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3d 69
I.
Section 2252(a)(2) can be fairly read to require that the defendant know he is
receiving items that depict child pornography. Under this reading, the phrase
"knowingly receives" means that the violator must know not only that he is
receiving material through interstate commerce, but also that it contains
sexually explicit depictions of minors. Accord United States v. Cochran, 17
F.3d 56, 61 (3d Cir.1994) (Congress intended that "knowingly" in Sec. 2252(a)
(2) require the government to prove that the defendant know the material
contained child pornography); United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 34 n. 2
(4th Cir.1991) (common sense meaning of "knowing receipt" is that the
defendant know he ordered child pornography).
never considered whether its construction of section 2252(a)(2) ran afoul of the
Constitution. Because courts should choose a constitutional reading of a statute
over an unconstitutional one, see Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 465-66, 109 S.Ct.
at 2572, Thomas 's interpretation of the statute is not compelling. See generally
Cochran, 17 F.3d at 58-59 (criticizing X-Citement and Thomas ); United States
v. Prytz, 822 F.Supp. 311, 320-21 (D.S.C.1993) (same).
6
We need not shape today the precise contours of section 2252(a)(2)'s scienter
requirement because Colavito pled guilty to possessing child pornography in
violation of the statute. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n. 2, 96 S.Ct.
241, 242 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1979) ("A guilty plea ... renders irrelevant those
constitutional violations ... which do not stand in the way of conviction, if
factual guilt is validly established."). Accordingly, we affirm Colavito's
conviction for receiving child pornography through interstate commerce.
II.
7
A penal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not define the offense well
enough to let ordinary people know what is prohibited. Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Section
2252(a)(4)(B) prohibits the possession of child pornography only when it has
traveled through interstate commerce. The section lists several means by which
pornography may travel between states, including the transmission of visual
images across telephone lines by way of computer modems. The fact that other
depictive media cannot travel in a similar manner hardly renders this statute
vague.
10
We originally decided this appeal by an order, which, under the rules of this
Court, has no precedential value. See 2d Cir.Rule 0.23. We hereby withdraw
our original order and replace it with this opinion. See Orange Env't, Inc. v.
Orange County Legislature, 2 F.3d 1235, 1235 (2d Cir.1993)