74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does
so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for
the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he
sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the
courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. . It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme
Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the
fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a
motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two
more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar, which was
still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict between his duties as
election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran
lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should
treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his profession is not
contingent upon the payment of his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona
Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio,
resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial
document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the convenio or of his brothers assumption of the
position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be
turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of
donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated
by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the
legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to
the examinations has successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it
is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct).
However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is
recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

113 SCRA 39 Political Law The Legislative Department Appearance in Court by a Congressman
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may
appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by
Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made
by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no
member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
The presiding judge however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that
CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a
corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions
the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because
Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang
Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFIs acting in their original
jurisdiction. CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin)
or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI
Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any
lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are courts without appellate jurisdiction.

Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960]
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a
public corporation and vesting in it the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks
systems. However, Bauan Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local
waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.
Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to
represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act. Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence
an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.
The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys fees, which the Auditor
General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had no authority to engage the services of a special
counsel
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a special counsel
Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a
province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law,
which in this case he is not. A fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for
by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of
law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.
61 Phil. 724 Legal Ethics Respect to the Courts Use of Temperate Language
In 1935, Atty. Vicente Francisco was the counsel for Felipe Salcedo in a case entitled Felipe Salcedo vs
Francisco Hernandez. Salcedo lost in that case and Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court however ordered Atty. Francisco to explain why he should not be disciplined. It appears that in
the Motion filed by Atty. Francisco, he expressed his disagreement with the judgment by stating that the

judgment is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the right of [Salcedo] and a mockery of
the popular will expressed at the polls in the Municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas (so this could be an election
case); that the court should rectify itself or else the voters in Tiaong might resort to the press publicly to
denounce the judicial outrage and that if uncorrected, the judgment will lead to the increase [of] the
proselytes (new converts) of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He is guilty of contempt. A lawyer owes respect to the courts. A lawyer is duty bound to uphold
the courts dignity and authority and to defend its integrity. The language used by Atty. Francisco is uncalled
for and unjustified. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and
resort to threats. Even if assuming that the trial court did err in its judgment, Atty. Francisco should still use
temperate and respectful language in advancing the cause of his client.
His insinuations that the voters in Tiaong, Tayabas might resort to sakdalism (a seditious movement) is a
suggestion to the people there of what they should do should his client not get a favorable judgment. This is a
veiled threat to the courts. It promotes distrust to the courts.
It is laudable for Atty. Francisco to defend his client with all fervor and energy but he must do so with respect to
the dignity of the courts. The lawyer was fined and reprimanded.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of
his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was
Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be

considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a lawyer
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because
Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one
which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his
defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was
Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname.
However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the
Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do
no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness,
candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D.
Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence
severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.
FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has
passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is
in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of
actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before
the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his
right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the
law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions.
Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision
of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical
and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body,
but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Ui vs. Bonifacio
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 01, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the ground of
immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of a marriage
certificate that said that she and Carlos got married in 1985 but according to the certificate of marriage obtained
from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must also have a continued possession of good moral
character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct , which has been defined as the conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the good and respectable
members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains that her relationship
with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral.
Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, it must be grossly
immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing
herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession.

On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that
she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to check that the information on the document she
attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts of malpractice.
e Digest in PALE: Deles v. Aragona, Jr.
AM No. 598; Mar. 28, 1969; J. Castro
Facts:
Aurora Soriano Deles, complainant , filed a verified letter-complaint against Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr.
, respondent, for having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against Deles in a motion filed
in Court of Agrarian Relations, Iloilo, cases 1254 and 1255, which allegedly caused hergreat
mentaltorture and moral suffering.
The CAR Case -- an intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of 10 hectares of the estate
by Deles to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique Soriano (brother of Deles) as
lessee of said land. In effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and
Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being tenanted by themupon authority of the lessee, Enrique.
IN DISREGARD OF THE ORDER, Deles attempted to take possession of the landholdings by placing
thereon her own tenants. The Aglinaos countered by filing against Deles two petitions with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Iloilo. After a hearing, the men of Deles entered the land in question and planted rice
thereon, this unauthorized entry prompted Atty. Aragona to file an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Interlocutory Order" praying that Deles, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf from
interfering with the work of the Aglinaos in their respective landholdings. Mrs. Soriano (wife of Enrique)
went to see Atty. Aragano - she told him that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of
Deles, accompanied by armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay thereon over the
protests f the Aglinaos; and that she was told that they were acting upon orders of the Deles.
POSSESSED OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, Atty. Aragona promptly prepared and filed with the
CAR an "Urgent Motion to Declare [Deles] in Contempt of Court."
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Aragona should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the
said motion.
Held:
No.
#1 -- In People vs. Aquino, this Court laid down the decisional authority that [S]tatement made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory
tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand
or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer,
or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for
contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255

 besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely
privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.

#2 -- Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual. Xxx. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
Indeed, the actuations of Atty. Aragano were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of
his clients -- Mrs. Soriano informed Atty. Aragano of the incident coupled with Deles' admissions.
BLANZA V ARCANGEL, 21 SCRA 7, September 5, 1967
FACTS
On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with
the death of
theirhusbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures o
n blank papers.After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress was made. After 6 years
they finally askedrespondentto return the said documents but the latter refused. Uponquestioning by Fiscal Rana
to whom the case was
referredby theSolicitor General respondent admitted having received thedocuments but explained that it was for
photo statingpurposesonly. His failure to immediately return them was due
tocomplainants
refusal to handin money to pay for thephotostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the
documents. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself
andturned over the documents to the fiscal. - Fiscal found
respondents
explanation satisfactory andrecommended the
respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels
that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering1) his failure to attend to
complainants pension claims
for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return thedocuments despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his fai
lureto return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her documents.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance
HELD
No. Respondents explanation for the
delay in filing the claimsinreturning the documents has not been controverted bycomplainants. On the contrary,
they admitted that respondent askedthem to shoulder the photo stating expenses but they did not give him
any money. Hence, complainants are partlytoblame. Moreover, the documents and their photo stats
were actually returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation
with him paying for the photo stating costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her docum
ents tocomplainant Pasion, the former denies this. The affidavit ofMrs.Blanza pardoning respondent cannot
prejudice complainantPasion because
res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet

.Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in a hearing but she let it go. Neither s
he nor hercounsel of record appeared. Thus, the Curt refusedto takedisciplinary action against respondent due to
lack of clearpreponderance of evidence substantiating the accusationsagainst him. Nevertheless the Court also stated that we
cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. Alawyer has a more dynamic and positive role
in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of thestatute. As a man of law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must,perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has
notlived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait and hope, for 6 long years in
their pension claims.Upon theirrefusal to co-operate, he should have terminated theirprofessional relationship
rather than keep them hanging. Andalthough we voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense,let this be a
reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the
highstandards of his chosen profession require of him.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly
notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latters failure to honor SPACs Commercial
Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latters counsel. In
said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications [1] issued by
the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the
following documents, viz:
1. Verification[2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, subscribed and sworn to
before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in
Quezon City and attached to defendants Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default;
and (2) To defer Plaintiffs Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002;
2. Affidavits of Merit[3] signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in par. 1 hereof,
likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged Notary Public in Quezon
City, on February 18, 2002;
3. The Affidavit of Service[4] signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and
Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on
February 19, 2002 as alleged Notary Public in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was
attached to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;

4. The Affidavit of Service[5] of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela
Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April
2002 at Quezon City, as Notary Public. This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants
Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow defendants
to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002.
5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[6] signed this time by a certain Celso N.
Sarto, as affiant, notarized on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano. This
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was attached to defendants Motion For
Extension of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;
6. The Affidavit of Service[7] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano as Notary Public on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan
was also attached to that Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the
Court of Appeals;
7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[8] executed by one Celso N. Sarto, alleged
Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and notarized by Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and
8. Affidavit of Service[9] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and
Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19
August 2002, as alleged Notary Public for Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by
December 31, 2002.
On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty.
Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.[10]
On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion[11] for extension of time to file answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion[12] to resolve the complaint after the extension requested by
respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment or
pleading filed by respondent.
On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order, [13] giving respondent a last chance to file
his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed to do so.
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation [14] dated 12 February 2004,
pertinent portions of which read:
A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent
notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires
December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal
Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.
All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondents alleged notarial book which
reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per records
on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City for the
year 2002.
Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per
records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from
January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial
commission for Quezon City.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not
commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590
documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said commission
amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of respondents
commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present and his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a
registered member a copy hereof for implementation should this recommendation be approved by the
Honorable members of the Board of Governors.[15]
Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6) months.
[16]

We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have
a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2)
certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002.
[17]
Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent
had already notarized a total of 590 documents.[18] The evidence presented by complainant conclusively
establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent.
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of
merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used and
presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in
respondents petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence.
His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was
forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer;
which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so
commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the
charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively,
respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year
2002.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[19] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding
to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an

attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.[20] Elaborating on this, we said
in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [22] Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.[23]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in
general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[24]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of
public documents.[25] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension
from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and
even disbarment.[26]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a
violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents with an
expired commission:
1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such as the
extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds of
absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary Public expired;
2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1) instance
of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an absolute
deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he was a stockholder and
legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the
cancellation of the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a

Notary Public. What aggravated respondents unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction
involved was in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five (5)
documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a
contract to sell, after his commission as Notary Public expired.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and
as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP
must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro,
which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby
MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY.
HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as
Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal files of
respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

A.C. No. 8390

July 2, 2010
[Formerly CBD 06-1641]
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Laarni N.
Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 061642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.
On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the loan application of
Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a
postdated check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.2 However,
upon presentation at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient

funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to
pay the whole amount of her obligation.
Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to appear
despite due notice.3 Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest4 was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On
November 22, 2004, complainant sent a letter5 to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The
said letter was received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return cards. 6 Despite court orders
and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide.
On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required
Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter 7 dated
March 16, 2006, respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore,
Mrs. Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation.
On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the mandatory conference. Atty.
Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP
ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.
Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross
misconduct.
The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerios mother, in view of the
latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the
physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court
processes, more particularly her failure to appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the
Court despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her
morally unfit to be a member of the bar.8
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the Court, in a Resolution dated
December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical certificate
issued by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of medical records to support the claim
of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice 9 to comply with the said Resolution,
no medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court by either respondent and/or her mother.
Thus, this resolution.
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,10 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must
conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite respondents failure to
cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the filing of the complaint against her,
Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an
obligation to pay on her part. Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughters
obligation.
The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is
suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the
complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the "medical certificate" on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios
failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued it.
Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She
failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set
by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the
complaint against her and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this
conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath
which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has
failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1avvphil
In Ngayan v. Tugade,11 we ruled that "[a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure
to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate
his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We come to the penalty imposable in this case.
In Lao v. Medel,12 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice
of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,13 having found guilty of
gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted
to him by the complainant.
However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio
was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, 14 because, aside from issuing worthless
checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the
course of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent
Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of
law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERA

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426
February 16, 1959
FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines
Patent Office due to a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law for requiring such
examination as condition precedent before members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases
before the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications,
etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law
HELD:

Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves
the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member
of the bar has been prepared.

As
stated
in
5
Am.
Jur,
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme
Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much
of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that
part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders
and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.

Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment
was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano
on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that
the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions
in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.

5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day
the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines,
legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no
means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation.

SORIANO V. DIZON

Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas
pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema
nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his
treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.

(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify
disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land.
The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his
probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. CA (181 SCRA 367

01/23/1990)
FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with
a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner
to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the
pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service
Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and
Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the
lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land
to Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of
the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as
its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which
the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate theattorney's liens on
the certificates of title of the parcels of land.
Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated
an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid
private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be
considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on
December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with
petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were
unsuccessful.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of
its attorney's fee.
2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.
3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of
the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
HELD:
1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement

of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and
he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have
to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a
charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment ofattorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua
non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the
attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action
from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in
view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."
2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of
the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case
willdetermine attorneys fees.
3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are:
(1)
the
importance
of
the
subject
matter
(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is hereby

in

controvers

REVERSED and SET.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right
to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.

WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAAA.M. No. 1048

/ 246 SCRA 64 July 14, 1995
Case Nature
: DISBARMENTViolation of lawyers oath (RULE 138,
Section 27, Rules of Court)
FACTS
Wellington Reyes, a complainant, reported to the National Bureauof Investigation (NBI) that he had been the
victim of extortion by Atty.Gaa, a respondent lawyer and a former Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,who was
investigating a complaint for es
tafa filed by complainants
business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondentP500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P1,
500.00 on three other
occasions. He said that another payoff was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. on
the same day in responde
nts office at the City Hall. An entrapment was
set up by the NBI after complainant furnished the NBI agents severalpeso bills totaling P150.00 for marking.
The paper bills were sent to theForensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returnedto
complainant for use in the entrapment. When complainant went to
respondents office, he was told that the latter would not return until
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business withrespondent. When finally complainant was
able to see the respondentafter thirty minutes of waiting, the complainant then handed torespondent the marked

money which he placed inside his right

pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to theNBI Forensic and Chemistry
Division
for examination. Respondents
hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlierto the marked money. Respondent was
thereafter taken to the Office ofthe Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he wasphotographed,
fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined togive a sworn statement to explain his side of the case,
invoking his right

against self-incrimination. Thereafter, the NBI recommended theprosecution of respondent for violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. The NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing ofadministrative
charges and the institution of disbarment proceedingsagainst him. An administrative complaint for disbarment
chargesrespondent with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as anattorney. In an answer to such
complaint, respondent asserted thatcomplainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocketwithout
his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminalcase (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI
was still pendingpreliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection withthe incident of March
30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminalcomplaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and
attemptedcorruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal ofManila. In reply to the
answer, complainant denied that the several casesagainst respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or
personal ill will.He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal ofthe charges filed by his
business rival. In a resolution dated December23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the
SolicitorGeneral for investigation, report and recommendation. However, uponthe adoption of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court, the case wastransferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation
anddisposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of theCommission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred.
ISSUE
Whether or not the extortion committed by Atty. Salavador Gaashall be considered as a ground for disbarment?

HELDYES.
The extortion committed by respondent constitutesmisconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a
violation of his
oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]) imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyers oa
this a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for hissuspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action. Where themisconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character asto affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, thenhe may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds(Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The respondent isDISBARRED and his name
is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll ofAttorneys.

The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several properties including two parcels of land
Lot 1586 and Lot 1603 both in Malabon. Isidra has 5 other siblings.
In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement. They were assisted by Felicisimas husband, Atty. Rolando Torres who was also
the administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586, they made it
appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement covering Lot 1603, the signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party to the
Deed. Torres then presented the Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of transferring the
titles into the name of Miriam and Felicisima. Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation.
Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this disbarment case against Atty. Torres.
Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds;
that he thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by
Isidras mother and as implemented by their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs
was merely an oversight.
Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such toka.
ISSUE: Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the other heirs from the Deeds
of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of their presence.
HELD: Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has committed falsehood. By letting
his wife and Miriam declare in a public document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are
other compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to
advise that the two were doing acts contrary to law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to
the subsequent transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts facilitated a
wrong against the other heirs.

A.M.
No.
3360
January
30,
1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
Facts;
Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her
guilty of violating BP 22.
Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension
was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further
that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense
charged.
Issue;
WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.

Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the
ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense
involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of
attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently,
the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his
comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC,
the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he
participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar.
The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and with the proper
knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not
morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied
admission to the bar.