Chapter 15

DUTIES TOWARDS THE BODY IN

RESPECT OF SEXUAL IMPULSE
Immanuel Kant

mongst our inclinations there is one which is directed towards other

human beings. They themselves, and not their work and services,
are its Objects of enjoyment. It is true that man has no inclination to enjoy the flesh of another-except, perhaps, in the vengeance of war, and
then it is hardly a desire-but none the less there does exist an inclination which we may call an appetite for enjoying another human being.
We refer to sexual impulse. Man can, of course, use another human being as an instrument for his service; he can use his hands, his feet, and
even all his powers; he can use him for his own purposes with the other's
consent. But there is no way in which a human being can be made an
Object of indulgence for another except through sexual impulse. This is
in the nature of a sense, which we can call the sixth sense; it is an appetite
for another human being. We say that a man loves someone when he has
an inclination towards another person. If by this love we mean true human love, then it admits of no distinction between types of persons, or
between young and old. But a love that springs merely from sexual impulse cannot be love at all, but only appetite. Human love is good-will,
affection, promoting the happiness of others and finding joy in their
happiness. But it is clear that, when a person loves another purely from

Reprinted, from lmmanual Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Methuen, 1930),
pp. 162-71, with the permission of Taylor and Francis Books, Ltd., and Routledge.

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sexual desire, none of these factors enter into the love. Far from there
being any concern for the happiness of the loved one, the lover, in order to satisfY his desire and still his appetite, may even plunge the loved
one into the depths of misery. Sexual love makes of the loved person an
Object of appetite; as soon as that appetite has been stilled, the person
is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which has been sucked dry. Sexual love can, of course, be combined with human love and so carry with
it the characteristics of the latter, but taken by itself and for itself, it is
nothing more than appetite. Taken by itself it is a degradation of human
nature; for as soon as a person becomes an Object of appetite for another, all motives of moral relationship cease to function, because as an
Object of appetite for another a person becomes a thing and can be
treated and used as such by every one. This is the only case in which a
human being is designed by nature as the Object of another's enjoyment. Sexual desire is at the root of it; and that is why we are ashamed of
it, and why all strict moralists, and those who had pretensions to be regarded as saints, sought to suppress and extirpate it. It is true that without it a man would be incomplete; he would rightly believe that he
lacked the necessary organs, and this would make him imperfect as a human being; none the less men made pretence on this question and
sought to suppress these inclinations because they degraded mankind.
Because sexuality is not an inclination which one human being has for
another as such, but is an inclination for the sex of another, it is a principle of the degradation of human nature, in that it gives rise to the preference of one sex to the other, and to the dishonouring of that sex
through the satisfaction of desire. The desire which a man has for a
woman is not directed towards her because she is a human being, but because she is a woman; that she is a human being is of no concern to the
man; only her sex is the object of his desires. Human nature is thus subordinated. Hence it comes that all men and women do their best to
make not their human nature but their sex more alluring and direct
their activities and lusts entirely towards sex. Human nature is thereby
sacrificed to sex. If then a man wishes to satisfY his desire, and a woman
hers, they stimulate each other's desire; their inclinations meet, but
their object is not human nature but sex, and each of them dish on ours
the human nature of the other. They make of humanity an instrument
for the satisfaction of their lusts and inclinations, and dishonour it by
placing it on a level with animal nature. Sexuality, therefore, exposes
mankind to the danger of equality with the beasts. But as man has this
desire from nature, the question arises how far he can properly make use
of it without injury to his manhood. How far may persons allow one of
the opposite sex to satisfY his or her desire upon them? Can they sell
themselves, or let themselves out on hire, or by some other contract allow use to be made of their sexual faculties? Philosophers generally

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point out the harm done by this inclination and the ruin it brings to the
body or to the commonwealth, and they believe that, except for the
harm it does, there would be nothing contemptible in such conduct in
itself. But if this were so, and if giving vent to this desire was not in itself
abominable and did not involve immorality, then any one who could
avoid being harmed by them could make whatever use he wanted of his
sexual propensities. For the prohibitions of prudence are never unconditional; and the conduct would in itselfbe unobjectionable, and would
only be harmful under certain conditions. But in point of fact, there is
in the conduct itself something which is contemptible and contrary to
the dictates of morality. It follows, therefore, that there must be certain
conditions under which alone the use of the Jacultates sexuales would be
in keeping with morality. There must be a basis for restraining our freedom in the use we make of our inclinations so that they conform to the
principles of morality. We shall endeavour to discover these conditions
and this basis. Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a
thing; he is not his own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for in so far as he is a person he is a Subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property, he would
be a thing over which he could have ownership. But a person cannot be
a property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the property.
Accordingly, a man is not at his own disposal. He is not entitled to sell
a limb, not even one of his teeth. But to allow one's person for profit to
be used by another for the satisfaction of sexual desire, to make of oneself an Object of demand, is to dispose over oneself as over a thing and
to make of oneself a thing on which another satisfies his appetite,just as
he satisfies his hunger upon a steak. But since the inclination is directed
towards one's sex and not towards one's humanity, it is clear that one
thus partially sacrifices one's humanity and thereby runs a moral risk.
Human beings are, therefore, not entitled to offer themselves, for profit,
as things for the use of others in the satisfaction of their sexual propensities. In so doing they would run the risk of having their person used by
all and sundry as an instrument for the satisfaction of inclination. This
way of satisfYing sexuality is vaga libido, in which one satisfies the inclinations of others for gain. It is possible for either sex. To let one's person
out on hire and to surrender it to another for the satisfaction of his sexual desire in return for money is the depth of infamy. The underlying
moral principle is that man is not his own property and cannot do with
his body what he will. The body is part of the self; in its togetherness with
the self it constitutes the person; a man cannot make of his person a
thing, and this is exactly what happens in vaga libido. This manner of satisfYing sexual desire is, therefore, not permitted by the rules of morality.
But what of the second method, namely concubinatus? Is this also inad-

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Duties towards the Body in Respect of Sexual Impulse

missible? In this case both persons satisfy their desire mutually and there
is no idea of gain, but they serve each other only for the satisfaction of
sexuality. There appears to be nothing unsuitable in this arrangement,
but there is nevertheless one consideration which rules it out. Concubinage consists in one person surrendering to another only for the satisfaction of their sexual desire whilst retaining freedom and rights in
other personal respects affecting welfare and happiness. But the person
who so surrenders is used as a thing; the desire is still directed only towards sex and not towards the person as a human being. But it is obvious
that to surrender part of oneself is to surrender the whole, because a human being is a unity. It is not possible to have the disposal of a part only
of a person without having at the same time a right of disposal over the
whole person, for each part of a person is integrally bound up with the
whole. But concubinage does not give me a right of disposal over the
whole person but only over a part, namely the organa sexualia. It presupposes a contract. This contract deals only with the enjoyment of a part of
the person and not with the entire circumstances of the person. Concubinage is certainly a contract, but it is one-sided; the rights of the two parties are not equal. But if in concubinage I enjoy a part of a person, I
thereby enjoy the whole person; yet by the terms of the arrangement I
have not the rights over the whole person, but only over a part; I, therefore, make the person into a thing. For that reason this method of satisfying sexual desire is also not permitted by the rules of morality. The sole
condition on which we are free to make use of our sexual desire depends
upon the right to dispose over the person as a whole-over the welfare
and happiness and generally over all the circumstances of that person. If
I have the right over the whole person, I have also the right over the part
and so I have the right to use that person's organa sexualia for the satisfaction of sexual desire. But how am I to obtain these rights over the
whole person? Only by giving that person the same rights over the whole
of myself. This happens only in marriage. Matrimony is an agreement
between two persons by which they grant each other equal reciprocal
rights, each of them undertaking to surrender the whole of their person
to the other with a complete right of disposal over it. We can now apprehend by reason how a commercium sexuale is possible without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws. Matrimony is the only
condition in which use can be made of one's sexuality. If one devotes
one's person to another, one devotes not only sex but the whole person;
the two cannot be separated. If, then, one yields one's person, body and
soul, for good and ill and in every respect, so that the other has complete
rights over it, and if the other does not similarly yield himself in return
and does not extend in return the same rights and privileges, the
arrangement is one-sided. But ifl yield myself completely to another and
obtain the person of the other in return, I win myself back; I have given

myself up as the property of another, but in turn I take that other as my

property, and so win myself back again in winning the person whose
property I have become. In this way the two persons become a unity of
will. Whatever good or ill, joy or sorrow befall either of them, the other
will share in it. Thus sexuality leads to a union of human beings, and in
that union alone its exercise is possible. This condition of the use of sexuality, which is only fulfilled in marriage, is a moral condition. But let us
pursue this aspect further and examine the case of a man who takes two
wives. In such a case each wife would have but half a man, although she
would be giving herself wholly and ought in consequence to be entitled
to the whole man. To sum up: vaga libido is ruled out on moral grounds;
the same applies to concubinage; there only remains matrimony, and in
matrimony polygamy is ruled out also for moral reasons; we, therefore,
reach the conclusion that the only feasible arrangement is that of
monogamous marriage. Only under that condition can I indulge my facultas sexualis. We cannot here pursue the subject further.
But one other question arises, that of incest. Incest consists in intercourse between the sexes in a form which, by reason of consanguinity,
must be ruled out; but are there moral grounds on which incest, in all
forms of sexual intercourse, must be ruled out? They are grounds which
apply conditionally, except in one case, in which they have absolute validity. The sole case in which the moral grounds against incest apply absolutely is that of intercourse between parents and children. Between
parents and children there must be a respect which should continue
throughout life, and this rules out of court any question of equality. Moreover, in sexual intercourse each person submits to the other in the highest
degree, whereas between parents and their children subjection is onesided; the children must admit to the parents only; there can, therefore,
be no equal union. This is the only case in which incest is absolutely forbidden by nature. In other cases incest forbids itself, but is not incest in the
order of nature. The state prohibits incest, but at the beginning there must
have been intermarriage between brothers and sisters. At the same time
nature has implanted in our breasts a natural opposition to incest. She intended us to combine with other races and so to prevent too great a sameness in one society. Too close a connection, too intimate an acquaintance
produces sexual indifference and repugnance. But this propensity must be
restrained by modesty; otherwise it becomes commonplace, reduces the
object of the desire to the commonplace and results in indifference. Sexual desire is very fastidious; nature has given it strength, but it must be restrained by modesty. It is on that account that savages, who go about
stark-naked, are cold towards each other; for that reason, too, a person
whom we have known from youth evokes no desire within us, but a strange
person attracts us much more strongly. Thus nature has herself provided
restraints upon any desire between brother and sister.

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Crimina Carnis
Crimina carnis are contrary to self-regarding duty because they are
against the ends of humanity. They consist in abuse of one's sexuality.
Every form of sexual indulgence, except in marriage, is a misuse of sexuality, and so a crimen carnis. All crimina carnis are either secundum naturam or contra naturam. Crimina carnis secundum naturam are contrary to
sound reason; crimina carnis contra naturam are contrary to our animal
nature. Among the former we reckon vaga libido, which is the opposite
of matrimony and of which there are two kinds: scortatio and concubinatus. Concubinatus is indeed a pactum, but a pactum inaequale, in which the
rights are not reciprocal. In this pact the woman surrenders her sex completely to the man, but the man does not completely surrender his sex
to the woman. The second crimen carnis secundum naturam is adulterium.
Adultery cannot take place except in marriage; it signifies a breach of
marriage. Just as the engagement to marry is the most serious and the
most inviolable engagement between two persons and binds them for
life, so also is adultery the greatest breach of faith that there can be, because it is disloyalty to an engagement than which there can be none
more important. For this reason adultery is cause for divorce. Another
cause is incompatibility and inability to be at one, whereby unity and
concord of will between the two persons is impossible. Next comes the
question whether incest is incest per se, or whether it is by the civil law
that it is made a crimen carnis, natural or unnatural. The question might
be answered either by natural instinct or by reason. From the point of
view of natural instinct incest is a crimen carnis secundum naturam, for it is
after all a union of the sexes; it is not contra naturam animalium, because
animals do not differentiate in this respect in their practices. But on the
judgment of the understanding incest is contra naturam.
Uses of sexuality which are contrary to natural instinct and to animal
nature are crimina carnis contra naturam. First amongst them we have
onanism. This is abuse of the sexual faculty without any object, the exercise of the faculty in the complete absence of any object of sexuality.
The practice is contrary to the ends of humanity and even opposed to
animal nature. By it man sets aside his person and degrades himself below the level of animals. A second crimen carnis contra naturam is intercourse between sexus homogenii, in which the object of sexual impulse is
a human being but there is homogeneity instead of heterogeneity of sex,
as when a woman satisfies her desire on a woman, or a man on a man.
This practice too is contrary to the ends of humanity; for the end of humanity in respect of sexuality is to preserve the species without debasing
the person; but in this instance the species is not being preserved (as it
can be by a crimen carnis secundum naturam), but the person is set aside,
the self is degraded below the level of the animals, and humanity is dis-

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honoured. The third crimen carnis contra naturam occurs when the object
of the desire is in fact of the opposite sex but is not human. Such is
sodomy, or intercourse with animals. This, too, is contrary to the ends of
humanity and against our natural instinct. It degrades mankind below
the level of animals, for no animal turns in this way from its own species.
All crimina carnis contra naturam degrade human nature to a level below
that of animal nature and make man unworthy of his humanity. He no
longer deserves to be a person. From the point of view of duties towards
himself such conduct is the most disgraceful and the most degrading of
which man is capable. Suicide is the most dreadful, but it is not as dishonourable and base as the crimina carnis contra naturam. It is the most
abominable conduct of which man can be guilty. So abominable are
these crimina carnis contra naturam that they are unmentionable, for the
very mention of them is nauseating, as is not the case with suicide. We all
fight shy of mentioning these vices; teachers refrain from mentioning
them, even when their intention is unobjectionable and they only wish
to warn their charges against them. But as they are of frequent occurrence, we are in a dilemma: are we to name them in order that people
should know and prevent their frequent occurrence, or are we to keep
them dark in order that people should not learn of them and so not have
the opportunity of transgressing? Frequent mention would familiarize
people with them and the vices might as a result cease to disgust us and
come to appear more tolerable. Hence our modesty in not referring to
them. On the other hand, if we mention them only circumspectly and
with disinclination, our aversion from them is still apparent. There is
also another reason for our modesty. Each sex is ashamed of the vices of
which its members are capable. Human beings feel, therefore, ashamed
to mention those things of which it is shameful for humanity to be capable. These vices make us ashamed that we are human beings and,
therefore, capable of them, for an animal is incapable of all such crimina
carnis contra naturam.