1

G.R. No. 152662

2012

June 13,

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA.
THERESA
PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)
filed
this
petition
for
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, praying for the
nullification and setting aside of the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the
Philippines and Private Complainant
Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon
City,
Branch
218,
is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153
against
petitioner
Ma.
Theresa
Pangilinan
are
hereby
ordered
3
DISMISSED.
Culled from the record
following undisputed facts:

are

the

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C.

Malolos (private complainant) filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
(respondent) with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent
issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of Nine Million Six
Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five
Hundred
Ninety-Two
Pesos
(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored
upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent
filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability
and
effectivity
of
contract and specific performance
against private complainant before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10
December 1997, respondent filed a
"Petition to Suspend Proceedings on
the Ground of Prejudicial Question"
before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as
basis the pendency of the civil action
she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela
City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City
Prosecutor
Ruben
Catubay
recommended the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the
outcome
of
the
civil
action
respondent filed against private

complainant
with
the
RTC
of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised
the matter before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of
Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent in connection
with her issuance of City Trust Check
No.
127219
in
the
amount
of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No.
423773
in
the
amount
of P4,475,000.00,
both
checks
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00.
The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other
checks included in the affidavitcomplaint filed on 16 September
1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently,
two
counts
for
violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on
3 February 2000 before the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These
cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch
31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an
"Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged

that her criminal liability has been

extinguished
by
reason
of
prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch
31, Quezon City granted the motion
in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On
26
October
2000,
private
complainant filed a notice of appeal.
The criminal cases were raffled to
RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City reversed the 5 October
2000 Order of the MeTC. The
pertinent portion of the decision
reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in
this case were filed on 03 February
2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07
June 2000, they are covered by the
Rule as it was worded before the
latest amendment. The criminal
action on two counts for violation of
BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet
prescribed when the same was filed
with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started
the proceedings having been filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order
dated 05 October 2000 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
a quo is hereby directed to proceed
with the hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 89152 and 89153.4

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision,

respondent filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review5 on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. This was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September
2000, this Court referred the petition
to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due
course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant
to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002,
the CA reversed the 27 July 2001
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon
City, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the
reason that the cases for violation of
BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the
appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx
this
Court
reckons
the
commencement of the period of
prescription for violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to
[respondent] sometime in the latter
part of 1995, as it was within this
period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant]
of the fact of dishonor of the subject
checks and, the five (5) days grace
period granted by law had elapsed.
The private respondent then had,
pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as
amended, four years therefrom or
until the latter part of 1999 to file her

complaint or information against the

petitioner before the proper court.
The
informations
docketed
as
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89152(sic) against the petitioner
having
been
filed
with
the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City only on 03 February 2000, the
said cases had therefore, clearly
prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended,
prescription
shall
be
interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes 7 the
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
proceedings referred to in Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, which means
the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on
the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before
that, which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a
violation of a municipal ordinance,
this Court, considering that Section 2
of Act 3326, as amended, governs the
computation of the prescriptive
period of both ordinances and special
laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme
Court
in
Zaldivia
v.
Reyes8 likewise applies to special

laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.

22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in
the
instant
petition
for
review.1wphi1 According to the OSG,
while it admits that Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3585 and further
amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23
November 1930, governs the period
of prescription for violations of special
laws, it is the institution of criminal
actions, whether filed with the court
or with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, that interrupts the period
of
prescription of
the offense
10
charged. It submits that the filing of
the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16
September 1997 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
effectively interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period of the subject
BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA
erred in its decision when it relied on
the doctrine laid down by this Court
in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes,
Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor
is not the "judicial proceeding" that
could have interrupted the period of
prescription.
In
relying
on
12
Zaldivia, the CA allegedly failed to
consider
the
subsequent
jurisprudence
superseding
the
aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena
of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled
that the filing of a complaint with the

Fiscals
Office
for
preliminary
investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the
informations with the MeTC of Quezon
City on 3 February 2000 was still
within the allowable period of four
years within which to file the criminal
cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26
July 2002, respondent avers that the
petition of the OSG should be
dismissed outright for its failure to
comply
with
the
mandatory
requirements on the submission of a
certified true copy of the decision of
the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are
allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of
the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City Prosecutors Office did
not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that
the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent
contends
that
the
arguments advanced by petitioner
are anchored on erroneous premises.
She claims that the cases relied upon
by
petitioner
involved
felonies
punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and are therefore covered by
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the
Revised
Rules
on
Criminal

Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out

that the crime imputed against her is
for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as
such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as
amended. She submits that a
distinction should thus be made
between
offenses
covered
by
municipal ordinances or special laws,
as in this case, and offenses covered
by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is
whether the filing of the affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription
of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents
claim that the OSG failed to attach to
the petition a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the 12 March
2002 decision of the CA and the
required proof of service is refuted by
the record. A perusal of the record
reveals that attached to the original
copy of the petition is a certified true
copy of the CA decision. It was also
observed that annexed to the petition
was the proof of service undertaken
by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the
petition, we find that the CA
reversively erred in ruling that the
offense committed by respondent had
already prescribed. Indeed, Act No.

3326 entitled "An Act to Establish

Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin," as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases.
Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules:
(a) xxx; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two
years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four
(4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should
be tolled upon the institution of

proceedings
person.

against

the

guilty

In the old but oft-cited case of People

v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely
for
purposes
of
preliminary
examination or investigation, should,
and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription
of
the
criminal
responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits.
This ruling was broadened by the
Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v.
Court of Appeals, et. al.17 when it held
that the filing of the complaint with
the Fiscals Office also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a
different rule should be applied to
cases involving special laws is bereft
of merit. There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and
those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the
period of prescription. The ruling in
Zaldivia
v.
Reyes,
Jr.18 is
not
controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican,19 Ingco,
et
al.
v.
Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante
v.
21
CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v.
Lim,22cases involving special laws,
this Court held that the institution of
proceedings
for
preliminary
investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription.
In
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources

Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even

ruled that investigations conducted
by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for violations of the
Revised Securities Act and the
Securities
Regulations
Code
effectively interrupts the prescription
period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice,24 which is in all
fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically
ruled
that
commencement of the proceedings
for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City
Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under BP Blg.
22. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because
of
circumstances
beyond
their
control, like the accuseds delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the
CA that "sometime in the latter part
of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being
the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private
complainant of the fact of dishonor of
the checks and the five-day grace
period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the

violations
were
filed
against
respondent on 16 September 1997.
The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on 13 February
2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the
ground of "prejudicial question". The
matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City
Prosecutor approved the petition to
suspend proceedings. It was only
after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with
the MeTC of Quezon City.

ORDERED to re-file the informations

for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.

Clearly, it was respondents own

motion for the suspension of the
criminal proceedings, which motion
she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in
court
of
the
1997
initiated
proceedings only in 2000.

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C.

Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint
for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. The complaint alleges
that respondent issued nine (9)
checks with an aggregate amount of
Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two
Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of
private complainant which were
dishonored upon presentment for
payment.
Consequently the case was modified,
and only on February 3, 2000 that
two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22
were
filed
against
respondent
Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan
in
the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City. On 17 June 2000, respondent

As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to

deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
The only thing the offended must do
to initiate the prosecution of the
offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The 12
March 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is

SO ORDERED.
JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING
THAT
INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION
OF CRIME
PEOPLE
V.
MA.
THERESA
PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:

FACTS:

filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash

the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She
alleged that her criminal liability has
been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
In defense of her claim, Pangilinan
said that the prevailing law that
governs the prescription of special
penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods
Of
Prescription
For
Violations
Penalized By Special Acts) where the
right to file an action to a proper
court and not to merely to
prosecution office for B.P. 22,
prescribes four (4) years from the
commission of the crime.
The
imputed violation occurred sometime
in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000
that a case was formally filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the
action
already
prescribes.
RTC
granted the motion.
On the other hand, the complainant
argued that the filing with the office
of city prosecutor constitutes an
interruption to the prescription.
ISSUE:
Is filing complaint to city prosecutor
office
considered
a
judicial
proceeding
that
can
interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22?
HELD:

YES. Following a catena of cases, the

court held that, there is no more
distinction between cases under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those
covered by special laws with respect
to the interruption of the period of
prescription; that the institution of
proceedings
for
preliminary
investigation
in
the
office
of
prosecutor against accused interrupts
the period of prescription.
Following the factual finding the
crime was committed sometime in
1995, the filing of complaint on
September 1997, two (2) years from
the commission of the crime validly
interrupts the running of prescription.
Therefore the action against the
respondent
Pangilinan
did
not
prescribe.

G.R. No. 143375

July 6, 2001

RUTH
D.
BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF
THE
REGIONAL
STATE
PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and
SUSAN ALOA,respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents a
new
dimension
in
the
ever

controversial Batas Pambansa Bilang

22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The
question posed is whether the drawer
of a check which is dishonored due to
lack of sufficient funds can be
prosecuted under BP 22 even if the
check is presented for payment after
ninety (90) days from its due date.
The burgeoning jurisprudence on the
matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner
Ruth D. Bautista issued to private
respondent Susan Aloa Metrobank
Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May
1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on
Metrobank
Cavite
City
Branch.
According to private respondent,
petitioner assured her that the check
would be sufficiently funded on the
maturity date.
On
20
October
1998
private
respondent presented the check for
payment.
The
drawee
bank
dishonored the check because it was
drawn against insufficient funds
(DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent
filed a complaint-affidavit with the
City Prosecutor of Cavite City.1 In
addition to the details of the issuance
and the dishonor of the check, she
also alleged that she made repeated
demands on petitioner to make
arrangements for the payment of the
check within five (5) working days
after receipt of notice of dishonor
from the bank, but that petitioner
failed to do so.

Petitioner then submitted her own

counter-affidavit asserting in her
defense that presentment of the
check within ninety (90) days from
due date thereof was an essential
element of the offense of violation of
BP 22. Since the check was presented
for payment 166 days after its due
date, it was no longer punishable
under BP 22 and therefore the
complaint should be dismissed for
lack of merit. She also claimed that
she
already
assigned
private
respondent her condominium unit at
Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas
Boulevard, as full payment for the
bounced checks thus extinguishing
her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating
prosecutor
issued
a
resolution
recommending
the
filing
of
an Informationagainst petitioner for
violation of BP 22, which was
approved by the City Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with
the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a
petition for review of the 22 April
1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the
petition in a one (1)-page resolution
dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999
petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, which the ORSP also
denied on 31 August 1999. According
to the ORSP, only resolutions of
prosecutors dismissing a criminal
complaint were cognizable for review
by that office, citing Department
Order No. 223.

10

On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed

with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review of the resolution of the
ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999
as well as the order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration. The
appellate court issued the assailed
Resolution dated 26 October 1999
denying due course outright and
dismissing the petition.2 According to
respondent appellate court A
petition
for
review
is
appropriate under Rule 42
(1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the
exercise
of
its
appellate
jurisdiction, filed in the Court of
Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides
for appeal, via a petition for
review x x x from judgment or
final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals
and
Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition
for Review" of the ORSP
resolution does not fall under
any of the agencies mentioned
in Rule 43 x x x x It is worth to
note that petitioner in her three
(3) assigned errors charged the
ORSP of "serious error of law
and grave abuse of discretion."
The grounds relied upon by
petitioner are proper in a
petition for certiorari x x x x
Even if We treat the "Petition
for Review" as a petition for
certiorari, petitioner failed to
allege
the
essential
requirements of a special civil

action. Besides, the remedy of

petitioner is in the Regional
Trial
Court,
following
the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts x
x x x (italics supplied)
First, some ground rules. This case
went to the Court of Appeals by way
of petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 43 applies to "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of quasijudicial functions."3
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor
conducting
a
preliminary
investigation performs a quasi-judicial
function,
citing Cojuangco
v.
4
PCGG, Koh
v.
Court
of
Appeals,5 Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal
of Surigao del Norte6 andCrespo v.
Mogul.7 In these cases this Court held
that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in
nature. But this statement holds true
only in the sense that, like quasijudicial bodies, the prosecutor is an
office in the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a
court. Here is where the similarity
ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that
preliminary investigation is very
different from other quasi-judicial
proceedings. A quasi-judicial body
has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and

11

other than a legislature which affects

the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making."8
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon
Development Bank Employees,9 we
held that a voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel,
enjoys in law the status of a quasijudicial agency, hence his decisions
and awards are appealable to the
Court of Appeals. This is so because
the awards of voluntary arbitrators
become final and executory upon the
lapse of the period to appeal; 10 and
since their awards determine the
rights of parties, their decisions have
the same effect as judgments of a
court. Therefore, the proper remedy
from an award of a voluntary
arbitrator is a petition for review to
the Court of Appeals, following
Revised Administrative Circular No. 195, which provided for a uniform
procedure for appellate review of all
adjudications
of
quasi-judicial
entities, which is now embodied in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in
a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication
nor
rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the

case on the merits and has no

purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.11 While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.12
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is
not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily,
its decisions approving the filing of a
criminal complaint are not appealable
to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43. Since the ORSP has the power to
resolve appeals with finality only
where the penalty prescribed for the
offense does not exceed prision
correccional,
regardless
of
the
imposable fine,13 the only remedy of
petitioner, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion, is to present her
defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the
courts cannot interfere with the
discretion of the fiscal to determine
the specificity and adequacy of the
offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it to be
insufficient in form or substance or if
he finds no ground to continue with
the inquiry; or, he may otherwise
proceed with the investigation if the
complaint is, in his view, in due and
proper form.14
In
the
present
recourse,
notwithstanding
the
procedural
lapses, we give due course to the

12

petition, in view of the novel legal

question involved, to prevent further
delay of the prosecution of the
criminal case below, and more
importantly, to dispel any notion that
procedural technicalities are being
used to defeat the substantive rights
of petitioner.
Petitioner is accused of violation of BP
22 the substantive portion of which
reads Section 1. Checks without
sufficient funds. - Any person
who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account
or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such in full
upon presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by
the
drawee
bank
for
insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to
stop
payment,
shall
be
punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but
not more than double the
amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or
both
such
fine
and
imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

The same penalty shall be

imposed upon any person who,
having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if
presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank x x x x (italics
supplied).
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two
(2) distinct acts: First, making or
drawing and issuing any check to
apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that the
drawer does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank;
and, second, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.15
In the first paragraph, the drawer
knows that he does not have
sufficient funds to cover the check at
the time of its issuance, while in the
second paragraph, the drawer has
sufficient funds at the time of
issuance but fails to keep sufficient
funds or maintain credit within ninety

13

(90) days from the date appearing on

the check. In both instances, the
offense is consummated by the
dishonor of the check for insufficiency
of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense
is worthless at the time of issuance
since the drawer had neither
sufficient funds in nor credit with the
drawee bank at the time, while that
involved in the second offense is
good when issued as drawer had
sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when issued.16 Under
the first offense, the ninety (90)-day
presentment period is not expressly
provided, while such period is an
express element of the second
offense.17

check, shall be prima facie

evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in
full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid
by the drawee (italics supplied).

Petitioner asserts that she could not

be prosecuted for violation of BP 22
on the simple ground that the subject
check was presented 166 days after
the date stated thereon. She cites
Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads -

Petitioner interprets this provision to

mean that the ninety (90)-day
presentment period is an element of
the offenses punished in BP 22. She
asseverates that "for a maker or
issuer of a check to be covered by
B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her
is one that is dishonored when
presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from date of the check. If
the
dishonor
occurred
after
presentment for payment beyond the
ninety (90)-day period, no criminal
liability attaches; only a civil case for
collection of sum of money may be
filed, if warranted." To bolster this
argument, she relies on the view
espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan
in his treatise - 18

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge

of insufficient funds. - The
making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment which is
refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit
with
such
bank,
when
presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the

Although evidentiary in nature,

section 2 of the law must be
taken
as
furnishing
an
additional element of the
offense defined in the first
paragraph of section 1 because
it provides for the evidentiary
fact
of
"knowledge
of
insufficiency of funds or credit"

From the allegations of the complaint,

it is clear that petitioner is being
prosecuted for violation of the first
paragraph of the offense.

14

which is an element of the

offense
defined
in
said
paragraph;
otherwise
said
provision of section 2 would be
rendered without meaning and
nugatory. The rule of statutory
construction is that the parts of
a statute must be read
together in such a manner as to
give effect to all of them and
that such parts shall not be
construed
as
contradicting
each other. The same section
cannot be deemed to supply an
additional element for the
offense under the second
paragraph of section 1 because
the 90-day presentment period
is already a built-in element in
the
definition
of
said
offense (italics supplied).
We are not convinced. It is
fundamental that every element of
the offense must be alleged in the
complaint or information, and must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt
by the prosecution. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be
stated must be determined by
reference to the definitions and the
essentials of the specific crimes.19
The elements of the offense under BP
22 are (a) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; (b) the maker,
drawer or issuer knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and, (c)

the check is subsequently dishonored

by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.20
The ninety (90)-day period is not
among these elements. Section 2 of
BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check
presented within the ninety (90)-day
period
creates
a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds, which is an
essential element of the offense.
Since knowledge involves a state of
mind difficult to establish, the statute
itself
creates
a prima
facie presumption of the existence of
this element from the fact of drawing,
issuing or making a check, the
payment of which was subsequently
refused
for
insufficiency
of
21
funds. The termprima facie evidence
denotes
evidence
which,
if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it
supports or to establish the facts, or
to counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction.22
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a
conclusive
presumption
that
forecloses
or
precludes
the
presentation of evidence to the
contrary.23 Neither
does
the
term prima facie evidence preclude
the presentation of other evidence
that may sufficiently prove the
existence
or
knowledge
of
insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.

15

Surely,
the
law
is
not
so
circumscribed as to limit proof of
knowledge exclusively to the dishonor
of the subject check when presented
within the prescribed ninety (90) day
period. The deliberations on the
passage of BP 22 (then known as
Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the
author, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan
Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove
insightful MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under
Section 1, who is the person
who may be liable under this
Section? Would it be the maker
or the drawer? How about the
endorser, Mr. Speaker?

MR. ROMAN: But under Section

1, it says here: "Any person
who shall make or draw or utter
or deliver any check." The
preposition is disjunctive, so
that any person who delivers
any check knowing at the time
of such making or such delivery
that the maker or drawer has
no sufficient funds would be
liable under Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA: That is correct
Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while
there is liability even as against
endorser, for example, the
presumption of knowledge of
insufficient funds arises only
against the maker or drawer
under Section 2.

MR. MENDOZA: Liable.

MR. ROMAN: The endorser,
therefore, under Section 1 is
charged with the duty of
knowing at the time he
endorses
and
delivers
a
check . . . .
MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser
is charged for violation of the
Act then the fact of knowledge
must be proven by positive
evidence
because
the
presumption
of
knowledge
arises only against the maker
or the drawer. It does not arise
as against endorser under the
following
section (italics
supplied).

MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It

is true; however, under Section
1, endorsers of checks or bills
of exchange would find it
necessary since they may be
charged with the knowledge at
the time they negotiate bills of
exchange
they
have
no
sufficient funds in the bank or
depository.
MR. MENDOZA: In order that an
endorser may be held liable,
there
must
be
evidence
showing that at the time he
endorsed the check he was
aware that the drawer would
not have sufficient funds to
cover
the
check
upon
presentation. That evidence
must be presented by the

16

prosecution. However, if the

one changed is the drawer,
then that evidence need not be
presented by the prosecution
because that fact would be
established by presumption
under
Section
2 (italics
supplied).24
An endorser who passes a bad check
may be held liable under BP 22, even
though the presumption of knowledge
does not apply to him, if there is
evidence that at the time of
endorsement, he was aware of the
insufficiency of funds. It is evident
from the foregoing deliberations that
the presumption in Sec. 2 was
intended to facilitate proof of
knowledge and not to foreclose
admissibility of other evidence that
may also prove such knowledge.
Thus, the only consequence of the
failure to present the check for
payment within ninety (90) days from
the date stated is that there arises
no prima
facie presumption
of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
But the prosecution may still prove
such
knowledge
through
other
evidence. Whether such evidence is
sufficient to sustain probable cause to
file the information is addressed to
the sound discretion of the City
Prosecutor and is a matter not
controllable by certiorari. Certainly,
petitioner is not left in a lurch as the
prosecution must prove knowledge
without
the
benefit
of
the
presumption, and she may present
whatever defenses are available to
her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements

of the offense and the evidence of
these elements is analogous or akin
to the difference between ultimate
facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential
and substantial facts which either
form the basis of the primary right
and duty or which directly make up
the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are
those which tend to prove or
establish
said ultimate
facts.25 Applying this analogy to the
case
at
bar, knowledge
of
insufficiency of funds is the ultimate
fact, or element of the offense that
needs to be proved, while dishonor of
the check presented within ninety
(90) days is merely the evidentiary
fact of such knowledge.
It is worth reiterating that courts will
not normally interfere with the
prosecutor's discretion to file a
criminal case when there is probable
cause to do so. Probable cause has
been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the
crime
for
which
he
was
26
prosecuted. The
prosecutor
has
ruled that there is probable cause in
this case, and we see no reason to
disturb the finding.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 26
October 1999 which dismissed the

17

petition for review questioning the

resolution of the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV,
dated 22 April 1999, and its order
dated 31 August 1999 denying
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
REGIONAL
STATE
PROSECUTOR,
REGION IV, and SUSAN ALOA,
respondents
G.R. No. 143375

July 6, 2001

Facts:
1) Sometime in April 1998 petitioner
Ruth D. Bautista issued to private
respondent Susan Aloa a check
dated
8
May
1998
for
P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank
Cavite City Branch.
2) On 20 October 1998 private
respondent presented the check for
payment.
The
drawee
bank
dishonored the check because it
was drawn against insufficient
funds.
3) On 16 March
respondent filed

1999 private
a complaint-

affidavit with the City Prosecutor of

Cavite City.
4) Petitioner then submitted her own
counter-affidavit asserting in her
defense that presentment of the
check within ninety (90) days from
due date thereof was an essential
element of the offense of violation
of BP 22. Since the check was
presented for payment 166 days
after its due date, it was no longer
punishable under BP 22.
5) On 22 April 1999, the investigating
prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of an
Information against petitioner for
violation of BP 22, which was
approved by the City Prosecutor.
Bautista filed a motion to review
the resolution with Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP)
for Region IV, but it was denied.
6) On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review of the resolution of the
ORSP. The appellate court issued
the assailed Resolution issued by
ORSP. CA further stated it is an
error to file a petition for review
under Rule 43 of Rules of Civil
Procedure in their case because
ORSP resolution does not fall under
a quasi-judicial body.

18

7) The petitioner escalated the

complaint to SC using the defense
that a prosecutor conducting a
preliminary investigation performs
a quasi-judicial function.
Issues:
1) Is the petition to review proper?
2) Is the 90-day period an essential
element of BP 22, to warrant the
defense of the petitioner.
Held:
1) The Office of the Prosecutor is not a
quasi-judicial body. The prosecutor
in a preliminary investigation does
not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused, like in
quasi-judicial bodies. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rulemaking functions. Further, it is wellsettled that the courts cannot
interfere with the discretion of the
fiscal to determine the specificity
and adequacy of the offense
charged. SC assailed Resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
2) It is clear that petitioner is being
prosecuted for violation of the first
paragraph of the offense. The court
is not convinced that the 90-day
period is an essential element of
the crime as claimed by the

petitioner. The ninety (90)-day

period creates a prima facie
presumption of knowledge, but it is
not a conclusive presumption that
forecloses
or
precludes
the
presentation of evidence to the
contrary. The term prima facie
evidence denotes evidence which,
if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition
it supports or to establish the facts,
or
to
counterbalance
the
presumption of innocence to
warrant a conviction.

G.R. No. 175602

February 13, 2013
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
P02
EDUARDO
VALDEZ
and
EDWIN
VALDEZ, AccusedAppellants.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The two accused were tried for three
counts of murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon
City. On January 20, 2005, after trial,
the RTC convicted them as charged,
prescribed on each of them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, and ordered them to pay to
the heirs of each victim P93,000.00

19

_as actual damages, P50,000.00 as

civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the
RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the
modification that each of the accused
pay
to
the
heirs
of
each
victim P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00
as
moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages,
and P25,000.00
as
exemplary damages, plus costs of
suit.
The two accused then came to the
Court on final appeal, but on May 9,
2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to
withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted on October 10, 2007, thereby
deeming Edwins appeal closed and
terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court
promulgated its judgment on the
appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding
him guilty of three counts of
homicide, instead of three counts of
murder, and meting on him for each
count of homicide the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporalas maximum,2 to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on July
18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2
Eduardo
Valdez
guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of
HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to
suffer
for
each
count
the

indeterminate sentence of 10 years

of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years
of reclusion
temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and
Joselito
Sayson
the
amounts
of P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and P25,000.00
as
temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the
Court Administrator a selfexplanatory
letter3 dated March 12, 2012, where
he pleaded for the application to him
of the judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 on the ground that
the judgment would be beneficial to
him as an accused. The letter reads
as follows:
HON.
MIDAS
MARQUEZ
Court
Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122
of Rules of Court, Request for.
Your honor,
The undersigned most respectfully
requesting through your Honorable
office, assistance on the subject
mentioned above.

20

I,
Edwin
and
Eduardo,
both
surnamed Valdez were both charged
before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Quezon City for the
entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720,
which convicted us to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for
each of the three (3) offense.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or

more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the
Appellate Court is favorable and
applicable to the latter: x x x"

Then after the decision of the RTC

Branch 86, the same was appealed to
the Court of Appeals with CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00876 and again on July 18,
2006 the Honorable Court of appeals
Ninth Division issued a Decision
AFFIRMED the questioned Decision
with MODIFICATION.

Thank you very much and more

power, God Bless.

Only
my
Co-principal
Accused
EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed
appealed
(sic)
the
Affirmatory
Decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with
G.R. Nos. 175602. On my part, I
decided to withdraw my appeal,
because I believe that there is no
more hope for me, but I was wrong
when I read the Decision of the First
Division of the Supreme Court, dated
January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief
Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona
and finally I found hope.
And now I come to your Honorable
Office through this letter to seek help
and assistance that the Decision of
the
Supreme
Court
to
my
Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also
benefitted (sic) the undersigned
through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court.

Favorable Humanitarian consideration

on this matter.

Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ
Through
a
comment
filed
on
4
September 25, 2012, the Solicitor
General interposed no opposition to
the plea for the reduction of Edwins
sentences for being in full accord with
the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of
Edwins sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 downgraded the
crimes committed by Eduardo from
three counts of murder to three
counts of homicide, and consequently
prescribed lighter penalties in the
form of indeterminate sentences. As a
result, Eduardo would serve only an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years
of reclusion
temporal as
maximum, under which he can qualify
for parole in due course by virtue of
the Indeterminate
Sentence
Law,

21

instead of suffering the indivisible

penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
The Court rationalized the result as
follows:
x x x The records show that the
version of PO2 Valdez was
contrary to the established facts
and circumstances showing that
he and Edwin, then armed with
short firearms, had gone to
the jai alaibetting station of
Moises to confront Jonathan
Rubio, the teller of the betting
booth then busily attending to
bettors inside the booth; that
because the accused were calling
to Rubio to come out of the
booth, Moises approached to
pacify them, but one of them
threatened
Moises; Gusto
mo
unahin na kita?; that immediately
after
Moises
replied: Huwag!,
PO2 Valdez fired several shots at
Moises, causing him to fall to the
ground;
that
PO2
Valdez
continued firing at the fallen
Moises; that Ferdinand (another
victim) rushed to aid Moises, his
brother,
but
Edwin
shot
Ferdinand in the head, spilling
his
brains;
that
somebody
shouted to Joselito (the third
victim) to run; that Edwin also
shot Joselito twice in the back;
and that Joselito fell on a burger
machine. The shots fired at the
three victims were apparently
fired from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the

States witnesses entirely jibed with
the physical evidence. Specifically,
the medico-legal evidence showed
that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound
in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselitos back and the right
side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head
and four gunshot wounds in the
chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the
NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that
the presence of marginal abrasions at
the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at
close range. Given that physical
evidence was of the highest order
and spoke the truth more eloquently
than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial
recollections
and
the
physical
evidence
rendered
the
findings
adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin
conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit the
felony. Proof of the actual agreement
to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be
implied or inferred from their acts.
Herein, both lower courts deduced
the conspiracy between the accused
from the mode and manner in which
they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was
warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2
Valdez cannot now avoid criminal

22

responsibility
for
the
fatal
shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand
and Joselito. Both accused were
convincingly shown to have acted
in concert to achieve a common
purpose
of
assaulting
their
unarmed victims with their guns.
Their acting in concert was
manifest not only from their
going together to the betting
station
on
board
a
single
motorcycle, but also from their
joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive
shots at Moises and immediately
followed by Edwins shooting of
Ferdinand and Joselito one after
the other. It was also significant
that they fled together on board
the same motorcycle as soon as
they had achieved their common
purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not
have to participate in every
detail of the execution; neither
did he have to know the exact
part
performed
by
his
coconspirator in the execution of
the criminal acts. Accordingly,
the existence of the conspiracy
between PO2 Valdez and Edwin
was properly inferred and proved
through their acts that were
indicative
of
their
common
purpose
and
community
of
interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable
for the Court to pronounce PO2
Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on

account of the informations not

sufficiently
alleging
the
attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of
means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly
and specially insure its execution,
without risk to the offending party
arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It
encompasses a wide variety of
actions and attendant circumstances,
the appreciation of which is particular
to a crime committed. Corollarily, the
defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying
is
also
varied
and
dependent
on
each
particular
instance. Such variety generates the
actual need for the state to
specifically
aver
the
factual
circumstances or particular acts that
constitute the criminal conduct or
that qualify or aggravate the liability
for the crime in the interest of
affording the accused sufficient notice
to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for,
indeed, the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of
the information, or from the
specification of the provision of
law
alleged
to
have
been
violated,
which
are
mere
conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the
complaint
or

23

information. In People v. Dimaano,

the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of
the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law
or part thereof allegedly violated,
these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited.
The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the
elements
of
the
crime
charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be
determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the
specified
crimes.
The
requirement
of
alleging
the
elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the

accused of the nature of the

accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is
that
the
accused
has
no
independent knowledge of the
facts
that
constitute
the
offense. [emphasis supplied]
The
averments
of
the
informations to the effect that
the two accused "with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did x x x
assault,
attack
and
employ
personal violence upon" the
victims "by then and there
shooting them with a gun, hitting
[them]" on various parts of their
bodies "which were the direct
and immediate cause of their
deaths" did not sufficiently set
forth the facts and circumstances
describing
how
treachery
attended each of the killings. It
should not be difficult to see that
merely averring the killing of a
person by shooting him with a
gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime
was
directly
and
specially
ensured without risk to the
accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed,
the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the
use
of
the
term treachery constitute
a

24

sufficient averment, for that

term,
standing
alone,
was
nothing but a conclusion of law,
not an averment of a fact. In
short, the particular acts and
circumstances
constituting
treachery
as
an
attendant
circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of
sufficient factual averments is
meant to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the
charge against him in order to
enable
him
to
prepare
his
defense.
This
requirement
accords with the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant
to which he is always presumed
to
have
no
independent
knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with.
To have the facts stated in the
body
of
the
information
determine the crime of which he
stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords
with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice, x x
x.

and the maximum from the medium

period of reclusion temporal. Hence,
the
Court
imposes
the
indeterminate sentence of 10
years
of prision
mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each
count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on July
18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding
PO2
Eduardo
Valdez
guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of HOMICIDE, and
sentencing him to suffer for each
count
the
indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years
ofreclusion
temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and
Joselito
Sayson
the
amounts
of P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and P25,000.00
as
temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of
suit.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

x x x. There being no circumstances

modifying
criminal
liability,
the
penalty is applied in its medium
period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum
of
the
indeterminate
sentence is taken from prision mayor,

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred

from seeking the application to him of
the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter
penalties) despite the finality of his
convictions for three counts of
murder due to his withdrawal of his
appeal. The downgrading of the

25

crimes committed would definitely be

favorable to him. Worth pointing out
is that to deny to him the benefit of
the lessened criminal responsibilities
would be highly unfair, considering
that this Court had found the two
accused to have acted in concert in
their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liabiliy
under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwins plea based on
Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of
several accused. (a) An appeal
taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has
pronounced
in Lim
v.
Court
6
of Appeals that the benefits of this
provision extended to all the accused,
regardless of whether they appealed
or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and
the OSG laterally argue that in the
event of Guingguings acquittal,
petitioner
should
likewise
be
acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section
11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of

several accused.(a) An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private
respondent
however,
contends that said provision is not
applicable to petitioner inasmuch as
he appealed from his conviction, and
the provision states that a favorable
judgment shall be applicable only to
those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase
"did not appeal," as espoused by
private respondent, will not give
justice to the purpose of the
provision.
It should be read in its entirety and
should not be myopically construed
so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to
benefit an accused who did not join in
the appeal of his co-accused in case
where the appellate judgment is
favorable. In fact, several cases
rendered by the Court applied the
foregoing provision without regard as
to the filing or non-filing of an appeal
by a coaccused, so long as the
judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court
extended the acquittal of Rodriguezs
co-accused to him despite the
withdrawal of his appeal, applying the
Rule
122,
Section
11(a),
and

26

considering that the evidence against

both are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who
persisted with the present appeal, the
well-established rule is that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the
whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by
the parties. The records show that
Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal
due to financial reasons. However,
Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that "an
appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the
latter." As we have elucidated, the
evidence against and the conviction
of both appellant and Rodriguez are
inextricably linked. Hence, appellants
acquittal, which is favorable and
applicable to Rodriguez, should
benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found
accused Arondain guilty only of
homicide.1wphi1 Such verdict was
applied to his co-accused, Jose
Precioso, who was previously found
guilty by the trial court of robbery
with homicide, despite the fact that
Precioso appealed but failed to file an
appellants brief. The Court also
modified Preciosos civil liability
although the additional monetary
award imposed on Arondain was not
extended to Precioso since it was not
favorable to him and he did not
pursue the appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas,

together with several coaccused,
were found by the trial court guilty of
forcible abduction. During pendency
of the review before the Court, Villas
withdrew his appeal, hence his
conviction
became
final
and
executory. Thereafter, the Court
found Villas co-accused guilty only of
grave coercion. Applying Rule 122,
Section 11(a), the Court also found
Villas guilty of the lesser offense of
grave coercion since it is beneficial to
him.
In People v. Escao, the Court
granted a motion filed by accused
Julian Deen Escao, praying that the
Courts Decision dated January 28,
2000, acquitting his co-accused
Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, be applied to
him. Escao originally filed a Notice
of Appeal with the trial court but later
withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the
accused
appealed
from
their
judgments of conviction but for one
reason or another, the conviction
became
final
and
executory.
Nevertheless, the Court still applied
to them the favorable judgment in
favor of their co-accused. The Court
notes that the Decision dated
September 30, 2005 in G.R. No.
128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt
with respect to Lim [herein petitioner]
had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court

27

cannot see why a different treatment

should be given to petitioner, given
that the judgment is favorable to him
and considering further that the
Court's finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically
stated that "the publication of the
subject advertisement by petitioner
and Lim cannot be deemed by this
Court to have been done with actual
malice."7
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN
VALDEZ for the application to him of
the judgment promulgated on January
18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO
VALDEZ guilty of three counts of
homicide, and sentencing him to
suffer
for
each
count
the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years
of reclusion
temporal as
maximum, and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr.,
and the late Joselito Sayson the
amounts
ofP50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P50,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and P25,000.00
as
temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.
012 PEOPLE vs EDUARDO VALDEZ
and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
TOPIC: RULE 110, Sec 6
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00
oclock in the evening, Estrella
Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen
(which also includes a jai alai betting
station) located at 77 Corregidor
Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City.
Estrella was preparing for the
celebration of the birthday of her
second husband, Wilfredo Lladones,
which was held later in the evening.
Estrellas son, the deceased Moises
Sayson, a former policeman, and his
wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned
the said canteen and managed the
betting station. At about 9:00 oclock
in the evening, Estrellas other sons
Joselito
Sayson
(Joselito)
and
Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived
at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. Estrellas family and other
visitors ate and enjoyed themselves
at the party.
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening,
the celebration was interrupted with
the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who
alighted from a motorcycle in front of
the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and
Edwin asked the jai alai teller,
Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come
out. Jonathan was then attending to
customers who were buying jai alai
tickets. Moises approached Eduardo
and Edwin and tried to reason with
them. Estrella saw Eduardo and
Edwin armed with guns. She tried to
prevent Moises from going near
Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not
heed his mothers warning. He went
out and advised Eduardo and Edwin
not to force Jonathan to go out of the

28

fronton. Estrella then heard one of

the
accused-appellants
threaten
Moises with the words Gusto mo
unahin na kita? Moises replied
huwag. Successive shots were
thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon even after he
was
sprawled on the ground.
Ferdinand immediately approached
the scene to help his brother Moises.
Ferdinand, however was shot on the
left temporal portion of his head and
fell. Somebody told Joselito to run
away, but he was hit at the back
while running. Joselito fell on a burger
machine. After shooting the Sayson
brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped
from the scene of the crime (p. 10,
TSN, February 6, 2001).
The RTC convicted the two accused of
three
counts
of
murder
and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder.
On appeal,
convictions.

the

CA

affirmed

the

In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the

credibility of the States witnesses by
pointing
to
inconsistencies
and
weaknesses in their testimonies;
challenges the finding of conspiracy
between the accused; and contends
that the State did not establish the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
prosecution sufficiently established

the
qualifying
treachery.
HELD: NO.

circumstance

of

RATIO:
it is unavoidable for the
Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty
of three homicides, instead of three
murders,
on
account
of
the
informations not sufficiently alleging
the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment
of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly
and specially insure its execution,
without risk to the offending party
arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It
encompasses a wide variety of
actions and attendant circumstances,
the appreciation of which is particular
to a crime committed. Corollarily, the
defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying
is
also
varied
and
dependent
on
each
particular
instance. Such variety generates the
actual need for the State to
specifically
aver
the
factual
circumstances or particular acts that
constitute the criminal conduct or
that qualify or aggravate the liability
for the crime in the interest of
affording the accused sufficient notice
to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed,
the real nature of the criminal charge
is determined not from the caption or

29

preamble of the information, or from

the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts
in the complaint or information.28 In
People v. Dimaano,29 the Court
elaborated:
For
complaint
or
information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable
a
person
of
common
understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense
must
be
stated
in
the
information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be
determined by reference to the

definitions and essentials of the

specified
crimes.
The
requirement
of
alleging
the
elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is
that
the
accused
has
no
independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the informations to
the effect that the two accused with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did xxx assault,
attack and employ personal violence
upon the victims by then and there
shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them] on various parts of their
bodies which [were] the direct and
immediate cause of [their] death[s]
did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how
treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to
see that merely averring the killing of
a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the
execution of the crime was directly
and specially ensured without risk to
the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the
use of the gun as an instrument to kill
was not per se treachery, for there
are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor
did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for
that term, standing alone, was

30

nothing but a conclusion of law, not

an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances
constituting
treachery
as
an
attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of
informing him of the charge, the
State must specify in the information
the details of the crime and any
circumstance that aggravates his
liability
for
the
crime.
The
requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of
the charge against him in order to
enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being
charged with. To have the facts stated
in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he
stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with
common
sense
and
with
the
requirements of plain justice, for, as
the Court fittingly said in United
States v. Lim San: From a legal point
of view, and in a very real sense, it is
of no concern to the accused what is
the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way
aids him in a defense on the merits.
That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all
things
else,
should
be
most
interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a

crime given in the law some technical

and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute.
The designation of the crime by name
in the caption of the information from
the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made
by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For
his full and complete defense he need
not know the name of the crime at
all. It is of no consequence whatever
for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important
question to him is, Did you perform
the acts alleged in the manner
alleged? not Did you commit a
crime
named
murder.
If
he
performed the acts alleged, in the
manner stated, the law determines
what the name of the crime is and
fixes the penalty therefor. It is the
province of the court alone to say
what the crime is or what it is named.
A practical consequence of the nonallegation of a detail that aggravates
his liability is to prohibit the
introduction or consideration against
the accused of evidence that tends to
establish that detail. The allegations
in the information are controlling in
the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the

31

offense charged in the information

and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in the
offense charged, or of the offense
charged included in the offense
proved. In that regard, an offense
charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an
offense
charged
is
necessarily
included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.

ARMANDO
CHINGH
PARCIA, Accused-Appellant.

CASE
LAW/
DOCTRINE:
The
sufficiency of the allegations of the
facts and circumstances constituting
the elements of the crime charged is
crucial in every criminal prosecution
because
of
the
ever-present
obligation of the State to duly inform
the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation.

That on or before March 11, 2004 in

the City of Manila, Philippines,
[Armando], with lewd design and by
means
of force, violence
and
intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
commit sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct upon a ten (10) year old
minor child, [VVV], by then and there
pulling her in a dark place then
mashing her breast and inserting his
fingers in her vagina and afterwards
his penis, against her will and
consent, thereby causing serious
danger to the normal growth and
development of the child [VVV], to
her damage and prejudice.

G.R. No. 178323

March

16, 2011
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando)
seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him of
Statutory Rape and Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
The
factual
and
procedural
antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information
for Rape was filed against Armando
for
inserting
his
fingers
and
afterwards his penis into the private
part of his minor victim, VVV,2 the
accusatory portion of which reads:

32

Contrary to law.3
Upon his arraignment, Armando
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of the victim, VVV;
the victims father; PO3 Ma. Teresa
Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The
defense,
on
the
other
hand,
presented
the
lone
testimony
Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was
only 10 years old at the time of the
incident. On 11 March 2004 at around
8:00 p.m., along with five other
playmates, VVV proceeded to a store
to buy food. While she was beckoning
the storekeeper, who was not then at
her station, Armando approached and
pulled her hand and threatened not
to shout for help or talk. Armando
brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo
Street, about 400 meters from the
store. While in a standing position
beside an unoccupied passenger
jeepney, Armando mashed her breast
and inserted his right hand index
finger into her private part. Despite
VVVs pleas for him to stop, Armando
unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and
rammed his phallus inside her vagina,
causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would
tell anyone what had happened, VVV
kept mum about her traumatic

experience when she arrived home.

Noticing
her
odd
and
uneasy
demeanor as well as her bloodstained underwear, however, her
father pressed her for an explanation.
VVV confessed to her father about
her
unfortunate
experience.
Immediately, they reported the
matter to the police authorities. After
his arrest, Armando was positively
identified by VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV
conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr.
Baluyot) of the Philippine General
Hospitals Child Protection Unit, in the
morning of 12 March 2004, showed a
"fresh laceration with bleeding at 6
oclock position" in the childs hymen
and "minimal bleeding from [said]
hymen laceration." Her impression
was that there was a "clear evidence"
of
"penetrating
trauma"
which
happened within 24 hours prior to the
examination. The photograph of the
lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly
illustrated
and
buttressed
Dr.
Baluyots medical report.4
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV.
Under his version, in (sic) the night of
11 March 2004, he and his
granddaughter were on their way to
his cousins house at Payumo St.,
Tondo, Manila. As it was already late,
he told his granddaughter to just go
home ahead of him while he decided
to go to Blumentritt market to buy
food. While passing by a small alley
on his way thereto, he saw VVV along

33

with some companions, peeling

"dalanghita." VVV approached him
and asked if she could go with him to
the market because she will buy
"dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused
her request and told VVV instead to
go home. He then proceeded towards
Blumentritt, but before he could
reach the market, he experienced
rheumatic pains that prompted him to
return home. Upon arriving home, at
about 8:30 oclock in the evening, he
watched television with his wife and
children. Shortly thereafter, three (3)
barangay officials arrived, arrested
him, and brought him to a police
precinct where he was informed of
VVVs accusation against him.5

It appearing that accused is detained,

the period of his detention shall be
credited in the service of his
sentence.

On April 29, 2005, the RTC, after

finding
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution overwhelming against
the accuseds defense of denial and
alibi, rendered a Decision6 convicting
Armando of Statutory Rape. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of

the trial court is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: accusedappellant is hereby found GUILTY of
two
counts
of
rape
and
is,
accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for
the crime of statutory rape, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and, for
the offense of rape through sexual
assault, the indeterminate penalty of
3 years, 3 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 11 months and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the victim, a
total
of P80,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P80,000.00
as
moral
damages;
and P40,000.00
as
exemplary damages, or a grand total
ofP200,000.00 for the two counts of
rape.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

the Court finds accused ARMANDO
CHINGH GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of
Statutory Rape defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d)
of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 8353 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
private
complainant
[VVV]
the
amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the
Decision before the CA, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA
rendered a Decision7 finding Armando
not only guilty of Statutory Rape, but
also of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The decretal portion of said Decision
reads:

Costs against accused-appellant.

34

SO ORDERED.8

Hence, Armando raises the following

errors:

In fine, the CA affirmed the decision

of the RTC, and considering that the
appeal opened the entire case for
judicial review, the CA also found
Armando guilty of the crime of Rape
Through Sexual Assault. The CA
opined that since the Information
charged Armando with two counts of
rape: (1) by inserting his finger in the
victims vagina, which is classified as
Rape Through Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and
(2) for inserting his penis in the
private part of his victim, which is
Statutory Rape, and considering that
Armando failed to object thereto
through a motion to quash before
entering his plea, Armando could be
convicted of as many offenses as are
charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with
the credible, direct, and candid
testimony of the victim, the elements
of Statutory Rape and Rape Through
Sexual Assault were indubitably
established by the prosecution.
Armando now
Court for relief.

comes

before

this

In a Resolution9 dated September 26,

2007, the Court required the parties
to file their respective supplemental
briefs.
In
their
respective
10
Manifestations, the parties waived
the filing of their supplemental briefs,
and instead adopted their respective
briefs filed before the CA.

I
The trial court gravely erred in
finding the accused guilty of
the crime of rape under article
266-a, paragraph 1 (d) of the
revised penal code in spite the
unnatural
and
unrealistic
testimony
of
the
private
complainant.
II
The trial court erred in finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing
the factual basis of his conviction,
which in effect, mainly questions the
credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses
for
the
prosecution,
particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando
maintains
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
present
sufficient evidence that will overcome
the
presumption
of
innocence.
Likewise, Armando insists that the
RTC gravely erred in convicting him
based
on
the
unrealistic
and
unnatural testimony of the victim.
Armando claims that VVVs testimony
was so inconsistent with common
experience that it deserves careful
and critical evaluation. First, it was so
unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and
not ask for help when the accused
allegedly pulled her in the presence

35

of
several
companions
and
bystanders; second, VVV did not
resist or cry for help while they were
on their way to the place where she
was allegedly abused, which was 300
to 400 meters away from where he
allegedly pulled her; third, VVV could
have run away while Armando was
allegedly molesting her, but she did
not; fourth, Armando could not have
inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were
standing, unless the victim did not
offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb
the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, as it was in
the better position to observe their
candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial
court; it had the unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
especially under cross-examination.
Its assessment is entitled to respect
unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of
the case.11
From the testimony of the victim,
VVV,
she
positively
identified
Armando as the one who ravaged her
on that fateful night of March 11,
2004. VVV clearly narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of
the accused. Notwithstanding her
innocence and despite the thorough
cross-examination
by
Armandos

counsel, VVV never faltered and gave

a very candid and truthful testimony
of the traumatic events. VVVs
testimony was corroborated and
bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene
Baluyot that the victims genital area
showed a fresh laceration with
bleeding at 6 oclock position in her
hymen.12 Dr. Baluyot concluded that
an acute injury occurred within 24
hours prior to the examination and
that the occurrence of rape within
that period was very possible. 13 Also,
the age of VVV at the time the
incident occurred, which was 10 years
old, was duly established by her birth
certificate,14 her testimony,15 and that
of her fathers.16
Time and again, this Court has held
that when the offended parties are
young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter
about which they testified were not
true.17 A young girl would not usually
concoct a tale of defloration; publicly
admit having been ravished and her
honor tainted; allow the examination
of her private parts; and undergo all
the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to
protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed
against her.18 Moreover, the Court has

36

repeatedly held that the lone

testimony of the victim in a rape
case, if credible, is enough to sustain
a conviction.19
On
the
other
hand,
Armando
admitted that he saw VVV on the date
of the incident, but denied the
accusations against him and merely
relied on his defense that he was
watching TV with his family when
barangay officials arrested him.
Armandos
defenses
were
also
unavailing. His contention that it was
unnatural and unrealistic for VVV to
remain quiet when he pulled her from
her companions and why she did not
cry for help or run away when he was
allegedly ravaging her deserves scant
consideration. Clearly, the reason
why VVV did not shout for help was
because Armando told her not to
shout or talk.20 Likewise, the reason
why VVV did not run when Armando
was molesting her was because his
finger was still inside her private
part.21 Moreover,
Armandos
argument that he could not have
inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were
standing is preposterous. It is settled
that sexual intercourse in a standing
position,
while
perhaps
uncomfortable, is not improbable.22
Armando tendered nothing but his
bare denial and contention that he
was elsewhere when the crime was
committed. Aside from this, he
presented no more evidence to
substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence

dictates that denial and alibi are the

common defenses in rape cases.
Sexual abuse is denied on the
allegation that the accused was
somewhere else and could not have
physically committed the crime. This
Court has always held that these two
defenses are inherently weak and
must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence in order to be
believed. As negative defenses, they
cannot prevail over the positive
testimony
of
the
complainant.23Consequently,
Armandos bare denial and alibi must
fail against the testimony of VVV and
her positive identification that he was
the perpetrator of the horrid deed.
Unmistakably, it has been proved
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
Armando had carnal knowledge of
VVV.1awphil
Anent Armandos conviction for the
crime of Rape Through Sexual
Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando
guilty of the crime of Rape Through
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law
of 1997.24 From the Information, it is
clear that Armando was being
charged with two offenses, Rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, and rape
as an act of sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando
was charged with having carnal
knowledge of VVV, who was under

37

twelve years of age at the time,

under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266A, and he was also charged with
committing an act of sexual assault
by inserting his finger into the genital
of VVV under the second paragraph
of
Article
266-A.
Indeed,
two
instances of rape were proven at the
trial. First, it was established that
Armando inserted his penis into the
private part of his victim, VVV.
Second, through the testimony of
VVV, it was proven that Armando also
inserted his finger in VVVs private
part.
The Information has sufficiently
informed accused-appellant that he is
being charged with two counts of
rape. Although two offenses were
charged, which is a violation of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
states
that
"[a]
complaint
or
information must charge only one
offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for
various
offenses."
Nonetheless,
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure also
states that "[w]hen two or more
offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict the
appellant of as many as are charged
and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and
law in each offense." Consequently,
since Armando failed to file a motion

to quash the Information, he can be

convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm
the CAs imposition of Reclusion
Perpetua for rape under paragraph 1
(d), Article 266-A. However, We
modify the penalty for Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the
commission of the sexual abuse, VVV
was ten (10) years old. This calls for
the application of R.A. No. 7610, or
"The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," which defines
sexual
abuse
of
children
and
prescribes the penalty therefor in
Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse. Children, whether
male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its
medium
period
to reclusion perpetua shall
be
imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in

38

prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted
under
Article
335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years
of
age
shall
be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.25
Paragraph
(b)
punishes
sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuses. It
covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit, but also
where one through coercion,
intimidation or influence engages
in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.26
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules
and regulations27 of R.A. No. 7610
defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus
or mouth of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual
desire
of
any
person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious

exhibition of the genitals or pubic

area of a person.28
In this case, the offended party was
ten years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Pursuant
to the above-quoted provision of law,
Armando was aptly prosecuted under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353,29 for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of
applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor,
considering that VVV was below 12
years of age, and considering further
that Armandos act of inserting his
finger
in
VVVs
private
part
undeniably amounted to lascivious
conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in
its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact
that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more
severe penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period than the one
who commits Rape Through Sexual
Assault, which is merely punishable
by prision mayor. This is undeniably
unfair to the child victim. To be sure,
it was not the intention of the framers
of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed
the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children.
Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which

39

must be applied when the victims are

children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves
from
abuse,
neglect,
cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or
condition."30
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that
which could be properly imposed
under the law, which is fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal. On the
other hand, the minimum term shall
be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, or twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months.
Hence, Armando should be meted the
indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
As to Armandos civil liabilities, the
CA correctly awarded the following
damages:
civil
indemnity
of P50,000.00
and
another P50,000.00
as
moral
damages for Rape under paragraph
1(d),
Article
266-A;
and
civil
indemnity ofP30,000.00 and moral

damages also of P30,000.00 for Rape

under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In
line,
however,
with
prevailing
jurisprudence, we increase the award
of
exemplary
damages
from P25,000.00 and P15,000.00, for
Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article
266-A and Rape under paragraph 2,
Article
266-A,
respectively,
toP30,000.00 for each count of rape.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
For
Rape
under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A,
Armando
Chingh
y
Parcia
is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape
Through
Sexual
Assault
under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, he is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay VVV the total
ofP80,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P80,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and P60,000.00
as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178323 Case Digest
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011
People of the Philippines, plaintiffappellee

40

v Armando Chingh y Parcia, accusedappellant

Ponente: Peralta

Facts:
Chingh seeks the reversal of the
decision of CA convicting him of
statutory rape and rape through
sexual assault.

On march 2005, an information was

filed against Chingh for inserting his
fingers and afterwards his penis into
the private part of his minor victim.
Upon
his
arraignment,
Chingh
pleaded not guilty. at the trial, the
prosecution
presented
the
testimonies of the victim, the victims
father, PO3 Solidarios and Dr.
Baluyot. The defense presented the
lone testimony of Chingh.
On April 2005, the RTC finding the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
overwhelming against the accused
denial and alibi rendered a decision
convicting Chingh of statutory rape.
Aggrieved, chingh appealed the
decision before CA, on December
2006 CA rendered decision Chingh
guilty of statutory rape and rape
through sexual assault.

Chingh now comes to court for relief.

in a resolution, September 2007, the
court required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. in
their manifestations, the parties
waived
the
filing
of
their
supplemental briefs and instead
adopted their respective briefs filed
before CA
Chingh raises the following errors: (1)
the trial court graved erred in finding
the accused guilty of the crime of
rape under article 266-a paragraph 1
of the RPC in spite the unnatural and
unrealistic testimony of the private
complainant. (2) the trial court erred
in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
Chingh
maintains
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
present
sufficient evidence that will overcome
the presumption of innocence.
ruling: court agreed with RTC that the
testimonies
presented
by
the
prosecution is favorable than the
mere denial and alibi of the accused.
Section 3, Rule 120 of the RPC
supports the decision of CA to
charged accused with two offenses,
since Chingh failed to file a motion to
quash the information.

41

CA's decision is affirmed with

modification of the penalty for the
sexual assault.

G.R. No. 178321

2011

October 5,

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CONRADO
LAOG
y
RAMIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which
affirmed appellants conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M2000 and rape in Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was
charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11,
of
Malolos,
Bulacan.
The
2
Information, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June,
2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael,
province
of
Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a lead
pipe and with intent to kill one

Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then

and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously,
with
evident
premeditation, abuse of superior
strength
and
treachery,
attack,
assault and hit with the said lead pipe
the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal,
thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal
serious
physical
injuries which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the
same court with the crime of rape of
AAA.3 The second Information,4 which
was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June,
2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael,
province
of
Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, violence and
intimidation, that is, by attacking and
hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA]
which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost
caused her death, and while in such
defenseless situation, did then and
there have carnal knowledge of said
[AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded
not guilty to both charges. The two
cases were thereafter tried jointly

42

because they arose from the same

incident.
The prosecution presented as its
principal witness AAA, the rape victim
who was 19 years old at the time of
the incident. Her testimony was
corroborated by her grandfather BBB,
Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six
oclock in the evening of June 6,
2000, she and her friend, Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along
the rice paddies on their way to apply
for work at a canteen near the
National Highway in Sampaloc, San
Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant,
who was holding an ice pick and a
lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly
brought them to a grassy area at the
back of a concrete wall. Without
warning, appellant struck AAA in the
head with the lead pipe causing her
to feel dizzy and to fall down. When
Jennifer saw this, she cried out for
help but appellant also hit her on the
head with the lead pipe, knocking her
down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer
several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with
thick grass.5 Appellant then turned to
AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and
stabbed her on the face. While AAA
was in such defenseless position,
appellant pulled down her jogging
pants, removed her panty, and pulled
up her blouse and bra. He then went
on top of her, sucked her breasts and
inserted his penis into her vagina.

After raping AAA, appellant also

covered her with grass. At that point,
AAA passed out.6
When AAA regained consciousness, it
was nighttime and raining hard. She
crawled until she reached her uncles
farm at daybreak on June 8,
2000.7 When she saw him, she waved
at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a
certain Nano then brought her to
Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan
where she stayed for more than three
weeks. She later learned that Jennifer
had died.8
During
cross-examination,
AAA
explained that she did not try to run
away when appellant accosted them
because she trusted appellant who
was her uncle by affinity. She said
that she never thought he would
harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at
about six oclock in the morning, he
was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San
Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a
woman waving a hand and then fell
down. The woman was about 200
meters away from him when he saw
her waving to him, and he did not
mind her. However, when she was
about 100 meters away from him, he
recognized the woman as AAA, his
granddaughter.
He
immediately
approached her and saw that her face
was swollen, with her hair covering
her face, and her clothes all wet. He
asked AAA what happened to her,
and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni"
referring to appellant who is his son-

43

in-law.10 With the help of his neighbor,

he brought AAA home.11 AAA was
later brought to Carpa Hospital in
Baliuag,
Bulacan
where
she
recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer,
testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital
and
asked
AAA
about
the
whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her
to look for Jennifer somewhere at
Buenavista.
She
sought
the
assistance of Barangay Officials and
they went to Buenavista where they
found Jennifers cadaver covered with
grass and already bloated.12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a
medico-legal officer of the Province of
Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on
the remains of Jennifer. His findings
are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of
decomposition[;] eyeballs and
to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips
and abdomen are swollen;
desquamation and bursting of bullae
and denudation of the epidermis in
the head, trunks and on the upper
extremities[;]
[f]rothy
fluid
and
maggots coming from the nose,
mouth, genital region and at the site
of wounds, three (3) lacerations at
the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at
the submandibular region[;] four [4]
punctured wounds at the chest of the
victim[.]

cause of death of the victim was

hemorrhagic shock as result of stab
wounds [in] the head and trunk.13
The prosecution and the defense also
stipulated on the testimony of
Elizabeth
Patawaran,
Jennifers
mother, as to the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It
was
stipulated
that
she
spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral
and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied
the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking
dinner around the time the crimes
were committed. With him were his
children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and
Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey
Laog. At around seven oclock, he
was arrested by the police officers of
San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that
his wife had reported him to the
police after he "went wild" that same
night and struck with a lead pipe a
man whom he saw talking to his wife
inside their house. When he was
already incarcerated, he learned that
he was being charged with murder
and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA
and Jennifer frequently went to
his nipa hut whenever they would ask
for rice or money. He claimed that in
the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and
Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they
left the following morning at around
seven oclock. An hour later, he left
his house to have his scythe repaired.
However, he was not able to do so

44

because that was the time when he

"went wild" after seeing his wife with
another man. He admitted that
his nipa hut is more or less only 100
meters away from the scene of the
crime.16
The
defense
also
presented
appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who
testified that he went to appellants
house on June 5, 2000, at around
three oclock in the afternoon, and
saw AAA and Jennifer there. He
recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer
before at his uncles house about
seven times because AAA and his
uncle had an illicit affair. He further
testified that appellant arrived before
midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept
with AAA. The following morning, at
around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer
went home. He and appellant
meanwhile left the house together.
Appellant was going to San Rafael to
have his scythe repaired while he
proceeded
to
his
house
in
17
Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint
Decision18 on June 30, 2003 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of both crimes. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162M-2000, this court finds the accused
Conrado
Laog
GUILTY
beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the heirs of

Jennifer Patawaran,
sums of money:

the

a.
P60,000.00
indemnity;
b.
P50,000.00
damages;
c. P30,000.00
damages.

following
as

as
as

civil
moral

exemplary

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308M-2000, this Court hereby finds the
accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape under Art.
266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
private complainant the following
sums of money.
a.
P50,000.00
indemnity;
b.
P50,000.00
damages;
c. P30,000.00
damages.

as
as

as

civil
moral

exemplary

SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction to
this Court. But conformably with our
pronouncement
in People
v.
Mateo,20the case was referred to the
CA for appropriate action and
disposition.

45

In a Decision dated March 21, 2007,

the CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal
is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint
Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case
Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is
hereby AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case
[No.]
2162-M-2000,
AccusedAppellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran
[an] additional
P25,000.00
as
actual damages. The exemplary
damages awarded by the Trial Court
in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are
hereby reduced
to
P25,000.00
each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court
assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction for both crimes of rape and
murder.
In
a
Resolution22 dated
August 22, 2007, we required the
parties to submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire.
However, the parties submitted
separate Manifestations in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs, adopting the
arguments in their respective briefs
filed in the CA. Appellant had raised
the
following
errors
allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

GIVING
CREDENCE
TO
THE
INCONSISTENT
AND
INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY
OF
PROSECUTION
WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE
FAILURE
OF
THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the killing of
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the
rape of AAA. He assails AAAs
credibility, the prosecutions main
witness, and points out alleged
inconsistencies in her testimony.
Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he
carefully planned the execution of the
crimes charged. According to him,
AAAs narration that he waylaid them
while walking along the rice paddies
on their way to apply for work
negates evident premeditation since
there was no evidence that the said
path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the
trial
court
and
CA
erred
in
appreciating
the
qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. He argues that for abuse of
superior strength to be appreciated in
the killing of Jennifer, the physical
attributes of both the accused and

46

the victim should have been shown in

order to determine whether the
accused
had
the
capacity
to
overcome the victim physically or
whether the victim was substantially
weak and unable to put up a defense.
Additionally, he attempts to cast
doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing
that it lacked some details on how,
after she was raped and stabbed by
appellant, she was still able to put on
her clothes and crawl to her
grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.

Here, both the trial and appellate

courts gave credence and full
probative weight to the testimony of
AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers
killing and was herself brutally
attacked by appellant who also raped
her. Appellant had not shown any
sufficiently weighty reasons for us to
disturb the trial courts evaluation of
the
prosecution
eyewitness
credibility. In particular, we defer to
the
trial
courts
firsthand
observations on AAAs deportment
while testifying and its veritable
assessment of her credibility, to wit:

Appellant principally attacks the

credibility of prosecution witness
AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that
the issue of credibility of witnesses is
"a question best addressed to the
province of the trial court because of
its unique position of having observed
that elusive and incommunicable
evidence
of
the
witnesses
deportment on the stand while
testifying which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts"24 and "absent
any substantial reason which would
justify the reversal of the trial courts
assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by
the formers findings, particularly
when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which
when considered would have affected
the outcome of the case."25 This rule
is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court concurred with the
trial court.26

From the moment [AAA] took the

stand, this Court has come to discern
in her the trepidations of a woman
outraged who is about to recount the
ordeal she had gone through. She
took her oath with trembling hands,
her voice low and soft, hardly audible.
Face down, her eyes were constantly
fixed on the floor as if avoiding an
eye contact with the man she was
about to testify against. After a few
questions in direct, the emotion
building up inside her came to the
fore and she burst into tears, badly
shaken, unfit to continue any further
with
her
testimony.
Thus,
in
deference to her agitated situation,
this Court has to defer her directexamination. When she came back,
however, to continue with her
aborted
questioning,
this
time,
composed and collected, direct and
straightforward in her narration, all
vestiges of doubt on her credibility
vanished.27

47

Indeed, records bear out that AAA

became so tense and nervous when
she took the witness stand for the
first time that the trial court had to
cut
short
her
initial
direct
examination. However, during the
next hearing she was able to narrate
her harrowing ordeal in a clear and
straightforward manner, describing in
detail how appellant waylaid them
and mercilessly hit and attacked her
and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice
pick before raping her. We quote the
pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q:
During
your
previous
testimony, Madam Witness, you
said that youre not able to
reach your place of work on
June 6, 2000, what is the reason
why you did not reach your
place of work?

Q: And what happened to you

when you were hit with the lead
pipe by Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal)
because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if
any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but
did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog
when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:

A:
We
waylaid (hinarang) by
Laog, sir.

were
Conrado

Q: In what manner were you

waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the
pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you
were hit?
A: We were walking along the
rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:

Q: How about Jennifer, where

was she when you heard her
crying?
A: She was standing on the rice
puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog
doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe,
sir.

48

Q: And
Jennifer?

what

happened

to

A: She fell down, sir.

Q: After that, what did he do

next?
A: And then, he went on top of
me, sir.

Q: What did Conrado Laog do

next?

Q: Then, what happened?

A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.

A: He sucked my breast, sir.

Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed

Jennifer, what happened next?

Q: And after that?

A: He covered Jennifer with

grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did
Conrado Laog do?

A: He was forcing his penis into

my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting
his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.

A: He came back to me, sir.

Q: When Conrado Laog came
back to you, what did you do, if
any?

Q: For how long did the accused

Conrado Laog insert his penis
into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.

A: He hit me with the pipe

several times, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

Q: And what happened to you?

A: After that, he stood up, sir.

A: And he stabbed me on my
face, sir.

Q: And where did he go?

Q: Then, what happened to

you?
A: After that,
my jogging
removed my
blouse and my

he pulled down
pants, sir. He
panty and my
bra.

A: After that, he covered me

with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you
do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.

49

Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is

inside the courtroom, will you
be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man
wearing an inmates uniform
and when asked his name,
answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely
interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. He claimed that at the time of
the incident, he was at his house with
his children and nephew cooking
dinner. His defense, however, cannot
prevail over the straightforward and
credible testimony of AAA who
positively identified him as the
perpetrator of the murder and rape.
Time and again, we have held that
positive identification of the accused,
when categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and
denial of the appellant whose
testimony is not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence.29 AAA
was firm and unrelenting in pointing
to appellant as the one who attacked
her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter
to death before raping AAA. It should
be noted that AAA knew appellant
well since they were relatives by
affinity. As correctly held by the CA,
with AAAs familiarity and proximity
with the appellant during the
commission of the crime, her

identification of appellant could not

be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA,
upon encountering appellant, did not
run away as she never thought her
own uncle would harm her and her
friend. Moreover, the most natural
reaction of victims of violence is to
strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and observe
the manner in which the crime is
being
committed.30 There
is
no
evidence to show any improper
motive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against appellant or to falsely
implicate him in the commission of a
crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.31
In People v. Nieto,32 we reiterated that
-It is an established jurisprudential
rule that a mere denial, without any
strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely
overcome
the
positive
declaration by the victim of the
identity and involvement of appellant
in the crimes attributed to him. The
defense of alibi is likewise unavailing.
Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to
concoct and difficult to disprove.
Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is
negative,
self-serving,
and
undeserving of any weight in law.
Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when
there is a positive identification of the
accused by a credible witness. Lastly,
in order that alibi might prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the accused

50

has been somewhere else during the

commission of the crime; it must also
be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere
within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he
was near the vicinity of the crime on
the evening of June 6, 2000. In fact,
during
his
cross-examination,
appellant admitted that his house
was more or less only 100 meters
from the crime scene. Thus, his
defense of alibi is not worthy of any
credit for the added reason that he
has not shown that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime at the time of its
commission.
In view of the credible testimony of
AAA, appellants defenses of denial
and alibi deserve no consideration.
We stress that these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive
identification
and
categorical
33
testimony of a rape victim.
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's
accusation of rape by pointing out
that while she testified on being very
weak that she even passed out after
she was raped by appellant, she
nevertheless stated that when she
crawled her way to her grandfather's
farm she was wearing her clothes.
Appellant also contends that the
prosecution should have presented
the physician who examined AAA to
prove her allegations that she was
beaten and raped by appellant.

We are not persuaded.

Based on AAAs account, appellant
did not undress her completely -- her
blouse and bra were merely lifted up
("nililis") while her undergarments
were just pulled down, which
therefore explains why she still had
her clothes on when she crawled to
her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless,
this matter raised by appellant is a
minor detail which had nothing to do
with the elements of the crime of
rape. Discrepancies referring only to
minor details and collateral matters -not to the central fact of the crime -do not affect the veracity or detract
from the essential credibility of
witnesses declarations, as long as
these are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole.34 For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a
basis for acquittal, it must establish
beyond doubt the innocence of the
appellant for the crime charged. 35 It
cannot be overemphasized that the
credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by
minor
inconsistencies
in
her
36
testimony.
As to the fact that the physician who
examined AAA at the hospital did not
testify during the trial, we find this
not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the
foremost
consideration
in
the
prosecution of rape is the victims
testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical

51

examination of the victim is not

indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victims testimony alone, if
credible,
is
sufficient
to
37
convict. Thus we have ruled that a
medical examination of the victim, as
well as the medical certificate, is
merely corroborative in character and
is not an indispensable element for
conviction in rape. What is important
is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal and credible,38 as
what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts
conclusion that appellant indeed was
the one who raped AAA and killed
Jennifer, we find that appellant should
not have been convicted of the
separate crimes of murder and rape.
An appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review on any
question, including one not raised by
the parties.39 The facts alleged and
proven clearly show that the crime
committed by appellant is rape with
homicide, a special complex crime
provided
under
Article
266-B,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353.40
In People v. Larraaga,41 this Court
explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special
complex crime is imperative. Where
the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special

complex crime. Some of the special

complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with
homicide, (2) robbery
with
rape, (3) kidnapping
with
serious
physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (5) rape
with homicide. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the
same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints.
As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed;
["] and that this provision gives rise
to a special complex crime. In the
cases at bar, particularly Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303, the Information
specifically alleges that the victim
Marijoy was raped "on the occasion
and in connection" with her detention
and was killed "subsequent thereto
and on the occasion thereof."
Considering that the prosecution was
able to prove each of the component
offenses,
appellants
should
be
convicted of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and
rape. x x x42 (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more
properly, a composite crime, has its
own definition and special penalty in

52

theRevised Penal Code, as amended.

Justice Regalado, in his Separate
Opinion in the case of People v.
Barros,43explained that composite
crimes are "neither of the same legal
basis as nor subject to the rules on
complex crimes in Article 48 [of the
Revised Penal Code], since they do
not consist of a single act giving rise
to two or more grave or less grave
felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a
necessary means to commit another
[complex crime proper]. However,
just like the regular complex crimes
and the present case of aggravated
illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of
such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, provides only a
single penalty for the composite acts
of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a

homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in
this case was able to prove both the
rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer
both perpetrated by appellant, he is
liable for rape with homicide under
the above provision. There is no
doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to
prevent her from aiding AAA or
calling for help once she is able to run
away, and also to silence her
completely so she may not witness
the rape of AAA, the original intent of
appellant. His carnal desire having
been satiated, appellant purposely
covered AAAs body with grass, as he
did earlier with Jennifers body, so
that it may not be easily noticed or
seen by passersby. Appellant indeed
thought that the savage blows he had
inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But
AAA
survived
and
appellants
barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the
constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it
is immaterial that the person killed in
this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape. An analogy

53

may be drawn from our rulings in

cases of robbery with homicide,
where the component acts of
homicide, physical injuries and other
offenses have been committed by
reason or on the occasion of robbery.
In People v. De Leon,45 we expounded
on the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit
robbery,
with
homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide
may take place before, during or after
the robbery. It is only the result
obtained,
without
reference
or
distinction as to the circumstances,
causes
or
modes
or
persons
intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony
of robbery with homicide through
reckless
imprudence
or
simple
negligence. The constitutive elements
of the crime, namely, robbery with
homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident; or that
the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or
more persons are killed, or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority,
is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim
of homicide is one of the robbers; the

felony would still be robbery with

homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of
the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The
word "homicide" is used in its generic
sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder,
parricide,
and
46
infanticide. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape
with homicide, the term "homicide" is
to be understood in its generic sense,
and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason
or on occasion of the rape.47 Hence,
even if any or all of the circumstances
(treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in
the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the
same would not qualify the killing to
murder and the crime committed by
appellant is still rape with homicide.
As in the case of robbery with
homicide,
the
aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Thus we ruled in
People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the
trial court erred in concluding that the
aggravating
circumstance
of
treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the

54

trial court in this case correctly

characterized treachery as a generic
aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending
himself when his arms were held by
two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded
them.
In People
v.
Salvatierra, we
ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in
the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, such treachery is to be
regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Robbery with homicide
is a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with
murder under the Revised Penal
Code. Here, treachery forms part of
the circumstances proven concerning
the actual commission of the complex
crime. Logically it could not qualify
the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it
helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of
abuse
of
superior
strength
is
considered
whenever
there
is
notorious
inequality
of
forces
between the victim and the aggressor
that
is
plainly
and
obviously
advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely
selected
or
taken
advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime.50 It is taken
into account whenever the aggressor
purposely used excessive force that is

out of proportion to the means of

defense available to the person
attacked.51
In this case, as personally witnessed
by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in
the head with a lead pipe then
stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which
appellant had brutally slain Jennifer
with a lethal weapon, by first hitting
her in the head with a lead pipe to
render
her
defenseless
and
vulnerable
before
stabbing
her
repeatedly, unmistakably showed
that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his
unarmed victim. As aptly observed by
the appellate court:
It has long been established that an
attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in
treachery, where the victim is not
given the opportunity to defend
himself or repel the aggression,
taking advantage of superior strength
does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position
of both and the employment of
means
weakening
the defense,

55

although
not
annulling
it.
By
deliberately
employing
deadly
weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took
advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The
accused-appellants sudden attack
caught the victim off-guard rendering
her defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this
case therefore is merely a generic
aggravating circumstance to be
considered in the imposition of the
penalty. The penalty provided in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code,
as
amended,
is
death.
However, in view of the passage on
June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines" the Court is mandated to
impose on the appellant the penalty
of
reclusion
perpetua
without
eligibility for parole.53
The
aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and use of deadly weapon
have greater relevance insofar as the
civil aspect of this case is concerned.
While the trial court and CA were
correct in holding that both the victim
of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape
victim (AAA) are entitled to the award
of exemplary damages, the basis for
such
award
needs
further
clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil
Code provide:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective

damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral,
temperate,
liquidated
or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or
more
aggravating
circumstances.
Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of
superior strength in the killing of
Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to
exemplary damages pursuant to
Article 2230. With respect to the rape
committed against AAA, Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman through force, threat or
intimidation under Article 266-A (a),
whenever such rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Since the use of a deadly weapon
raises the penalty for the rape, this
circumstance would justify the award
of exemplary damages to the
offended
party
(AAA)
also
in
accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the
imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any
of
the
aggravating/qualifying

56

circumstances enumerated therein.

Among
these
circumstances
is
minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim. (Emphasis
supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who
is his uncle by affinity, was not
alleged in the information but
admitted by appellant when he
testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

Q So she is your niece-in-law?

A Yes, sir.
x x x x54 (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to
allege in the information AAAs
relationship to appellant will not bar
the
consideration
of
the
said
circumstance in the determination of
his civil liability. In any case, even
without
the
attendance
of
aggravating
circumstances,
exemplary damages may still be
awarded where the circumstances of
the
case
show
the
"highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender." Citing our earlier
ruling in the case of People v.
Catubig,55 this Court clarified in
People v. Dalisay56:

CONRADO LAOG By:

Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name
of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her
house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts
generally
awarded
exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an
aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven
to
have
attended
the
commission of the crime, even if the
same was not alleged in the
information. This is in accordance
with the aforesaid Article 2230.
However, with the promulgation of
the Revised Rules, courts no longer
consider
the
aggravating
circumstances not alleged and proven
in the determination of the penalty
and in the award of damages. Thus,
even if an aggravating circumstance
has been proven, but was not

57

alleged, courts will not award

exemplary damages. Pertinent are
the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid
down the principle that courts may
still award exemplary damages based
on the aforementioned Article 2230,
even if the aggravating circumstance
has not been alleged, so long as it
has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the
Revised
Rules
which
remained
pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned
that the retroactive application of the
Revised Rules should not adversely
affect the vested rights of the private
offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of
jurisprudence,
criminal
cases,
especially those involving rape,
dichotomized:
one
awarding
exemplary damages, even if an
aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime had not
been sufficiently alleged but was
consequently proven in the light of
Catubig;
and
another
awarding
exemplary damages only if an
aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following
the Revised Rules. Among those in
the first set are People v. Laciste,
People v. Victor, People v. Orilla,
People
v.
Calongui,
People
v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines
v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People
of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag
Jimenez, and People of the Philippines

v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set

are People v. Llave, People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
and People of the Philippines v. Edwin
Mejia. Again, the difference between
the two sets rests on when the
criminal case was instituted, either
before or after the effectivity of the
Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on
Article 2230 as the legal basis for the
grant of exemplary damagestaking
into account simply the attendance of
an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have
lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded.
Catubig is enlightening on this point,
thus
Also
known
as
"punitive"
or
"vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong
doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment
for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. These terms are generally,
but not always, used interchangeably.
In common law, there is preference in
the use of exemplary damages when
the award is to account for injury to
feelings and for the sense of indignity
and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been
maliciously and wantonly inflicted,
the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by

58

the highly reprehensible conduct of

the defendantassociated with such
circumstances
as
willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence
or recklessness, oppression, insult or
fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies
the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to
refer to those species of damages
that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct
in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary
damages, therefore, can be awarded,
not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender.
In much the same way as Article
2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary
damages
may
be
awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of
the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio,
the
Court
imposed
exemplary damages to deter other
fathers with perverse tendencies or
aberrant
sexual
behavior
from
sexually abusing their own daughters.
Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court
awarded exemplary damages on
account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the
accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently,
in People of the Philippines v. Cristino

Caada, People of the Philippines v.

Pepito Neverio and The People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the
Court awarded exemplary damages
to set a public example, to serve as
deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the
latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said
cases, the Court used as basis Article
2229, rather than Article 2230, to
justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice
Carpio Morales words in her separate
opinion in People of the Philippines v.
Dante
Gragasin
y
Par,
"[t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code strictissimi juris in such cases,
as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the
award of exemplary damagesto set
a public example or correction for the
public
good."57 (Emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1
In this case, the brutal manner by
which appellant carried out his lustful
design against his niece-in-law who
never had an inkling that her own
uncle would do any harm to her and
her friend, justified the award of
exemplary
damages.
Appellants
sudden and fierce attack on AAA -hitting her several times on the head
with a lead pipe before stabbing her
face until she fell down, hurriedly
lifting her bra and blouse and pulling
down her undergarments, raping her
while she was in such a defenseless
position, covering her body with
grasses and abandoning her to die in

59

a grassy field -- was truly despicable

and outrageous. Such vicious assault
was made even more reprehensible
as it also victimized Jennifer, who
sustained more stab wounds and
beatings, causing her violent death.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows
the award of exemplary damages in
order to deter the commission of
similar acts and to allow the courts to
forestall behavior that would pose
grave and deleterious consequences
to society.58 In line with current
jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000
each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer
as exemplary damages was correctly
awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA
in ordering appellant to pay the heirs
of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the
amounts
of P50,000
as
moral
damages. In cases of murder and
homicide, the award of moral
damages is mandatory, without need
of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim.59 Anent the award
of civil indemnity, the same is
increased to P75,000 to conform with
recent
jurisprudence.60 As
to
expenses incurred for the funeral and
burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly
awarded her heirs the amount
of P25,000 as actual damages, said
amount having been stipulated by the
parties during the trial.
Lastly,
we
affirm
the
award
of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity
for the crime of rape, as well as the
award ofP50,000 as moral damages.
Civil
indemnity ex
delicto is

mandatory upon a finding of the fact

of rape while moral damages are
awarded upon such finding without
need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has
actually
suffered
moral
injuries
entitling the victim to such award.61
WHEREFORE,
the
appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00234
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape With
Homicide under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility
for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered
to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal P75,000
as
civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as
moral damages, P25,000 as actual
damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay
to the victim AAA the sums
of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000 as moral damages
and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

against

the

accused-

60

PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee,

PHILIPPINES,

- versus CONRADO
LAOG
Accused-Appellant

RAMIN,

G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011

Facts:
AAA testified that she and her friend
were walking on their way to apply.
Suddenly, appellant, who was holding
an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid
them and forcibly brought them to a
grassy
area.Without
warning,
appellant struck AAA in the head with
the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy
and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but
appellant also hit her on the head
with the lead pipe, knocking her
down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer
several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with
thick grass. Appellant then turned to
AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and
stabbed her on the face. While AAA
was in such defenseless position,
appellant pulled down her jogging
pants, removed her panty, and pulled
up her blouse and bra. He then went
on top of her, sucked her breasts and
inserted his penis into her vagina.
After raping AAA, appellant also
covered her with grass. At that point,

AAA passed out. When AAA regained

consciousness, it was nighttime and
raining hard. She crawled until she
reached
her
uncles
farm
at
daybreak.When she saw him, she
waved at him for help. Her uncle,
BBB, and a certain Nano then brought
her to Hospital. She later learned that
Jennifer had died.

Appellant, on the other hand, denied

the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking
dinner around the time the crimes
were committed. With him were his
children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and
Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey
Laog.
At around seven oclock, he
was arrested by the police officers of
San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that
his wife had reported him to the
police after he went wild that same
night and struck with a lead pipe a
man whom he saw talking to his wife
inside their house. When he was
already incarcerated, he learned that
he was being charged with murder
and rape.
The RTC found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both
crimes rape and murder. The CA
affirmed
with
modification
for
damages.
Issue:

61

Whether the accused-appellant is

guilty of the crimes charged despite
failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
It must be underscored that the
foremost
consideration
in
the
prosecution of rape is the victims
testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical
examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victims testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict. Thus
we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as
the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not
an
indispensable
element
for
conviction in rape. What is important
is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal and credible.
In People v. Larraaga, this Court
explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special
complex crime is imperative. Where
the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with

homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)

kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder
or homicide, and (5) rape with
homicide.
In a special complex
crime,
the
prosecution
must
necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if
they were made the subject of
separate complaints.
As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
by adding thereto this provision:
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that
this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime. In the cases at bar,
the Information specifically alleges
that the victim Marijoy was raped on
the occasion and in connection with
her
detention
and
was
killed
subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof. Considering that
the prosecution was able to prove
each of the component offenses,
appellants should be convicted of the
special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape.
Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal
Code,
as
amended,
provides only a single penalty for

62

the composite acts of rape and

the killing committed by reason
or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties.
Rape
under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever
the
rape
is
committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a
homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death.
When by reason or on the occasion
of
the
rape,
homicide
is
committed, the penalty shall be
death.
Considering that the prosecution in
this case was able to prove both the
rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer
both perpetrated by appellant, he is
liable for rape with homicide under
the above provision.
There is no
doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to
prevent her from aiding AAA or

calling for help once she is able to run

away, and also to silence her
completely so she may not witness
the rape of AAA, the original intent of
appellant. His carnal desire having
been satiated, appellant purposely
covered AAAs body with grass, as he
did earlier with Jennifers body, so
that it may not be easily noticed or
seen by passersby. Appellant indeed
thought that the savage blows he had
inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But
AAA
survived
and
appellants
barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the
constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it
is immaterial that the person killed in
this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape.
An
analogy may be drawn from our
rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts
of homicide, physical injuries and
other offenses have been committed
by reason or on the occasion of
robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape
with homicide, the term homicide is
to be understood in its generic sense,
and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason
or on occasion of the rape. Hence,

63

even if any or all of the circumstances

(treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in
the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the
same would not qualify the killing to
murder and the crime committed by
appellant is still rape with homicide.
As in the case of robbery with
homicide,
the
aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.
In this case, as personally witnessed
by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in
the head with a lead pipe then
stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which
appellant had brutally slain Jennifer
with a lethal weapon, by first hitting
her in the head with a lead pipe to
render
her
defenseless
and
vulnerable
before
stabbing
her
repeatedly, unmistakably showed
that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his
unarmed victim. As aptly observed
by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an
attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the

weapon used in the act afforded him,

and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in
treachery, where the victim is not
given the opportunity to defend
himself or repel the aggression,
taking advantage of superior strength
does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless.
Abuse of
superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position
of both and the employment of
means
weakening
the defense,
although not annulling it.
By
deliberately
employing
deadly
weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
accused-appellant
clearly
took
advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The
accused-appellants sudden attack
caught the victim off-guard rendering
her defenseless.
WHEREFORE,
the
appeal
is
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape With
Homicide under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.

64

G.R. No. 179497

25, 2012

January

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RENANDANG
MAMARUNCAS,
Piagapo,
Lanao
del
Sur;
PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo,
Lanao
del
Sur;Appellants,
BAGINDA PALAO (at large) Alias
"Abdul Wahid Sultan", Accused.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The assessment of the credibility of
witnesses by the trial court is the
center of this controversy. The wellknown rule, though subject to certain
recognized
exceptions,
is
that
findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses are matters
best left to the trial court. Hence,
"[u]nless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of
the case, the trial courts assessment
must be respected."1
Assailed in the present appeal is the
June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00196
which
affirmed
with
modification the July 19, 1999
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in

Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting
Renandang
Mamaruncas
(Mamaruncas)
and
Pendatum
Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the
crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following
Information4 for murder was filed
against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao
(Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and
Ampuan.5
That on or about February 1, 1996, in
the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Honorable Court, the said accused,
except for others whose cases are
still under preliminary investigation,
conspiring with and confederating
together and mutually helping each
other, armed with deadly weapon, to
wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by means of
treachery and evident premeditation,
and with intent to kill, did then and
there
willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously attack, shoot and wound
one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby
inflicting upon him the following
physical injuries, to wit:

Cardio respiratory arrest

Hypovolemic shock

Multiple gunshot wound

65

which caused his death.

Contrary to and in violation of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code with
the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan
appeared
at
the
scheduled
arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their
co-accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid
Sultan (Abdul), remains at large.
Appellants pleaded not guilty6 and
trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized
by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in its brief and substantiated
by the transcripts of stenographic
notes of the proceedings, are as
follows:
Around noontime on February 1,
1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard
Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain
"Nito" were working on vehicles
inside Baudelio Batoons auto repair
shop situated along the highway in
Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop
accompanied
by
appellants
Renandang
Mamaruncas
and
Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao
wore desert camouflage fatigues;

while his two (2) companions wore

Philippine
Army
tropical
green
fatigues. Baginda Palao showed
Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant
and told the latter he was serving it
against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palaos group
prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard
Batoon to stop their work and
observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to
just wait awhile, as they would settle
the matter after he [Batoon] [finishes]
tuning-up an engine he had been
working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping
the victims stomach and pointing a .
45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio
Batoon then tried to grab Palaos gun,
causing the two of them to grapple
for the same. As these two wrestled
for control of the gun, Renandang
Mamaruncas,
who
was
behind
Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind
Batoons right thigh with a .38 cal.
homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan,
who was also standing behind
Baudelio Batoon, followed up by
shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .
45 cal. [homemade] pistol. Baudelio
Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda
Palao finished [him off] with a single .
45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito
Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the

66

entire scene, stunned and unable to

do anything. From their vantage
points three (3) to four (4) meters
away, these witnesses had a clear
and unobstructed view of the entire
incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano
Mijares, then Commanding Officer of
the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force
Company, was riding a civilian car
along the highway, heading towards
Iligan
City
proper.
He
was
accompanied by his driver, SPO3
William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo.
They heard the gunshots emanating
from the auto repair shop at Baraas,
prompting Inspector Mijares to order
his driver to stop the car. They
alighted and proceeded to the source
of the gunshots. At the repair shop,
they saw three (3) men in camouflage
gear with guns drawn and pointed at
a person already lying on the ground.
Inspector Mijares group shouted at
the camouflaged gunmen to stop
what they were doing and to drop
their firearms, at the same time
announcing that they (Mijares group)
were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by
firing at the policemen. The latter
fired back. During the exchange of
gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the
Batoon house, while Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan

ran towards the road and a nearby

car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit
Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while
SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan.
Mamaruncas, who managed to get
inside the car, and Ampuan were then
captured by the policemen. The
lawmen also gave chase to Baginda
Palao; but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought
Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the
hospital for treatment and they were
eventually placed under detention.
Baudelio Batoon was brought to the
hospital by his wife; but he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination
of the victims body, Dr. Leonardo
Labanen established that the three
(3) gunshot wounds found on the
body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the
right thigh, left armpit and back) were
inflicted at close range due to the
presence, or at least traces, of
gunpowder burns.7
Only appellants testified for their
defense.
Their
testimonies,
as
narrated by the trial court, are as
follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas
testified that he is 34 years old,
married, carpenter and a resident of
Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the

67

morning of February 1, 1996, he was

in Marawi City. He decided to come
down to Iligan City to see a movie. He
left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon
arrival at the Tambacan terminal in
Iligan City, he went to the house of
his cousin. Later, he changed his
mind about going to a movie and
returned to the Tambacan terminal in
order to go back to Marawi City. At
about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan
arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on
board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul
Wahid invited him to go with them
because he will collect some money
and afterwards they will have some
enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the
rear seat behind the driver. Abdul
Wahid was at the front seat with
Pendatum behind at the back seat.
They drove to Baraas. They stopped
at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and
Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before
walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to
Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with
instructions to remain in the car and
[keep] watch. At first he refused but
Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted
the gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum
walked to the shop leaving the rear
right door open. About ten minutes
later, he heard three gunshots. He
moved to the rear seat where the
door was open and saw policemen,
who arrived and surrounded the car.
He placed the gun on the seat and
raised his hands as a sign of

surrender. Then with his right hand,

he closed the car door. Just as the
door closed, the policemen shot him
on the forearm and chest below the
right nipple. He lost consciousness
and regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid
Sultan is an old friend. He is also
known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum
Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid
Sultan.
He also declared that the statement
of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul
Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan
entered the shop and shot Baudelio
Batoon is true and that the testimony
of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the
victim is not true. He denied any part
in the shooting to death of Baudelio
Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified
that he is 20 years old, single,
student and a resident of Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at
about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City
for Iligan City on board a passenger
Armak jeepney. He alighted at the
terminal
behind
the
Gaisano
Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m.,
he entered the store and went to the
upper storey to shop. When he came
out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah.
Together they walked to the Maharlika
Theater but then Bessah expressed

68

the intention to go home to Marawi

City. He accompanied Bessah to the
Tambacan
terminal.
Then
he
proceeded to the house of his Uncle
Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North of
the city and at the opposite side from
Tambacan which is South of the city).
He arrived there at noon. He stayed
overnight at his Uncle Alis house. At
about 9:00 a.m., the following day,
February 1, 1996, he left the house of
his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda
Palao, who was looking for a certain
Baser, a policeman. He wanted the
latter to help him collect a debt. They
went to the terminal at the back of
Gaisano store but did not find Baser.
Baginda told him to wait while he will
look for Baser inside the Gaisano
store. Baginda returned without
having found Baser and once again
he told him to wait while Baginda will
look for a car. A little later, Baginda
returned on board a car driven by one
Aminola Basar. They went to the
Tambacan terminal but again did not
find
Baser.
Instead,
they
saw
Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda
invited the latter to go with them to
Baraas to collect a debt. Renandang
entered the car and they proceeded
to Baraas. The car stopped at a place
near a shop. Baginda instructed him
and Renandang to remain in the car
because he was going out to collect
the debt. Baginda left the car and
entered the shop. About ten minutes

later, he heard shouting followed by

gunfire. He stepped out of the car to
verify and saw Baginda Palao [shoot]
the victim. He retreated to the car as
the police led by Capt. Mijares
arrived. They confiscated the car key
and arrested them except Baginda
Palao who escaped. They were taken
to the hospital due to injuries. In his
case, the sustained wounds when
mauled by the children of the victim
but in another breath he admitted
that his injury was a gunshot wound
when he was caught in the cross fire
as the police shot Renandang
Mamaruncas. He was inside the car
when he was hit. He further admitted
that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul
Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting
Baudelio Batoon.8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The
RTC
debunked
appellants
defense of denial and held them
guilty
as
principals
by
direct
participation in the killing of Baudelio
Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith
and credence to the evidence of the
prosecution
especially
on
the
presence of conspiracy among the
malefactors and rendered a verdict of
conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the
accused Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond

69

reasonable doubt as principals of the

crime
of
murder
qualified
by
treachery defined and penalized in
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without the presence of
any other aggravating circumstances
and hereby sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with the corresponding
accessory penalties attached thereto
by law and to indemnify the Heirs of
Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
1. P10,200,000.00 for and as loss
of support;
2. P66,904.00 for and as actual
damages;
3. P50,000.00 as death indemnity
and
4. P100,000.00 for and as moral
damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having
been
under
preventive
detention since February 1, 1996, the
period of such detention shall be
credited in full in favor of said
accused in the service of their
respective sentences.
SO ORDERED.9

In view of the Notice of Appeal10 filed

by the appellants, the RTC forwarded
the records of the case to this Court.
By Resolution11 dated January 31,
2000, the Court resolved to accept
the
appeal.
In
view
thereof,
appellants were required to file their
brief.12 Appellants thus filed their brief
on November 20, 200013 while the
OSG submitted the Brief for the
Plaintiff-Appellee14 on May 2, 2001.
Later, however, consonant with this
Courts pronouncement in People v.
Mateo15 the case was transferred to
the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision17 promulgated on June
30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision.
Said
court
ruled
that
the
inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses testimonies pointed out by
the appellants pertain only to minor
and collateral matters which do not
dilute the probative weight of said
testimonies. Regarding the erroneous
designation of appellant Ampuans
name in the Information, the court
went on to hold that such error was
only a formal defect and the proper
correction of which was duly made
without any objection on the part of
the defense. The CA likewise held

70

that
treachery
attended
commission of the crime.

the

The decretal portion of the Decision

reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
the questioned Judgment dated July
19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION.
Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas
and Pendatum Ampuan are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
murder as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
appellants are to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Baudelio
Batoon the amount ofP50,000.00 by
way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages andP66,904.00
as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Disgruntled, appellants are now again
before this Court in view of their
Notice of Appeal19 from the Decision
of the CA.
By Resolution20 dated November 19,
2007, this Court notified the parties
that they may file their respective

supplemental briefs within 30 days

from notice. In their respective
manifestations, the parties opted to
adopt the briefs they earlier filed as
their supplemental briefs.21
In their brief, appellants assign the
following errors:
i.

That the trial court erred in

convicting [them] when they
should have been acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to
prove
its
case
beyond
reasonable doubt; and

ii.

The information filed before the

trial court was substantially
defective.22

The basic thrust of appellants first

assignment of error is the credibility
of
the
prosecution
witnesses.
Appellants contend that the trial court
anchored its finding and conclusion
on the testimonies of witnesses
Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard
Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp.
Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who
appear to be inconsistent in their
stand and whose credibility is
therefore assailable. They question
the
prosecution
witnesses
identification of Abdul and Ampuan as
one and the same person and aver
that the same only leads to the
logical conclusion that said witnesses

71

were perjured witnesses. They argue

that Ampuan failed to grasp the
information read to him as he was
arraigned as "Abdul Wahid Sultan
alias Pendatum Ampuan".

encounter, he failed to identify him in

court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he
identified Abdul and Ampuan as one
and the same person but later on
testified to the contrary.

On the other hand, the OSG in

praying for the affirmance of the
appealed
Decision,
opines
that
inconsistencies
on
minor
and
collateral matters in the testimony of
a prosecution eyewitness do not
affect his credibility. It also contends
that whatever defect the information
subject
of
appellant
Ampuans
arraignment has had been cured with
the latters consent during the trial.

Credibility of witnesses not affected

by minor inconsistencies.

Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal,
appellants tried to cast doubt on the
credibility
of
witness
Gepayo
anchored on the following grounds:
(1) there was serious inconsistency in
his testimony on whether he knew
Ampuan before the incident; (2) his
actuation of just watching the
incident without giving any assistance
to his fallen employer as well as his
immediate return to work thereafter
is contrary to human nature and
experience; (3) while he testified that
appellant Mamaruncas was one of the
wounded
suspects
during
the

The perceived inconsistency on

whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even
before the incident is inconsequential
as to discredit the credibility of
Gepayos
testimony.
The
inconsistency
pointed
out
by
appellants pertains only to collateral
or trivial matters and has no
substantial effect on the nature of the
offense. In fact, it even signifies that
the witness was neither coached nor
was lying on the witness stand. What
matters
is
that
there
is
no
inconsistency in Gepayos complete
and vivid narration as far as the
principal occurrence and the positive
identification of Ampuan as one of the
principal
assailants
are
23
concerned. "The Court has held that
although
there
may
be
inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses on minor details, they do
not impair their credibility where
there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant."24

72

It could be true that Gepayo did not

retreat to a safer place during the
shooting incident and did not render
assistance to his wounded employer.
To appellants, this reaction is contrary
to human nature. We believe
otherwise. This imputed omission, to
our mind, does not necessarily
diminish the plausibility of Gepayos
story let alone destroy his credibility.
To us, his reaction is within the
bounds of expected human behavior.
Surely, he was afraid that they might
kill him because the malefactors were
then armed with guns.25 Thus, he
would not dare attempt to stop them
and stake his life in the process. At
any rate, it is settled "that different
people react differently to a given
situation or type of situation, and
there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange or startling
or frightful experience. Witnessing a
crime is an unusual experience which
elicits different reactions from the
witnesses and for which no clear-cut
standard form of behavior can be
drawn."26
The failure of Gepayo to identify
Mamaruncas in court does not bolster
appellants cause. As the CA correctly
pointed out:
x x x We agree with the prosecutions
observation that although he did not

positively
identify
appellant
Mamaruncas as one of the shooters,
he was however, able to point out
that there was a third person who
accompanied assailants Palao and
Ampuan in approaching the victim
during the incident. This is also
bolstered
by
Insp.
Mijares[]
testimony
that
he
saw
three
assailants pointing their guns at the
victim who was already lying
prostrate on the ground.27
In any event, even without Gepayos
identification of Mamaruncas, the
unrebutted testimony of another
prosecution
eyewitness,
Batoon,
clearly points to Mamaruncas as one
of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons
rather Abdul Wahid together
with
two
companions,
presented the warrant of arrest
to your father, what happened
thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and
pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber
gun [and pointed it at] your
father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir

73

Q: And what happened after the

.45 pistol [was] pointed [at]
your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .
45 caliber from Abdul Wahid,
Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of
his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a
person. [W]hen he was asked x
x x his name[,] he answered
that
he
is
Renandang
Mamaruncas)
xxxx
Q:
After
this
Renandang
Mamaruncas shot your father,
what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired
the next shot (witness pointing
to a person sitting at the bench
inside the Courtroom and when
he was asked x x x his name,
he
answered
that
he is
28
Pendatum [Ampuan].)
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on
material details are straightforward

and consistent with each other. They

personally saw appellants at the
scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.
Their
combined
declarations
established
beyond
reasonable doubt the identities of
both appellants, along with their coaccused Abdul, as the perpetrators of
the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo
referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and
Pendatum Ampuan as one and the
same person in his affidavit29 and yet
later on testified to the contrary, this
Court finds the same inconsequential
and will not outrightly justify the
acquittal of an accused. In a very
recent case,30 this Court reiterated
that as between an affidavit executed
outside the court and a testimony
given in open court, the latter almost
always
prevails.
It
emphasized
therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn
statement and testimony in court do
not outrightly justify the acquittal of
an accused. Such discrepancies do
not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are often
incomplete. They do not purport to
contain a complete compendium of
the details of the event narrated by
the
affiant.
Thus,
our
rulings
generally consider sworn statements

74

taken out of court to be inferior to in

court testimony (citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover,
clearly points out that it was the
police officers who supplied the
names of the suspects in Gepayos
affidavit.31
Any alleged defect in the Information
deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error,
appellants aver that the Information
filed before the trial court was
substantially defective considering
that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as
one and the same person when in
fact they were identified as different
persons. As such, Ampuan was not
able to comprehend the Information
read to him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this
argument. It is well to note that
appellants failed to raise the issue of
the defective Information before the
trial court through a motion for bill of
particulars or a motion to quash the
information. Their failure to object to
the alleged defect before entering
their pleas of not guilty amounted to
a waiver of the defect in the
Information. "Objections as to matters
of form or substance in the
[I]nformation cannot be made for the
first time on appeal."32 Records even

show that the Information was

accordingly amended during trial to
rectify this alleged defect but
appellants
did
not
comment
thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of
this witness, the Information be
amended
from
[Renandang]
Mamaruncas and the word and, it
should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias
Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias
Pendatum Ampuan be erased as
corrected.

COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.33
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by
the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court, the facts sufficiently
prove that treachery was employed
by appellants. The attack on Baudelio
was so swift and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no opportunity to

75

resist or defend himself. As ruled by

the trial court:

concerted action and community of

interest."35

In the above situation, treachery was

considered to exist. More so in this
case when the victim was completely
without any weapon from the
inception of the assault. At the
moment when Pendatum Ampuan
and Renandang Mamaruncas shot
him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any
position to defend himself. And when
Abdul Wahid shot him while lying
wounded on the ground, he was
utterly defenseless.34

In this case, conspiracy was clearly

established.
All
three
accused
entered the shop of Baudelio at the
same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio
from behind, hitting the latter at his
left armpit while Mamaruncas shot
Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio
fell to the ground face down, Abdul
shot him at the back. These
consecutive acts undoubtedly showed
appellants unanimity in design,
intent and execution. They performed
specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and
design in the commission of the
crime.

Hence, both lower courts correctly

found appellants guilty of murder in
view of the presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of
conspiracy. Conspiracy exists "when
two or more persons come to an
agreement
concerning
the
commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary x x x [as it] may be shown
through
circumstantial
evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such lead
to a joint purpose and design,

The Court thus sees no cogent reason

to disturb the findings of the RTC and
the CA considering that they are
based on existing evidence and
reasonable
conclusions drawn therefrom. It has
been held time and again that factual
findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to
be given the highest respect. As a
rule, the Court will not weigh anew
the evidence already passed on by

76

the trial court and affirmed by the

CA.36 Though the rule is subject to
exceptions, no such exceptional
grounds obtain in this case.
Against
the
damning
evidence
adduced
by
the
prosecution,
appellants could only muster mere
denial. As ruled in various cases by
the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence is
inherently a weak defense as it is
negative
and
self-serving.
"As
between the categorical testimony
that rings of truth on one hand, and a
bare denial on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail."37
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is
murder in view of the attending
aggravating
circumstance
of
treachery. Murder, as defined under
Article 24838 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, is the unlawful
killing of a person which is not
parricide or infanticide, provided that
treachery, inter alia, attended the
killing. The presence of any one of
the enumerated circumstances under
the aforesaid Article is enough to
qualify a killing as murder punishable
by reclusion perpetua
to death. Since only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is found to

be present, both the RTC and the CA

properly
imposed
the
penalty
of reclusion perpetua pursuant
to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 934639 provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of
offenses
punishable
with reclusion perpetua or
whose
sentences
will
be
reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision,
appellants are therefore not eligible
for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil
indemnity
in
the
amount
of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,40 said
award
is
increased to P75,000.00. Anent the
award of moral damages, the CA
correctly
imposed
the
amount
41
of P50,000.00. These "awards are
mandatory without need of allegation
and proof other than the death of the
victim, owing to the fact of the
commission of murder or homicide."42

77

Anent the award of actual damages,

the victims widow testified that the
family spent a total of P66,904.00
relative to the wake and burial of the
victim. However, the claim for said
amount is supported merely by a list
of expenses43 personally prepared by
the widow instead of official receipts.
To be entitled to an award of actual
damages, "it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and
on the best evidence obtainable x x
x."44 "A list of expenses cannot
replace receipts when the latter
should have been issued as a matter
of
course
in
business
45
transactions." Thus
the
Court
deletes the lower courts award of
actual damages. Nonetheless, since
entitlement of the same is shown
under the facts of the case,
temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.0046 should be awarded in
lieu of actual damages to the heirs of
the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of
the Civil Code which provides that
temperate
damages
"may
be
recovered when the court finds that
pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty."
The
CA
correctly
deleted
the
indemnity for loss of earning capacity
awarded
by
the
trial

court.lawphi1 Such indemnity cannot

be awarded in the absence of
documentary evidence except where
the victim was either self-employed
or a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda
Batoon, the victim was earning a
monthly
income
of P20,000.00
andP90,000.00 as an auto repair shop
and a six-wheeler truck operator,
respectively. The trial court made a
conservative estimate of P500.00 a
day as the net income from the truck
alone
after
making
reasonable
deductions from its operation. Thus,
ranged against the daily minimum
wage then prevailing in Region X
which isP137.00 per day pursuant to
Wage Order No. RX-03, this case
undoubtedly does not fall under the
exceptions where indemnity for loss
of earning capacity can be given
despite the lack of documentary
evidence.
The Court sustains the award of
exemplary damages in view of the
proven qualifying circumstance of
treachery. The CA however awarded
exemplary damages to the heirs of
the
victim
in
the
amount
of P25,000.00.
To
conform
with
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court

78

increases
to P30,000.00.47

this

amount

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

the June 30, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00196 which found appellants
Renandang
Mamaruncas
and
Pendatum
Ampuan guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
murder
is AFFIRMED
with
further
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for
parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity
is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as
actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate
damages is awarded in lieu of
actual damages;
5. The award of
damages
is
to P30,000.00; and

exemplary
increased

6.
Appellants
are
further
ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

MAMARUNCAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 179497, January 25,
2012
FACTS:
Around noontime on February
1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard
Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain
Nito were working on vehicles
inside Baudelio Batoons auto repair
shop situated along the highway in
Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the
shop accompanied by appellants
Renandang
Mamaruncas
and
Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao
wore desert camouflage fatigues
while his
2
companions
wore
Philippine
Army
tropical
green
fatigues. Baginda Palao showed
Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant
and told the latter he was serving it
against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palaos
group prompted Juanito Gepayo and
Richard Batoon to stop their work and
observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda
Palao to just wait awhile, as they
would settle the matter after he
finishes tuning-up an engine he had
been working on.

79

Baginda Palao reacted by

slapping the victims stomach and
pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him.
Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab
Palaos gun, causing the 2 of them to
grapple for the same. As these two
wrestled for control of the gun,
Renandang Mamaruncas, who was
behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from
behind Batoons right thigh with a .38
cal. homemade gun. Pendatum
Ampuan, who was also standing
behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up
by shooting Batoons left arm pit with
a .45 cal. homemade pistol. Baudelio
Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda
Palao finished him off with a single .
45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito
Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the
entire scene, stunned and unable to
do anything. From their vantage
points 3 to four 4 meters away, these
witnesses
had
a
clear
and
unobstructed view of the entire
incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector
Graciano Mijares, then Commanding
Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile
Force Company, was riding a civilian
car along the highway, heading
towards Iligan City proper. He was
accompanied by his driver, SPO3
William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo.
They heard the gunshots emanating
from the auto repair shop at Baraas,
prompting Inspector Mijares to order
his driver to stop the car. They
alighted and proceeded to the source
of the gunshots. At the repair shop,
they saw 3 men in camouflage gear

with guns drawn and pointed at a

person already lying on the ground.
Inspector Mijares group shouted at
the camouflaged gunmen to stop
what they were doing and to drop
their firearms, at the same time
announcing
that
they
were
policemen.
The
camouflaged
gunmen
reacted by firing at the policemen.
The latter fired back. During the
exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao
ran behind the Batoon house, while
Renandang
Mamaruncas
and
Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the
road and a nearby car. Inspector
Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas
and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise
hit
Ampuan.
Mamaruncas,
who
managed to get inside the car, and
Ampuan were then captured by the
policemen. The lawmen also gave
chase to Baginda Palao but he
escaped.
Other responding policemen
brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to
the hospital for treatment and they
were
eventually
placed
under
detention. Baudelio Batoon was
brought to the hospital by his wife but
he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The Regional Trial Court held
them guilty as principals by direct
participation in the killing of Baudelio
Batoon. It gave full faith and
credence to the evidence of the
prosecution
especially
on
the
presence of conspiracy among the

80

malefactors and rendered a verdict of

conviction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision.
Said
court
ruled
that
the
inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses testimonies pointed out by
the appellants pertain only to minor
and collateral matters which do not
dilute the probative weight of said
testimonies. Regarding the erroneous
designation of appellant Ampuans
name in the Information, the court
held that such error was only a formal
defect and the proper correction was
duly made without any objection on
the part of the defense.

Appellants failed to raise the

issue of the defective Information
before the trial court through a
motion for bill of particulars or a
motion to quash the information.
Their failure to object to the alleged
defect before entering their pleas of
not guilty amounted to a waiver of
the defect in the Information.
Objections as to matters of form or
substance in the Information cannot
be made for the first time on appeal.
Records
even
show
that
the
Information was accordingly amended
during trial to rectify this alleged
defect but appellants did not
comment thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information
filed before the trial court was
substantially defective.
RULING:
No.
Appellants
aver
that
the
Information filed before the trial court
was
substantially
defective
considering that it accuses Abdul and
Ampuan as one and the same person
when in fact they were identified as
different persons. As such, Ampuan
was not able to comprehend the
Information read to him.

G.R. No. 184800

2010

May 5,

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN

UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND
JOVENCIO
PERECHE,
SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT
OF
MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE
JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

81

Via a petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M.
Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances
of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
Makati
(public
respondent) Order1 of April 22, 2008
which denied their motion to quash
the Amended Information indicting
them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of
August
12,
2008
denying
reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P.
Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October
18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco
Family
("in
particular,"
former
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the
Malayan
Insurance
Co.,
Inc.
(Malayan),4 a
criminal
complaint,5 before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13)
counts of libel under Article 355 in
relation to Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio,
Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella
Relova Santos, who are officers of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition,
Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez,
Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda
Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz,
Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste,
Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio
Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter
Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI,
Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI
(collectively, the accused), and a
certain John Doe, the administrator of
the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed
by a large group of disgruntled

planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI)

- a wholly owned subsidiary of Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation,
also owned by the Yuchengco Group
of Companies (YGC) - who had
previously purchased traditional preneed educational plans but were
unable to collect thereon or avail of
the benefits thereunder after PPI, due
to liquidity concerns, filed for
corporate rehabilitation with prayer
for suspension of payments before
the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to
honor its obligations under the
educational pre-need plans, PEPCI
sought to provide a forum by which
the planholders could seek redress for
their pecuniary loss under their
policies by maintaining a website on
the internet under the address
of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also
owned, controlled and moderated on
the internet a blogspot6 under the
website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.c
om, as well as a yahoo egroup7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.
com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone
logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon
accessing the above-stated websites
in Makati on various dates from
August 25 to October 2, 2005, he
"was appalled to read numerous
articles [numbering 13], maliciously
and recklessly caused to be published

82

by [the accused] containing highly

derogatory statements and false
accusations, relentlessly attacking
the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and
particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an
article which was posted/published
on www.pepcoalition.com on August
25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng
mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang
mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak
ng negotiation because it was done
prematurely since we had not file any
criminal aspect of our case. What is
worse is that Yuchengcos benefited
much from the nego. x x x . That is
the fact na talagang hindi dapat
pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD.
FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT,
BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado,
congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other
venues to air our grievances and call
for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within
ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga
investments and deposits natin sa
lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and
again convince friends to do the
same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon
ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon
specially those who joined only after
knowing that there was a negotiation
for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG

NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE
READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE
NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US
NA. x x x9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the
Makati
City
Prosecutors
Office,
finding probable cause to indict the
accused, filed thirteen (13) separate
Informations11 charging them with
libel. The accusatory portion of one
Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-876, which was raffled
off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of
August 2005 in Makati City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being
then the trustees of Parents Enabling
Parents Coalition and as such trustees
they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which
is
of
general
circulation,
and
publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping
with one another together with John
Does, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
and
publicly
and
maliciously
with
intention of attacking the honesty,
virtue, honor and integrity, character
and
reputation
of
complainant
Malayan
Insurance
Co.
Inc.,
Yuchengco
Family
particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Dee and for further purpose
exposing the complainant to public
hatred and contempt published an

83

article imputing a vice or defect to

the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in
the
said
website www.pepcoalition.comand
injurious and defamatory article as
follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng
mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang
mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak
ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang
nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for
it because they had successfully lull
us and the next time they will try to
kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing
article
as
published/posted
in www.pepcoalition.com is attached
as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be
used in order to post and publish the
above defamatory article are known
to the accused as trustees holding
legal title to the above-cited website
and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and
publication of the defamatory articles
that the article in question was
posted and published with the object
of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the
Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by
a petition for review to the Secretary

of Justice who, by Resolution of June

20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of
probable cause and accordingly
directed the withdrawal of the
Informations for libel filed in court.
The Justice Secretary opined that the
crime of "internet libel" was nonexistent, hence, the accused could
not be charged with libel under
Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners,
as
co15
accused, thereupon filed on June 6,
2006, before the public respondent, a
Motion to Quash16the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the
grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the
acts complained of in the Information
are not punishable by law since
internet libel is not covered by Article
353 of the RPC; and the Information is
fatally defective for failure to
designate the offense charged and
the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing
Macasaet
v.
17
People, petitioners maintained that
the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article
was printed and first published or
that the offended parties resided in
Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and
first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006, 18 the
public respondent, albeit finding that
probable cause existed, quashed the
Information,
citing
Agustin
v.

84

Pamintuan.19 It
found
that
the
Information lacked any allegations
that the offended parties were
actually residing in Makati at the time
of the commission of the offense as in
fact they listed their address in the
complaint-affidavit
at
Yuchengco
Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the
alleged libelous article was printed
and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider
the
quashal
of
the
Information,20 insisting
that
the
Information
sufficiently
conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent.
It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which
held that the Information need not
allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was "printed and first
published" in the appropriate venue.
And it pointed out that Malayan has
an office in Makati of which Helen is a
resident. Moreover, the prosecution
alleged that even assuming that the
Information was deficient, it merely
needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions
motion
for
reconsideration,
contending, inter alia, that since
venue is jurisdictional in criminal
cases, any defect in an information
for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is
not a mere matter of form that may
be cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007, 23 the
public
respondent
granted
the
prosecutions
motion
for
reconsideration
and
accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to

"amend the Information to cure the

defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to
admit the Amended Information
dated
March
20,
2007,24 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of
August 2005 in Makati City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being
then the trustees of Parents Enabling
Parents Coalition and as such trustees
they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which
is
of
general
circulation,
and
publication to the public conspiring,
confederating together with John
Does, whose true names, identities
and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Dee and for further purpose
exposing the complainant to public
hatred and contempt published an
article imputing a vice or defect to
the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in
the
said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a
website accessible in Makati City, an
injurious
and
defamatory

85

article, which was first published and

accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in
the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the
Amended Information25 which, they
alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction
upon the public respondent because
it failed to allege that the libelous
articles were "printed and first
published" by the accused in Makati;
and the prosecution erroneously laid
the venue of the case in the place
where the offended party accessed
the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22,
2008, the public respondent, applying
Banal III, found the Amended
Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration26 having been denied
by the public respondent by Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008, they
filed the present petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition faulting the public
respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED
INFORMATION
WHOSE
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT;
and

3. NOT RULING THAT AN

AMENDMENT
IN
THE
INFORMATION
FOR
THE
PURPOSE
OF
CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS
ILLEGAL.27
With
the
filing
of
Gimenezs
28
Comment to the petition, the issues
are: (1) whether petitioners violated
the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus
render the petition dismissible; and
(2) whether grave abuse of discretion
attended the public respondents
admission
of
the
Amended
Information.
The established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy
of courts,29 as a rule, requires that
recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked
court
exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher
court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy
clearly indicates that petitions for the
issuance
of
extraordinary
writs
against first level courts should be
filed in the RTC and those against the
latter should be filed in the Court of
Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad,
however, as it admits of certain
exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is
unnecessary when cases brought
before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but purely legal
questions.32
In the present case, the substantive
issue calls for the Courts exercise of
its discretionary authority, by way of

86

exception, in order to abbreviate the

review process as petitioners raise a
pure question of law involving
jurisdiction in criminal complaints for
libel under Article 360 of the RPC
whether the Amended Information is
sufficient to sustain a charge for
written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any
person who shall publish, exhibit or
cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible
for the same.
The author or editor of a book or
pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall
be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent
as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for
damages
in
cases
of
written
defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city
where
the
libelous
article
is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at
the time of the commission of the

offense, the action shall be filed in

the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed
and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in
the City of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed
and first published x x x. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal
actions such that the place where the
crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but
constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires
even greater import in libel cases,
given that Article 360, as amended,
specifically provides for the possible
venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such
cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its
earlier pronouncements in Agbayani
v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on
venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both
the bench and the bar, this Court

87

finds it appropriate to reiterate our

earlier pronouncement in the case of
Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to
the venue of the criminal action for
written defamation, the complaint or
information
should
contain
allegations as to whether, at the time
the offense was committed, the
offended party was a public officer or
a private individual and where he was
actually
residing
at
that
time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was
printed and first published should
likewise be alleged. That allegation
would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel
was printed and first published is
used as the basis of the venue of the
action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of

libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to
only either of two places, namely: 1)
where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission
of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged
defamatory
article
was
printed and first published. The
Amended Information in the present
case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second. Thus, it stated
that the offending article "was first
published
and accessed by
the
private complainant in Makati City." In
other words, it considered the phrase
to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation
of
printing
and
first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in
the Amended Information to vest
jurisdiction
in
Makati
becomes
pronounced upon an examination of
the rationale for the amendment to
Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v.
Court of Appeals36 explained the
nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive
restatement of the rules of venue in
actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of
the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form
provided that the venue of the
criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein
the libel was published, displayed or
exhibited, regardless of the place
where the same was written, printed

88

or composed. Article 360 originally

did not specify the public officers and
the courts that may conduct the
preliminary
investigation
of
complaints for libel.

for the bill which became Republic Act

No. 4363, Congressional Record of
May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v.
Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39
SCRA 303, 311).

Before article 360 was amended, the

rule was that a criminal action for
libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article
was
published
or
circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or
printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618).
Under that rule, the criminal action is
transitory and the injured party has a
choice of venue.

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

Experience had shown that under

that old rule the offended party could
harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal
action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article
published in the Daily Mirror and the
Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa,
Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces
were charged with libel in the justice
of the peace court of San Fabian,
Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman,
93 Phil. 933).
To
forestall
such
harassment,
Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It
lays down specific rules as to the
venue of the criminal action so as to
prevent the offended party in written
defamation
cases
from
inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note

Clearly, the evil sought to be

prevented by the amendment to
Article 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung
areas, meant to accomplish nothing
more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness
of the situation becomes even more
acute where the offended party is a
person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated
by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the
libel was printed and first published
are used by the offended party as
basis for the venue in the criminal
action, the Information must allege
with
particularity where the
defamatory
article
was
printed
and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in
order to forestall any inclination to
harass.
The same measure cannot be
reasonably expected when it pertains
to defamatory material appearing on

89

a website on the internet as there

would be no way of determining the
situs of its printing and first
publication. To credit Gimenezs
premise of equating his first access to
the defamatory article on petitioners
website in Makati with "printing and
first publication" would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the
chaos that would ensue in situations
where the websites author or writer,
a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for
libel anywhere in the Philippines that
the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending
website.
For the Court to hold that the
Amended
Information
sufficiently
vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati
simply
because
the
defamatory
article
was accessed therein would open the
floodgates to the libel suit being filed
in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being
accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the
venue requirements imposed by
Article 360, as amended, are unduly
oppressive,
the
Courts
pronouncements
in
Chavez37 are
instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it
would be necessary to abandon the

Agbayani rule providing that a private

person must file the complaint for
libel either in the place of printing
and first publication, or at the
complainants place of residence. We
would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this
rule
in Agbayani,
such
as Soriano, Agustin,
and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to
resort to such a radical action. These
limitations imposed on libel actions
filed by private persons are hardly
onerous, especially as they still allow
such persons to file the civil or
criminal complaint in their respective
places of residence, in which situation
there is no need to embark on a
quest to determine with precision
where the libelous matter was printed
and first published.
(Emphasis
supplied.)

and

underscoring

IN FINE, the public respondent

committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners motion to
quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED. The assailed Order of April
22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of
August 12, 2008 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby
DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.

90

Petitioners moved to quash the

Amended Information[25] which, they
alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction
upon the public respondent because
BONIFACIO vs RTC of Makati G.R. No. 184800
it failed to allege that the libelous
branch 149
articles were printed and first
published
by
the
accused
FACTS:
in Makati; and the
prosecution
Private respondent Jessie John P.
erroneously laid the venue of the
Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on behalf
case in the place where the offended
of the Yuchengco Family and of the
party accessedthe internet-published
Malayan
Insurance
Co.,
Inc.
article.
(Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint, for
thirteen (13) counts of libelunder
ISSUE:
Article 355 against officers, trustees,
W/N venue of
internet-published
and members of Parents Enabling
article libel is where the offended
Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI). PEPCI
party accessed the libellous article
was aplanholders of Pacific Plans, Inc.
(PPI) owned by the the Yuchengco
HELD:
family. PPI refused to honor its
No. in this situation there is no
obligations to PEPCI which the latter
need to embark on a quest to
created and maintained different
determine with precision where
websites which tend to be the forum
the libelous matter was printed
for redress by the planholders. These
and first published.
websites are easily accessible to the
public or by anyone logged on to the
It is clear that the venue of libel
internet. Gimenez alleged that upon
cases where the complainant is a
accessing such websites by the PEPCI
private individual is limited to
in Makati, he was appalled to read
only either of two places, namely: 1)
numerous articles, maliciously and
where the complainant actually
recklessly caused to be published by
resides at the time of the commission
[the accused] containing highly
of the offense; or 2) where the
derogatory statements and false
alleged
defamatory
article
was
accusations, relentlessly attacking
printed and first published. The
the Yuchengco Family. The Makati City
Information in the present case opted
Prosecutors Office find pobable
to lay the venue by availing of the
cause and charge them with libel.
second. Thus, it stated that the

91

offending article was first published

and accessed by
the
private
complainant in Makati City. In other
words, it considered the phrase to be
equivalent to the requisite allegation
of printing and first publication.
Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted to prevent the accused
from harrasment. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of
the criminal action so as to
prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning
complaints
filed
in
remote municipal courts
Clearly, the evil sought to be
prevented by the amendment to
Article 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung
areas, meant to accomplish nothing
more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness
of the situation becomes even more
acute
The same measure cannot be
reasonably expected when it pertains
to defamatory material appearing on
a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining
the situsof its printing and first
publication. To credit Gimenezs
premise of equating his first access to

the defamatory article on petitioners

website in Makati with printing and
first publication would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the
chaos that would ensue in situations
where the websites author or writer,
a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for
libel anywhere in the Philippines that
the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending
website.

G.R. No. 159186

2009

June 5,

JESSE
Y.
YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
HON.
MONICO
G.
CABALES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 35, General Santos
City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 1, General Santos City;
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
JOVITA
DIMALANTA
and
MERGYL
MIRABUENO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for the

92

issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or issuance of status
quo order seeking to annul and set
aside the Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003
denying
petitioner's
motion
for
2
reconsideration of the Decision dated
April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No.
68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse
Bessie Yap are engaged in the real
estate
business
through
their
company Primetown Property Group.
Sometime
in
1996,
petitioner
purchased several real properties
from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In
consideration of said purchases,
petitioner issued several Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated
checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses
Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and
spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta,
rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks
were honored by the bank, but in the
early part of 1997, when the
remaining checks were deposited
with the drawee bank, they were
dishonored for the reason that
the "Account
is
Closed."Demands
were made by Spouses Mirabueno
and Spouses Dimalanta to the
petitioner to make good the checks.
Despite this, however, the latter
failed
to
pay
the
amounts
represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses

Mirabueno filed a civil action for
collection of sum of money, damages
and attorney's fee with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6231.3 On December 15,
1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed
suit and instituted a similar action,
which was docketed as Civil Case No.
6238.4
Subsequently, on various dates, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of
General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22
against the petitioner with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
General Santos City. The criminal
complaints were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to
34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522I.5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed
separate
motions
to
suspend
proceedings on account of the
existence of a prejudicial question
and motion to exclude the private
prosecutor from participating in the
proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that
the proceedings in the criminal cases
be suspended until the civil cases
pending before the RTC were finally
resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June
21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the
motions for lack of merit. Petitioner

93

filed
a
Partial
Motion
for
Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal
Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to
34869
and
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the Part of the
Order Denying the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on Account of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question
relative to Criminal Case No. 35522I.9 The subsequent motions were
denied in the Order10 dated October
18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with a Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed
as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001,
the RTC issued an Order12 denying the
petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,13 which was denied
in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the
CA
a
Petition
for Certiorari
Prohibition and Mandamus with
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
of Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a
Decision16 dismissing the petition for
lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not
pose a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of the petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal
of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238
reveals that the issue involved
therein is not the validity of the sale
as incorrectly pointed out by the
petitioner, but it is, whether or not
the complainants therein are entitled
to collect from the petitioner the sum
or the value of the checks which they
have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It
behooves this Court to state that the
sale and the rediscounting of the
checks are two transactions, separate
and distinct from each other. It so
happened that in the subject civil
cases it is not the sale that is in
question, but rather the rediscounting
of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's
contention that the main issue
involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow
ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed
the validity of the sale that is
contested in the subject civil cases,
then, We cannot fathom why the
petitioner never contested such sale
by filing an action for the annulment
thereof or at least invoked or prayed
in his answer that the sale be
declared null and void. Accordingly,
even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and
6238 are tried and the resolution of
the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner
cannot be held liable anymore for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17
Petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
18
Reconsideration, which was denied
in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.

94

Hence, the petition assigning the

following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES
(FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF
MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER,
CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND
6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT
SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL
CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT
OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
NOT
GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20
The main contention of the petitioner
is that a prejudicial question, as
defined by law and jurisprudence,
exists in the present case. It is the
petitioner's assertion that Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of
sum of money and damages were
filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further
alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private
respondents are entitled to collect
from the petitioner despite the lack of
consideration, is an issue that is a
logical antecedent to the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For

if the court rules that there is no valid

consideration
for
the
check's
issuance, as petitioner contends, then
it necessarily follows that he could
not also be held liable for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg.
22 specifically requires, among other
elements, that the check should have
been issued for account or for value.
There must be a valid consideration;
otherwise, no violation of the said law
could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner
said that the reason for the dishonor
of the checks was his order to the
drawee bank to stop payment and to
close his account in order to avoid
necessary penalty from the bank. He
made this order due to the failure of
Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to
the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
there is no prejudicial question in Civil
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which
would warrant the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the
petitioner. The issue in the civil cases
is not the validity of the sale between
the petitioner and Evelyn, but
whether the complainants therein are
entitled to damages arising from the
checks. These checks were issued by
the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who,
thereafter, negotiated the same
checks to private complainants. The
checks were subsequently dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG
maintains that the resolution of such

95

issue has absolutely no bearing on

the issue of whether petitioner may
be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.21
The present case hinges on the
determination of whether there exists
a
prejudicial
question
that
necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus,
we resolve to deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists
in a situation where a civil action and
a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the former an
issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or
not
the
criminal
action
may
22
proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have
similar issues, or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided
the other element or characteristic is

satisfied. It must appear not only that

the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would be necessarily
determinative
of
the
guilt
or
innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same
facts, or if there is no necessity that
the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case,
the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question.23 Neither is there
a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each
other.24
The issue in the criminal cases is
whether the petitioner is guilty of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil
case, it is whether the private
respondents are entitled to collect
from the petitioner the sum or the
value of the checks that they have
rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in
the civil action is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal cases against him, and
there is no necessity that the civil
case be determined first before
taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions,
even if petitioner is declared not
liable for the payment of the value of

96

the checks and damages, he cannot

be adjudged free from criminal
liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is in itself an offense.25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial
question under determination was
whether the daily interest rate of 5%
was void, such that the checks issued
by respondents to cover said interest
were likewise void for being contra
bonos mores, and thus the cases for
B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that
"whether or not the interest rate
imposed by petitioners is eventually
declared void for being contra bonos
mores will not affect the outcome of
the BP Blg. 22 cases because what
will ultimately be penalized is the
mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed
before the court hearing the B.P. Blg.
22 cases is whether the law has been
breached; that is, if a bouncing check
has been issued."
Further, We held
Jurado,27 that:

in Ricaforte

v.

The gravamen of the offense

punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we
have declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended

or designed to coerce a debtor to pay

his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit,
under
pain
of
penal
sanctions, the making and circulation
of worthless checks. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. In People
v. Nitafan, we said that a check
issued as an evidence of debt though not intended to be presented
for payment - has the same effect as
an ordinary check and would fall
within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
xxxx
x x x The mere act of issuing a
worthless check - whether as a
deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt - is
malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which
checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public
reposes
in
the
stability
and
commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking
communities. So what the law
punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose
for which it was issued or the terms
and
conditions
relating
to
its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless
check
is
malum
28
prohibitum.

97

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras

v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case
of Ras involves
a
complaint
for
nullification of a deed of sale on the
ground of an alleged double sale.
While the civil case was pending, an
information for estafa was filed
against Ras (the defendant in the civil
case) arising from the same alleged
double sale, subject matter of the
civil complaint. The Court ruled that
there was a prejudicial question
considering that the defense in the
civil case was based on the very
same
facts
that
would
be
determinative
of
the
guilt
or
innocence
of
the
accused
in
the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras,
inasmuch as the determination of
whether the petitioner is liable to pay
the private respondents the value of
the checks and damages, will not
affect the guilt or innocence of the
petitioner because the material
question in the criminal cases is
whether petitioner had issued bad
checks, regardless of the purpose or
condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal
precepts, it is clear that the
determination of the issues involved
in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for
collection of sum of money and
damages is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner in the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack

of consideration may be raised as a
defense during the trial of the
criminal cases against him. The
validity and merits of a partys
defense and accusation, as well as
the admissibility and weight of
testimonies and evidence brought
before the court, are better ventilated
during trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has
courts of law is to ascertain the
respective rights of the parties, to
examine and to put to test all their
respective allegations and evidence
through a well designed machinery
termed "trial."Thus, all the defenses
available to the accused should be
invoked in the trial of the criminal
cases. This court is not the
proper forum that should ascertain
the facts and decide the case for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against
the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no
reversible error in affirming the
decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
and the Decision dated April 30, 2003
and the Resolution dated July 17,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
YAP VS. CABALES G.R. NO. 159186
JUNE 5, 2009

98

FACTS: Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his

spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the
real estate business through their
company Primetown Property Group.
Yap purchased several real properties
from a certain Evelyn Te. In
consideration of said purchases,
petitioner
issued
several
BPI
postdated
checks
to
Evelyn.
Thereafter, spouses Orlando and
Mergyl
Mirabueno
and
spouses
Charlie
and
Jovita
Dimalanta,
rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
Some of the checks were dishonour
by reason of account closed. Despite
of the demand, Yap failed to pay the
amounts represented by the said
checks. Spouses Mirabueno filed a
civil action for collection of sum of
money against Yap. Subsequently,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of
General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of BP 22
against the petitioner. In the criminal
cases, Yap filed separate motions to
suspend proceedings on account of
the existence of
a prejudicial
question. The MCTC denied the
motions for lack of merit. On appeal,
the RTC likewise denied the petition.
CA rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. The CA
opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 did not pose a prejudicial
question to the prosecution of the
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a
prejudicial question that necessitates
the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCC.

HELD:
None. A prejudicial question generally
exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the
former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the
latter
may
proceed,
because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action
is
resolved
would
be
determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have
similar issues, or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided
the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. It must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would be necessarily
determinative
of
the
guilt
or
innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same

99

facts, or if there is no necessity that

the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case,
the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.
G.R. No. 200030
2012

April 18,

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NELSON
BAYOT
y
SATINA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION

Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was

charged
with
Rape
in
an
4
Information dated
29
December
1997, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of
September, 1997, in the Municipality
of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
[appellant], by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the
[AAA], 44 years old, against her will.5
On arraignment, appellant pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

PEREZ, J.:
This
is
an
appeal
from
the
Decision1 dated 9 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CRH.C. No. 00269 affirming with
modification the Decision2 dated 31
July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental,
6th
Judicial
Region,
Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 982025, finding herein appellant Nelson
Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of
rape,
committed
against
AAA,3 thus, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
appellate court increased the award
of
indemnity
from P40,000.00
to P50,000.00.
It
also
ordered
appellant to pay AAA moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00.

In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC

convicted appellant of the crime of
rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay AAA the amount of P40,000.00 as
indemnity with costs. In convicting
appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that
AAAs testimony as regards her
ordeal
was
simple
and
straightforward, unshaken by a rigid
cross-examination. There appeared to
be no inconsistency in her testimony.
Further, AAAs declaration that she
was
raped
by
appellant
was
corroborated by a medical certificate
showing contusion on her vagina at
6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice,
which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo
Cubid to have been caused by
forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC
negates the "sweet heart" defense

100

offered by appellant. It stated that

appellants claim of being AAAs lover
was a mere devise to extricate
himself from the consequence of his
dastardly lust. AAAs immediate
response of reporting the rape
incident carries the stamp of truth.
Moreover, if, indeed, there was such
relationship between appellant and
AAA, the latter would not have
pursued this case. It bears stressing
that despite appellants repeated plea
for the dismissal of the case, AAA
remained steadfast in seeking justice
for the violation of her womanhood.6
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the
aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6
September 2000.7 In light, however,
of this Courts pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,8 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate
review
per
9
Resolution dated 4 October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed appellants
conviction with the modification
increasing the award of indemnity
from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It
likewise awarded moral damages in
favor of AAA in the amount
of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals
aptly observed that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant committed the
crime of rape against AAA. It further
held that other than the self-serving
declaration of appellant that he and
AAA were sweethearts; no other
evidence was ever presented to

substantiate such claim. Even the

testimony of appellants daughter,
who claimed that her father and AAA
are maintaining an illicit relationship,
could not be given any considerable
weight. Aside from the fact that
appellants daughter could not point
to any other circumstance supporting
her claim, except for one incident
when she allegedly saw her father
and AAA holding hands during a
dance at their barangay fiesta, her
testimony could not be stripped of
bias and partiality considering that
she is the daughter of appellant. In
the same way, her testimony that she
saw her father and AAA in the act of
sexual intercourse deserves scant
consideration as she was not present
at the time of the commencement of
the said act. She could not, therefore,
be in a position to state with certainty
that there was no struggle on the part
of AAA. Hence, her testimony
regarding such matter is a mere
conclusion of fact.10
However, in a letter dated 29 May
2006,11 Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal
Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid
Prison, informed the Court of Appeals
that appellant died at the New Bilibid
Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004.
Attached in his letter is the original
copy of appellants Certificate of
Death.12
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys
Office still appealed, on behalf of
appellant, the aforesaid Court of
Appeals Decision to this Court via a
Notice of Appeal13 dated 31 May

101

2006, which was given due course by

the
Court
of
Appeals
per
14
Resolution dated 19 January 2007.
The Court of Appeals also directed
the Chief of the Judicial Records
Division to forward the entire records
of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellants
death, this Court will now determine
its effect to this present appeal.
Appellants death on 4 December
2004, during the pendency of his
appeal before the Court of Appeals,
extinguished not only his criminal
liability for the crime of rape
committed against AAA, but also his
civil liability solely arising from or
based on said crime.15
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code,
as
amended,
specifically
provides the effect of death of the
accused on his criminal, as well as
civil, liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final
judgment; [Emphasis supplied].

1. Death of the accused

pending
appeal
of
his
conviction
extinguishes
his
criminal liability as well as the
civil
liability
based
solely
thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex
delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability
survives
notwithstanding the death of
[the] accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates
these
other
sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act
or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

Applying the foregoing provision, this

Court, in People v. Bayotas,16 which
was cited in a catena of cases, 17 had
laid down the following guidelines:

3. Where the civil liability

survives,
as
explained
in
Number 2 above, an action for

102

recovery therefor may be

pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be
enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the
estate
of
the
accused,
depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended
party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in
cases
where
during
the
prosecution of the criminal
action
and
prior
to
its
extinction, the private-offended
party
instituted
together
therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case,
conformably
with
[the]
provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by
prescription.18
From the foregoing, it is clear that the
death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale,
therefore, is that the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is

no longer a defendant to stand as the

accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal
case.19
Evidently,
as
this
Court
has
pronounced in People v. Olaco and
People v. Paniterce,20 it is already
unnecessary to rule on appellants
appeal. Appellants appeal was still
pending and no final judgment had
been rendered against him at the
time of his death. Thus, whether or
not appellant was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant
because
even
assuming
that
appellant did incur criminal liability
and civil liability ex delicto, these
were totally extinguished by his
death, following the provisions of
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code and this Courts ruling in People
v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed
Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CRH.C. No. 00269 finding appellant
guilty of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
and
ordering
him
to
pay
AAA P50,000.00
as
indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages
had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of
appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the
Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CRH.C. No. 00269 is SET ASIDE and

103

Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the

RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EFFECTS OF DEATH OF PARTY IN

A
CRIMINAL
CASEPEOPLE
V.
NELSON BAYOT y SATINA
G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012Perez,
J:
FACTS:
The accused Nelson Bayot y Santina
was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court
(RTC)
for
a
crime
of
rapecommitted against AAA, thus
sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of
reclusion perpetua
. The appellatecourt increased the
award of indemnity from 40,000 to
50,000Php. It also ordered accused to
pay AAAmoral damages in the
amount of P 50,000. The decision was
promulgated on May 9, 2006.
However, in aletter dated May 29,
2006, the Superintendent Leopando
of New Bilibid Prison informed the
Court ofAppelas that the appellant
died at the Pri
sons hospital on December 4, 2004.
ISSUE:
Is the death of the accused before the
final promulgation of the decision
which
convicts
him
for
rapeextinguished both his criminal
and civil liability?
HELD:

YES. This is for the reason that the

source of civil liability of the accused
is based solely on his criminal
liability. As opined by Justice Regalado, the
death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his
criminal liability directly arising and
based
solely
on
the
offense
committed. The claim for civil
liabilitysurvives notwithstanding the
death of the accused if the same may
also
predicate
on
a
source
ofobligation
other
thank
delict.
However in this case, the claim for
civil liability is attached to the
criminalliability.In addition, par 1 of
Art. 89 provides that the death of the
convict extinguished the criminal
liabilitiesand
as
to
pecuniary
penalties liability, when the death
occurs before the final judgment.
Based from therecords, the judgment
was promulgated only on 2006, two
(2) years after the death of the
accused in2004, therefore, both his
criminal
and
civil
liability
is
extinguished.
G.R. No. 171268
September 14, 2010
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRINGAS
BUNAY
y
DAMAT, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

104

The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

26, in Luna, Apayao tried and found
the accused guilty of qualified rape in
its decision dated December 11,
2001, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused,
BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM-AT guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape as charged against him, this
court hereby sentences said accused
to suffer the Supreme Penalty of
DEATH.

2004,3 conformably
Mateo.4

with

People

v.

On August 10, 2005, the Court of

Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction
of the accused for qualified rape in
C.A.-G.R. No. CR HC No. 00758,5 viz:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26 in
Criminal Case No. 5-2001 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The accused is further ordered to pay

the victim, "AAA", the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00)
by way of civil indemnity plus
exemplary and moral damages of
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00).
The accused is ordered to be
immediately shipped to New Bilibid
Prisons,
Muntinlupa
City,
for
imprisonment thereat while awaiting
the review of this decision by the
Supreme Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
On December 13, 2001, the accused
was committed to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, per the
certification issued on August 14,
2002 by the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections.2
The conviction was brought for
automatic review, but the Court
transferred the case to the CA for
intermediate review on November 9,

Following the CAs denial of his

motion
for
reconsideration,
the
accused now appeals to the Court.
On April 20, 2010, the Court received
the letter dated April 15, 2010 from
Bureau of Corrections Assistant
Director for Operations Rodrigo A.
Mercado, advising that the accused
had died on March 25, 2010 at the
New Bilibid Prison Hospital in
Muntinlupa City. The report of Dr.
Marylou V. Arbatin, Medical Officer III,
revealed that the immediate cause of
death had been cardio-respiratory
arrest, with pneumonia as the
antecedent cause.
On June 22, 2010, the Court required
the Bureau of Corrections to submit a
certified true copy of the death
certificate of the accused.1avvphi1
By letter dated August 16, 2010,
Armando
T.
Miranda,
Chief
Superintendent of the New Bilibid

105

Prison,
submitted
the
certificate of the accused.

death

Under the foregoing circumstances,

the death of the accused during the
pendency of his appeal in this Court
totally extinguished his criminal
liability. Such extinction is based on
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
which pertinently provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:

criminal case is considered closed

and terminated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186529

3, 2010

1. By the death of the convict, as to

the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

PEOPLE
OF
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JACK
RACHO
RAQUERO, Appellant.

xxx

DECISION

The death of the accused likewise

extinguished the civil liability that
was based exclusively on the crime
for which the accused was convicted
(i.e., ex delicto), because no final
judgment of conviction was yet
rendered by the time of his death.
Only civil liability predicated on a
source of

NACHURA, J.:

obligation other than the delict

survived the death of the accused,
which the offended party can recover
by means of a separate civil action.6
UPON
THE
FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the appeal of the
accused is dismissed, and this

August
THE
y

On appeal is the Court of Appeals

(CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming
the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint
Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding
appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following
facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential
agent of the police transacted
through cellular phone with appellant

106

for the purchase of shabu. The agent

later reported the transaction to the
police authorities who immediately
formed a team composed of member
of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group
of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the
appellant.4 The agent gave the police
appellants name, together with his
physical description. He also assured
them that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.,
appellant called up the agent and
informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in
Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day
wearing a red and white striped Tshirt. The team members then posted
themselves
along
the
national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis
bus arrived in Baler. When appellant
alighted
from
the
bus,
the
confidential agent pointed to him as
the person he transacted with earlier.
Having alighted from the bus,
appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring
him to his final destination. As
appellant was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station
on suspicion of carrying shabu.
Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his
hands from his pants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.5

The team then brought appellant to

the police station for investigation.
The confiscated specimen was turned
over to Police Inspector Rogelio
Sarenas De Vera who marked it with
his initials and with appellants name.
The
field
test
and
laboratory
examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive
results
for
methamphetamine
6
hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two
separate
Informations,
one
for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law
for possessing, dangerous drugs, the
accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in
the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in
Baler,
Aurora
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, did then and there,
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
have in his possession five point zero
one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride
commonly known as "Shabu", a
regulated drug without any permit or
license from the proper authorities to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in
the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in
Baler, Aurora, the said accused did
then
and
there,
unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully transporting
or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01

107

[or 4.54] grams of shabu without any

permit or license from the proper
authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant
pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability
and claimed that he went to Baler,
Aurora to visit his brother to inform
him about their ailing father. He
maintained that the charges against
him were false and that no shabu was
taken
from
him.
As
to
the
circumstances of his arrest, he
explained that the police officers,
through their van, blocked the tricycle
he was riding in; forced him to alight;
brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge;
stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station
for investigation.9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a
Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II,
R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to
suffer
the
penalty
of
life
imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of
the charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the
credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the

identity of the confiscated drug

because of the teams failure to mark
the specimen immediately after
seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time,
the legality of his arrest and the
validity of the subsequent warrantless
search. He questions the admissibility
of the confiscated sachet on the
ground that it was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal. However, this
is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when
there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked,
misunderstood,
or
misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that would
have affected the case.13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the
validity of his arrest and the search
and seizure of the sachet of shabu
and, consequently, the admissibility
of the sachet. It is noteworthy that
although the circumstances of his
arrest were briefly discussed by the
RTC, the validity of the arrest and
search and the admissibility of the
evidence against appellant were not
squarely raised by the latter and
thus, were not ruled upon by the trial
and appellate courts.

108

It is well-settled that an appeal in a

criminal case opens the whole case
for review.1avvphi1 This Court is
clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even those not raised
on appeal, if we find them necessary
in arriving at a just disposition of the
case. Every circumstance in favor of
the accused shall be considered. This
is in keeping with the constitutional
mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records
of the case and for reasons that will
be discussed below, we find that
appellant can no longer question the
validity of his arrest, but the sachet of
shabu seized from him during the
warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him.

The records show that appellant

never objected to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. In
fact, this is the first time that he
raises the issue. Considering this
lapse, coupled with his active
participation in the trial of the case,
we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having
voluntarily
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is
deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest,
thus curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. The legality
of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized
drug in evidence, it is necessary for
us to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a
search and consequent seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable
and any evidence obtained therefrom
shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.17 Said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain
view;"

109

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4.
Consented
search;

warrantless

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and
circumstances.18

emergency

What constitutes a reasonable or

unreasonable warrantless search or
seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto, declaring
that he was caught in the act of
actually committing a crime or
attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the apprehending officers
as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing
with
him
a
sachet
of
20
shabu. Consequently,
the
warrantless search was considered
valid as it was deemed an incident to
the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in
searches incident to a lawful arrest,
the arrest must precede the search;
generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search

substantially contemporaneous with

an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the
search.21 Thus, given the factual
milieu of the case, we have to
determine whether the police officers
had
probable
cause
to
arrest
appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition,
it ordinarily signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.22
The determination of the existence or
absence
of
probable
cause
necessitates a reexamination of the
established facts. On May 19, 2003, a
confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase of
shabu. The agent reported the
transaction to the police authorities
who immediately formed a team to
apprehend the appellant. On May 20,
2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called
up the agent with the information
that he was on board a Genesis bus
and would arrive in Baler, Aurora
anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team
members posted themselves along
the national highway in Baler, Aurora,
and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same
day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.
When appellant alighted from the
bus, the confidential agent pointed to
him as the person he transacted with,

110

and when the latter was about to

board
a
tricycle,
the
team
approached him and invited him to
the police station as he was
suspected of carrying shabu. When
he pulled out his hands from his
pants pocket, a white envelope
slipped
therefrom
which,
when
opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.23 The
team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and
the
confiscated
specimen
was
marked in the presence of appellant.
The
field
test
and
laboratory
examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive
results
for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to
apprehend appellant, even without a
warrant, was the tip given by the
informant that appellant would arrive
in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another
question: whether that information,
by itself, is sufficient probable cause
to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this
jurisdiction
is
that
"reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.24 We find no
cogent reason to depart from this
well-established doctrine.

The instant case is similar to People v.

Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People
v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was
tipped off by his informant that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving
from Baguio City the following day
with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, the police
assembled a team and deployed
themselves
near
the
Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner
Bus stopped in front of the PNB
building where two females and a
man got off. The informant then
pointed to the team members the
woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then
carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter,
the team approached her and
introduced themselves. When asked
about the contents of her bag, she
handed it to the apprehending
officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana
leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show
that in July and August, 1999, the Toril
Police Station, Davao City, received a
report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud
(Tudtud) were complaining that the
latter was responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in the area.
Reacting
to
the
report,
the
Intelligence
Section
conducted
surveillance. For five days, they
gathered information and learned
that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian

111

asset informed the police that Tudtud

had headed to Cotabato and would
be back later that day with a new
stock of marijuana. At around 4:00
p.m. that same day, a team of police
officers posted themselves to await
Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two
men disembarked from a bus and
helped each other carry a carton. The
police
officers
approached
the
suspects and asked if they could see
the contents of the box which yielded
marijuana leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police
officers received information that a
certain male person, more or less
54" in height, 25 to 30 years old,
with a tattoo mark on the upper right
hand, and usually wearing a sando
and maong pants, would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. While
conducting stationary surveillance
and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking, they saw the accused who
fit the description, carrying a plastic
bag. The police accosted the accused
and informed him that they were
police officers. Upon inspection of the
plastic bag carried by the accused,
the bag contained marijuana dried
leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue
cloth. In his bid to escape charges,
the accused disclosed where two
other male persons would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon
seeing the two male persons, later
identified as Reynaldo Din and
Fernando
Inocencio,
the
police
approached
them,
introduced
themselves as police officers, then
inspected the bag they were carrying.

Upon inspection, the contents of the

bag turned out to be marijuana
leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to
validate the warrantless search
precisely because there was no
adequate
probable
cause.
We
required the showing of some overt
act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant
herein was not committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have
personal
knowledge
of
facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested
had
committed,
was
committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest,
appellant had just alighted from the
Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in
any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the
police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it
not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have
been apprehended and no search
would
have
been
made,
and
consequently, the sachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of
jurisprudence that deems "reliable
information" sufficient to justify a
search
incident
to
a
lawful
warrantless arrest. As cited in People
v. Tudtud, these include People v.

112

Maspil,
Jr.,31 People
v.
32
Bagista, People v. Balingan,33 People
v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People
v.
Valdez,36 and
People
v.
37
Gonzales. In these cases, the Court
sustained
the
validity
of
the
warrantless searches notwithstanding
the absence of overt acts or
suspicious circumstances that would
indicate that the accused had
committed, was actually committing,
or attempting to commit a crime. But
as aptly observed by the Court,
except in Valdez and Gonzales, they
were covered by the other exceptions
to the rule against warrantless
searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers
impelled by any urgency that would
allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant. As testified to by
Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a
member of the arresting team, their
office
received
the
"tipped
information" on May 19, 2003. They
likewise learned from the informant
not only the appellants physical
description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that
appellant would arrive on the same
day (May 19), there was an assurance
that he would be there the following
day (May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a
warrant.39
Obviously, this is an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant
with Article III, Section 3(2) of the

1987 Constitution, "any evidence

obtained in violation of this or the
preceding
section
shall
be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Without
the
confiscated
shabu,
appellants conviction cannot be
sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of
appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a
plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused.
A waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in
People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the
administration of justice would have
no right to expect ordinary people to
be law-abiding if we do not insist on
the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and
judges may still tend to gloss over an
illegal search and seizure as long as
the law enforcers show the alleged
evidence of the crime regardless of
the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude
condones law-breaking in the name
of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of

113

our system of justice, and the

eventual denigration of society. While
this
Court
appreciates
and
encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of
society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the
end never justifies the means.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court of Appeals Decision dated
May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is
ACQUITTED
for
insufficiency
of
evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to cause the
immediate release of appellant,
unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause; and to inform the
Court of the date of his release, or the
reasons for his confinement, within
ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. JACK RACHO G.R. NO.
186529 AUGUST 3, 2010
FACTS:
A confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase of
shabu.
The
police
authorities

immediately formed a team to

apprehend the appellant. The agent
gave the police appellants name,
together with his physical description.
He also assured them that appellant
would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
Appellant called up the agent and
informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in
Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day
wearing a red and white striped Tshirt. The team members then posted
themselves. A Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. Having alighted from the bus,
appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring
him to his final destination. As
appellant was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station
on suspicion of carrying shabu.
Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his
hands from his pants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant to
the police station for investigation.
The confiscated specimen was turned
over to a Police Inspector who marked
it with his initials and with appellants
name. The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the

114

confiscated sachet yielded positive

results
for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Appellant was charged
in two separate Informations, one for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law
for possessing, dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant
pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability
and claimed that he went to Baler,
Aurora to visit his brother to inform
him about their ailing father. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he
explained that the police officers,
through their van, blocked the tricycle
he was riding in; forced him to alight;
brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge;
stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station
for investigation.
The RTC rendered a Joint Judgment
convicting appellant and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence,
the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not jurisdiction over the
person o the accused has been
acquired.
HELD: The records show that
appellant never objected to the

irregularity of his arrest before his

arraignment. In fact, this is the first
time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with
his active participation in the trial of
the case, we must abide with
jurisprudence which dictates that
appellant,
having
voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, is deemed to have waived
his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect
may have attended his arrest. The
legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal. Appellant Jack
Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
G.R. No. 193833
November 16, 2011
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, P/S
INSP. LORIEMAN* L. MANRIQUE,
and
RODIE
J.
PINEDA
@
"Buboy,"Accused.
PO1
FROILAN
L.
TRESTIZA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

115

G.R. No. 193833 is an appeal 1 from

the Decision2 promulgated on 30 June
2009
as
well
as
the
Resolution3promulgated on 11 June
2010 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC.
No. 03119. The appellate court
affirmed the 24 July 2007 Joint
Decision4 of Branch 143 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. 023393 for Kidnapping (for Ransom),
03-766 for Robbery, and 04-1311 also
for Robbery.
The trial court found appellant PO1
Froilan L. Trestiza (Trestiza) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal
by direct participation of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 7659 (RA 7659), and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages to Irma
Navarro (Navarro) and Lawrence Yu
(Yu). P/Insp. Lorieman L. Manrique
(Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y
Jimenez (Pineda) were likewise found
guilty of the same crime by the trial
court, and adjudged the same
sentence as Trestiza. The trial court
acquitted Trestiza, Manrique and
Pineda in Criminal Case Nos. 03-766
and 04-1311.
The Facts
The following charges were brought
against Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda
on 20 November 2002:

Criminal Case
Kidnapping

No.

02-3393

for

That on or about the 7th day of

November 2002, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S
Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, both
active members of the Philippine
National Police, and Rodie Pineda y
Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of
them armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping
one another with one PO2 [Reynel]
Jose, a member of the Philippine
National Police, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria
Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive
them of their liberty by then and
there kidnap without legal grounds
for the purpose of extorting money
for their safety and immediate
release as in fact said accused
demanded
the
amount
of P1,000,000.00 as ransom money
from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal
Possession
of
Firearm
and
Ammunitions
That on or about the 16th day of
November 2002, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully

116

and
feloniously
have
in
his
possession, custody and control one
(1) Pistol Glock 21 bearing SN 035481
with thirteen (13) rounds of live
ammunitions
and
without
the
corresponding license or permit
thereof, which he carried outside of
his residence.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 15 April 2004, Trestiza was
acquitted of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 02-3394.7 The
Affidavit of Arrest stated that the
serial number of the firearm seized
was 035481, while the firearm itself
had a serial number of BRG-768. The
trial court rejected the explanation
that the difference between the serial
numbers was a mere typographical
error.
An order8 of the trial court dated 16
April 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 023393, 02-3394, 03-766 and 04-1311
recounted the circumstances involved
in the filing of the charges against
Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda.
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for
Kidnapping against accused PO1
Froilan Trestiza y Lacson (PO1
Trestiza),
PS/Insp.
Loriemar
L.
Manrique (PS/Insp. Manrique) and
Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) and
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal
Possession
of
Firearms
and
Ammunitions against accused PO1
Trestiza alone were filed before this
Court on 20 November 2002.
Surprisingly, however, SPO2 [Reynel]

Jose was not included as an accused

in the Kidnapping case although in
the original Information, Prosecutor
Andres N. Marcos mentions him as
someone who mutually helped all the
other accused in the willful, unlawful,
felonious
kidnapping
of
private
complainants Lawrence Yu y Lim (Yu)
and Ma. Irma Navarro (Navarro). A
Motion for Reinvestigation dated 21
November 2002 was then filed by
"all" three accused while a separate
Motion for Reinvestigation and/or
Preliminary Investigation dated 22
November was filed by accused
PS/Insp. Manrique.
Then Acting Presiding Judge Salvador
S. Abad Santos issued the Order
dated 26 November 2002 granting
the Motions filed by all accused. In
the said Order, he directed the Public
Prosecutor to conduct a Preliminary
Investigation of the cases filed and to
furnish the Court with his Report
within sixty (60) days from said date.
On
21
February
2003,
Public
Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information of
Kidnapping with Ransom and to Admit
Information for Robbery with attached
Resolution dated 03 January 2008. He
pointed out therein that after he
conducted
a
preliminary
investigation, he found no probable
cause
exists
to
warrant
the
indictment of the accused for the
crime of Kidnapping with Ransom. He
added that they should be charged
instead for the crimes of Robbery and
Grave Threats. The Court set the

117

hearing of this Motion to 06 March

2003.
On
03
March
2003,
private
complainants
appearing
through
Private Prosecutor Teresita G. Oledan
filed an "Urgent Motion to Hold
Withdrawal
of
Information
for
Kidnapping Charge with Entry of
Appearance as Private Prosecutor."
They alleged in said Motion that they
were not furnished clear and certified
true copies of the Resolution dated 03
January 2003 to enable them to file
their Opposition/Comment to the
Motion to Withdraw.
On 05 March 2003, the Branch Clerk
of Court of RTC Makati Branch 135
sent a letter dated 26 February 2003
addressed to the Branch Clerk of this
Court ostensibly transmitting the
Release Order of PO1 Trestiza dated
22 February 2003 together with other
pertinent documents in connection
with Criminal Case No. 02-3394,
which was duly approved by the Hon.
Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge of
said Court.1wphi1
The Order of Release dated 22
February 2003 signed by Judge Ibay
directed the Jail Warden of Makati
Police
Station,
Makati
City
to
discharge from his custody the
person of said accused as the latter
was able to file the corresponding bail
bond in the amount of two hundred
thousand pesos (PHP200,000.00) thru
the Plaridel Surety and Insurance
Company provided "there exists
no order in any other case to the

effect that he shall remain

confined under your custody." He
set the arraignment of the accused
on 14 March 2003 at 8:30 oclock in
the morning.
Before the scheduled hearing of the
Motion to Withdraw at 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon of 06 March 2003, the
Private
Prosecutor
filed
her
Opposition thereto at 1:30 oclock in
the afternoon of said date. She
alleged therein that while the Motion
to Withdraw filed by Public Prosecutor
Marcos prays for the withdrawal of
the Information for Kidnapping with
Ransom and the substitution thereof
with an Information for Robbery, the
latter
Information
was
filed
immediately with the Criminal Cases
Unit of the Office of the Clerk of Court
on the same date that the Motion to
Withdraw was filed with this Court on
21 February 2003. Subsequently, said
"Information for Robbery" was raffled
to RTC Branch 57 on 03 March 2003
yet there was a scheduled hearing of
the Motion to Withdraw on 06 March
2003.
She
added
that
the
complainants were in a quandary why
the alleged "substituted" Information
for Robbery was raffled to another
Court and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-766, when this Court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the
original cases filed. The same case
was thereafter consolidated with this
Court on 26 March 2003 as per Order
dated 24 March 2003 rendered by the
Honorable
Reinato
G.
Quilala,
Presiding Judge thereat. Accused
PS/Insp. Manrique, PO1 Trestiza, and

118

Pineda posted bail in this case, which

was duly approved by Judge Ibay,
while accused SPO2 Joses bail was
approved by Judge Napoleon E.
Inoturan, Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 133.

a
copy
of
their
"Motion
for
Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated January 03, 2003 but Released
on February 20, 2003" which they
filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City.

At the hearing to the Motion to

Withdraw, then Acting Presiding Judge
Abad Santos gave counsel for the
accused time within which to file his
comment/objection to the Urgent
Motion to Hold Withdrawal of
Information for Kidnapping filed by
the private complainants, furnishing
the Private Prosecutor a copy thereof,
who was given the same number of
days to file her Reply, if necessary.
The Court likewise ordered the "recommitment" of all three (3) accused,
who were then present at that
hearing, to the custody of the Makati
City Jail despite the fact that they
have already posted bail, considering
that the Motion to Withdraw was still
pending resolution.

xxx

Counsel for the accused filed his

Comment to the Opposition dated 10
March 2003 alleging that the same
did not bear the conformity of the
Public Prosecutor who has direct
control and supervision over the
Private Prosecutor as provided for
under
the
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure. Said Comment, to his
mind, is thus a mere scrap of paper
which
did
not
deserve
any
consideration by the Court.
On 13 March 2003, the Court was
furnished by the private complainants

On 29 May 2003, accused PO1

Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique filed
an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion
for Withdrawal of Original Information
claiming
that
said
Original
Informations have subsequently been
amended by the Public Prosecutors
Office
and
just
"needs
the
court/judge[s] approval of the Motion
to Withdraw Complaint and for
Admission
of
the
Amended
Information." Moreover, they averred
that the City Prosecutors Office has
approved
the
findings
of
the
reinvestigating
Assistant
City
Prosecutor on the downgrading of the
original complaint. Both accused
prayed that said motion be heard on
28 May 2003.
On 9 June 2003, the Private
Prosecutor
filed
an
Ex-Parte
Opposition to Accuseds Motion for
Withdrawal of Original Information
with Motion for Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against accused
SPO2 Jose. She alleged therein that
"it is true that one of the accuseds
right is the right to speedy trial.
However, where, as in this case, the
stench of "something fishy" already
was evident when suddenly the
robbery case as amended by

119

Prosecutor Marcos and more recently

"affirmed" by Prosecutor Sibucao,
there should be further in-depth
investigation as the circumstances on
how the three accused were able to
post bail without the knowledge and
approval of this Honorable Court,
which
had
already
acquired
jurisdiction over the case. In fact, a
Petition
for
Review
from
the
Resolution of Prosecutor Sibucao
denying the Private Complainants
Motion for Reconsideration of the 03
January 2003 Resolution of Prosecutor
Marcos duly approved by the City
Prosecutor has been seasonably
filed." She further alleged that, the
Urgent Motion allegedly filed by
accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp.
Manrique does not include accused
SPO2 Jose, also a member of the
Police Force. However, the records
show that the latter also "post bail"
for the Robbery case and was in fact
"outside" the Chamber of this
Honorable Court when the hearing
was being conducted. "However,
when she went out to look for him,
SPO2 Jose was able to do a Houdini
and disappeared from view." Private
Prosecutor Oledan prayed for the
deferment of the proceedings herein
until the final resolution of the
Petition for Review.
Referring back to the Urgent Motion
to Resolve by accused PO1 Trestiza
and PS/Insp. Manrique, considering
that the latter prayed for it to be
heard on 28 May 2003, but filed said
Motion the following day only, the
same was then set for hearing on 10

June 2003. On the same date, the

Private Prosecutor furnished the Court
a copy of their Petition for Review
which they filed with the Department
of Justice. In the meantime, the
Branch Clerk of this Court issued a
Certification to the effect that Acting
Presiding Judge Abad Santos was on
official leave until 15 July 2003 and
that there is an Urgent Motion to be
resolved. Pairing Judge Manuel D.
Victorio, acting on the Urgent Motion,
issued the Order of even date
directing the City Prosecution Office
to submit to the Court the complete
records
of
its
Preliminary
Investigation within five (5) days from
notice, thereafter the same shall be
considered for resolution.
On 23 June 2003, accused PO1
Trestiza filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Early Resolution of the Pending
Motion to Resolve, reiterating the
grounds stated in his previous Motion.
Before the issue could be resolved by
the Pairing Judge, however, the
Honorable Estela Perlas Bernabe, took
over this Court as Assisting Presiding
Judge, after the Honorable Salvador
S. Abad Santos requested the
Supreme Court to be relieved of his
assignment herein. Judge Bernabe
issued the Order dated 27 June 2003
holding in abeyance the Resolution of
the Prosecutions Motion to Withdraw
Information for a period of sixty (60)
days from the filing of the Petition for
Review by private complainants with
the Reviewing Office. On 08 July
2003, she denied the Motion to

120

Dismiss Criminal Case No. 02-3394

for Illegal Possession of Firearms filed
against accused PO1 Trestiza on the
grounds that the allegations raised by
said accused are defenses proper for
determination in a full-blown trial and
set the pre-trial of the same to 24 July
2003. Trial on the merits for this
particular Criminal Case ensued until
the Prosecution rested its case and
said accused filed his Demurrer to
Evidence on 05 March 2004.
In the meantime, without any word
yet as to the outcome of the Petition
for Review filed with the DOJ relative
to Criminal Case No. 02-3393, Judge
Bernabe issued the Order dated 28
August 2003, directing the City
Prosecution Office to conduct a reassessment and re-evaluation of the
evidence presented and to submit its
report and recommendation within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of said Order. The Resolution of the
subject Motion was again held in
abeyance.
On 02 March 2004, the Prosecution
filed a "Motion to Resolve (Motion to
Withdraw Information of Kidnapping)
with attached Order dated 19
February 2004. It alleged therein that
it
conducted
a
thorough
reassessment and re-evaluation of the
evidence obtaining in this case in
compliance with the Order of this
Court dated 28 August 2003 and
maintains that the correct and
appropriate charges to be filed
against accused should be for
ROBBERY and GRAVE THREATS but for

two (2) counts each, and NOT for

KIDNAPPING as initially filed. Thus, it
prayed for this Court to be allowed to
withdraw the present Information for
Kidnapping "considering that the
appropriate charges of two (2) counts
of Robbery and two (2) counts of
Grave Threats in lieu of the charge of
KIDNAPPING have already been filed
with the proper Courts."
To justify the Prosecutions withdrawal
of the Information for KIDNAPPING,
Public Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang
states, in the Order attached to the
said Motion, that, to wit:
"A careful re-evaluation of the pieces
of evidence adduced by both parties
shows that the offense of Kidnapping
shall not prosper against all the
accused. As correctly stated in the
Resolution issued on February 20,
2003, one of the essential elements
for the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom defined and penalized under
[Article] 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is that [the]
offender must be a private individual
which does not obtain in the case at
bar
as
respondents
Trestiza,
Manrique, and Jose are public officers
being police officers who at the time
the complainants were allegedly
divested of their cash money and
personal
belongings
by
herein
respondents, were conducting a
police operation to enforce the
provision of the Dangerous Drug Law
(R.A. 9165).

121

All accused were in the place of the

incident to conduct such operation is
shown not only by the existence of
coordination between them and the
police authorities but also by the
declaration of the complainants that
they were able to verify the plate
number of the vehicle of the accused
from the Makati Police Station.
Hence, they should be charged with
the offense of Robbery under Article
294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code
and
Grave
Threats
as
recommended by this Office in its
Resolution issued on February 20,
2003. Considering that there are two
(2) complainants, the respondents
should be charged with two (2)
counts of Robbery and Grave
Threats."
The Prosecution filed on the same
date a Motion to Amend Information
and to Admit Attached Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 02766 alleging that the Criminal
Information therein for Robbery
should only be limited to private
complainant Yus complaint and not
to Navarros. Counsel for the accused,
Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria, filed an
Urgent Motion to calendar the hearing
of the Motion to Amend Information
and to Admit Amended Information
which the Court granted in its Order
dated 25 March 2004.
In the meantime, Criminal Case No.
04-1311 for Robbery which was filed
on the strength of the Complaint of
Navarro was consolidated with similar

cases pending before this Court, upon

the Order dated 12 March 2004 by
the Honorable Ma. Cristina J. Cornejo,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 147.
After study, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY the Motion to
Withdraw Information for
Kidnapping
under
Criminal Case No. 023393;
2. To [sic] GRANT the
Motion
to
Amend
Information for Robbery;
[and]
3. To [sic] Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest
against SPO2 Jose in
Criminal Case No. 023393 until after the
Information
relative
thereto shall have been
duly amended by the
Prosecution.
In its Motion to Withdraw Information
for Kidnapping, the Public Prosecutor
argues in essence that the crime of
Kidnapping could not be possibly
committed by the accused as they,
except for one, are police officers,
who at the time the complainants
were divested of cash and other
personal belongings were conducting
a police operation to enforce the
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs
Law. This to the mind of the movant
runs counter to the provisions of Art.

122

267 of the Revised Penal Code which

provides that any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of
his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or
detention
shall
have
lasted more than three
days;
2.
If
it
shall
have
committed
simulating
public authority;
3. If any serious physical
injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or
if threats to kill him shall
have been made;
4.
If
the
person
kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any
of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The Court finds this unmeritorious.
Even a public officer can commit the
said crime within the context of the
aforesaid legal provision. This is
settled in our jurisprudence in the
case of People vs. ALIPIO SANTIANO,
JOSE SANDIGAN, et al. (GR No.
123979[,] December 3, 1998) which
provides in part:
"The fact alone that appellant Pillneta
is an organic member of the NARCOM

and appellant Sandigan a member of

the PNP would not exempt them from
the criminal liability of kidnapping. It
is quite clear that in abducting and
taking away the victim, appellants did
so neither in furtherance of official
functions nor in the pursuit of
authority vested in them. It is not, in
fine, in relation to their office, but in
purely private capacity that they
have acted in concert with their coappellant Santiano and Chanco."
Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz
B. Regalado elucidates on this point
clearly:
"This article provides that the crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention are committed by private
individuals obviously because if the
offender is a public officer the crime
is arbitrary detention under Art. 124,
but passing sub silentio on the matter
of
kidnapping.
It
should
be
understood however, that the public
officer who unlawfully detains another
and is punishable by Art. 124 is one
who has the duty to apprehend a
person with a correlative power to
detain him. If he is only an employee
with clerical or postal functions,
although the Code considers him as a
public officer, his detention of the
victim is illegal detention under this
article since he is acting in a private,
and not an official, capacity. If a
policeman kidnaps the victim, except
when legally authorized as part of
police operations, he cannot also be
said to be acting in an official
capacity, hence he is to be treated as

123

a private individual liable under this

article. (underscoring ours)
From the purpose and the formulation
of R.A. 18 and R.A. 1084, it can be
deduced
that
the
legislative
intendment was to put all forms of
kidnapping under Art. 267 when
Congress amended it together with
Art. 270. There appears to have been
some oversight, however, in the
related articles and these will be
discussed at the proper juncture."
(Florenz B. Regalado, Pages 488 and
489, Criminal Law Conspectus, First
Edition, March 2000)
As to whether or not the accused
were
indeed
engaged
in
the
performance of a legitimate police
operation at the time the private
complainants were allegedly deprived
of
their
liberty
and
personal
belongings is a matter which at this
stage can only be considered as
a defense that calls for further factual
support in the course of judicial
proceedings. Was there a Mission
Order? Are there documents to show
that police-to-police coordinations
were indeed made? Are there
corroborations
to
these
claims
whether documentary or testimonial?
The need for further evidence
supportive of this claim gains
significance in the light of the
emphatic assertions to the contrary
by the private complainants and their
witnesses.
As there appears to be probable
cause for the inclusion of accused

SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case No. 023393 for Kidnapping considering that
the latter was specifically mentioned
in the body of the Information as
someone
who
conspired,
confederated and mutually helped
the other accused in this case, the
Court resolves to await for the
Prosecution to amend the same
before issuing a Warrant of Arrest
against said accused.
Lastly, the Court finds the sought
amendment of the Information for
Robbery to be well-taken.
WHEREFORE, premises
the Court resolves to:

considered,

1. DENY the Motion to

Withdraw Information for
Kidnapping
[under
Criminal Case No. 023393];
2. GRANT the Motion to
Amend Information for
Robbery;
3. Hold in abeyance the
Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest against accused
SPO2 Jose in Criminal
Case No. 02-3393 until
after
the
Information
relative thereto shall have
been duly amended by
the Prosecution.
Set these cases for arraignment on
27 April 2004 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning.1wphi1 The
Amended

124

Information for Robbery duly attached

in the Motion is hereby ADMITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria (Atty. Austria)
withdrew as counsel for Manrique and
Pineda. Atty. Austria also manifested
that he would file an Omnibus Motion
relative to the 16 April 2004 Order of
the trial court. The arraignment was
reset to 25 May 2004,9 which was
further reset to 28 June 2004, 10 19
July 2004,11 23 August 2004,12 and
finally on 31 August 2004.13
Atty. Austria filed his Omnibus Motion
for
Trestiza:
motion
for
reconsideration of the 16 April 2004
Order,
motion
to
quash
the
informations, and motion to allow
Trestiza to post bail.14 Complainants
opposed the Omnibus Motion.15 The
corresponding
reply16 and
rejoinder17 were also filed. In its 19
August 2004 Order,18 the trial court
denied the Omnibus Motion. It ruled
that the trial court has the authority
to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information relative to a criminal case
filed before it. Moreover, the quashal
of the informations against the
accused goes into the determination
of the nature of the arrest, which, in
turn, goes into the merits of the case.
Finally, the charge of kidnapping is a
non-bailable offense.
When the case was called for
arraignment, Trestiza, Manrique and
Pineda all pleaded not guilty to the
following charges:

Criminal Case No. 02-3393:

That on or about the 7th day of
November 2002, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S
Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, both
active members of the Philippine
National Police, and Rodie Pineda y
Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of
them armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping
one another with one PO2 Reynel
Jose, a member of the Philippine
National Police, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria
Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive
them of their liberty by then and
there kidnap without legal grounds
for the purpose of extorting money
for their safety and immediate
release as in fact said accused
demanded
the
amount
of P1,000,000.00 as ransom money
from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 03-766:
That on or about the 7th day of
November 2002, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, PO1 Froilan Trestiza y
Lacson and P/S Insp. Loriemar L.
Manrique, PO2 Reynel Jose, all active
members of the Philippine National

125

Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a

private individual[,] all of them armed
with
firearms,
conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping
one another with intent to gain by
means of force and violence or
intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
rob and divest Lawrence Yu y Lim and
Maria Irma Navarro of the following
items to wit:
a. One (1) piece of
necklace
(gold)
with
pendant
amounting
to P50,000.00;

i. One (1) womens ring

gold worth P12,000.00;
j. One (1) necklace gold
[sic] worth P20,000.00;
k.
One
(1)
[sic]
cellphone[s] described as
Nokia 7650 & 8855; and,
l. Cash money amounting
to
more
or
less P300,000.00
to
the
damage
and
prejudice of the said
complainants.

b. Two (2) pieces bracelet

(gold) worth more or
less P70,000.00;

CONTRARY TO LAW."

c. One (1) Rolex watch

worth P270,000.00;

That on or about the 7th day of

November 2002, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines a place
within
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent of
gain and by means of force and
violence or intimidation, did then and
there
willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously rob and divest Irma Maria
A. Navarro of the following items to
wit:

d. One (1) mens ring

worth P15,000.00;
e. Two (2) cellphone[s]
described as Nokia 9210
& 3310;
f. One (1) Philip Chariole
[sic]
watch
worth P150,000.00;
g. One (1) Philip Chariole
[sic]
bracelet
worth P75,000.00;
h. One (1) solo diamond
studded
[sic]
(3K)
worth P500,000.00;

Criminal Case No. 04-1311:

a. One (1) Chariol (sic)

watch
b. One (1) Gold ring

126

c. One (1) Chariol (sic)

bracelet
d. One (1) pair diamond
earring (sic)
e. One (1) gold necklace
f. One (1) cellphone 7650
Nokia
g. One (1) cellphone 8855
Nokia
h.
Cash
money
amounting
to P120,000.00
to
the
damage
and
prejudice
of
the
complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
The trial court set the case for pretrial conference on 14 September
2004,20 which was reset to 20
September
2004.21 The
parties
stipulated on the following:
1. That on November 7, 2002,
the three (3) accused, Trestiza,
Manrique and Pineda were
using an Adventure van with
plate no. XAU-298;
2. That Loriemar Manrique was
the team leader of the group
comprising [sic] of Rodie Pineda
and Reynel Jose on November
7, 2002;

3. That the incident started at

the Hotel Intercon located in
Makati City;
4. That Loriemar Manrique is a
member of the PNP Drug
Enforcement Agency;
5. That accused Froilan Trestiza
was the driver of the Adventure
van bearing plate no. XAU-298
on November 17, 2002;
6. That after the operation was
conducted, there was never any
occasion that the accused
Froilan Trestiza communicated
with any of the complainants;
7. None of the items allegedly
lost by the complainants were
recovered from accused Froilan
Trestiza.22
The trial court summarized the
testimonies during trial as follows:
The prosecution sought to establish
its case by presenting the following
witnesses: Ma. Irma A. Navarro,
Lawrence Yu y Lim, PO2 Rodolfo
Santiago, PO3 Rosauro P. Almonte,
John Paul Joseph P. Suguitan, Angelo
Gonzales, PO3 Edward C. Ramos,
Schneider R. Vivas, PSInsp. Salvador
V. Caro, and Chief Insp. Roseller
Fabian.
The Prosecutions main evidence
relies heavily upon the accounts of
Irma and Lawrence who testified
respectively as follows:

127

On November 7, 2002 at about one

oclock in the morning, Irma and her
boyfriend Lawrence, both twenty-two
(22) years old at the time of the
incident, were at the "Where Else
Disco" in Makati attending a party.
They stayed thereat for around thirty
(30) minutes only. Irma however,
went out ahead of Lawrence. When
she was about to proceed to where
Lawrences Honda ESI car was
parked, she noticed that the said car
was blocked by another vehicle which
was a Mitsubishi Adventure van.
Three (3) armed men later on
emerged from the said van. As she
was about to open the door of the
Honda ESI, somebody hit her in [sic]
the nape. When she turned her back,
she saw the three (3) men in the
company of Rodie Pineda alias
"Buboy" ("Pineda"). She knew Pineda
because the latter was her sister
Cynthias "kumpare," Pineda being
the godfather of Cynthias child.
Furthermore, she saw Pineda in their
residence the night of November 6,
2002 as he visited his [sic] sister. She
asked Pineda what was happening
but the latter replied "pasensya na,
mare, trabaho lang" ("Bear with me,
mare, this is just a job").
She was told that the three (3) whose
identities she later on learned as
Capt. Lorieman Manrique, PO2 Reynel
Jose and PO1 Froilan Trestiza, were
policemen. She asked why she was
being
accosted
but
she
was
handcuffed by Manrique. She was
ushered inside the Honda ESI. Pineda
asked her where Lawrence was but

she was left inside the car with Jose

while Pineda, Trestiza and Manrique
on the other hand went away
apparently to look for Lawrence.
Pineda and Manrique later on went
back inside the Honda ESI. They
drove later with Jose behind the
wheels [sic] while Pineda occupied
the passenger seat. They followed the
Mitsubishi Adventure van which was
then driven by Trestiza. Unknown to
Irma, Lawrence was already inside
the van at the time. They just drove
and drove around ("umiikot"), passing
through small alleys as they avoided
major routes. She was asked later by
Pineda to remove her jewelry. She
was able to remove only her earrings
as she was in handcuffs. Pineda
himself removed her Philip Chariolle
[sic] watch and bracelet. Her
necklace and ring followed. All these
were later on turned over by Pineda
to Manrique. Her bag where her
wallet
containing
the
amount
of P120,000.00 was likewise taken.
Her two (2) cellphones, a 7650 and
an 8855, were likewise taken by
Pineda. They stopped several times at
the side streets and the accused
would talk to each other. Pineda
would stay with her inside the vehicle
while Jose would go out and talk to
the occupants of the Mitsubishi
Adventure. Later on, she and
Lawrence were brought together
inside the Mitsubishi Adventure van.
It was there that they were told that
they will not be released if they will
not be able to produce one million
pesos. These were all uttered by Jose

128

and Manrique. It was somewhere in

Blumentritt, San Juan where all the
accused stopped for the last time.
She was crying all the while.
She later on felt the call of nature,
prompting her to ask permission if
she could possibly relieve herself. She
was accompanied by Pineda to a
nearby Shell gas station in San Juan.
When they returned to where they
stopped, she was asked as to whom
she could possibly call so that the
money that the accused were asking
will be produced. The accused later
on asked Lawrence to make a call
using his cellphone with speaker
phone. Lawrence was able to get in
touch with his friends John Paul
Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales. The
latter was told that Lawrence figured
in an accident and that he needs
money badly. Lawrence and his
friends agreed that the money the
two will produce will be brought to
the Caltex gas station along Ortigas
corner Wilson Street in Greenhills.
They proceeded to the said place
later where they waited for the
friends of Lawrence. She was told
later by Manrique that she better
pray that the transaction pushes
through. Manrique further warned her
against reporting the incident to
anyone lest her whole family will be
held liable. She was even shown by
the accused the picture of her child.
She was cursed by Jose. Trestiza on
the other hand told her that
Lawrences transaction should better
push through.

The two, John Paul Suguitan and

Angelo Gonzales, later on arrived at
the gas station. Lawrence took from
them what appears to be a package
and handed the same to Pineda.
Manrique thereafter called Pineda
asking "positive na ba?" to which
Pineda replied "yes." The amount
raised by the friends of Lawrence was
one hundred eighty thousand pesos
(Php 180,000.00). They (Irma and
Lawrence) were later brought to the
Star Mall along Edsa. Their captors
warned them not to report the matter
to the authorities otherwise they will
face dire consequences. The items
taken from Irma like the cash money,
jewelry and cellphone were placed by
the men inside the console box of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. When they
reached Star Mall, the men talked to
them for thirty minutes. Again, they
were warned about the consequences
of their reporting the incident to the
police. Irma was told that the men
knew her address, the members of
her family and that they have the
picture of her child. She was likewise
warned not to report the matter to
her father, Rod Navarro, who was an
actor and a policeman, otherwise her
daughter with Lawrence will be the
one [to] bear the consequences
("anak ko ang mananagot"). They
were released after thirty (30)
minutes. Lawrence had to plead for
their gasoline from the accused and
he was given Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother
about the incident as she was very
afraid. Lawrence however made a

129

report to the Makati police station in

the evening of 7 November 2002
where he was shown a "coordination
sheet" pertaining to the plate number
of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy
Pineda in the meanwhile kept on
calling them (Irma and Lawrence)
demanding for their "balance" of one
million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
Irmas mother however soon learned
of the incident because of a
newspaper item. Her father likewise
learned of the incident and lost no
time in contacting authorities from
the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence)
were later investigated by the CIDG
people to whom they gave their
sworn statements on November 14,
2002. As Buboy Pineda continued to
call them for the alleged balance, an
entrapment operation was planned
on that date. Boodles of money were
dusted with ultra-violet powder. On
the same date, Buboy Pineda called
Lawrence for purposes of meeting
him that night in order to get the
remaining money. The entrapment
operation which was conducted along
the New World Hotel, and participated
in by PO2 Almonte, was successful as
Buboy
Pineda
was
arrested.
Recovered from the possession of
Pineda were a gold necklace without
a pendant; a Nokia cellphone model
7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate
number PNG 214 color red and one
(1) ignition key. The necessary
acknowledgment receipt was duly
signed by the said accused. A
pawnshop
ticket
was
likewise
recovered from his possession.

Lawrence on the other hand narrated

that during that fateful day of 7
November 2002 at around 1:30
oclock in the morning, as he was
stepping out from the Where Else
Disco,
he
was
suddenly
"sandwhiched" [sic] by two (2)
persons, Manrique and Trestiza.
Pineda whom he likewise knew, held
a gun and pointed the same to him.
He was later on "lifted" through his
belt and loaded to a yellow Mitsubishi
Adventure. He was made to occupy
the passenger seat at the back while
Trestiza drove the said vehicle.
Manrique occupied the seat beside
Trestiza. He asked the accused who
they were and he was told that they
were policemen. At the time, Trestiza
was wearing an outfit which was "hip
hop" while Manrique was wearing a
polo which was "button down." He
was cursed and told to shut up. He
was asked to bow down his head as
they drove along. He remembers that
the accused dug into his pockets and
his valuables consisting of cellphones,
a 9210 and a 3310 models [sic]
respectively, including his wallet,
cigarettes, watch bracelet, ring,
necklace and a pair of earrings, were
taken from him. He later on saw his
Honda ESI car. He noticed that the
Mitsubishi Adventure they riding was
following the said Honda ESI.
Manrique later asked him how much
money did he have. When replied
that his money was inside his car,
Manrique
allegedly
retorted
"imposible." They later on stopped in
Mandaluyong near an open canal. He
was asked again by Manrique about

130

his money. At that point, another man

whose name he later on learned was
SPO2 Reynel Jose, boarded also the
Mitsubishi Adventure. Jose asked him
about his money. When he replied
that his money was inside his car,
Jose got mad and boxed him on his
face. They later on resumed driving
around. When they stopped again,
Jose asked him whether he has
thought of the money. When he again
replied that the money was inside his
car, he was boxed repeatedly by Jose.
Manrique and Trestiza were seated in
the front seats but did not do
anything.
They resumed driving again. Jose
asked him again about the money.
When he gave the same response,
Jose put a plastic material over his
head which made him unable to
breath [sic]. Jose strangled him,
prompting him to shout later "okay
na, okay na. Sige na, sige na
magbibigay na ako" ("Okay, okay. I
will give."). Jose stopped strangling
him and immediately removed the
plastic material over his head. Jose
remarked that had he cooperated
earlier, he would not have been hurt.
Trestiza and Manrique told him that
he should not have kept the matter
long. Later on, the four (4) men had a
brief huddle. He was later on
approached by them saying "okay na
ha, isang milyon na" ("Okey ha, its
one million). He could not recall
however who in particular made the
remark. He was later on instructed by
Manrique to call certain persons with
the information that he figured in [an]

accident. He was made to use his

9210 model phone as the same had a
"speaker" thus enabling the accused
to listen to the conversation. He tried
to get in touch with his siblings but
failed. He was able to contact later on
his friends John Paul Suguitan and
Angelo Gonzales who were then in
Libis. He told his friends that he
needed money very badly as he had
an accident. He instructed his friends
to proceed to the area given by
Manrique which was at the Caltex gas
station along Ortigas corner Wilson
Street in Greenhills.
Later on, Irma and Lawrence were
allowed to be together inside the
Mitsubishi Adventure. It was at that
point where they were told to produce
the amount of One Million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00) that night so they will
be released. These very words were
uttered by Jose and Manrique. Irma
later on asked permission to answer
the call of nature and she was
accompanied by Pineda to the Shell
gas station in San Juan where she
relieved herself. Upon arriving at the
said gas station, Lawrence was
directed to drive his Honda ESI car.
He was in the company of Pineda
while Irma on the other hand was
with Manrique, Trestiza and Jose
inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. While
Irma was inside the Mitsubishi
Adventure, she was told that if the
person contacted by Lawrence will
not show up, they will not be released
and if Lawrence will escape, she will
be finished off. Manrique thereafter
told Irma to better pray that the

131

transaction will push through. She

was warned that if she reports the
incident, her family will be harmed.
The said accused had her childs
picture at the time. Jose was cursing
her. Trestiza on the other hand was
seated at the driver side of the
Mitsubishi
Adventure
van
and
remarked that Lawrences transaction
should push through so that they will
be released.
Not long after, Lawrence alighted
from his car and stood beside the
vehicle. His friends vehicle later on
arrived. Lawrence approached the
vehicle that has just arrived and took
something. Pineda remained seated
in Lawrences car while smoking. The
door of the said car was open at the
time. Lawrence thereafter walked
back to where Pineda was and
handed to him a package. It was
already around 4: or 4:30 in the
morning.
Lawrences
friends
thereafter went away, prompting
Pineda to call Manrique. Manrique
allegedly asked "positive na ba?" to
which Pineda replied "yes."
The amount raised by the friends of
Lawrence was one hundred eighty
thousand pesos (Php 180,000.00).
They (Irma and Lawrence) were later
brought to the Star Mall along Edsa.
Their captors warned them not to
report the matter to the authorities
otherwise
they
will
face
dire
consequences. The items taken from
Irma like the cash money, jewelry and
cellphone were placed by the men
inside the console box of the

Mitsubishi Adventure. When they

reached Star Mall, the men talked to
them for thirty minutes. Again, they
were warned about the consequences
of their reporting the incident to the
police. Irma was told that the men
knew her address, the members of
her family and that they have the
picture of her child. She was likewise
warned not to report the matter to
her father, Rod Navarro, who was an
actor and a policeman, otherwise her
daughter with Lawrence will be the
one [to] bear the consequences
("anak ko ang mananagot"). They
were released along Edsa after thirty
(30) minutes. Lawrence had to plead
for their gasoline from the accused
and he was given Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother
about the incident as she was very
afraid. Lawrence however made a
report to the Makati police station in
the evening of 7 November 2002
where he was shown a "coordination
sheet" pertaining to the plate number
of the Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy
Pineda in the meanwhile kept on
calling them (Irma and Lawrence)
demanding for their "balance" of one
million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
Irmas mother however soon learned
of the incident because of a
newspaper item. Her father likewise
learned of the incident and lost no
time in contacting authorities from
the CIDG. They (Irma and Lawrence)
were later investigated by the CIDG
people to who they gave their sworn
statements on November 14, 2002.
As Buboy Pineda continued to call

132

them for the alleged balance, an

entrapment operation was planned
on that date. Boodles of money were
dusted with ultra-violet powder. On
the same date, Buboy Pineda called
Lawrence for purposes of meeting
him that night in order to get the
remaining money. The entrapment
operation which was conducted along
the New World Hotel, and participated
in by PO2 Almonte, was successful as
Buboy
Pineda
was
arrested.
Recovered from the possession of
Pineda were a gold necklace without
pendant; a Nokia cellphone model
7650; a Toyota corolla car with plate
number PNG 214 color red and one
(1) ignition key. The necessary
acknowledgment receipt was duly
signed by the said accused. A
pawnshop
ticket
was
likewise
recovered from his possession.
Early in the morning of the following
day at the CIDG, Lorieman Manrique
went to the said office looking for his
co-accused
Froilan
Trestiza.
He
(Manrique) was arrested thereat
when the private complainants who
happened to be there as they were
giving
additional
statements
identified him (Manrique) through a
one-way mirror. Trestiza was likewise
arrested later as he was identified by
his co-accused Rodie Pineda. During
the arrest, Trestiza was found to be in
possession of an unlicensed firearm
for which the corresponding charge
was filed. He (Trestiza) was likewise
the subject of the complaint sheet
filed by Irma and Lawrence and was
likewise identified by his co-accused

Pineda as one of the cohorts in the

kidnapping of the former.
The Defense on the other hand
presented the following version:
Private complainants Irma Navarro
and Lawrence Yu were known to
accused Rodie Buboy Pineda, a
freelance dance instructor prior to his
incarceration, and a godfather to the
child of Irmas sister, since 1997. The
two (Irma and Lawrence) are known
to Pineda as suppliers of prohibited
drugs, particularly Ecstasy, blue
anchors, and yeng-yen. The two,
Irma and Lawrence have been
distributing these drugs to various
customers who [sic] frequented bars
and disco pubs. Pineda has been
transacting with the two, particularly
Lawrence, for a profit. Realizing later
that his involvement with the group
of Lawrence has become deeper and
deeper, Pineda thought of causing the
arrest of the latter. He (Pineda) soon
decided to report the matter to the
police authorities and contacted
forthwith his long-time acquaintance,
now his co-accused Froilan Trestiza on
November 6, 2002 at 10:30 in the
evening. At that time, Trestiza was a
policeman under the Special Action
Unit, Group Directors Office of the
National Capital Region. Pineda and
Trestiza, who have known each other
for the past ten years, used to be
dancers at the Equinox Disco along
Pasay Road. Upon learning the
information from Pineda, Trestiza
contacted his classmate PO2 Rolando
de Guzman of the Philippine Drugs

133

Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who in

turn referred Trestiza to Captain
Lorieman Manrique who was then the
Deputy
Chief
of
the
Special
Enforcement Unit of the PDEA, Metro
Manila Regional Office. Manrique was
called later by Trestiza through
cellphone and they agreed to meet
the same night, at around midnight,
at
the
parking
lot
of
the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati.
Manrique prepared a Pre-Operation
sheet for a possible narcotics
operation. He likewise gave [the]
plate number of the vehicle he was
then driving which was a Mitsubishi
Adventure van with plate number
HAU-298.
During
their
ensuing
meeting,
Manrique was with PO2 Reynel Jose.
Pineda and Manrique talked to each
other. Manrique later on briefed
Pineda and Jose. Trestiza was about
three to five meters away from the
three (3). After the briefing, Manrique
asked Trestiza to drive the Mitsubishi
Adventure. Manrique told Trestiza that
the buy-bust operation has been precoordinated with the Makati police.
Manrique later joined Trestiza inside
the Mitsubishi Adventure while Jose
and Pineda were outside as though
waiting for someone. Irma and
Lawrence later on arrived and they
talked to Pineda and Jose. Pineda
introduced Jose to Irma and Lawrence
as the buyer. Jose was only wearing
a t-shirt at the time and it seemed
Lawrence and Irma doubted him. Jose
told the two that he has the money
with him and he would like to buy

drugs. Irma however whispered

something to Lawrence prompting the
latter to vascillate [sic]. From where
they are seated inside the Mitsubishi
Adventure, Trestiza and Manrique
could see what were [sic] going on
among Irma, Lawrence, Jose and
Pineda. Later on, Jose approached
Trestiza and Manrique and told them
that the pre-arranged signal is when
he (Jose) scratched his head.
According
further
to
Jose, his
scratching of his head will mean a
signal to Trestiza to drive towards
them the vehicle. As Jose later on
scratched his head, Trestiza drove the
vehicle towards the group as
instructed.
Manrique
thereafter
alighted and effected the arrest of
Irma and Lawrence. Irma went
hysterical and was loaded into the
Honda ESI while Lawrence was made
to board the Mitsubishi Adventure. It
was at that point when two (2) mobile
cars arrived with policemen on board.
A commotion immediately ensued
between the police men aboard the
mobile cars and Manriques men.
Firearms were drawn and poked
against
each
of
the
men
(nagkatutukan
ng
baril).
Jose,
however, later on showed what
appeared to be a document to the
men aboard the mobile car. One of
the men later on made a call through
his radio and then left afterwards.
Manrique later on instructed Trestiza
to drive towards Edsa on their way to
Camp Crame. Along the way,
Manrique
conducted
a
tactical
interrogation against Lawrence and

134

Irma
about
their
drug-related
activities.
Upon
reaching
SM
Megamall, however, Manrique told
Trestiza to pull over. Manrique talked
to Lawrence, Irma, Jose and Pineda.
Trestiza remained inside the van.
Trestiza, however, overheard that
Lawrence was at that point was
talking about his supplier of ecstasy.
Thereafter, Manrique briefed anew
Pineda and Jose in the presence of
Irma and Lawrence. It was understood
among them that Lawrence will wait
for his alleged supplier whose name
was allegedly Jojo at the Caltex gas
station along Wilson Street in
Greenhills. Lawrence told Manrique
that this Jojo was really a big-time
supplier of ecstasy and cocaine. Upon
arriving at the gas station, the group
waited for Lawrences supplier for an
hour but nobody appeared. Manrique
became impatient and went to where
Lawrence was. Manrique later told his
men that Lawrence might have
alerted his supplier. He (Manrique)
then decided to bring the two (Irma
and Lawrence) to Camp Crame.
Trestiza, however, pointed out to
Manrique that nothing was taken from
the possession of the two. Manrique
conferred anew with Jose. Jose
remarked that the items could have
been thrown away. It was later on
decided that Irma and Lawrence will
just be released. The two were indeed
released near the [Manuela] Complex
along Edsa.

lot of the Club 5 Disco. A gun was

poked at him and he was shoved
inside a vehicle. He was boxed and
placed on handcuffs. He was not
shown any warrant of arrest. He told
the arresting officers that he is also a
policeman. He was brought later to
Camp Crame. While at Camp Crame,
he was shown to his co-accused
Pineda and the latter was asked "di
ba sya yung nag-drive noong may
operation laban kina Irma Navarro?"
("Is he not the one who drove during
the
operation
against
Irma
Navarro?"). He (Trestiza) asked the
authorities what were the grounds for
detaining him but his queries were
not answered. His watch, wallet and
cellphone were taken. Later on the
same day, Irma arrived in Camp
Crame. The authorities thereat talked
to Irma, afterwhich, a policeman told
her "eto yung itinuturo ni Buboy na
nag-drive." ("This is the one pointed
to by Buboy as the one who drove").
Several days later, all the accused
were presented to the press by the
office of General Matillano. The
Philippine Daily Inquirer covered the
story and later on came out with an
article entitled "We Were Framed."

Trestiza was later on arrested by the

CIDG operatives in the early morning
of November 16, 2002 at the parking

The Trial Courts Ruling

The defense likewise presented PO2

Rolando
de
Guzman
who
corroborated the claim of Trestiza that
he was called by the latter concerning
the information given by Pineda. No
further evidence was presented.23

135

In its Joint Decision24 dated 24 July

2007, the trial court found Trestiza,
Manrique, and Pineda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by
direct participation of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom.
The trial court concentrated its ruling
on the credibility of the witnesses. It
found
the
testimonies
of
the
prosecution
credible,
with
their
versions of the incident dovetailing
with each other even on minor
details. On the other hand, the
defenses testimonies taxed the
credulity of the trial court. The trial
court raised numerous questions
about the defenses story line:
x x x But this leads the court to
wonder: if indeed Pineda was so
bothered by his involvement with the
group of Lawrence, why did he spill
the beans against Irma and Lawrence
only? Did he not state that it was a
"group" that he was transacting
with? Who were the other members
of this group? What were their
activities that were so dark and
clandestine so as to make him
suddenly shudder and opt for a
change of life? These were not
answered by Pinedas testimony.
Also, while Manrique presented what
appears to be a Pre-Operation
Coordination Report, thus creating at
first glance the impression that theirs
was a legitimate police operation, this
still does not detract from nor
diminish the credibility of the
complainants claim that they were

subsequently abducted and money

was demanded in exchange for their
release. For even if the court is to
indulge the claim of the defense that
the complainants were indeed drugpushers and undeserving of this
courts sympathy, the nagging doubt
about the existence of a prepared
police operation as what Manrique
and his co-accused refer to, persists.
For
one,
the
said
PreOperation/Coordination
Sheet
appears to be unreliable. Aside from
the fact that the same was not duly
authenticated, the failure of the
defense,
particularly
accused
Manrique, to summon the signatories
therein who may attest to the
existence and authenticity of such
document was not at all explained.
Second, all the accused narrated
about their almost-fatal encounter
with another group of policemen
while they were allegedly in the act of
conducting the supposed buy-bust
operation against the complainants.
This event, to the view of this court,
only invites the suspicion that the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet was
dubious if not actually non-existent.
The accused likewise claimed that
they released the two later along
Edsa as nothing was found on them.
The manner of the release, however,
raises several questions: why were
the complainants who were earlier
suspected of being drug-pushers not
brought to the police precinct? Did
not Lawrence volunteer the name of
his alleged supplier earlier during the
tactical interrogation? Why were they

136

unloaded just like that along Edsa at

that ungodly hour? Was there an
incident report on the matter
considering
that
Manrique
was
mindful enough earlier to first secure
a Pre-Operation/Coordination sheet?25

On
the
same
date
as
the
promulgation of its decision, the trial
court
issued
an
Order
of
Commitment27 of Trestiza, Manrique,
and Pineda to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections.

The dispositive portion of the trial

courts Decision states:

On 27 July 2007, Trestiza, Manrique,

and Pineda filed a Motion for New
Trial and for Inhibition. Two witnesses,
Camille Anne Ortiz y Alfonso (Ortiz)
and Paulo Antonio De Leon y Espiritu
(De Leon), allegedly intimate friends
of Navarro and Yu, will testify as to
the circumstances which took place in
the early morning of 7 November
2002. Their testimonies, if admitted,
will allegedly result in the acquittal of
Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda. These
witnesses are not known to the
accused, and they could not have
been produced during trial. Moreover,
the accused are of the belief that trial
court judge Zenaida T. GalapateLaguilles acted with bias against
them. She allegedly made an off-therecord remark and stated that the
prosecution failed to establish what
they sought to prove, but then later
on questioned the existence of the
defenses Pre-Operation/Coordination
Sheet
in
her
decision.
Judge
Galapate-Laguilles also failed to
resolve the Petition for Bail, and failed
to point out discrepancies in the
testimonies
of
the
defenses
witnesses,
particularly
those
regarding the arrests of Trestiza,
Manrique, and Pineda.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 finding the
accused PO1 FROILAN TRESTIZA Y
LACSON,
P/INSP
LORIEMAN
L.
MANRIQUE and RODIE PINEDA Y
JIMENEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt
as
principals
by
direct
participation
of
the
crime
of
KIDNAPPING for RANSOM, and they
are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA. In
addition thereto, they are ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, the private
complainants the sums of PHP
300,000.00 as actual damages, and
PHP
300,000.00
as
exemplary
damages. All the accused are
ACQUITTED in Criminal Cases Nos.
03-766 and 04-1311 both for Robbery
respectively.
Send the records of this case to the
archives in so far as accused PO2
Reynel Jose, who continues to be at
large, is concerned. Let, however, a
Warrant of Arrest be issued against
him.
SO ORDERED.26

The prosecution opposed the Motion

for New Trial and Inhibition.28 De Leon

137

shared a cell with Manrique since July

2003, while the trial was ongoing, and
hence De Leons supposed testimony
should not be considered "newly
discovered" evidence. On the other
hand, Ortizs narration of events in
her affidavit is full of inconsistencies.
The prosecution likewise questioned
the credibility of the witnesses who
allegedly heard Judge GalapateLaguilles off-the-record remark. One
was Trestizas relative, while the other
was a security escort who was
supposed to stay outside the
courtroom. Finally, the motion itself
was filed late. The supplement to the
motion, to which the affidavits of the
additional witnesses were attached,
was filed two days after the finality of
the trial courts decision. Copies of
the decision were furnished to both
prosecution and defense on 24 July
2007, which was also the date of
promulgation. The Motion for New
Trial and Inhibition was dated 27 July
2007, while the Supplement to the
Motion which included the witnesses
affidavits was dated 10 August 2007.
The trial court held hearings on the
twin motions. On 3 October 2007, the
trial court issued an Order29 denying
the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition. The evidence presented
was merely corroborative, and the
prosecution was able to prove its
case despite the judges alleged offthe-record equivocal remark.
On 19 October 2007, Trestiza,
Manrique, and Pineda filed a notice of
appeal.30 The Order denying the

Motion for New Trial and for Inhibition

was received on 18 October 2007,
while the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition was filed on 27 July 2007 or
three days after the promulgation of
the Decision on 24 July 2004. The trial
court gave due course to the notice of
appeal.31 In their brief filed with the
appellate court, Trestiza, Manrique,
and Pineda assigned the following
errors:
The
trial
court
erred
in
convicting
accused
Trestiza
despite the fact that he was not
part of the alleged conspiracy
in that it was not stipulated
during the pre-trial that he was
just the driver and was not part
of the team. Besides, he did not
perform any act in furtherance
of the alleged conspiracy.
The trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of
private complainants Lawrence
Yu and Irma Navarro as their
demeanor in the witness stand
show hesitation indicative of
guilt of fabrication and their
testimonies lack spontaneity
and were not straightforward.
The trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses John Paul
Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales
as they alleged facts and
circumstance that are contrary
to
human
nature
and
experience.

138

The
trial
court
erred
in
convicting the accused despite
the fact that the complainants
were arrested in a legitimate
operation as evidenced by the
Pre-Operation/Coordination
Sheet which was authenticated
by
accused-appellant
32
Manrique.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 June 2008, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the trial courts decision.
In its recitation of facts, the appellate
court quoted from the Peoples Brief
for the prosecution and from the trial
court for the defense. The appellate
court ruled that Trestizas contention
that he was just the driver of the van
and never communicated with the
witnesses
deserves
scant
consideration. Yu identified Trestiza as
one of the two men who sandwiched
him as he left Where Else Disco, and
insisted that Yu cooperate with Jose
when Jose asked Yu for cash.
Trestizas acts thus show that he
acted in concert with his co-accused
in the commission of the crime. The
appellate court relied on the trial
courts assessment of the reliability of
the prosecutions witnesses, and gave
credence to their testimonies. The
appellate court declared that all the
elements of kidnapping for ransom
are present and thus affirmed the trial
courts decision:

In any event, it was established that

all the elements constituting the
crime of kidnapping for ransom in the
case at bar are present. The elements
of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) 7659 are as follows: (a) intent
on the part of the accused to deprive
the victim of his liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his
liberty; and (c) motive of the accused,
which is extorting ransom for the
release of the victim (People vs. Raul
Cenahonon, 527 SCRA 542). Here,
Navarro and Yu testified how they
were abducted at gun point from the
parking lot in Makati and confined
inside the car and van respectively;
that they were both handcuffed,
hence, deprived of their liberty and
that appellants made a demand for
them to deliver a certain amount in
exchange for their release.
In fine, the Court rules and so holds
that appellants guilt for the offense
of kidnapping for ransom has been
proven beyond moral certainty of
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED and this
appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.33
Trestiza alone filed a Motion for
Reconsideration34 of the appellate
courts decision. In his Motion,
Trestiza claimed that he alone,
through counsel, filed an appeal brief.

139

Trestiza further claimed that the

stipulations made during pre-trial
established
Trestizas
limited
involvement, that is, he was merely a
driver of the vehicle when the alleged
crime
took
place,
he
never
communicated
with
the
complainants, and none of the items
allegedly
taken
from
the
complainants were recovered from
Trestizas possession. The trial court
did not mention nor discuss these
stipulations in its decision. Even the
trial courts finding of facts shows
Trestizas participation was merely
that of an invited driver in a
legitimate
Philippine
Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) drug
bust
operation.
Moreover,
the
testimonies of witnesses of both
prosecution and defense establish
that Trestiza was a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) when
he allegedly committed the crime.
Under the circumstances, Trestiza
claimed he should be held liable only
for
Arbitrary
Detention.
Finally,
Trestizas identification was not only
improper for being suggested, but his
warrantless arrest should also be held
invalid.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a comment opposing
Trestizas Motion for Reconsideration.
The stipulations do not discount that
Trestiza conspired with his coappellants Manrique and Pineda in
committing the crime charged. The
apprehension
and
detention
of
Navarro and Yu were clearly effected
for the purpose of ransom; hence, the

proper crime really is Kidnapping with

Ransom. Trestiza filed a Reply to the
Comment35 on 20 October 2009.
The appellate court denied Trestizas
Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution
dated
11
November
2009.36 An
examination
of
the
appellants brief showed that the
brief was filed for Trestiza, Manrique
and Pineda. The appellate court found
no compelling reason to warrant
consideration of its decision.
Trestiza still filed a Notice of
Appeal37 of the appellate courts
decision on 10 January 2010. The
appellate
court
initially
38
denied Trestizas Notice of Appeal
due to late filing, but eventually
granted39 Trestizas
Motion
for
Reconsideration40 of the 16 February
2010 resolution denying his Notice of
Appeal.
Trestiza
filed
the
present
41
supplemental brief before this Court
on 15 August 2011. In his brief,
Trestiza emphasized that Yu was
apprehended by agents of the PNP
and PDEA on 30 June 2011 during a
raid of an illegal drugs laboratory. Yu
was charged with the crime of
manufacturing,
possessing,
and
selling illegal drugs under Sections 8,
11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.
The Issues

140

Trestiza
raised
the
arguments against the
courts decision:

following
appellate

I.
The
supervening
event
involving the apprehension of
Lawrence L. Yu as the head of a
big-time drug syndicate throws
his credibility as a witness
beneath the abyss of morass
and decay that must be now
totally discarded.
II. The facts and circumstances
surrounding the above-entitled
case is consistent with the
innocence
of
[Trestiza]
rendering
the
evidence
presented
insufficient
and
without moral certainty to
support a conviction.
III. At the very least, the
"equipoise
rule"
finds
application in the case at bar,
taking into consideration the
supervening
event
that
demolished the credibility of
the witnesses presented by the
prosecution.
IV.
The
Constitutional
presumption of innocence of
[Trestiza]
has
not
been
overwhelmed by the tainted
testimony and total lack of
credibility of Lawrence L. Yu
and, in light of the supervening
event, could not now be
overcome
by
questionable
testimonies presented by the
prosecution.

V. The conviction of an innocent

man is a great injustice that
affects the very foundations of
humanity.
VI. It was not sufficiently shown
that all the accused in the
above-entitled case conspired
in committing the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and the
same was not proven by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
VII. [Trestiza] has no malicious
or evil intent in acquiescing to
drive the vehicle used in the
buy-bust operation.
VIII. [Trestiza] is innocent of the
crime
of
Kidnapping
for
42
Ransom.
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, we declare that the 30
June 2011 arrest of Yu has no bearing
on the present case. The two cases
are independent of each other and
should be treated as such. Yus
innocence or guilt regarding his 30
June 2011 arrest does not affirm or
negate the commission of the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom against
him.
Warrantless Arrest
These
are
the
circumstances
surrounding Trestizas arrest: Pineda
had been contacting Yu to follow up
on the balance on the ransom. Pineda
was then arrested pursuant to an

141

entrapment operation conducted in

the early morning of 16 November
2002 at New World Hotel. During the
investigation at Camp Crame, Pineda
revealed that Trestiza could be found
at Club 5 in Makati. Pineda and Yu
accompanied the arresting team to
Club 5. Yu pointed out Trestiza to the
arresting team while Trestiza was on
his way to his black Hummer.43
Trestiza questioned the legality of his
warrantless arrest in an Omnibus
Motion44 filed before his arraignment.
In its Order dated 19 August 2004,
the trial court stated that the quashal
of the informations on account of
Trestizas
illegal
arrest
is
not
warranted. The determination of the
nature of the arrest goes directly into
the merits of the case, and needs a
deeper
judicial
determination.
Matters of defense are not grounds
for a Motion to Quash. The trial court,
however, did not make any ruling
related to Trestizas warrantless arrest
in its 24 July 2007 Decision.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances when warrantless arrests
are lawful.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested
has
committed,
is
actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has
just been committed and
he has probable cause to
believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the
person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal
establishment or place
where he is serving final
judgment
or
is
temporarily
confined
while his case is pending,
or has escaped while
being transferred from
one
confinement
to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a)
and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It is clear that Trestizas warrantless
arrest does not fall under any of the
circumstances mentioned in Section
5, Rule 113. However, Trestiza failed
to make a valid objection to his
warrantless arrest.
Any objection to the procedure
followed in the matter of the

142

acquisition by a court of jurisdiction

over the person of the accused must
be opportunely raised before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.45Trestiza,
being a policeman himself, could
have immediately objected to his
warrantless arrest. However, he
merely asked for the grounds for his
arrest. He did not even file charges
against the arresting officers. There
was also a lengthy amount of time
between Trestizas arrest on 16
November 2002 and the filing of the
Omnibus
Motion
objecting
to
Trestizas warrantless arrest on 11
May 2004. Although it may be argued
that the objection was raised prior to
the entry of Trestizas plea of not
guilty in the kidnapping for ransom
charge, it must be noted that the
circumstances of the present case
make us rule otherwise. Trestiza was
charged with two crimes at the time
of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom
under Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and
illegal possession of firearms under
Criminal Case No. 02-3394. Trestiza
did not question the legality of his
warrantless arrest nor the acquisition
of jurisdiction of the trial court over
his person, and fully participated in
the hearing of the illegal possession
of firearms case. Thus, Trestiza is
deemed to have waived any objection
to his warrantless arrest. Under the
circumstances, Trestizas Omnibus
Motion in the kidnapping for ransom
case is a mere afterthought and
cannot be considered as a timely
objection.

Assuming arguendo that

Trestiza
indeed made a timely objection to his
warrantless arrest, our jurisprudence
is replete with rulings that support
the view that Trestizas conviction is
proper despite being illegally arrested
without warrant. In People v. Manlulu,
the Court ruled:
[T]he illegality of the warrantless
arrest cannot deprive the State of its
right to prosecute the guilty when all
other facts on record point to their
culpability.46
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error. 47 The fatal
flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest
becomes moot in view of a credible
eyewitness account.48
Kidnapping with Ransom
The trial courts findings of facts, its
calibration
of
the
collective
testimonies
of
witnesses,
its
assessment of the probative weight
of the evidence of the parties, as well
as its conclusions anchored on the
said findings, are accorded great
weight, and even conclusive effect,
unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood
or
misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would
alter the outcome of the case. This is
because of the unique advantage of
the trial court to observe, at close
range, the conduct, demeanor and

143

the deportment of the witnesses as

they testify.49 We see no reason to
overrule the trial courts finding that
Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping with
ransom.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious
illegal
detention.
Any
private
individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or
detention
shall
have
lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been
committed
simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical
injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or
if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4.
If
the
person
kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any
of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping
or
detention
was

committed for the purpose of

extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were
present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.
Before the present case was tried by
the trial court, there was a significant
amount of time spent in determining
whether kidnapping for ransom was
the proper crime charged against the
accused, especially since Trestiza and
Manrique were both police officers.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
specifically stated that the crime
should be committed by a private
individual.50 The trial court settled the
matter by citing our ruling in People
v. Santiano,51 thus:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta
is an organic member of the NARCOM
and appellant Sandigan a member of
the PNP would not exempt them from
the criminal liability of kidnapping. It
is quite clear that in abducting and
taking away the victim, appellants did
so neither in furtherance of official
functions nor in the pursuit of
authority vested in them. It is not, in
fine, in relation to their office, but in
purely private capacity that they
have acted in concert with their coappellant Santiano and Chanco.

144

In the same order, the trial court

asked for further evidence which
support the defenses claim of
holding a legitimate police operation.
However, the trial court found as
unreliable
the
PreOperation/Coordination
Sheet
presented by the defense. The sheet
was not authenticated, and the
signatories were not presented to
attest
to
its
existence
and
authenticity.

on, I was "sandwiched" by two (2)

persons and when I looked up, I noted
the presence of one (1) man
immediately in front of me holding a
gun.

The second to the last paragraph of

Article 267 prescribes the penalty of
death when the extortion of ransom
was the purpose of the kidnapping. Yu
and Navarro were released only after
they were able to give various
personal effects as well as cash
amounting to P300,000, with the
promise
to
give
the
balance
of P1,000,000 at a later date.

Q: Are they inside this Courtroom?

Trestiza insists that his participation is

limited to being a driver of the
Mitsubishi Adventure van. Yu testified
otherwise.
Direct Examination of Lawrence Lim
Yu

Q: And these men who "sandwiched"

you and the third men [sic] who held
the gun in front of you, would you be
able to identify them?
A: Yes, maam.

A: Yes, maam.
Q: Will you please identify them?
A: The three of them, maam.
At this juncture, the witness is to
pointing to the three (3) men, who
are the accused in this case, inside
the Courtroom.
COURT: (To the Accused) Again, for
the
record,
please
stand
up,
gentlemen.
At this juncture, the three (3) accused
stood up.

Atty. Oledan:
Q: What happened [after you left
Wherelse Disco]?

COURT: (To Witness) Are you sure

these were the three (3) men whom
you are referring to?

Witness:

WITNESS:

A: As soon as I stepped out of the

Wherelse Disco, somebody bumped
me at my right side. And then later

A: Yes, maam.

145

COURT: Make it of record that the

witness pointed to accused PO1
Froilan Trestiza, PSINP Loriemar
Manrique and Rodie Pineda.

A: They told me the same thing. They

told me that I should not have kept
the matter long.
Q: What happened after that?

ATTY. OLEDAN:
Q: (To Witness) Specifically, who
among these three (3) "sandwiched"
you?

A: After that, Reynel Jose alighted

again and we drove towards an area,
which I know now to be within San
Juan. Right in front of the Tambunting
Pawnshop.

WITNESS:
A: It was PO1 Trestiza and Capt.
Manrique.
xxx
Q: What happened after you were
brought inside the Mitsubishi vehicle?
A: Later on, Officer Trestiza and Capt.
Manrique
likewise
boarded
the
Mitsubishi Adventure.
xxx

Q: What happened at the Tambunting

Pawnshop? Did the vehicle stop
there?
A: The two (2) vehicles parked there
beside each other.
Q: What happened when you were
there at Tambunting Pawnshop?
A: After parking in front of the
Tambunting Pawnshop, they boarded
Irma and have her sat [sic] beside
me. Then after which, the door at my
left side was opened.

Q: Who was driving the vehicle?

Q: What else happened?
A: It was Froilan Trestiza, maam.
xxx
Q: After [Reynel Jose] said [that had
Yu cooperated earlier, he would not
have been hurt] and the plastic
removed from your head, what did
[sic] the two, Trestiza and Manrique,
doing?

A: They told me not to make any

move, that I just keep on sitting
there. Afterwards, the men huddled
with each other ("nagkumpul-kumpol
po sila").
Q: Where did they huddle?
A: They huddled in an area close to
me, almost in front of me.

146

Q: Who among the accused huddled

together?

Q: After Buboy
happened?

A: The four (4) of them, maam.

A: I told him that he need not do that,

because if he needs money, I can
always lend him.

Q: How long did they huddle?

A: For a while only, maam, around
(10) ten minutes.
Q: After ten
happened?

(10)

minutes,

what

A: After ten (10) minutes, Buboy

approached me.

said

that,

what

Q: What did Buboy say?

A: After saying this to Buboy, he told
me to just shut up and then he later
on handed over to me a cell phone
and told me to contact a person, who
can give me money.
Q: Who handed you your cell phone?

Q: What did he say?

A: It was Froilan Trestiza, maam.
A: He told me that they thought my
money would be One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).
xxx
Q: So, after that huddle, after you
were told by Buboy that "okay na
yong one million" and that was
confirmed by one of the three (3)
men who said "isang million na," what
happened?

xxx
Q: After that, were you told to go
home already?
A: Not yet, maam. Before letting us
go, they threatened us. They
reminded us that they have our IDs,
the pictures of our children and the
members of our family.
Q: What did you do after that?

A: I was talking to Buboy at that time

and I was telling him, "Why do you
have to do this to me? You are the
kumpare of the elder sister of Irma."

A: We just kept on saying yes

because we wanted to go home
already.

Q: What did Buboy say to that?

Q: What time was that?

A: Buboy retorted, "Pare, pasensya

na, pera pera lang yan."

A: It was almost daybreak ("maguumaga na"). I have no watch already

at that time, maam.

147

Q: So, what did you do after that?

A: After that, Froilan Trestiza handed
to me my sim card telling me that
they will be calling me in my house
concerning my alleged balance.52
We agree with the appellate courts
assessment that Trestizas acts were
far from just being a mere driver. The
series of events that transpired
before,
during,
and
after
the
kidnapping incident more than shows
that Trestiza acted in concert with his
co-accused in committing the crime.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons
aimed
their
acts
towards
the
accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in
fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of
sentiment.53
Trestizas civil liability is joint and
several with Manrique and Pineda.
They are liable for the P120,000
taken from Navarro and the P180,000
raised by Yu. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,54 Trestiza is also liable
for P75,000 as civil indemnity which
is awarded if the crime warrants the
imposition of death penalty; P75,000
as moral damages because the victim
is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, without need of proof;
and P30,000 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
H.C.
No.
03119
promulgated on 30 June 2009, as well
as the Resolution promulgated on 11
June
2010,
is AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION. Froilan L. Trestiza is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 023393 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well
as the accessory penalties provided
by law. In addition to the restitution
of P300,000 for the ransom, Trestiza
is ordered to pay Lawrence Yu and
Irma
Navarro P75,000
as
civil
indemnity, P75,000
as
moral
damages, and P30,000 as exemplary
damages.
Costs against Froilan L. Trestiza.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Trestiza
GR 193833 November 16, 2011

Facts: On Nov. 7, 2002 at about 1:00

AM, Irma Navarro and her boyfriend
Lawrence Yu were at a party in
Makati. She went out ahead of
Lawrence. She was about to open the
door of Lawrences Honda car when 3
armed men emerged from a van and
hit her on the nape. She recognized
one of the three as accused Pineda.
The other two were policemen
Manrique and Trestiza. She was made

148

to enter the Honda car. Lawrence, on

the other hand, was also accosted
and was brought inside the van. Later
on, they were brought together. Their
valuables were taken with threats
that their families will be in danger.
They were also told that they should
call their friends to get the money the
accused asked of them. Two of their
friends raised 180 000. They were
then released. Later on, as accused
Pineda kept on calling them for the
alleged balance, an entrapment
operation was planned. Pineda was
arrested. The other two accused,
Manrique and Trestiza, were arrested
later. The trial court found the three
accused guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom. The CA
affirmed. Only Trestiza appealed.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Trestizas

warrantless arrest was lawful.
2. Whether or not Trestiza is
guilty of Kidnapping with Ransom.

Ruling: 1. No. It is clear that Trestizas

warrantless arrest does not fall under
any of the circumstances mentioned
in Section 5, Rule 113. However, any
objection to the procedure followed in
the matter of the acquisition by a
court of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be opportunely

raised before he enters his plea;

otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. Trestiza failed to make a valid
objection to his warrantless arrest
and is deemed to have waived any
objection thereto.
2. Yes. It is quite clear that in
abducting and taking away the
victim, appellants did so neither in
furtherance of official functions nor in
the pursuit of authority vested in
them. Conspiracy may be implied if it
is proved that two or more persons
aimed
their
acts
towards
the
accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in
fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of
sentiment.
Trestiza was positively identified by
the victim Lawrence Yu stating that
he was sandwiched by 2 persons
while a man was holding a gun in
front of him. One of those two
persons was Trestiza. It was also him
who was driving the vehicle. The
accused got their valuables and
arranged to get 180 000 from the
victims friends as ransom.
G.R. No. 176229
19, 2011

October

149

HO
WAI
PANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Infraction of the rights of an accused
during custodial investigation or the
so-called Miranda Rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during
such investigation.1 "The admissibility
of other evidence, provided they are
relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is
not affected even if obtained or taken
in
the
course
of
custodial
2
investigation."
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in
this present recourse assails the June
16, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01459 affirming the April 6, 1995
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in
Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding
him and his co-accused, namely, Law
Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,5 Wu Hing
Sum, Tin San Mao6 and Kin San
Ho7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 15, Article
III8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is
the
January
16,
2007
CA
Resolution9 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around
11:30 in the evening, United Arab
Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA). Among
the passengers were 13 Hongkong
nationals who came to the Philippines
as tourists. At the arrival area, the
group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny
Wong)
presented
a
Baggage
Declaration
Form
to
Customs
Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who
was then manning Lane 8 of the
Express Lane. Cinco examined the
baggages of each of the 13
passengers as their turn came up.
From the first traveling bag, she saw
few personal belongings such as used
clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes
which she pressed. When the second
bag was examined, she noticed
chocolate boxes which were almost of
the same size as those in the first
bag. Becoming suspicious, she took
out four of the chocolate boxes and
opened one of them. Instead of
chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained
in a white transparent plastic. Cinco
thus immediately called the attention
of her immediate superiors Duty
Collector
Alalo
and
Customs
Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised
her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon,
she guided the tourists to the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while
bringing with her the four chocolate
boxes earlier discovered.

150

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists

one after the other using the
passenger manifest and further
examined their bags. The bag of Law
Ka Wang was first found to contain
three chocolate boxes. Next was
petitioners bag which contains
nothing except for personal effects.
Cinco, however, recalled that two of
the
chocolate
boxes
earlier
discovered at the express lane belong
to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed
and same yielded three chocolate
boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin
San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao
each contained two or three similar
chocolate boxes. All in all, 18
chocolate boxes were recovered from
the baggages of the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro
corroborated the relevant testimony
of Cinco pertaining to the presence of
the chocolate boxes. According to
him, he conducted a test on the white
crystalline substance contained in
said chocolate boxes at the NAIA
using
the
Mandelline
Re-Agent
10
Test. The
result
of
his
examination11 of the white crystalline
substance
yielded
positive
for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate
boxes were bundled together with
tape, placed inside a plastic bag and
brought to the Inbond Section.
The following day, September 7,
1991, the 13 tourists were brought to
the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for further questioning. The
confiscated stuff were turned over to

the Forensic Chemist who weighed

and examined them. Findings show
that its total weight is 31.1126
kilograms and that the representative
samples
were
positive
for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride.12 Out
of
the
13
tourists, the NBI found evidence for
violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as
against petitioner and his five coaccused.
Accordingly,
six
separate
Informations all dated September 19,
1991 were filed against petitioner and
his co-accused. These Informations
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
91-1591
to
97.
Subsequently,
however, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation13 which the trial court
granted.
The
reinvestigation
conducted gave way to a finding of
conspiracy among the accused and
this resulted to the filing of a single
Amended
Information14 under
Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the
withdrawal
of
the
other
Informations.15 The
Amended
Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991
in Pasay City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring,
confederating
and
mutually helping one another, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously carry and transport
into the country without lawful
authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or
less,
of
Methamphetamine

151

Hydrochloride, also popularly known

as "SHABU", a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
After pleading not guilty to the crime
charged,17 all the accused testified
almost identically, invoking denial as
their defense. They claimed that they
have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance
(shabu) taken from their traveling
bags which were provided by the
travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a
Decision18 finding all the accused
guilty of violating Section 15, Article
III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
all
the
foregoing
considered, the Court finds the
accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT
yue, ho wai pang, wu hing sum, tin
sun mao, and kin san ho (ho kin san)
guilty of Conspiracy in violating
Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended for having
conspired to transport into the
Philippines 31.112 kilograms of
methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride,
locally known as Shabu, and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX
(6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND
TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF
THIRTY
(30)
THOUSAND
PESOS
(p30,000.00) each as FINE, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is being

imposed pursuant to Republic Act No.

7659 considering its applicability to
the accused though retroactively for
having a less stricter penalty than
that of life imprisonment provided in
Republic Act No. 6425. The fine
ofP30,000.00 for each accused is
imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it
being more favorable to the accused
[than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659
WITH
IMMEDIATE
DEPORTATION
AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The
penalty of death cannot be imposed
since the offense was committed
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued against accused WONG KOK
WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU,
HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.19
From this judgment, all the accused
appealed to this Court where the case
records were forwarded to per Order
of
the
RTC
dated
May
10,
20
1995. Later, all the accused except
for petitioner, filed on separate dates
their
respective
withdrawal
of
appeal.21 This Court, after being
satisfied
that
the
withdrawing
appellants were fully aware of the
consequences of their action, granted
the withdrawal of their respective
appeals through a Resolution dated
June
18,
1997.22 Per
Entry
of
23
Judgment, said Resolution became
final and executory on July 7, 1997.
Consequently, petitioner was the only
one left to pursue his appeal.

152

Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6,

1998
while
the brief25 for
the
respondent People of the Philippines
was filed on August 27, 1998 through
the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Per Resolution26 dated August
30, 2004, this Court referred the
appeal to the CA for proper
disposition
and
determination
pursuant to this Courts ruling in
People v. Mateo.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the
appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. While conceding that
petitioners constitutional right to
counsel
during
the
custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it
nevertheless went on to hold that
there were other evidence sufficient
to warrant his conviction. The CA also
rebuked petitioners claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional and
statutory right to confront the
witnesses against him. The CA gave
credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and quoted
with
favor
the
trial
courts
ratiocination regarding the existence
of conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration28 which the CA
denied
in
its
Resolution29 dated
January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following
grounds:

I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
STATUTORY
RIGHTS
UNDER
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
BOTH
BY
THE
CUSTOMS
OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS,
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
NOT
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN
DURING
THE
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
NOT
CONSIDERING
THAT
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
NOT
FINDING
THAT
THE
PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
NOT
FINDING
THAT
THE
PROSECUTION
FAILED
TO
PRESENT
PROOF
BEYOND

153

REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO
OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO
PETITIONER
BY
THE
30
CONSTITUTION.
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution prohibits as evidence
only confessions and admissions of
the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned,
petitioner takes issue on the fact that
he was not assisted by a competent
and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He claimed
that he was not duly informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have
competent counsel of his choice.
Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not
excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
While there is no dispute that
petitioner was subjected to all the
rituals of a custodial questioning by
the customs authorities and the NBI
in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 1231 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however,
lose sight of the fact that what said
constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against
himself.
Thus,
in
Aquino
v.
Paiste,32 the Court categorically ruled
that "the infractions of the so-called
Miranda rights render inadmissible

only the extrajudicial confession or

admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are
relevant to the issue and [are] not
otherwise excluded by law or rules,
[are] not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial
investigation."
In the case at bench, petitioner did
not
make
any
confession
or
admission
during
his
custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not
present any extrajudicial confession
extracted from him as evidence of his
guilt. Moreover, no statement was
taken from petitioner during his
detention and subsequently used in
evidence against him. Verily, in
determining the guilt of the petitioner
and his co-accused, the trial court
based its Decision on the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and on
the existence of the confiscated
shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran,33 "[a]ny
allegation
of
violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material
only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis
of
their
conviction."
Hence,
petitioners claim that the trial court
erred in not excluding evidence taken
during the custodial investigation
deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this
Courts ruling in People v. Wong
Chuen Ming34 to exculpate himself
from the crime charged. Though there

154

are semblance in the facts, the case

of Ming is not exactly on all fours with
the present case. The disparity is
clear from the evidence adduced
upon which the trial courts in each
case relied on in rendering their
respective decisions. Apparently in
Ming, the trial court, in convicting the
accused, relied heavily on the
signatures which they affixed on the
boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
plastic bags. The Court construed the
accuseds act of affixing their
signatures
thereon
as
a
tacit
admission of the crime charged. And,
since the accused were not informed
of their Miranda rights when they
affixed
their
signatures,
the
admission was declared inadmissible
evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights.
In ruling against the accused, the trial
court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner
whom it presumed to have performed
his
duties
in
regular
manner.
However, in reversing the judgment
of conviction, the Court noted that
said examiners testimony was not
corroborated by other prosecution
witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners
conviction in the present case was on
the strength of his having been
caught inflagrante
delicto
transporting shabu into the country
and not on the basis of any
confession or admission. Moreover,
the testimony of Cinco was found to
be direct, positive and credible by the
trial court, hence it need not be

corroborated. Cinco witnessed the

entire incident thus providing direct
evidence as eyewitness to the very
act of the commission of the crime.
As the Court held in People v Dela
Cruz,35 "[n]o
rule
exists
which
requires
a
testimony
to
be
corroborated to be adjudged credible.
x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon
to reach a conclusion of guilt on the
basis of the testimony of a single
witness
despite
the
lack
of
corroboration, where such testimony
is found positive and credible by the
trial court. In such a case, the lone
testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction."
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot
simply be bodily lifted and applied to
another case when there are stark
differences between the two cases.
Cases must be decided based on
their own unique facts and applicable
law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right
to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned
error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providing
for
the
right
to
confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself

155

and counsel, to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was
deprived of his right to know and
understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a
full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would
enable an accused to comprehend
the evidence being offered against
him and to refute it by crossexamination
or
by
his
own
countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that
petitioner was given the opportunity
to confront his accusers and/or the
witnesses of the prosecution when his
counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioners call to hire an interpreter
to understand the proceedings before
him and if he could not do so, he
should have manifested it before the
court. At any rate, the OSG contends
that petitioner was nevertheless able
to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses and that such examination
suffices
as
compliance
with
petitioners right to confront the
witnesses against him.

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records,
petitioner did not register any
objection to the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence particularly on
the testimony of Cinco despite the
absence of an interpreter. Moreover,
it has not been shown that the lack of
an interpreter greatly prejudiced him.
Still and all, the important thing is
that petitioner, through counsel, was
able to fully cross-examine Cinco and
the other witnesses and test their
credibility. The right to confrontation
is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the
witnesses of the prosecution. In
People v. Libo-on,36 the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers
are and must be given a chance to
cross-examine them on their charges.
The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the
opportunity for cross-examination, so
that if the opportunity for crossexamination has been secured, the
function and test of confrontation has
also
been
accomplished,
the
confrontation
being
merely
the
dramatic
preliminary
to
crossexamination.
Under the circumstances obtaining,
petitioners constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him
was not impaired.

156

Conspiracy among the accused was

duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error,
we uphold the trial courts finding of
conspiracy which was quoted by the
appellate court in its assailed
Decision, and which we once again
herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the
Court finds [no] direct evidence to
conclude conspiracy. However, just
like in other cases where conspiracy
is not usually established by direct
evidence
but
by
circumstantial
evidence, the Court finds that there
are enough circumstantial evidence
which if taken together sufficiently
prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be
denied that the accused somehow
have known each other prior to their
[departure] in Hong Kong for Manila.
Although Law Ka Wang denied having
known any of the accused prior to the
incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai
Pang identified him as the one who
assisted him in the supposed tour in
the Philippines to the extent of
directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was
the one who received the personal
things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be
place[d] in a bag provided for by the
travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum
has been known to accused Ho Kin
San for about two to three years as
they used to work as cooks in a
restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho
Wai Ling, who is still at large, is
know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue,
Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These

relationships in a way can lead to the

presumption that they have the
capability to enter into a conspiracy.
Second, all the illegal substances
confiscated from the six accused
were contained in chocolate boxes of
similar sizes and almost the same
weight
all
contained
in
their
luggages. The Court agrees with the
finding of the trial prosecutor that
under the given circumstances, the
offense charged [c]ould have been
perpetrated
only
through
an
elaborate and methodically planned
conspiracy with all the accused
assiduously cooperating and mutually
helping each other in order to ensure
its success.37
We find no cogent reason to reverse
such findings.
"Conspiracy is [the] common design
to commit a felony."38 "[C]onspiracy
which determines criminal culpability
need not entail a close personal
association
or
at
least
an
acquaintance between or among the
participants to a crime."39 "It need not
be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a
common design."40 "The assent of the
minds may be and, from the secrecy
of the crime, usually inferred from
proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that
they are parts of some complete
whole" as we ruled in People v.
Mateo, Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced
from petitioner and his co-accuseds
collective conduct, viewed in its

157

totality, that there was a common

design,
concerted
action
and
concurrence of sentiments in bringing
about the crime committed.
Petitioners guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He makes
capital on the contention that no
chocolate boxes were found in his
traveling bag when it was examined
at the ICU. He claimed that it was his
co-accused Sonny Wong who took
charge in ascribing upon him the
possession of the two chocolate
boxes.
Petitioners
persuade.

contentions

fail

to

True, when principal prosecution

witness Cinco first testified on June 3,
1992, she declared that she did not
see any chocolate boxes but only
personal
effects
in
petitioners
42
bag. Nonetheless, she clarified in
her succeeding testimony that she
recalls taking the two chocolate boxes
from petitioners bag when they were
still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag
when they were at the ICU.43 To us,
this slight clash in Cincos statements
neither dilute her credibility nor the
veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter
when
it
resolved
petitioners

Demurrer to Evidence in its Order44 of

February
16,
1993
is
quite
enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic]
presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to command conviction,
the Demurrer went on to say that the
testimony of Hilda Cinco is either
conjectural or hearsay and definitely
missed its mark in incriminating
accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she
even testified that she found nothing
inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho
Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3,
1992).
But
that
was
when
investigation was going on at the
Intensive
Counting
Unit
(ICU).
However, the same Hilda Cinco later
on testified that from the express
lane in going to the ICU, after the
discovery of shabu, she was already
carrying with her four (4) chocolate
boxes, two of [which] taken from the
bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two
retrieved from the luggage of herein
movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically,
Cinco admitted it was the reason that
at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was
already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June
3, 1992), but she nonetheless
recognized the bag and could recall
the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai
Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay
evidence. They are facts from the
personal perception of the witness
and out of her personal knowledge.
Neither is it conjectural.45
Jurisprudence
teaches
that
in
assessing the credibility of a witness,
his testimony must be considered in

158

its entirety instead of in truncated

parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its
isolated
parts
and
anchor
a
conclusion on the basis of said parts.
"In ascertaining the facts established
by a witness, everything stated by
him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and
considered."46 Also, where there is
nothing in the records which would
show a motive or reason on the part
of the witnesses to falsely implicate
the accused, identification should be
given full weight. Here, petitioner
presented no evidence or anything to
indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by
any improper motive, hence her
testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.1avvphi1
Verily, the evidence adduced against
petitioner is so overwhelming that
this Court is convinced that his guilt
has
been
established
beyond
reasonable doubt. Nothing else can
speak so eloquently of his culpability
than the unassailable fact that he was
caught red-handed in the very act of
transporting, along with his coaccused, shabu into the country. In
stark contrast, the evidence for the
defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was
not aware of the shabu inside his
luggage considering that his bag was
provided by the travel agency.
However, it bears stressing that the
act of transporting a prohibited drug
is a malum prohibitum because it is

punished as an offense under a

special law. As such, the mere
commission of the act is what
constitutes the offense punished and
same suffices to validly charge and
convict
an
individual
caught
committing the act so punished
regardless
of
criminal
intent.
Moreover, beyond his bare denials,
petitioner has not presented any
plausible proof to successfully rebut
the evidence for the prosecution. "It
is basic that affirmative testimony of
persons who are eyewitnesses of the
events or facts asserted easily
overrides negative testimony."47
All told, we are convinced that the
courts below committed no error in
adjudging
petitioner
guilty
of
transporting
methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu into the
country in violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the
trial court and as affirmed by the
appellate court, we find the same in
accord with law and jurisprudence. It
should be recalled that at the time of
the commission of the crime on
September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A.
No. 6425 was already amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1683.48 The
decree provided that for violation of
said Section 15, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging
fromP20,000.00
to P30,000.00 shall be imposed.

159

Subsequently, however, R.A. No.

765949 further
introduced
new
amendments to Section 15, Article III
and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Under the new
amendments, the penalty prescribed
in Section 15 was changed from "life
imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging
from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 toP10 million". On
the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 amended Section 20, Article IV
of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory
law shall be applied depending on the
quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed
on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather
than life imprisonment ratiocinating
that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
retroactive application, it being more
favorable to the petitioner in view of
its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we
held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No.
93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled
(a) that the amendatory law, being
more lenient and favorable to the
accused than the original provisions
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should
be accorded retroactive application, x
x x.

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a

lighter
penalty
than
life
imprisonment, and considering the
rule that criminal statutes with a
favorable effect to the accused, have,
as to him, a retroactive effect", 51 the
penalty imposed by the trial court
upon
petitioner
is
proper.
Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is
reclusion perpetua, as well as the
amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being
more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered,
the petition is DENIED and the
assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and
January 16, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 176229.
October 19, 2011.
FACTS: When Gilda Cinco search the
bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage
Declaration at the arrival area, she
found boxes of chocolate which when
she saw inside had white substance.
They were then brought to the PNP
after the procedures in the airport.
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA
while affirming the RTC decision took
note that their right to counsel during
custodial investigation was violated.

160

ISSUE: Whether the violation of the

petitioner's right to counsel made the
evidence taken from the petitioner
inadmissible.
RULING: The SC held in the negative.
The SC reiterated that infractions to
the accused during the custodial
investigation render only extrajudicial
confession or admissions of the
suspect inadmissible as evidence.
Also, the guilt of Pang was based on
the testimony of Cinco when she
caught Pang in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu.
G.R. No. 192164
12, 2011
ANSELMO
DE
CUYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

October
LEON
THE

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review
under
Rule
45
assailing
the
Order1 issued by Branch 28 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando
City, La Union, in Special Civil Action
Case No. 0001-10.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Anselmo Cuyo and Alejo
Cuyo
are
estranged
brothers.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal

possession of firearms against Alejo.
On 20 November 2003, petitioner
appeared before Judge Samuel H.
Gaerlan of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 26, San Fernando City,
La Union with regard to the
application for a search warrant by
the
Criminal
Investigation
and
Detective Group (CIDG) for the search
of the house of Alejo, and, in the
course of the proceedings, made
untruthful statements under oath.
Consequently, Alejo filed a complaint
for perjury against petitioner.
On 25 August 2009, Branch 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
in San Fernando City, La Union, found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
and sentenced him to imprisonment
of four (4) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year. He was likewise ordered
to pay private complainant Alejo Cuyo
the amount of P10,000 for attorneys
fees
and
litigation
2
expenses. Petitioner was not present
during the promulgation of the
judgment and was represented by his
counsel instead.
On 28 August 2009, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration3 of the
Decision, but the motion was
subsequently denied4 by the MTCC on
19 October 2009.
Petitioner received the Order of the
MTCC
denying
his
Motion
for
Reconsideration on 23 October 2009.

161

He subsequently filed a Motion for

Probation5 on 5 November 2009.

become Final and Executory as of

November 3, 2009.

On 6 January 2010, the MTCC issued

an Order6 denying petitioners latter
motion on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days as
provided by Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended, or the
Probation
Law
of
1976.7 The
reckoning date used by the MTCC in
computing the 15 day period was the
day of promulgation on 25 August
2009, tolled by the period from the
filing
of
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration to the receipt of the
Order denying the motion on 23
October 2009. Thus, the MTCC stated:

On 7 January 2010, petitioner moved

for the reconsideration8 of the latter
order,
asking
for
a
liberal
interpretation of the rules with regard
to the computation of the period for
applying for probation. He also filed
on 10 January 2010 a Supplemental
Motion9 to
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration praying for the
deferment of the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest or the recall of the
warrant if one had already been
issued.

It is note worthy (sic) that four (4)

days has (sic) lapsed from August 25,
2009 when the decision was entered
in the criminal docket of this court
and the time the motion for
reconsideration was filed.
Since the period to apply for
probation as provided for by law in
(sic) only fifteen (15) days, the
accused has only the remaining
eleven (11) days of the fifteen (15)
days reglamentary period to apply for
probation. The 11 day period from
October 23, 2009 when he received
the denial of his motion ended on
November 3, 2009.
The Motion for Probation was
received by the court on November 5,
2009 when the decision has already

The MTCC, however, denied the

motion
on
3
February
2010.
Reference was made to Neypes v.
Court
of
Appeals,10 wherein
the
appeal period was sought to be
standardized, by establishing the rule
that a fresh period of 15 days was
allowed within which to file a notice
of appeal, counted from the receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for new
trial or a motion for reconsideration.
The MTCC, however, did not view
Neypes as applicable to the case of
petitioner. It believed that Neypes
applied only to Rules 40, 42, 43 and
45 appeals and not to a Rule 122
appeal, all under the Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a Petition11 under Rule
65 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union
alleging
that
the
MTCC
had
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his Motion

162

for Probation. He asserted that the

"fresh period rule" established in
Neypes should also be applied to
criminal cases. Petitioner prayed for a
liberal construction and application of
the rules. He also prayed that the RTC
stay the execution of the Decision
dated 25 August 2009, and that it
recall the warrant of arrest issued
pending the resolution of the issues.
On 26 April 2010, the RTC denied the
Petition and ruled that the application
period had lapsed when petitioner
neither surrendered nor filed a motion
for leave to avail himself of the
remedies under the Rules of Court. In
addition, the RTC ruled that petitioner
failed to implead private complainant
Alejo Cuyo in violation of Rule 65,
Section 5. This rule mandates that
petitioner should join as private
respondent the person interested in
sustaining the proceedings of the
court.
Petitioner filed the present Rule 45
Petition for Review, assailing the
Order of the RTC. He contends that
the RTC erred in computing the 15day period provided in the Probation
Law; and in dismissing the petition on
procedural
issues
without
determining whether petitioner is
entitled to avail himself of the
benefits of probation.
We find some merit in the petition,
but only with respect to the additional
ground for dismissal of the certiorari
petition cited by the RTC the failure
to implead private complainant as a

respondent in the Petition for

Certiorari filed before the RTC. We
uphold the rest of the RTC Decision,
and in doing so, fully affirm its
dispositive portion.
The RTC held that petitioner failed to
observe Rule 65, Sec. 5, which states:
Respondents and costs in certain
cases. When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents
with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons
interested
in
sustaining
the
proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private
respondents to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or
respondents
affected
by
the
proceedings, and the costs awarded
in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the private
respondents only, and not against the
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person
impleaded
as
public
respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed
by the court where the petition is
pending, the public respondents shall
not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any
pleading therein. If the case is
elevated to a higher court by either
party, the public respondent shall be

163

included therein as nominal parties.

However,
unless
otherwise
specifically directed by the court,
they shall not appear of participate in
the proceedings therein.
While it may be correct to say that
petitioner failed to comply with the
rule cited above, it would not be
correct to dismiss the petition based
on this provision. Rule 3, Sec. 11
states that neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Thus, the
trial court should have ordered
petitioner to add private complainant
as a respondent to the case.
Nevertheless, we agree with the RTC
that the Motion for Probation was
filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. The
judgment is promulgated by reading
it in the presence of the accused and
any judge of the Court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction
is for a light offense, the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment
may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In case the accused fails to appear at

the scheduled date of promulgation

of judgment despite notice, the

promulgation shall be made by
recording the judgement in the
criminal docket and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and
the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave
of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his
absence
at
the
scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days
from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and
found guilty of perjury. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a
period which is considered as a
correctional penalty. Under Article 9
of the Revised Penal Code, light
felonies are those infractions of law
for the commission of which the
penalty of arresto menor (one to
thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos
(P200), or both are imposable. Thus,
perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It
was
therefore
mandatory
for

164

petitioner to be present at
promulgation of the judgment.

the

To recall, despite notice, petitioner

was
absent
when
the
MTCC
promulgated its judgment on 25
August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120,
Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is
convicted of a light offense that a
promulgation may be pronounced in
the presence of his counsel or
representative. In case the accused
failed to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation despite notice,
and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the accused shall
lose all the remedies available in the
Rules against the judgment. One such
remedy
was
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the judgment of
the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28
August 2009. Absent a motion for
leave to avail of the remedies against
the judgment, the MTCC should not
have entertained petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner
had only 15 days from 25 August
2009 or until 9 September 2009 to
file his Motion for Probation. The
MTCC thus committed grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the
motion
instead
of
immediately
denying it.
In People of the Philippines v. De
Grano,12 we stated:
When the Decision dated April 25,
2002
was
promulgated,
only
Estanislao
Lacaba
was
present.1avvphi1 Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and

explaining the reasons for their

absence,
Joven,
Armando,
and
Domingo joined Estanislao in their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In
blatant disregard of the Rules, the
RTC not only failed to cause the arrest
of the respondents who were at large,
it also took cognizance of the joint
motion.
The
RTC
clearly
exceeded
its
jurisdiction when it entertained the
joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were
at large. It should have considered
the joint motion as a motion for
reconsideration that was solely filed
by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven
and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused
jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner asserts that his failure to
appear during the promulgation was
for a justifiable cause. He alleges that
he was on board an international
vessel as a seaman at the time of the
promulgation. He further alleges that
the MTCC was informed of this fact.
He insists that his absence was
justified, thus exempting him from
the application of Rule 120, Sec. 6.
Petitioner, however, did not file a
motion for leave to avail himself of

165

the remedies prior to filing his Motion

for Reconsideration. The hearing on
the motion for leave would have been
the proper opportunity for the parties
to allege and contest whatever cause
prevented petitioner from appearing
on 25 August 2009, and whether that
cause was indeed justifiable. If
granted, petitioner would have been
allowed to avail himself of other
remedies under the Rules of Court,
including
a
motion
for
reconsideration.
Moreover, in his Reply13 filed on 14
October 2010, petitioner belatedly
questions the propriety of the
promulgation. In so doing, petitioner
is barred by estoppel for failing to
raise the issue at the earliest possible
opportunity, that is, when the case
was still pending with the MTCC.
As a final point, while we held in Yu v.
Samson-Tatad14 that
the
rule
in
Neypes is also applicable to criminal
cases
regarding
appeals
from
convictions in criminal cases under
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
nevertheless, the doctrine is not
applicable to this case, considering
that petitioners Motion for Probation
was filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the
Petition is DENIED. The Order issued
by the Regional Trial Court in Special
Civil Action Case No. 0001-10 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Cuyo v. People of the Philippines

GR 192164
Facts: The petitioner is the accused in
a perjury case wherein he was
convicted to be imprisoned for 4
months, and during the promulgation
of the judgement the petitioner was
absent.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner

may still avail of the remedies after
trial.

Held: No, rule 120 section 6 of the

criminal procedure requires the
attendance of the accused during the
promulgation of judgement; and the
failure of the accused to appear
without justifiable cause the accused
shall lose all the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment.
However the judgement may be
promulgated on the counsel or
representative of the accused if the
offense committed is a light felony.
G.R. No. 168852
30, 2008

September

SHARICA
MARI
L.
GOTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and
JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

166

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued

an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's
prayer for a TPO.

Before the Court is a Petition for

Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q05-54536
and
the
RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which
denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.

On February 7, 2005, respondents

filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent
Protection
Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by
R.A. No. 9262.

The factual background of the case:

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed

a
Comment
on
Opposition11 to
respondents' Motion to Dismiss
arguing
that
respondents
were
covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety
of victims of violence.

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. GoTan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married.3 Out of this
union, two female children were born,
Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On
January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO)6 against
Steven
and
her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C.
Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents)
before the RTC. She alleged that
Steven,
in
conspiracy
with
respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and
(i)7 of
Republic
Act
(R.A.)
No.
8
9262, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a

Resolution12 dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that,
being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner,
they
were
not
included/covered
as
respondents
under R.A. No. 9262 under the wellknown rule of law "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed
her
Verified
Motion
for
14
Reconsideration contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication
should be applied in the broader
interests of substantial justice and
due process.

167

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed

their Comment on the Verified Motion
for
Reconsideration15arguing
that
petitioner's
liberal
construction
unduly broadened the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for
the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a
Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC reasoned that to include
respondents under the coverage of
R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained
interpretation of the provisions of the
law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure
question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTSSPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY
BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER,
IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST
WOMEN
AND
THEIR
17
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262
must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No.
9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly,
the provision on "conspiracy" under
Article 8 of the RPC can be

suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;

that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in
tormenting
her
by
giving
her
insufficient
financial
support;
harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically;
that respondents should be included
as indispensable or necessary parties
for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents
submit that they are not covered by
R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender
should be related to the victim only
by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents
require
a
factual
determination which cannot be done
by this Court in a petition for review;
that
respondents
cannot
be
characterized as indispensable or
necessary
parties,
since
their
presence in the case is not only
unnecessary but altogether illegal,
considering the non-inclusion of inlaws as offenders under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262.
The Court
petitioner.

rules

in

favor

of

the

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines

''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of
acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with

168

whom the person has or had a sexual

or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty."
While the said provision provides that
the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For
purposes of this Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable
laws,
shall
have suppletory
application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC
provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this
Code. This
Code
shall
be
supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially

provide
supplied)

the

contrary.(Emphasis

Hence, legal principles developed

from the Penal Code may be applied
in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws,
such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the
special law is silent on a particular
matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court
applied suppletorily the provision on
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of
the RPC to cases of violations of Act
No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting
that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant
could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, 19 the
Court applied suppletorily the rules
on the service of sentences provided
in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the
accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," considering the
lack of similar rules under the special
law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court
applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18
and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal,"
"accomplices"
and
"accessories" under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995," because said words were not
defined therein, although the special

169

law referred to the same terms in

enumerating the persons liable for
the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied
suppletorily
the
provisions
on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article
39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law," noting the
absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law.

It must be further noted that Section

5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children
may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against
Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxx

Most
recently,
in Ladonga
v.
People,22 the
Court
applied
suppletorily
the
principle
of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a
contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8
of
the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because
of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary
to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily
applicable,
may
be
applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may
be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent
or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.23

(h) Engaging in purposeful,

knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or
through
another, thatalarms or causes
substantial
emotional
or
psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following
the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window
or lingering outside the
residence of the woman
or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining
in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or
her child against her/his
will;
(4)
Destroying
the
property and personal

170

belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form
of
harassment
or
violence; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the protection order that
may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may
include
individuals other than the offending
husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The
protection orders that may be issued
under this Act shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:
(a)
Prohibition
of
the
respondent from threatening to
commit
or
committing,
personally orthrough another,
any of the acts mentioned in
Section
5
of
this
Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b)
Prohibition
of
the
respondent
from
harassing,
annoying,
telephoning,
contacting
or
otherwise
communicating
with
the
petitioner,
directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262

calls for a liberal construction of the
law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall
be liberally construed to promote
the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their
children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the
statute is the law24 and that this
intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the
express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature
for liberal construction as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of
the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection
and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.
Thus,
contrary
to
the
RTC's
pronouncement,
the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio
alterius" finds no application here. It
must be remembered that this maxim
is only an "ancillary rule of statutory
construction." It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It
should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is
not otherwise manifest and should
not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner
unnecessarily argues at great length
on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing
the
conspiracy
or
connivance
of
Steven
and

171

respondents
to
cause
verbal,
psychological and economic abuses
upon her. However, conspiracy is an
evidentiary matter which should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined
in the present petition since this
Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary
matters
since
this
controversy is centered only on the
determination
of
whether
respondents may be included in a
petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy
can be best passed upon after a trial
on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that
the principle of conspiracy may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on
whether
respondents
may
be
considered
indispensable
or
necessary parties. To do so would be
an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is GRANTED.
The
assailed
Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and
July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil
Case
No.
Q-05-54536
are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the
petition
against
respondents
is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No.
168852

Subject Matter: Applicability of

the doctrine of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code to R.A.
9262
(Anti-Violence
Against
Women and Children Act of 2004)
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari GoTan and Steven Tan were married. Out
of this union, two female children
were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen
Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely
six years into the marriage, petitioner
Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for
the
issuance
of
a
Temporary
Protective
Order
(TPO)
against
Steven,
in
conspiracy
with
respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological, and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and
(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses,
Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of
Sharica, may be included in the
petition for the issuance of a
protective order, in accordance with
RA 9262.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner. While the provisions of RA
9262 provides that the offender be
ralted or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a

172

sexual or dating relationship, it does

not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has
expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC. Hence, legal
principles developed from the Penal
Code
may
be
applied
in
a
supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as
RA 9262 in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.
G. R. No. 160188
2007

June 21,

ARISTOTEL
VALENZUELA
y
NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
NACHURA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the
firmament of our criminal law
jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively
concedes having performed the
felonious acts imputed against him,
but instead insists that as a result, he
should
be
adjudged
guilty
of
frustrated theft only, not the felony in
its consummated stage of which he
was convicted. The proposition rests
on a common theory expounded in
two well-known decisions1 rendered
decades ago by the Court of Appeals,

upholding the existence of frustrated

theft of which the accused in both
cases were found guilty. However, the
rationale behind the rulings has never
been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told, 2 the last time
this Court extensively considered
whether an accused was guilty of
frustrated or consummated theft was
in 1918, in People v. Adiao. 3 A more
cursory
treatment of the question was
followed in 1929, in People v.
Sobrevilla,4 and in 1984, in Empelis v.
IAC.5 This petition now gives occasion
for us to finally and fully measure if or
how frustrated theft is susceptible to
commission under the Revised Penal
Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed
before us. The case stems from an
Information6 charging
petitioner
Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and
Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the
crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at
around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and
Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex
along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard who was
then manning his post at the open
parking area of the supermarket.
Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing
an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),"
hauling a push cart with cases of

173

detergent of the well-known "Tide"

brand. Petitioner unloaded these
cases in an open parking space,
where
Calderon
was
waiting.
Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5)
minutes, emerged with more cartons
of
Tide
Ultramatic
and
again
unloaded these boxes to the same
area in the open parking space.7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking
area and haled a taxi. He boarded the
cab and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was
waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons
of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi,
then boarded the vehicle. All these
acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area. When
Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of
the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot,
but Lago fired a warning shot to alert
his fellow security guards of the
incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the
stolen merchandise recovered.8 The
filched items seized from the duo
were four (4) cases of Tide
Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25
grams, and three (3) additional cases
of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of P12,090.00.9
Petitioner and Calderon were first
brought to the SM security office
before they were transferred on the
same day to the Baler Station II of the
Philippine National Police, Quezon
City, for investigation. It appears from

the police investigation records that

apart from petitioner and Calderon,
four
(4)
other
persons
were
apprehended by the security guards
at the scene and delivered to police
custody at the Baler PNP Station in
connection
with
the
incident.
However, after the matter was
referred to the Office of the Quezon
City Prosecutor, only petitioner and
Calderon were charged with theft by
the Assistant City Prosecutor, in
Informations prepared on 20 May
1994, the day after the incident.10
After
pleading
not
guilty
on
arraignment, at the trial, petitioner
and Calderon both claimed having
been innocent bystanders within the
vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the
afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they
were haled by Lago and his fellow
security guards after a commotion
and brought to the Baler PNP Station.
Calderon
alleged
that
on
the
afternoon of the incident, he was at
the Super Sale Club to withdraw from
his ATM account, accompanied by his
neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.11 As the
queue for the ATM was long, Calderon
and Rosulada decided to buy snacks
inside the supermarket. It was while
they were eating that they heard the
gunshot fired by Lago, leading them
to head out of the building to check
what was
transpiring. As they were outside,
they were suddenly "grabbed" by a
security guard, thus commencing
their
detention.12 Meanwhile,
petitioner testified during trial that he

174

and
his
cousin,
a
Gregorio
Valenzuela,13 had been at the parking
lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS
complex and headed to ride a tricycle
going to Pag-asa, when they saw the
security guard Lago fire a shot. The
gunshot caused him and the other
people at the scene to start running,
at which point he was apprehended
by Lago and brought to the security
office. Petitioner claimed he was
detained at the security office until
around 9:00 p.m., at which time he
and the others were brought to the
Baler Police Station. At the station,
petitioner denied having stolen the
cartons of detergent, but he was
detained overnight, and eventually
brought to the prosecutors office
where
he
was
charged
with
14
theft. During
petitioners
crossexamination, he admitted that he had
been employed as a "bundler" of GMS
Marketing,
"assigned
at
the
15
supermarket" though not at SM.
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1
February 2000, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
90, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon
of
the
crime
of
consummated theft. They were
sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of two (2) years of prision
correccional as minimum to seven (7)
years
of
prision
mayor
as
17
maximum. The RTC found credible
the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses
and
established
the
convictions
on
the
positive
identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime.

Both accused filed their respective

Notices
of
Appeal,18 but
only
19
petitioner filed a brief with the Court
of Appeals, causing the appellate
court to deem Calderons appeal as
abandoned
and
consequently
dismissed. Before the Court of
Appeals, petitioner argued that he
should only be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in
a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen.20 However, in its
Decision dated 19 June 2003,21 the
Court of Appeals rejected this
contention and affirmed petitioners
conviction.22 Hence
the
present
Petition for Review,23 which expressly
seeks that petitioners conviction "be
modified to only of Frustrated
Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of
Appeals,
petitioner
effectively
conceded both his felonious intent
and his actual participation in the
theft of several cases of detergent
with a total value of P12,090.00 of
which he was charged.25 As such,
there is no cause for the Court to
consider a factual scenario other than
that presented by the prosecution, as
affirmed by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. The only question to
consider is whether under the given
facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be
convicted
of
frustrated
theft,

175

petitioner
cites26 two
decisions
rendered many years ago by the
Court of Appeals: People v. Dio 27 and
People v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit
the interest of this Court, as they
modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and
involve a factual milieu that bears
similarity to the present case.
Petitioner invoked the same rulings in
his appeal to the Court of Appeals,
yet the appellate court did not
expressly consider the import of the
rulings
when
it
affirmed
the
conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court
of Appeals for giving short shrift to
the Dio and Flores rulings since they
have not yet been expressly adopted
as precedents by this Court. For
whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the
crime of frustrated theft has not
come to pass before us. Yet despite
the silence on our part, Dio and
Flores have attained a level of renown
reached by very few other appellate
court
rulings.
They
are
comprehensively discussed in the
most popular of our criminal law
annotations,29 and studied in criminal
law classes as textbook examples of
frustrated crimes or even as definitive
of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in
those cases is hardly akin to the
fanciful scenarios that populate
criminal law exams more than they
actually occur in real life. Indeed, if

we finally say that Dio and Flores

are doctrinal, such conclusion could
profoundly influence a multitude of
routine theft prosecutions, including
commonplace
shoplifting.
Any
scenario that involves the thief
having to exit with the stolen
property through a supervised egress,
such as a supermarket checkout
counter or a parking area pay booth,
may easily call for the application of
Dio and Flores. The fact that lower
courts have not hesitated to lay down
convictions for frustrated theft further
validates that Dio and Flores and the
theories offered therein on frustrated
theft have borne some weight in our
jurisprudential system. The time is
thus ripe for us to examine whether
those theories are correct and should
continue to influence prosecutors and
judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis
of Dio and Flores, as well as the
specific issues relative to "frustrated
theft," it is necessary to first refer to
the basic rules on the three stages of
crimes under our Revised Penal
Code.30
Article 6 defines those three stages,
namely the consummated, frustrated
and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated "when all the elements
necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present." It is
frustrated
"when
the
offender
performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a

176

consequence
but
which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is
attempted
"when
the
offender
commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or
accident
other
than
his
own
spontaneous desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal
Code has a "subjective phase," or
that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by
the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated
crime.31 After that point has been
breached, the subjective phase ends
and the objective phase begins. 32 It
has been held that if the offender
never passes the subjective phase of
the offense, the crime is merely
attempted.33 On the other hand, the
subjective
phase
is
completely
passed in case of frustrated crimes,
for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively
the crime is complete."34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between
consummated and frustrated felonies
on one hand, and attempted felonies
on the other. So long as the offender
fails to complete all the acts of
execution despite commencing the
commission of a felony, the crime is
undoubtedly in the attempted stage.
Since the specific acts of execution

that define each crime under the

Revised Penal Code are generally
enumerated in the code itself, the
task of ascertaining whether a crime
is attempted only would need to
compare the acts actually performed
by the accused as against the acts
that constitute the felony under the
Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of
whether a crime is frustrated or
consummated necessitates an initial
concession that all of the acts of
execution have been performed by
the offender. The critical distinction
instead is whether the felony itself
was actually produced by the acts of
execution. The determination of
whether the felony was "produced"
after all the acts of execution had
been performed hinges on the
particular statutory definition of the
felony. It is the statutory definition
that generally furnishes the elements
of each crime under the Revised
Penal Code, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite
acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea"
supplies an important characteristic
of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent
must unite with an unlawful act for
there to be a crime," and accordingly,
there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting.35 Accepted
in this jurisdiction as material in
crimes mala in se,36 mens rea has
been defined before as "a guilty

177

mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or

criminal intent,"37 and "essential for
criminal liability."38 It follows that the
statutory definition of our mala in se
crimes must be able to supply what
the mens rea of the crime is, and
indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that "a criminal law
that
contains
no
mens
rea
requirement
infringes
on
constitutionally
protected
rights."39 The criminal statute must
also provide for the overt acts that
constitute the crime. For a crime to
exist in our legal law, it is not enough
that mens rea be shown; there must
also be an actus reus.40
It is from the actus reus and the mens
rea, as they find expression in the
criminal statute, that the felony is
produced. As a postulate in the
craftsmanship
of
constitutionally
sound laws, it is extremely preferable
that the language of the law
expressly provide when the felony is
produced. Without such provision,
disputes would inevitably ensue on
the elemental question whether or
not a crime was committed, thereby
presaging the undesirable and legally
dubious set-up under which the
judiciary is assigned the legislative
role of defining crimes. Fortunately,
our Revised Penal Code does not
suffer from such infirmity. From the
statutory definition of any felony, a
decisive
passage
or
term
is
embedded which attests when the
felony is produced by the acts of
execution. For example, the statutory
definition of murder or homicide

expressly uses the phrase "shall kill

another," thus making it clear that
the felony is produced by the death of
the victim, and conversely, it is not
produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory
definition of theft. Under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, its
elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.
Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another
without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost
property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having
maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an
inclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather
cereals, or other forest or farm
products.

178

Article 308 provides for a general

definition
of
theft,
and
three
alternative and highly idiosyncratic
means by which theft may be
committed.41 In
the
present
discussion, we need to concern
ourselves only with the general
definition since it was under it that
the prosecution of the accused was
undertaken and sustained. On the
face of the definition, there is only
one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft the taking of
personal property of another. It is also
clear from the provision that in order
that such taking may be qualified as
theft, there must further be present
the descriptive circumstances that
the taking was with intent to gain;
without force upon things or violence
against or intimidation of persons;
and it was without the consent of the
owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the
following elements of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that
there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra
traces the history of the definition of
theft, which under early Roman law
as defined by Gaius, was so broad

enough as to encompass "any kind of

physical
handling
of
property
belonging to another against the will
of the owner,"43 a definition similar to
that by Paulus that a thief "handles
(touches, moves) the property of
another."44 However,
with
the
Institutes of Justinian, the idea had
taken hold that more than mere
physical handling, there must further
be an intent of acquiring gain from
the object, thus: "[f]urtum est
contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri
faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam
usus
ejus
possessinisve."45 This
requirement of animo lucrandi, or
intent to gain, was maintained in both
the Spanish and Filipino penal laws,
even as it has since been abandoned
in Great Britain.46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was
compounded with apoderamiento, or
"unlawful taking," to characterize
theft. Justice Regalado notes that the
concept of apoderamiento once had a
controversial
interpretation
and
application. Spanish law had already
discounted the belief that mere
physical taking was constitutive of
apoderamiento, finding that it had to
be coupled with "the intent to
appropriate the object in order to
constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the
lawful owner of the thing."47 However,
a conflicting line of cases decided by
the
Court
of
Appeals
ruled,
alternatively, that there must be
permanency in the taking48 or an
intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the stolen property;49 or that

179

there was no need for permanency in

the taking or in its intent, as the mere
temporary possession by the offender
or disturbance of the proprietary
rights
of
the
owner
already
constituted
apoderamiento.50 Ultimately,
as
Justice Regalado notes, the Court
adopted the latter thought that there
was no need of an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his
property to constitute an unlawful
taking.51
So
long
as
the
"descriptive"
circumstances that qualify the taking
are present, including animo lucrandi
and apoderamiento, the completion
of the operative act that is the taking
of personal property of another
establishes, at least, that the
transgression
went
beyond
the
attempted stage. As applied to the
present case, the moment petitioner
obtained physical possession of the
cases of detergent and loaded them
in
the
pushcart,
such
seizure
motivated
by
intent
to
gain,
completed without need to inflict
violence or intimidation against
persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of
the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner
forfeited the extenuating benefit a
conviction for only attempted theft
would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it
was consummated or frustrated theft,
we are obliged to apply Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code to ascertain
the answer. Following that provision,

the theft would have been frustrated

only, once the acts committed by
petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to
produce theft as a consequence, "do
not produce [such theft] by reason of
causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator." There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider:
that the felony is not "produced," and
that such failure is due to causes
independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
The
second
factor
ultimately depends on the evidence
at hand in each particular case. The
first, however, relies primarily on a
doctrinal definition attaching to the
individual felonies in the Revised
Penal Code52 as to when a particular
felony is "not produced," despite the
commission of all the acts of
execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the
theft is consummated or frustrated, it
is necessary to inquire as to how
exactly is the felony of theft
"produced." Parsing through the
statutory definition of theft under
Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of
the law that theft is already
"produced" upon the "tak[ing of]
personal property of another without
the latters consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports
that notion. Therein, a customs
inspector was charged with theft after
he abstracted a leather belt from the
baggage of a foreign national and
secreted the item in his desk at the
Custom House. At no time was the

180

accused able to "get the merchandise

out of the Custom House," and it
appears
that
he
"was
under
observation
during
the
entire
54
transaction." Based apparently on
those two circumstances, the trial
court had found him guilty, instead,
of frustrated theft. The Court
reversed,
saying
that
neither
circumstance was decisive, and
holding instead that the accused was
guilty of consummated theft, finding
that "all the elements of the
completed
crime
of
theft
are
55
present." In support of its conclusion
that the theft was consummated, the
Court cited three (3) decisions of the
Supreme
Court
of
Spain,
the
discussion of which we replicate
below:
The defendant was charged with the
theft of some fruit from the land of
another. As he was in the act of
taking the fruit[,] he was seen by a
policeman, yet it did not appear that
he was at that moment caught by the
policeman but sometime later. The
court said: "[x x x] The trial court did
not err [x x x ] in considering the
crime as that of consummated theft
instead of frustrated theft inasmuch
as nothing appears in the record
showing that the policemen who saw
the accused take the fruit from the
adjoining land arrested him in the act
and thus prevented him from taking
full possession of the thing stolen and
even its utilization by him for an
interval of time." (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 14,
1898.)

Defendant picked the pocket of the

offended party while the latter was
hearing mass in a church. The latter
on account of the solemnity of the
act, although noticing the theft, did
not do anything to prevent it.
Subsequently, however, while the
defendant was still inside the church,
the offended party got back the
money from the defendant. The court
said
that
the
defendant
had
performed all the acts of execution
and
considered
the
theft
as
consummated. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, December 1,
1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a
room of a certain house and by
means of a key opened up a case,
and from the case took a small box,
which was also opened with a key,
from which in turn he took a purse
containing 461 reales and 20
centimos, and then he placed the
money over the cover of the case;
just at this moment he was caught by
two guards who were stationed in
another room near-by. The court
considered this as consummated
robbery, and said: "[x x x] The
accused [x x x] having materially
taken possession of the money from
the moment he took it from the place
where it had been, and having taken
it with his hands with intent to
appropriate the same, he executed all
the acts necessary to constitute the
crime which was thereby produced;
only the act of making use of the
thing having been frustrated, which,
however, does not go to make the

181

elements
of
the
consummated
crime." (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao
itself, and the three (3) Spanish
decisions cited therein, that the
criminal actors in all these cases had
been able to obtain full possession of
the personal property prior to their
apprehension. The interval between
the commission of the acts of theft
and the apprehension of the thieves
did vary, from "sometime later" in the
1898 decision; to the very moment
the thief had just extracted the
money in a purse which had been
stored as it was in the 1882 decision;
and before the thief had been able to
spirit the item stolen from the
building where the theft took place,
as had happened in Adiao and the
1897 decision. Still, such intervals
proved of no consequence in those
cases, as it was ruled that the thefts
in each of those cases was
consummated
by
the
actual
possession of the property belonging
to another.
In 1929, the Court was again
confronted by a claim that an
accused was guilty only of frustrated
rather than consummated theft. The
case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where
the accused, while in the midst of a
crowd in a public market, was already
able to abstract a pocketbook from
the trousers of the victim when the
latter, perceiving the theft, "caught
hold of the [accused]s shirt-front, at
the same time shouting for a

policeman; after a struggle, he

recovered his pocket-book and let go
of the defendant, who was afterwards
caught by a policeman."58 In rejecting
the contention that only frustrated
theft was established, the Court
simply said, without further comment
or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is
groundless. The [accused] succeeded
in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the
pocket-book
was
afterwards
recovered, such recovery does not
affect
the
[accuseds]
criminal
liability, which arose from the
[accused] having succeeded in taking
the pocket-book.59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent
with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme
Court cases cited in the latter, in that
the fact that the offender was able to
succeed
in
obtaining
physical
possession of the stolen item, no
matter how momentary, was able to
consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish
Supreme Court decisions cited therein
contradict the position of petitioner in
this case. Yet to simply affirm without
further
comment
would
be
disingenuous, as there is another
school of thought on when theft is
consummated, as reflected in the
Dio and Flores decisions.
Dio was decided by the Court of
Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after
Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The

182

accused therein, a driver employed

by the United States Army, had
driven his truck into the port area of
the South Harbor, to unload a
truckload of materials to waiting U.S.
Army personnel. After he had finished
unloading, accused drove away his
truck from the Port, but as he was
approaching a checkpoint of the
Military Police, he was stopped by an
M.P. who inspected the truck and
found therein three boxes of army
rifles. The accused later contended
that he had been stopped by four
men who had loaded the boxes with
the agreement that they were to
meet him and retrieve the rifles after
he had passed the checkpoint. The
trial court convicted accused of
consummated theft, but the Court of
Appeals modified the conviction,
holding instead that only frustrated
theft had been committed.

proposition was drawn from a

decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888
decision), which was quoted as
follows:

In doing so, the appellate court

pointed out that the evident intent of
the accused was to let the boxes of
rifles "pass through the checkpoint,
perhaps in the belief that as the truck
had already unloaded its cargo inside
the depot, it would be allowed to pass
through the check point without
further
investigation
or
checking."60 This point was deemed
material and indicative that the theft
had not been fully produced, for the
Court of Appeals pronounced that
"the
fact
determinative
of
consummation is the ability of the
thief to dispose freely of the articles
stolen, even if it were more or less
momentary."61 Support
for
this

This court is of the opinion that in the

case at bar, in order to make the
booty subject to the control and
disposal of the culprits, the articles
stolen must first be passed through
the M.P. check point, but since the
offense was opportunely discovered
and the articles seized after all the
acts
of
execution
had
been
performed, but before the loot came
under the final control and disposal of
the looters, the offense can not be
said to have been fully consummated,
as it was frustrated by the timely
intervention of the guard. The offense
committed, therefore, is that of
frustrated theft.63

Considerando que para que el

apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida
sea determinate de la consumacion
del delito de hurto es preciso que so
haga en circunstancias tales que
permitan al sustractor la libre
disposicion de aquella, siquiera sea
mas o menos momentaneamente,
pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto
del delito de hurto, no puede decirse
en realidad que se haya producido en
toda su extension, sin materializar
demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa
ajena.62
Integrating these considerations, the
Court of Appeals then concluded:

183

Dio thus laid down the theory that

the ability of the actor to freely
dispose of the items stolen at the
time of apprehension is determinative
as
to
whether
the
theft
is
consummated or frustrated. This
theory was applied again by the Court
of Appeals some 15 years later, in
Flores, a case which according to the
division of the court that decided it,
bore
"no
substantial
variance
between the circumstances [herein]
and in [Dio]."64 Such conclusion is
borne out by the facts in Flores. The
accused therein, a checker employed
by the Luzon Stevedoring Company,
issued a delivery receipt for one
empty sea van to the truck driver
who had loaded the purportedly
empty sea van onto his truck at the
terminal of the stevedoring company.
The truck driver proceeded to show
the delivery receipt to the guard on
duty at the gate of the terminal.
However, the guards insisted on
inspecting the van, and discovered
that the "empty" sea van had actually
contained other merchandise as
well.65The accused was prosecuted
for theft qualified by abuse of
confidence,
and
found
himself
convicted of the consummated crime.
Before the Court of Appeals, accused
argued in the alternative that he was
guilty only of attempted theft, but the
appellate court pointed out that there
was
no
intervening
act
of
spontaneous desistance on the part
of
the
accused
that
"literally
frustrated the theft." However, the
Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on
Dio, did find that the accused was

guilty only of frustrated, and not

consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court
admitted it found "no substantial
variance"
between Dio and Flores then before
it. The prosecution in Flores had
sought to distinguish that case
from Dio, citing a "traditional ruling"
which
unfortunately
was
not
identified in the decision itself.
However, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that the said "traditional
ruling" was qualified by the words "is
placed in a situation where [the actor]
could dispose of its contents at
once."66 Pouncing
on
this
qualification, the appellate court
noted that "[o]bviously, while the
truck and the van were still within the
compound, the petitioner could not
have disposed of the goods at
once." At the same time, the Court of
Appeals conceded that "[t]his is
entirely different from the case where
a much less bulk and more common
thing as money was the object of the
crime, where freedom to dispose of or
make use of it is palpably less
restricted,"67 though
no
further
qualification was offered what the
effect would have been had that
alternative
circumstance
been
present instead.
Synthesis of the Dio and Flores
rulings is in order. The determinative
characteristic as to whether the crime
of theft was produced is the ability of
the actor "to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, even if it were only

184

momentary." Such conclusion was

drawn from an 1888 decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain which had
pronounced that in determining
whether
theft
had
been
consummated, "es preciso que so
haga en circunstancias tales que
permitan al sustractor de aquella,
siquiera
sea
mas
o
menos
momentaneamente." The qualifier
"siquiera
sea
mas
o
menos
momentaneamente" proves another
important consideration, as it implies
that if the actor was in a capacity to
freely dispose of the stolen items
before apprehension, then the theft
could be deemed consummated.
Such circumstance was not present in
either Dio or Flores, as the stolen
items in both cases were retrieved
from the actor before they could be
physically extracted from the guarded
compounds from which the items
were filched. However, as implied in
Flores, the character of the item
stolen could lead to a different
conclusion as to whether there could
have been "free disposition," as in the
case where the chattel involved was
of "much less bulk and more common
x x x, [such] as money x x x."68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice
Aquino makes the following pointed
observation on the import of the Dio
ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of
Appeals that theft is consummated
when the thief is able to freely
dispose of the stolen articles even if it
were more or less momentary. Or as

stated in another case[69 ], theft is

consummated upon the voluntary
and malicious taking of property
belonging to another which is realized
by the material occupation of the
thing whereby the thief places it
under his control and in such a
situation that he could dispose of it at
once. This ruling seems to have been
based on Viadas opinion that in order
the theft may be consummated, "es
preciso
que
se
haga
en
70
71
circumstancias x x x [ ]"
In the same commentaries, Chief
Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao
and other cases, also states that "[i]n
theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had
material possession of the thing with
intent to appropriate the same,
although his act of making use of the
thing was frustrated."72
There are at least two other Court of
Appeals rulings that are at seeming
variance with the Dio and Flores
rulings. People v. Batoon73 involved
an accused who filled a container
with gasoline from a petrol pump
within view of a police detective, who
followed
the
accused
onto
a
passenger truck where the arrest was
made. While the trial court found the
accused guilty of frustrated qualified
theft, the Court of Appeals held that
the
accused
was
guilty
of
consummated qualified theft, finding
that "[t]he facts of the cases of U.S.
[v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla
x x x indicate that actual taking with

185

intent
to
gain
is
enough
consummate the crime of theft."74

to

In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused

had removed nine pieces of hospital
linen from a supply depot and loaded
them onto a truck. However, as the
truck passed through the checkpoint,
the stolen items were discovered by
the Military Police running the
checkpoint. Even though those facts
clearly admit to similarity with those
in Dio, the Court of Appeals held
that the accused were guilty of
consummated theft, as the accused
"were able to take or get hold of the
hospital linen and that the only thing
that was frustrated, which does not
constitute any element of theft, is the
use or benefit that the thieves
expected from the commission of the
offense."76
In pointing out the distinction
between Dio and Espiritu, Reyes
wryly observes that "[w]hen the
meaning of an element of a felony is
controversial, there is bound to arise
different rulings as to the stage of
execution of that felony."77 Indeed, we
can discern from this survey of
jurisprudence that the state of the
law insofar as frustrated theft is
concerned is muddled. It fact, given
the disputed foundational basis of the
concept of frustrated theft itself, the
question can even be asked whether
there is really such a crime in the first
place.
IV.

The Court in 1984 did finally rule

directly that an accused was guilty of
frustrated, and not consummated,
theft. As we undertake this inquiry,
we have to reckon with the import of
this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis
v. IAC.78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of
a coconut plantation had espied four
(4) persons in the premises of his
plantation, in the act of gathering and
tying some coconuts. The accused
were surprised by the owner within
the plantation as they were carrying
with them the coconuts they had
gathered. The accused fled the scene,
dropping the coconuts they had
seized,
and
were
subsequently
arrested after the owner reported the
incident to the police. After trial, the
accused were convicted of qualified
theft, and the issue they raised on
appeal was that they were guilty only
of simple theft. The Court affirmed
that the theft was qualified, following
Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code,79 but further held that the
accused were guilty only of frustrated
qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis
decision that the issue of whether the
theft was consummated or frustrated
was raised by any of the parties.
What does appear, though, is that the
disposition
of
that
issue
was
contained in only two sentences,
which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only
frustrated qualified theft because

186

petitioners were not able to perform

all the acts of execution which should
have produced the felony as a
consequence. They were not able to
carry the coconuts away from the
plantation due to the timely arrival of
the owner.80
No legal reference or citation was
offered for this averment, whether
Dio, Flores or the Spanish authorities
who
may
have
bolstered
the
conclusion. There are indeed evident
problems with this formulation in
Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only
frustrated because the actors "were
not able to perform all the acts of
execution
which
should
have
produced
the
felon
as
a
consequence."81 However, per Article
6 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime is frustrated "when the
offender performs all the acts of
execution," though not producing the
felony as a result. If the offender was
not able to perform all the acts of
execution, the crime is attempted,
provided that the non-performance
was by reason of some cause or
accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that
the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts
of execution were performed due to
the timely arrival of the owner.
However, following Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, these facts
should elicit the conclusion that the
crime was only attempted, especially

given that the acts were not

performed because of the timely
arrival of the owner, and not because
of spontaneous desistance by the
offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot
attribute weight to Empelis as we
consider the present petition. Even if
the two sentences we had cited
actually aligned with the definitions
provided in Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, such passage bears no
reflection that it is the product of the
considered evaluation of the relevant
legal or jurisprudential thought.
Instead, the passage is offered as if it
were sourced from an indubitable
legal premise so settled it required no
further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been
reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited
as authority on theft. Indeed, we
cannot
see
how
Empelis
can
contribute to our present debate,
except for the bare fact that it proves
that the Court had once deliberately
found an accused guilty of frustrated
theft.
Even
if
Empelis
were
considered as a precedent for
frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is
extremely compromised by the
erroneous legal premises that inform
it, and also by the fact that it has not
been entrenched by subsequent
reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us
that it is an insurmountable given
that frustrated theft is viable in this
jurisdiction. Considering the flawed

187

reasoning behind its conclusion of

frustrated theft, it cannot present any
efficacious argument to persuade us
in this case. Insofar as Empelis may
imply that convictions for frustrated
theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to
reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code
was enacted in 1930, the 1870
Codigo Penal de Espaa was then in
place. The definition of the crime of
theft, as provided then, read as
follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y
sin volencia o intimidacin en las
personas ni fuerza en las cosas,
toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin
la voluntad de su dueo.
2. Los que encontrndose una cosa
perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo
se la apropriaren co intencin de
lucro.
3. Los daadores que sustrajeren o
utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao
causado, salvo los casos previstos en
los artculos 606, nm. 1.0; 607,
nms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, nm. 1.0;
611; 613; Segundo prrafo del 617 y
618.
It was under the ambit of the
1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited
Spanish Supreme Court decisions

were handed down. However, the

said code would be revised again in
1932, and several times thereafter. In
fact, under the Codigo Penal Espaol
de 1995, the crime of theft is now
simply defined as "[e]l que, con
nimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin
la voluntad de su dueo ser
castigado"82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995
definition of theft in the penal code of
Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the
property is not an element or a
statutory characteristic of the crime.
It does appear that the principle
originated and perhaps was fostered
in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted
a question-answer form in his 1926
commentaries on the 1870 Codigo
Penal de Espaa. Therein, he raised
at least three questions for the reader
whether the crime of frustrated or
consummated theft had occurred.
The passage cited in Dio was
actually utilized by Viada to answer
the question whether frustrated or
consummated theft was committed
"[e]l que en el momento mismo de
apoderarse de la
cosa
ajena,
vindose sorprendido, la arroja al
suelo."83 Even as the answer was as
stated in Dio, and was indeed
derived from the 1888 decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, that
decisions
factual
predicate
occasioning
the
statement
was
apparently very different from Dio,

188

for it appears that the 1888 decision

involved an accused who was
surprised by the employees of a
haberdashery as he was abstracting a
layer of clothing off a mannequin, and
who then proceeded to throw away
the garment as he fled.84

1921; esta doctrina no es admissible,

stos, conforme a lo antes expuesto,
son hurtos consumados.86

Nonetheless, Viada does not contest

the notion of frustrated theft, and
willingly recites decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain that have
held to that effect.85 A few decades
later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello
Caln pointed out the inconsistent
application by the Spanish Supreme
Court with respect to frustrated theft.

La
doctrina
hoy
generalmente
sustentada considera que el hurto se
consuma cuando la cosa queda de
hecho a la disposicin del agente.
Con este criterio coincide la doctrina
sentada
ltimamente
porla
jurisprudencia
espaola
que
generalmente considera consumado
el hurto cuando el culpable coge o
aprehende la cosa y sta quede por
tiempo ms o menos duradero bajo
su poder. El hecho de que ste pueda
aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es
indiferente. El delito no pierde su
carcter de consumado aunque la
cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el
culpable o fuere recuperada. No se
concibe la frustracin, pues es muy
dificil que el que hace cuanto es
necesario para la consumacin del
hurto no lo consume efectivamente,
los
raros
casos
que
nuestra
jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara
hurtos frustrados son verdaderos
delitos
consumados.87 (Emphasis
supplied)

Hay frustracin cuando los reos

fueron sorprendidos por las guardias
cuando llevaban los sacos de harino
del carro que los conducia a otro que
tenan preparado, 22 febrero 1913;
cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto
por la intervencin de la policia
situada en el local donde se realiz la
sustraccin que impidi pudieran los
reos disponer de lo sustrado, 30 de
octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos"
frustracin, si existe apoderamiento,
pero el culpale no llega a disponer de
la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustracin
"muy prxima" cuando el culpable es
detenido por el perjudicado acto
seguido de cometer la sustraccin, 28
febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han
considerado
la
existencia
de
frustracin cuando, perseguido el
culpable
o
sorprendido
en
el
momento de llevar los efectos
hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo
1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo

Ultimately, Cuello Caln attacked the

very idea that frustrated theft is
actually possible:

Cuello Calns submissions cannot be

lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was
content with replicating the Spanish
Supreme Court decisions on the
matter, Cuello Caln actually set forth
his own thought that questioned
whether
theft
could
truly
be

189

frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil

que el que hace cuanto es necesario
para la consumacin del hurto no lo
consume efectivamente." Otherwise
put, it would be difficult to foresee
how the execution of all the acts
necessary for the completion of the
crime would not produce the effect of
theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces
us, at least, that there is no weighted
force in scholarly thought that obliges
us to accept frustrated theft, as
proposed in Dio and Flores. A final
ruling by the Court that there is no
crime of frustrated theft in this
jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic
pariah, for such a submission is
hardly heretical in light of Cuello
Calns position.
Accordingly,
it
would
not
be
intellectually disingenuous for the
Court to look at the question from a
fresh perspective, as we are not
bound by the opinions of the
respected Spanish commentators,
conflicting as they are, to accept that
theft is capable of commission in its
frustrated stage. Further, if we ask
the question whether there is a
mandate of statute or precedent that
must compel us to adopt the Dio
and Flores doctrines, the answer has
to be in the negative. If we did so, it
would arise not out of obeisance to
an inexorably higher command, but
from the exercise of the function of
statutory interpretation that comes as
part and parcel of judicial review, and
a function that allows breathing room

for a variety of theorems in

competition until one is ultimately
adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us
as we explore the matter is that it lies
in the province of the legislature,
through statute, to define what
constitutes a particular crime in this
jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as
representatives of the sovereign
people, which determines which acts
or combination of acts are criminal in
nature. Judicial interpretation of penal
laws should be aligned with what was
the evident legislative intent, as
expressed primarily in the language
of the law as it defines the crime. It is
Congress, not the courts, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.88 The
courts
cannot
arrogate the power to introduce a
new element of a crime which was
unintended by the legislature, or
redefine a crime in a manner that
does not hew to the statutory
language. Due respect for the
prerogative of Congress in defining
crimes/felonies constrains the Court
to refrain from a broad interpretation
of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. "The
Court must take heed of language,
legislative history and purpose, in
order to strictly determine the wrath
and breath of the conduct the law
forbids."89
With that in mind, a problem clearly
emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum.

190

The ability of the offender to freely

dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of
theft. It finds no support or extension
in Article 308, whether as a
descriptive or operative element of
theft or as the mens rea or actus reus
of the felony. To restate what this
Court has repeatedly held: the
elements of the crime of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there
be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.90
Such factor runs immaterial to the
statutory definition of theft, which is
the taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property of another without
the
latters
consent.
While
the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate
to the mindset of the offender, the
statutory definition of theft considers
only the perspective of intent to gain
on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of
property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining
whether theft is susceptible of
commission in the frustrated stage,
the question is again, when is the
crime of theft produced? There would
be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when

there is deprivation of personal

property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able
or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution.
This conclusion is reflected in Chief
Justice Aquinos commentaries, as
earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or
robbery the crime is consummated
after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his
act of making use of the thing was
frustrated."91
It might be argued, that the ability of
the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen delves into the
concept of "taking" itself, in that
there could be no true taking until the
actor obtains such degree of control
over the stolen item. But even if this
were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade
the
crime
to
its
attempted, and not frustrated stage,
for it would mean that not all the acts
of
execution
have
not
been
completed, the "taking not having
been accomplished." Perhaps this
point could serve as fertile ground for
future discussion, but our concern
now is whether there is indeed a
crime of frustrated theft, and such
consideration
proves
ultimately
immaterial
to
that
question.
Moreover, such issue will not apply to

191

the facts of this particular case. We

are satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case.
With intent to gain, he acquired
physical possession of the stolen
cases of detergent for a considerable
period of time that he was able to
drop these off at a spot in the parking
lot, and long enough to load these
onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that
unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same.92 And long
ago, we asserted in People v. Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion
in the crime of theft is the taking of
the thing to be appropriated into the
physical power of the thief, which
idea is qualified by other conditions,
such as that the taking must be
effectedanimo lucrandi and without
the consent of the owner; and it will
be here noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be
effected against the will of the owner
but merely that it should be without
his consent, a distinction of no slight
importance.94
Insofar as we consider the present
question, "unlawful taking" is most
material in this respect. Unlawful
taking, which is the deprivation of
ones personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in
its consummated stage. At the same

time, without unlawful taking as an

act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can
only conclude that under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft
can
only
be
attempted
or
consummated.
Neither Dio nor Flores can convince
us otherwise. Both fail to consider
that once the offenders therein
obtained possession over the stolen
items, the effect of the felony has
been produced as there has been
deprivation
of
property.
The
presumed inability of the offenders to
freely dispose of the stolen property
does not negate the fact that the
owners have already been deprived
of their right to possession upon the
completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case,
the adoption of the rule that the
inability of the offender to freely
dispose of the stolen property
frustrates the theft would introduce
a convenient defense for the accused
which does not reflect any legislated
intent,95 since the Court would have
carved a viable means for offenders
to seek a mitigated penalty under
applied circumstances that do not
admit of easy classification. It is
difficult
to
formulate
definite
standards as to when a stolen item is
susceptible to free disposal by the
thief. Would this depend on the
psychological belief of the offender at

192

the time of the commission of the

crime, as implied in Dio?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of
several
classes
of
factual
circumstances such as the size and
weight of the property, the location of
the property, the number and identity
of people present at the scene of the
crime, the number and identity of
people
whom
the
offender
is
expected to encounter upon fleeing
with the stolen property, the manner
in which the stolen item had been
housed or stored; and quite frankly, a
whole lot more. Even the fungibility or
edibility of the stolen item would
come into account, relevant as that
would be on whether such property is
capable of free disposal at any stage,
even after the taking has been
consummated.
All these complications will make us
lose sight of the fact that beneath all
the colorful detail, the owner was
indeed deprived of property by one
who intended to produce such
deprivation for reasons of gain. For
such will remain the presumed fact if
frustrated theft were recognized, for
therein, all of the acts of execution,
including the taking, have been
completed. If the facts establish the
non-completion of the taking due to
these peculiar circumstances, the
effect could be to downgrade the
crime to the attempted stage, as not
all of the acts of execution have been
performed. But once all these acts
have been executed, the taking has
been completed, causing the unlawful

deprivation
of
property,
and
ultimately the consummation of the
theft.
Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are, in
some degree, grounded in common
sense. Yet they do not align with the
legislated framework of the crime of
theft. The Revised Penal Code
provisions on theft have not been
designed in such fashion as to
accommodate said rulings. Again,
there is no language in Article 308
that expressly or impliedly allows that
the "free disposition of the items
stolen" is in any way determinative of
whether the crime of theft has been
produced. Dio itself did not rely on
Philippine laws or jurisprudence to
bolster its conclusion, and the later
Flores was ultimately content in
relying on Dio alone for legal
support. These cases do not enjoy the
weight of stare decisis, and even if
they did, their erroneous appreciation
of our law on theft leave them
susceptible to reversal. The same
holds true of Empilis, a regrettably
stray decision which has not since
found favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the
Revised Penal Code, there is no crime
of frustrated theft. As petitioner has
latched the success of his appeal on
our acceptance of the Dio and Flores
rulings, his petition must be denied,
for we decline to adopt said rulings in
our jurisdiction. That it has taken all
these years for us to recognize that
there can be no frustrated theft under
the Revised Penal Code does not

193

detract from the correctness of this

conclusion. It will take considerable
amendments to our Revised Penal
Code in order that frustrated theft
may be recognized. Our deference to
Viada yields to the higher reverence
for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Valenzuela V. People 2007
Lessons Applicable:
consummated
Laws

Applicable:

frustrated or
theft
Art.

FACTS:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel
Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were
sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within the ShoeMart
(SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who
was then manning his post at the
open
parking
area
of
the
supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela,
who was wearing an ID with the mark
Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)
who hauled a push cart with cases of
detergent of Tide brand and
unloaded them in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting.
He
then
returned
inside
the
supermarket and emerged 5 minutes
after with more cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open

parking space. Thereafter, he left the

parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon
loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic
inside the taxi, then boarded the
vehicle. As Lago watched, he
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area and
asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the
merchandise but Valenzuela and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot.
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela
and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene and the stolen merchandise
recovered
worth
P12,090.
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other
persons were first brought to the SM
security office before they were
transferred to the Baler Station II of
the Philippine National Police but only
Valenzuela
and
Calderon
were
charged with theft by the Assistant
City
Prosecutor.

They
pleaded
not
guilty.
Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon
of the incident, he was at the Super
Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM
account,
accompanied
by
his
neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the
queue for the ATM was long, he and
Rosulada decided to buy snacks
inside the supermarket. While they
were eating, they heard the gunshot
fired by Lago, so they went out to
check what was transpiring and when
they did, they were suddenly grabbed
by
a
security
guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed
as a bundler of GMS Marketing and

194

assigned at the supermarket. He and

his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had
been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and
headed to ride a tricycle going to Pagasa, when they saw the security
guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon
to start running. Then they were
apprehended
by
Lago.
RTC: guilty of consummated theft

CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected

his contention that it should only be
frustrated theft since at the time he
was apprehended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose
of
the
articles
stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be
guilty
of
consummated
theft.
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

Article 6 defines those three

stages, namely the consummated,
frustrated and attempted felonies.
o A felony is consummated when
all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are
present.
o It is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a
consequence
but
which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the
will
of
the
perpetrator.
o
It is attempted when the
offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or
accident
other
than
his
own

spontaneous
desistance.

Each felony under the Revised

Penal
Code
has
a:
o subjective phase - portion of the
acts constituting the crime included
between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last
act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the
consummated
crime
if the offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense, the
crime
is
merely
attempted
o objective phase - After that point
of subjective phase has been
breached

subjective phase is completely

passed in case of frustrated crimes

the determination of whether a

crime is frustrated or consummated
necessitates an initial concession that
all of the acts of execution have been
performed
by
the
offender
The determination of whether the
felony was produced after all the
acts of execution had been performed
hinges on the particular statutory
definition
of
the
felony.
actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea - ordinarily, evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to
be a crime or there can be no crime
when the criminal mind is wanting

In crimes mala in se, mens rea

has been defined before as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent and essential for
criminal
liability.
Statutory definition of our mala in
se crimes must be able to supply
what the mens rea of the crime is and
overt acts that constitute the crime

195

Article 308 of the Revised Penal

Code
(Elements
of
Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal
property - only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in
theft
2.
property belongs to another
3.
taking be done with intent to
gain - descriptive circumstances
4.
taking be done without the
consent of the owner - descriptive
circumstances
5.
taking be accomplished without
the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon
things - descriptive circumstances

Abandoned
cases:
o
U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the
merchandise out of the Custom
House
consummated
theft
o Dio: Military Police inspected the
truck at the check point and found 3
boxes of army rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the
empty sea van had actually
contained other merchandise as well consummated
theft
o
Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene,
dropping the coconuts they had
seized - frustrated qualified theft
because petitioners were not able to
perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the
felony
as
a
consequence
cannot attribute weight because
definition
is
attempted
The ability of the actor to freely
dispose of the articles stolen, even if
it
were
only
momentary.
o
We
are
satisfied
beyond
reasonable doubt that the taking by
the petitioner was completed in this

case. With intent to gain, he acquired

physical possession of the stolen
cases of detergent for a considerable
period of time that he was able to
drop these off at a spot in the parking
lot, and long enough to load these
onto
a
taxicab.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal

Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted
(no unlawful taking) or consummated
(there is unlawful taking).

G.R. No. 178323

16, 2011

March

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO
CHINGH
y
PARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando)
seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of

196

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him of
Statutory Rape and Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
The
factual
and
procedural
antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information
for Rape was filed against Armando
for
inserting
his
fingers
and
afterwards his penis into the private
part of his minor victim, VVV,2 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or before March 11, 2004 in
the City of Manila, Philippines,
[Armando], with lewd design and by
means
of force, violence
and
intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
commit sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct upon a ten (10) year old
minor child, [VVV], by then and there
pulling her in a dark place then
mashing her breast and inserting his
fingers in her vagina and afterwards
his penis, against her will and
consent, thereby causing serious
danger to the normal growth and
development of the child [VVV], to
her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.3
Upon his arraignment, Armando
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of the victim, VVV;

the victims father; PO3 Ma. Teresa

Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The
defense,
on
the
other
hand,
presented
the
lone
testimony
Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was
only 10 years old at the time of the
incident. On 11 March 2004 at around
8:00 p.m., along with five other
playmates, VVV proceeded to a store
to buy food. While she was beckoning
the storekeeper, who was not then at
her station, Armando approached and
pulled her hand and threatened not
to shout for help or talk. Armando
brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo
Street, about 400 meters from the
store. While in a standing position
beside an unoccupied passenger
jeepney, Armando mashed her breast
and inserted his right hand index
finger into her private part. Despite
VVVs pleas for him to stop, Armando
unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and
rammed his phallus inside her vagina,
causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would
tell anyone what had happened, VVV
kept mum about her traumatic
experience when she arrived home.
Noticing
her
odd
and
uneasy
demeanor as well as her bloodstained underwear, however, her
father pressed her for an explanation.
VVV confessed to her father about
her
unfortunate
experience.
Immediately, they reported the
matter to the police authorities. After

197

his arrest, Armando was positively

identified by VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV
conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr.
Baluyot) of the Philippine General
Hospitals Child Protection Unit, in the
morning of 12 March 2004, showed a
"fresh laceration with bleeding at 6
oclock position" in the childs hymen
and "minimal bleeding from [said]
hymen laceration." Her impression
was that there was a "clear evidence"
of
"penetrating
trauma"
which
happened within 24 hours prior to the
examination. The photograph of the
lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly
illustrated
and
buttressed
Dr.
4
Baluyots medical report.
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV.
Under his version, in (sic) the night of
11 March 2004, he and his
granddaughter were on their way to
his cousins house at Payumo St.,
Tondo, Manila. As it was already late,
he told his granddaughter to just go
home ahead of him while he decided
to go to Blumentritt market to buy
food. While passing by a small alley
on his way thereto, he saw VVV along
with some companions, peeling
"dalanghita." VVV approached him
and asked if she could go with him to
the market because she will buy
"dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused
her request and told VVV instead to
go home. He then proceeded towards
Blumentritt, but before he could
reach the market, he experienced

rheumatic pains that prompted him to

return home. Upon arriving home, at
about 8:30 oclock in the evening, he
watched television with his wife and
children. Shortly thereafter, three (3)
barangay officials arrived, arrested
him, and brought him to a police
precinct where he was informed of
VVVs accusation against him.5
On April 29, 2005, the RTC, after
finding
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution overwhelming against
the accuseds defense of denial and
alibi, rendered a Decision6 convicting
Armando of Statutory Rape. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court finds accused ARMANDO
CHINGH GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of
Statutory Rape defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d)
of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 8353 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
private
complainant
[VVV]
the
amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages and to
pay the costs.
It appearing that accused is detained,
the period of his detention shall be
credited in the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the
Decision before the CA, which was

198

docketed
01119.

as

CA-G.R.

CR-H.C.

No.

On December 29, 2006, the CA

rendered a Decision7 finding Armando
not only guilty of Statutory Rape, but
also of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The decretal portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of
the trial court is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: accusedappellant is hereby found GUILTY of
two
counts
of
rape
and
is,
accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for
the crime of statutory rape, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and, for
the offense of rape through sexual
assault, the indeterminate penalty of
3 years, 3 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 11 months and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the victim, a
total
of P80,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P80,000.00
as
moral
damages;
and P40,000.00
as
exemplary damages, or a grand total
ofP200,000.00 for the two counts of
rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
In fine, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC, and considering that the
appeal opened the entire case for
judicial review, the CA also found
Armando guilty of the crime of Rape
Through Sexual Assault. The CA

opined that since the Information

charged Armando with two counts of
rape: (1) by inserting his finger in the
victims vagina, which is classified as
Rape Through Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and
(2) for inserting his penis in the
private part of his victim, which is
Statutory Rape, and considering that
Armando failed to object thereto
through a motion to quash before
entering his plea, Armando could be
convicted of as many offenses as are
charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with
the credible, direct, and candid
testimony of the victim, the elements
of Statutory Rape and Rape Through
Sexual Assault were indubitably
established by the prosecution.
Armando now
Court for relief.

comes

before

this

In a Resolution9 dated September 26,

2007, the Court required the parties
to file their respective supplemental
briefs.
In
their
respective
10
Manifestations, the parties waived
the filing of their supplemental briefs,
and instead adopted their respective
briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following
errors:
I
The trial court gravely erred in
finding the accused guilty of

199

the crime of rape under article

266-a, paragraph 1 (d) of the
revised penal code in spite the
unnatural
and
unrealistic
testimony
of
the
private
complainant.

have run away while Armando was

allegedly molesting her, but she did
not; fourth, Armando could not have
inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were
standing, unless the victim did not
offer any resistance.

II
The trial court erred in finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing
the factual basis of his conviction,
which in effect, mainly questions the
credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses
for
the
prosecution,
particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando
maintains
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
present
sufficient evidence that will overcome
the
presumption
of
innocence.
Likewise, Armando insists that the
RTC gravely erred in convicting him
based
on
the
unrealistic
and
unnatural testimony of the victim.
Armando claims that VVVs testimony
was so inconsistent with common
experience that it deserves careful
and critical evaluation. First, it was so
unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and
not ask for help when the accused
allegedly pulled her in the presence
of
several
companions
and
bystanders; second, VVV did not
resist or cry for help while they were
on their way to the place where she
was allegedly abused, which was 300
to 400 meters away from where he
allegedly pulled her; third, VVV could

Generally, the Court will not disturb

the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, as it was in
the better position to observe their
candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial
court; it had the unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
especially under cross-examination.
Its assessment is entitled to respect
unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of
the case.11
From the testimony of the victim,
VVV,
she
positively
identified
Armando as the one who ravaged her
on that fateful night of March 11,
2004. VVV clearly narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of
the accused. Notwithstanding her
innocence and despite the thorough
cross-examination
by
Armandos
counsel, VVV never faltered and gave
a very candid and truthful testimony
of the traumatic events. VVVs
testimony was corroborated and
bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene
Baluyot that the victims genital area
showed a fresh laceration with

200

bleeding at 6 oclock position in her

hymen.12 Dr. Baluyot concluded that
an acute injury occurred within 24
hours prior to the examination and
that the occurrence of rape within
that period was very possible. 13 Also,
the age of VVV at the time the
incident occurred, which was 10 years
old, was duly established by her birth
certificate,14 her testimony,15 and that
of her fathers.16
Time and again, this Court has held
that when the offended parties are
young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter
about which they testified were not
true.17 A young girl would not usually
concoct a tale of defloration; publicly
admit having been ravished and her
honor tainted; allow the examination
of her private parts; and undergo all
the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to
protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed
against her.18 Moreover, the Court has
repeatedly held that the lone
testimony of the victim in a rape
case, if credible, is enough to sustain
a conviction.19
On
the
other
hand,
Armando
admitted that he saw VVV on the date

of the incident, but denied the

accusations against him and merely
relied on his defense that he was
watching TV with his family when
barangay officials arrested him.
Armandos
defenses
were
also
unavailing. His contention that it was
unnatural and unrealistic for VVV to
remain quiet when he pulled her from
her companions and why she did not
cry for help or run away when he was
allegedly ravaging her deserves scant
consideration. Clearly, the reason
why VVV did not shout for help was
because Armando told her not to
shout or talk.20 Likewise, the reason
why VVV did not run when Armando
was molesting her was because his
finger was still inside her private
part.21 Moreover,
Armandos
argument that he could not have
inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were
standing is preposterous. It is settled
that sexual intercourse in a standing
position,
while
perhaps
uncomfortable, is not improbable.22
Armando tendered nothing but his
bare denial and contention that he
was elsewhere when the crime was
committed. Aside from this, he
presented no more evidence to
substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence
dictates that denial and alibi are the
common defenses in rape cases.
Sexual abuse is denied on the
allegation that the accused was
somewhere else and could not have
physically committed the crime. This
Court has always held that these two

201

defenses are inherently weak and

must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence in order to be
believed. As negative defenses, they
cannot prevail over the positive
testimony
of
the
23
complainant. Consequently,
Armandos bare denial and alibi must
fail against the testimony of VVV and
her positive identification that he was
the perpetrator of the horrid deed.
Unmistakably, it has been proved
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
Armando had carnal knowledge of
VVV.1awphil
Anent Armandos conviction for the
crime of Rape Through Sexual
Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando
guilty of the crime of Rape Through
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law
of 1997.24 From the Information, it is
clear that Armando was being
charged with two offenses, Rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, and rape
as an act of sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando
was charged with having carnal
knowledge of VVV, who was under
twelve years of age at the time,
under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266A, and he was also charged with
committing an act of sexual assault
by inserting his finger into the genital
of VVV under the second paragraph
of
Article
266-A.
Indeed,
two

instances of rape were proven at the

trial. First, it was established that
Armando inserted his penis into the
private part of his victim, VVV.
Second, through the testimony of
VVV, it was proven that Armando also
inserted his finger in VVVs private
part.
The Information has sufficiently
informed accused-appellant that he is
being charged with two counts of
rape. Although two offenses were
charged, which is a violation of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
states
that
"[a]
complaint
or
information must charge only one
offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for
various
offenses."
Nonetheless,
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure also
states that "[w]hen two or more
offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict the
appellant of as many as are charged
and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and
law in each offense." Consequently,
since Armando failed to file a motion
to quash the Information, he can be
convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm
the CAs imposition of Reclusion
Perpetua for rape under paragraph 1
(d), Article 266-A. However, We

202

modify the penalty for Rape Through

Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the
commission of the sexual abuse, VVV
was ten (10) years old. This calls for
the application of R.A. No. 7610, or
"The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," which defines
sexual
abuse
of
children
and
prescribes the penalty therefor in
Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse. Children, whether
male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its
medium
period
to reclusion perpetua shall
be
imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted
under
Article
335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the

Revised Penal Code, for rape or

lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years
of
age
shall
be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.25
Paragraph
(b)
punishes
sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuses. It
covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit, but also
where one through coercion,
intimidation or influence engages
in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.26
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules
and regulations27 of R.A. No. 7610
defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus
or mouth of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual
desire
of
any
person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.28
In this case, the offended party was
ten years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Pursuant
to the above-quoted provision of law,

203

Armando was aptly prosecuted under

paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353,29 for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of
applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor,
considering that VVV was below 12
years of age, and considering further
that Armandos act of inserting his
finger
in
VVVs
private
part
undeniably amounted to lascivious
conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in
its medium period.

of a physical or mental disability or

condition."30

The Court is not unmindful to the fact

that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more
severe penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period than the one
who commits Rape Through Sexual
Assault, which is merely punishable
by prision mayor. This is undeniably
unfair to the child victim. To be sure,
it was not the intention of the framers
of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed
the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children.
Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which
must be applied when the victims are
children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves
from
abuse,
neglect,
cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because

Hence, Armando should be meted the

indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that
which could be properly imposed
under the law, which is fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal. On the
other hand, the minimum term shall
be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, or twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months.

As to Armandos civil liabilities, the

CA correctly awarded the following
damages:
civil
indemnity
of P50,000.00
and
another P50,000.00
as
moral
damages for Rape under paragraph
1(d),
Article
266-A;
and
civil
indemnity ofP30,000.00 and moral
damages also of P30,000.00 for Rape
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In
line,
however,
with
prevailing
jurisprudence, we increase the award
of
exemplary
damages
from P25,000.00 and P15,000.00, for
Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article

204

266-A and Rape under paragraph 2,

Article
266-A,
respectively,
toP30,000.00 for each count of rape.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
For
Rape
under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A,
Armando
Chingh
y
Parcia
is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape
Through
Sexual
Assault
under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, he is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay VVV the total
ofP80,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P80,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and P60,000.00
as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011

People of the Philippines, v Armando
Chingh y Parcia, Peralta
Facts: Chingh seeks the reversal of
the decision of CA convicting him of
statutory rape and rape through
sexual assault.

On march 2005, an information was

filed against Chingh for inserting his
fingers and afterwards his penis into
the private part of his minor victim.
Upon
his
arraignment,
Chingh
pleaded not guilty. at the trial, the
prosecution
presented
the
testimonies of the victim, the victims
father, PO3 Solidarios and Dr.
Baluyot. The defense presented the
lone testimony of Chingh.
On April 2005, the RTC finding the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
overwhelming against the accused
denial and alibi rendered a decision
convicting Chingh of statutory rape.
Aggrieved, chingh appealed the
decision before CA, on December
2006 CA rendered decision Chingh
guilty of statutory rape and rape
through sexual assault.
Chingh now comes to court for relief.
in a resolution, September 2007, the
court required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. in
their manifestations, the parties
waived
the
filing
of
their
supplemental briefs and instead
adopted their respective briefs filed
before CA
Chingh raises the following errors: (1)
the trial court graved erred in finding
the accused guilty of the crime of
rape under article 266-a paragraph 1
of the RPC in spite the unnatural and
unrealistic testimony of the private
complainant. (2) the trial court erred

205

in finding the accused guilty of the

offense charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
Chingh
maintains
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
present
sufficient evidence that will overcome
the presumption of innocence.
ruling: court agreed with RTC that the
testimonies
presented
by
the
prosecution is favorable than the
mere denial and alibi of the accused.
Section 3, Rule 120 of the RPC
supports the decision of CA to
charged accused with two offenses,
since Chingh failed to file a motion to
quash the information.
CA's decision is affirmed with
modification of the penalty for the
sexual assault.
Time and again, this Court has held
that when the offended parties are
young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter
about which they testified were not
true.17 A young girl would not usually
concoct a tale of defloration; publicly
admit having been ravished and her
honor tainted; allow the examination
of her private parts; and undergo all
the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been

raped and been truly moved to

protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed
against her.18 Moreover, the Court
has repeatedly held that the lone
testimony of the victim in a rape
case, if credible, is enough to sustain
a conviction.
On
the
other
hand,
Armando
admitted that he saw VVV on the date
of the incident, but denied the
accusations against him and merely
relied on his defense that he was
watching TV with his family when
barangay officials arrested him.
Armandos
defenses
were
also
unavailing. His contention that it was
unnatural and unrealistic for VVV to
remain quiet when he pulled her from
her companions and why she did not
cry for help or run away when he was
allegedly ravaging her deserves scant
consideration. Clearly, the reason
why VVV did not shout for help was
because Armando told her not to
shout or talk.20 Likewise, the reason
why VVV did not run when Armando
was molesting her was because his
finger was still inside her private
part.21
Moreover,
Armandos
argument that he could not have
inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were
standing is preposterous. It is settled
that sexual intercourse in a standing
position,
while
perhaps
uncomfortable, is not improbable.22

206

Armando tendered nothing but his

bare denial and contention that he
was elsewhere when the crime was
committed. Aside from this, he
presented no more evidence to
substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence
dictates that denial and alibi are the
common defenses in rape cases.
Sexual abuse is denied on the
allegation that the accused was
somewhere else and could not have
physically committed the crime. This
Court has always held that these two
defenses are inherently weak and
must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence in order to be
believed. As negative defenses, they
cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of the complainant.23
Consequently, Armandos bare denial
and alibi must fail against the
testimony of VVV and her positive
identification that he was the
perpetrator of the horrid deed.
Unmistakably, it has been proved
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
Armando had carnal knowledge of
VVV.
G.R. No. 188726
25, 2012

January

CRESENCIO C. MILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
MARKET
PURSUITS,
INC.
represented
by
CARLO
V.
LOPEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari

assailing
the
22
April
2009
1
Decision and
8
July
2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the Decision of the trial
court finding petitioner Cresencio C.
Milla (Milla) guilty of two counts of
estafa through falsification of public
documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was
the Financial Officer of private
respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc.
(MPI).
In
March
2003,
Milla
represented himself as a real estate
developer
from
Ines
Anderson
Development Corporation, which was
engaged
in
selling
business
properties in Makati, and offered to
sell MPI a property therein located.
For this purpose, he showed Lopez a
photocopy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 216445 registered in
the name of spouses Farley and
Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as
well as a Special Power of Attorney
purportedly executed by the spouses
in favor of Milla.3 Lopez verified with
the Registry of Deeds of Makati and
confirmed that the property was
indeed registered under the names of
Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was
convinced by Millas authority, MPI
purchased the property for P2 million,
issuing Security Bank and Trust Co.
(SBTC) Check No. 154670 in the
amount
of P1.6
million.
After
receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez
(1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 25 March 2003 executed by
Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2)

207

an original Owners Duplicate Copy of

TCT No. 216445.4
Milla then gave Regino Acosta
(Acosta), Lopezs partner, a copy of
the new Certificate of Title to the
property, TCT No. 218777, registered
in the name of MPI. Thereafter, it
tendered in favor of Milla SBTC Check
No.
15467111
in
the
amount
of P400,000 as payment for the
balance.5
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to
Acosta, but did not furnish the latter
with the receipts for the transfer
taxes and other costs incurred in the
transfer of the property. This failure to
turn over the receipts prompted
Lopez to check with the Register of
Deeds, where he discovered that (1)
the Certificate of Title given to them
by Milla could not be found therein;
(2) there was no transfer of the
property from Sps. Handog to MPI;
and (3) TCT No. 218777 was
registered in the name of a certain
Matilde M. Tolentino.6
Consequently, Lopez demanded the
return of the amount of P2 million
from Milla, who then issued Equitable
PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955
dated 20 and 23 May 2003,
respectively, in the amount of P1
million each. However, these checks
were dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds.
When Milla ignored the demand letter
sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of
the authority vested in him by the
MPI Board of Directors, filed a

Complaint against the former on 4

August 2003. On 27 and 29 October
2003, two Informations for Estafa
Thru Falsification of Public Documents
were filed against Milla and were
raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region,
Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC Br.
146).7 Milla was accused of having
committed
estafa
through
the
falsification of the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777
purportedly issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
That on or about the 25th day of
March 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a private individual,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a document
denomindated as "Deed of Absolute
Sale", duly notarized by Atty. Lope M.
Velasco, a Notary Public for and in the
City of Makati, denominated as Doc.
No. 297, Page No. 61, Book No. 69,
Series of 2003 in his Notarial
Register, hence, a public document,
by causing it to appear that the
registered owners of the property
covered by TCT No. 216445 have sold
their land to complainant Market
Pursuits, Inc. when in truth and in fact
the said Deed of Absolute Sale was
not executed by the owners thereof
and after the document was falsified,
accused, with intent to defraud
complainant Market Pursuits, Inc.
presented the falsified Deed of Sale

208

to complainant, herein represented

by Carlo V. Lopez, and complainant
believing in the genuineness of the
Deed of Absolute Sale paid accused
the amount of P1,600,000.00 as
partial payment for the property, to
the damage and
prejudice of
complainant in the aforementioned
amount of P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April
2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a document
denominated as Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 218777 purportedly
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati
City,
hence,
a
public
document, by causing it to appear
that the lot covered by TCT No.
218777 was already registered in the
name of complainant Market Pursuits,
Inc., herein represented by Carlo V.
Lopez, when in truth and in fact, as
said accused well knew that the
Register of Deeds of Makati did not
issue TCT No. 218777 in the name of
Market Pursuits Inc., and after the
document was falsified, accused with
intent to defraud complainant and
complainant
believing
in
the
genuineness of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218777 paid accused the
amount of P400,000.00, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant

in the aforementioned amount of

P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
After the prosecution rested its case,
Milla filed, with leave of court, his
Demurrer to Evidence.9 In its Order
dated 26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146
denied the demurrer and ordered him
to present evidence, but he failed to
do so despite having been granted
ample opportunity.10 Though the court
considered his right to present
evidence to have been consequently
waived, it nevertheless allowed him
to file a memorandum.11
In its Joint Decision dated 28
November 2006,12 RTC Br. 146 found
Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents,
thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
finding the accused Cresencio Milla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
Applying the indeterminate sentence
law and considering that the amount
involved is more than P22,000,00 this
Court should apply the provision that
an additional one (1) year should be
imposed for every ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos in excess of
P22,000.00, thus, this Court is
constrained
to
impose
the
Indeterminate (sic) penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to

209

twenty (20)
temporal as
count.

years of reclusion
maximum for each

Accused is adjudged to be civilly

liable to the private complainant and
is ordered pay (sic) complainant the
total amount of TWO MILLION
(P2,000,000.00) PESOS with legal rate
of interest from the filing of the
Information until the same is fully
paid and to pay the costs. He is
further ordered to pay attorneys fees
equivalent to ten (10%) of the total
amount due as and for attorneys
fees. A lien on the monetary award is
constituted
in
favor
of
the
government, the private complainant
not having paid the required docket
fee prior to the filing of the
Information.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in
the assailed Decision dated 22 April
2009, affirmed the findings of the trial
court.14 In its assailed Resolution
dated 8 July 2009, it also denied
Millas
subsequent
Motion
for
15
Reconsideration.
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges
that the Decision and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals were not in
accordance
with
law
and
jurisprudence. He raises the following
issues:
I. Whether the case should be
reopened on the ground of
negligence of counsel;

II. Whether the principle

novation is applicable;

of

III. Whether the principle of

simple loan is applicable;
IV. Whether the Secretarys
Certificate presented by the
prosecution is admissible in
evidence;
V.
Whether
the
supposed
inconsistent
statements
of
prosecution witnesses cast a
doubt
on
the
guilt
of
petitioner.16
In its Comment, MPI argues that (1)
Milla was not deprived of due process
on the ground of gross negligence of
counsel; (2) under the Revised Penal
Code, novation is not one of the
grounds for the extinction of criminal
liability for estafa; and (3) factual
findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive.17
On the other hand, in its Comment,
the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that (1) Milla was accorded
due process of law; (2) the elements
of the crime charged against him
were established during trial; (3)
novation is not a ground for extinction
of criminal liability for estafa; (4) the
money received by Milla from Lopez
was not in the nature of a simple loan
or cash advance; and (5) Lopez was
duly authorized by MPI to institute the
action.18

210

In his Consolidated Reply, Milla

reiterates that the negligence of his
former counsel warrants a reopening
of the case, wherein he can present
evidence to prove that his transaction
with MPI was in the nature of a simple
loan.19
In the disposition of this case, the
following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the negligence of
counsel deprived Milla of due
process of law
II. Whether the principle of
novation can exculpate Milla
from criminal liability
III. Whether the factual findings
of the trial court, as affirmed by
the appellate court, should be
reviewed on appeal
We resolve to deny the Petition.
Milla was
process.

not

deprived

of

due

Milla argues that the negligence of his

former counsel, Atty. Manuel V.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived
him of due process. Specifically, he
states that after the prosecution had
rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, and that the
former was never advised by the
latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was
purportedly surprised to discover that
RTC Br. 146 had already rendered
judgment finding him guilty, and that
it had issued a warrant for his arrest.

Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus

Motion for Leave to File Motion for
New Trial, which Milla claims to have
been denied by the trial court for
being an inappropriate remedy, thus,
demonstrating
his
counsels
negligence. These contentions cannot
be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of
a counsel binds the client, and it is
only in instances wherein the
negligence is so gross or palpable
that courts must step in to grant relief
to the aggrieved client.20 In this case,
Milla was able to file a Demurrer to
Evidence, and upon the trial courts
denial thereof, was allowed to present
evidence.21 Because of his failure to
do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in
considering that he had waived his
right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial
court still allowed him to submit a
memorandum in the interest of
justice. Further, contrary to his
assertion that RTC Br. 146 denied the
Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest
thereafter filed by his former counsel,
a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order
of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially
denied the Omnibus Motion for New
Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest,
but granted the Motion for Leave of
Court to Avail of Remedies under the
Rules of Court, allowing him to file an
appeal and lifting his warrant of
arrest.22
It can be gleaned from the foregoing
circumstances that Milla was given
opportunities to defend his case and
was granted concomitant reliefs.

211

Thus, it cannot be said that the

mistake and negligence of his former
counsel were so gross and palpable to
have deprived him of due process.
The principle of novation cannot be
applied to the case at bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of
Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and
188955 before the institution of the
criminal
complaint
against
him
novated his obligation to MPI, thereby
enabling him to avoid any incipient
criminal liability and converting his
obligation into a purely civil one. This
argument does not persuade.
The principles of novation cannot
apply to the present case as to
extinguish his criminal liability. Milla
cites People v. Nery23 to support his
contention that his issuance of the
Equitable PCI checks prior to the filing
of the criminal complaint averted his
incipient criminal liability. However, it
must be clarified that mere payment
of an obligation before the institution
of a criminal complaint does not, on
its own, constitute novation that may
prevent criminal liability. This Courts
ruling in Nery in fact warned:
It may be observed in this regard that
novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Penal Code
whereby criminal liability can be
extinguished; hence, the role of
novation may only be to either
prevent the rise of criminal liability or
to cast doubt on the true nature of

the original petition, whether or not it

was such that its breach would not
give rise to penal responsibility, as
when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar
disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs.
People, 90 Phil. 581; Villareal, 27 Phil.
481).
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of
partial payments, without further
change in the original relation
between the complainant and the
accused, can not produce novation.
For the latter to exist, there must be
proof of intent to extinguish the
original relationship, and such intent
can not be inferred from the mere
acceptance of payments on account
of what is totally due. Much less can
it be said that the acceptance of
partial satisfaction can effect the
nullification of a criminal liability that
is fully matured, and already in the
process of enforcement. Thus, this
Court has ruled that the offended
partys acceptance of a promissory
note for all or part of the amount
misapplied does not obliterate the
criminal offense (Camus vs. Court of
Appeals,
48
Off.
Gaz.
3898).24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, in Quinto v. People,25 this
Court exhaustively explained the
concept of novation in relation to
incipient criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and
the animus novandi, whether totally
or partially, must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their

212

acts
that are
too
clear
unequivocal to be mistaken.

and

The extinguishment of the old

obligation by the new one is a
necessary element of novation which
may be effected either expressly or
impliedly. The
term
"expressly"
means that the contracting parties
incontrovertibly disclose that their
object in executing the new contract
is to extinguish the old one. Upon the
other hand, no specific form is
required for an implied novation, and
all that is prescribed by law would be
an incompatibility between the two
contracts. While there is really no
hard and fast rule to determine what
might constitute to be a sufficient
change
that
can
bring
about
novation,
the
touchstone
for
contrariety, however, would be an
irreconcilable incompatibility between
the old and the new obligations.
There are two ways which could
indicate, in fine, the presence of
novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation
by another which substitutes the
same. The first is when novation has
been explicitly stated and declared in
unequivocal terms. The second is
when the old and the new obligations
are incompatible on every point. The
test of incompatibility is whether or
not the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its
independent
existence.
If
they
cannot, they are incompatible and
the latter obligation novates the first.
Corollarily,
changes
that
breed

incompatibility must be essential in

nature and not merely accidental. The
incompatibility must take place in any
of the essential elements of the
obligation, such as its object, cause
or
principal
conditions
thereof;
otherwise, the change would be
merely modificatory in nature and
insufficient to extinguish the original
obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner
consists only in the manner of
payment. There was really no
substitution of debtors since private
complainant merely acquiesced to
the payment but did not give her
consent to enter into a new contract.
The appellate court observed:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The acceptance by complainant of

partial payment tendered by the
buyer, Leonor Camacho, does not
evince
the
intention
of
the
complainant to have their agreement
novated. It was simply necessitated
by the fact that, at that time,
Camacho had substantial accounts
payable to complainant, and because
of the fact that appellant made
herself scarce to complainant. (TSN,
April 15, 1981, 31-32) Thus, to
obviate
the
situation
where
complainant would end up with
nothing, she was forced to receive
the tender of Camacho. Moreover, it
is to be noted that the aforesaid
payment was for the purchase, not of
the jewelry subject of this case, but of
some other jewelry subject of a

213

previous transaction. (Ibid. June 8,

1981, 10-11)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code

defines estafa and penalizes any
person who shall defraud another by
"misappropriating or converting, to
the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods,
or other property. It is axiomatic that
the gravamen of the offense is the
appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice
of the owner. The terms "convert" and
"misappropriate" have been held to
connote "an act of using or disposing
of anothers property as if it were
ones own or devoting it to a purpose
or use different from that agreed
upon."
The
phrase,
"to
misappropriate to ones own use" has
been said to include "not only
conversion
to
ones
personal
advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another
without right. Verily, the sale of the
pieces of jewelry on installments (sic)
in contravention of the explicit terms
of the authority granted to her in
Exhibit "A" (supra) is deemed to be
one of conversion. Thus, neither the
theory of "delay in the fulfillment of

commission" nor that of novation

posed by petitioner, can avoid the
incipient criminal liability. In People
vs. Nery, this Court held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The criminal liability for estafa

already committed is then not
affected by the subsequent novation
of contract, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and
punished by the State in its own
conation. (Emphasis supplied.)26
In the case at bar, the acceptance by
MPI of the Equitable PCI checks
tendered by Milla could not have
novated the original transaction, as
the checks were only intended to
secure the return of the P2 million the
former had already given him. Even
then, these checks bounced and were
thus unable to satisfy his liability.
Moreover, the estafa involved here
was not for simple misappropriation
or conversion, but was committed
through Millas falsification of public
documents, the liability for which
cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the trial courts finding of
guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual
findings of the trial court. Suffice it to
say that factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are binding on

214

and accorded great respect by this

Court.27

executed prior to or simultaneously

with the commission of the fraud:

There was no reversible error on the

part of the Court of Appeals when it
affirmed the finding of the trial court
that
Milla
was
guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of
estafa through falsification of public
documents. The prosecution was able
to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime charged. The
relevant provisions of the Revised
Penal Code read:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or

falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.

Art. 172. Falsification by private

individual and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000 shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who shall
commit any of the falsification
enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial
document
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any

person who shall defraud another by
any of
the means
mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx

xxx

xxx

It was proven during trial that Milla

misrepresented himself to have the
authority to sell the subject property,
and
it
was
precisely
this
misrepresentation that prompted MPI
to purchase it.1wphi1 Because of its
reliance on his authority and on the
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and
TCT No. 218777, MPI parted with its
money in the amount of P2 million,
which has not been returned until
now despite Millas allegation of
novation. Clearly, he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the
Petition. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MILLA VS PEOPLE
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. By means of any of the following

false pretenses or fraudulent acts

Facts: In this case, a criminal case

was filed against Milla for having
committed estafa through falsification

215

of the notarized deed of absolute sale

and TCT purportedly issued by the
ROD
of
Makati.
Milla
by
misrepresenting himself and through
falsification of the said documents
was ableto get the total amount of
P2m from Carlo Lopez of Market
Pursuits, Inc. When Lopez discovered
Millas
scheme
however,
Lopez
demanded the return of the amount
of P2m which Milla acquiesced into by
issuing 2 checks for the said amount.
These
checks
were
later
on
dishonored and Milla for his part
consistently ignored the demands
made by Lopez. This led to the filing
of the present case.
Now Milla contends that his issuance
of the 2 checks reprenting the
amount of 2m before the institution
of the criminal complaint against him
novated his obligation to MPI, thereby
enabling him to avoid any incipient
criminal liability and converting his
obligation into a purely civil one.
Issue: So the issue in this cse is
whether or not the payment of an
obligation before the institution of a
criminal complaint, in itself constitute
novation that may prevent criminal
liability or WON there is novation in
this case. No.
Ruling: In Quinto v. People, this Court
exhaustively explained the concept of
novation in relation to incipient
criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and the
animus novandi, whether totally or

partially, must appear by express

agreement of the parties, or by their
acts
that are
too
clear
and
unequivocal to be mistaken.
There are two ways which could
indicate, in fine, the presence of
novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation
by another which substitutes the
same. The first is when novation has
been explicitly stated and declared in
unequivocal terms. The second is
when the old and the new obligations
are incompatible on every point. The
test of
incompatibility is whether or not the
two obligations can stand together,
each one having its independent
existence. If they cannot, they are
incompatible and the latter obligation
novates the first. Corollarily, changes
that breed incompatibility must be
essential in nature and not merely
accidental. The incompatibility must
take place in any of the essential
elements of the obligation, such as its
object, cause or principal conditions
thereof; otherwise, the change would
be merely modificatory in nature and
insufficient to extinguish the original
obligation.
In the case at bar, the acceptance by
MPI of the Equitable PCI checks
tendered by Milla could not have
novated the original transaction, as
the checks were only intended to
secure the return of the P2 million the
former had already given him. Even
then, these checks bounced and were

216

thus unable to satisfy his liability.

Moreover, the estafa involved here
was not for simple misappropriation
or conversion, but was committed
through Millas falsification of public
documents, the liability for which
cannot be extinguished by mere
novation. In view of the foregoing, the
petition of Milla was denied.
G.R. No. 172716
November 17, 2010
JASON
IVLER
y
AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTOSAN
PEDRO,
Judge
of
the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the
Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a
lower
courts
ruling
finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accuseds previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in
August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release
in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no
identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After
unsuccessfully
seeking
reconsideration, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No.
2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of

217

proceedings in Criminal Case No.

82366, including the arraignment on
17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment
and,
because
of
petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven
days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion
to
suspend
proceedings
and
postponing his arraignment until after
his
arrest.5 Petitioner
sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against
petitioner, respondent Ponce sought
in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No.
2803 for petitioners loss of standing
to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006,
the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioners forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from
the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366. Thus, without reaching the
merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC
effectively
affirmed
the
MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He

explains that his petition in S.C.A. No.
2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC
was a special civil action seeking a
pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal
of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to
reach the merits of his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner
argues
that
his
constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution
in Criminal Case No. 82366, having
been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits
that
the
multiple
consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for
the Court to disturb the RTCs
decision
forfeiting
petitioners
standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A.
2803.
On
the
merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Courts
attention to jurisprudence holding
that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution

218

was obliged to separate the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight
physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and
damage to property.

Petitioners Non-appearance at the

Arraignment
in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
Divest
him
of
Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we

granted the Office of the Solicitor
Generals motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.

Dismissals of appeals grounded on

the appellants escape from custody
or violation of the terms of his bail
bond are governed by the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of
Appeals to "also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments
of convictions.

The Issues
Two questions are presented for
resolution: (1) whether petitioner
forfeited his standing to seek relief in
S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered
his
arrest
following
his
nonappearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in
the negative, whether petitioners
constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy
Clause
bars
further
proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners nonappearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain
the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2)
the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same
offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.

The RTCs dismissal of petitioners

special civil action for certiorari to
review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the
Due
Process
Clause
to
bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366
finds
no
basis
under
procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The RTCs reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTCs
ruling. There, the Court granted
review to an appeal by an accused
who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even
though she jumped bail pending trial
and was thus tried and convicted in

219

absentia. The Court in Esparas

treated the mandatory review of
death sentences under Republic Act
No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment
of petitioners non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Courts
treatment of a defendant who
absents
himself
from
postarraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendants
absence
merely
renders
his
bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should
the bondsman fail to produce the
accused
within
30
days);
the
defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the
30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere nonappearance does not ipso facto
convert the accuseds status to that
of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that
petitioner provided "no explanation
why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by
the
records.
Days
before
the
arraignment, petitioner sought the
suspension of the MeTCs proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of
his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No.

2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to

defer arraignment (the order for
which was released days after the
MeTC ordered petitioners arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the
filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal
Case
No.
82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy
of
punishment
for
the
same
13
offense" protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that
petitioners conviction in Criminal
Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case
No. 82367 involve the "same
offense."
Petitioner
adopts
the
affirmative view, submitting that the
two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MeTC
ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence
Resulting
in
Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."15

220

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single
Crime,
its Consequences on Persons
and
Property are Material Only to
Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner,
arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended,
namely,
Article
365
defining
and
penalizing
quasioffenses. The text of the provision
reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any
person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any
person
who,
by
simple
imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious

felony, the penalty of arresto mayor

in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act
covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall
cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties,
the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in
article shall not be applicable:

this

1. When the penalty provided

for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in
the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period
which they may deem proper to
apply.

221

2. When, by imprudence or
negligence and with violation of
the Automobile Law, to death of
a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall
be
punished
by
prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in
voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical
condition
and
other
circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the
lack of precaution displayed in those
cases
in
which
the
damage
impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to
those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who
fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in this
hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs
are
collapsible
into
four
subgroupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence"
and
"negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified

penalty scheme for either or both

quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and
9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
imposing penalties (paragraph 5);
and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence"
and
"simple
imprudence"
(paragraphs
7-8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize
"the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike
willful offenses which punish the
intentional
criminal
act.
These
structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from
the mass of intentional crimes under
the first 13 Titles of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasioffenses, whether reckless or simple,
are
distinct
species
of
crime,
separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new. As early as the
middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the
Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x"17 on three points
of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as
opposed to intentional crimes); (2)
the legislative intent to treat quasicrimes as distinct offenses (as
opposed to subsuming them under
the
mitigating
circumstance
of
minimal intent) and; (3) the different

222

penalty structures for quasi-crimes

and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3
of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines
a lower degree of criminal liability is
too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their
structure
cannot
be
committed
through
imprudence:
murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief,
etc. In truth, criminal negligence in
our Revised Penal Code is treated as
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is
not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a
modality in the commission of
felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed
in
the
mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore,
the
theory
would
require
that
the
corresponding
penalty should be fixed in proportion
to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For
each penalty for the willful offense,

there would then be a corresponding

penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art.
365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence
at
arresto
mayor
maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would
constitute
a
grave
felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for
the latter could range all the way
from
prision
mayor
to
death,
according to the case. It can be seen
that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically
correct way to allege quasi-crimes is
to state that their commission results
in damage, either to person or
property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of
the
Peace
in
Quizon
without
jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage
to
Property
through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction
being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining
in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the
normative ancestry of our present
day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands
on
solid
conceptual foundation. The contrary
doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller22that "[r]eckless impudence is

223

not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply

a way of committing it x x x,"23 has
long been abandoned when the Court
en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Fallers conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasicrimes under Article 365 are distinct
species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only
by
dint
of
lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365
crimes and the complexing of
intentional crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code which, as will
be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed,
the Quizonian conception of quasicrimes undergirded a related branch
of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a
quasi-offense alleging one resulting
act after a prior conviction or
acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from
the same reckless act or omission
upon which the second prosecution
was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless
Imprudence
Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the
Same
Quasi-Offense
The
doctrine
that
reckless
imprudence under Article 365 is a

single quasi-offense by itself and not

merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense,
regardless
of
its
various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954.
There, a full Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving,"
arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question
was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal
of
reckless
imprudence
bars
subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences
alleged
for
both
charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently
answered
in
the
affirmative
in
People
v.
26
Belga (promulgated in 1957 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated
in
1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.),
People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon
J.),
People
v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the
Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated
in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal,
J.),
People
v.

224

Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the

Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by
the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People
v.
City
Court
of
33
Manila (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These
cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions
as
constitutionally
impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance
of
extending
the
constitutional
protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best
articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence"
because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act,
the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide
in that once convicted or acquitted of
a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365
of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the

consequence is only taken into

account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several
persons,
the
offense
(criminal
negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.35 x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently,
the
Diaz
line
of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy
merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one
ruling going against this unbroken
line of authority. Preceding Diaz by
more than a decade, El Pueblo de
Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the
pre-war colonial Court in November
1940,
allowed
the
subsequent
prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property despite his
previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the
same reckless operation of a motor
vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estiponas
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz
chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all
doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we
reviewed the Court of Appeals
conviction of an accused for "damage
to property for reckless imprudence"
despite his prior conviction for "slight
and less serious physical injuries thru

225

reckless imprudence," arising from

the same act upon which the second
charge was based. The Court of
Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals
was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People
vs. Estipona decided on November
14, 1940. However, in the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March
29,
1968),
this
Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
held that
Reason and precedent both coincide
in that once convicted or acquitted of
a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several
persons,
the
offense
(criminal
negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant,

Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace
(now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted
for
serious
physical
injuries through reckless imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of
one
and
the
same
vehicular
accident, because
the
second
accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes,
Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor
General in Buerano, in a reversal of
his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which
did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice
Felix
V.
Makasiar,
in
his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double
jeopardy and submits that "its
affirmatory decision dated January
28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123CR finding petitioner guilty of damage
to
property
through
reckless
imprudence should be set aside,
without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the
reckless act resulted into homicide

226

and physical injuries. then the same

consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused
merely damage to property-not
death-and physical injuries. Verily,
the value of a human life lost as a
result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising
from
the
same
40
mishap." (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners
submission that the lower courts
erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioners
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz
progeny. There, the accused, who was
also involved in a vehicular collision,
was
charged
in
two
separate
Informations with "Slight Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence"
and "Homicide with Serious Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former,
the accused sought the quashal of
the latter, invoking the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially
denied
relief,
but,
on
reconsideration, found merit in the
accuseds claim and dismissed the
second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its
analysis of the issue following Diaz
and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court
reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959
and dismissed the case, holding:

[T]he Court believes that the case

falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People
v. Belga, x x x In the case cited,
Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the
crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a
collision
between
the
two
automobiles driven by them (Crim.
Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the
same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision
one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No.
95) signed by the owner of one of the
vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident.
Both of these two complaints were
filed against Jose Belga only. After
trial, both defendants were acquitted
of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal,
Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint
for
multiple
physical
injuries through reckless imprudence
filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case
was just a duplication of the one filed
by the Chief of Police wherein he had
just been acquitted. The motion to
quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Albay. In the meantime,

227

the case for damage to property

through reckless imprudence filed by
one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been
remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had
waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in
the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one
for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage
to
property
through
reckless
imprudence.
Both
cases
were
dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon
motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash.
On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the
order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is
whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in
the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R.
No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954,
the accused was charged in the
municipal court of Pasay City with
reckless driving under sec. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having
driven an automobile in a fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing
an accident. After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was

dismissed in that court for failure of

the Government to prosecute. But
some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the
damage was alleged to beP249.50.
Pleading
double
jeopardy,
the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal
by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor

The next question to determine is the

relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of
damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal
Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or
not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule
113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether
the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether
the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the
Supreme Court also disposes of the

228

contention
of
the
prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in this case, in
view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecutions contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out
of
the
same
alleged
reckless
imprudence of which the defendant
have been previously cleared by the
inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General
had urged us in Silva to reexamine
Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We
declined
the
invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the
lower court erred in dismissing the
case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the

acquittal of the accused in the JP

court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same
breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the
case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling
of the Belga case x x x, upon which
the order of dismissal of the lower
court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a reexamination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose
of
delimiting
or
clarifying
its
application. We find, nevertheless,
that further elucidation or disquisition
on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or
similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to
the government. On one hand, there
is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was
clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the
Belga case, in the identical case of
Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April
30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts
Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question
posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC
succumbed,
stems
from
persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining
and
penalizing
quasi-

229

offenses and Article 48 on complexing

of crimes, both under the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either
of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding
from its operation light felonies46);
and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the
other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused
who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties,
will
only
serve
the
maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a
substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting
in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will
operate smoothly. Article 48 works to
combine in a single prosecution
multiple intentional crimes falling
under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper;
Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent
acts
and
their
consequences.
However,
the
complexities of human interaction
can produce a hybrid quasi-offense
not falling under either models that
of a single criminal negligence

resulting
in
multiple
non-crime
damages to persons and property
with varying penalties corresponding
to light, less grave or grave offenses.
The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasicrime be prosecuted? Should Article
48s framework apply to "complex"
the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light
offenses
which
will
be
tried
separately)?
Or
should
the
prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasicrime, to be penalized separately
following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence
adopts
both
approaches. Thus, one line of rulings
(none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts
and, on the other hand, resulting acts
amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly,
this
is
the
approach
the
MeTC
impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty

230

under Article 365 which is prision

correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of
double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under
Article 365 involves only resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if
one of the resulting acts is penalized
as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is
not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes
Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the
quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their
number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in
Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x
x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act
covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be

punished by a fine ranging from an

amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply
means that if there is only damage to
property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter.
The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x
x x.53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court
meant, logically, the penalty scheme
under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while
parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence
in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1)
we allow the "complexing" of a single
quasi-crime by breaking its resulting
acts into separate offenses (except
for
light
felonies),
thus
reconceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon
its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the
Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and
treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2)
we forbid the application of Article 48
in the prosecution and sentencing of
quasi-crimes,
require
single
prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and

231

severity, separately penalize each as

provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of
quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied
to double jeopardy adjudication in the
Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts
place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws
constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasicrimes and intentional felonies under
our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasicrimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasioffense to
stand
for
(1)
a
single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
anoffense which
is
a
necessary
means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected
the
Solicitor
Generals
argument that double jeopardy does
not bar a second prosecution for
slight
physical
injuries
through
reckless
imprudence
allegedly
because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other
charge for serious physical injuries
through
reckless
imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his
brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence,

because Article 48 of the Revised

Penal
Code
allows
only
the
complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might
be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted
the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan,
Bulacan,
which
acquitted
the
defendant,
the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out
of
the
same
alleged
reckless
imprudence of which the defendant
has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the
exoneration of this appellant x x x by
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the
charge of slight physical injuries
through
reckless
imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where
both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the

232

second
accusation
places
the
appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally
compelled choice. By prohibiting the
splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts,
rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions
are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved
and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions
under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the
number
or
severity
of
the
consequences. In imposing penalties,
the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for
each
consequence
alleged
and
proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365,
and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the
accused facing an Article 365 charge
a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more
than compensated by the certainty of
non-prosecution
for
quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If

it is so minded, Congress can re-craft

Article 365 by extending to quasicrimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile,
the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this
ruling.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
petition. We REVERSE the Orders
dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig
City,
Branch
157.
We DISMISS the
Information
in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on
the President of the Senate and the
Speaker
of
the
House
of
Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17,
2010
FACTS:

233

Following a vehicular collision in

August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City
(MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for
the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage
to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

arraignment
and,
because
of
petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.

Petitioner posted bail for his

temporary release in both cases. On
2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge on the first delict and was
meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.

1. Whether petitioner forfeited

his standing to seek relief from his
petition for certiorari when the MTC
ordered his arrest following his nonappearance at the arraignment in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and

The MTC refused quashal,

finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.
The petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the
MTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal
case,
including
the
arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners
motion, the MTC proceeded with the

Seven days later, the MTC

issued
a
resolution
denying
petitioners
motion
to
suspend
proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but
as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:

2.
Whether
petitioners
constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy
Clause
bars
further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent
Ponces husband.
RULING:
The
accused
negative
constitutional right not to be "twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from,
among
others,
post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a

234

court of competent jurisdiction upon

a valid information.
Petitioner
adopts
the
affirmative view, submitting that the
two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MTC
ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence
Resulting
in
Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."
The
two
charges
against
petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasioffenses.
The provisions contained in this
article shall not be applicable. Indeed,
the
notion
that
quasi-offenses,
whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless
imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense,
regardless
of
its
various resulting acts, undergirded

this Courts unbroken chain of

jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred
the
second
prosecutions
as
constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the
accused facing an Article 365 charge
a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more
than compensated by the certainty of
non-prosecution
for
quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If
it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasicrimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile,
the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this
ruling.
Petition granted.

235

G.R. No. 162540

2009

July 13,

GEMMA
T.
JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari filed
by
petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
23761 dated December 16, 2003,
affirming petitioner's conviction of the
crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004
denying
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other
women, namely, Anita Busog de
Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle, was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 131, with the crime of
Qualified Theft, allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the
month of July 1997, in Kalookan City,
Metro
Manila,
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one
another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC.,
herein
represented
by
JOSEPH

DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had

free access inside the aforesaid
establishment, with grave abuse of
trust and confidence reposed upon
them with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No.
0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the
sum
of P10,000.00,
representing
payment made by customer Baby
Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to
the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforesaid stated amount
of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which
both the RTC and the CA found to be
more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita
Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby
Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De
Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check was
payment for Baby Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of
Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account
of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former
pricing, merchandising and inventory
clerk of Mega Foam.

236

Meanwhile,
Rowena
Ricablanca,
another employee of Mega Foam,
received a phone call sometime in the
middle of July from one of their
customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The
customer wanted to know if she could
issue checks payable to the account
of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the
checks
payable
to CASH.
Said
customer
had
apparently
been
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to
make check payments to Mega Foam
payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call
from an employee of Land Bank,
Valenzuela Branch, who was looking
for Generoso Capitle. The reason for
the call was to inform Capitle that the
subject BDO check deposited in his
account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused
Anita
Valencia,
a
former
employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline
Capitle about the phone call from
Land Bank regarding the bounced
check. Ricablanca explained that she
had to call and relay the message
through
Valencia,
because
the
Capitles did not have a phone; but
they could be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former coemployee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the
check came from Baby Aquino, and
instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with
cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of
a plan to take the cash and divide it

equally
into
four:
for
herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon
the
advise
of
Mega
Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to
the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked
to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner
a
BDO
check
for P10,000.00 sometime in June
1997 as payment for her purchases
from Mega Foam.4Baby Aquino further
testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the
phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.5 Verification from company
records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said
that she had already paid Mega
Foam P10,000.00 cash in August
1997
as
replacement
for
the
dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a
hostile witness, admitted depositing
the subject BDO check in his bank
account, but explained that the check
came into his possession when some
unknown woman arrived at his house
around the first week of July 1997 to
have the check rediscounted. He
parted with his cash in exchange for
the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman
or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check
bounced, he merely disregarded it as

237

he didnt know where to find the

woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile,
Dyhengco
filed
a
Complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents.
Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
by Dyhengco were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder by
the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were
given to Ricablanca, who was tasked
to pretend that she was going along
with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and
petitioner met at the latter's house.
Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over
said check to Ricablanca. They
originally intended to proceed to
Baby Aquino's place to have the
check replaced with cash, but the
plan did not push through. However,
they agreed to meet again on August
21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again
went to petitioners house, where she
met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.
Petitioner,
her
husband,
and
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided
not to go with the group because she
decided to go shopping. It was only
petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca
and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby
Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
alighted from the jeep and entered
the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash

from Baby Aquino. However, the cash

she actually brought out from the
premises was the P10,000.00 marked
money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the
jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia
and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
and Valencia were arrested by NBI
agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought
to the NBI office where the Forensic
Chemist found fluorescent powder on
the palmar and dorsal aspects of both
of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the
marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft
against the two and one Jane Doe
who was later identified as Jacqueline
Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand,
denied having taken the subject
check and presented the following
scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a
collector for Mega Foam until she
resigned on June 30, 1997, but
claimed that she had stopped
collecting
payments
from
Baby
Aquino for quite some time before her
resignation from the company. She
further testified that, on the day of
the arrest, Ricablanca came to her
mothers house, where she was
staying at that time, and asked that
she accompany her (Ricablanca) to
Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner

238

was going for a pre-natal check-up at

the
Chinese
General
Hospital,
Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride
with the former and her husband in
their jeep going to Baby Aquino's
place in Caloocan City. She allegedly
had no idea why Ricablanca asked
them to wait in their jeep, which they
parked outside the house of Baby
Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her
lap and the NBI agents arrested
them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she
was the cashier of Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was
never part of her job to collect
payments from customers. According
to her, on the morning of August 21,
1997, Ricablanca called her up on the
phone, asking if she (Valencia) could
accompany her (Ricablanca) to the
house of Baby Aquino. Valencia
claims that she agreed to do so,
despite her admission during crossexamination that she did not know
where Baby Aquino resided, as she
had never been to said house. They
then met at the house of petitioner's
mother, rode the jeep of petitioner
and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they
arrived at said place, Ricablanca
alighted, but requested them to wait
for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her
surprise, Ricablanca gave her money
and so she even asked, "What is
this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested
them.

The trial of the three accused went its

usual course and, on October 4, 1999,
the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing,
the
Court
finds
accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto
y
Latosa,
Anita
Busog
De
Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime ofQUALIFIED
THEFT and each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS
AND
ELEVEN
(11)
DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on
December 16, 2003, a Decision was
promulgated, the dispositive portion
of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision
of
the
trial
court
is MODIFIED, in that:
(a)
the
sentence
against
accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b)
the
sentence
against
accused Anita
Valencia
is
reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused
Capitle is acquitted.

Jacqueline

239

SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of
the foregoing CA Decision was filed
only for petitioner Gemma Tubale
Jacinto, but the same was denied per
Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition
Review
on Certiorari filed
petitioner
alone,
assailing
Decision and Resolution of the
The issues raised in the petition
as follows:

for
by
the
CA.
are

1. Whether or not petitioner can

be convicted of a crime not
charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless
check can be the object of
theft; and
3.
Whether
or
prosecution
has
petitioner's
guilt
reasonable doubt.8

not
the
proved
beyond

The petition deserves considerable

thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the
following pieces of evidence to
constitute the elements of the crime
of qualified theft defined under Article
308, in relation to Article 310, both of
the Revised Penal Code: (1) the
taking of personal property - as
shown by the fact that petitioner, as
collector for Mega Foam, did not remit
the customer's check payment to her
employer and, instead, appropriated

it for herself; (2) said property

belonged to another the check
belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was
her payment for purchases she made;
(3) the taking was done with intent to
gain this is presumed from the act
of unlawful taking and further shown
by the fact that the check was
deposited to the bank account of
petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was
done without the owners consent
petitioner hid the fact that she had
received the check payment from her
employer's customer by not remitting
the check to the company; (5) it was
accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things
the check was voluntarily handed to
petitioner by the customer, as she
was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with
grave
abuse
of
confidence

petitioner is admittedly entrusted

with the collection of payments from
customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the
aforementioned
Articles
of
the
Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft
must have some value, as the
intention of the accused is
to gain from the thing stolen. This
is further bolstered by Article 309,
where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused
is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took
the postdated check belonging to

240

Mega Foam, but the same was

apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the
question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually
produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in
the negative.
9

Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly

instructive and applicable to the
present case. In Intod, the accused,
intending to kill a person, peppered
the latters bedroom with bullets, but
since the intended victim was not
home at the time, no harm came to
him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But
upon review by this Court, he was
adjudged
guilty
only
of
an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the
Revised Penal Code, because of the
factual impossibility of producing the
crime. Pertinent portions of said
provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. Criminal
responsibility
shall
be
incurred:
xxxx

2. By any person performing an act

which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for
theinherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual
means.
(emphasis
supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in
case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. - When
the person intending to commit an
offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature
one of impossible accomplishment or
because the means employed by
such
person
are
essentially
inadequate to produce the result
desired by him, the court, having in
mind the social danger and the
degree of criminality shown by the
offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible
crime are: (1) that the act performed
would be an offense against persons
or property; (2) that the act was done
with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment
was
inherently
impossible, or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The
aspect
of
the
inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the
intended crime under Article 4(2) of
the Revised Penal Code was further

241

explained by the Court in Intod10 in

this wise:
Under this article, the act performed
by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced
because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility,
or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person
already dead falls in this category.
On
the
other
hand,
factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
x x x 11

In Intod, the Court went on to give an

example of an offense that involved
factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet, but gets nothing since the
pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin
to the above example of factual
impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts
to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against
property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain
or be unjustly enriched. Were it not
for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face
value
thereof,
which
was
not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
due to the extraneous circumstance
of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time,
that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to
replace the value of said dishonored
check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later
entrapped receiving the P5,000.00
marked money, which she thought
was the cash replacement for the
dishonored check, is of no moment.
The Court held in Valenzuela v.
People12 that under the definition of

242

theft in Article 308 of the Revised

Penal Code, "there is only one
operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft the taking of
personal
property
of
another."
Elucidating further, the Court held,
thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory
definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer
provided in the language of the law
that theft is already "produced" upon
the "tak[ing of] personal property of
another without the latters consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft
produced? There would be all but
certain unanimity in the position that
theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due
to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it
is immaterial to the product of the
felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution
for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since
the deprivation from the owner alone
has already ensued from such acts of
execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that
unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the

deprivation
of
ones
personal
property, is the element which
produces
the
felony
in
its
13
consummated stage. x x x
From the above discussion, there can
be no question that as of the time
that petitioner took possession of
the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft,
had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving
the P5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check
was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to
convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had
been dishonored by the drawee bank.
Since the crime of theft is not a
continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement
should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the
fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was
merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner
further
planned
to
have
the
dishonored check replaced with cash
by its issuer is a different and
separate
fraudulent
scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the

243

Court cannot pronounce judgment on

the accused; otherwise, it would
violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
dated
December
16,
2003,
and
its
Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto
is
found GUILTYof
an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined
and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph
2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arrresto mayor, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
PERALTA, J.: A petition for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming petitioner's conviction of the
crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution
denying
petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Baby Aquino handed petitioner
Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO)
Check in the amount of P10,000.00.
The check was payment for Baby

Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam

Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the
collector of Mega Foam. Somehow,
the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle,
the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the
latter is the sister of petitioner and
the former pricing, merchandising
and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a
phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, who was looking for Generoso
Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO
check deposited in his account had
been dishonored. Ricablanca then
called and relayed the message
through accused Anita Valencia, a
former employee/collector of Mega
Foam, because the Capitles did not
have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor
and former co-employee of Jacqueline
Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the
check came from Baby Aquino, and
instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with
cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of
a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally
into
four:
for
herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon
the
advise
of
Mega
Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to
the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.

244

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked

to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner
a
BDO
check
for
P10,000.00 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam. Baby
Aquino further testified that petitioner
Jacinto also called her on the phone
to tell her that the BDO check
bounced. Verification from company
records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said
that she had already paid Mega Foam
P10,000.00 cash as replacement for
the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Ten pieces
of P1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted
with fluorescent powder by the NBI.
Thereafter, the bills were given to
Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that she was going along
with Valencia's plan.
Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband,
and
Valencia
then
boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby
Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
alighted from the jeep and entered
the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash
from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the
premises was the P10,000.00 marked
money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the

jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia

and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
and Valencia were arrested by NBI
agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
A case was filed against the three
accused,
Jacinto,
Valencia
and
Capitle. RTC rendered its Decision
finding
them
GUILTY
beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced
each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11)
DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20)
DAYS, as maximum.
The three appealed to the CA and the
decision of the trial court was
MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence
against accused Gemma Jacinto
stands; (b) the sentence against
accused Anita Valencia is reduced to
4 months arresto mayor medium, and
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is
acquitted. Hence, the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner alone,
Issue: Whether or not a worthless
check can be the object of theft.
Held: As may be gleaned from the
aforementioned
Articles
of
the
Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of
the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen. This is further bolstered by
Article 309, where the law provides
that the penalty to be imposed on the

245

accused is dependent on the value of

the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took
the postdated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the
question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually
produced. The Court must resolve the
issue in the negative. Intod v. Court of
Appeals is highly instructive and
applicable to the present case.
In Intod (see doctrines laid out in
Intod), the Court went on to give an
example of an offense that involved
factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet, but gets nothing since the
pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin
to the above example of factual
impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts
to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against
property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain
or be unjustly enriched. Were it not
for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face
value
thereof,
which
was
not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
due to the extraneous circumstance
of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time,

that prevented the crime from being

produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to
replace the value of said dishonored
check.
The fact that petitioner was later
entrapped receiving the P5,000.00
marked money, which she thought
was the cash replacement for the
dishonored check, is of no moment.
The Court held in Valenzuela v. People
that under the definition of theft in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in
theft the taking of personal
property of another. As of the time
that petitioner took possession of the
check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed
all
the
acts
to
consummate the crime of theft, had it
not
been
impossible
of
accomplishment
in
this
case.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement
for the check was hatched only after
the check had been dishonored by
the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement
should
not
be
considered as a continuation of the
theft. At most, the fact that petitioner
was caught receiving the marked
money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her
intent to gain.

246

Moreover, the fact that petitioner

further
planned
to
have
the
dishonored check replaced with cash
by its issuer is a different and
separate
fraudulent
scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the
Court cannot pronounce judgment on
the accused; otherwise, it would
violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED.
Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as

defined and penalized in Articles 4,

paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arrresto mayor, and to
pay the costs.