Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA,
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS
PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations
-- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786

October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795

October 6, 2000

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS

(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW,
UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP,
PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941
mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
1
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
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Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related
laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject,
ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new
paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October
15, 1998 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; 2and
(2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution 3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full
complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list
method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered
with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their
election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. 4 In effect, a voter is
given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative. 5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives,
Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3,2 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
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this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics
ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules
and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26,
1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows: 6
Party/Organization/
Coalition

Number of
Votes Obtained

Percentage
Total Votes

Nominees

1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes S. Osabel

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI

255,184 3

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.57%

Patricia M. Sarenas

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9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc
further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list
seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th
party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation
of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It
further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by
other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were
COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCWUNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAGASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting,
would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional 9 seats
must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system."
(Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It
thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881),
Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the
instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted
by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO

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5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS

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34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated
June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing
the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and
Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated
in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for
APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents. 10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having
obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38
parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941,
only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were
entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue
concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the
remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each
garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if
they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote
requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors:
urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the
essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional
and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three
commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It,
however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution
6
of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941,
the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.

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Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of
temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and
organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. 13 In the suits,
made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been
declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively,
petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all
of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST from
constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as
winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for
petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D.
Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private
respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec.
Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification
of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-list
election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be
nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall7 be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half
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of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law,
will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that
there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list
seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however,
is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to
Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party,
organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative
requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle
the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then
naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness,"
for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and
how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty
percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional, because its strict application
would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party8
list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
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In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared
therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility,"
suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law
through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as
far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law
as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or
otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected
and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I think,
Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be
provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10
percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn,
they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr.
President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the following
shows:
9

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent
ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical
formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more
particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19

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Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of
which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that
anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes
in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of
500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking
about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We
believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to
avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and
that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work
hard, and should earn their seats within that system." 20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. 21 But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the
law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. 23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of
representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we
also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very
serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system.
This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for
each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single
group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these
consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
10

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions
are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The
percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
Legal Accounting

determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed
seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional
seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained
equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. 25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least
six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled
to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of
simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for
example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent.
Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3
seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only.
We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German
mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this
formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting
product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated
Total no. of votes of
qualified parties

No. of votes of
x
=
party concerned

No. of additional
seats of party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the
decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats
under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party

Number of
Votes

Guaranteed
Seats

Additional

Extra
Seats

Total

1. APEC

503,487

5.73

2. ABA

321,646

3.66

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.55

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.47

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.90

6. AKO

239,042

2.72

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.71

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.68

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.64

Legal Accounting

11

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.45

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.21

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.16

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.12

3,429,338

13

32

Total

52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the
limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each
be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our
Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are
marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents, 26 one half of
the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because
German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the
Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of
fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of
essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique
formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a
qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathematical
formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
12

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is

Legal Accounting

computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with
at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of
its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats.
Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it
garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to
that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given
less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the
ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of
mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such
incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the
voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 27 that a fractional membership cannot be converted
into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would
be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim
more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did
not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely
applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is
that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first
party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's
number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is
entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
=
Total votes for
party-list system

Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total
valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes
13 without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of
additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as
in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In
Legal Accounting

such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of
party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat
or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is
entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As
explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter.
For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above
formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the
first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of
seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting
only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent.
The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent,
additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party

Additional seats
for concerned =
party

Total No. of votes

for party-list system

No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party

No. of votes of
first party
Total No. of
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional seats
for concerned =
party

No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of votes of
first party

No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:

Additional seats
for concerned =
party (ABA)

No. of votes
of ABA
14 of vites of
No.
first party (APEC)

No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Legal Accounting

Additional seats = 321,646 x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since

for concerned
rounding off is not to be applied
party (ABA)
503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization

Votes
Garnered

%age of
Total Votes

Initial No.
of Seats

Additional
Seats

Total

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47

8. ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47

9. AKBAYAN!

232,376

2.54%

232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.04%

186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37

PINAY

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other
party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the
other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be
awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of
the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the
law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a
maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may
be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only
two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number
of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence,
we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and
methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes15our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula
merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in
its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect the
changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
Legal Accounting

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated
two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto
itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define
the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any
clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are
beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to
demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse
of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, 30 cannot simply disregard
an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its
approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict
enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits. 31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each),
because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation" mandated by
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the
law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication
that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered
that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our
presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart
of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge
to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for
representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in
adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our
people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity,
our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of
the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC
and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

16

Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno , J., see separate concurring opinion.

Legal Accounting

Mendoza , J., dissents.

Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:

COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the
party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system
of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require
parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
17
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are

Legal Accounting

apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with
at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of
its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation.
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law,
will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that
there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list
seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80

Legal Accounting

18

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however,
is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is No.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295

April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
19
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

Legal Accounting

The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as
NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo
(AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus
and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast
under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion
to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats." 7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT
filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No.
07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
(BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela),
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN),
Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance
of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its SubCommittee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total
offifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the
Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May
2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers
20 party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven
reveals that the projected/maximum total
hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical
data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

Legal Accounting

i.

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

ii.

Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome)

from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes

15,283,659
1,337,032
102,430

16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two
percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its
ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be
determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty
four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION

VOTES
RECEIVED

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

13

ARC

338,194

Legal Accounting

1,163,218

21

390,029

14

ABONO

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which
anURGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the
aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under
the Party-List System:
1

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

Bayan Muna

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

Gabriela Womens Party

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

APEC

Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through

Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.

A TEACHER

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

AKBAYAN

Alagad

ALAGAD

Luzon Farmers Party

1
0

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

11 Anak Pawis
1
2

Alliance of Rural Concerns

1
3

Abono

BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA

BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
22
The total number of seats of each winning
party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
toVeterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred
until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Legal Accounting

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72,
which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and
were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers,
the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes
canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes
among the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
23organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance
with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on
the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
Legal Accounting

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans,
is:
Number of votes of first party
Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first

= party relative to total votes for
party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received
by the first party

Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%

One (1) additional seat

Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the
correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
Additional seats for =
a concerned party

No. of votes of
concerned party

x No. of additional
seats allocated
to first party

No. of votes of
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL

0.69

A TEACHER

Legal Accounting

24

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle
them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional
seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as
follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
25

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

Legal Accounting

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized
with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be
applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first
ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes
they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that
is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total
nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
"ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the
procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the
Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein
petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did
not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its
decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other
party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System:
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines,
Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the
26
certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

Legal Accounting

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of
SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as
said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
27

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the
"First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party"
and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
Legal Accounting

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for
under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941,
and are of transcendental importance to our nation. 17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." 19
28 has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional
However, because the formula in Veterans
representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Legal Accounting

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the
total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the
number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats
available to legislative districts
x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
22
0

x .20 = 55

.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of
the legislature.
29
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

Legal Accounting

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No.
7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party
Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula 21 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which
provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section
12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House
of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total
party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats
(Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those
seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not
secured the maximum three (3) 30
seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

Legal Accounting

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by
each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats." 25 Thirty-four (34)
party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono,
and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a
second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties
only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats
available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole
integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified
parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from
the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered
during the elections.27

Rank

Votes
Garnered

Party
1

BUHAY

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

1,169,234

48

KALAHI

88,868

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

49

APOI

79,386

CIBAC

755,686

50

BP

78,541

GABRIELA

621,171

51

AHONBAYAN

78,424

APEC

619,657

52

BIGKIS

77,327

A TEACHER

490,379

53

PMAP

75,200

AKBAYAN

466,112

54

AKAPIN

74,686

ALAGAD

423,149

55

PBA

71,544

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

56

GRECON

62,220

BUTIL

409,160

57

BTM

60,993

10

Legal Accounting

31

11

BATAS

385,810

58

A SMILE

58,717

12

ARC

374,288

59

NELFFI

57,872

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

60

AKSA

57,012

14

ABONO

339,990

61

BAGO

55,846

15

AMIN

338,185

62

BANDILA

54,751

16

AGAP

328,724

63

AHON

54,522

17

AN WARAY

321,503

64

ASAHAN MO

51,722

18

YACAP

310,889

65

AGBIAG!

50,837

19

FPJPM

300,923

66

SPI

50,478

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

67

BAHANDI

46,612

21

ABS

235,086

68

ADD

45,624

22

KAKUSA

228,999

69

AMANG

43,062

23

KABATAAN

228,637

70

ABAY PARAK

42,282

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

71

BABAE KA

36,512

25

ALIF

217,822

72

SB

34,835

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

73

ASAP

34,098

27

AT

197,872

74

PEP

33,938

28

VFP

196,266

75

ABA ILONGGO

33,903

29

ANAD

188,521

76

VENDORS

33,691

30

BANAT

177,028

77

ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

31

ANG KASANGGA

170,531

78

ALMANA

32,255

32

BANTAY

169,801

79

AANGAT KA PILIPINO

29,130

33

ABAKADA

166,747

80

AAPS

26,271

34

1-UTAK

164,980

81

HAPI

25,781

35

TUCP

162,647

82

AAWAS

22,946

36

COCOFED

155,920

83

SM

20,744

37

AGHAM

146,032

84

AG

16,916

38

ANAK

141,817

85

AGING PINOY

16,729

39

ABANSE! PINAY

130,356

86

APO

16,421

40

PM

119,054

87

BIYAYANG BUKID

16,241
14,161

32
41

AVE

110,769

88

ATS

42

SUARA

110,732

89

UMDJ

9,445

43

ASSALAM

110,440

90

BUKLOD FILIPINA

8,915

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44

DIWA

107,021

91

LYPAD

8,471

45

ANC

99,636

92

AA-KASOSYO

8,406

46

SANLAKAS

97,375

93

KASAPI

6,221

47

ABC

90,058

TOTAL

15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list. 28

Rank

Party
1

BUHAY

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over Total

Votes for Party-List, in %

Guaranteed Seat

1,169,234

7.33%

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

APEC

619,657

3.88%

A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11

BATAS29

385,810

2.42%

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

Total
18

YACAP

19

FPJPM

20

UNI-MAD

33

17
310,889

1.95%

300,923

1.89%

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list

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candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we
distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where
petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is
contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat
itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100
million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
"the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
34
fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
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remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the PartyList System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

BUHAY

Votes
Garnered

Votes
Garnered
over
Total Votes
for Party
List, in %
(A)

Guaranteed
Seat
(First Round)
(B)

Additional
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)

(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integers
(D)

Applying
the three
seat cap
(E)

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

931

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

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35

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives
from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in
the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because
we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is
this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating
36
under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in
the party list system?

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MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer.
Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely
the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta
and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under
the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may
be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to
seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should
not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this
37
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us
to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of
mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in
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Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But
the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why
political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so
that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty
of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual
political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least
a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the
38 Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a
sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
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engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the
Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee "wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, 35 that is, if the
nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens,
he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified partylist organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the partylist elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from
the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats,
the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System
shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from
participating in party-list elections. This Decision
39 is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3
seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party
vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner
at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of partylists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion
of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
40
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
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VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall
be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not
more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and
50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of
the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying
the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists
which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat
itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100
million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
41

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.

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2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case,
17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17
= 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3
seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more
than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied
seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
42
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court
continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was
not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
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parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of
the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.

43

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP);
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA;
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral
44 According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status
parties, organizations and political parties.
and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party
w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a
result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political

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parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early
release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to
keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that
said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001,
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613,
also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court
ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file
their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May
17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of 45
any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

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Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other
plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues
that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9,
2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of
2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no
motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It 46
has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of
other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

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Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the partylist system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna
objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like
the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate
in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under
the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a
seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
47 or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
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political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the
legislature."35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like
"in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
48 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
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whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and
"lack ofwell-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those
who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with
this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized 49
group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban

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poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941
"does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing
the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress
that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate
desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated
by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the
OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor,
Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar
planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power
more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the
size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank
accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the50
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district
elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the
chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the
simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
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foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest
scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been
within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
"open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list
system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to
the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law
could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list
system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words
in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be
made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision
being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics
of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of 51
the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole
x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional
deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express

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their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence,
they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of
the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed
above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major
political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in
the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec
Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation
does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents
herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it
is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51It
is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they
qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate
in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.
52 In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors.

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Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and
other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim
to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not
be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the
following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths,
will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec
can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent
their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church,
the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The
prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on
any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running
as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
53
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that
does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but
also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section
9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the
youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized
and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x." 61
54

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."

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Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life
should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It
gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the
prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out
of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the
party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the
party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are
nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of
people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the
makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner"
during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and
reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
Facts:
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that
said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11,
2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments
within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
55

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on the
Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also
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challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2.

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785."
Held:
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last
party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to
have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC"to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have complied
and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as
to costs. SO ORDERED.
In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785
Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on that
Petition.
In view of the pendency of the elections,56
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no
other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this
date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a
formality because the COMELEC, through theOffice of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
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other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for
it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules."
Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the partylist system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna
objects to the participation of "major political parties."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party"
as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and
supports
certain
of
its
leaders
and
members
as
candidates
for
public
office."
In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party
or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941.
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
57 underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
While the enumeration of marginalized and
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

In view of OSG contention

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Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any party or
group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias
Village could participate in the party-list elections.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated
by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence,
the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State.
In view of COMELECs grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to
reinvent or second-guess it.
In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work.
In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives
in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense,
these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives
are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-takeall" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the
legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate
are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented.
What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors"
by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Under Art. VI, 5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only
for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the party-list system
was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged"
sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" onehalf of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
58

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two
solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed
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exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not
its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in
the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors
mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly
include other sectors.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958

59

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

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G.R. No. 203960

1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L.
Agustin, the partys Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO
C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
60
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125

Legal Accounting

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D.
Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG
MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

61

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216

Legal Accounting

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael
Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

62

G.R. No. 204318

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Legal Accounting

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul
Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364

63

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO

BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.

Legal Accounting

VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

64

G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Legal Accounting

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR
AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as
COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436

65

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

Legal Accounting

G.R. No. 204455

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
66petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20 November
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54
2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Legal Accounting

G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng
Sining (ASIN)

- The "artists" sector is not

considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers
Savings and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be
considered marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)

- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)

- Failure of the nominees to

qualify: although registering
as a regional political party,
two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

- Failure of the group to show

that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya
(AAB)

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7

204436

Legal Accounting

12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

67

Abyan Ilonggo
Party (AI)

- Failure to represent a
marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

- Failure to show that the

party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the

memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
8

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of
Organizations,
Networks and Associations of
the Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)

- Failure to establish that the

group can represent 14
sectors; - The sectors of homeowners
associations, entrepreneurs
and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)

- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
- Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

10

204402

12-061 (PP)

Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)

- The group reflects an

advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12

204490

Legal Accounting

12-073
(PLM)

- Failure to prove
membership base and track
record;
- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and
- The nominees do not belong
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.

68

Pilipinas Para sa
Pinoy (PPP)

- Failure to show that the

group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and

- Failure to show a track

record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, 19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a
party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."20These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN,
AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following
groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 10 October 2012

1

203818-19

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

Grounds for Denial

24

AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum,
Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

69

204002

Legal Accounting

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural Concerns
(ARC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and

- Failure of the party to prove

that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United
Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
- The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)

Cancelled registration
- The party is a military
fraternity;
- The sector of community
volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

20426

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)

Cancelled registration
- Three of the seven
nominees do not belong to
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10

203922

Legal Accounting

12-201
(PLM)

70

Association of
Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)

Cancelled registration
- The sector of rural energy
consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector; and

- The nominees do not belong

to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
11

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party
( AT )

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

12

203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural and
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
and urban poor sectors that
the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

13

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)

Cancelled registration
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14

203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

71
15

204126

Legal Accounting

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)

Cancelled registration
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
party;

- Failure to show track record

for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at
Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

17

204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True
Marcos Loyalist
(for God,
Country and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18

204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor Youth
Advancement
and Welfare
( PA C YAW )

Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

19

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)

Cancelled registration
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20

203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng
mga Nakulong
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and

72

Legal Accounting

underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
21

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing
Pinoy (AG)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for
Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent an
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23

204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for

the Environment
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K
Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25

204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League
of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

73

Legal Accounting

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

26

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of
Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)

Cancelled registration
- The sector it represents is a
specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
registration under the party-list system; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)

Cancelled registration
- The nominees are
disqualified from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of
Bicolnon Party
(ABP)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party
List (BAYANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

30

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura
Natin Isulong
(AANI)

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31

204125

Legal Accounting

12-292
(PLM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

74

Agapay ng
Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are members of the
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively

participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
32

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

33

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod
Party-List
(ABANG
LINGKOD)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to establish a track
record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood for Active
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation - Failure to show that the
party is actually able to
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng
mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)

75
Resolution dated 28 November 2012
36

204356

Legal Accounting

12-136
(PLM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party receives
assistance from the
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

45

Butil Farmers
Party (BUTIL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative

sectors are marginalized and

underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat ng
Bayan
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
(1st
KABAGIS)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
- Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United
Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39

204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM),
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of
Senior Citizens
in the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

Cancelled registration
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had a term-sharing
agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI,
AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR
CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This
Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that
were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

76

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

Legal Accounting

203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(APEC)

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(AKMA-PTM)

203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)

204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)

204263

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

77Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

Legal Accounting

204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social Movement for Active Reform and

Transparency (SMART)

204356

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(1AAAP)

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

204436

12-009 (PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

Legal Accounting

78

204484

11-002

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)

The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the
party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since
the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the
House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or
organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

79

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Legal Accounting

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the
party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were
made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats.
In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats;
that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of
which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the
nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The
problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine
sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law
become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we
had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are
many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer.
And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we
are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by
presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say,
laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present
candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented
in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party,
a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the
day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list
system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these
50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names
because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the
end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15
percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote.
80

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets
a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are
saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national
constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It
also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each
of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they
Legal Accounting

will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get
five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list
system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making
sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in
the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a
legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though
we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention
sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the
party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because
we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation
side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
81

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

Legal Accounting

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer.
Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely
the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta
and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under
the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO
may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang
laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized
along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or
organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations
or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In
82 matter are final and unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
other words, COMELEC decisions on this
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."53
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In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly
explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off
from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum
of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees
from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr.
Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that
reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged
parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral
groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the
first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from
participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted
starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors.
This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding.
Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to
the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There can
be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the
party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that
winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to
membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in
legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and
non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and
"regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
83be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and
intended national and regional parties to
regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list
system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The
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text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties
for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats
to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,"
clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means
that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties
or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least
a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
84
concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

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(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides
that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideologybased and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system
is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector.
There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as
citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans,
overseas
workers,
and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even
the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack welldefined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special
interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national
or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
85

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

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(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to
the"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all
the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient
that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and causeoriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and
underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party
system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have
the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the
party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution
and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in
86
SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties
cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor
represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the
party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
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reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the
party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of
Representatives. "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political
party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been
compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties.
BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections
since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political
parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major
political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of
Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women
or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing
is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is
allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
87
age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1

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A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent.In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang
Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. x x x.
xxxx
88

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section
9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member
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of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the
lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political
parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system
through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in
socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However,
for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new
formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing
formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to
apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal to this Court
from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district 89
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
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interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these
two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one
or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in
socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does
not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but
because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under
the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo
Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13
May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct
summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

90

Changing Rules on the Party List System

Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on which parties compose the party list
system swings from one side to the other. Previously, the Supreme Court limited the party list system to
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representatives of marginalized and underprivileged sectors. In Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC(G.R. Nos. 203766,
et al., April 2, 2013), the latest in the series of party list cases, the pendulum now points to the opposite side.
The New Ruling
Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list
groups against COMELEC for disqualifying them from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of
the main reasons for the disqualification was their failure to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Two issues were presented:
(1)
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from
participating in the May 2013 elections; and
(2)
Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC (ABB) and BANAT v. COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May
2013 elections.
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it merely followed
the rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new
parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the
status of the petitioners based on the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies,
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and 91
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

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It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent
a sector that is marginalized and underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never intended the party-list system to be
reserved for sectoral parties. The latter were only part of the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two
more groups composing the system national and regional parties. This is evident from the phrasing of Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsand those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (emphasis supplied)
National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the former need not organize along
sectoral lines and represent a particular sector. Hence, it is not necessary for these parties to be representative of
the marginalized and underrepresented. In fact, Republic Act No. 7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections
under the Constitution, does not require these parties to fall under this criterion. The Supreme Court emphasized
that the phrase marginalized and underrepresented appeared only once in R.A. No. 7941, particularly in
the Declaration of Policy. The section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging tomarginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require
sectors, organizations, or parties to fall under the criterion as well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind
the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The Supreme Court answered in this wise:
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and causeoriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
92
and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and
underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party
system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have

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the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the
party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in
SUVs.
Based on the Courts ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society must comply with the criterion of representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. For national, regional, and sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth,
it is sufficient that they consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional parties, the Supreme Court categorically
stated that they may participate in the party-list elections. The rules for their participation are found under
guideline number three.
Evolution of Party-List Cases
ABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior to Atong Paglaum.
In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major political parties may join the party list elections. However,
the Supreme Court went on saying that although they may participate, it does not mean that any political party
or group for that matter may do so. It is essential for these parties to be consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list system is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Essentially, the goal is to give voice to the voiceless to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented to become members of Congress.
Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented may join the party-list elections. The
Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system cannot be exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented
because if the rich and overrepresented can participate, it would desecrate the spirit of the party-list system.
In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with the matter, it categorically declared, by
a vote of 8-7, that major political parties are barred from participating either directly or indirectly from the party-list
elections.
Clearly, the doctrine in Atong Paglaum is in stark contrast with the former interpretation of the party-list system.
The Supreme Courts reasoning in both decisions also sits at opposite sides of the scale. In ABB and BANAT, the
Supreme Court concentrated on the spirit and purpose of the party-list system while in Atong Paglaum, it focused
on the letter of the law and the intent of the Constitutions framers and Congress.
No wonder this decision has sparked intense debate and passionate reaction from the stakeholders. These partylist cases constitute three decisions with two exceptionally different doctrines. Which then is correct? Should the
spirit of the law prevail over the letter? Should the party-list system be really open to all? Should the court engage
in socio-political engineering as it did in the first two cases or should it remain as neutral magistrates of the law,
blindfolded like lady justice, interpreting the
93 letter of the law strictly according to its words?
The decision in Atong Paglaum is not yet final and executory. The case is still, if not already, subject to a motion
for reconsideration. It is still possible for the pendulum to swing back to its former side or it may remain
suspended where it is now.

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G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort
to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013
party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012,
ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or
some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system
laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the 94
main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system
is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers
intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
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Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in
the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides
that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
"sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector.
There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as
citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these
two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although
they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have
been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The 95
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
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poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties
or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in
socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does
not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but
because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under
the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

Petitions Granted

96

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