Constitutional Law 1 Cases

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh

Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated during
the time of the Japanese occupation. After the liberation of
Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on his
case saying that the proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur has
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the courts of the Philippines and without the enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines
under the Japanese.
Issues:
1. Whether or Not judicial proceedings and decisions during the
Japanese Occupation were valid and remained valid.
2. Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthur
declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other
Government other than that of the commonwealth are null and
void, invalidated and all judgments and judicial acts proceeding
from the courts.
3. Whether or not of they were invalidated (reference to No.2),
the courts can continue hearing the cases pending before them
Held:
1.It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts
and proceedings and non-political judgments of a de facto
government are good and valid. The governments by the

Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the

Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments,
which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid,
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy
(postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.2.

it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been,
the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase
"processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law. The only reasonable construction of the said
phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than
judicial processes of court proceedings." A statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." If a belligerent occupant is required to
establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden
to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing there
in their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military
commander of the forces of liberation or the restored
government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the
judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the
period of occupation.
3. The proceedings in cases then pending in said court may
continue,
without
necessity
of
enacting
a
lawconferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become the laws

and courts of Japan by being continued as required by the law of

nations.
Same
courts
may
continue
exercising
the
same jurisdictions and cases pending therein before the
restoration of the commonwealth until abolished and replaced by
the said government.
DECISION:
WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the Court Of
First Instance of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in Case No. 3012.3
Kinds of De Facto Government:
1.Established through Rebellion
Governments gets possession and control through the force of
the voice of the majority and maintains itself rightful government
2.Established through Occupation
(PARAMOUNT FORCE) Maintained by the military forces who
invade and occupy the territory of the enemy.
3.Established through Insurrection
Established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
CO
75

KIM

CHAN

v.
PHIL

VALDEZ

TAN

KEH
113

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and
to continue the proceedings in petitioners case on the ground
that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General

Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial

proceedings and judgments of court during the Japanese
occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the
government established during the Japanese occupation was no
de
facto
government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the
Japanese
occupation
remain
good
and
valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments
and
judicial
acts
and
proceedings
of
said
court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending
in
said
courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
government established by military forces and thus a de facto
government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial,
acts of de facto governments, which are not of political
complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that
the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer
to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments
and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The
existence of the courts depend upon the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and
continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus
obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue
proceedings in cases not of political complexion.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR
OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,

ET
G.R.

No.

73748,

May

22,

AL.
1986

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
are the judge. The Court further held that the people have
accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
R E S O L U T IO N

PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents,
petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5
(not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it
refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among
the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and VicePresident Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to
under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution
refers to, . ...
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for
lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring
this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary
that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in

effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic,

President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's
allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public
record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of
June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986
Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by
this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the

Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22,

1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines,
etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972
[People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs.
Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton
U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the
petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and VicePresident of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted
reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras,
JJ., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
FELICIANO, JJ., concurring.
The petitioner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent
President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
elections" as stated in Article XVIII, Section 5 of the Draft
Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986.
We agree that the petition deserves outright dismissal as this
Court has no original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's prayer for a

declaration as to who were elected President and Vice President
in the February 7, 1986 elections should be addressed not to this
Court but to other departments of government constitutionally
burdened with the task of making that declaration.
The 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as amended, and
the 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly provide 'that boards of
canvassers in each province and city shall certified who were
elected President and Vice President in their respective areas.
The certified returns are transmitted to the legislature which
proclaims, through the designated Presiding Head, who were
duty elected.
Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards
of canvassers have not been furnished this Court nor is there any
need to do so. In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume
the function of stating, and neither do we have any factual or
legal capacity to officially declare, who were elected President
and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections.
As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President
referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, we agree that there is
no doubt the 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President Salvador H.
Laurel.
Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the Court in G.R. Nos.
73748, 73972, and 73990.
For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant
petition.
CRUZ, J., concurring:

I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that the Constitution

we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified and is
therefore not yet effective. I see here no actual conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination at this time. (Aetna
Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227; PACU vs.
Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806.)
G.R. No. L-17467

April 23, 1963

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, represented by its

Agents,
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE YULO TOBIAS, defendant-appellee.
Ramon
de
los
Reyes
for
plaintiff-appellant.
Vicente Hilado for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by plaintiff, National Development Company,
represented by its agent, The Philippine National Bank, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon the ground of prescription of
action, without special pronouncement as to costs.
In said complaint, filed on March 22, 1960, plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant, Jose YULO TOBIAS, the sum of
P6,905.81, plus interest and attorney's fees, under a promissory
note of said defendant, dated and issued on May 13, 1946, for
the sum of P7,000.00, payable "on demand after date" to the
order of said plaintiff. Upon being summoned, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss upon the ground that "the action upon which
the complaint is based has prescribed long ago," more than ten
(10) years having elapsed since May 13, 1946, when said

promissory note was issued and plaintiff's action accrued. Hence,

the aforementioned order of dismissal, which plaintiff assails as
erroneous upon the theory that the statute of limitations does
not run against the plaintiff because the same is an
instrumentality of the Government. In support of this view
plaintiff cites the case of the Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Monte de Piedad (35 Phil. 738).
Plaintiffs pretense is clearly devoid of merit. The case cited is not
in point, it having been instituted by the Government of the
Philippine Islands. Plaintiff herein is neither the Government of
the Republic nor a branch or subdivision thereof. It is true that
plaintiff is an instrumentality of such Government, but as this
Court has held in the case of Association Cooperative de Credito
Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro (74 Phil. 281), "even the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, which is a government owned
and controlled corporation and which has been created to
promote agriculture and industry on a larger scale than
agriculture credit cooperative associations, cannot be said to
exercise a sovereign function. It is, like all other corporation
capitalized by the Government, a business corporation," and, as
such, its causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations.
To the same effect are the cases of Monteadora vs. Cebu
Portland Cement Co. (54 O.G. 4289), Price Stabilization Corp. vs.
CIR (54 O.G. 4472), GSIS vs. Castillo (52 O.G. 4269), and
Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Co. (73 Phil.
374).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers and,

hence, can not invoke the exemptions thereof but is an agency
for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business
functions, is apparent from its Organic Act (Commonwealth Act
182, as amended by Commonwealth Act 311) pursuant to
section 3 of which it "shall be subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law in so far as they are not inconsistent" with the
provisions of said Commonwealth Act "and shall have the general
powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law, and, hence, "may
engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural, and other
enterprises which may be necessary or contributory to the
economic development of the country, or important in the public
interest," as well as "acquire, hold, mortgage, and alienate
personal and real property in the Philippines or elsewhere . . .;
make contracts of any kind and description" and "perform any
and all acts which a corporation or natural person is authorized
to perform under the laws now existing or which may be enacted
hereafter."
In fact, plaintiff was sentenced to pay costs in Batongbacal v.
National Development Co. (49 O.G. 229), and National
Development Co. vs. CIR, L-13209 (September 30, 1959),
despite the fact that "no costs shall be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by Law,"
pursuant to Rule 131, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes,
Dizon,
Regala
and
Makalintal,
JJ.,
concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

Laurel v. Misa
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects of Cession.
LAUREL
77

v.
PHIL

Laurel vs. Misa

MISA
856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending
that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on
the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and
that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon
the
proclamation
of
the
Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
1.
Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during
Japanese
occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government
on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no
such
thing
as
suspended
allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the
change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense
to the same government and same sovereign people.

77 Phil. 856
FACTS:
The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occu
pation, the
accused
adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort.
He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance
to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims th
at he cannot be tried under a
change of
sovereignty
over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth
which was replaced already by the Republic.
HELD/RATIO:
The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and perma
nent allegiance
to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was
made; hence, it
is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power.
Moreover,
sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or elimin
ated and
replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the
exercise of
sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended all
egiance.
Regarding the change of government, there is no such change si
nce the
sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happene
d was a mere change of name of government,
from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political la
ws of the
Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Pen
al Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the land are mo
mentarily halted. Regarding the
change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines
wasnt sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was u
nder the Unite
States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the
new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

(1946)
Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary,
instead of surrendering to the Japanese forces, disbanded his
company, retreated to the mountains and led a guerilla unit.
Lieut. Col. Jurado, recognized by the United States Armed
Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy but was slain by the latter and
his companions. The same people who killed the replacing officer
claim that they were not subject to military law at the time when
the offense was committed.
But the rule suspending political laws only affects the civilian
inhabitants of the occupied territory and is not intended to bind
the enemies in arms.
Thus, members of the armed forces continued to be covered by
the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other laws
relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese

occupation. By the acceptance of the Halleck's Int. Law, chap.

34, par. 14, petitioners appointments as officers in the Philippine
Army they became amenable to the Articles of War.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945)
Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was
prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He was
found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance
no. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition
for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Courts
existence was void ab initio because it was created as a political
instrumentality under the command of the Japanese Imperial
Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his
constitutional rights; that the penalties provided for are much
more severe than the RPC. Sol Gen is of the opinion that the
petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in
creating said court is tinged with political complexion, that the
procedure does not afford a fair trial and violates constitutional
right of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The
court is of the opinion that:
As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only
factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power
which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in
International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by
the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in
the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.

The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special

tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the
military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary
courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor,
International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the
Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent
to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.
No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a
political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged
with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within
its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political
complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the
law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the
validity of the creation of the court in question.
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment
upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or
power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65
which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
It appears clear that it was within the power and competence of
the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65
of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and
other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum
period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called
Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as
maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised
Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.65
with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses
demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and
necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent

occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its

support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. The last
question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines
and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is,
whether or not, by the principle of postliminy,
the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through
or ceased to be valid from that time.
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgment of
political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime,
ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of
the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to
the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of
a crime of apolitical complexion must be considered as having
ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation
of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearms. The CA modified the sentence from arresto mayor to
prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of the CA on
the sole ground that the court was a creation of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the
court ruled that the RP and the PEC were governments de facto
and that judicial acts were good and valid and remained good
and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government. The CA that existing during Japanese occupation
was the CA after the restoration. And even if the CA was a new
court, its judgments would still remain good and valid provided
that they do not have a political complexion. A punitive or penal

sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes

either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts
already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as
new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant,
incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons,
acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy
and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the
belligerent occupant. As examples, the crimes against national
security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public

order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the

Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised
Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent
occupant.