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505
shoot. Thus the.army was totally dependent on the poli-c and hence could not
be as effective as it could have been. This
can be illustrated by an incident at
Behrampada.
The local Shiv Sena -MLA Sarpotdar
was alleged to have playeda'role in attacks
on Behrampada. He was found in possession of a revolver and a 'gupti' and the
army arrestedhim. But the police released
him after women supporters demonstrated outside the police -station. Bal
Thackeray said that the police had done
the 'right thing. This clearly shows that
the police was taking very lenijentview of
the activities of Shiv S4jniks. Bal
Thackeray wrote highly provocative
editorials in Samna, the Sena mouthpiece
and yet no action was taken by the Naik
administration. On the other hand, Naik
phoned Thackerayasking him not to write
such provocative editorials and articles.
This also shows how weak the Naik administration was.
Prime minister Narasimha Rao was
equally ineffective. He did not stir out of
Delhi when Bombay was aflame. When
some film artists met him in Delhi requested him to go to Bombay he said hle
can do so only after Makar Sankranti on
January 14! What can be expected of a
prime ministerwho gave more importance
to his religious beliefs than to the bloodshed in Bombay? When he finally did visit
Bombay riots were already over. It was a
short visit and he merely passed through
riot-affectedareas without as much as getting down from his car the reason given
by him for not coming out of his car was
that the securityofficers did not allow him
to do so.
The prime minister was content to send
Sharad Pawarto Bombay.He made an appeal for peace but it was hardly effective.
Though the intensity of rioting decreased
in the city, it spread to other areas in
suburbs. One cannot say whether Sharad
Pawar tried really hard to stop riots or
not. However, when riots were raging in
Bombay,dissension was at its height in the
Congress. Even Sunil Dutt, a noted film
artist and an MP from Bombay tendered
his resignation from parliament to the
prime minister out of sheer disgust.
The BJP leader L K Advani too visited
Bombay on January 16. His first halt was
at Jogeshwari where four members of a
Hindu family were burnt alive by Muslim
miscreants. He too attributed the communal violence to 'foreign hand: without
of course substantiating it or specifying
which country had a hand in inciting the
riots. He visited mostly the Hindu areas
though he did talk to some Muslim victims also. He also maintained that the
riots in Bombay were intensified only
after the incident at Radhabai Chawl in
Jogeshwari. However, he desisted from
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saying that the reaction was out of all proportions as more than 600 persons were
killed in retaliatioh.
What was worrying most was the cruelty with which many people were killed in
Bombay. Most of the bodies were beyond
recognition as they were highly mutilated.
In some cases a person was stabbed and
then set ablaze after sprinkling petrol
while still alive to make his death more
painful and agonising. In KEM hospital
a most shocking incident occurred. The
miscreants stabbed an injured person in
a critical condition just outside the operation theatre. The miscreants thought he
might survive if the operation was successful. In fact it was a case of mistaken
identity as the person concerned was a
Hindu and the miscreants thought he was
a Muslim on account of his beard.
Apart from the fact that now miscreants could come right up to the operation theatre with arms it shows the extent
of dehumanisation of the killers and insensitivity of people to such brutal killings. It is not only the question of killing
'the other'. but of dehumanisation and
desensitivisationnot only of the killersbut
also of the community to which they
belong. Our survey also points out that
therewas, in general, acceptabilityof what
was happening. There was no protest
against it in any form. Middle class
Maharashtrians had sympathy with the
Shiv Sena and their killers. It is only very
conscious and committed people who protested or took out peace-marcbes.Workers
were also divided along communal lines.
The trade unions could not intervene at
all and this included left trade unions, as
the workers were not with them. Workers
were by and largesympathetic to the Sena.
One must understand that in such a
communally surcharged situations, the
emotional appeal of religion is far more
powerful than that of workers' unity, etc.
It is also partly the result of lack of efforts on the part of trade union leaders
to politically educate their workers. Trade
union activities have been confined, by
and large, to economic demands for
higher wages, dearness allowance, bonus,
etc. In some places the Shiv Sena successfully tried to prevent the Muslim
workers from rejoining their duties after
the riots. It happened even in the public
sector Mazgaon Docks.
In 1984 riots too the Shiv Sainiks had
tried to stop Muslim workersfrom resuming the work, but not on such a scale.
Moreover, this time it was not only
restricted to the workers. They even tried
to prevent Muslim children from going to
schools. They threatened principals of
schools not to let the Muslim children
come to their schools. Even at Lijjat
Papads_,.a women's co-operativeMuslim women were preventedfrom comEconomic and Political Wecklv
and lolitical
Available from
Wieeklv
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507
. He doesn't
508
economic policies is the wealth and linkages of its.key membersto the class structure and economic system.
ADMINISTRATION'S MILLIONAIRES
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