Analyze Jong Kun Chois term strategic patience

in the context of North Korea

I.

Introduction.
1. The trend in using nuclear weapon by the super power state has been
ended with the end of the Cold War, however it left some lesson for small
country to use it as deterrence effect in dealing the outer threats. Like
which was happened in North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. 1 Different with
Pakistan and Iran, North Korea has been too provocative in developing
their nuclear weapons. After succeed in a few missile tests since 2006 to
early 2016,2 on March 2016, North Korea Kim Jong-un has declared China
as enemy and also threatened with nuclear war.3 Then, on June 2016, he
threatened the U.S. and its allies after tested the new missiles. 4
2. Some diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the North constantly be done
since 1992, yet never achieved the expected result. Several analysis from
technology perspective has generated a policy of President Obamas
administration to implement strategic patience in dealing the threat from
the Pyongyang regime. The policy come from scientist analysis which
argue that the North has not been mastering the basic technology which
very important in developing nuclear missile, such as miniaturize a nuclear
warhead, missile re-entry technology and evaded early-warning radars
and missile-interceptors.5 Therefore, the U.S. government may conclude
that the North threat was not really dangerous as well prefer to patience
and wait the regime fall.

1 Thrse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st century: Lessons from the Cold
War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy (CA, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012),
p.10,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf
(accessed July 25, 2016)
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-usstrategy.html?_r=0
3 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/wwiii-fears-kim-jong-un-7665166
4 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3655346/North-Korea-leader-says-missiletest-success-threat-US.html
5 http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents/bmdhist.pdf

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3. On the other hand, in 2016, Jong Kun Choi as a Professor on Yonsei

University of Seoul criticize the Obamas administration which prefer to
wait and patient in dealing the Pyongyang regime. He stated that strategic
patience has given a chance and time toward the North regime to more
strong and dangerous. He also argued that Obama's government have to
ending the strategy and create a real effort to resolve the problem rather
than just waiting the regime fall. Further, he suggested a set of diplomatic
efforts in denuclearizing the North.
4. Thesis Statement.
a. Based on the distinction above, this essay will analyze the Jong
Kun Choi argument in term of strategic patience which has been
applied by the U.S. government in facing of the North Koreas
behavior which so provocative in using their nuclear weapons.
b. It will be started by the brief description concerning on the North
Korea background and Jong's opinion, then analyze the strengths
and weaknesses of his argument in criticizing the Obama's strategy
and his alternative solution.
c. Further, it will compare the strengths and weaknesses to find the
lessons and opportunities in considering another alternative
solution.
d. Then, it will be ended with the conclusion which agree toward
Jong's opinion that strategic patience have to be terminated and
replaced with a real effort which more concrete. However, it will be
more inclined that the settlement through military approach is more
effective than diplomatic way like Jong's suggestion.
II.

Body: Analyze Jong Kun Chois term strategic patience in the context of North
Korea.
5. Overview of North Koreas nuclear threat.
The nuclear threat of North Korea come from their strategic culture
which influenced by the historical background, leadership and limitation.
a. North Korean strategic culture. (from lecturer)
Latar belakang historis telah melahirkan asumsi dasar Kim Il
Sung sebagai pemimpin pertama DPRK untuk menempuh jalan
terbaik yaitu kemandirian berdasarkan ajaran sosialis dan antipati
terhadap liberalism. Runtuhnya komunis di Indonesia yang
merupakan sahabat terbaik di era 1960s merupakan bukti bahwa

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masuknya liberalism dalam kehidupan masyarakat merupakan
awal jatuhnya komunisme di negara itu. Sehingga tindakan yang
paling strategis untuk mengamankan identitas nasional adalah
memutus pengaruh external dengan cara isolasi. Namun, Kim
menyadari bahwa dunia telah bergerak semakin liberal. Dilain
pihak, Kim memahami bahwa persenjataannya yang kuno tidak
akan mampu menghadapi kekuatan liberal yang semakin canggih. 6
Kondisi ini memberikan ide untuk menempuh jalan singkat dengan
menguasai senjata pemusnah massal sebagai alat untuk
meningkatkan posisi tawar sekaligus deterrence effect dalam
menghadapi hegemoni liberalism dunia.
b. Nuclear
weapon
development.
(take
from:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm )
North Korea started learning nuclear theoretically since 1950
under the Soviet-North Korea agreement. 7 In early 1990, North
Korea developed missile program and begin tested with nuclear
warhead in 2006.8
Namun, para ahli berbeda pendapat tentang perkembangan
teknologi rudal nuklir Korea Utara. Perbedaan ini terjadi karena
minimnya sumber informasi yang dapat dijadikan sebagai bahan
rujukan. Umumnya mereka mendasarkan analisisnya berdasarkan
publikasi dari pemerintah Korea Utara. Namun, dari beberapa test
yang dipublikasikan secara resmi oleh pemerintah Korea Utara
menunjukkan kegagalan, antara lain test tahun 2006, 2009 dan
2012. Sebagai contoh peluncuran roket UNHA-3 pada bulan April
2012, dimana pemerintah Kim Jong-un mengundang perwakilan
dari ilmuwan dan media internasional untuk menyaksikan. Mereka

6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gX2_I___pQ , 940.
7 https://books.google.com.bn/books?
id=iPyeOflxTsMC&pg=PA101&dq=north+korea+nuclear+development+program&hl
=id&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiUw4Sxk53OAhUEUZQKHYI7AFwQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&
q=north%20korea%20nuclear%20development%20program&f=false
8 https://books.google.com.bn/books?
id=ZCIwNCoTx_8C&pg=PA25&dq=North+Korea+launches+Nuclear+program,
+1990&hl=id&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwil4_ilmZ3OAhWEJpQKHS0HBK8Q6AEINjAD#v=o
nepage&q=North%20Korea%20launches%20Nuclear%20program%2C
%201990&f=false, p. 25.

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mengalami kegagalan tanpa mengetahui penyebabnya, dimana
roket meledak setelah 2 menit 15 detik mengudara pada ketinggian
7.5 km.9 Stan Grant, wartawan CNN yang turut hadir dalam
peluncuran menyatakan bahwa ruang mission control proyek
tersebut tidak seperti layaknya negara maju lainnya. Itu hanya
seperti ruangan kosong dengan beberapa meja dan monitor,
katanya.10
Berbeda
dengan
peluncuran
sebelumnya,
tanpa
mengundang ilmuwan dan media internasional, pada Desember
tahun yang sama, Pyongyang mempublikasikan keberhasilannya
meluncurkan UNHA-3 dan menempatkan satelit di orbitnya. 11 Dilain
pihak, sebagian ahli menyatakan bahwa keberhasilan tersebut
tetap masih kontroversial, mengingat beberapa kegagalan
sebelumnya.12 Namun, berbagai media dan pengamat politik telah
menjadikannya sebagai evidence bahwa Korea Utara telah
memiliki rudal nuklir. Seperti contoh Aiden Warren dan bukunya
The Obama Administrations Nuclear Weapon Strategy: The
Promises of Prague. 13 Bukti lain tentang masih lemahnya teknologi
rudal Korea Utara juga disampaikan oleh Kementerian Pertahanan
Korea Selatan pada Maret 2016 yang menyatakan bahwa Korea
Utara belum menguasai teknologi re-entry untuk rudal jarak jauh. 14
Yang lebih ambigu adalah analisis Bruce E. Bechtol, dia
mempercayai publikasi Korea Utara namun tidak menemukan
satupun informasi yang dapat mengkonfirmasi kebenarannya. 15

9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toVcPMsV8tA , 1533.
10 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/11/world/asia/north-korea-grant-missioncontrol/index.html
11 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20690338
12 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-launch/
13 https://books.google.com.bn/books?
id=DXkqAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA262&dq=north+korea+failed+missile&hl=id&sa=X&ved
=0ahUKEwiqvvCJ0J3OAhXMqY8KHepoBWMQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=north
%20korea%20failed%20missile&f=false , p. 225.
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFpWneoofgc , 117.

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Seperti sebuah teka teki, mengapa ketika disaksikan banyak
orang mereka gagal, namun ketika mereka mengerjakan sendiri
mereka berhasil.
Namun sekali lagi, tidak terdapat sumber untuk konfirmasi
kecuali public statement by the North Korea government. Satusatunya kemampuan Korut yang dapat dikonfirmasi kebenarannya
adalah kemampuan memproduksi rudal sekelas Scud, namun tidak
untuk rudal nuklir.16
c. Efforts to denuclearization.
In the next discussion, it will explains a set of diplomatic
efforts in denuclearizing the North to asses its effectivity.
Terlepas dari benar tidaknya kemampuan Korea Utara
dalam menguasai teknologi rudal nuklir, berbagai upaya untuk
denuklirisasi telah dilakukan. Upaya denuklirisasi telah dilakukan
sejak 1992, tujuh tahun setelah rezim Korut menyetujui the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) pada 1985. 17 Namun, the regime
tidak pernah memenuhi persyaratan dari the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) hingga Amerika dan USSR menarik senjata
nuklir mereka dari Semenanjung Korea pada 1991, sebagai tanda
denuklirisasi di semenanjung tersebut. 18 Akibatnya, pada Maret
1992, the U.S. menjatuhkan sanksi terhadap dua industry Korea
Utara untuk kegiatan proliferasi rudal. 19 Hal ini membuat

15 https://www.du.edu/korbel/media/korbel-internal-newsletter/twt-special-reportnorth-koreas-nuclear-threat-april12016.pdf
16 Need citation ambil keterangan tentang Korut jualan rudal Scud ke Iran, dll

17 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
18 https://books.google.com.bn/books?
id=DEKbBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA298&lpg=PA298&dq=March+6,+1992:+The+United+St
ates+imposes+sanctions+on+North+Korea
%E2%80%99s&source=bl&ots=sTtylnM3af&sig=lLwB1Ouajfw84GCObDqtGPTar0k&
hl=id&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHOaU853OAhXFr48KHWj8CPwQ6AEIKzAC#v=onepage&q=March%206%2C
%201992%3A%20The%20United%20States%20imposes%20sanctions%20on
%20North%20Korea%E2%80%99s&f=false, p. 298.
19 Ibid. (book)

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Pyongyang kembali serius terhadap komitmennya untuk
denuklirisasi. Namun, kembali rezim tidak dapat mengklarifikasi
perbedaan jumlah awal plutonium dengan hasil inspeksi IAEA pada
September 1992. Proses yang berbelit-belit dan berakhir dengan
pengumuman pengunduran diri Korea Utara dari pemeriksaan
IAEA yang merupakan syarat komitmen terhadap NPT.
Selanjutnya, mulai 1994, dilaksanakan negosiasi tingkat tinggi
antara pemerintah Amerika dan Korea Utara. Namun sikap Korea
Utara semakin membingungkan hingga akhirnya menarik diri dari
NPT pada tahun 2003.
Sebuah babak baru upaya denuklirisasi Korea Utara dimulai
pada 2003 melalui Six Party Talk (6PT) yang melibatkan South
Korea, North Korea, United States of America, China, Japan and
Russia.20 Namun, hingga tahun 2008 belum dapat menundukkan
ambisi rezim Korea Utara untuk menghentikan program senjata
nuklirnya. Berbagai sanksi telah dijatuhkan untuk menghambat
pembangunan senjata nuklir Korut, namun selama tahun-tahun
tersebut Korut malahan melakukan berbagai test kemampuan
nuklirnya.21 Pada 2009, Rezim menarik diri dari 6PT dan
menyatakan bahwa Korea Utara tidak terikat lagi atas hasil yang
telah dibuat selama 2003-2008. Tindakan sepihak ini telah
mengembalikan upaya 6PT kepada titik nol dalam rangka
denuklirisasi Korea Utara. Ini menunjukkan bahwa rezim Korut
sangat unpredictable.
Demikian juga pada masa pemerintahan Presiden Obama,
sikap rezim Korut yang menjengkelkan kembali dimunculkan.
DPRK kembali memberikan harapan untuk denuklirisasi melalui
Cina pada February 9, 2010. Keinginannya semakin nampak
sungguh-sungguh setelah dituduh terlibat dalam tenggelamnya
kapal patroli Cheonan milik Korsel pada March 26, 2010. Namun,
ketika pihak Cina maupun U.S. mulai serious menanggapi
keinginannya tersebut, dia kembali menolaknya. Sanksi
pembatasan keuangan juga pernah dijatuhkan, namun tidak
berdampak kepada sikap Pyongyang. Semenanjung Korea kembali
memanas pada November 23, 2011, ketika Korut menembakkan
sekitar 200 peluru artileri ke tentara Korsel yang sedang

20 http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-park-rethinking-north-koreasdenuclearization.pdf
21 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201718.pdf

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melaksanakan latihan di Pulau Yeonpyeong. 22 Sebagai akibatnya,
dua tentara Korea Selatan tewas dan sekitar 50 tentara dan sipil
terluka.23 Akibat insiden itu, Amerika dan Rusia mengutuk tindakan
Korut, namun China membela Korut dan mengusulkan masalah ini
diselesaikan dalam forum 6PT. Pihak U.S., Korsel dan Jepang yang
awalnya menolak, akhirnya menyetujui usul tersebut dan memulai
lagi upaya diplomatis. Setelah mencapai beberapa tahapan dialog,
upaya denuklirisasi Korut menunjukkan hasil yang positif. Sebagai
imbalannya, U.S. berjanji memberikan 240.000 metrik ton makanan
kepada Korut pada Februari 29, 2012. Namun secara mengejutkan,
Pada 16 March 2012, Rezim baru Kim Jong-un mengumumkan
akan meluncurkan roket UNHA-3 sebagai perayaan 100 tahun
meninggalnya Kim Il Sung. Hal ini telah mengundang kekhawatiran
berbagai pihak. 29 Maret U.S. mengancam akan membatalkan
bantuan dan perjanjian jika Pyongyang melaksanakan rencana
tersebut. 13 April 2012, rezim meluncurkan UNHA-3 sesuai
rencana dan semua upaya diplomatic yang sudah dibangun,
kembali ke titik Nol.
Pada 31 Maret 2014, kembali Korut dan Korsel saling
menembakkan ratusan peluru artileri di perbatasan Laut Barat. Ini
merupakan insiden paling berbahaya setelah adu artileri tahun
2011. Satu hal yang perlu dipertanyakan adalah, mengapa Korut
tidak menembakkan rudal nuklir bila memang memilikinya? Ini
memperkuat asumsi bahwa kepemilikan rudal nuklir Korut
diragukan.
Pada 20 November 2014, kembali rezim Korut memberikan
harapan denuklirisasi melalui Rusia. Mereka juga menyeru agar
U.S. dan Korsel menghentikan latihan bersama di sekitar
semenanjung Korea. 8 Februari 2015, Korut kembali menguji rudal
balistik jarak pendek. Adm William Gortney, head of U.S. North
Command mengomentari bahwa rudal antar benua Korea Utara
adalah operasional, meskipun belum pernah di uji coba. Namun
para ahli membantah pernyataan Gortney.
There are two important key to be highlighted from the
description above. Pertama, dari behavior rezim Korea yang
unpredictable dan bukti upaya diplomatic yang telah gagal
berulangkali, digarisbawahi bahwa Rezim Pyongyang tidak
sungguh-sungguh
menginginkan
denuklirisasi.
Mereka

22 http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2010/11/101123_korearetaliation
23 Ibid.

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menggunakan ancaman nuklir untuk mendapatkan their national
interest. Kedua, dari dua tragedi duel artileri, beberapa kegagalan
percobaan rudal nuklir ketika disaksikan pihak luar dan berhasil
ketika tidak disaksikan, tidak adanya bukti untuk konfirmasi
penguasaan teknologi rudal nuklir yang diragukan para ahli
teknologi memberikan indikasi kuat bahwa Korea Utara sebenarnya
belum dapat memproduksi rudal nuklir. Ini selaras dengan analisis
Andrei Lankov, Head of Korean affairs, Kookmin University (Seoul)
and ex-student of the Kim Il Sung University (Pyongyang), who
states that North Korean like Mozambique, mereka harus nampak
menakutkan atau berbahaya untuk mendapat bantuan dari dunia.
Oleh karena itu, mereka mengembangkan teknologi dan
persenjataan Nuklir dan mereka harus nampak serius dalam
mengembangkannya.24 Menanggapi hal ini, pemerintahan Obama
akhirnya memilih kesabaran strategis dengan scenario jatuhnya
rezim.

6. Analyzing the Jong Kun Chois opinion about the strategic patience.
Uraian dan hasil asesmen diatas selanjutnya digunakan sebagai
dasar untuk menganalisa pendapat Jong Kun Choi terhadap
kesabaran strategis pemerintahan Obama dalam menghadapi
kelakuan Rezim Korut.
a. The definition of strategic patience according to Jong Kun Choi.
In term of strategic patience, Jong explains that it was only
wait and see as well without concrete action. Strategic patience
was very dangerous if implemented to deal the behavior of the
regime.
b. The strengths of Jongs argument.
There are five strengths of Jongs argument. First, Jongs
argument about strategic patience has given opportunity toward
North Korea to enhance their nuclear missiles capability is true.
Although, hal ini belum terbukti menghasilkan rudal nuklir, namun
pengetahuan dan pengalaman Korea Utara akan meningkat dari
kegagalannya. Kedua, waiting the regimes collapse is unrealistic.
Meskipun berbagai sanksi telah diberlakukan, pembatasan dan
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gX2_I___pQ , 1100.

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isolasi, namun tidak berhasil menyebabkan rezim collapse. Ketiga,
pendekatan diplomatis melalui sekutunya, yaitu China dan Rusia
juga tidak dapat menundukkan kelakuan rezim Pyongyang.
Keempat, the changed of the leader does not give negative impact.
North Koreas strategic culture has navigated the regime, sehingga
karakter dasar pemimpin tidak akan mampu melawan sociocontract yang telah terbangun. Kelima, the isolations has caused
the difficulty in collecting information about the North Korea.
Internally, isolasi terjadi karena kebijakan rezim. Namun externally,
sanksi-sanksi yang dijatuhkan semakin memperkuat isolasi dan
menjadi justifikasi bagi rezim. Hal selanjutnya membenarkan
kesimpulan Jong bahwa strategic patience was not effective to
solve the issue.
c. The weaknesses of Jongs argument.
On the other hand, there are five weaknesses of Jongs
analysis. First, Jong impose diplomatic negotiation, even though it
has been clearly unrealistic in facing the characters of the North's
leadership. Jong still consider that Six Party Talk (6PT) can resolve
the problem, even though it had been tried out twice and worked
not effectively. Second, Jong does not discuss further if the
scenario by 6PT fails. Jong tidak membahas dalam efektifitas
upaya diplomatis as well as tidak memberikan solusi alternative lain
jika upaya diplomatic gagal. Third, Jong has assumed that the
North Korean public statements can be used to reopen the
negotiation process. This is contrary to the reality that the Norths
public does not have a place under the Kim regime. Fourth, Jong
did not discuss deeply in the technological perspective as the most
important things to assess the North's nuclear missiles capability.
Jong just stand on the political assumption which was clearly
unable to describe the reality of the threat. Fifth, Jong did not
explain the implications of the North Koreas nuclear policy toward
their domestic implications. Bahwa penjatuhan sanksi tidak
berdampak terhadap rezim, namun justrru berdampak terhadap
masyarakat Korea. Ini merupakan kegagalan internasional dalam
menerapkan prinsip Responsibility to Protec (RtoP).

7. The Finding.
a. Advantaged and disadvantaged.

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Inside the issue, there are some part that has been
advantaged and disadvantaged. Meskipun rakyat Korea Utara
menderita kelaparan, kekurangan gizi dan kualitas hidup yang tidak
layak, namun rezim Kim tetap akan menikmati permainan dan tidak
merasakan dampak terhadap berbagai sanksi dan resiko tersebut.
Rakyat Korea juga akan menjadi pihak yang paling menderita bila
terjadi perang di semenanjung Korea. Mereka akan dihadapkan
pada kematian dan pengungsian. They also have been the victims
of the regime duping. In deep understanding, the U.S. has held
both side. Menggelar theater di semenanjung Korea tentunya akan
berdampak terhadap ekonomi U.S. Selanjutnya, sebagai
pemegang hegemony dunia, the U.S. memerlukan justification atas
keberadaannya di Asia. Dimana salah satu justification adalah
melindungi Korea Selatan dan Jepang terhadap ancaman Korut.
Bila masalah Korut selesai, maka alasan yang tersisa adalah
balancing the rising of China especially in South China Sea conflict.
Sedangkan yang sudah pasti dirugikan adalah South Korea and
Japan. South Korea and Japan will always bear the psychological
burden. Although they have the early warning system and
interceptor missiles, however will always standby and worried every
time to anticipate the North's strike which unpredictable. It means
that they will not feel at secure and peace as long as this problem
has not been resolved. If the military approach to be the option, it
will cause a wave of North Korean refugee. In this case, China and
South Korea will bear the economic issue.
b. The circle of securitization.
This analysis also find a complex securitization that
conducted by circle actions. It will be difficult to explain where the
start is as well as the end. U.N. sanctions to North come from the
U.S. draft. The sanction was felt as a threat for the North. No can
be done by the North, except show of force in nuclear capabilities
to increase their bargaining position to make sure that there are no
enemy will strike her and to make all the world let her go with the
regime's interest. Further, this condition creates two heavy impact
on security and humanitarian issue. The show of force of the
regime has been blown up by the media and politician comment.
They were not wrong, because the evidence came from the
regimes statement and untested action functionally. The fear of the
nuclear impact given birth the security issue internationally. Then,
the isolated community in the North by the dictatorial regime

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created the second issue in humanitarian field. Both of these issues
were enough to become an evidence in recalling the UN resolution
to give the sanction. Furthermore, it will back to the beginning of the
circle.
c. Another alternative solution.
All in all, it reflects that the problem will continue as long as
the circle was not terminated. The North Korea's threat to strike
China and the U.S. and its allies is the opportunity to be taken as a
declaration of war. This is an important moment for America and its
allies in ending the North Korea's drama by issuing an ultimatum
that emphasize on four key points. First, that America and its allies
respond to the North Korea's threat as a declaration of war.
Second, efforts to peace is still possible if North Korea is willing to
disarm all nuclear weapons and abide by the NPT unconditionally.
Third, under the second condition, the U.S. and its allies will
protect the North Korea and help its development. Fourth, if there
is no response, the U.S. and allies would initiate offensive action
within some necessary days. This is similar to what happened
during the Japanese conquest in 1945. As the result, the world can
see now, how the American ultimatum has worked effectively
toward Japan and make it a developed and stable country at this
time. When the Japanese at that time requires demilitarization to
eliminate its fascist ideology, then North Korea requires the
denuclearization and disclosure from the regime's isolation. Over
the time, transparency will make the North Korean people know
whether the Juche is the best ideology to be followed. After they
know that whole world has been developing, they will understand
that the regime has fooled them. It will be the good time to make
North Korean really changed that they do not alive alone in the
world, that the world do not threatening them. It will be good ending
for peace, security and stability in the region and the world. One
risky strike in several time will be better than less risky yet in a long
time which do not know when will be ended.
Pengalaman U.S. di Iraq dapat menjadi pelajaran
bagaimana melakukan serangan sekaligus melindungi sekutunya.
Pada invasi Iraq pertama, sekutu U.S. melindungi Kuwait dengan
rudal Patriot dari serangan Scud Iraq. Hal ini sama dengan yang
terjadi ketika Korea Utara mengumumkan akan meluncurkan roket
UNHA-3 untuk menempatkan satelit di orbit, banyak pihak

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meragukan apakah Korut benar akan meluncurkan roket ataukah
rudal balistik yang ditujukan ke musuhnya. Oleh karena itu, Korea
Selatan dan Jepang mengaktifkan system radar deteksi dini dan
rudal patriot mereka. Ini menunjukkan bahwa system pengamanan
U.S. dan sekutunya adalah qualified. Keberhasilan U.S. menjaga
Kuwait dengan rudal patriotnya dari ancaman Scud Irak dapat
digunakan sebagai tolak ukur untuk memprediksi apakah Rudal
Patriot Korea Selatan dan Jepang akan bekerja efektif menangkal
kemungkinan serangan rudal Korut. Selanjutnya
The next important thing is the promotion and campaign by
the Japan that they had been experienced the same thing in the
past. Then at the present time, they get a lot of benefit from the
U.S. assistance. This aimed to prevent the interference from the
Russia and China that could hinder the efforts to rehabilitate North
Korea. This is also to gain the sympathy and support from the world
as well as leave alone the Russia and China with their disapproval.
However, it will leave a question, whether America is ready to finish
the North Korea's issue that will causing its presence in Asia is
becoming less necessary without the presence of a threat.

III.

Conclusion.
8. The use of nuclear technology as a means in defense system has been
giving a lessons for some rogue state to increase their bargaining power.
This causes a fear and threat toward peace and security in the region and
internationally.
9. Like what happened with North Korea which led to a professor of Yonsei
University, Jong Kun Choi criticize American policy of strategic patience as
letting and powerless against the behavior of North Korea, which spread a
terror with their nuclear missiles.
10. Jong has been clearly explained how the strategic patience was wrong in
assuming the end of the scenario with the fall of the North. Contrary, it
gives an opportunity for Pyongyang's regime to increasingly sophisticated
and dangerous.
11. Although some experts doubt the ability of the long-range nuclear missiles
of the North as technically, however it has led to tensions in the region
with their middle-range missiles. The diplomatic efforts in halting North
Korea's behavior has been conducted since 2003 with no results. It

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IMAN WIDHIARTO
challenges a new way through a military approach as has been
implemented to subdue the attitude of the Japanese fascists in 1945.
Even though this method differ with Jong's idea, yet it more realistic and
expected to bring a better end for the North as it is currently perceived by
Japan.

12. However, this will leave a question, whether America is ready to resolve
the North Korea's issue that will causing its presence in Asia is becoming
less necessary.

d. The patience of the U.S. in the issue is does not mean that the U.S.
is weak and wrong in calculating the issue.
e. It reflects that the Obamas administration deeply understand that
there are no real threat in the issue. Keengganan pemerintah U.S.
menuntaskan masalah Korut, lebih mengindikasikan untuk
memelihara permasalahan dalam rangka mempertahankan as well
as justification his presence in Asia.