GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE et al vs.

IAC et al
FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at
the wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao
City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after
crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence
of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the
truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped
on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI
of Bohol.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence
The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the
plaintiffs appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias
to be negligent and his negligence gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and
solidary. It therefore ordered the defendants jointly and solidarily to
indemnify the plaintiffs
The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a
reversal of the judgment of the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran
counter to the established facts
ISSUE:
1. WON the decision o fthe IAC was erroneous
2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case
HELD: , the appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED
1. YES
The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following:
1. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25
cm of the jeeps lane. However it was found out that the center stripe of the
road is misaligned and with the correct calculation of the width of the road,
the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is
intruding the trucks lane.
2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted
negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane
upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as
has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeeps way
as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in

fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still 30
meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action.
3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the
police, Calibos companions, Roranes and Patos, who suffered injuries on
account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or give statements to
the police officers is a telling indication that they did not attribute the
happening to defendant Zacarias negligence or fault. 7
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter;
there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer
Calibos negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias
had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed
in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been
zigzagging, which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically
at the time. The other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the
accident had remarked on the jeeps zigzagging. There was also testimony
that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep.
2. YES
Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of
Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each
others vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to
a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at
that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time
to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not
merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him
a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his
employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the
evidence supports the latters additional defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be
undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has
not been controverted.
NOTES:
It must be pointed out, however, that IAC also seriously erred in holding the
petitioners Agad and Felix Lim solidarily liable for the damages awarded in its
appealed decision, as alleged owners, with petitioner George Lim, of Glan

Peoples Lumber and Hardware, employer of petitioner Zacarias. This

manifestly disregarded, not only the certificate of registration issued by the
Bureau of Domestic Trade identifying Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware as
a business name registered by George Lim, but also unimpugned allegations
into the petitioners answer to the complaint that Pablo S. Agad was only an
employee of George Lim and that Felix Lim, then a child of only eight (8)
years, was in no way connected with the business.
In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Courts
power to review the assailed decision of the IAC under the authority of
precedents recognizing exceptions to the familiar rule binding it to observe
and respect the latters findings of fact. Many of those exceptions may be
cited to support the review here undertaken, but only the most obvious
that said findings directly conflict with those of the Trial Court will suffice.
In the opinion of this Court and after a careful review of the record, the
evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the IAC which, for all that
appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of
the deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective appraisal of the proofs
and a correct application of the law to the established facts. Compassion for
the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of the love and support of a
husband and father is an entirely natural and understandable sentiment. It
should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of, much less to
influence, a just verdict in a suit at law.

RCPI vs. CA
FACTS:
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the
following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued
RCPI for damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and
that the attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees
which was not meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it
insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its employees.

Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees
and it affected greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor
of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability
of RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.
The cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of
the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru
negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary
liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps
to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The
company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this
void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their
clienteles interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable
for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its
business through its employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts
of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC. G.R. Nos. L-66102-04 August 30, 1990.
A TRANSPORTATION CASE. BY C Y.
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.
FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and
driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck
was detouch so the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south
where it come from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in
the death of the three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of
SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the
case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of
first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery

of civil damages before the court of first instance impleading both the
defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers
of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last
clear chance in this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where
passengers demand responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual
obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was
reinstated.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

FACTS:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his
boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford
dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with
no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by
Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried
to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical
injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by
imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high
speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or
by respondents own negligence
HELD:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a

valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the
preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during
that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected
by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners'
theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent
Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment,
these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this
evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances
outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of
the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he
should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not
see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road
lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners
would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the
defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact
of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have
played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which
have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant
have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the
character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient

cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so
created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of
heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on
the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has
itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to
determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum
of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is
only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to
weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating
most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded
by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be
borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be

paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable

therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course
entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate
court.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX

PANGALANGAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA,Defendants-Appellees.
Angel A. Sison, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for Defendants-Appellees.
SYNOPSIS
As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint for damages based on culpaaquitiana was filed against the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Fernando
Pineda, and Balingit as manager of the company. The trial court dismissed
the complaint against Balingit on the ground that he is not the manager of
an establishment contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code making
owners and managers of an establishment responsible for damages caused
by their employees, since Balingit himself may be regarded as an employee
of the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. On appeal, plaintiffs urged that the veil
of corporate fiction should be pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc.
being merely a business conduit of Balingit, since he and his wife are the
controlling stockholders. The Supreme Court held that this issue cannot be
entertained on appeal, because it was not raised in the lower court.
Order of dismissal affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. QUASI-DELICT; EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES; "EMPLOYER" AND "OWNER
AND MANAGER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ENTERPRISE" DO NOT INCLUDE
MANAGER OF CORPORATION. The terms "employer" and "owner and
manager of establishment or enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code do not include the manager of a corporation owning a truck the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose.

2. WORDS AND PHRASES; "MANAGER" UNDER SEC. 2180 OF CIVIL CODE

USED IN THE SENSE OF "EMPLOYER." Under Article 2180 the term
"manager" is used in the sense of "employer" and does not embrace a
"manager" who may himself be regarded as an employee or dependiente of
his employer.
3. APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT CANNOT BE
ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. A new factual issue injected in the brief which
was not alleged in the complaint or raised in the trial court cannot be
entertained on appeal. An appeal has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court, and appellants can ventilate on appeal only
those legal issues raised in the lower court and those within the issues
framed by the parties.
4. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF THEORY; PARTY-LITIGANT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO
CHANGE THEORY OF CASE ON APPEAL. When a party deliberately adopts a
certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below,
he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because that would
be unfair to the adverse party.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure
questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit,
was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is
not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the
Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be
used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings

amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American

Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that
Balingit was not Pinedas employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground
that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him.
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The
bus company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
x

"The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x

"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)"
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms
"employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise"
(dueos o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of
the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager

of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly

resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the
term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of
"employer."
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer,
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad
subsidiaria establecida en el num. 3.x del (art.) 1903, el director de un
periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarqu!
a, y aunque lleve la direccin de determinadas convicciones politicas, no por
eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa"
(Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12
Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants brief, injected a new
factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because
out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had
subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the
other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael
Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced
and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be
treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the
lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in
the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has
a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is
one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues
framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his

theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, would be unfair to the

adverse party (2 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower courts order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against
the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.