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SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVSION
G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WENCESLAO
ALMUETE
FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO
DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA,
defendants-appellees.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.
Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres
for appellant.
Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda,
Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were
charged with a violation of section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was
alleged in the information that in
December, 1963, in Muoz, Nueva Ecija
the accused being tenants of Margarita
Fernando in her riceland, without notice to
her or without her consent, pre-threshed a
portion of their respective harvests of five
(5) cavans of palay each to her damage in
the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan
(Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo
Branch VI).
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not
guilty. They filed motion for a bill of
particulars as to the exact date of the
commission of the offense charged. The
lower court denied their motion because
they had already entered their plea.
Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash
As held in the Adillo case, the act of prereaping and pre-threshing without notice
to the landlord, which is an offense under
the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased
to be an offense under the subsequent law,
the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To
prosecute it as an offense when the Code
of Agrarian Reforms is already in force
would be repugnant or abhorrent to the
policy and spirit of that Code and would
subvert the manifest legislative intent not
to punish anymore pre-reaping and prethreshing without notice to landholder.
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an
act which purports to set out in full all that
it intends to contain operates as a repeal of
anything omitted which was contain in the
old act and not included in the amendatory
act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes,
p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* Appellees' contention that the Court of
First Instance had no jurisdiction over the
offense because inferior courts have
jurisdiction over offense in which the
penalty is imprisonment for not more than
three years, or a fine of not more three
thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment and that it is the Muoz
municipal court that has jurisdiction is
wrong. The Court of First Instance has
concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior
court in mm in which the penalty provided
by law is imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of-more than two
hundred pesos (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law).
xxx
xxx
BENGZON, J.:
The question in this appeal is whether
cocoa beans may be considered as
"chocolate" for the purposes of exemption
from the foreign exchange tax imposed by
Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
During the period from January 8, 1953 to
October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant
imported sun dried cocoa beans for which
it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per
cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming
exemption from said tax under section 2
of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that
had exacted payment; and in its amended
complaint it included the Treasurer of the
Philippines. The suit was filed in the
Manila Court of First Instance, wherein
defendants submitted in due time a motion
to dismiss on the grounds: first, the
complaint stated no cause of action
because
cocoa
beans
were
not
"chocolate"; and second, it was a suit
against the Government without the
latter's consent.
The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge,
sustained the motion, and dismissed the
case by his order of November 19, 1954.
Hence this appeal.
The lower court, appellant contends, erred
in dismissing the case and in holding that
the term "chocolate" does not include sun
Contrary to law.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea,
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an
order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted
the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200;
and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a personother than a
participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an
offense punishable under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the
information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense,
the respondent judge acted in grave abuse
of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration which respondent Court
of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated
whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
of telephone wiretapping, we held that the
use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among
the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as
applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
barbarity.
Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. For victims of
unjust imprisonment or detention, the
compensation shall be based on the
number of months of imprisonment or
detention and every fraction thereof shall
be considered one month: Provided,
however, That in no case shall such
compensation exceed One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) per month.
In all other cases, the maximum amount
for which the Board may approve a claim
shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to
reimburse the claimant the expenses
incurred for hospitalization, medical
treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or
other expenses directly related to the
injury, whichever is lower. This is without
prejudice to the right of the claimant to
seek other remedies under existing laws.
2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29:
"When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground."
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading
thereof readily shows that in addition to
the cash and surety bonds and the escrow
money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a
decision of the POEA. Obviously, the
appeal bond is intended to further insure
the payment of the monetary award in
favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds
and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all
valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited
to monetary awards to employees whose
contracts of employment have been
violated. The POEA can go against these
bonds also for violations by the recruiter
of the conditions of its license, the
provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing
rules,
E.O.
247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA
Rules, as well as the settlement of other
liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was
presumably intended to provide for a
standing fund, as it were, to be used only
as a last resort and not to be reduced with
the enforcement against it of every claim
of recruited workers that may be adjudged
against the employer. This amount may
not even be enough to cover such claims
and, even if it could initially, may
eventually be exhausted after satisfying
other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be
appealed grants a monetary award of
about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent.
petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private
respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the
March 31, 1986 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.CG.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "RadiolaToshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon.
Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and
its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found
by the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a
petition for the involuntary insolvency of
Carlos
Gatmaytan
and
Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents
herein, the case docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court
issued an order taking cognizance of the
said petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any
debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondentsdebtors from other persons, or, to any
other persons for the use and benefit of the
same respondents-debtors and/or the
transfer of any property by and for the
said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of
certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors
informed respondent sheriff Angeles City
Herein
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioneraccused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the
decision dated August 14, 19741 in CAG.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of
the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant"
of respondent Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment of the City Court of
Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971
which found the petitioner guilty for
having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended)
and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the
City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act on
November 21, 1970 in an information 3
which reads as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate
that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21
June, 1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo
S. Aisporna was duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros, with license to
expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that
date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal
Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by
Perla thru its author representative,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of
twelve (12) months with beneficiary as
Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00;
apparently, insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy, and for reasons
not explained in record, present
information was filed by Fiscal, with
assistance of private prosecutor, charging
wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189