to enter the U.S. infrastructure market through greenfield investments. One
example is a joint venture between Chinas ENN group and Utah-based CH4 Energy
Corporation, which is building a nationwide network of natural gas fueling stations
(known as blu LNG fueling stations) for trucks along U.S. highways. CH4 benefits
from ENNs experience in operating more than 200 such gas stations in China. In the
United States, two stations are already operational, four more are under
construction and the consortium plans to build an additional fifty stations
throughout the United States this year.85 ENNs expertise and industrial capacity
are crucial assets to CH4 as it and its leading competitor in the emerging U.S.
natural gas transportation market, Clean Energy Fuels Corp., seek to accelerate
infrastructure build-out to make commercial use viable in the long term.86
REGULATIONS ARE A MAJOR HURDLE

Regulatory hurdles related to tax and transparency also stand in the way of greater
financial investment. Under the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, overseas
financial institutions like CDB must provide the U.S. government with the names of
U.S. clients.93 However, according to Liu Xiangman, deputy director of legal affairs
at Peoples Bank of China, Chinas banking and tax laws and regulations do not
allow Chinese financial institutions to comply [with this demand], and it is thought
that this legal conflict may ultimately have been a contributing factor to the failed
Lennar Corp-CDB projects demise.
CHINESE CREATING PRODUCERS IN US INCREASES JOBS AND

GROWTH
Chinese firms can also participate in U.S. infrastructure in the second manner
discussed in Part 1, as a vendor. The commercial logic for Chinas participation as
vendor is primarily cost based. Chinese firms can produce goods and manufacturing
services at globally competitive prices, a function of low labor costs and economies
of scale resulting from increased industrial capacity, following Chinas infrastructure
buildout at home over the past several years. For example, steel fabrication for
several U.S. suspension bridges has recently been outsourced to China. In 2006,
steel manufacture for part of the new San FranciscoOakland Bay Bridge was
outsourced to Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy
Industries (Shanghai Zhenhua), after an American joint venture between American
Bridge and Fluor enterprise underbid competing firms in 2006. A spokesperson for
the joint venture noted that Shanghai Zhenhuas advantages included its excess
cash, low cost of labor and huge warehouses for massive steel production
projects.94 Similarly, in 2012, Chinas Railway Shanghaiguan Bridge group was
subcontracted to manufacture the steel deck for the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge in
New York; steel manufacture was then subcontracted to Chinas Anshan Iron and
Steel Group to complete the project.95 Again, the Chinese firms were able to
compete based on industrial capacity and cost, enabling the Chinese parties to
immediately produce and supply the steel deck panels required at a competitive
price. Discussing the Chinese firms role in the project, the chairman and CEO of the
New York Metropolitan Transit Authority, managers of the project, noted that their
decision to use a Chinese manufacturer was based on the U.S. steel industrys
limited capacity to fabricate orthotropic deck panels, and that the additional costs
from using an American supplier would have ranged from $100 million to $235
million for the project.96 The possibility of Chinese participation as vendor has also
led some Chinese manufacturers to set up factories on U.S. soil in order to localize
production. For example, TPCO Enterprise, Inc., a subsidiary of Tianjin Pipe Group, a
Chinese supplier of seamless steel pipes, has a factory in Houston, Texas, where it
produces pipes for the American market.97 By bringing production to America, firms
can (1) establish distribution networks or more closely monitor third-party
distributors; (2) provide improved post-sales support; and (3) in some cases, reduce
the impact of tariffs on their products.
LEGAL BARRIERS STOP INVESTMENT

Finally, legal issues can obstruct provision of goods in several ways. With respect to
quality control, there is a concern that the current state of U.S.China legal
cooperation may make it difficult to hold Chinese vendors liable for the damage
caused by a faulty product.101 For example, the 2007 and 2008 discoveries of
contaminated blood thinners, pet food, toothpaste, toys and other products
produced in China and distributed by American companies demonstrated how
difficult it is to identify and prosecute wrongdoers in China.102 Even if a claim is
litigated successfully in a U.S. court, China does not ordinarily recognize U.S. court
judgments, which may make obtaining recoveries difficult. Some plaintiffs may also
be reluctant to file suit in China because there remains a general perception that
Chinese courts may not fairly adjudicate lawsuits by foreign parties. For
infrastructure projects with large capital expenditures, such liability problems may
pose an intolerable risk for many stakeholders.
CHINESE PRODUCTION INVESTMENT KEY TO LONG TERM

SOLVENCY
Despite these challenges Chinese manufacturers may still want to participate as a
supplier of raw and intermediate materials in the private sphere and in channels
beyond the scope of Buy American laws.103 Most Chinese firms, however, lack the
local supply network required for such participation. Furthermore, in instances
where an intermediate good can only be finished once it has been shipped to the
end user (as in the delicate final stages of wind-turbine assembly),104 failing to
localize also reduces the possibility of transitioning from an intermediate goods
supplier to a supplier of higher value-added finished goods in the American market.
CHINESE FIRMS SOLVE BEST
Provision of services offers a third mode for Chinese participation in U.S.

infrastructure build-out. Opportunities across infrastructure sectors range from
supplying contract construction services to acting as a general contractor and
managing the entire life of an infrastructure project. Chinese firms are typically
known for providing cost-competitive products globallysupported by low-cost
inputs and government incentives assuring industrial production margins. However,
Chinese firms are now increasingly becoming internationally competitive in the
provision of certain services. Infrastructure-related service is one such category, as
Chinas rapid urbanization process, which has involved countless so-called mega
projects has given firms the experience and capability needed to compete
overseas.105 Consider, for example, the capabilities of Chinese firms in the energy
sector. China is home to the worlds largest energy market. Over the past 10 years,
Chinese companies have installed 800 gigawatts of power generation capacity
domestically, almost as much as total U.S. installed capacity. This scope of
investment has also allowed Chinese firms to gain experience in projects that have
not recently been built in advanced economies, such as large hydro dams or new
technology like coal liquefaction plants. Chinese construction, engineering, and
equipment companies are unrivaled in the scale and speed at which they are able
to build electrical infrastructure. In the past decade, they have become efficient
providers of lowcost infrastructure in the developing world as well, especially in
Africa.106
REGULATORY CONFUSION IS THE PRIMARY DE-MOTIVATOR FOR

CHINESE INVESTORS
At the same time, the provision of services in developed economies poses many
challenges to Chinese firms, thus limiting the potential opportunities in the United
States. Although Chinese construction service providers have operated successfully
in developing economies, lack of experience operating within foreign and often
complex regulatory environments in developed economies is a primary commercial
impediment. A leading example of large-scale failure brought on by lack of
operational expertise is China Overseas Engineering Groups (Covecs) unsuccessful
attempt to build a highway in Poland in 2009.
REGULATIONS, MAN
Given the landscape of the Chinese economy and the strong history of Chinese
companies being at least partly owned by the government, the issue of state control
and whether an entity is acting on the basis of commercial concerns or on behalf of
government interests may result in increased regulatory or political scrutiny of
Chinese participation in infrastructure projects. From the perspective of U.S.
government officials and politicians evaluating Chinese investment, even publicly

traded Chinese companies that otherwise look and feel like Western companies not
affiliated with the state may present government control issues. Ministries and
agencies within China have served as incubation grounds for companies that were
later spun off privately. The fact that the founders of these companies may have
their origins with the Chinese government can contribute to a view of the
companies as government affiliated or controlled. Furthermore, the Chinese
government often retains shares in publicly traded companies, and senior officials in
Chinas larger state-owned enterprises are appointed and evaluated by the
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party.115While there is a strong record of successful investments in the United
States by state-owned enterprises from China, the relationship between the
government and the companies, including the nature of ownership interests, can be
a significant factor for U.S. regulatory approval authorities, such as CFIUS, as well as
in the politics related to infrastructure projects.
PLAN ENABLES CHINESE CYBER ATTACKS

Cyber security is a significant public policy issue for U.S. officials and other
governments around the world. Senior U.S. defense officials have warned about
cyber Pearl Harbor that could derail passenger trains contaminate the water
supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the
country.119 The Industrial Control System-Computer Emergency Response Team
(ICS-CERT) at the Department of Homeland Security issued a warning in May 2013
to energy companies to be on alert for attacks.120 It was not entirely clear whether
that alert was in response to particular activities, but The New York Times also
reported that 10 major energy companies had seen probing activity that appeared
to resemble an attack on Saudi Aramco that destroyed 30,000 computers.121 The
U.S. governments concerns about the cyber threat posed by China are well
documented. Given these concerns, Chinese participation in certain types of
infrastructure projects may face greater challenges than others. For example, a
Chinese investment in energy infrastructure may be particularly challenging as a
regulatory and political matter, given the number of reports that have emerged
detailing cyber operations originating in China and targeting U.S. energy
infrastructure and companies.122 By contrast, other infrastructure projects
including toll roads or certain types of rail projects are inherently less vulnerable to
cyber- or other attacks and therefore may be less likely to present exceptional
hurdles to investment from China.
PLAN -> ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
One of the biggest challenges for Chinese participants in certain sectors is

regulatory and political concern over Chinese commercial and state espionage. The
U.S. intelligence community has characterized the Chinese intelligence services as
among the most capable and persistent intelligence threats and aggressive
practitioners of economic espionage against the United States,117 and the
Department of Justice considers Chinese espionage one of its top priorities.118
Espionage concerns predominate in high-technology industries important to
national defense, such as defense, aerospace, telecommunications, and information
technology, which they are likely to be less acute in infrastructure-related
industries. In most cases, companies involved in infrastructure projects simply do
not possess the types of high-tech intellectual property that are likely to viewed as
especially sensitive. There are, of course, important exceptions. As certain U.S.
infrastructure assetssuch as the electricity gridbecome more technologically
advanced, Chinese investments in those sectors are likely to present greater
challenges. Airports and seaports are also generally viewed as critical infrastructure;
information about their operations and, in particular, their security procedure is
likely to be viewed as sensitive information that must be protected.
CONGRESSIONAL UNPREDICTABILITY ALSO SCARES CHINESE

INVESTORS
Apart from CFIUS and other regulatory approvals, the U.S. Congress can take an
active interest in foreign participation in U.S. infrastructure and be an important
institution for parties to consider and engage in the context of specific transactions.
This is particularly true for transactions that present national security issues.
Congress is likely to continue to be a more important institutional consideration for
investments from China than it will be for investments from virtually any other
country. Indeed, in 2000, Congress created a bipartisan committee, the United
StatesChina Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), specifically to
monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of
the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China. The USCC regularly holds hearings and publishes
research papers on specific subjects pertinent to U.S.China relations, and it is
required to submit to Congress an annual report that includes recommendations for
legislative and administrative action. Over the past decade, the experience of a
number of Chinese companieswhich can be defined broadly to encompass Hong
Kongbased companies as well has proven the direct impact Congress can have
on individual transactions involving Chinese investors. For example, congressional
opposition ultimately killed China National Offshore Oil Corporations (CNOOC) bid
for Unocal in 2005, and there was substantial political opposition to the proposed
investment by Huawei Technologies (Huawei) in 3Com in 2007, which ultimately was
rejected by CFIUS.
CONGRESSIONAL BLOCKS ON CHINESE INVESTMENT RARE

These experiences demonstrate that congressional or public reactionand the
possibility for a transaction to become politicizedare factors that Chinese
investors must consider and plan for. However not all investment from China has
been subject to the same degree of congressional scrutiny, and Chinese investors
should not necessarily anticipate a congressional environment that will always be
hostile. For example, the political reaction to Lenovos acquisition of IBMs Personal
Computer division was relatively mild, as was Congresss reaction to CNOOCs
proposed acquisition of Nexen (and its U.S. assets) in 2012. Some members of
Congress expressed concerns about Wanxiangs acquisition of the nondefense
assets of A123 Systems, but the transaction was ultimately approved. Most
recently, CFIUSs approval of Shuanghui Internationals acquisition of Smithfield
Foods generated only limited Congressional opposition.
PUBLIC HATES FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Because transport infrastructure in the United States is largely a local matter,
Chinese participants, and particularly investors, should be prepared to address local
political concerns. By one estimate, more than 80% of U.S. voters oppose the use of
foreign capital in domestic infrastructure projects.123 Thus, while investments in
roadways and related infrastructure have the benefit of being less likely to raise
national security concerns than, for example, investments in airports or seaports,
they may still face adverse public opinion. Despite possible political obstacles, the
need for new capital to modernize the U.S. roadways offers considerable
opportunities for investors.
PUBLIC NEGATIVITY CAN BE RESOLVED EASILY

Many states pursuing PPP projects are aware of the political problems that foreign
participation may generate. In a study assessing the ability of California to attract
foreign investment to local PPP projects, researchers explicitly recognized that one
policy factor that may relate uniquely to overseas investors is the potential for an
adverse reaction to foreign ownership and operation of core domestic assets.124
The study concluded that these problems could be mitigated through a wellthought-out public outreach and education program, in conjunction with
decentralized transactions that aggregate investments from diverse investors.
These studies suggest that states can be helpful partners not only in the PPP
projects themselves but also in navigating the political and regulatory challenges
surrounding the projects.
TOO MANY DOMESTIC LEGAL HURDLES

The following is a non-exhaustive list of the domestic government bodies that must
approve Chinese outbound foreign direct investment. Approvals or record filing with
additional bodies may be required for certain companies and in certain industries
for example, the Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) for state-owned or statecontrolled companies or the China Banking
Regulatory Commission for certain financial services investments. National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). A Chinese firm looking to invest
abroad must first apply to its local NDRC office (the local DRC). The local DRC has
authority to approve the investment without further NDRC review unless the project
involves: An investment of more than USD $300 million in resource-based sectors;
An investment of more than USD $100 million in non-resource-based sectors; or
An investment in a sensitive country (described as a country without a formal
diplomatic relationship with China or under international sanctions, at war or in a
state of unrest, etc.) or a sensitive industry (described as basic
telecommunication operations, cross-border water resources development and
utilization, large-scale land development, main electrical grids, news media, etc.).
For such investments, NDRC approval, in addition to local DRC approval, is required.
In certain cases, State Council approval may also be required. State-owned or
statecontrolled companies under the direct administration of SASAC may simply file
for record with NDRC and do not need to obtain local DRC or NDRC approval.
Notably, an August 2012 draft regulation would eliminate the need for NDRC
approval (though not local DRC approval) for investments of up to $300 million in
transportation and infrastructure projects. 127 The draft measures would also
eliminate the need for NDRC approval for outbound investments by overseas
subsidiaries of Chinese companies that do not involve mainland financing or
guarantees. Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). As with NDRC approval, whether an
application must be submitted to MOFCOM or its local affiliate turns on the type or
amount of the planned investment. Central MOFCOM must approve, inter alia,
investments over $100 million or that create an offshore special purchase vehicle,
while a provincial-level MOFCOM is the approval authority for investments between
$10 and $100 million, investments in resources and minerals industries, and
investments that seek to obtain financing from other Chinese investors. State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). Finally, a Chinese investor must apply
for a foreign exchange registration certificate for outbound investment from SAFE
or its local office in order to transfer funds overseas. SAFE approvals are not
necessary if the Chinese investor wishes to use profits earned overseas for an
overseas investment.
LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE BRIDGES

The need for more than $8 trillion in spending for infrastructure renewal in the
United States over the next two decades presents clear opportunities for global
investors and infrastructure firms. As a key source of global capital and Americas
second largest trading partner, China is well positioned to participate in this
opportunity. Chinese investors can look to the U.S. infrastructure sector for portfolio
diversification and safe, long-duration investment opportunities. Chinese providers
of infrastructure goods and services can look to leverage low labor costs, economies
of scale, and significant infrastructure experience to enter the U.S. market. This
report has described and suggested strategies to address many of the legal,
political, and commercial challenges to Chinese participation in the U.S.
infrastructure sector. Chinese parties looking to expand participation in the sector
are well advised to consider, assess, and plan for these challenges, both on a
project-by-project basis and in the context of a long-term strategy. We believe that if
they do, and if Chinese participation realizes a fraction of its potential, the
infrastructure sector will serve as an important area for bridge buildingboth literal
and figurativebetween the two nations.
CHINESE INVESTMENT WILL INCREASE ONLY A MATTER OF

WHERE THE MONEY GOES
http://addisfortune.net/columns/in-praise-of-global-imbalances/
China dominates global investment because it saves and invests nearly half of its
10.5 trillion dollars economy. But this investment rate is likely to decline sharply
over the next five to 10 years, because the country already boasts new
infrastructure, has excess manufacturing capacity in many sectors, and is trying to
shift economic activity to services, which require less investment. Moreover, Chinas
rapidly ageing population and declining working-age population will reduce longterm investment demand.
Because the current account balance is the difference between investment and
savings rates, the decline in investment will generate large surpluses unless savings
also decline. And the experience of other ageing societies, such as Germany and
Japan, suggests that domestic investment falls faster than savings rates.
Thus, China can expect large external surpluses to transform the country from the
worlds workshop into its main financier. Indeed, the scale of capital outflows could
be so large that long-term capital will remain cheap even after the worlds major
central banks tighten monetary policy. How the world absorbs those surpluses will
define the next period of global economic expansion.
BOTH PARTIES LIKE PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

http://www.cfr.org/united-states/infrastructure-finance-america-we-getsmarter/p32597
The politics of creating Infrastructure USA should be easy. Democrats and
Republicans agree that U.S. infrastructure needs more investment, and both parties
support using more private money to make that happen. President Obama could
potentially create Infrastructure USA without legislation in the initial stage to get it
up and running immediately. The cost would be minimal, but the impact could be
large if PPP Canada is any guide. The federal government is also well positioned to
pool expertise that can then be shared broadly. An agency like the Small Business
Administration is a good domestic example; it has provided advice, training,
support, and capacity-building to entrepreneurs and small businesses for years.
Infrastructure USA would not impose federal guidelines or priorities. Its services
would be voluntary for state and local governments and by request. They could
reject any recommendations to counter any fear of overreach by the federal
government or political interference. Ultimately, the purpose of Infrastructure USA
would be to ensure that taxpayers at all levels of government can make wellinformed investment decisions and receive better value for money, and that quality
infrastructure gets built.
USFG NOT CHANGING ON INFRASTRUCTURE SOON
http://www.cfr.org/infrastructure/encouraging-us-infrastructure-investment/p27771
Congress has done little to address this growing crisis. Ideally, it would pass
comprehensive bills to guide strategic, long-term investments. The surface
transportation bill, known as the highway bill, is a notable example of such
comprehensive legislation. It is the largest source of federal infrastructure spending,
allocating hundreds of billions of dollars over several years for highways, rapid
transit, and rail. But the most recent six-year highway bill expired in 2009, and
Congress has been unable to agree on a new multiyear bill since then. The Senate
passed a new bill in March 2012 that provides only two years of funding and efforts
in the House to pass a longer-term bill have nearly collapsed. The continuing
impasse forced Congress to pass its ninth temporary extension of the old law at the
end of March 2012, this time for ninety days. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood
announced in February that he does not expect a bill to pass before the 2012
election, a view many experts share.
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK

There is no shortage of good proposals to encourage infrastructure investment. For
example, President Obama has endorsed the idea of creating a national
infrastructure bank to leverage federal funds and encourage PPPs. Bipartisan
negotiations in the Senate produced a bill for a scaled-down version of the bank,
focused on low-cost federal loans to supplement state financing and private capital.
The bill is not supported by House Republican leaders, however, and is unlikely to
pass this year. There are also important transportation reforms in both pending
highway bills where Republicans and Democrats are on common ground: expanding
the popular Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loan
program, streamlining the Department of Transportation bureaucracy to speed
approval of new projects, and eliminating congressional earmarksa huge step
toward smarter project selection based on merit rather than political interests. But if
the highway bill does not pass, none of these reforms will happen.
OBAMA CAN SOLVE REGULATION WITH EXECUTIVE ACTION

States are already looking at new ways to finance infrastructure as federal funding
becomes uncertain and their own budgets are strained. More states rely on PPPs to
share the costs and risks of new projects, and they are finding new sources of
nontax revenues to fund investments, like tolling and higher utility rates. But at the
same time, federal regulations and tax laws often prevent states from taking
advantage of creative methods to finance projects. Federal programs designed to
facilitate innovative state financing are underfunded, backlogged, or saddled with
dysfunctional application processes. Many of these obstacles can be removed by
adjusting regulations and tax rules to empower states to use the tools already
available to them, and by better managing federal credit programs that have
become so popular with states and private investors.
In cases where modest reforms can make more financing solutions possible, good
ideas should not be held hostage to "grand bargains" on big legislation like the
highway bill or the failed 2010 energy bill. Congress should take up smaller
proposals that stand a chance of passing both houses this yearincremental steps
that can unlock billions of dollars in additional investments without large federal
costs. Any proposals hoping to win Republican support in the House need to have a
limited impact on the federal deficit and focus on reducing, rather than expanding,
federal regulations and bureaucracy. Some progress can also be achieved by
circumventing Congress entirely with executive branch action.
CUT THAT TAPE
Cut red tape for new projects. On March 22, 2012, President Obama issued a new
executive order to "improve performance of federal permitting and review of
infrastructure projects." But the order is short on substance and long on studies and
steering committees. A bolder step would be eliminating duplicative reviews by
merging them into single-track proceedings wherever possible. The approval
process for natural gas pipelines is a model; an interagency agreement established
a "one-stop" review conducted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) with input from other government agencies. President Obama could order
similar streamlining without congressional approval and without waiting months for
a steering committee plan.
US INFRASTRUCTURE STAGNATING NOW

https://www.aei.org/publication/china-answer-americas-infrastructure-woes/
While seemingly patent today, the Interstate Highway System was a novel system
upon its inception and played an important role in the US economys primacy
throughout the latter half of the 20th Century. The reason is simple: a welldeveloped infrastructure system has long-term economic benefits. However, the US
infrastructure system may now be stagnant both in terms of innovation and funding.
To revitalize Americas infrastructure system, the US should consider new creative
methods, such as lowering barriers to entry into the infrastructure market; opening
the market will entice cost-effective and experienced innovators, from home or
abroad.
INFRASTRUCTURE AFFECTS ALL OTHER MARKETS KEY TO

COMPETITIVELY
Prolonged under-investment in the US infrastructure system could have serious
domestic economic consequences, and may lead to more spending down the line. A
crumbling road network will result in decreased productivity for businesses and
individuals alike the more time spent on congested roads, the less time at work
and the more money spent on car maintenance and related expenses. The
American Society of Civil Engineers, a group that examines the conditions of
infrastructure in the US, estimates that American households and businesses lost an
estimated $130 billion in 2010 due to infrastructure deficiencies, and projects that
Americas deteriorating infrastructure will cost the economy nearly $1 trillion by
2020. Even if the cost is much lower, there will be a negative impact on most
Americans.
Decreased infrastructure quality also has consequences for Americas global
competitiveness. In a speech delivered this month, Christine Lagarde, the managing
director of the International Monetary Fund, argued that 2015 must be the year of
action when policymakers show leadership on infrastructure investment for all
nations. Lagarde reasoned that well-developed and maintained infrastructure
systems allow for increased global trade, and that the United States must refurbish
its languished infrastructure system in order to avoid reduced trade and decreased
competitiveness in the international market.
REDUCING BARRIERS SOLVES CHINA HAS DESIRE AND

EXPERTISE
Will the United States heed the admonitions of economic advisers

and business leaders? Seeing that increased government funding is still
under debate, other solutions to Americas infrastructure woes may be necessary.
One method is to reduce barriers to entry in the infrastructure market. Opening up
the market would bolster American infrastructure by creating more opportunity for
experienced and cost-efficient foreign investors and contractors, thereby increasing
competition for projects and reducing project costs.
China invests in and builds the most infrastructure globally. Over the past ten years,
the American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundations China Global
Investment Tracker (CGIT) has recorded almost 1,400 investment and engineering
transactions of $100 million or more. Chinese companies have increased spending
around the world at a steady pace over this time period with total business, both
investment and contracts, nearing $1 trillion.
For investment, the US is a prime target. Beginning with Lenovos acquisition of
IBMs ThinkPad business, initial Chinese investment in the US was slow as both
nations waited to see how Lenovo performed in the US market. The CGIT currently
estimates a total of 24 transactions amounting to almost $17 billion of Chinese
investment in the US in 2014, the third annual increase in a row. In total, the US has
received nearly $78 billion of Chinese investment since 2005, making America the
largest recipient country in the world.
In sharp contrast, Chinese engineering and construction in the US is barely visible.
Despite demands for infrastructure maintenance and improvement, the US has only
outsourced five road and bridge projects worth more than $100 million to Chinese
firms, and the total cost for these five projects is less than $1 billion. In comparison
to the rest of the world, by CGIT estimates, the United States does not rank in the
top 30 countries for transportation contracts and has received less than 1 percent of
Chinas total outbound engineering contracts.
Awarding construction contracts to Chinese firms may sound outlandish, but it
certainly is not seen that way elsewhere. In 2005, Chinas global infrastructure
construction of all types road, rail, ports, and aviation was over $4 billion. In
2014, the amount exceeded $30 billion. Chinese global infrastructure construction
has occurred, or is currently in development, in over 70 countries and totals over
$125 billion.
The increase in Chinese construction globally demonstrates Chinas growing
expertise and capacity to develop safe, reliable and cost-effective transportation
systems. A few US states have already found this appealing. China Construction
America, Inc., a subsidiary of Chinas State Construction Engineering, rehabilitated
the Alexander Hamilton Bridge in New York City and the Pulaski Skyway in New
Jersey. These projects should be viewed by other states as an experiment how well
did the companies do their jobs? If the projects are completed in a safe, timely, and
cost-effective manner, other states should follow suit and seek out Chinese
construction companies such as Sinomach for bids.
The CGIT data show that, in terms of Chinese firms, a disconnect exists between the
access to American investment and construction markets. The American
infrastructure market affords an untapped opportunity, which Chinese companies
are more than capable, and likely willing, to fill. How much infrastructure work the
US needs is a matter of debate. That it is worthwhile to reduce barriers to entry into
the US infrastructure market, an area where Chinese firms are able to contribute,
should not be.
ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS
http://qz.com/138761/america-needs-8-trillion-worth-in-infrastructure-over-the-nexttwo-decades-and-china-could-help/
The idea of Chinese control over critical US infrastructure like power and water
plants or airports is enough to get a number of US officials up in arms. Lawmakers
have already said American companies should not to do business with Chinese firms
Huawei and ZTE for fear of enabling Chinese government influence over domestic
telecom equipment. And its not only the US that is sensitive. Over $200 billion in
potentialmergers or acquisitions around the world have fallen through because of
political or regulatory opposition to Chinese investment, according to the US think
tank, the Heritage Foundation.
GOOD MATCH PLAN SOLVES
Thats a missed opportunity, the US Chamber report says. Chinese investment in
the US last year reached a record $6.5 billion, but even that is only a fraction of the
Peoples Republics total overseas foreign direct investment, or OFDI. Chinas OFDI
is low compared to the size of its economy, but at $77 billion last year, it is still the
worlds sixth largest overseas investor. The US needs capital for expanding energy
supplies, but also for drinking or waste water treatment equipment, highways, and
bridges. Annual expenses should be about $455 billion, and that doesnt even cover
operation and maintenance or upgrades.
What makes China a good candidate is that it is already investing in infrastructure
in foreign countries, including the US, and in some cases in quite sensitive sectors.
In the UK, Chinese investors can own majoritystakes in future nuclear plants. The
countrys sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, (CIC) also owns
9% of the company that controls the UKs largest water and sewage company. In the
US, CICowns a minority stake in EIG Global Energy Partners, an asset manager that
invests in energy and resources-related infrastructure. Thats on top of its 17%
stake in the American power company AES. The state-owned oil giant Sinopec also
announced earlier this year it is buying half of one of Chesapeake Energys oil and
gas fields in Oklahoma and Kansas.
SOES ARE 70% OF CAPITAL

The fact that Chinese investment in the US is gradually changing may make things
easier. As weve reported, Chinese investment may not always be from state-owned
firms. In 2010, state-owned enterprises accounted for about 70% of Chinese (pdf,
p.12) overseas direct investment. But in the first three quarters of 2012, that
proportion flipped, and private Chinese firms made up 62% of overseas deals.
POLITICIANS WILL KEEP IGNORING INFRASTRUCTURE MUST

ACT NOW
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-the-us-modernise-itsinfrastructure/
When a major highway bridge in California collapsed last month, the impact on the
entire southwestern United States once again highlighted the countrys serious
infrastructure problem. Indeed, in a sense, the worlds largest economy is falling
apart.
Ideological aversion to public-sector investment, together with the endemic shortterm thinking of those who write budgets, has kept spending on roads, airports,
railways, telecommunication networks, and power generation at levels far below
what is needed. And yet the problem can no longer be ignored. If the US does not
act quickly to provide its fragile economic recovery with a solid foundation of
modern infrastructure, it could find itself sinking slowly back into stagnation.
US INFRASTRUCTURE SUCKS
It seems self-evident that a developed economy requires adequate, ongoing
investment in public goods. But the state of infrastructure in the US suggests that
many decision-makers do not share this view. A 2013 report by the American
Society of Civil Engineers gave the US a pathetic overall grade of D+ for its
infrastructure. The report cited numerous state-specific shortcomings, including
Michigans 88 high-hazard dams and 1,298 structurally deficient bridges and the
$44.5 billion needed to upgrade drinking-water systems in California.
PRIVATE FUNDING CP
Americas desperate need for modern infrastructure has come, in some ways, at a
fortuitous moment. At a time when the economic recovery remains fragile, a
publicly financed infrastructure program could meaningfully transform the prospects
of US workers, providing new employment opportunities for low and un-skilled labor.
Meanwhile, scaling up infrastructure spending could provide an often-overlooked
opportunity for long-term institutional investors. Pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds in the US manage combined assets totaling roughly
$30 trillion, and they have been struggling to find investments that match their
long-term obligations. Persistently low interest rates have been particularly
challenging for pension funds, which face rising liabilities (calculated on a
discounted basis).
A large-scale program to reboot Americas crumbling infrastructure would go a long
way toward addressing this gap between assets and liabilities, providing pension
funds with investments with long time horizons (and thus guaranteeing the incomes
of tomorrows retirees) while leveraging private capital for the public good. In fact,
US pension funds are already investing in infrastructure, but they are doing so in
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
POLITICS BLOCKING INFRASTRUCTURE RESOLUTION

Sadly, ideological objections and partisan politics are likely to strew obstacles in the
path of any effort to modernize Americas infrastructure and create such
opportunities at home. Public-sector investment invariably rekindles the age-old
struggle between those who insist that government should stay out of efforts to
create jobs and those who believe that part of governments role is to put
underutilized human resources to work.
BIPARTISAN INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION CP
One way to avoid this bottleneck would be for US President Barack Obama to
establish a bipartisan Infrastructure Commission tasked with finding solutions to the
problem. This would operate much like the bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, established in 2010 to address Americas fiscal
challenges, or the military-base-closing commissions of the 1980s and 1990s. By
splitting the responsibility between the countrys two main parties, the commission
would free its members from the pressures of day-to-day politics and allow them to
concentrate on the health of the economy. Congress would then hold an up-or-down
vote on the commissions recommendations.
INFRASTRUCTURE KEY
Infrastructure has long been acknowledged as fundamental to a countrys economic
prospects. In neglecting the necessary investments, the US has put itself on a
precarious path, one that could lead to stagnation and decline, which would be
difficult to reverse.
LACK OF CHINESE INVESTMENT BC OF POLITICAL CLIMATE
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/12/10/chinese-investmentin-the-u-s-will-grow-in-2016/#38be65a31a8a
Even though the U.S. is a favorite nation, investments here have been significantly
lower than in the rest of the world: Chinas $90 billion invested in the worlds largest
economy is less than 10% of its total outward investment of $1.1 trillion since 2005.
This underweight position results partly from Chinas earlier investment strategy
and partly from to the political climate in the U.S.
Until recently, three quarters of Chinese foreign investment was in energy, natural
resources, and related transportation infrastructure. Those kinds of investments can
be made elsewhere in the world at less cost and political risk than in the U.S., where
natural resources are seen as vital to the national interest. The federal Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States traditionally takes a dim view of Chinese
SOEs buying up strategic national resources and screens out investorsSOEs in
particularit feels do not meet the national security test.
THIS IS NOT FREE TRADE

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/xi-jinping-chinese-investment213185
Chinese investments in the United States over a certain dollar threshold must still
be approved by a minimum of one, and up to three Chinese governmental entities.
So, by definition, large Chinese investments in the U.S. must fulfill governmental
objectives. Thats not free-market principles at work.
To take just one example, lets look at Chinas purchase of Smithfield Foods a short
time ago. This past weekend, former Treasury Secretary Paulson applauded the
purchase and the resulting 45 percent increase in U.S. pork exports to China that
resulted. Hes got it wrong. For years, U.S. pork producers had been trying to get
their products into the hands of Chinese consumers. It was only after our leading
company was purchased that exportsfor that companys productsincreased.
Under real free market conditions, we would have been able to export our high
quality pork without China having to purchase one of Americas great companies.
THEIR ECON STUDIES ARE SUSPECT

As a commissioner, Ive spent a good bit of time and energy trying to locate
business case studies analyzing Chinese-invested firms here in the United States
that were done by acknowledged experts with free access to the management, the
workers and the books of those companies. And, as important, where the study
wasnt paid for by the firm being studied. So far, those kind of honest studies dont
appear to have been done.
CHINESE INVESTMENT BAD FOR US COMPANIES
This raises an important question: Is more investment by Chinese companies, who
are primarily guided by non-market economic principles and often receive support
from the state, really in our interest? What will their sourcing patterns be? Will a
company that makes steel pipe and tube use domestically produced raw materials
and suppliers or will they seek to employ the workers in their home market? As
Smithfield Foods may no longer be subject to same profit pressures as other
producers, have other companies had to engage in cost-cutting measures to
compete against it? If so, what has been the impact of those cuts on pig farmers,
feed grain producers and other suppliers?
CHINA RELIES ON OVERPRODUCTION FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

China continues to build its industries far beyond its domestic demand. Rising
overcapacity, in sector after sector, fueled by government subsidies and policies,
has devastated producers in the United States and other markets who have had to
compete against these products. From steel to aluminum to glass to solar to paper
to many other industries, China has continued to keep capacity online, or add to it,
despite global overcapacity and relatively stagnant or declining demand.
The result has been decreasing profits for too many U.S. firms, countless lost jobs
and a flood of imports that are not governed by the need to make a profit for their
companies. Trade cases have been filed against China in product after product area,
but every time China loses a case it simply shifts strategies to subsidize and dump
other products. Overcapacity has been raised during numerous Strategic and
Economic Dialogue talks with the Chinese. But the problem is only getting worse.
The Chinese Communist Partys power, in part, rests on ensuring an adequate level
of domestic growth to keep its people employed and its industries humming along.
So China isnt interested in taking capacity offline and putting its people out of
work.
COOPERATION LEADS TO CHINA TAKING ADVANTAGE, NOT

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
From the BIT to economic espionage to overcapacity Chinas playing by a different
set of rules. By now, we should have learned that further trade deals and
investment treaties will only lead to more outsourcing of production and loss of jobs.
Chinas playing to win and so should the United States. When China understands
that the U.S. will stand up when they dont open up their markets and that we will
respond forcefully to rule breaking and upsetting international norms, we may be
able to manage our differences. Until then we should stop hoping that China wants
to be more like us.
CFIUS AND PRESIDENT BLOCKING CHINESE INVESTMENT A LOT

LATELY
Several recent cases indicate that both CFIUS and U.S. policymakers are willing to
block investment transactions by Chinese firms, especially when the firms are stateowned or are favored by the State.102 Note that it is not necessary for CFIUS or the
President to issue a formal order to block an investment transaction.103 Concerns
raised by CFIUS may be sufficient to deter parties from going forward with a
transaction. For example, in February 2010, Emcore Corporation, a manufacturer of
components for fiber optics systems, announced that it had agreed to sell sixty
percent of its fiber optics business to a Chinese SOE for $27.8 million.104 However,
in June 2010, Emcore canceled the transaction due to concerns raised by CFIUS.105
In May 2010, Huawei Technologies purchased IP assets from 3Leaf Systems for $2
million.106 Members of Congress expressed concerns that Huaweis acquisition of
U.S. technology would provide access for the Communist Party to core computer
technology and threaten U.S. national security interests.107 In February 2011,
CFIUS formally notified Huawei that it should terminate its offer to acquire the 3Leaf
assets.108 Huawei subsequently withdrew its offer.109 Note that Huawei is not an
SOE but a private company.110 Although Huawei is a private company, U.S. officials
were concerned that Huawei might be a state-favored enterprise due to its close
ties to the Party and the Chinese government.111
CHINESE INVESTORS WANT TO INVEST INFRASTRUCTURE

MAINTENANCE NEEDED
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-03/27/content_19927054.htm
Qingbin Cui, associate professor of the department of civil and environmental

engineering at the University of Maryland, said the summit emphasized the need for
international capital to invest in US infrastructure.
"China's infrastructure is developing very fast. The infrastructure here is out of
date," Qingbin said. "In the past people just invest but not in maintenance. Now
they find that the cost of maintenance is getting higher and higher. So they need
more and fast investment. The government needs capital. They need public-private
partnership."
Some members of the Chinese delegation mentioned the difficulty in starting a
business in the US.
CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT GOOD FOR ECON

ONLY LAWS STAND IN THE WAY
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-releases-report-chineseinvestment-us-infrastructure
Two-way infrastructure investment has emerged as one of the most promising
opportunities to spur economic growth and job creation in both the United States
and China, U.S. Chamber President and CEO Thomas J. Donohue said. This type of
investment would benefit both of our countries, strengthening our relationship and
enhancing global stability and prosperity.
The report shows that the pressing need for resources to modernize U.S.
infrastructure is creating new opportunities for Chinese investors to act as providers
of capital, goods, and services in areas such as civil engineering, architecture,
construction, and contract and life-cycle management. At a minimum, more than $8
trillion in new investment will likely be needed in U.S. transportation, energy, and
wastewater and drinking water infrastructure from 2013 through 2030totaling
some $455 billion per year. However, making the most of these opportunities will
require careful navigation of the legal, regulatory, and political landscape in the
United States.
US INFRASTRUCTURE SUCKS
https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/infrastructure-week-kicks-the-hard-facts
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden noted the United States is 28th in the world. Thats
28th in the world in infrastructure.
AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka called the hold-up in progress pure politics,
adding, This is becoming [a] self-inflicted crisis and its not a pretend collapse a
bridge collapse is a real crisis.
MOSTLY ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IS NEEDED

https://www.uschamber.com/report/international-interstates-assessing-opportunitychinese-participation-us-infrastructure
The pressing need for capital to modernize U.S. infrastructure is creating substantial
new opportunities for Chinese investors. At a minimum, we estimate that more than
$8 trillion in new investment will be needed in U.S. transportation, energy, and
wastewater and drinking water (water-related) infrastructure from 2013 through
2030totaling some $455 billion per year. In reality, a much higher amount
of investment will likely be necessary. Investment in energy infrastructure accounts
for 57% of the total projected need, followed by 36% for transport and 7% for waterrelated infrastructure. Making the most of these opportunities will require navigating
the legal, regulatory, and political landscape in the United States. This study
examines the opportunities for Chinese participation in U.S. infrastructure
and provides practical advice for potential participants.
CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE NO LONGER A GOOD INVESTMENT
The Chinese economy has reached an inflection point. It is not yet clear whether the
Chinese Communist Party can successfully traverse these changing circumstances
and maintain its hold on power. The growth model that pulled more than 400 million
Chinese citizens out of poverty over the past three decades is running out of steam.
Chinese wages are rising and eliminating Chinas prior price advantages in global
export markets. Fixed infrastructure investments are producing diminishing returns.
Chinese citizens no longer accept the pollution costs associated with heavy
industry, and even if they did, the global market cannot continue to absorb more
Chinese steel and cement at double-digit annual growth rates. In order to keep the
economy growing and maintain ruling legitimacy, Chinese leaders must downshift
from the old growth model and foster new industries based on technological
innovation, domestic consumption, and services.
RISK OF OIL SHOCKS IS A 4 MORE INVESTMENT SOLVES

Very low probability, High impact; Risk intensity =
The response of the world's oil companies to lower oil prices should raise concerns
about the long-term impact on future energy supplies.
Analysis
Around US$400bn dollars-worth of oil and gas projects have been deferred or
cancelled (a process that actually started before the decline in oil prices began),
with, for example, the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras, announcing in June
2015 that it was cutting its 2020 production target from 4.2m b/d to 2.8m b/d. The
shale oil industry in the US, although primarily responsible for the recent collapse in
oil prices, is also concomitantly vulnerable, given the surge in US oil independents'
debts in recent years. History also provides repeated warnings of the long-term
impact of oil price slumps: the surge in oil prices to close to US$150/barrel in 2008,
for example, can be traced back to the investment freeze across the industry in the
wake of the oil price collapse in 1998. Meanwhile, contrary to historical precedent,
the oil market is still not fully taking into account geopolitical risks to supplies,
ranging from war in the Middle East to political ructions in Venezuela.
Conclusion
The risk of an oil price shock in 2016-20 is low currently. However, the volatile
geopolitical environment in the Middle East and eastern Europe, and the longer-term
impact of a curtailing of investment in the sector, provide upside risk.
CHINA HARD LANDING HAS AN IMPACT RATING OF 20

ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIST NEED TO TAKE ALL STEPS TO
AVOID
High probability, Very high impact; Risk intensity = 20
We assess the prospect of a sharp economic slowdown in China as our top risk
scenario.
Analysis
Continued deterioration in the country's services and manufacturing sectors, the
ongoing build-up of the country's debt stock (which is now equivalent to some 240%
of GDP), and continued capital outflows have highlighted structural weaknesses in
the economy and resulted in a (market-driven) depreciation in the renminbi's
exchange rate against the US dollar. The government's means to revive economic
confidence are limited. Its huge fiscal stimulus in 2009 led to a build-up of bad debt
that it is still seeking to curtail (especially in local government), and, despite the
People's Bank of China burning through US$108bn of reserves in December alone,
the renminbi has continued to weaken. Meanwhile, poorly managed official attempts
to shore up the stockmarket have highlighted concerns that the government's
promise to put a floor under economic growth might not be credible - as well as
showing the shallow nature of the government's commitment to allowing market
forces to play a role in raising productivity.
Conclusion
If China's economy slows by more than we currently expect, it will further feed the
ongoing global commodity price slump (especially in oil and, in particular, metals),
with a hugely detrimental impact on those Latin American, Middle Eastern and SubSaharan African states that had benefited from the earlier Chinese-driven boom in
commodity prices. In addition, given the growing dependence of Western
manufacturers and retailers on demand in China and other emerging markets, a
prolonged deceleration in growth there would have a severe knock-on effect across
the EU and the US - far more than would have been the case in earlier decades.
LEGITIMACY ON BRINK AND GETTING WORSE BC OF ECON

SLOWDOWN INEFFICIENT INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE
KEY CAUSE
Glaciology/Fem K
NEED A MULTIDIMENSIONAL FEM LENS FOR GLACIOLOGY
http://phg.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/08/0309132515623368.long#sec-7
A critical but overlooked aspect of the human dimensions of glaciers and global
change research is the relationship between gender and glaciers. While there has
been relatively little research on gender and global environmental change in
general (Moosa and Tuana, 2014; Arora-Jonsson, 2011), there is even less from a
feminist perspective that focuses on gender (understood here not as a male/female
binary, but as a range of personal and social possibilities) and also on power,
justice, inequality, and knowledge production in the context of ice, glacier change,
and glaciology (exceptions are Bloom et al., 2008; Williams and Golovnev,
2015; Hevly, 1996; Hulbe et al., 2010; Cruikshank, 2005). Feminist theories and
critical epistemologies especially feminist political ecology and feminist
postcolonial science studies open up new perspectives and analyses of the history
of glaciological knowledge. Researchers in feminist political ecology and feminist
geography (e.g. Sultana, 2014; Mollett and Faria, 2013; Elmhirst, 2011; Coddington,
2015) have also called for studies to move beyond gender, to include analyses of
power, justice, and knowledge production as well as to unsettle and challenge
dominant assumptions that are often embedded in Eurocentric knowledges (Harris,
2015: xx). Given the prominent place of glaciers both within the social imaginary of
climate change and in global environmental change research, a feminist approach
has important present-day relevance for understanding the dynamic relationship
between people and ice what Nsser and Baghel (2015) refer to as the cryoscape.
Through a review and synthesis of a multi-disciplinary and wide-ranging literature
on human-ice relations, this paper proposes a feminist glaciology framework to
analyze human-glacier dynamics, glacier narratives and discourse, and claims to
credibility and authority of glaciological knowledge through the lens of feminist
studies. As a point of departure, we use glaciology in an encompassing sense that
exceeds the immediate scientific meanings of the label, much as feminist critiques
of geography, for example, have expanded what it is that geography might mean
vis--vis geographic knowledge (Domosh, 1991; Rose, 1993). As such, feminist
glaciology has four aspects: (1)knowledge producers, to decipher how gender
affects the individuals producing glacier-related knowledges; (2) gendered science
and knowledge, to address how glacier science, perceptions, and claims to
credibility are gendered; (3) systems of scientific domination, to analyze how power,
domination, colonialism, and control undergirded by and coincident with
masculinist ideologies have shaped glacier-related sciences and knowledges over
time; and (4) alternative representations, to illustrate diverse methods and ways
beyond the natural sciences and including what we refer to as folk glaciologies to
portray glaciers and integrate counter-narratives into broader conceptions of the
cryosphere. These four components of feminist glaciology not only help to critically
uncover the under-examined history of glaciological knowledge and glacier-related
sciences prominent in todays climate change discussions. The framework also has
important implications for understanding vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience
all central themes in global environmental change research and decision-making
that have lacked such robust analysis of epistemologies and knowledge production
(Conway et al., 2014; Castree et al., 2014).
FEM LENS KEY TO INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO GLACIOLOGY

Feminist glaciology asks how knowledge related to glaciers is produced, circulated,

and gains credibility and authority across time and space. It simultaneously brings
to the forefront glacier knowledge that has been marginalized or deemed outside
of traditional glaciology. It asks how glaciers came to be meaningful and significant
(through what ontological and epistemological process), as well as trying to
destabilize underlying assumptions about ice and environment through the
dismantling of a host of boundaries and binaries. The feminist lens is crucial given
the historical marginalization of women, the importance of gender in glacier-related
knowledges, and the ways in which systems of colonialism, imperialism, and
patriarchy co-constituted gendered science. Additionally, the feminist perspective
seeks to uncover and embrace marginalized knowledges and alternative narratives,
which are increasingly needed for effective global environmental change research,
including glaciology (Castree et al., 2014; Hulme, 2011). A combination of feminist
postcolonial science studies and feminist political ecology provide the intellectual
foundation for feminist glaciology.
TRADITIONAL GLACIOLOGY IS ROOTED IN MASCULINITY AND

EPISTEMOLOGICALLY FALSE
Most existing glaciological research and hence discourse and discussions about
cryospheric change stems from information produced by men, about men, with
manly characteristics, and within masculinist discourses. These characteristics
apply to scientific disciplines beyond glaciology; there is an explicit need to uncover
the role of women in the history of science and technology, while also exposing
processes for excluding women from science and technology (Phillips and Phillips,
2010; Domosh, 1991; Rose, 1993). Harding (2009) explains that the absence of
women in science critically shapes the selection of scientific problems, hypotheses
to be tested, what constituted relevant data to be collected, how it was collected
and interpreted, the dissemination and consequences of the results of research, and
who was credited with the scientific and technological work (Harding, 2009: 408).
Scientific studies themselves can also be gendered, especially when credibility is

attributed to research produced through typically masculinist activities or manly
characteristics, such as heroism, risk, conquests, strength, self-sufficiency, and
exploration (Terrall, 1998). The tendency to exclude women and emphasize
masculinity thus has far-reaching effects on science and knowledge, including
glaciology and glacier-related knowledges.
OUR LENS IS INTERSECTIONAL

Feminist glaciology is rooted in, and combines, both feminist science studies and
postcolonial science studies to meaningfully shift present-day glacier and ice
sciences. While feminist science studies focuses explicitly on gender and the place
(or absence) of women in science, it can neglect specific analyses of the social
relations of colonialism and imperialism, emphasizing instead Western women
without sustained attention to indigenous, non-Western, and local knowledge
systems that are the centerpiece of postcolonial science studies (Harding,
2009; Phillips and Phillips, 2010;Schnabel, 2014). The postcolonial perspective is
crucial for understanding glaciological knowledges because the science of
glaciology has historically participated in the imperialist, colonial, and capitalist
projects associated with polar exploration, mountain colonization, resource
extraction, and Cold War and other geopolitical endeavors.
CURRENT KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IS INCOMPLETE AND

OPPRESSIVE
More recently, glaciology has also been central to earth systems science that often
relies on remote sensing from satellite imagery to suggest broader claims of
objectivity but is actually akin to the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere
(Haraway, 1988: 581; also see Shapin, 1998). Questions about epistemology in
climate science, ice coring, and glaciology are only beginning to be asked,
especially focusing on Cold War polar glaciology (Martin-Nielsen,
2012, 2013; Elzinga, 2009; Korsmo, 2010; Naylor et al., 2008; Turchetti et al.,
2008; Macdougall, 2004; Finnegan, 2004; Heymann et al., 2010; Bowen,
2005; Hulme, 2010). Of these studies probing the discipline of glaciology, only a tiny
subset analyze gender (exceptions include Bloom, 1993; Bloom et al., 2008; Hulbe
et al., 2010; Hevly, 1996) or approach human-glacier interactions from the
perspective of feminist postcolonial science studies or feminist political ecology
(exceptions include Williams and Golovnev, 2015; Cruikshank, 2005). Fewer still
recognize indigenous knowledges, local perspectives, or alternative narratives of
glaciers, even though large populations of non-Western and indigenous peoples
inhabit mountain and cold regions near glaciers and possess important knowledge
about cryoscapes (Carey et al., 2015; Nsser and Baghel, 2014; Drew, 2012).
TRADITIONAL GLACIOLOGY SILENCES THE OPPRESSED

An additional theoretical foundation for feminist glaciology is feminist political

ecology, which has generally emphasized unequal vulnerability and
disproportionate global change impacts, but which also contributes significant
research on knowledge production, ontologies, and epistemologies. With hundreds
of millions of people utilizing glaciers for everything from drinking water and
hydroelectricity to recreation and spiritual sites, the disproportionate vulnerabilities
and disparate adaptive capacities in these societies are critical to acknowledge.
Feminist political ecology addresses how inequality and unequal power relations
mediated and co-constituted through gender dynamics have silenced the
knowledge of people most affected and marginalized by neoliberal, colonial, and
patriarchal systems (Hanson and Buechler, 2015: 6).
UNEXAMINED GLACIOLOGY IS STEEPED IN TRADITIONAL

MASCULINITY
Since the origins of the field of glaciology in the 19th century, the discipline has
been dominated by men and masculinity. Glaciology, polar exploration, and
mountaineering profoundly interconnected pursuits have also been
characterized by masculinist discourses that privileged manly exertion, heroism,
and conquest (Chisholm, 2008;Schrepfer, 2005; Bloom, 1993; Brown, 2002). In polar
sciences and Antarctica in particular, women were marginalized and absent until at
least the mid-20th century (Pyne, 1986; Fogg, 1992), while a white, masculinist
narrative emerged instead (Bloom, 1993; Bloom et al., 2008; Lewander, 2009).
Women, if mentioned at all, were often cast as mens curiosities or companions, as
wives or helpers (Hulbe et al., 2010). Their appearance was almost always
incidental to the aims of men and the male ship captains, expedition leaders, and
government officials. As just one example, Louise Sguin sailed secretly on Captain
Yves Joseph de Kerguelens 1773 voyage to the Antarctic region (Lewander, 2009:
92). She made scientific observations and discoveries but, at first, hid from public
visibility. Subsequent publicity about her presence tarnished Kerguelens reputation
and contributions, thereby demonstrating not only how womens roles and activities
have been eclipsed but also how discovery and exploration were supposed to be
mens terrain. National exploration, scientific practices, and patriarchy all resulted in
the exclusion of women and the restriction of glaciological (and other) knowledge.
MASCULINE GLACIOLOGY PERPETUATES SEXISM AND

OPPRESSION IN THE SCIENCES
Measuring womens involvement by tracking their published literature or other

similar metrics risks recognizing women in glaciology only if they behave like men
or do the things that men do, such as earning a PhD in a university where men hold
the majority of leadership and faculty positions, or publishing in peer-reviewed
journals often managed by men. It also ignores the preponderance of sexual
harassment and sexual assault by field scientists in other disciplines, especially at
early career stages. Clancy et al. (2014) sampled 666 researchers in other science
fields to find that 64 percent of women reported they had experienced sexual
harassment, while more than 20 percent revealed they had experienced sexual
assault. Women were 3.5 times more likely to experience harassment than men,
indicating its gendered nature. While the Clancy et al. (2014) study is not about
glaciology field work or the experiences of female glaciologists per se, it illuminates
trends in these other fieldwork-focused disciplines to suggest that analyzing only
the numbers of participating women in glaciology may obscure many other aspects
of gender discrimination in glaciology.
NON-WESTERN, NON-TRADITIONAL METHODOLOGIES OF

GLACIOLOGY ARE NOT ANY BETTER
Local, non-Western, and indigenous societies are often no more egalitarian than
scientific disciplines such as glaciology, and thus they, too, experience differential
representation in the production of environmental knowledges (Cochrane,
2014). Klein et al. (2014) report in their study of Tibetan herders understandings
and observations of climate change, for example, that bias and inequality exist in
those communities in Nagchu Prefecture. It was not possible to achieve gender
balance in their interviews, for instance, because women repeatedly refused to be
interviewed, citing their own lack of knowledge and illustrating how dominant
perceptions of glaciology can emerge, which may in some cases suppress
alternative knowledges. Women often do possess different knowledge about glaciers
due to many issues, such as: spending more time than men attending to livestock
near Andean glaciers (Dunbar and Medina Marcos, 2012); managing agriculture,
terracing, and irrigation that includes the distribution of glacier runoff in highland
Peruvian communities (Bolin, 2009); being responsible for mobility, storage, and
shelter amidst changes to snowfall and other cryospheric changes on the Tibetan
Plateau (Yeh et al., 2014); expressing water supplies in the Ganges River through
spiritual frameworks that contradict hydrologic models (Drew, 2012); and
responding to diminishing water supplies in Tajikistan mountains with more efficient
water use practices, as opposed to mens reactions to emigrate from their
communities (Christmann and Aw-Hassan, 2015). Nevertheless, it is critical to avoid
objectifying womens vulnerability, clinging to a sharp male-female binary, or
portraying women as passive victims. After all, climate change can lead to the
breakdown of stereotypical gender roles and even gender renegotiation (Godden,
2013). Moreover, the romanticization of womens environmental sensibilities or the
over-classification of women as poverty-stricken and marginalized in local
communities can render them passive; such representations often privilege
environmental forces such as climate, glaciers, drought, or hydrology acting on

women, without sufficient analysis of power relations and inequalities that more
profoundly affect vulnerability and knowledge disparities (Arora-Jonsson, 2011).
DIVERSITY OF METHODOLOGY KEY

One way to diversify knowledge production and collect environmental knowledge
from local women is through emerging methodologies, such as locally-led
indigenous ethnographic video (audio-visual storytelling) among women in the
Pamir Mountains of Tajikistan (Williams and Golovnev, 2015). This projects goal was
to examine how local indigenous assessments of climate change and glacier
shrinkage corresponded with scientific, governmental, and NGO conclusions. Team
leaders specifically sought womens voices and contributions after recognizing that
women generally did not hold public positions of authority. Ultimately the video
production process not only involved local women in three communities, but also
went beyond participation to achieve active collaboration in both the video creation
and the collection of climate- and glacier-related knowledge. Knowledge about
changing climatic conditions and glaciers varied among the women involved, with
one participant appreciating the warmer weather at high elevation, another
lamenting the loss of a glacial lake for its hydrologic impacts, and another who
inhabited an urban area being largely unfamiliar with nearby environmental
changes. Including these divergent local voices and perspectives diversifies (and
localizes) the information produced in national climate assessments and
underscores the disconnect between local womens knowledge and Western
scientific conclusions expressed in the IPCC and elsewhere. Williams and Golovnev
believe this is vital to illustrate, given the ways in which policy is too often based
solely on Western science. The Western climate science-to-policy paradigm, they
conclude, paralyzes public agency through elitist mechanistic science, marketdriven governance decisions, and globally dominant consumer skewed media
network products. This approach to environmental governance is oppressive for
peoples with different cultural configurations (Williams and Golovnev, 2015: 220).
Involving local indigenous women or any marginalized groups facilitates equality
and self-determination while simultaneously producing more equitable discussions
about the cryoscape, climate, and global environmental change.
EVERYTHING ABOUT YOUR GLACIOLOGY LINKS

METHODOLOGY, RHETORIC, OUTCOMES, AND CONTROL
OBSESSION
The history of glaciology is not simply about the ubiquity of men and the absence
and/or erasure of women. It is also about how scientific practices and results are
gendered. Many natural science fields have historically been defined by, and their
credibility built upon, manly attributes such as heroic (often nationalistic)
exploration and triumphs over hostile, wild, and remote landscapes (Terrall, 1998).
Feminist science studies began critiquing the gendered dimensions of
environmental knowledge several decades ago (Merchant, 1980; Plumwood,
1993; Haraway, 1988). These scholars and others since (e.g. Buck et al., 2014) have
argued that the Baconian view of knowledge engendered a strong tendency in the
environmental sciences to classify, measure, map, and, ideally, dominate and
control nonhuman nature as if it were a knowable and predictable machine, rather
than dynamic, chaotic, unpredictable, and coupled natural-human systems. Such
feminist critiques apply today to glaciology, climate sciences, and global
environmental change research more broadly. Terry (2009: 6), for example, argues
that climate discourse is still a stereotypically masculine one, of new
technologies, large-scale economic instruments, and complex computer modeling,
which for glaciers can render them static, essentialized, and passive (also
see Moosa and Tuana, 2014).
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION LINKS
Fleming (2010) finds a similar story of domination in the climate sciences, in which
20th-century scientists and engineers used cloud seeding and other geoengineering
strategies to manipulate weather, steer storms, and make rain. Technoscientific
control is a dominant trope in climate change discourse and knowledge, and it is by
nature highly gendered (Israel and Sachs, 2013). Much geographical fieldwork
involves this masculinist reflexivity generating supposed objectivity through
distance from and disinterest in the subject (Coddington, 2015; Sundberg, 2003).
These conclusions transcend gendered dimensions of knowledge by acknowledging
broader trends in Western sciences that have sought to place science at a god-like
vantage from nowhere, ignoring both situated knowledges and the geography of
science (Haraway, 1988; Shapin, 1998; Livingstone, 2003).
TRADITIONAL GLACIOLOGY IS ABLEIST

Thompson and Balogs work is impressive to be sure because collecting the data
they gathered was no easy feat and they are yielding insights for science and
climate change impacts. But read alongside older heroic scientific narratives, the
masculinist attributions ascribed to this type of field science remain prevalent over
three centuries. To be credible, glaciologists, according to most commentators, still
need to be experienced mountain climbers to overcome high altitude, limited
oxygen, cold temperatures, circumscribed logistical support, and overall rugged
working conditions. As Savage (2015: 396) reports in the journal Nature, Young
scientists who are considering a career in ice-core palaeoclimatology ought to have
some experience with climbing, says Doug Hardy of the University of Massachusetts
Amherst, if only to know whether or not they can handle it. While Savage
recognizes that those without the inclination or the ability to climb glaciers can
find other positions in glaciology, such as computer modeling, the articles subheadline (Climb any mountain: Glaciology is an outdoors game) certainly does not
celebrate these indoor desk jobs. Nor does such a depiction consider class barriers
for entry into the field, such as the high costs of acquiring and maintaining
necessary alpine skills. Alternative knowledges and practices are marginalized in
this sustained masculinist atmosphere, restricting scientific questions asked,
practitioners involved, methods employed, sites studied, and results achieved.
YOUR CLIMATE CHANGE NARRATIVE PRIVILEGES RICH,

EUROCENTRIC NARRATIVES
Feminist glaciology builds on feminist postcolonial science studies and feminist
political ecology to understand how gender, power, and inequality are embedded in
systems of scientific domination (Schiebinger, 2014). Such power structures
maintain glaciology as a discipline concentrated in the wealthy developed world,
often termed the Global North, with generally weak institutional representation from
the developing world or indigenous communities. This pattern exists for global
climate simulations in general, which are conducted by European and North
American scientists with little to no representation from Central and South America,
Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia (Edwards, 2011). The feminist lens is crucial
for effective analysis of what might look on the surface like postcolonial or
hegemonic structures of development. But global power imbalances and gender
inequality co-constitute each other and the natural sciences and glaciology in
particular. Current climate change discussions, for example, perpetuate power
discrepancies through what Israel and Sachs (2013: 345) refer to as the centrality
of mathematical and technological sciencestructured by masculinist ideologies of
domination and mastery, thus determining who can or cannot participate in climate
science and policy-making. Such institutional, cultural, and scientific practices also
affect glaciological knowledge. While there are, on paper, few recognized
glaciologists from the Global South (for exceptions see Carey, 2010), such
recognition is predicated upon a specific type of knowledge production that is
restricted to a group of scientists who often cannot be divorced from larger
processes of colonialism, imperialism, patriarchy, and capitalist resource extraction.
YOUR GLACIOLOGY EXCLUDES NON-WESTERN FORMS OF

KNOWLEDGE
Questions of who produces glaciological knowledge, and how such knowledge is
used or shared, take on real implications when considered through feminist
postcolonial science studies and feminist political ecology lenses. Specifically, the
feminist approach opens up marginalized knowledge and exposes how larger
structures of domination have worked historically to suppress certain voices. It
reveals how people across the planet have been living with glaciers for centuries
and have produced wide ranges of glaciological knowledge folk glaciology that is
rarely recognized within the scientific discipline of modern glaciology. We use the
term folk glaciology to refer to significant glacier-oriented knowledges produced at
different times and places by diverse peoples, cultures, and social groups.
EXAMPLE OF THE ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY

For instance, in Canadas Yukon Territory, glacier knowledge of elder indigenous
women has both a gendered context and offers alternative visions of ice compared
to Western sciences. Cruikshank (2005) explains for Northwest North America that
knowledge of the landscape is influenced profoundly by culture, gender, age, and
the personal experiences of each individual living with glaciers. Additionally,
whereas glaciologists may try to measure glaciers and understand ice physics by
studying the glacial ice itself, indigenous accounts do not portray the ice as passive,
to be measured and mastered in a stereotypically masculinist sense. The glaciers
these women speak of, explains Cruikshank (2005: 513), engage all the senses.
[The glaciers] are willful, capricious, easily excited by human intemperance, but
equally placated by quick-witted human responses. Proper behavior is deferential. I
was warned, for instance, about firm taboos against cooking with grease near
glaciers that are offended by such smells.Cooked food, especially fat, might grow
into a glacier overnight if improperly handled. The narratives Cruikshank collected
show how humans and nature are intimately linked, and subsequently demonstrate
the capacity of folk glaciologies to diversify the field of glaciology and subvert the
hegemony of natural sciences.
TRADITIONAL GLACIOLOGY FURTHERS IMPERIALISM AND

COLONIZATION
While folk glaciologies were often marginalized through Western colonialism, the
discipline of glaciology experienced growth and support as a result of European and
US imperialism and geopolitical expansion already highly gendered projects in
themselves (Cohn, 1987; Levine, 2007; Woollacott, 2006) in turn helping to
materially and discursively undergird those projects. The United States, for
example, had an overwhelmingly militarized relationship with the polar regions in
the early Cold War period, from which glaciology benefitted immensely, gaining
institutional resources, growth, standing, and credibility. The US Antarctic operations
Highjump and Windmill in the late 1940s were intended to prepare the military for
conflicts in cold regions, in the process constituting, for US scientists especially, a
regionally-expansive and technologically-driven domination of the south polar
region (Belanger, 2006; Rose, 1980).
The US had a similarly militarized relationship with the Arctic (Farish, 2013; MartinNielsen, 2012, 2013). In 1949, US Air Force Lt. Col. Emil Beaudry convinced his
superiors that, as Greenland was likely to be the avenue of approach for untold
destruction, [and] unless guarded could well spell doom for the United States as a
nation, whichever country was able to completely master [Greenland] would
possess a new weapon that could not be countered or molested (quoted in MartinNielsen, 2012: 6971). Mastering and defending Greenland, however, required
mastering its ice sheet, and new glaciological knowledge was only possible with the
resources available to the US military. In 1949 Henri Bader, the chief scientist for the
US governments Snow, Ice and Permafrost Research Establishment (SIPRE),
complained that, while there was general knowledge of the location and easilydiscernible characteristics of glaciers, more complex and sophisticated knowledge
of their physical processes was poor (Bader, 1949: 1309). The substantial growth of
glaciology in subsequent decades relied, to an important degree, on these military
demands. This militarization of the polar regions and the intellectual and
institutional growth of glaciology were part of broader US geopolitical visions and
strategies during the Cold War, which were pursued by a particular group of men as
policy-makers who were products of specific elite masculinities (Dean, 2003),
operating in the context of anxieties about American masculinities (Cuordileone,
2005), and with particular discourses of masculinity and male bodies, especially in
distant places like the Arctic (Farish, 2010).
DEFENDING ICE CORE DRILLING REIFIES GENDERED VIOLENCE

Structures of power and domination also stimulated the first large-scale ice core
drilling projects these archetypal masculinist projects to literally penetrate glaciers
and extract for measurement and exploitation the ice in Greenland and Antarctica.
These ice cores, which have revealed glacial-interglacial cycles and validated
trajectories of both climate change and anthropogenic warming, also began as part
of American and Soviet Cold War geostrategic projections into the polar regions. The
first ice core from Camp Century in Greenland emerged from a drilling program
begun in 1959, even before Willi Dansgaard introduced a method of isotope analysis
for paleoclimates. Ice coring, in other words, began with a military purpose but
eventually found a scientific function (Martin-Nielsen, 2013). The even longer ice
cores from Vostok in the center of the East Antarctic ice sheet began with similar
geostrategic motives: the Soviet Union was trying to exert its control of Antarctica
by establishing the Vostok Station at the pole of relative inaccessibility the
furthest point from the sea in Antarctica. Ice core drilling at Vostok began in the late
1950s, and by the 1980s the core offered a longer climatic record than the first
Camp Century core and clearly demonstrated the links between carbon dioxide
levels and past temperatures (Ueda and Talalay, 2007; Turchetti et al., 2008). These
ice cores were born in the contest for scientific authority and geostrategic control of
the polar regions, manifesting the centrality of power, conquest, and national
security in the history of glaciological knowledge.
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SECURITY THREAT LINKS

The military and geopolitical dimensions of glaciers persist today, albeit in different
forms that illustrate the importance of feminist glaciology extending beyond
gender to other aspects of inequality, power-knowledge dynamics, and imperialism.
In official US discourse, retreating glaciers are framed as threats to national security
and international stability, and therefore knowledge of ice is essential to
maintaining geopolitical power. Retreating glaciers rank with drought, flooding, sea
level rise, and epidemics as critical threats to US national security. Former CIA
director R. James Woolsey explained when he testified before the US House of
Representatives in February 2009 that:One of the fastest set [sic] of melting glaciers
is apparently in the Andes, and if we think we have trouble coming up with a sound
and agreed-upon immigration policy for the United States now, what is it going to
be like if our southern borders are seeing millions of our hungry and thirsty southern
neighbors headed toward temperate climates?For Woolsey, US national security
hinges on increased knowledge of glaciers, much as it was integral to Canadian and
US expansion into the Yukon and Alaska in the 19th century, as well as to Soviet and
US strategists in the early Cold War years. Systems of domination and structures of
power and patriarchy have long fed the production of glaciological knowledge.
YOUR METHODOLOGY SILENCES WE EXPAND ROOM FOR

OTHER VOICES
If the intersecting forces of colonialism, neoliberalism, and patriarchy have
historically silenced and marginalized certain ways of knowing and types of
knowledge produced by particular groups, such as women or indigenous people,
then feminist glaciology drawing from feminist political ecology and feminist
postcolonial science studies seeks to expose those more-than-science voices and
offer a diversity of representations of cryoscapes. Researchers across a range of
disciplines have increasingly advocated for greater plurality in knowledge about and
representations of global environmental change. Castree et al. (2014: 765), for
example, contend thatother forms of knowledge, discourse and understanding
[beyond natural sciences] must be properly acknowledged, precisely because they
both affect, and are affected by, science and technology. These forms range beyond
the cognitive to encompass the moral, spiritual, aesthetic and affective.These calls
align with those of feminist political ecology and feminist postcolonial science
studies that seek to unsettle dominant Western assumptions, narratives, and
representations which tend to privilege the natural sciences and often emerge
through the co-constituted processes of colonialism, patriarchy, and unequal power
relations (Harding, 2009). Dominant narratives can erase local, regional, and even
national variation and the diversity of perspectives, including those of women and
other marginalized peoples (Israel and Sachs, 2013). Feminist political ecologists
have thus sought to use innovative research methods such as storytelling,
narrative, literature, and the visual arts to go beyond gender to find new voices
discussing and representing global environmental change (Harris, 2015; Mollett and
Faria, 2013; Coddington, 2015: 215). Feminist glaciology promotes alternative
glacier representations (which include folk glaciologies) and calls for
transdisciplinary knowledge integration and methodology, which is crucial for
putting glacier knowledges into their human contexts (Hewitt, 2014a).
ENACTING ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES

In contrast to trends in masculinist glaciology, one example of alternative glacier
representations includes glacier-oriented visual and literary arts, which are
particularly illustrative of how ice may be meaningful and significant beyond
common efforts of control and domination. Visual and literary arts re-position and
re-envision glaciers as greater than their usual status as passive research subjects
and into various cultural fields comprised of social myths, images, characters,
performances, and artworks. Artists including Resa Blatman, Zaria Forman, Camille
Seaman, Spencer Tunick, Claudia Mrzendorfer, and Joan Perlman articulate new
narratives of human-glacier relationships by approaching ice through feeling and
affect, emotional response, sense of place, the personal and the intimate, kinship
and family rather than through the attributes and characteristics of the dominant,
masculinist scientific glaciology often characterized by control, prediction, ice
penetration, measurement, and quantification. Many of the examples below from
the visual and literary arts veer away from the more typical, masculinist
representations of glaciers by offering alternative gendered ice depictions.
OBJECTIVITY IS A LINK
Ice is not just ice. The dominant way Western societies understand it through the
science of glaciology is not a neutral representation of nature. The feminist
glaciology framework draws attention to those who dominate and frame the
production of glaciological knowledge, the gendered discourses of science and
knowledge, and the ways in which colonial, military, and geopolitical domination coconstitute glaciological knowledge. Even in a globalized age where the place of
women and indigenous people has improved markedly in some parts of the world,
masculinist discourses continue to dominate, in subtle and determinative ways.
Feminist glaciology advocates for a shift of preoccupations in research, policy, and
public perceptions from the physical and seemingly natural, to a broader
consideration of cryoscapes, the human, and the insights and potentials of
alternative ice narratives and folk glaciologies.
ALTERNATIVE SPILLS OVER INTO LARGER ECOLOGY AND SOLVES

BETTER
The call for a feminist glaciology is not limited to ice and glaciers, but is a larger
intervention into global environmental change (and especially climate change)
research and policy. As international negotiations remain stalled and governmental
commitments to change and reform are fitful and seemingly ineffectual, those
studying environmental change and aware of its significant effects and dangerous
potentials continue to search for ways of stemming the tides of change as well as
forming just and equitable global structures for addressing it. The feminist
glaciology framework articulates with these larger quests in at least two ways. First,
it repeats the demands for increased presence of humanities and social science
perspectives in global environmental change research, policy, and broader public
discourse. Many humanities and social science disciplines and sub-disciplines have
given significant attention to these issues, but there remain boundaries between
these analyses and those considered central to the environmental change question.
The natural sciences that drive and undergird environmental change policy are
often asked by decision-makers and the media to speak for society or frame
research and policy questions for humanity. But the natural sciences are not
equipped to understand the complexities and potentialities of human societies, or to
recognize the ways in which science and knowledge have historically been linked to
imperial and hegemonic capitalist agendas. Feminist glaciology participates in this
broader movement by suggesting richer conceptions of human-environment
relations, and highlighting the disempowering and forestalling qualities of an
unexamined and totalizing science.
NOT ENOUGH JUST TO SHOW DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS NEED TO

INTERROGATE METHODOLOGY
Second, we reiterate the need not only to appreciate the differential impacts of
environmental change on different groups of people men and women, rich and
poor, North and South but to understand how the science that guides attempted
solutions may in fact perpetuate differences because they are, essentially, built on
and draw their epistemic power from differentiation and marginalization. Struggles
over authority and legitimacy play out in many obvious ways in climate change
negotiations. Struggles also happen in less obvious ways, such as in the
environmental change research underpinning climate politics. Analysts and
practitioners must recognize the ways in which more-than-scientific, non-Western,
non-masculinist modes of knowledge, thinking, and action are marginalized. The
response to simplistic ice is just ice discourse is not merely to foreground or single
out women and their experiences that would simply perpetuate binaries and
boundaries and ignore deeper foundations. Rather, it is a larger integration of
human approaches and sensibilities with the existing dominant physical sciences.
Global environmental change research must pluralize its ontologies, epistemologies,

and sensibilities. Though there is ever-increasing evidence to guarantee future
temperature increases, what remains uncertain are the human structures and ideas
mobilized to cope with environmental changes as well as to forestall potentially
worse outcomes. If we constitute glaciological and global environmental change
research differently, we can constitute our future, our gender relations, and our
international political economic relations more justly and equitably.
Politics
TUMP ELECTION BAD MODERATE RISK HIGH IMPACT
Moderate probability, High impact; Risk intensity = 12
The businessman and political novice, Donald Trump, has built a strong lead in the
Republican party primary, and looks the firm favourite to be the party's candidate in
the US presidential election in November.
Analysis
Thus far Mr Trump has given very few details of his policies - and these tend to be
prone to constant revision - but a few themes have become apparent. First, he has
been exceptionally hostile towards free trade, including notably NAFTA, and has
repeatedly labelled China as a "currency manipulator". He has also taken an
exceptionally right-wing stance on the Middle East and jihadi terrorism, including,
among other things, advocating the killing of families of terrorists and launching a
land incursion into Syria to wipe out IS (and acquire its oil). In the event of a Trump
victory, his hostile attitude to free trade, and alienation of Mexico and China in
particular, could escalate rapidly into a trade war - and at the least scupper the
Trans-Pacific Partnership between the US and 11 other American and Asian states
signed in February 2016. His militaristic tendencies towards the Middle East (and
ban on all Muslim travel to the US) would be a potent recruitment tool for jihadi
groups, increasing their threat both within the region and beyond.
Conclusion
Although we do not expect Mr Trump to defeat his most likely Democratic
contender, Hillary Clinton, there are risks to this forecast, especially in the event of
a terrorist attack on US soil or a sudden economic downturn. It is worth noting that
the innate hostility within the Republican hierarchy towards Mr Trump, combined
with the inevitable virulent Democratic opposition, will see many of his more radical
policies blocked in Congress - albeit such internal bickering will also undermine the
coherence of domestic and foreign policymaking.
POLICY TOWARDS CHINA NOT PERCEIVED

http://www.johnfeffer.com/east-asia-is-invisible/
Americans dont care about East Asia.

Thats a strong statement. So, let me make a few qualifications. First, Americans
love Chinese, Japanese, and (increasingly) Korean food. They like to visit East Asia.
They will, on occasion, watch a Hong Kong action film or the latest from Park ChanWook.
But when it comes to the pressing issues of the day, most Americans simply dont
follow whats going on in East Asia. Im not talking here about Asia experts, who are
essentially paid to follow the news. Im also not talking about diaspora communities
interested in whats going on in their home countries.
Im talking about average Americans. And Im talking about what they see on
network news.
According to the latest Tyndall Report, which annually tracks coverage of the news
by the three major television networks, East Asia is invisible to the American viewer.
No stories from the region cracked the top 20 news items. When it comes to foreign
policy, the network news focused in 2015 on the Islamic State, the wars in Syria and
Iraq, the refugee crisis in Europe, the terrorism attacks in Paris, and the nuclear
negotiations with Iran. The top stories did not include China, Japan, or Korea.
Foreign policy stories made up only 6.5 percent of the network news coverage
overall. So, Americans are not paying much attention to foreign policy in general.
But even within that narrow share of the news, East Asia rarely appears. When you
look at an expanded list of stories from 2015, coverage of the region doesnt even
make it into the top 150 stories.
PLAN WILL NOT AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION

http://www.johnfeffer.com/east-asia-is-invisible/
Of course, East Asia is of interest to various niche consumers of the news who get
their information from Facebook or English-language versions of East Asian news
outlets. But East Asia is invisible when it comes to the mass market. And thats
where public opinion is formed.
CONTAINMENT MORE POPULAR THAN ENGAGEMENT

http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/3/219.full
Recently, negative images of China have come to dwarf the positive representation
of China as a strategic partner. The dominant discourse has been one of stoking fear
about the rise of China, particularly in the economic sphere, with Chinas growth
commonly being framed as a causeor, at the very least, a correlateof American
decline. There has been precious little attempt to build a domestic coalition in
favour of Chinas rise: economic and political groups with a stake in facilitating
Chinese economic growth are unorganized, lacking a coherent voice in US politics,
while those poised to make political hay out of so-called China bashing86do so
with impunity. As a result, congagement rests upon fragileand potentially volatile

domestic-political foundations, the containment (anti-China) elements of the
strategy perhaps resting upon firmer ground than the engagement (pro-China)
aspects.87
CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY TAKES A LOT OF POLITICAL

CAPITAL
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/3/219.full
The domestic-political foundations for ambitious foreign policies seldom exist by

chance. Instead, they must be put in place by assiduous foreign policymakers.
Those close to the foreign policy apparatus observe leaders to be involved in foreign
policymaking in at least three ways. First, elected leaders formally are responsible
for sanctioning (enacting) agreed upon policies and ordering and overseeing
(executing) their implementation. Secondly, leaders are often able to control the
process by which such policies are made, whether through exercising their formal
powers of office or through investing their (usually considerable) political capital in
ways such as agenda setting.28
PROTECTIONISM POPULAR
http://reason.com/archives/2016/03/25/china-trade-didnt-kill-americas-working
American politics aren't exactly immune to bouts of protectionism. A Bloomberg poll
has found that two-thirds of Americans, Republicans and Democrats, are four-square
behind ita sentiment that Bernie Sanders is exploiting on the left and Donald
Trump on the right.
But although free trade has always been a tough sell to the general public,
American economists across the political spectrum have long held firm that
globalization and trade liberalization are, on balance, a boon for the country. But
now this consensus may be fraying, with The New York Times' agent provocateur
Paul Krugman recently declaring that such thinking is "fundamentally dishonest"
elitist bunkum.
NON-UNIQUE CHINA BASHING HIGH
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/isolationism-making-comeback-13764
On the right, would-be Republican nominees seem to revel in making xenophobic
remarks, especially China-bashing (even arguing that the U.S. should go out of its
way to undermine the most important bilateral relationship in the world), and see
no problem with standing apart from the international community over the Iran
deal. Although Rand Paul is perhaps the only vocal proponent of a
more slender foreign policy, it is telling that even his purportedly hawkish
Republican colleagues have failed to stoplet alone reversethe huge cuts to the
military that have been imposed by sequestration.
ISOLATIONISM BECOMING MORE POPULAR AND BIPARTISAN

http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/isolationism-making-comeback-13764?
page=2
What is more, both liberal and conservative varieties of isolationism appear to be
increasingly popular with their respective electorates. That is, large slices of the
Democrat and Republican parties seem content to back nationalistic, protectionist,
and outright isolationist candidates for office. In this new political environment,
American preeminence in international affairs may well be nearing its expiration
date. It will take brave leaders to speak out in favor of internationalism once the
new normal is in favor of isolation and introspection. Of course, Americas
unipolar moment could never last forever (something that Krauthammer was
quick to acknowledge even as he coined the phrase), but its willing surrender
seemed unthinkable only years ago.
ELITES FAVOR INTERNATIONALISM
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/isolationism-making-comeback-13764
So far, however, Americas post-Cold War presidentsBush, Clinton, Bush and
Obama to a manhave been fortunate enough to govern during times when at
least a bare majority of the political elite have been in favor of broad
internationalism when it has counted most. Even if isolationism has triumphed on
occasion, the macro-level bias towards internationalism in U.S. foreign policy is not
dead yet. But the internationalist consensus is certainly weakening and there is
now a real risk that the United States is approaching a tipping point after which the
domestic balance will be in favor of isolationist tendencies.
China Legitimization
LEGITIMACY ON BRINK AND GETTING WORSE ECON
SLOWDOWN
SCS AGGRESSION PART OF LEGITIMIZATION PLAN

Chinese leaders are also demonstrating a new assertiveness on foreign policy
issues. That is partly because they recognize that their upper-middle-income status
and overall economic strength bring new capabilities; it is also because Beijing
wants to use foreign policy to shore up political support at home and support the
nations economic transition. For example, Beijings new Belt and Road initiative is
primarily an economic growth strategy. Chinese leaders hope to improve regional
economic integration and create new markets for Chinese products, thus giving the
Chinese economy new legs to stand on as it move through the transition phase. On
regional maritime issues, many Chinese scholars argue that their nation has too
long bided its time and watched other nations make territorial gains at Chinas
expense. They believe that since China now has the capabilities to push back and
assert its territorial claims, Beijing has a responsibility to do so.
CCP IS IN A BAD PLACE MULTIPLE WARRANTS
Unfortunately for proponents of the theory of authoritarian resilience, their

assumptions, evidence, and conclusions have become harder to defend in light of
recent developments in China. Signs of intense elite power struggle, endemic
corruption, loss of economic dynamism, and an assertive, high-risk foreign policy
are all in evidence. As a result, even some of the scholars whose research has been
associated with the authoritarian resilience thesis of have been forced to
reconsider.2 It has become increasingly clear that the recent developments that
have changed perceptions of the CPCs durability are not cyclical but structural.
They are symptomatic of the exhaustion of the regimes post-Tiananmen survival
strategy. Several critical pillars of this strategysuch as elite unity, performancebased legitimacy, co-optation of social elites, and strategic restraint in foreign policy
have either collapsed or become hollow, forcing the CPC to resort increasingly to
repression and appeals to nationalism to cling to power.
ELITES KEY TO STABILITY

Despite popular images of people power or the Arab Spring revolutions, the
single most important source of regime change in authoritarian regimes is the
collapse of the unity of the ruling elites. This development is caused principally by
the intensification of conflict among the ruling elites over the strategies of regime
survival and distribution of power and patronage. Experience from democratic
transitions since the mid-1970s shows that, as autocracies confront challenges from
social forces demanding political change, the most divisive issue among ruling elites
is whether to repress such forces through escalating violence or to accommodate
them through liberalization. Should reformers prevail, initial steps toward regime
transition, typified by relaxation of political and social control, will follow. If
hardliners win the fight, greater repressionbut also escalating social and political
conflictwill result, at least until the regime faces another crisis that forces it to
revisit the question of whether a repressive course is the best strategy.3 Another
familiar source of elite disunity is the conflict over the distribution of power and
hence the ambit of patronage networks. In more established autocracies, such as
post-totalitarian Leninist party-states, this conflict tends to arise when competition
for power leads to violations of long-established rules and norms that safeguard a
delicate balance of power among ruling elites and their physical security. In many if
not most casesand China is no exceptionsuch violations are committed on
behalf of family groupings, and hence represent the repatrimonialization of
politics.4
ELITES IN CHINA ARE FRACTURED DONT TRUST EACH OTHER
Three pillars supported this system. The first was a delicate balance of political
power at the top, commonly known as collective leadership, designed to prevent
the emergence of another Mao-like leader who could impose his will on the party.
Under this system, key policy decisions were made through a process of consensusbuilding and compromise, ensuring the protection of the interests of the senior
leaders and their factions. The second pillar was absolute personal security for top
leaders. One of the key lessons from the debacles of the Maoist era was that elite
unity is impossible without such security, because only untouchable rulers have the
capacity and credibility to negotiate with each other, strike deals, and resolve intraregime conflict. The third pillar was a system of sharing the spoils of economic
growth among the elites, mainly through large and sophisticated patronage
networks. To be sure, this system has caused pervasive corruption, but it also has
provided incentives for its elites to toil for the regime.
Today, less than three years after Xi ascended to the top, this system has been
shredded. The equivalent of a multipolar world at the top of the CPC regime is
now a unipolar system; the collective leadership has yielded to strongman rule
and a decision-making process dominated by Xi. Absolute personal security for the
top leaders, defined as sitting or retired members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, has also been shattered with the fall of Zhou Yongkang, a former
member of the committee and internal security chief who drew a life sentence in
2015 after his conviction on corruption charges. The anti-corruption drive and its
accompanying austerity measures have also put an end, at least temporarily, to the
practice of sharing spoils among elites, engendering their bitterness and reportedly
prompting them to engage in work stoppages as protest. While it is doubtful that
Xis war on corruption will actually root out corruption, it has succeeded in
destroying the post-Tiananmen incentive structure inside the regime.
On its own, the transformation of collective leadership into strongman rule may
not necessarily unravel Chinese Leninism. However, the clear initial outcome of this
transformation so far is the evaporation of elite unity, the glue that has held
together the post-Tiananmen system. Even though there are no overt signs of
challenge to Xis power within the CPC today, it is a safe bet that his rivals are
biding their time, waiting for the right moment to strike back.
DECREASED LEGITIMACY LEADS TO MORE AUTHORITARIANISM

However, trends since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012 suggest that repression
and nationalism are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the CPCs survival
strategy. An obvious explanation is that Chinas faltering economic growth is
creating social tensions and eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing the
regime to deter potential societal challenge with force and divert public attention
with nationalism. There is, however, an equally valid explanation that many
observers have overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on delivering

economic growth to maintain legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only
because economic growth cannot be guaranteed and ever-rising popular
expectations will be impossible to meet, but also because sustained economic
growth produces structural socioeconomic changes that, as demonstrated by social
science research and histories of democratic transitions, fatally threaten the
durability of autocratic rule.
OPPRESSION HIGH NOW

Judging by the policies and measures taken by the current CPC leadership, the party
seems intent on betting against history. In the past three years, the party has
greatly intensified repression. Among its most notable steps, the CPC has
aggressively tightened censorship of the internet, social media, and the press,
passed a national security law designed primarily to curtail non-governmental
organizations and ensure regime security, destroyed hundreds of church crosses to
restrict religious freedoms, strengthened ideological control on college campuses,
and arrested dozens of human rights lawyers and civic activists on trumped-up
charges. In many ways, the level of repression today is higher than any time since
the Tiananmen crackdown.
AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL NOT SUSTAINABLE
Manipulating nationalism and muscle-flexing may deliver short-term political
benefits, but only at the cost of the CPCs long-term security. One of the wisest
strategic choices made by Deng Xiaoping was to develop friendly ties with the U.S.led West to accelerate Chinas modernization program. In the post-Deng era, Xis
two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, also learned a key lesson from the
collapse of the Soviet Union: a strategic conflict with the United States would imperil
the very survival of the CPC. The costs of a new arms race would be unbearable,
and outright hostility in Sino-U.S. relations would destroy the bilateral economic
relationship.
It is unclear whether the CPC leadership understands the risks of its new and stillevolving survival strategy. If its members are convinced that only this strategy could
save CPC rule, now threatened by the collapse of the key pillars of the postTiananmen model, they are likely to continue on the present course. Ironically, such
a course, if the above analysis is right, is more certain to accelerate the CPCs
demise than to prevent it.
AUTHORITARIANISM BAD
If the CPC believes that escalating repression and nationalism will enable it to
maintain power during a period of elite disarray, deteriorating economic
performance, and heightened social tensions, it must consider the enormous risks
and costs of this new survival strategy. Besides taking China backwards, this
strategy is unsustainable and dangerous. Repression may work for a while, but
autocracies overly dependent on it must be prepared to escalate the use of violence
continuously and apply ever-more draconian measures to deter opposition forces.
Repression can also be bad for business, as rulers are forced to curtail information
flows and economic freedom to ensure regime security. (Indeed, Western firms are
already complaining about the inconveniences caused by the Great Firewall.)
Raising the level of repression when the economy is sinking into stagnation will
strain the CPCs resources because repression requires the maintenance of an
expensive network of informants, secret police, censors, and paramilitary forces.
Repression also incurs huge moral costs and could ignite a divisive debate inside
the regime. Lets put the question starkly: Is China really ready to become another
North Korea?
Topicality stuf
ENGAGEMENT INCLUDES SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/engagement-what-does-it-mean-for-publicdiplomacy/
When presenting statistics about social media activities undertaken by the State
Departments Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, Ambassador
Alberto Fernandez described the number of engagements the CSCCs digital
outreach team had made that year as in the thousands. Explaining what an
engagement is, Fernandez stated that engagements consist of written text posted
to online forums, Facebook, or the comments sections of media Web sites. So does
each post the CSCC makes in a forum count as an engagement? Does each post
on Facebook count as an engagement? If so, this appears to set a low bar for what
is considered engagement.
Rhino Ranch Af
Plan: The United States Federal Government should make a substantial amount of
its federal land available for lease to the Peoples Republic of China with the
condition that the land be used to sustainably raise and ranch rhinos to be used in
Chinese traditional medicine
CLIMATE IS HOSPITABLE JUST NEED U.S. TO ALLOW

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-rhino-texas-idUSKBN0O418P20150519
In the Texas grassland, home to white-tailed deer and rattlesnakes, outdoorsman
Charly Seale sees a vast sanctuary of open spaces that could be used to protect the
wild African rhino from its biggest enemy - poachers in search of the animals'
valuable horns.
Seale is part of an ambitious project organized by animal welfare groups in the
United States and African countries to bring hundreds of orphaned baby southern
white rhinos to the south Texas grasslands, whose climate and geography are
similar to their native South African veld.
That is if governments will let them and the Texans can afford a transportation bill
that could run tens of millions of dollars, all paid for by private donations.
RHINOS ARE KEYSTONE
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/articles/heres-what-might-happen-localecosystems-if-all-rhinos-disappear-180949896/?no-ist
Some large animals influence their surroundings more than others. Elephants are
known as ecosystem engineers for their tendency to push over trees and stomp
shrubby areas in the savannah into submission. This keeps forests at bay, which
otherwise would overtake open grasslands. Wolves, on the other hand, are apex
predators. They keep other species like deer in check, preventing herbivore
populations from getting out of hand and eating all the plants into oblivion. Both
elephants and wolves are keystone species, or ones that have a relatively large
impact on their environment in relation to their actual population numbers.
African rhinos, it turns out, also seem to be a keystone species. According to a
recent study published by Scandinavian and South African researchers in the Journal
of Ecology, rhinos maintain the diverse African grasslands on which countless other
species depend.
RHINOS KEY TO SAVANNAH ECOSYSTEM

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/articles/heres-what-might-happen-localecosystems-if-all-rhinos-disappear-180949896/?no-ist
The places where the fewest rhinos lived, they found, had 60 to 80 percent less
short grass cover than places where rhinos frequently hung out. "Short grass" is a
catch-all metric commonly used to approximate plant diversity in grassy areas
in Africa, referring to a number of munchable species. Rhino-inhabited areas also
had about 20 times more grazing lawns, or patches where specific grass species
grow that are prime eating for not only rhinos but also smaller grazing animals such
as zebra, gazelle and antelope.
Based on these findings, the authors think that the rhinos are probably playing a
role in controlling the make-up of the parks grasslands. Rhinos, like other grazing
species, selectively browse on certain grass species, which leaves room for others
that otherwise could not compete to move in and promotes a diverse mosaic of
edible plants. As a science writer for the University of Washington put it, "Think of
them less as lawnmowers and more as...selective lawnmowers."
Rhinos have only been around the park for a relatively short amount of time, so
future studies will have to confirm whether their presence leads to even more
substantial ecosystem changes. Examining other places in Africa will also help
confirm whether or not rhinos have the same influence wherever they go.
Rhinos are one of the few megaherbivoresplant-eaters that weigh more than
2,000 poundsthat still live in the world. Most others have long gone extinct, many
of which were victims to human hunting and expansion. Rhinos' continued
existence, however, is questionable. Poachers killed nearly 1,000 rhinos in South
Africa alone last yearan almost 50 percent increase from 2012so as things now
stand, rhinos may very likely go the way of so many other species before them.
If the rhinos do disappear from Africa, the authors warn, the savannah will likely
become a distinctly different placein addition to an emptier one.
RHINOS ON THE BRINK LEADS TO WORLD ECOSYSTEM

COLLAPSE
http://www.businessinsider.com/rhino-extinction-could-be-catastrophic-2014-10
One of the last northern white rhinos in the world died in Kenya this weekend,
leaving the species on the brink of extinction, with only six animals left.
While other species of rhinoceros, such as the southern white rhino, still roam, all
five species currently sit on the endangered list. If the entire population disappears
from the globe, the result could spell catastrophe for African savannas and
potentially the whole world.
SAVANNAHS KEY TO CARBON SINKING RHINOS KEY TO

SAVANNAH
http://www.businessinsider.com/rhino-extinction-could-be-catastrophic-2014-10
Aside from providing food for numerous species, grasslands, like the savannas,
serve an important global role, as well. They act as natural "carbon sinks"
essentially storage lockers for carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a cause of global
warming. Because of industrialization, Africa's carbon emissions will likely increase
substantially throughout the 21st century.
The savannas, where rhino live, are an important ecosystem, and it seems that
conservation of the species is essential to preserving them.
RHINO LOSS CRUSHES LOCAL STATES ECONOMIES

http://www.earthshare.org/2016/01/rhino.html
These ecosystem changes have a real human cost as well. The majority of black
rhinos live in South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Tourism is a significant
contributor to the economies of all these countries. In South Africathe lowest of
the fourit accounts for nearly 10 percent. In Namibia on the other end of the
spectrum, tourism comprises almost 15 percent of its GDP.
Tourism directly supports nearly 1 million jobs in these four countries. Indirectly, the
industry supports double that, including 19 percent of all jobs in Namibia, according
to data from the World Travel and Tourism Council.
Large fauna, including the black rhino, are a primary draw for the millions of tourists
that visit these countries. Losing these animals could stem the flow of tourists, not
only putting existing jobs at risk, but also potentially leaving these workers with less
environmentally-friendly job options.
TCM DRIVES THE MARKET AND MAKES INVESTING IN HORNS

VERY PROFITABLE
http://www.earthshare.org/2016/01/rhino.html
Just as the fate of the black rhino affects their local habitat, the rhinos themselves
are not insulated from people who may never set foot in Africa.
Rhino horn is a purportedly powerful ingredient in traditional medicine from
Malaysia to South Korea. Traditional Chinese medicine credits rhino horns with
curing fevers and improving function. International efforts to reduce demand for
rhino horn and curb poaching have worked to a degree in China, where the
ingredient was removed from the oeuvre of traditional medicine.
Today, some of the largest demand for rhino horns comes from Vietnam, where it
was rumored to have cured a politician of cancer in the 2000s. This rumor drove
demand so high that in 2013, at $300,000 per horn, rhino horn was literally worth
more than its weight in gold. Basic supply and demand tells us that the fewer rhinos
there are, the higher the price will go until theyre poached into extinction.
PLAN SOLVES STOPS EXTINCTION AND AVOIDS POACHING

http://www.myewa.org/rhino-project.cfm
South Africa is currently losing 3 or more rhinos per day to poaching, led by wellorganized crime syndicates. Funding from the illicit trade in rhino horn is also
apparently finding its way into the coffers of terrorist organizations. The EWA is in
the process of working out the details of an arrangement with South African
ranchers, which may culminate in the relocation of white rhino to the U.S. and more
specifically, to South Texas, where the rhinos would find safe haven, in the wild. This
ambitious initiative could be an important element of a multi-part strategy being
implemented by South Africa and Texas ranchers to combat the seemingly
inevitable extinction of the species, if left unchecked. By the admission of senior
officials involved in efforts to combat poaching in South Africa, the war is being lost.
If suitable terms could be agreed to by ranchers on both sides of the pond, and
assuming regulatory and legislative requirements can be complied with, Texas
ranchers could become part of a large-scale rhino relocation project, in a bid to save
the species. To find out more about the plight of rhinos in Africa and a novel
approach to saving them contact the EWA.
ONLY FARMING SOLVES POACHING RESTRICTIONS DONT
https://animalblawg.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/can-farming-rhinos-save-thespecies/
Kevin Charles Redmon poses an interesting thought: can farming the horns of
African rhinoceroses save the species? The horns of the rhinos are used throughout
the world, from dagger handles to medicine. Though the animals are endangered,
and protected underCITES, there is a lucrative black market business in poaching,
especially when the horns fetch $65,000 a kilo; demand for horn is inelastic and
growing, so a trade ban (which restricts supply) only drives up prices, making the
illicit good more valuableand giving poachers greater incentive to slaughter the
animal. Poachers arent overly concerned with the long-term extinction risks of
their prey. The focus is on the immediate value. Because the activity is illegal,
timing is of the essence, and its apparently easier to kill and harvest the rhinos
versus tranquilizing and waiting for them to go down. What if, Redmon wonders, we
were to harvest the horns (they re-grow over time) by placing rhinos in captivity,
guarding them well, and introducing a sustainable horn supply that doesnt kill the
rhinos?
Its not an easy question on either side. On one hand, it is hardly unheard of to take
a segment of an endangered species out of the wild to raise its numbers before
reintroducing a revitalized, or at least stable, population. In the United States we
have done this with the California Condor, the Bison, and the Grey Wolf, just to
name a few charismatic megafuana. On the other hand, this wouldnt be a strictly
preservation move. The rhinos would be farmed for their horns. While what Redmon
suggests is a long way from anything like a CAFO, its a step that likely makes many
activists and conservationists wary. CITES would also have to legalize this method of
horn harvesting, giving legitimacy to further animal exploitation. Rhinos would be
just another animal that exists at our whim and for our uses.
As hard as it may be to stomach, a main issue is that current enforcement of the
laws against poaching are not enough to discourage people from the business (even
thought World Wildlife Fund is taking a page from the Obama playbook of terrorism
deterrence). Supply and demand, as often is the case, are at the core. The focus has
(and remains) on limiting the demand. It would seem that there are at least 65,000
reasons why that approach is not as effective as it could be. If we cant control
demand, cant we try to control the supply? Dont both ends need to be addressed?
For those who seek to eliminate CAFOs, it isnt enough to promote vegetarian/vegan
habits. In the meantime, the supply must also be influenced, which is why you see
campaigns to end gestation crates and battery cages. Maybe legalized production
of rhino horns would help assuage the demand so that poaching would not be as
profitable, and would therefore be worth a more humane form for exploitation, even
if it isnt a utopian one. Maybe it would backfire and instead increase the worldwide
demand. Either way, we are running out of time to make a decision.
RHINO RANCHING SOLVES

http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.augsburg.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?
sid=9bb6fa99-3482-448a-86a0-cfcaff5226e3%40sessionmgr112&vid=1&hid=129
The models suggest that the species could be saved by a carefully controlled trade
in horn collected from rhinos that die naturally or harvested from live animals
without killing them. Money from this would fund increased antipoaching patrols and
create an income source for local people, deterring them from poaching.
PLAN SOLVES MAKES TONS OF MONEY FOR INVESTORS AND

SOLVES EXTINCTION BY DRIVING DOWN PRICES
and
southern
2007,
white
15
simum
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a
c2013.
k
(illegally
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a
n
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Africa.
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escalated
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to
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in
conducted
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economic
analysis
determine
to
whether
trade
in
southern
a
legal
white
horn
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rhinoceros
rhinoceros
Generalized
protection.
linear
were
used
models
examine
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the
drivers
of
on
data
1990
collected
2013,
project
and
the
to
total
number
rhinoceroses
of
likely
to
from
2023.
2014
to
population
Rhinoceros
dynamics
then
modeled
were
under
8
different
that
implemented
could
be
to
poaching.
control
We
also
the
economic
estimated
costs
and
enhanced
scenario
under
only
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and
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legal
horn
used
awith
framework
rank
the
to
scenarios
objective
of
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the
generating
while
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stakeholders.
local
southern
go
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<20
years
in
the
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present
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optimal
maintain
above
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provide
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increase
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onl
legalizing
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ar.
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We
believe
ban
35-year-old
products
should
lifted
unless
not
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money
from
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is
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population.
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protection
current
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to
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and
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a
in
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the
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cobi.12412/epdf
Between 1990 and 2007, 15 southern white (Ceratotherium simum

simum)andblack(Dicerosbicornis) rhinoceroses on average were killed illegally every
year in South Africa. Since 2007 illegal killingof southern white rhinoceros for their
horn has escalated to >950 individuals/year in 2013. We conductedan ecological
economic analysis to determine whether a legal trade in southern white rhinoceros
horn couldfacilitate rhinoceros protection. Generalized linear models were used to
examine the socioeconomic drivers ofpoaching, based on data collected from 1990
to 2013, and to project the total number of rhinoceroses likely tobe illegally killed
from 2014 to 2023. Rhinoceros population dynamics were then modeled under 8
differentpolicy scenarios that could be implemented to control poaching. We also
estimated the economic costs andbenefits of each scenario under enhanced
enforcement only and a legal trade in rhinoceros horn and used adecision support
framework to rank the scenarios with the objective of maintaining the rhinoceros
populationabove its current size while generating profit for local stakeholders. The
southern white rhinoceros populationwas predicted to go extinct in the wild <20
years under present management. The optimal scenario to maintainthe rhinoceros
population above its current size was to provide a medium increase in antipoaching
effort andto increase the monetary fine on conviction. Without legalizing the trade,
implementing such a scenario wouldrequire covering costs equal to approximately
$147,000,000/year. With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, theconservation
enterprise could potentially make a profit of $717,000,000/year. We believe the 35year-old banon rhinoceros horn products should not be lifted unless the money
generated from trade is reinvested inimproved protection of the rhinoceros
population. Because current protection efforts seem to be failing, it istime to
evaluate, discuss, and test alternatives to the present policy.
Between
and
2007,
1990
15
southern
(Ceratotherium
white
simum)
simum
a
n
d
b
a
c2013.
k
(illegally
Diceros
rhinoceroses
average
were
on
killed
every
year
in
South
Since
2007
Africa.
illegal
killing
for
their
horn
has
>950
escalated
to
in
individuals/year
We
conducted
analysis
economic
to
whether
determine
a
legal
trade
white
in
rhinoceros
southern
horn
could
protection.
rhinoceros
linear
Generalized
models
examine
were
used
the
to
drivers
socioeconomic
of
on
data
collected
2013,
1990
and
project
number
the
of
total
likely
to
from
2014
Rhinoceros
2023.
dynamics
were
then
modeled
8
different
that
could
be
implemented
control
to
poaching.
also
estimated
We
economic
and
under
enforcement
enhanced
only
and
a
legal
used
awith
horn
framework
to
rank
scenarios
the
the
maintaining
objective
the
of
while
generating
local
profit
stakeholders.
southern
go
extinct
in
the
wild
under
<20
present
years
The
management.
optimal
scenario
maintain
population
above
size
was
its
to
current
provide
medium
increase
effort
antipoaching
and
monetary
fine
onl
Without
conviction.
legalizing
trade,
the
such
implementing
a
scenario
would
costs
approximately
equal
to
ar.
$147,000,000/ye
With
legal
horn,
enterprise
potentially
could
make
$717,000,000/ye
profit
of
We
35-year-old
believe
ban
should
products
not
be
lifted
money
unless
generated
is
from
reinvested
of
the
Because
population.
current
protection
seem
to
be
efforts
failing,
it
is
discuss,
alternatives
and
to
test
policy.
present
CREATING MARKET IS THE ONLY WAY TO STOP EXTINCTION
Under enhanced enforcement only, maintaining thepopulation was extremely

expensive (Supporting In-formation), whereas legalizing the trade increased thesize
of the population and generated profit under en-hanced law enforcement
(Supporting Information). Ac-cording to the scenario ranking, the optimal scenarioto
maintain the rhinoceros population above its sizein 2010, while maximizing profit,
was to provide themedium increase in antipoaching effort and to increasethe fine
upon conviction (Table 3). Without legalizingthe trade, maintaining the population
above its cur-rent size required covering costs equal to
approximately$147,000,000/year under the most cost-effective scenario(Table 3).
With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, under thesame scenario, the conservation
enterprise made a profitof $717,000,000/year (Table 3). By 2023, under the
samepolicy scenario, the net profit generated through the legaltrade was predicted
to exceed $1,000,000,000 and thesouthern white rhinoceros population was
predicted toincrease to approximately 35,000 individuals (SupportingInformation).
DEMAND WILL NOT LOWER SOON ONLY CREATING A MARKET

FOR RHINO HORNS SOLVES
Reducing demand for rhinoceros horn through con-sumer behavior modification and
conservation educationis unlikely in the short term because of longestablishedcultural beliefs; use of rhinoceros horn has continuedsince the trade ban
was implemented in 1977 (Rivalanet al. 2007; Graham-Rowe 2011). Our model
predictedthat increasing poaching of subadults and adults willhave a negative

impact on the dynamics of the south-ern white rhinoceros population in the
imminent future.Ensuring population viability under increased poachinglevels will
require using many tens of millions of dollarsevery year just for rhinoceros
protection alone, whichis problematic in areas where pressing issues of
humandevelopment remain a societal priority (Adams et al.2004). Private and
communal landowners would find it almost impossible to cover such protection
costs unlessalternative sources of funding were found. Hence, animportant
contribution that the legal trade could make isto cover such costs, at least in the
short term, until othermeasures over longer periods lead to a reduction in de-mand
from users in the Far East. In addition, a legal supplyof rhinoceros horn could
potentially diminish the pres-tige value that has recently emerged in Vietnam
(Milliken& Shaw 2012). At the same time, the profit generated from the legaltrade
could also be used to financially empower com-munities in Mozambique, where
many poachers origi-nate, in accordance with some of the principles of theLondon
Conference on Wildlife Crimes (Lawson & Vines2014). Although increasing
enforcement only might notkeep criminals from committing a crime (Ariely
2012),economic incentives may be an important solution to pro-mote participation
of local communities in improved en-forcement (but see Andrade & Rhodes 2012).
Enhancedenforcement combined with effective engagement withlocal communities,
for example, has enabled Nepal to notlose a single rhinoceros to poaching in 2011
and 2013(Emslie et al. 2013). Finally, the funding generated fromthe legal trade
could also be used for the protection ofother biodiversity via the umbrella effect of
rhinoceroses(Di Minin et al. 2013c; Di Minin & Moilanen 2014).
OUR PLAN IS GOOD AND WE SHOULD FEEL GOOD

Because the market in rhinoceros horn has been il-legal since 1977, there is a lack
of data, which pre-vented us from explicitly modeling potentially impor-tant aspects
driving rhinoceros poaching. As in Poudyalet al. (2009), we had to use a proxy (GDP)
to capturedemand for rhinoceros horn in consumers countries. Inour economic
model, we assumed that the legal priceof rhinoceros horn would remain constant
over time. Atthis stage, it is not possible to estimate a full-price quan-tity model for
rhinoceros horn. Yet, our results highlightthat even at a lower selling price than the
illegal price(currently > $50,000/kg) (Milliken & Shaw 2012) theprofit generated
could cover important protection costsrequired to maintain the rhinoceros
population above itscurrent size. Finally, we assumed that poaching pressure is
evenly distributed in space because this informationis currently not available for all
conservation areas thathave rhinoceroses.International donors cannot be expected
to raise manymillions of dollars year after year to protect rhinocerosesfrom
poaching, especially when endless other usesfor conservation resources exist.
Similarly, given long-established cultural beliefs, consumers are unlikely toreduce
their near-future demand for rhinoceros horn. Un-der current management the
southern white rhinocerospopulation could go extinct in <20 years. Instead,

ourresults suggest that a legal trade in horn that does not re-quire killing any
rhinoceroses could cover higher protec-tion costs, allowing the rhinoceros
population to increasein size. A legal trade could also provide sustainable eco-nomic
incentives to local stakeholders. At the same time,policy makers in South Africa
should be careful in advo-cating for CITES to lift a 35-year-old ban on rhinoceroshorn
products unless the funding generated from thetrade will be reinvested in improved
protection of therhinoceros population. The recent escalation in poachingin South
Africa and the recent losses of 3 subspecies ofrhinoceroses elsewhere in Asia and
Africa (Milliken &Shaw 2012) make it timely to evaluate, discuss, and
testalternatives to the present long-standing policy.
RHINO POACHING INCREASING

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/can-you-wage-a-war-onpoaching/375760/
This market demand has been disastrous for African wildlife conservations. The
most dramatic effects are evident in South Africas Kruger National Park, which, at
the end of last year, had seen a 5,000-percent increase in rhino poaching since
2006, according to the countrys Department of Environmental Affairs.
MARKET SOLVES US FRAMING KEY
All of which raises the question: If the problem is primarily one of economic
incentives from a foreign market, why are African leaders in Washington seeking
military-grade weaponry as a solution?
Part of the answer stems from the way in which the challenge is being framed in the
United States. The Obama administration, which announced a presidential taskforce
on wildlife trafficking last summer, has often echoed the language of the War on
Terror in its public statements on the subject, asserting in the most recent White
House fact sheet that wildlife trafficking undermines security across nations. Born
Free USA, an American conservation group, has reported that U.S.-designated
terrorist groups such as Somalias al-Shabab and Ugandas Lords Resistance Army
reap profits from the illegal wildlife trade. Johan Bergenas, a researcher at the
Stimson Center, a D.C.-based think tank, has been a particularly vocal advocate for
combating a new threat in the terrorist hotbed of Africa. He urges conservation
groups to combat poaching, using new and inexpensive technologies to detect and
deter terrorist activities and traffickers, adding, Drones, satellite imagery, tracking
devices and other high-tech tools could transform the fight to save elephants and
rhinos, cheaply and effectively starving terrorists of the easy money they gain from
wildlife crimes.
SMALL AMOUNT OF HORNS WOULD SOLVE THE BLACK MARKET

PROBLEM
One possible solution, which was not discussed at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, is
legalization. In 2013, South Africas Environmental Minister Edna
Molewa suggested that the country could reduce black-market demand for poaching
by producing legally harvested rhino horns. Others, including investment
analyst Michael Eustace and sustainability economist Michael 't' Sas-Rolfes, have
also championed the approach. The plan would involve the non-lethal removal of
rhino horns, which rhinos have the capacity to regrow. Eustace has estimated that
roughly 1,200 horns per year could be sustainably obtained from live rhinos, while
400 additional horns could be collected from rhinos who die of natural causes. The
collective output from these "harvests" would be enough to squash the illegal
market.
ONLY MARKETS SOLVE THEORY DOESNT

http://www.perc.org/blog/qa-michael-t-sas-rolfes-why-legal-rhino-horn-trade-willsave-rhinos
I think they are not only helpful, but essential. The poaching crisis and indeed
many other conservation problems is driven by human behaviour. To solve such
problems we need to come to grips with the incentives driving that behaviour and
the systems that create those incentives. So we need to have an understanding of
social sciences more than biological sciences: that includes economics, psychology,
sociology and politics! Most importantly, we need to understand how markets work.
Michael 't Sas-Rolfes Michael 't Sas-Rolfes Q: For those of us who dont speak
economese, it can be tricky to understand the poaching problem and the rhinohorn market in rigorous economic terms. Is there a simple way to break things
down? A: Simply put, the way things are set up right now, poachers and illegal
traders have much stronger incentives and more money at their disposal to kill
rhinos than individual rhino owners and custodians have to protect them. This is
because Asian demand for rhino horn is real and not expected to decline in the near
future, and most importantly Asian suppliers are expecting rhino horn to become
commercially extinct and therefore increasingly valuable over time. We are facing
some very powerful market forces here.
RESTRICTING MARKET LEADS TO THE IMPACTS CREATING

SURPLUS SOLVES
Yes, I think that is a somewhat misguided interpretation of what actually happened
(as seen through a Western lens of understanding). Rhino horn has been a valued
commodity in Asia for thousands of years, for both ornamental and medicinal
purposes, mostly in elite circles. An essential part of the horns current value is its
scarcity. As a medicine, it is and has always been used to treat a wide range of
conditions related to inflammation and toxicity in the body. In some circles it is
considered the ultimate medicine to treat serious (and not so serious) cases i.e. it
is the Rolls Royce of traditional Chinese medicine. Evidence suggests that demand
is rising in both Vietnam and parts of China along with increased affluence (not just
for cancer treatment, but for all sorts of medicinal and ornamental uses, but with
the underlying prestige factor). The poaching crisis was sparked when we
responded to that increasing demand in exactly the wrong way: by restricting the
supply. Basic economics tells us that if you reduce the supply in the face of
increasing demand, market prices will rise. If prices rise, so do the potential rewards
for poachers and illegal traders.
RE-EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA DOESNT WORK ONLY

MARKET CHANGES SOLVES
Many anti-poaching campaigns are aiming to reduce Asian demand for rhino horn
through awareness and education. Can reeducation work?
A: I am skeptical that this approach can deliver results fast enough to bring
poaching down to sustainable levels in the short and even medium term. We are
dealing with a product market based on very deeply held cultural values and beliefs.
Those advocating demand reduction are unable to tell us how quickly this can work
and most importantly how much it will cost to be effective and who is going to
pay for it.
ONLY LOWERING VALUE OF RHINO HORNS SOLVES

Q: Aside from awareness campaigns, you argue that enhanced security (and what
you call after-the-fact enforcement) will not be enough to halt rampant poaching.
Why?
A: Poachers and other criminals have very short time horizons. If you offer them a
huge reward now with a fairly low probability of being caught and punished at some
time in the vague future, they will typically ignore that potential cost. And what is
the point of prosecuting them a year or two later anyway? By then a whole bunch of
new poachers and criminals are already in the game. To stop poaching you need to
convince poachers that they are very unlikely to succeed in their initial poaching
attempt that it simply wont be worth it in the first place. The only way you can do
that is by lowering the value of their potential initial take (dehorning rhinos and/or
reducing the price of horn) and most critically having such effective security on
the ground that the rhinos are almost impossible to get to.
RANCHING IS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

Q: What would you say to those who feel that farming rhinos for their horns would
effectively reduce one of Africas most iconic wild animals to the status of livestock?
A: I fear we are faced with a stark choice: a lower risk option of white rhino farming
as a buffer to wild populations of all species or the continued severe threat to all
species and likely reduction (and even extinction) of almost all wild rhino
populations.
RANCHING SOLVES FOR CREATING A GENUINE MARKET
Q: Even if trade is legalised and farming rhinos becomes a reality, is it possible that
some consumers may still seek out horns sourced from wild (poached) rhinos
rather than their farmed counterparts (the same way wild-caught salmon is
preferred over the farmed variety)?
A: I consider this less likely with rhinos as we are not talking about artificial and
intensive feed-lot farming, but rather ranching periodically removing the horn from
free-ranging rhinos (that is by far the most cost-effective way to produce horn).
Conscious meat consumers avoid grain-fed feed-lot beef but are happy to eat grassfed free range beef, even if the cattle in question are not truly wild. I would not
expect rhinos to be much different. If you offer consumers the choice between
genuine certified legal free-range rhino horn and illegal horn of unknown origin that
may be a fake, I suspect few consumers would pay a premium for the latter. If
anything, most would probably be willing to pay far less.
THIS YEAR IS KEY TO LEGALIZING RHINO HORNS

Q: Even if South Africa decides to move forward on the road to legalisation, legal
trade hinges on approval from CITES which can only be granted at the next CITES
conference in 2016. What are the logistics of that approval process and who would
be involved?
A: The logistics are intimidating. South Africa will have to secure the buy-in of key
consumer countries, which will need to amend their laws to allow for this. The
mechanism is also critical there are many wrong ways to set up legal trade and
only one right one. There is still a lot of work to be done on this and everyone needs
to be involved, from government agencies to private agents and NGOs.
PLAN SOLVES ONLY ECONOMICS SOLVES AND THIS IS THE

ONLY PLAN THAT MAKES ECONOMIC SENSE
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/legalize-horn-farming-to-saveendangered-species-white-rhino-cites-53582
As parties to the international Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species (Cites) meet in Bangkok this week, a team of Australian conservationists
are presenting an unusualand controversialproposal: in order to save the
remaining African rhinos, farm them for their horns.
The economic logic goes like this: demand for horn is inelastic and growing, so a
trade ban (which restricts supply) only drives up prices, making the illicit good more
valuableand giving poachers greater incentive to slaughter the animal.
Rhino horn is used for dagger handles in Yemen and has been used in Chinese
traditional medicine for millennia as a presumed cure for a wide range of ailments,
explains Duan Biggs, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of
Queensland, in a March issue of Science. Rapid economic growth in east and
southeast Asia is assumed to be the primary factor driving the increased demand
for horn. Conservation managers have even tried preempting poachers by dehorning animals in their care, to no avail; the stubs are simply too valuable to pass
up. (As documented in the 2012 National Geographic article, Rhino Wars, African
wildlife conservation has become as militarized as Americas war on drugs, with
the same miserable failures.)
But horn harvesting need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.
Rhino horn is composed entirely of keratin and regrows when cut, writes Biggs.
Sedating a rhino to shave its horn can be done for as little as $20. A white rhino
produces about a kilo of horn per year, and the current global demand could be met
by farming as few as 5,000 animals on a private, well-guarded preserve. (Natural
rhino death would also provide hundreds of horns annually, even as the herd
continues to grow at a rate near 10 percent.) The millions of dollars generated by
the legal enterprise could be used to fund further conservation efforts, such as
wildland preservation, sustainable rural development, and field research.
NEED TO CREATE SURPLUS IN THE HORN MARKET RANCHING

NEEDED
Still, Biggs argues, horn farming wont necessarily replace poaching unless certain
conditions are met. The black market will only collapse when legal horns are
cheaper and easier to obtain than ill-gotten ones and penalties for operating outside
the central selling organization are severe. DNA signatures and radio chips will
help trace licit horns, and exporters will be subject to regular audits. At the same
time, buyers must demand cruelty- and conflict-free wares (think of efforts to
demonize blood diamonds).
OTHER METHODS HAVE FAILED

Yet education, enforcement, protection, and awareness efforts aimed at reducing
the use of horn have all demonstrably failed to turn the tide of this rising demand,
Biggs writes. Legitimizing the market for horn may be morally repugnant to some,
but it is probably the only way to prevent extinction of Africas remaining rhino.
RHINO POACHING OPPRESSES THOSE WHO ARE MOST

VULNERABLE
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/south-africa-asks-would-legalizingtrade-in-rhino-horn-save-the-species
I slowed the car and eased past the men, who nodded as I rolled by. These werent
poachers, who operate more clandestinely, but a security force walking home after
the night shift at a nearby rhino ranch. You could be forgiven for confusing the two.
In South Africas rhino warperhaps the greatest ecological threat on the continent
the men facing off on the front lines are alike in far more ways than theyre
different. Well armed, largely poor, and almost always black, they are pawns in a
conflict that is rapidly destroying the largest rhino population on the planet.
PLAN WORKS ONLY MARKETS SOLVE
The legalization proposalwhich has been called a desperate gamble by Julian
Rademeyer, author of Killing for Profit, the definitive book on the illegal rhino horn
tradebegan gathering momentum several years ago, championed by a small
group of rhino farmers. In South Africa, where wildlife can be owned, its not
uncommon for peoplelargely white and wealthy landownersto turn big tracts of
acreage into private game reserves to attract safari tourists. A smaller number of
people run private ranches to breed and raise non-endangered animals like buffalo
or antelope. And some are raising rhinos as well. Not only can rhinos adapt to
ranching, but their horns (made of keratin, like fingernails) grow back after being cut
off, meaning they can be harvested.
As poaching has soared, so has the animals value, and some of these rhino farmers
saw an opportunity to help preserve wildlife as well as start a lucrative business.
Trade supporters see horn harvesting as akin to milking cows or shearing wool from
sheep. Farmers breed and raise the rhinos, storing the horns in hopes that
legalization will be passed so they can sell their haul for a healthy profit, even after
covering their substantial farming and security costs. The animals themselves are
also for sale, usually to game reserves or zoos, but that doesnt yield as much
revenue as the horns would.
WHITE AND BLACK RHINOS ON THE BRINK

None of this is doing anything to help the lumbering rhino, whose numbers continue
to plummet as the demand for horn soars. There are thought to be about 20,000
white rhinos left in Africa and 4,000 black rhinos. If poaching rates continue to
climb, some experts worry that, in 10 years, all wild black rhinos will be gone, which
would mean it wouldn't be long until the white rhino meets the same fate.
SECURITY ALONE FAILS NEED TRADE TO SOLVE
Security is far and away Humes biggest expense, and he insists that legalized horn
is the only way to cover his costs. If you are anti-legal trade, then you are the
enemy of my rhinobecause that is the biggest reason why my rhinos will go
extinct, he said. Without us being able to sell the horns, this project will fail. The
costs are insurmountable.
ANIMALS FIRST OBJECTIONS ARE BLINDED BY EUROCENTRICITY

Western civilization doesnt understand the problem. They just think, Oh, its wrong
to cut off a rhinos horn, and theres no right way to do a wrong thing, Hume
continued. The East will find horn to buy. And if we refuse them as we are now,
theyll just buy it illegallywhich means the rhinos will get poached.
RHINO MURDER IS MORALLY WRONG ONLY A RANCHING

SOLVES
When Eustace retired from banking, he became a co-founder of African Parksa
non-profit that helps rehabilitate national parks in several countries on the
continent. He acknowledges that trading in endangered species is unseemly but
dismisses these concerns when it comes to rhino. When someone says to me,
Well, what about trading pangolin? I think, Ew, I dont want to trade pangolin.
Youve got to kill it to get the scales. With rhino, you dont have to do that. And I
dont want to keep them in pens. I dont want to run a zooI would rather have a
rhino running around with a horn on. But if some have to be farmed to save the rest,
well, then Ill go with that. The current slaughter is just totally morally
unacceptable.
RHINO MARKET MUST BE CONTROLLED ONLY PLAN SOLVES

A trading system would have to be controlledsimply flooding the market would
bring the price too low, which would burn through supply and further threaten the
species: You need a monopoly of supply, selling through a cartel, Eustace said.
You cant really have more than about a million users. And the way you do that is
by keeping the price high. Without the price controls, he said, speculators would
buy up the supply and wait for prices to surge again.
Rhino are a fantastic commercial opportunity, Eustace said. And its sustainable.
And exclusive. Its something we havethe rest of the world doesnt have it.
CREATING MARKET IS BY FAR THE BEST SOLUTION
Rhino breederswith their stockpiles of harvested hornsstand to make tens of
millions of dollars if trade is legalized. Hume owns four tons of horn, which he
estimated would earn him about $40 million at current prices. (After filling up the
local banks with his stock, he now keeps them with an international security firm.)
The majority of that money would go into protecting the rhinos, he said, and the
rest into breeding.
Hume has bred more than 500 rhinos to date, including 131 in 2014. His goal is to
produce 200 calves a year, at which point he could start selling the animals. His
ultimate ambition is to buy more farmland and increase the scale of his operation,
so that in the next 20 or 30 yearsIf they ever get rid of the scourge of
poachinghe could release his rhinos back into the wild.
We drove back to the main house, where more members of Humes anti-poaching
unit sat silently in the shade, awaiting their polygraph. Rhinos today are worth
more dead than alive, Hume said, adding that if trade were legalized, the animals
would have more allies than ever. Nobody would ever kill a rhino if he was getting
money from the horn. A smile spread across his face, and he cupped his hands
together as if holding an imaginary prize: It produces like a henand who the hell
would kill the hen that lays the golden egg?
POACHING KILLS COMMUNITY

But the influx of money has had corrosive effects as well. In Massingir, a town in
Mozambique just a few miles from the Kruger bordera place Barkas calls the
poaching capital of the regionrhino horn profits have sparked a rise in
prostitution, cocaine use, and the deadly combination of alcohol and untrained new
car owners. What was a very communal place is now divided, Barkas told me.
Theyre killing each other, and organized crime has moved in.
LEGALIZATION AND TRADING SUCKS
More importantly, legalization would spark an increase in demand. As Andrew
Wetzler, director of the Land and Wildlife program at the Natural Resources Defense
Council, told me, Given the experience the world has had with the one-off sales of
ivory, we ought to be extraordinarily cautious when it comes to rhino horn
legalization. The only argument in favor of it is that it will bring down the price and
therefore reduce the incentive to poach. And I dont think theres any reason to
think thats true.
According to Wetzler, there are two main reasons why legalization wont work. First,
if trade were allowed, it would become much easier to buy and sell illegal rhino
horn, with criminals fraudulently applying legitimate certificates to contrabands,
making it difficult to distinguish one from the other. Second, the demand for horn is
so highand could potentially get much higher in China and Vietnam if made legal
that they cant be produced fast enough to affect the price.
If you cant drive the price down, then all youre doing is generating a new market.
And as long as the price is extraordinarily high, theres every incentive to poach,
Wetzler said. So rather than alleviate the problems, its very likely that legalization
will just make it worse."
Adam Welz, who represents South Africa for WildAid, a non-profit that fights illegal
wildlife trading, agrees: The second you legalize it, youre sending a very powerful
message. Youre endorsing this productand youre immediately going to get a lot
more people interested in buying it.
Welz puts no stock in the idea that rhino horn revenue could pay for sufficient
security, pointing out that protecting some rhinos in a prison camp situation, with
giant electric fences and machine gun posts in every corner, isnt enough. Youre
never going to protect them in an ecologically functional way, he said. Youre
always going to find somebody willing to risk his life to shoot a rhino because hes
going to get paid five or 10 times his annual salary for two days work.
MOVING RHINOS AWAY IS KEY

Were pumping significant amounts of money into anti-poaching and security and
intelligence operations, and yet were losing three rhinos a day in South Africa, said
Les Carlisle, the project manager. So moving the rhinos away, spreading the risk, is
a critical part of the current threats were facing.
MARKET FLOODING FAILS
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/rhino-horn-south-africalegalized/
History backs them up on this point. Similar one-off sales of ivory to Japan in 1999
and China in 2008 have been linked to the resultant increased demand for ivory in
Asia, which has driven elephant poaching across Africa to crisis proportions in the
past decade. At the time, proponents of those sales said flooding the market with
stockpiled ivory would lower prices and therefore eliminate the incentive to poach
more elephants. The opposite happened and prices soared. South Africa now argues
that putting more than 18,000 kilograms of rhino horn up for sale would glut the
market, lower prices and save more rhinos. This is an argument we have heard
before.
Meanwhile, any legal rhino horn market only supports the misconception that this
keratinous body part has medicinal qualities. In China and especially Vietnam rhino
horn powder is sold as a cancer cure and an after-party drug to remove hangovers.
Rhino horns have no such abilities. Why support the misplaced economic value of
something that has no practical function for humans, and why support the utterly
false belief that rhino horn could cure desperately sick people of their cancer?
As WildAid Executive Director Peter Knights wrote on the organization's blog,
"Legitimizing and promoting demand for rhino horn would inevitably create a far
larger consumer base and once this genie is out we could never re-cork the bottle if
the experiment went wrong.
LEGALIZING WILL TAKE TOO LONG ULTIMATELY FAIL

So, would legalizing rhino horn trade put an end to poaching? I doubt it. Putting a
"well-regulated trade system" in place would probably take years and high levels of
international cooperation. Meanwhile the criminal mechanisms already exist to
poach and smuggle rhino horn and it seems highly doubtful that they would
transition to a legal system; instead, they would continue to kill and smuggle
through existing channels while the news that rhino horns were about to become
legal served to increase their market.
LEGALIZING SUCKS
Legalizing rhino horn, however, does not appear to be the answer. Instead, the
international community needs to target the consumer demand for rhino horn and
end it. Rhino horns are useless to every human but they are essential for rhinos,
which use them to defend themselves and root up food. Eliminating the market for
rhino horns is the only way we're going to ensure the long-term survival of these
threatened species.
RHINOS AT TIPPING POINT ONLY CREATING A LEGAL,

CONTROLLED MARKET SOLVES
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-22-00-sa-pushes-for-legal-trade-in-rhino-horn
"We believe it is the right direction as one of the measures [to curb rhino
poaching]," Molewa said in an interview with the Mail & Guardian in Bangkok during
the recent Cites meeting. "The model that we have is based on pure law of supply
and demand. Economics 101. Our rhinos are killed every day and the numbers are
going up. The reality is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing
every day isn't working. We do think that we need to address this issue of trade in a
controlled manner so that we can at least begin to push down this pressure."
It is a move born out of desperation. If poaching levels continue to rise, South
Africa's rhino population will begin to fall, with deaths outstripping the birth rate by
2016, what conservationists describe as the "tipping point".
CHINA IS KEY
Vietnam, which Traffic, the wildlife trade monitoring network, has described as the
"nexus" of a "rapacious" demand for rhino horn, continues to deny its centrality to
the problem, despite evidence to the contrary. Last week, Do Quang Tung, the
acting head of Vietnam's wildlife trade authority, dismissed as "bullshit" suggestions
that Vietnam was the primary destination and consumer country for rhino horn.
Instead, he pointed to China, saying it was responsible for "99% of the horn that
goes through Vietnam".
ONE OFF SALES ARE NOT THE SAME AS PLAN

Environmentalists also point to the disastrous impact of two "one-off" ivory stockpile
sales, which they say reinvigorated China's demand for ivory and is now causing
mass-scale slaughter of elephants in parts of Africa. But pro-trade lobbyists argue
that there is no comparison, as rhino horn, unlike elephant tusks, can be
"harvested" without killing the animals.
RHINO HORN NOT USED FOR TCM ITS A STATUS SYMBOL FOR
ELITES
http://africageographic.com/blog/an-open-letter-to-point-out-flaws-in-legalising-therhino-horn-trade/
We agree that rhinoceros are being poached for their horns; composed mostly of
keratin, the same protein in our hair and fingernails. In the past, western society
believed, erroneously as it turns out, that demand for horn was ostensibly driven by
the sexual desires of Asian men. During the same period Yemeni demand for
dagger-handles made of rhino horn, considered a symbolic rite of passage, also
contributed to global demand. Until very recently it was thought that demand for
horn was primarily driven by Eastern medicinal requirements. Rhino horn is said to
cool the blood and break a fever. Notwithstanding, Traditional Chinese Medicine
(TCM ) does, in fact, advocate an alternative. Modern demand-theory challenges the
notion that TCM demands are causal in the main. Its now believed that rhino horn is
symbolic of status for the elite. The cure for cancer theory emanating out of
Vietnam has also, largely, been discounted.
To clarify then, rhino horn is not an aphrodisiac. Yemeni demand for dagger-handles
has all but disappeared, and even though rhino horn has been used in TCM in the
past, todays practitioners prescribe alternatives. Most agree that rhino horn does
not cure cancer. Modern theory holds that it is considered symbolic of status. Whats
clear is that demand for rhino horn is tangible.
YOUR PLAN SUCKS 9 POINTS FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN WHO

KNOWS
http://africageographic.com/blog/an-open-letter-to-point-out-flaws-in-legalising-therhino-horn-trade/
This is where you come in. You say to lift the CITES ban on rhinoceros trade.
Legitimise the demand at the end-user. Eliminate the illegal supply chain. Establish
a Central Selling Organisation mandated to control supply of approved product
through legal channels and to approved distributors only who in turn supply the
end-user markets. De-horn rhinoceros safely and without any negative effect on the
donor-animal and collapse prices by volume of supply. Funds raised from the legal
sales would contribute to current conservation in any one of a number of ways,
either by bolstering fortress conservation (security) or for the purchase of land etc.
Your point is well made but, dare I say it, flawed.
Allow me to clarify as best as I can. For ease of reference, the points will be
annotated.
1. Nobody detracts from the success of your herd. I certainly dont. Even so, as the
owner of South Africas largest privately owned herd you stand to benefit more than
most from a resumption of trade. Its a conflict of interest, which I cant, in good
conscience, ignore. Whilst the authorities deliberate, perhaps you would consider
recusing yourself from the discussion and withdrawing from the media?
2. Its true that rhino horn can be harvested as and when the animal regenerates its
horn and over the course of its life. Its also true that the animal doesnt have to be
killed to do so. Notwithstanding, unless SANPARKS and/or Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
intend to dehorn their herd in the field, which youll agree is an unlikely occurrence,
the only benefit to either would be the sale of surplus animals to private owners. To
participate equitably these rhino would need to be sold at prices at, or in excess of,
the current price of horn. A single animal yields approximately 4-6kg of horn? At
current prices of US$30,000-US$50,000 per kilogram that equates to approximately
ZAR1,500,000 to ZAR2,500,000 per animal or circa 10 times the current price of the
live animal.
3. On my point 2. above, you might be inclined to point out that an increase in
supply should, by definition, drop the price of the product to more reasonable
levels. Thats true if demand stays constant but its an assumption best left in the
bin where it belongs. There is no irrefutable evidence that demand wont increase,
perhaps dramatically so, if ever trade was legalised. A possible/probable shift
outwards of the demand curve would leave prices unchanged at best, or resume its
upward spiral as new users enter the market.
4. The global regulatory environment is constantly in flux. Its safe to expect some
significant change within my own industry. The CSO concept as a stand-alone entity
will soon be obsolete. A fairly common criticism of the CSO structure is its bias
towards some form of complicity either in open forum or disguised by internal
policies. In truth most operate as cartels, controlling both price and supply.
Manipulation is simply endemic in such a structure. The same cartel-like complicity
will manifest in the demand markets. Selling to selected distributors has the same
causal effect.
5. It does not follow that illegal syndicates will become redundant when trade is
legalised. On the contrary, the scope to launder illegally harvested product
through official channels becomes entrenched, particularly in a corrupt environment
and or when large sums of money are involved. At the same time your cost of
harvesting horn or your production costs are significantly higher, I suspect, than the
price of a bullet plus one or two thousand dollars for the trigger-men.
6. You have said that illegal trade will be eradicated in a legal trade environment. I
dont see why. The infrastructural environment under the auspices of legal trade
would, in all likelihood be no different from the current. The illegal networks are well
established. Fortunately some commendable work has been done by the authorities
to break down these structures, but they still exist and will continue to exist until
they dont and certainly for reasons other than resumption in trade.
7. The most blatant flaws in your argument Ive left to last and they detract from the
rest of your argument. Cattle farming has little to do with conservation. Farming
lions for the legal trade is, by anybodys definition, not conservation. The same
applies to the farming of chickens or pigs or sheep or in this case rhinoceros.
Farming rhinoceros to shave their horns is as far removed from conservation as is
farming crocodiles for their belly skins. Yes, theyre not domesticated, but theyre
hardly free-roaming wild animals either. Your herd is supplementary-fed and
controlled in relatively small paddocks. Mauricedale is obviously a well-run farming
operation.
8. Now, if you were to publicly distinguish your herd from the free-roaming herd and
openly commoditise your rhinoceros then your herd becomes a product; like eggs or
bacon. Yes, its still an illegal commodity but your exhortations in the public domain
to reopen trade would be inscrutable. Intentions are made clearer, are based on
sound business principles and are more readily understood in the public eye.
However, masking intent by including conservation benefits and the projectintegration of the local community in the same dialogue is misleading; although
unintended perhaps.
9. In passing I am confident that the authorities in control of the valuable stockpile
of rhinoceros horn will remain steadfast in their application thus avoiding any
potential conflicts of interest. These same officials hold the elective right to lobby
CITES for renewal of trade.
SIMILAR PLANS HAVE WORKED

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/01/150106-rhino-poaching-southafrica-animals-conservation/
Many rhino horn trade advocates tout the Andean vicuaan iconic South American
mammal in the camel family that's related to llamas, alpacas, and guanacosas an
example of successful conservation through sustainable use. The vicua has been
valued for thousands of years for its soft, fine wool.
Excessive hunting for European markets drove vicuas to the brink of extinction in
the 1960s. The animals were usually shot and the fleeces sheared off their
carcasses.
In the early 1970s, CITESwhich regulates the global wildlife tradeand the
countries where the vicuas range in the wild took measures that included a ban on
trade in their wool, putting them on a path to recovery. By the 1990s, their numbers
had rebounded to more than 200,000 (most of them in Peru), and regulated legal
trading in wool resumed.
Back then, ecologist Cristian Bonacic, of Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, in
Santiago, was at the forefront of developing best practice guidelines for sustainable,
ethical use of vicuas.
Bonacic, a doctor of veterinary medicine, is a leading expert on South American

camelids, the taxonomic group that includes vicuas, with more than 30 years of
research experience on wild populations. Because of his work with Oxford
University's Wildlife Conservation Research Unit, vicua management practices
were aimed at reducing stress during capture, handling, and shearing.
Today, wild vicuas number more than 340,000 in the Andean highlands of Peru,
Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile, but once again, poaching and illegal trading are
threatening them.
PLAN WOULD WORK

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/01/150106-rhino-poaching-southafrica-animals-conservation/
A legal trade, proponents argue, would reduce incentives for poaching of wild
rhinos and the illegal trade of their horns. People who are pro-trade view rhino horn
as a renewable resource because the horns gradually regrow after they're cropped.
The idea is that rhinos would be intensively managed under farmed, or at least
semi-captive, conditions, and that the animals would be sedated while their horns
are harvested. Profits from the sale of horns would be invested in maintaining
"viable, free-ranging" populations in "natural habitat," as South African trade
advocate Michael 't Sas-Rolfes and others envisionalthough they leave the quoted
terms "open to interpretation." This overall approach falls under the label
"sustainable use."
INACTION LEADS TO EXTINCTION FARMING SOLVES

http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-14-rhino-farms-win-win-or-hell-no
Julian Sturgeon, executive director of nongovernmental organisation Resource

Africa, said his group is working with SANParks to test a rhino farming project.
"Unless we make a decisive intervention, it is bye-bye rhino without a question."
Several farms located near rural communities would each hold 64 adult rhinos. This
would create 108 full-time jobs and make R12-million a year in areas where there is
no other employment.
"This would be by far the most effective type of farming on the planet and the
beauty is that it's a win-win scenario."
John Hume, the country's largest private rhino owner, said a legal trade would save
the rhino from extinction. The international ban and the local moratorium on trade
in 2009 had only pushed people to the black market.
SUPPLY KEY FARMING SOLVES

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/1217
3750/Why-the-worlds-largest-rhino-farmer-is-cutting-off-their-horns.html
Its not the demand for rhino horn thats killing our rhino, its the way that demand
is currently supplied, he told The Telegraph this week at his orange-brick home in
the heart of his 8,000 hectare farm. Up until 2008, we had no rhinos being poached
in South Africa because demand was being supplied by legal sales from live rhino.
Then they banned that trade and those sales were mirrored by rhino poaching
deaths in Kruger National Park.
Since the keratin horn grows back, he said, his rhinos and those of other farmers
can produce far more in their lifetime than one slaughtered by poachers ever could.
SPECIAL INTERESTS ARE STOPPING PLAN THEY ARE THE

IMMORAL ONES
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/1217
3750/Why-the-worlds-largest-rhino-farmer-is-cutting-off-their-horns.html
Ms Otto believes the arguments against rhino farming are clouded by other
agendas. Its about politics and money, how an NGO gets its funding, she said.
No one thinks about the rhino. I can tell you theyd gladly sacrifice their horn to
stay alive.
In an ideal world, rhino would be running around as natured intended but this isnt
an ideal world. There is a demand for rhino horn and you cant change centuries of
culture overnight.
FARMING DOESNT WORK WITHOUT A CHANGE IN CONSUMER

BEHAVIOR
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2015/proceed/papers/P1015.pdf
Under a policy of legalising the rhino horn trade (but without consumer behaviour
modification), rhino abundance continues to be driven to extinction, while game
farm profitability is positive for all values of the discount rate (Figure 3). The
incentive therefore for game reserves to harvest rhino horn to extinction, while
maximising profits by taking the maximum amount of rhino horn from each animals.
FARMING AND DEHORNING DOESNT SOLVE
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2015/proceed/papers/P1015.pdf
Conventional wisdom holds that demand reduction strategies would be effective in
reducing supply, where demand is downward sloping. Our study shows that, that
even if the demand curve is negative and inelastic as hypothesised by Biggs et al
(2012), conventional demand reduction strategies that influence the price of rhino
horn to the market may not be successful in curbing supply. Our model indicates
traditional demand management strategies that operate through the price

mechanism may not be effective in regulating the trade. Our model indicated that
demand was unresponsive to price, and this is also consistent with the findings of
Milner-Gulland (1993). However, what was effective was less conventional demand
management strategies (such as consumer education, behaviour modification). This
had the greatest effect on rhino population abundance, as well as game farm
profitability. The system dynamics model did indicate a preference for a trade
scenario as this resulted in the highest NPVs for game farms, and this outcome was
consistent with the findings of Di Minin et al. (2015). However, when the poaching
and game farm cost and price data was fed into the optimal dehorning model of
Milner-Gulland, it was found that is optimal for poachers to dehorn a rhino at very
low stump sizes. This, coupled with an unresponsive price of rhino horn to changes
in demand indicates that a legal trade would not be effective in ensuring the
sustainability of rhino horns, as it remains optimal for poachers to continue
poaching even under a dehorning strategy of game farms.
RHINO FARMING FAILS CANT MEET DEMAND AND OPENS UP

MARKET FOR EXPLOITATION
http://magazine.africageographic.com/weekly/issue-22/rhino-horn-trade-southafrica-china-selling-out/
Last week the number of South African rhinos poached for their horn since January
surpassed the 2013 total of 1,004. At the time of publishing the number was 1,030.
With this news more weight will be put behind the arguments in favour of legalising
trade in rhino horn, a strategy that some claim will reduce demand by flooding the
market with stockpiled and farmed horn. It is a solution the government appears
intent on implementing despite potentially disastrous results and lack of evidence
that the enormous financial benefits to the rhino owners who are campaigning for
legalisation will filter down into anti-poaching efforts where they are needed most
our under-funded national parks. In this account of the situation, conservationist
Dex Kotze reveals how global conservation authorities appear to be opening
avenues for trade while South Africa cannot even meet 1% of the potential demand
for rhino-horn.
ANTI-POACHING DOESNT SOLVE ONLY MARKETS CAN

http://africageographic.com/blog/want-save-rhino-look-beyond-guns-trade/
The large amounts of cash handed over in shops and back alleys in Vietnam and
China in exchange for small bags of rhino horn powder, tiny trinkets, necklaces and
bracelets and sometimes whole horns supports a transnational network of crime
that excels at evading controls. The money buys off Asian customs officials, police
and airline staff. It pays for the transport costs of middlemen and mules, who risk
arrest carrying horn into Asia from Africa. It covers losses when horn is occasionally
confiscated en route. It enriches corrupt African politicians and crime bosses who
provide weapons, vehicles and operating expenses for crews of poachers, bribes to
court officials to make inconvenient evidence disappear, and fees for good lawyers
and hitmen. It provides an incentive more powerful than the fear of death to the
squads of triggermen who regularly enter rhino reserves despite the presence of
armed rangers, police and military units.
Hundreds have died in shootouts with authorities across the country in recent years,
but they still come. The proceeds from a single horn can be literally life-changing in
the poor rural communities where many poachers live, where jobs are scarce and
nearby parks are hostile no-go zones, not assets that communities can benefit from
and be proud of. This means we will never shoot our way out of the poaching
nightmare. As spending on armed protection of rhinos has increased, so have South
Africas poaching rates, now the highest recorded since records began. Massive
outlays on harsh security measures by individual reserves can sometimes reduce
rhino deaths locally, but the total rhino body count for the country rises at an ever
greater pace.
CONTROLLED MARKET SOLVES

http://africageographic.com/blog/want-save-rhino-look-beyond-guns-trade/
The pro-traders argue that legal sales will generate a windfall from government-held
stockpiles of horn and provide an income stream to rhino owners (who can remove
horn without killing their rhinos), thus paying for expensive security and
incentivising the growth of a rhino farming industry. Legal marketplaces will replace
the black market as the place for Asians to purchase their horn. Because the
Chinese have used rhino horn for millennia, they say, theres no way of persuading
them to abandon such a deep-seated tradition. If you cant beat them, join them.
SOUTH AFRICA IS TOO CORRUPT TO MANAGE RHINO TRADE
http://magazine.africageographic.com/weekly/issue-22/rhino-horn-trade-southafrica-china-selling-out/
South Africas poor record of governance and corruption at the highest level under
President Zuma is a major obstacle for legalised trade to work. Stockpiles of rhino
horn worth millions have already been stolen from government offices where safe
custody, security alarms and electric fences were blatantly absent.
The government and pro-trade lobbys concept of a transparent central selling
organisation (CSO) regulating rhino horn trade is a pipe dream that could never
work. Motivations using comparisons to the CSO of the global diamond industry are
navely ironic. Illicit diamond trading continues throughout the world, blood
diamonds still enter the market, and criminal syndicates in South Africa are
targeting jewellery stores on a weekly basis indicating a healthy black market for
diamonds. If the imposition of controls by the massively-resourced diamond industry
has not curbed illegal activity, why would anybody think that this system would
work with regard to rhino horn?
In addition CITES has proved to be totally ineffectual in controlling illegal trade in
wildlife, despite ongoing efforts and the imposition of controls, again calling into
question the efficacy of the proposed model.
FLORIDA ALSO WORKS

http://lowvelder.co.za/264347/local-rhino-farmer-seals-the-sale-of-6-rhino-to-usafirm/
A businessman and the owner of a zoo in Pretoria has sold six white rhino to a
conservancy in Miami, Florida, on the east coast of United States of America (USA).
The seller, Mr Mike Bester, is the founder of Bester Birds and Animal Zoo Park in
Pretoria. He is a member of the Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA).
Bester said the sale was part of a conservation project to support the species
survival.
The buyer was the Centre for Conservation of Tropical Ungulates (CCTU) in Miami,
Florida.
CCTU is a wildlife ranch with a conservation and propagation facility which places
tropical and subtropical hoofed animals in spacious, natural conditions.
CASE RESOLVES ALL THE CURRENT BARRIERS
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-14-bold-plan-to-fly-sa-rhinos-to-texas
Several challenges
But the plan must overcome several challenges before it can move forward: it must
get approval from the United States department of agriculture to import the
animals; it must find enough ranchers in Texas who want to take the rhinos; and it
must raise the funds to move the creatures, at an estimated cost of at least $50 000
a rhinoceros.
PLAN IN PLACE NOW JUST NEED GOV TO SIGN OFF

http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-14-bold-plan-to-fly-sa-rhinos-to-texas
Flying a thousand rhinos from South Africa to south Texas sounds like something out
of a bad Disney movie. But if the plan, announced last week by Group Elephant and
the Exotic Wildlife Alliance, goes through, it could become a model for conserving
animal populations under threat.
The proposal to transport 6% of the countrys rhinos to southern Texas, which has a
similar climate and landscape to the animals native habitat, underlines just how
bad poaching has become.
Last week, the environment minister revealed that a record 393 animals were killed
in the Kruger National Park between January and April of this year.
Home to 80% of the planets rhinoceros population, South Africa is in the midst of a
poaching epidemic. The animals horns fetch a high price $65 000 for just under
1kg in markets such as China and Vietnam, where rhino horn is an ingredient in
traditional medicines. Illegal rhino killings increased by 20% in 2014, with 1?215
rhinos dead.
Conservation groups, representatives of the government and individual supporters
such as landowners in both regions are just beginning to formulate the Texas
relocation plan. Game farmers own roughly 5 000 of South Africas estimated
20 000 white and black rhinos, and have good reason to co-operate with a scheme
that might preserve the population.
Land Lease Stuf

Plan: The United States Federal Government should make a substantial amount of
its federal land available for lease to the Peoples Republic of China with the
condition that the land be used to raise and ranch rhinos to be used in Chinese
traditional medicine
LEASES ARE DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

Strauss, May 2015, Michael J., Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International
Law, Strauss is professor at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, Paris
teaching international relations and law. A specialist in territorial lease agreements,
his numerous published works include The Leasing of Guantanamo Bay.
Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International Law focuses on an unexplored but
relatively common practice in which states reallocate their rights on territory
without altering formal boundaries or resorting to definitive cessions. As products of
diplomacy, leases address a frequent situation that, in extreme cases, can lead to
war: the desire by more than one state to exercise sovereign authority in the same
place. As instruments of international law, they paradoxically reinforce the territorial
integrity of states while raising questions about the nature of their sovereignty. This
book draws from a large number of leases to examine the practice from historic to
modern times, describing their elements in detail and assessing them from both
political and legal perspectives.
LEASING NOT MODELED NOW
Yet considering this activity to be part of normal state practice is something that is
not often done. The leasing of territory has been largely an ad hoc process in which
states have addressed a range of specific situations for which the conventional
application of sovereignty was less advantageous or convenient. Although individual
cases have occurred on every populated continent, they have differed widely in
origin, purpose, implementation and even terminology, and there has never been
any clear template. Consequently, leasing has gone largely unexplored as part of
the comportment of states, as an element of diplomacy or as a contributor to the
development of international law.
That is not to say that leases are ignored, as numerous scholars have studied
individual cases Hong Kong and Guantanamo Bay have been probed from many
different angles in recent decades, to give just to prominent examples. But material
about the broader phenomenon remains sparse, and some of what exists is more
than a century old. This means that most leases of territory have been made by
states with little detailed knowledge of, or regard for, the broader context in which
they happen. Even when a state has engaged in some form of systematic leasing,
as the United States has done with foreign military bases and Russia has done with
strategic sites in former Soviet states, it has necessarily occurred in this vacuum.
AGRICULTURAL LAND LEASE IS GOOD FOR ECON AND THE

PRODUCT MARKET
Many states routinely import large quantities of agricultural products, but their
dependence on international markets was brought into question when global prices
of food commodities surged higher in 2007-2008 with unprecedented severity, and
importing states sought alternate ways to obtain stable flows of a foreign farm
products with less price risk. One result was a movement to secure long-term rights
on farmland abroad, and this rapidly developed into a large-scale international
scramble to purchase or lease sometimes vast areas of foreign land. The trend,
often derided as a land grab, nonetheless attracted the eager participation of
many states where the land is located, particularly developing countries, because it
offered a new source of investment income and held the promise of strengthening
their agricultural sectors.
LEASES ARE BILATERAL AND IMPROVE RELATIONS

Although the parties involved may not be the states themselves, the states can be
affected in much the same ways as when they conclude a bilateral lease of territory
by treaty, as well as in other ways. In a positive sense, relations etween the states
may be enhanced through the benefits that each derives from the lease; besides
increased food security or investment income, there can be the development of a
large, stable and long-term bilateral trade flow. On the negative side, issues arising
from the arrangement may become sources of conflict between the states involved,
as might occur during a drought when water must be allocated; in a 2008 treaty
between Libya and Mali by which Mali leased 100,000 hectares of farmland for 50
years to a company created by both states for purposes of growing crops for Libya,
Mali was obliged to permit the Societe Malibya agricole to use the quatity of water
necessary, without restriction, for the project during the period from June to
December of each year.
WE HAVE A BETTER LINK INTO ANTI-MODERNITY AND STATISM

LEASES EXPOSE THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF THE CONCEPT
OF SOVEREIGNTY
Every territorial lease created between states addresses a situation in which the
very essence of sovereignty the exclusivity of the territorial authority it embodies,
which makes the international system of states possible is deemed the less
desirable response to an issue that arises in connection with the territory. By
readjusting the distribution of rights so that more than one state has a direct stake
in the authority over a given zone, the practice of leasing appears to expose
sovereignty, a fundamental attribute of states and a pillar of international law, as
unable to satisfy the full range of state interests that can emerge in the realm of
territorial control.
CHINESE WILL NOT OVER-EXPLOIT STILL HAVE TO FOLLOW US

LAWS
The land subject to these arrangement is typically purchased or leased in
accordance with the laws of the host nation, and when leases are involved they are
generally for extended periods. Because these contracts tend to be of a private or
partially private nature, even when the lessee of the lessor is a state, there is little
transparency about their number and details, although in 2009 the UN special
rapporteur on the right to food estimated that more than 30 million hectares had
become subject to such agreements. By 2012 the practice had spread further and
was summed up as follows by an advisory group to the European Commission:
LEASE stuf
Hezbollah Advantage
NO TERRITORIAL LEASE MODELING [REGIME IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW] NOW
Strauss 2009, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Interview with Leonhardt
van Efferink,
www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Strauss_Michael_Territorial_Leasing_Bounda
ry_Conflicts_Disputes_Borders_Guantanamo_Bay.html
There are six known cases in which territorial leases have been used
successfully to resolve boundary disputes, and no known cases in which a lease concluded for
that purpose failed to achieve its goal. But each time, the lease involved a very small area and information
about it was poorly disseminated, so none of these leases ever
became a model that other states copied. The result was that the
wheel kept being reinvented while territorial leasing has been widely
used for economic and military purposes, it was considered an
original idea each time it was used for resolving a sovereignty
dispute. This indicates that a degree of diplomatic creativity was
necessary, and creativity is the exception rather than the rule.
LEASING WILL SOLVE IN SHABA FOR HEZBOLLAH & REGIONAL

DESTABILIZATION
Strauss & Gal-Or, 2008, Michael J and Noemi, Lecturer in Geopolitics-Doctoral
Program at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, & Director at Institute
for Transborder Studies and Professor of Department of Political Science at Kwantlen
University College in Surrey B.C, Touro International Law Review Volume 11,
International Leases as a Legal Insturment of Conflict Resolution: The Shab'a Farms
as a Prototype for the Resolution of Territorial Conflicts,
www.tourolaw.edu/ILR/uploads/articles/STRAUSS_FINAL_FULL_TEXT.pdf
This paper looks at the
Shaba Farms considered by the U.N. Secretary General

as the linchpin excuse in the Hizb Allah rhetoric justifying the destabilization of the Israel-Lebanon-Syria relationship . It contemplates
the possibility of defusing a violent conflict by borrowing the lease a
legal instrument in domestic law of contract and real property and private international law and turning it into a
public international legal device.
HEZBOLLAH WILL GO NUCLEAR
Herbert I. London, 10, President Emeritus of Hudson Institute, The Coming Crisis
in the Middle East, June 23, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=publication_details&id=7101&pubType=HI_Opeds
The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum . War clouds are
on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive
action to commence is a trigger. Turkeys provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a
humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of
Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria
is playing a dangerous game

with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public
accounts Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and short range
missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military
material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to
Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war
with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran with
sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons .
It will take some time to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted
sanctions can convince Iran to change course. Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the
strong horse as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to
maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia
regional strategic vision is a combination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear
weapons as a counter weight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all
bets are of in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni tent must
stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could
incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an
escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is

a distinct possibility. However, implausible it may seem at the
moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a
second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change
this slide into warfare is an active United States policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from
the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, it has done nothing to forestall that eventual
outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S.
forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S.
leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed
of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the weak horse, the one that is dangerous to ride. In
every Middle East capital the words unreliable and United States are linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a
distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial
exhilaration. It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur and where it will break out. There are
many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi
Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or is this a war in which there arent
victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more
dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim
and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign.
Territorial Leases solve war

AVERT BORDER WARS AND INCREASES RELATIONS
van Efferink,
Boundaries are normally fixed when states are created, but states
and their populations and economies continue to evolve after that
point and so do their perceived territorial needs. Territorial leasing is a mechanism by
which states sometimes address these evolving interests without
resorting to formal boundary changes. A lease essentially reallocates sovereign-like rights in a way
that can be less dramatic or definitive than a cession of territory by one state to the other. If a lease can satisfy the interests of
both states, it can sometimes be an alternative to war it can transform a conflict
from being about sovereignty into being about specific rights and
obligations associated with sovereignty, and this opens up new
options for resolving the issue. A lease normally requires administration, and if this involves both states it
can become a confidence-building activity that can, if all goes well,
enhance bilateral relations more broadly.
EMPIRICALLY SOLVES, HAS NEVER FAILED

van Efferink,
There are six known cases in which territorial leases have been used
successfully to resolve boundary disputes, and no known cases in
which a lease concluded for that purpose failed to achieve its goal . But
each time, the lease involved a very small area and information about it was poorly disseminated, so none of these leases ever became a
model that other states copied. The result was that the wheel kept being reinvented while territorial leasing has been widely used for
economic and military purposes, it was considered an original idea each time it was used for resolving a sovereignty dispute. This
indicates that a degree of diplomatic creativity was necessary, and creativity is the exception rather than the rule.
SOLVES TERRITORIAL ISSUES BEFORE THEY ESCALATE
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Papers and Proceedings of
the Nineteeth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban
Economy, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/strauss
.pdf
Territorial leases gained favor among states by broadening their
diplomatic options. They are alternatives to transfers of territorial
title when these may seem too disproportionate or definitive, and
they can provisionally resolve territorial issues for which permanent
agreements prove too difficult. But leases can also lead to unintended consequences, such as sovereignty
over a leased territory eventually passing from the lessor state to the lessee state; cases in which this occurred once led scholars to refer
to leases as disguised cessions.
Has worked every time in the past, even the problems it creates are easily resolved
The leases concluded by France and Spain, Bangladesh and India, and
Israel and Jordan all resulted in stable situations of sovereignty and
territorial control in the frontier locations where these questions had
been disputed. They established clearer and more precise boundaries that were respected by the
states and also by local populations in proximity to the territories
involved, and they brought to an end the periodic violence that had
occurred in some of these areas. All three of the leases generated new
problems, but these were either resolved or considerably less acute
than the initial problems of territorial sovereignty that were being addressed. Moreover, the
problems that arose were associated with the individual
circumstances of each lease, such as the economic impact of a specific clause or a third partys reaction to the
arrangement, rather than being inherent in the lease itself as a legal
instrument.
Modeling stuf
UNIQUENESS
[in 1ac]
LINKS
LEASING GETS MODELED POST CASE (GITMO IS ONE OF AND
THE MAIN EXAMPLE DISCUSSED ABOVE THIS SECTION)
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Viability of Territorial
Leases in Resolving International Sovereignty Disputes, p 283, Published by
L'Harmattan, October 27,
This raises the question of whether limits to using territorial leases in resolving such disputes can be identified. Until now, too few
examples have existed to know, and it remains a subject for further research. Nonetheless, the cases presented
here all fall within the limits of what can succeed, and collectively they can act as
a preliminary model for resolving other territorial conflicts with similar
characteristics. Future application of the leasing concept in the context of settling territorial
disputes between states may indicate more clearly where the limits are, and allow a more refined model
to be developed. In the meantime, the examples studied here provide evidence that the phenomenon of
territorial leasing as a means of conflict resolution may be identifiable
as an international regime a role that would ofer greater visibility to
this practice and bring it more fully into the range of recognized
options that states have available for settling issues pertaining to
territorial control.
RUSSIA-UKRAINE MODULE
Sets precedent for Ukraine Russia dispute coming in 2017
van Efferink,
There is also the danger that the lessee state may not leave, and if
its a strong state the lessor may not be able to kick it out.
Guantanamo Bay is an example of this, too. Cuba has called on the
United States to go home ever since the Cuban revolution in 1959, but the United States
has argued that the lease is a valid agreement that allows it to
remain there. A problem of this nature is currently brewing between
Ukraine and Russia over the port that Russia leases for its Black Sea
Fleet of naval ships at Sevastopol. Ukraine says it wont renew the
lease when it expires in 2017, but Russia seems intent on staying , at least
until it has an alternative port ready at some later point.
SHABA MODULE
Inherency/Uniqueness
Shaba farms are the lynchpin in the Levant another war inevitable without
resolution
On July 12, 2006,
the Second Lebanon War broke out. The UN Secretary

General, in retrospect, noted in his September 2006 report that [i]t is important to
emphasize that the issue of the Shaba Farms area continues to be
put forward in contradiction to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council to justify the
existence and activities of Hizbollah insofar as militant activity across
the blue Line is concerned. [] A permanent solution of this issue [status of
the area], however, remains contingent upon the delineation of the border
between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.
SHABA HAS NOT BEEN DEMARCATED SUCCESSFULLY

Although the positions of Syria and Lebanon with regard to
sovereignty over the Shaba Farms have now practically been
reversed by 180 at the unilateral political declaratory leve, no
revisions of sovereignty were undertaken formally, nor did either of
the parties delineate borderlines or enter into any corresponding
bilateral or otherwise relevant agreement.
Leasing Harms/Impacts
General
NO RESOLUTION ON SHEBA MEANS MASSIVE UPHEAVALS IN
THE LEVANT
Electric Lebanon 2009, September 11, Shebaa Farms "real issue" is water,
electronicintifada.net/content/shebaa-farms-real-issue-water/8438
continued Israeli occupation of
the Shebaa Farms will remain a key trigger to renewed conflict
between the two countries.
There will not be enough water for our generation or the next , said Comair.
We will see social, economic, political and military conflicts and in
that order within the next 20 years.
But in the absence of hydro-diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon, the
SHABA IS SET ON THE BLUE LINE WITHOUT RESOLVING

SHABA VIOLENCE WILL ESCALATE TO A REGIONAL WAR
UN Report, 2013, February 28, Ban's report on 1701: Lebanese elections should
be conducted within constitutional timeframe, unreport.blogspot.com/2013/02/bans-report-on-1701-lebanese-elections.html
The situation in UNIFILs area of operations generally remained stable during the reporting period. Calm
prevailed
along the Blue Line and the parties worked closely with UNIFIL to strengthen liaison and coordination arrangements.
However, a few incidents occurred which had the potential to spark a
serious escalation.
RESOLUTION OF SHABA IS NECESSARY FOR LEVANT PEACE

AND SOLVING LEBANESE TURMOIL

The resolution of the Shaba Farms dispute, and a corresponding
Israeli withdrawal, have been widely considered as a necessary (although
not sufficient) condition for defusing the larger conflict (including the volatile
domestic Lebanese situation) and the neutralization of the Hizb Allah.
SHABA KEY TO UN CRED, WATER RIGHTS IN THE LEVANT, AND

ISREALI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The Shaba Farms, however, represent an issue of significance far beyond
the immediate local context.15 Apparently, the more Arab states conclude
peace agreements with Israel, consequently eliminating grounds for
conflict, the greater the salience of these arid farmland s, a colonial relic resurrected
for twenty-first century purposes. It has been made the center pillar of strategizing
Syrian and Iranian political interests in the region, tied in to water
rights and scarcity thereof in the area, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Lebanese efective sovereignty, and Israels security at large,
and the UN stature, to name the most prominently related themes.
Water Wars
SHABA RESOLUTION IS KEY TO PREVENT WATER WARS IN THE
LEVANT
The absence of hydro-diplomacy reflects conflict in the region . In 1965, Syria
and Lebanon began the construction of channels to divert the Banias and Hasbani, preventing the rivers flowing into Israel. Israel
attacked the diversion works, the first in a series of moves that led to a regional war two years later.
In 2002, when the Lebanese constructed a pipeline on the River Wazzani intended to
supply households in southern Lebanon with water, Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared

the action a causus belli. In the July War of 2006, Israeli warplanes targeted southern Lebanons water network.
Bassam Jaber, a water expert at Lebanons Ministry of Energy and Water, argues the Shebaa is critical to Israels water needs, especially
because fresh water is critical when all sources within Israel are salty . The
flows from the area help to regulate the saltiness of Lake Tiberius.
And it is not just the direct overland flow that the Shebaa provides
Israel. According to the Lebanese Water Ministrys Comair, 30 to 40 percent of the River Dans
water flows into it through underground supplies originating in the
Shebaa. Israel is worried that if Lebanon gains control of the Shebaa,
it can then control the flow to the Dan river, said Comair.
NO RESOLUTION ON SHEBA MEANS MASSIVE UPHEAVALS IN

THE LEVANT
But in the absence of hydro-diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon , the

continued Israeli occupation of the Shebaa Farms will remain a key trigger to
renewed conflict between the two countries.
There will not be enough water for our generation or the next , said Comair.
We will see social, economic, political and military conflicts and in
that order within the next 20 years.
WATER WARS OUTWEIGHMOST LIKELY EXTINCTION SCENARIO

In These Times 02 (11/11, in These Times is a nonprofit, independent,
national magazine published in Chicago. Weve been around since 1976, fighting for
corporate accountability and progressive government. In other words, a better world
cites environmental thinker and activist Vandana Shiva Maude Barlow and Tony
Clarkeprobably North Americas foremost water experts
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/25/culture1.shtml
The two books provide a chilling, in-depth examination of a rapidly emerging global crisis. Quite simply, Barlow and Clarke write,
unless we dramatically change our ways, between one-half and two-thirds of humanity will be living with severe fresh water shortages
within the next quarter-century. The hard news is this: Humanity is depleting, diverting and polluting the planets fresh water
resources so quickly and relentlessly that every species on earthincluding our ownis in mortal danger. The crisis is so great, the
three authors agree, that the worlds next great wars will be over water. The Middle East, parts of Africa, China, Russia, parts of the
United States and several other areas are already struggling to equitably share water resources. Many conflicts over water are not even
recognized as such: Shiva blames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in part on the severe scarcity of water in settlement areas. As available
fresh water on the planet decreases, todays low-level conflicts can only increase in intensity
WATER CONFLICT ARE EMPIRICALLY PROVEN

Glecik in 9, http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars/
Peter Gleick is co-founder and president of the Pacific Institute in Oakland,
California, and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on
Water Security and the UNs Expert Group on Policy Relevance of the World Water
Assessment Program. He is editor of the biennial book The Worlds Water and has
recently begun blogging at Water By the Numbers.
Far more important, and far easier to answer, is the question: Is there any connection between fresh water and conflict, including violent
conflict? And the answer has to be an unambiguous yes. History going back 5,000 years is rife with examples where water has been a
goal of violence, a target or tool of conflict, or a source of disputes and political strife. Our Water Conflict Chronology, at
worldwater.org, lists hundreds of these examples. And if there is a strong connection between water and conflicts, two new questions
come up: Are the risks of these conflicts growing, and how can we reduce them? I think the answer to the first is, yes, the risks of waterrelated conflicts appears to be growing.
CLIMATE CHANGE INCREASES THE RISK OF WATER SHORTAGE

Campana 9,
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars/
Michael E. Campana is the director of the Institute for Water and Watersheds and a
professor of geosciences at Oregon State University. He maintains the blog
WaterWired.
The aforementioned events afford some measure of optimism, but will the past predict the future? We face an uncertain and potentially
calamitous future. World population is approaching 7 billion people. Climate change and its effect on water resources loom ominously.
Watershed boundaries may change. Water supplies may increase in some areas and decrease in others. And since water does more than
quench thirstit grows food, maintains ecosystems and fisheries, dilutes waste, provides recreation, facilitates navigation and trade, and
generates powerI can foresee situations where nations, or even states, cities, or provinces, wage war over water and the services it
provides.
WATER INSECURITY IS A FORM OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AT

THE ROOT OF GENDER, POWER AND ECONOMIC OPPRESSION
Allouche 2010, Jeremy, Institute of Development Studies The sustainability and resilience of global water
and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global
trade q Food Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol
What about the future? It is clear that water and food management will face major challenges due to
increasing uncertainties caused by climate change and fast changing socio-economic boundary
conditions. Hydro meteorological records and climate change scenarios provide evidence that water
resources are vulnerable with strong consequences for human security. Five hundred million people
worldwide currently live in countries where supply is chronically short; the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts these numbers will rise as climate change affects surface water
levels that depend on rainfall and glacial melting (Bates et al., 2008). Heatwaves and water shortages
will have an adverse impact on safe drinking water and sanitation, with disproportionate effects on the
poorest and most vulnerable. According to studies by the Feinstein International Center, the number of
people affected globally by natural disasters (including droughts and oods) has been increasing
steadily, by an estimated 50,00060,000 people per decade, since the early 1970s. The number of
reported disasters has also increased year on year, from an average annual total of 90 in the 1970s, to a
gure close to 450 per year in the present decade. The data and projections by the Feinstein
International center suggest a 20% increase in extreme event frequency (Mackinnon et al., 2009). In
relation to the waterfood nexus, as climate temperature extremes are predicted to increase in
frequency and intensity in future, droughts and oods may become more severe and more frequent
and this could potentially dramatically reduce crop yields and livestock numbers and productivity
especially in semiarid areas. This means that the poorest regions with high levels of chronic
undernourishment will also be exposed to the highest degree of instability in food production. Climate
change may affect food systems in several ways ranging from direct effects on crop production (e.g.
changes in rainfall leading to drought/ooding or warmer/cooler temperatures leading to changes in
the length of growing season) to changes in markets, food prices and supply chain infrastructure. Most
studies found that climate change will have a highly negative impact for developing countries in terms
of crop productivity and increase risk of hunger, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Rosegrant and
Cline, 2003). Most of the research up to now has been on the bio-physical aspects of production (land
suitability, crop yields, pest regimes Gregory et al., 1999). The possible impact of climate change on
food accessibility and utilization has been neglected. Recent research by Gregory et al. (2005) and
Schmidhuber and Tubiello This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges
in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource
scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conict, political instability or
food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in
explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conicts. Although resource scarcity
has been linked to international wars, the current data shows that most conict over water and food
are much more local. But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger
and water insecurity, in the majority of cases, water and food insecurity are rarely about competition
over resources but rather reect the politics of allocation and inequality. In this respect, war and
conicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At the global
level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities.
Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in
terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars
scenarios. Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and
resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and
hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their
living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under
anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food
security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily
linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.
WATER SHORTAGES CAUSE GLOBAL DESTABILIZATION

Gleick 12 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-h-gleick/time-for-a-21st-centuryu_b_1920367.html Time for a 21st Century U.S. Water Policy
Water-related problems also threaten our national security. In our
globally integrated economy, water problems in other countries
reverberate back home. Political insecurity and instability is growing
in regions where access to freshwater is a problem, including especially in
North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, with growing concerns about tensions in the central Asian republics. Less
predictable hot spots are also likely to appear and there are growing reports of violence and political disruption over water shortages. in
parts of Africa. Just this month the BBC reported that over 100 people have died in conflicts between farmers and cattle herders over
land and water in Kenya. Because conflicts over water contribute to broader political
tensions and conflicts, diplomatic efforts to reduce the risks of conflict must now include an environmental
component. Furthermore, military preparedness should include an improved understanding and analysis of the threats associated with
water.
HEZBOLLAH - GENERAL
SOLVING SHABA SOLVES HIZBALLAH
Spyer 2009, Jonathan, Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global
Research in International Affairs Center, June 1, Israel and Lebanon: Problematic
Proximity, www.gloria-center.org/2009/06/spyer-2009-06-01/
Nevertheless, the
Shaba farms claim was used as a casus belli by Hizballah,

which vowed to continue attacks on Israel unless the area was
ceded. Hizballahs determination to continue its fight against Israel and the failure of the Beirut government or the Syrian powerbrokers in Lebanon to interfere with this resulted in continued tension on Israels
northern border.
RESOLUTION OF SHABA IS NECESSARY FOR LEVANT PEACE

AND SOLVING LEBANESE TURMOIL


The resolution of the Shaba Farms dispute, and a corresponding
Israeli withdrawal, have been widely considered as a necessary (although
not sufficient) condition for defusing the larger conflict (including the volatile
domestic Lebanese situation) and the neutralization of the Hizb Allah.
Hezbollah Syrian Revolution

HIZBALLAH NEUTRALIZATION PREREQ TO SOLVING SYRIA
[REVOLUTION] NOT SOLVING ENSURES REGIONAL WAR (A2
D/AS & POLITICS)
Nahmias 2011, Roee, News reported for Israel News, November 22, Report:
Hezbollah considering military coup if assad falls,
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4151677,00.html
As
soon as Hezbollah will sense that the collapse of Assad's regime is

imminent, armed cells will quickly begin operating to seize control of
Beirut's eastern and western parts," one of the sources told al-Arabia. "This operation,
which will be coordinated with Hezbollah's allies, including Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic
Movement, will be carried out under the banner of 'protecting the resistance and its weapons inside Lebanon,'" he said. According to the
source, Hezbollah will explain that the takeover "as an act that is aimed at countering Lebanese forces plotting to suppress the resistance
in cooperation with foreign elements - headed by Israel and take advantage of (Assad's downfall) to annihilate Hezbollah." About a
week and a half ago Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah warned Israel and the US that a war against Iran
and Syria would lead to an all-out regional conflict. "They should understand that a
war on Iran and Syria will not remain in Iran and Syrian territory, but
it will engulf the whole region and there is no escaping this reality ,
Nasrallah said during a televised speech honoring "Martyrs' Day."
MUST SOLVE HEZBOLLAH TO SOLVE SYRIAN REVOLUTION
White 2013, defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military
and security affairs of the Levant and Iran. He is widely sought out as a
commentator on military issues involving Syria, Israel, Hizballah, the Gaza conflict,
and Iran May 29, Hezbollah's declaration of war in syria: military implications, The
Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollahsdeclaration-of-war-in-syria-military-implications
On May 25, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah ma de
what amounts to a
declaration of war against the Syrian revolution. He committed his group to
defeating the rebellion and preserving the regime of Bashar al-Assad, declaring
that "Syria is the resistance's main supporter, and the resistance cannot stand still and let takfiris [extremist Sunnis] break its
backbone." No one can fault him for lack of clarity; this was not a speech cloaked in ambiguity. Assuming he follows through on his
commitment to protect Assad's regime, both the speech and Hezbollah actions already
underway in Syria could profoundly afect the war's military course,

the security situation in Lebanon, and the group's military contest
with Israel.
REVOLUTION FAILS WITHOUT STOPPING HEZBOLLAH

DIPLOMACY ALONE WONT DO
White 2013, defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military
and security affairs of the Levant and Iran. He is widely sought out as a
commentator on military issues involving Syria, Israel, Hizballah, the Gaza conflict,
and Iran May 29, Hezbollah's declaration of war in syria: military implications, The
Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollahsdeclaration-of-war-in-syria-military-implications
Hezbollah's commitment in particular will change the equation on whatever battlefields the group fights,
giving the regime renewed ofensive and defensive capabilities and
greater resources. It will also boost morale among the regime's forces
and supporters, encouraging Assad to stay the course and crush the rebellion. As a result, the regime will be even
less likely to negotiate a true transition of power, deflating the hopes
of those pressing for a diplomatic solution. A regime that has shown
no inclination to negotiate while losing the war will hardly be moved
to compromise if it believes its prospects have improved . Hezbollah's
bold action stands in sharp contrast to the feeble response from supporters of the Syrian opposition. Without a significant upgrading of
rebel capabilities -- either from their own resources, outside assistance, or both -- Nasrallah's declaration could
prove decisive to the war's outcome.
NOT SOLVING HEZBOLLAH MEANS REGIONAL WAR IN THE

LEVANT ARMING WILL ONLY MAKE THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION
WAR WORSE
Cortright 13 (David, 6/11/13, director of policy studies at the University of Notre
Dames Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Best way for Obama to help
Syria is with aid and diplomacy- not weapons, The Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0611/Best-way-for-Obama-tohelp-Syria-is-with-aid-and-diplomacy-not-weapons/(page)/2//SJ)
What if American arms assistance were to somehow help the rebels turn the tide in their favor? More
Hezbollah
troops would probably enter the fray on the side of the Assad government,
and their paymasters in Tehran might also intervene more directly .
This would escalate and expand the conflict. The Sunni majority Syrian rebels would face a
Shiite-backed (Hezbollah, Iran) Assad regime, intensifying a regional Shiite-Sunni divide already tearing apart Lebanon and Iraq.
This conflict would sunder the entire region and further devastate
Syria. With US involvement growing and escalation likely , pressure would build for
stronger action. A no-fly zone? Drone strikes against Syrian tanks and artillery? Boots on the ground? The US might find
itself dragged into another even more dangerous Middle East war .
Rather than pursuing uncertain and dangerous military solutions, the
US should use its influence to continue to press for a diplomatic
settlement. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov announced recently in Moscow the
convening of a conference in Geneva to end the fighting and begin negotiations for a transitional government. UN-Arab League envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi welcomed last weeks communiqu as the first hopeful news concerning that unhappy country in a very long time."
HEZBOLLAH ISRAEL STRIKE SCENARIO
HEZBOLLAH RISKS ISRAEL FIRST STRIKE

Siddiqui March 2013 [Areej Elahi-Siddiqui is an undergrad in Intl. Relations at
Whitehead School of Diplomacy, March 2013, Israel May Strike Syria to Prevent
Chemical Weapons From Reaching Hezbollah,
http://www.policymic.com/articles/24243/israel-may-strike-syria-to-preventchemical-weapons-from-reaching-hezbollah //SD]
According to Israeli officials,
Israel may launch a pre-emptive strike in attempts to

stop Syria's chemical weapons from reaching Lebanon's Hezbollah or alQaeda-inspired groups the Associated Press has reported on Sunday. As Syrian President Bashar
Assad clings to power in the midst of a deadly 22-month long civil war , Israel has expressed
concern that the leader may lose control over his chemical weapons . Vice
Prime Minister Silvan Shalom believes that the transfer of weapons to particularly violent groups
such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, which incidentally is backed by another one of Israel's
greatest causes of concern, Iran, could be extremely dangerous for the country and
undoubtedly a game changer. "It would be crossing a line that would demand a different
approach, including even action," he told the Army Radio, according to the AP. When asked whether this could
possibly lead to a pre-emptive attack, he said: "We will have to make the decisions." Although Israel has
largely kept out of the Syrian civil war that has resulted in over 60,000 deaths with no end or
solution in sight, yet another cause of grief for Israel is that the violence could spill over into the
Israel from its northern border. Syria, however, has rarely acknowledged possessing chemical weapons. At a
cabinet meeting on Sunday, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to threats from Syria and Iran both who are
each other's main regional allies" saying, "we must look around us, at what is happening in Iran and its proxies
and at what is happening in other areas, with the deadly weapons in Syria, which is increasingly coming apart."
Meanwhile, Israel's departing defense minister, Ehud Barak, said that the Pentagon had prepared blueprints for an
operation to set back Iran's nuclear program in the case that the U.S. would plan to attack, the New York Times has
reported. This could be an indication that Israel no longer plans a unilateral strike. In an interview conducted by The
Daily Beast, Barak made it clear that although they don't intent to strike at the moment, they certainly are not
allowing Iran to obtain nuclear weapon capability. "What we basically say is that if worse comes to worst, there
should be a readiness and an ability to launch a surgical operation that will delay them by a significant time frame
and probably convince them that it won't work because the world is determined to block them." Many also believe
that Israel has also now realized that it mostly likely cannot afford a fight with Iran on its own, and is now relying on
the U.S.'s "scalpels," as Barak has said, for aid in a multi-lateral attack, if necessary. In other words, as the Israeli
attention shifts towards Syria and the potential threat it poses to Israel, the nation has taken a step back from Iran
changing its stance from possibly going in on a unilateral strike into Iran to now once again depending on the U.S.
for assistance.
HEZBOLLAH LEBANON SCENARIO

HEZBOLLAH DESTABILIZES LEBANON
Simon Tisdall, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, 6
[Tisdall was also previously a foreign leader writer for the paper and has also served
as its foreign editor and its US editor. He was the Observers foreign editor from
1996-98. Middle East crisis: World briefing: Bringing Iran and Syria in from the
cold, 7-27, The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, p. Nexis]
A black day in the Middle East produced one hopeful glimmer : Kofi Annan's insistence,
backed by hosts Italy and other Rome conference participants, that lasting peace in Lebanon would
require the "constructive engagement" of all regional countries including Syria and
Iran. "Looking at the broader picture it is clear we need a new push for comprehensive peace," the UN secretarygeneral said. "Without this, we are only buying time until the next explosion ." Mr
Annan's words sound like a statement of the obvious. And Syria and Iran have repeatedly stated that no Lebanon
deal can stick without them. But for its own geo-strategic reasons, the US continues to cold-shoulder the two
countries it blames for arming and aiding the Lebanese Shia militia. There have been half-hearted contacts with
Syria through the US embassy in Damascus. But with Tehran, a founder member of Mr Bush's "axis of evil", nothing
Yet good reasons for seeking direct Iranian and Syrian engagement grow by the
day as the US and Israel dig themselves into ever deeper trouble. Yesterday's Roman circus
at all.
again underlined international divisions over how to end the fighting and how subsequently to police the Israel-
The wider context

- Saudi warnings of regional conflagration, a possible Shia uprising against US
and British forces in Iraq, escalating mayhem in Gaza, a big al-Qaida recruiting
boost, more suicidal terror attacks in western cities, and further global oil
shocks -adds up to a strong case for a change of course. On top of all that,
pro-western Arab regimes of varying degrees of illegitimacy wonder how long they
can prevent street-level anger at the destruction inflicted on Lebanon taking an
insurrectionary turn. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been quietly pushing for an
opening to Syria, diplomats say. Recognising the danger, conservative American commentators are
urging Mr Bush to make President Bashar al-Assad an offer he cannot refuse: a grand
bargain that would accord Syria the regional power status it covets while smashing
its alliance with Iran. In return for cutting its weapons supplies and its political and
financial support for Hizbullah, they say, Syria could be offered normalised relations
and an end to bilateral sanctions. Other carrots include soft-pedalling on the inquiry into last
year's murder of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, and renewed discussion on the
Golan Heights, seized by Israel in 1967. "The big strategic chess move is to try to split
Syria off from Iran and bring Damascus back into the Sunni Arab fold. That is the
game-changer," said columnist Thomas Friedman. "What would be the Syrian price? It would be worth finding
out. After all, Syria hosts Hamas's leadership. It is the land bridge between Hizbullah and Iran.
Lebanon border. None of the participants has any appetite for forcibly disarming Hizbullah.
And it is the safe haven for Ba'athist insurgents in Iraq." Nadim Shehadi, a Middle East expert at Chatham House,
all the other

choices facing the US and Israelis were even worse . "It would be capitulation, maybe you could
said it was possible Mr Bush would turn to Syria as a way out of the crisis but only because
call it capitulation light, but capitulation all the same. It would be the end of the American regional agenda," he
said. And Syria would never entirely pull the plug on Hizbullah. Nor would it break with Iran. "The idea that it would
Cutting a
deal with Damascus to break the deadlock might be more attractive to Washington
than accepting a ceasefire that would be portrayed as a victory for Hizbullah, Mr
Shehadi said. And it was better than the other choice, which was "direct confrontation
with Iran and Syria that could lead to a world war". The biggest danger, he said,
was that Mr Bush might suffer "an Oedipus moment" and, determined to avoid his
father's supposed mistake in leaving Saddam Hussein in power after the 1991 Gulf war, would attack
do so is naive. The only reason Syria is not under attack now is because of its alliance with Iran."
Iran before the country went nuclear. Given that background engaging Iran, as urged by Mr Annan,
looks like an even harder sell. Iran's price for collaboration would include compromise over its suspect nuclear
programme - a likely deal-breaker for the US. And even then, Iran would not abandon Hizbullah. Former president
Muhammad Khatami recently hailed the group as "a shining sun that illuminates and warms the hearts of all
Muslims and supporters of freedom in the world". And he is a moderate.
LEBANON CONFLICT CAUSES GLOBAL OIL WARS

Gundzik, 2k6 Jephraim, president of Condor Advisers, Inc. Condor Advisers has
provided investment risk analysis on emerging markets to individual and
institutional investors Escalating Conflict in the Middle East Could Spark a Global
Recession, PINR, July 31, 2006, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?
ac=view_report&report_id=532&language_id=1]
As the war between Israel and Lebanon escalates, growing regional and
world outrage may increasingly be channeled toward the United States -- the
only country that has influence over Tel Aviv. This may encourage the world's three largest oil
producers, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran, to reduce oil exports
significantly in order to increase pressure on Washington to rein in Israel's military actions.
An oil export embargo undertaken by just Russia and Iran, which together account for 20 percent of the world's oil exports, would be much more effective
at extracting a major policy change from the Bush administration than Syrian and Iranian missile strikes against Israel. Economic data released by the
Because excess oil

production capacity does not exist anywhere in the world , a coordinated
reduction of just five percent of oil exports between any or all of the world's largest oil exporters would
quickly send international oil prices toward $125 per barrel. An increase in
Bureau of Economic Analysis on July 28 showed that economic growth in the United States is weakening.
oil prices of this magnitude could be expected to push the United States
economy into recession .
With the November mid-term Congressional elections in the United States approaching rapidly, those
countries opposing Israel's military actions may soon act to cut oil exports and effect political change in the United States,
global recession
touching of a
in 2007.
OIL WARS GO NUCLEAR
Islam Yasin Qasem, holds a Master Degree in International Affairs from Columbia
University in NYC, 7 [7-9, The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o
.htm]
Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests,
superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military
power to ensure secure access
to oil resources,
triggering worldwide tension , if
while superpowers like the United States maintain

superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker
states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons.
In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure,
not armed conflict. And
and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear

weapons in pursuit of national interests are high.
HEZBOLLAH TERRORISM SCENARIO

Hezbollah active now and most likely scenario for terrorism
US Fed News Service, 13 (US Fed News Service, Fast accurate verbatim
transcripts for political events in Washington Including US State News, 6-1-13,
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON IRAN, THE
IRGC, AND HEZBOLLAH'S INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE,
ProQuest//ACK)
US. Department of State issued the following press release: MODERATOR: Hey, good morning, everyone,
and thanks for joining us. And let me just go ahead and introduce our speakers real quick and we'll get it
over to them. We have - first of all, this call is on background. We have [Senior Administration Official One],
who'll be Senior Administration Official One. And our second speaker is [Senior Administration Official Two],
who will be Senior Administration Official Two. So I'm going to turn it right over to Senior Administration
Official One for some opening remarks and then Two for some brief comments as well. So go ahead, Senior
Administration Official One. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you very much and thanks for
everyone to be - for being on the call today. As many of you will have seen, yesterday we released at the
State Department the annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012. And one of
the most noteworthy conclusions when we put that report together was a marketing resurgence
of terrorist activity by Iran and Hezbollah. The tempo of operational
activity was something we haven't seen since the 1990s, with attacks
plotted in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa in 2012 alone . We believe this
is an alarming trend. It's borne out by the facts and it merits closer inspection as we evaluate the landscape
deepening commitment both Iran

and Hezbollah have made to fight and kill on behalf of the Assad
regime in Syria. That involvement, of course, is hardening the conflict
and threatening to spread the violence across the region. Hezbollah and the
of terrorist activity globally. Add to this, of course, is the
Iranian leadership share a similar world view and strategic vision and are seeking to exploit the current
This approach has increased sectarian

tensions and conflict and serves further as a destabilizing force
during a time of great change throughout the region. The activity is, as I said,
unrest in the region to their advantage.
alarming, but there's also an encouraging trend at work and one I think that's received fairly - relatively little
attention in our view, and that's the increasingly firm response among governments around the world to
these actions. We're seeing prosecutions of Hezbollah operatives in multiple jurisdictions around the world,
ongoing investigations, and discussions about proscribing the group as a terrorist organization. Now just to
recap a couple of the
notable incidents in 2012 that we also covered in our report, in February

July 2012 bombing in
of this year the Bulgarian Government publicly implicated Hezbollah in a
Burgas that killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen and injured 32 others. In March of this year, a
court in Cyprus found a Hezbollah operative guilty of charges stemming from surveillance activities carried
out in 2012 against Israeli tourists. Thailand is currently prosecuting a Hezbollah member for his role in
helping plan a possible terrorist attack in that country. We understand that trial will begin in mid-June. The
Qods Force is suspected of directing terrorist attacks in Georgia, India, Thailand, and Kenya in 2012. You will
Qods Force was implicated in a 2011 plot to assassinate

the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington . Manssor
also recall that the
Arbabsiar was sentenced yesterday to 25 years in prison for his involvement in that plot. We see no signs of
assessment is that Hezbollah and Iran will

both continue to maintain a heightened level of terrorist activity and
operations in the near future. Now turning to Syria, Hezbollah has long
this activity abating in 2013. In fact, our
been involved in the conflict and, of course, is making no - no longer making any effort to
disguise or downplay the extent of its commitment to kill or die on behalf of the Assad
regime. A large number of Hezbollah fighters are now operating in
Syria, even though the Lebanese Government has sought to
disassociate Lebanon from the Syrian crisis in the best interest of the Lebanese
people. The group is openly undermining that policy and working closely with Iran to provide a range of
support to the Assad regime, including fighters, weaponry, and training a large pro-regime militia. We judge
Iran and Hezbollah have enlisted Alawite, Iraqi, Shia militant and
terrorist groups to participate in counter-opposition operations in Syria. All of this support is helping
that
the regime brutally crack down on the opposition, kill civilians, and is contributing to regional instability,
both Hezbollah and Iran's

involvement in Syria is only deepening as they take whatever steps are necessary to
notably in Lebanon. And unfortunately, it's clear that
ensure that their close ally survives.
Solvency
LEASING SOLVES FOR ALL PARTIES AND FITS THE HISTORICAL
MODEL WILL SAY YES
Our proposal suggests embarking on a completely different route. In
the Middle East, perception is

often more powerful than objective reality, and the task of todays
Israeli and Palestinian leaders of finding ways to interpret the myths
in a way that maintains both sides dignity and opens the way for
practical solutions is formidable.60 This applies also to the relations
between Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, and to our suggestion regarding
a leasehold solution. Since 1982, the Hizb Allah has been extremely
successful in creating and developing a new perception regarding
southern Lebanon; and since 2000, specifically concerning the Shaba
Farms.61 This tactic could be reversed and employed to assist Syria in returning to a leadership position
in the Arab world as well as bolstering its status vis--vis Iran and restoring control over the Hizb Allah and all this
without losing face. It may prove the carrot to attract Syria to join the
negotiation table. The study of international leasing indicated that conflicts which are
amenable to resolution through territorial leases involve areas that
are small, both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the states involved; with few if any
inhabitants; with limited natural resources (known or suspected); and with
limited economic activity. Leases may also succeed for territories with other characteristics, but these
mentioned here are the conditions that the territories examined had
in common. The same conditions are present for certain territories on all continents where issues of sovereignty remain
unresolved between states, among them the Shaba Farms.
LEASING WILL SOLVE

Taking stock of all of these factors suggests that a territorial lease
may be a workable option for resolving the conflict over the Shaba
Farms, particularly since the cease-fire after the Second Lebanon War
in 2006 has kept the intensity of the conflict at a reduced level. The crosscurrents of claims suggests a variety of possible scenarios, for example:
LEASE ACTS AS A BRIDGE TO LONG TERM SOLVENCY

The cooperation required for administering a lease would provide a
forum for confidence-building among the states involved in the
Shaba Farms dispute. In the event that a lease is agreed as a
provisional measure because a lasting solution cannot be negotiated,
the process of administering it can be a catalyst for relations, moving
the states toward the point where a more permanent solution might
be achievable.
PALESTINE MODULE
Palestine could use the leasing model
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WQTyWaFzD4TI12ay_dQkF8Pp_cjRzdRpKPVqRebIF7c/edit
Cubas options. RELATED TO SOVEREIGNTY
Abrasive:
1. As the sovereign, Cuba can request that the Cuban flag be flown at the Base. 2. As the sovereign, Cuba could lease other territory to
other countries, for any purpose. 3. As the sovereign, Cuba could invoke eminent domain against the Naval Station.
Cooperative:
4. Cuba could ask the US to reaffirm the Teller Amendment. 5. Cuba could ofer to renegotiate a
Treaty of Relations 6. Cuba could offer to renegotiate the Lease on a mutually agreeable basis.
This actually could be an important model for the settlement of the
issue of Palestine.
OTHER MODULES (INCOMPLETE)
LEASING CAN SOLVE 3 DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR CONFLICT

van Efferink,
There are a number of conflicts in which territorial leasing may be worth
considering as an option, based on the characteristics of the territories and of the
conflicts themselves. Some examples include the dispute over the Shaba
(Shebaa) Farms, a small area where Israel, Syria and Lebanon converge; a
dispute between Bolivia and Chile over part of the Atacama Desert; and a conflict
between Egypt and Sudan over an area called the Halaib Triangle. The viability of
a territorial lease in each case would depend on a number of circumstances, but
the initial profiles of these and other disputes suggest that carefully negotiated
leases might be successful in alleviating or resolving them.
MUST ACT SOON, TIMEFRAMES FOR THESE SCENARIOS DONT

ALWAYS LAST

Conflicts that are low-intensity may also have the greatest potential to be settled through leases, as this was also a feature in the cases
studied. The timing of conflict-resolution eforts relative to events in a
dispute is therefore critical; while this would be the case for any type
of settlement attempt, it is possible that resolving a conflict through
leasing may be viable at an earlier moment of calm rather than resolving it through a
more traditional and definitive determination of sovereignty and rights.
A2 TERRITORIAL LEASES -> INDEFINITE CONTROL

HISTORICALLY UNTRUE
van Efferink,
Territorial leasing can have disadvantages for the lessor state if the
transfer of rights is so comprehensive that the lessee state is
tempted to claim sovereignty over the territory after a period of
controlling it. Sovereignty over leased territories has occasionally been transferred this way, causing some scholars a century
ago to refer to territorial leases as "disguised cessions." Yet this is far from the rule, since leased
territories have also been returned to the lessor states upon
termination of the leases modern examples being Hong Kong , which
reverted back to China, and the Panama Canal, which reverted back to Panama.
PROBLEM IS WITH THE WRITING OF THE LEASES, NOT THE IDEA

ITSELF GITMO PROVES
van Efferink,
That said, problems
that arise with territorial leases are usually the result

of the specific terms contained in the lease. Cubas lease of
Guantanamo Bay gave the United States "complete jurisdiction and
control" over the territory, which prompted Cubas Supreme Court to rule that Cuba had to consider the area as
foreign for legal purposes, even though Cuba retained "ultimate sovereignty." That left Cuba with no active
authority on this piece of its sovereign territory.

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Heg

US IS THE HEGEMON NO CHANGES COMING

CHINA CHALLENGING THE US ALL OVER THE WORLD

HEGEMONIC ASSERTION ONLY RE-ENTRENCHES CHINAA

strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese conclusion

CHINA DOESNT WANT THE US INVOLVED IN ASIA

US HEG CAUSES CHINA MILITARIZATION

HFC AGREEMENT NEEDED NOW

CHINA HAS A 53% TARIFF ON US SOLAR

HUMAN RIGHTS IMPORTANT TO US

HUMAN RIGHTS NOT KEY IRRECONCILABLE IDEOLOGICAL

HUMAN RIGHTS KEY TO ALL OTHER IMPACTS

CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE GETTING WORSE

NEED TO USE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

SHOULD CALL FOR PRISONER RELEASE

CHINA WONT CHANGE THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS BECAUSE OF US

HR KEY TO OTHER ISSUES AND LARGER RELATIONS

US ANTI-BLACKNESS MEANS CHINA WONT CHANGE THEIR HR

CHINA MAKING STRATEGIC HR ADVANCES OVERALL POSITIVE

US HYPOCRISY PREVENTS CHINA HR CHANGES

RESOLUTION OF US RELATION TO POC HAS TO COME BEFORE

HERES WHAT THE AFF SHOULD SOUND LIKE:

CHINAS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE US:

Undertake measures to combat racial discrimination, including adoption of a

CHINESE GOV AFFIRMS HUMAN RIGHTS ARE UNIVERSAL

HANDS OFF APPROACH IS BETTER ALLOWS US TO RESOLVE

HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE TIED TO OTHER ISSUES

To be sure, there are some exceptions to this generalization. Michael Pillsbury

HUMAN RIGHTS IS MERELY POLITICAL POSTURING

CHINA CARES MORE ABOUT CRIMINAL REPATRIATION

NO COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS = US LOSES CREDIBILITY

US HYPOCRISY EMBOLDENS CHINA TO NOT RESOLVE HUMAN

By pointing an accusing finger at the counterterrorism legislation and claiming it will

CP: CHINA/UNHCR PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREAN

CHINA REALLY BAD ON HUMAN RIGHTS GETTING WORSE

In China, an economic powerhouse that nevertheless remains a one-party

CHINA SEES HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICAL POSTURING FOR

US WALKING THE WALK KEY TO SOLVING

US LACK OF HUMAN RIGHTS CREDIBILITY HALTS DIALOGUE

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES HURT CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

HURDLE IS CULTURAL RELATIVISM NOT HYPOCRISY

HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS IN US KEY TO REFORMS IN CHINA

Ultimately, pushing forward in these four directions amounts to making better,

ECON COOPERATION SOLVES CHINA-RUSSIA PACT AND

CHINA ECON SUSTAINABLE

best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding private sector still

ECON KEY TO RELATIONSHIP BUT AT BRINK NOW

ECON KEY TO CHINA STABILITY RECESSION LEADS TO

ECON KEY TO CHINESE STABILITY

ECON KEY TO HUMAN RIGHTS

CHINESE SLOWDOWN SPILLS OVER TO EMERGING COUNTRIES

BIT GIVES STRONG SIGNAL TO BUSINESSES RAISES BIZ CON

CHINA HARD LANDING HAS AN IMPACT RATING OF 20

March 17th 2016Introduction

CHINESE ECON SLOWDOWN PRETTY MUCH INEVITABLE MANY

CHINA MUST REINVEST ITS INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS OR

ECON GROWTH KEY TO CCP LEGITIMACY

CONTAINMENT LEADS TO ESCALATION

SCENARIOS FOR WAR

WONT HAPPEN CHINA KNOWS THEYLL LOSE AND THEY

CHINAS NUKES ARE IMPROVING DEVELOPING SECOND STRIKE

China is making significant qualitative improvements to its nuclear deterrent along

nuclear strikes to seek deescalation on terms favorable to China. A key implication