Leviste vs CA

GR No 189122

March 17, 2010

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for
the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an
application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course
of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.
Ruling:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if
the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
circumstances:
1.
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2.
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
3.
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4.
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5.
that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from

Elena Dycaico vs. SSS (due process and equal protection clause)
June 23, 2011
Facts:
Elena Dycaico seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision of
Social Security Commission denying her claim for survivors pension which accrues from the
death of her husband, Bonifacio Dycaico.
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight
children as beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from
the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few months prior
to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors
pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not living under the
benefit of marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis was Section 12-B(d) of
Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 which reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.

An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but it was, likewise, denied. The same Court ruled
that that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his
retirement, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries is void.
The petitioner claims that there is no merit to the decision of Court of Appeals as the SSS law
does is silent denying the beneficiarys claim for survivor pension.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in the positive. There is a violation of due process and equal
protection.
The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
If the said provision will be sustained, there will be an outright confiscation of benefits due to the
surviving spouse without giving her opportunity to be heard. There is, therefore, a violation of
due process.
There is also a violation of equal protection of the Constitution.
A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on
whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law
Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose assignment as a
beneficiary was made after the marriage and spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary was
made before the marriage. The statute violates equal protection clause when it grants surviving
pensions only to the spouses belonging to the former case and not to than the latter.

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT
CHILD
DEVELOPMENT
CENTER,
INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1.
2.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.

3.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

8.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1.

Power of Judicial Review

2.

Actual Case or Controversy

3.

Facial Challenge

4.

Locus Standi

5.

Declaratory Relief

6.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1.

Right to life

2.

Right to health

3.

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4.

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5.

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6.

Due process clause

7.

Equal protection clause

8.

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1.

Actual Case or Controversy

2.

Facial Challenge

3.

Locus Standi

4.

Declaratory Relief

5.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they
are modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1.

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

3.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether
or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care
institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service
provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted
from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of
the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.

7.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8.

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to

involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order
to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.

To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It
has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible
parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as

stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary
of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be
made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon
the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better

qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

ABAKADA
G.R.

Guro
No.

Party
168056

List
September

vs.
1,

Ermita
2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6
of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT
rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners
argue
that
the
law
is
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2)
of
the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III
Sec.
1
of
the
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments
to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income
taxes,
percentage,
and
excise
and
franchise
taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process
can
go
forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation
and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary
will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.
CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the
petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for
reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed, since
Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all
money claims arising from employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from
when such cause of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.
ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?
HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however,
does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad

sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law,
but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment
of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the
impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must
be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during
strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and
illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be
unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an
unlawful practice.

ANTONIO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

M.

SERRANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twentythree days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared
illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever
they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010

FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was
denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the
18th of November 2008, the judgement became final and executory.
The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding
the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.

RULING:

Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional

law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such
as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the
Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people
who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

October 23, 2012 ~ vbdiaz
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,
respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic

educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the
question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter
reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to
humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the
factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248
declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In
Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has
the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be
grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires

have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes
and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreignhires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Monday,
February
02,
2009
Posted
by
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further,
PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent

have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection

of

the

Filipino

workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No.

1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights

among

1.
2.

In

men

Such
That

3.
4.

all

the

case

women.

classification
they

are

They
They

and

are
apply
at

bar,

germane

equally

admits

rests

not

the

It

on
to

al

classifications

purpose
to

members
made,

classification,

provided

substantial

the

confined
to

of

rest

distinctions
of

existing
of
on

that:

the
substantial

the

law

conditions
same

class

distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under

Rule

65

of

the

ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using

religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON

Respondent

violated

the

Non-establishment

clause

of

the

Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to

utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

CASE DIGEST: Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

GR No 148208
Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively
replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed
a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from
implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to
establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of
the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below
shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the
classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said
proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that
it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the

classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy
of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing
laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws,
hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee
status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients
are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act.
Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the
former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December 7,

2010 (CASE DIGEST)
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO,
COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

petitioner,

v.

THE

PHILIPPINE

TRUTH

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or
render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences
gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission;

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.

It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.