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159132)
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months
pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to the Lorma
Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to
vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via
telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day.
2
A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing
3
the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. The following day,
4
Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the
fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding,
petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and
Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." The procedure was
performed by the petitioner and Editha was discharged the
next day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at
the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe
abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha
6
had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a
result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
Respondents: first, petitioners failure to check up, visit or
administer medication on Editha during her first day of
9
confinement at the LMC; second, petitioner recommended
that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without
10
conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure;
third, petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure
instead of closely monitoring the state of pregnancy of
Editha.
Petitioner: it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission
in insisting to be discharged against doctors advice and her
unjustified failure to return for check-up as directed by
petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on;
that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her very
abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was
an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal
placental implantation; that whether or not a D&C procedure
was done by her or any other doctor, there would be no
difference at all because at any stage of gestation before
term, the uterus would rupture just the same.
RULING: Medical malpractice is a particular form of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of
care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession
generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence
44
cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert
testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon
would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr.
Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the
subject. He testified that the rupture occurred minutes prior
to the hysterectomy or right upon admission on September
15, 1994 which is about 1 months after the patient was
discharged, after the D&C was conducted. It is evident that
the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the
rupture of Edithas uterus.
The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under
Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
Defendant presented
-the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole
franchise area, including Area No. 9 which covered the
residence of Antonio Yabes, did not suffer from any defect
that might constitute a hazard to life and property.
-the service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in
Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in
question.
-defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid
injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
-Defendant had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making
a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively
assigned to them.
CFI -in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint
CA-issued the controverted decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the
deceased's death.
RULING:
We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The
respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument
that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons
and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons
and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
We subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent CA.
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in
Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of
June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any
probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence
does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. (CA
Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies
must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger.
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be"
(Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence
of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to
produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would
not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
G.R. No. 154259
against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims
alleged abusive conduct.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr.
Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither
can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done
within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to
bear alone.
112 Picart vs. Smith| Street March 15, 1918 | 37 Phil 809
lane
while
De Roy v. CA
FACTS: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
RULING: Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners
argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the.
warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
PLDT v. CA
FACTS: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban
had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. Respondent
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was
left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered
physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered.
PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it
should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and
Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one
liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract
and
had
installed
necessary
barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely
contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident,
hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries
which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot
recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT
considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid the
injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proof to show existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof.
109 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District | Bautista Angelo
L-7644 August 29, 1958 |
FACTS
Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara,
Quezon City
It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its
pools
Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went
to the pools along with his 2 brothers
He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers
that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him
and went to the Deep pool
Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person
was swimming to long under water
Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool
to retrieve Ongs lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard
tried to revive the boy.
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render
assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente
who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the
security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the
resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected
the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left
on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of
the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued the artificial
manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they
applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted
Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is
asphyxia by submersion in water (pagkalunod)
The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against
Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and
supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had
the last clear chance to revive Ong.
It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety
measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards,
ring buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator.
There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic
established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also
on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which
prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any
attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full- time
physician in the swimming pool compound, it has however a
nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections
or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its
negligence
W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in
this case
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Metropolitan is not negligent
Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid
danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy,
toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black
colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs
six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course
for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief
and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time
on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided
with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who
are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong
was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of
appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life.
When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the
inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they
applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were
exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they
sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines
who however came late because upon examining the body
found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that
appellee has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that
reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death