CEBU

ROYAL
PLANT
(SAN
MIGUEL
CORPORATION), vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES
Subject: Labor Standards
FACTS:
Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of
employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical
examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB
minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since
his illness was not curable within 6 months.
Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the same.
The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and payment of
back wages.
Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for
his removal, to wit, pulmonary tuberculosis minimal, was not certified as incurable within six months
as to justify his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required
by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment.
CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had
no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was
handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper.
HELD: No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Pilones was
already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he
ceased to be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him
by the Constitution and the Labor Code.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct
such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that
the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment. The record does not contain the certification required by
the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal.
It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after
his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in
force at that time) was not a trivial technicality. It required not just the mere filing of a petition or the

mere attempt to procure a clearance but that the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative
act of termination.
Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume
his work, as certified by competent authority.
**Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction:
Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his
protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and
hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nations future. It is error to take him for granted. He
deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands
shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The
choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten the weight of
centuries of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.

G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987

CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent was removed by the petitioner and complained to the Ministry of Labor. His
complaint was dismissed by the regional director, who was, however, reversed by the public
respondent. Required to reinstate the separated employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner
has come to us, faulting the Deputy Minister with grave abuse of discretion. We have issued in the
meantime a temporary restraining order. 1
The public respondent held that Ramon Pilones, the private respondent, was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for
his removal, to wit, "pulmonary tuberculosis minimal," was not certified as incurable within six months
as to justify his separation. 2Additionally, the private respondent insists that the petitioner should have
first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his
employment.
The petitioner for its part claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his
dismissal and so had no security of tenure. His dismissal was not only in conformity with company
policy but also necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the
processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public. It is also argued that the findings of the
regional director, who had direct access to the facts, should not have been disturbed on appeal. For
these same reasons, it contends, the employee's reinstatement as ordered by the public respondent
should not be allowed.
The original findings were contained in a one-page order 3 reciting simply that "complainant was
employed on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months. After said period, he underwent
medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering
from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by
respondent." The order then concluded that the termination was "justified." That was all.

As there is no mention of the basis of the above order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll
authority 4submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on probation
on February 16, 1978. Even supposing that it is not self- serving, we find nevertheless that it is selfdefeating. The six-month period of probation started from the said date of appointment and so ended
on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private respondent's employment also ended then; on
the contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, "an employee who
is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee." Hence,
Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days
after he ceased to be a probationer.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct
such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period. In the light of such
delay, its protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would prejudice public health cannot but
sound hollow and hypocritical. By its own implied admission, the petitioner had exposed its customers
to the employee's disease because of its failure to examine him before entrusting him with the
functions of a "syrup man." Its belated concern for the consuming public is hardly persuasive, if not
clearly insincere and self-righteous.
There is proof in fact that the private respondent was first hired not on February 16, 1978, but earlier
in 1977. This is the 1977 withholding tax statement 5 issued for him by the petitioner itself which it
does not and cannot deny. The petitioner stresses that this is the only evidence of the private
respondent's earlier service and notes that he has not presented any co-worker to substantiate his
claim. This is perfectly understandable. Given the natural reluctance of many workers to antagonize
their employers, we need not wonder why none of them testified against the petitioner.
We are satisfied that whether his employment began on February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he
claims, the private respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed on August
21, 1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution
and the Labor Code.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. Where the employee suffers from a
disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or
to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment
unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured
within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the
employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. The medical certificate
offered by the petitioner came from its own physician, who was not a "competent public health
authority," and merely stated the employee's disease, without more. We may surmise that if the
required certification was not presented, it was because the disease was not of such a nature or
seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and unlawful sanction.

It is also worth noting that the petitioner's application for clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after
his dismissal. 6 As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in
force at that time) was not a "trivial technicality." It required "not just the mere filing of a petition or the
mere attempt to procure a clearance" but that "the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative
act of termination. 7
We agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the law by separating the employee after five
months' service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then rehiring him on
probation, again without security of tenure. We cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to
the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other hand, we have also the health of the public and
of the dismissed employee himself to consider. Hence, although we must rule in favor of his
reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent
authority.
We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his
employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness
and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It
is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will
determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry
weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should,
we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but
does not bow his head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order of November 18,
1981, is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the
modification that the backwages shall be limited to three years only and the private respondent shall
be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return to
work. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

JGB and ASSOCIATES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ARTURO C. ARROJADO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision and the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 002149-91, finding petitioner and its principal, Tariq Hajj
Architects, guilty of having illegally dismissed private respondent and, for this reason, ordering them
to pay his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract, salary
differentials and reimbursement of the amount withheld for telephone bills. The decision reverses the
contrary decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, dismissing the complaint
filed by private respondent.
The facts are as follow:

Private respondent Arturo C. Arrojado was hired by petitioner JGB and Associates, Inc. for its
principal, Tariq Hajj Architects, to work as draftsman in Saudi Arabia. The contract of employment was
for two years, commencing May 27, 1989. The salary was US$500.00 a month, although private
respondents Travel Exit Pass (TEP) showed that his monthly salary was US$525.00.
On February 25, 1990, before the expiration of his contract of employment, private respondent was
given notice by his employer that his employment was terminated for the reason that his performance
both in productivity and efficiency was below average. The termination of his employment took effect
on the same day. He was immediately scheduled to depart Saudi Arabia and on February 28, 1990,
three days after his dismissal, he found himself already in the Philippines.
On March 12, 1990, private respondent filed with the POEA a complaint against JGB and Associates,
Inc., Tariq Hajj Architects and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, alleging illegal dismissal and
seeking payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract,
salary differential, refund of S.R. 1,000 which was withheld from him for telephone bills, moral
damages and attorneys fees.
Private respondent alleged that he did his job conscientiously and that he was even asked to make
scale models, in addition to his regular duties. He claimed that he was never reprimanded nor
informed of his alleged negligence and incompetence either by his immediate supervisor or by his
employer. He also complained that he was denied due process because his dismissal took effect on
the same day he was given notice and claimed that, because he was immediately repatriated, he had
no opportunity to challenge his arbitrary dismissal. Private respondent admitted that he signed a
waiver of claims but alleged that he did so under compulsion and that, in any event, he was not
precluded from questioning the legality of his dismissal and from recovering monetary claims due
him.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that private respondent was dismissed for neglect of duties and
performance below par. Petitioner also alleged that although no prior notice of dismissal was given to
private respondent, he was given in lieu thereof a notice pay equivalent to one month
salary. Petitioner denied liability for salary differential on the ground that the employment contract
stipulated that his monthly salary was US$500.00. Petitioner invoked a quitclaim signed by private
respondent as evidence that he had been paid all the monetary claims due him.
The POEA dismissed private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal but ordered as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to pay
complainant jointly and severally the peso equivalent at the time of actual payment the amount of
SR1,000 representing the refund of the telephone bills deducted from the latter.
Ten percent (10%) of the total refund as and for attorneys fees to be paid by complainant.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent timely appealed to the NLRC, which found private respondents dismissal illegal
and ordered petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby set-aside and a new one is
entered declaring complainants dismissal from employment illegal.

Hence, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant jointly and severally the peso equivalent
at the time of payment of the following amount:
1. US Dollars Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Five (US$7,875.00 or its peso equivalent,
representing the unexpired portion of the contract.
2. US Dollars Two Hundred Twenty Five (US$225.00) representing salary differential for nine (9)
months
3. Saudi Riyals One Thousand (S.R. 1,000.00) representing refund for telephone bill.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the NLRC in a resolution
dated January 27, 1993, for lack of merit. Hence this petition. Petitioner alleges that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The issue in this case is whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decision of
the POEA and ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
We find that petitioner failed to prove that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that private respondent was illegally dismissed. In termination cases, the burden of proving just cause
for dismissal is on the employer. In this case, the grounds for the dismissal of private respondent
were stated in two documents presented by petitioner before the POEA: (1) the notice of termination
given to private respondent on February 20, 1990; and (2) the letter of the principal, Tariq Hajj on
August 1, 1990. In the termination letter, the foreign employer stated that private respondents
performance was below average. In its August 1, 1990 letter, the foreign employer stated that:
ever since the early days of Mr. Arrojado with us (,) we were not fully satisfied with his performance
and our expectations from him were much higher than we saw him actually producing. Nevertheless
(,) to be very fare [sic] with Mr. Arrojado(,) we gave him a lot of time to develop and to get acquainted
with our work, system, environment and standards. However and for more than eight (8) months he
spent with us(,) we have not witnessed any development in skills or abilities. Moreover, we noticed a
very evident neglect by Mr. Arrojado of the duties assigned to him. This combined with a very
thorough evaluation of his performance which resulted from his continuous and repeated neglect
throughout the period he spent with us, our decision was very natural. We felt that Mr. Arrojado was
causing our firm tangible financial lose [sic] and considerable technical difficulties due to his
incompetent performance.[1] (Italics added)
The contract of employment between the parties provided in pertinent part:
D. Termination by Employer. An Employer may terminate the contract of employment for any of the
following causes:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties
(d) Fraud or willful neglect by the employee of his duties

Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. [2] Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On
the other hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the employee in failing
to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and the latters business.
None of these causes is stated in the two letters of the employer as reasons for dismissing private
respondent. None of the reasons there stated even approximates any of the causes provided in the
contract of employment for the termination of employment by the employer.
Indeed, the grounds given for private respondents dismissal are nothing but general, vague and
amorphous allegations. As the NLRC noted, the letters do not state particular acts which show that
private respondent was indeed negligent and that his performance was below par. Nor did petitioner
show the tangible financial loss which it claimed it suffered as a result of private respondents alleged
neglect of duty.
It is noteworthy that when private respondent was given notice of the termination of his employment,
he had already served his employer for nearly ten months. The letter of termination, expressed
disappointment that despite the length of time he had been with the company he had not shown any
development in skills or abilities. It may be assumed, however, that before private respondent was
employed, he was tested for his skill and his ability. Why petitioner suffered him so long in its employ
if he did not come up to its expectations has not been explained. On the other hand, what is clear
from the record is that petitioner made private respondent work on scale models, in addition to the
latters regular work. If private respondents performance was below average, it is difficult to
understand why he should be given additional task to perform.
Indeed, the burden of proving just cause for terminating an employee-employer relationship is on the
employer. The employee has no duty to prove his competence in order to prove the illegality of his
dismissal. As the NLRC rightly held:
What is worse, a finding was made that complainant has the burden of proving that he was not
incompetent or inefficient. This is a serious error and contrary to the well-settled rule that in
termination cases it is the employer who has the burden of proof that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is illegal (Polymedic General
Hospital v. NLRC, 134 SCRA 420). Hence, there is no valid basis for the Administrator to conclude
that there was a semblance of truth to the charges of incompetence or unsatisfactory performance
when the complainant failed to rebut the same. Thus, in the absence of any other evidence submitted
by respondents to substantiate the general charges hurled against complainant, the documents,
which comprise respondents evidence in chief, contain empty and self-serving statements insufficient
to establish just and valid cause for the dismissal of complainant (Royal Crown International v. NLRC,
178 SCRA 569). For to allow an employer to terminate the employment of his worker merely based
on pure allegations and generalities will place the latter on a dangerous situation as he will be at the
sole mercy of the former and therefore, the right to security of tenure which were bound to protect will
be unduly emasculated.[3]
Nor is the quitclaim signed by private respondent a bar to the filing of the complaint. We have already
held in a number of cases[4] that a deed of release or quitclaim can not bar an employee from
demanding what is legally due him. The reason for this is that the employee does not really stand on
an equal footing with his employer. In some cases he may be so penurious that he is willing to
bargain even rights secured to him by law. There is good reason for applying this ruling here because
private respondent was made to sign the deed of quitclaim in this case on the same day he was
dismissed. He was in a foreign country and he had no one to help him. In three days he was due for

repatriation to the Philippines. He had no means of questioning his employers acts. He had no choice
but to accept what was being offered to him. Necessitous men are not free men.
Furthermore, as the NLRC noted, the fact that private respondent had to be granted by the POEA
salary differential for nine months and ordered reimbursed in the amount of 1,000 Saudi Riyal belies
the claim that private respondent had been paid everything legally due to him.
Employees enjoy security of tenure; they can only be dismissed for just cause and only after due
process.[5] If an employee is dismissed without just cause, he is entitled to reinstatement
with backwages up to the time of his actual reinstatement, [6] if the contract of employment is not for a
definite period; or to the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the
employment contract, if the contract is for a definite period. [7] If the dismissal is for a just cause but it
was made without due process, the employee is entitled to the payment of an indemnity. [8]
In the case at bar, private respondent was not only dismissed without cause but his dismissal was
made without due process. He was informed of the reason for his dismissal only at the time his
employment was terminated on February 25, 1990. Giving him notice pay equivalent to his one month
salary in lieu of the notice in the contract of employment could not take the place of notice before
dismissal as required by law. The notice required is not a mere technicality but a requirement of due
process to which every employee is entitled to insure that the employers prerogative to dismiss is not
exercised in an arbitrary manner.[9]
As the employment contract in the case at bar is for a definite period, private respondent is entitled to
the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. The NLRC,
therefore, correctly awarded private respondent the amount which is equivalent to the unexpired
portion of his contract. The notice pay given to private respondent should be deemed as indemnity for
his dismissal without due process.[10]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

JGB and Associates, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R No. 10939, March 7, 1996 DIGEST
Facts: On February 25, 1990, before the expiration of his contract of employment, private respondent
was given notice by his employer that his employment was terminated for the reason that his
performance both in productivity and efficiency was below average. The termination of his
employment took effect on the same day. He was immediately scheduled to depart Saudi Arabia and
on February 28, 1990, three days after his dismissal, he found himself already in the Philippines.
- On March 12, 1990, private respondent filed with the POEA a complaint against JGB and
Associates, Inc., Tariq Hajj Architects and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, alleging illegal
dismissal and seeking payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, salary differential, refund of S.R. 1,000 which was withheld from him for telephone bills,
moral damages and attorneys fees.- Petitioner averred that private respondent was dismissed for
neglect of duties and performance below ]par. Petitioner also alleged that although no prior notice of
dismissal was given to private respondent, he was given in lieu thereof a notice pay equivalent to
one month salary.

HELD- Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances. On the other hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the
employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and the latters business.None of these causes is stated in the two letters of the employer as reasons for dismissing private
respondent. None of the reasons there stated even approximates any of the causes provided in the
contract of employment for the termination of employment by the employer.- Indeed, the grounds
given for private respondents dismissal are nothing but general, vague and amorphous allegations.
As the NLRC noted, the letters do not state particular acts which show that private respondent was
indeed negligent and that his performance was below par. Nor did petitioner show the tangible
financial loss which it claimed it suffered as a result of private respondents alleged neglect of duty.