Delegation of Powers

Delegation
of Powers
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil
and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of
nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the
President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16
August 1991, for consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the
President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied
(in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad
valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter
or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products.
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan),
petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all
articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad
valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported
articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.
This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad
valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order
No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to
initiate the process required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of
a specific levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading
Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as
amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing to give
interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support
of their respective positions.
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August
1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails
the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills
in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the
President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or
to impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries or
products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to restrain the implementation
of those Executive Orders. We will examine these questions in that order.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of
Executive Order No. 507 did not render the instant Petition moot and academic.
Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. The additional duty in the nature of ad
Delegation of Powers
valorem imposed on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of

Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that
the selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof, shall
continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad valorem.
Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive
Order No. 475 and to the special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478.
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of
the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by
the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose"
to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These
are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provides in relevant part:
hundred per cent ad valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four
Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff
Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security,
and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce
or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary
change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in
no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten
(10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher
than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish
import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3)
to impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the
Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a
gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of
this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of
import duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent
amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby
adopted and form part of this Code.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA

pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an
additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall
conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings
wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present,
produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and
recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality
concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings and recommendations to
the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of
duty indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically
provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within
the limits fixed in subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of
duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific
equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal competing
foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of
all customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or
its duly authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all
liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended thereto as
finally filed in the Commission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of this section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall take effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of
additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take
effect at the discretion of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations
found in Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, by contending
that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to
protect local industries and products for the sake of the national economy,
general welfare and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:
E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of
local industries and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security. On the contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to
crude oil, an essential product which we do not have to protect, since we produce
only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise
government finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution, as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 3
(Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of
either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a
sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is
anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1): "existing
protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end
of Section 401 (a): "protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . "
We believe that the words "protective" and ''protection" are simply not enough to
support the very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to
rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact
of which this Court may take judicial notice that the Bureau of Customs which
administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal
traditional generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in
character, that generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the
government The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff
rates are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenueraising and for regulatory purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held that "customs
duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of
commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or
exported to, a foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported
goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries
where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods.
Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the
effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue
taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the
proceeds of which become public funds 6 have either or both the generation of
revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving
purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance,
is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in
fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,
the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil
and imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon
indigenous oil production. For the effective, price of imported crude oil and oil
products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial
revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff
rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our
constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of
the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent:
that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general
welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection
of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local
industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy,
general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take
seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies
summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of
consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at
the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general
welfare and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so

customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of
protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient
service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise
impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and
the corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods
which are not found at all and not produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and
Customs Code is replete with such articles and commodities: among the more
interesting examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from
the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); Olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or European
fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,
8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88,
88.0l); special diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human medicine and
surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens, etc.
(Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be
imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to
discourage any importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that
customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there
are any competing local industries to protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the desire to generate
additional public revenues, are not, for that reason alone, either constitutionally
flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality
and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled. 7
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with
petitioner's additional contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
be declared unconstitutional and illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of
petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to
adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect
repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order
No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3
which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition
for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is
not applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous
publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered

enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of
law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That
is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others,
all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means
that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption
is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a
clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be
the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's
trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve
the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should
be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular
censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this
Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative
authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in
his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof
or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter
that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the
force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President
"in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more
appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be
cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise
on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was
purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like
some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable
and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific
description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that
will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of
the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up
as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea
of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant
promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or
property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the
law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid
guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through
the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his
say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea
of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is
made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be
reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the
arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from
one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less
that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of
this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments
of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and
empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for
example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when
the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which
may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety
and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport
of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to
compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be
omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all
the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable
and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him
still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order
No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at
the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken
steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to
be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the
required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An
epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number
had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these
animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the
police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these
animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought
to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years
old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that
"no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint
for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing
may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these
minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action
may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is
not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there
is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in
Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only
the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
relinquished rights.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander
who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing
the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to
enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of
the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the
Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his
rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of
his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage
of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are
but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are
kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner
obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising
the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of
this Act; . . .
G.R. No. 17122
February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendantappellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant. Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or

corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or
define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations,
orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a
fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more
than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case
of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally
liable.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions
of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State,
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this
Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or
corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of
the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the
Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company
or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the
provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of
other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily
suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination
shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such
termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the
period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at
which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of
the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in
relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act
No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to
be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged,
and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it
was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation
on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of
August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of
August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far
as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be
sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms,
the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not
specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the
consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate
"temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this
Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain
in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature
itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has
left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what
is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure
for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is
valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price
at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at
a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price
may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency,
but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a
proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United
States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the
duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and
of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute
or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature
is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself
has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that
power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868?
In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?
By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the
power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the
legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within
itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which
is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases
(94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public
interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to
legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their
charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of
charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different
railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public
utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish
reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State
of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad
commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The
constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of
State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the
court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under
Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse
commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the
transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and,
in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates
recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on
that question.
Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus
given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and
judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative
power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and
property shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission
to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable
rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the
commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too
well settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to
adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to
carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just
and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it
deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what
the law shall be, which would not be allowable, but have merely conferred
upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law,
and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature
itself has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The
commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It
can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely charged with
the administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance
policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its
terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government,
and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary,
upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United
States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the
rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on
government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there
provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such
reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the
forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or
such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon
stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and
enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The
regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of
administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the
landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it
as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different from
governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring
upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did
govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress
had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it
could give to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill
up the details" by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the
violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress,
or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants
drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations,
they were making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they
thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are
set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them
from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the
occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of
reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a
crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating
legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a
railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public
utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and
determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the
legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from
the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the
commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy
of fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and
regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for
Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot
delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any
other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental
principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself,
it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or
event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain
closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of
the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that
State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to
confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the
ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons
similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making
power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body
cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can
make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its
operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative
officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to
the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when
a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and
cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any
rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not
commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the
sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow
that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to
sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was
to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time
being as follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the
Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and
necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces,
the maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the
Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of
supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be
determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate
with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and
Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations
in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that
the industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local
or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power
to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation
by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize
the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo.
It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands
under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the
terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all
over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo.
Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take
judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding
market values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the
grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or
quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or
63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing
about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay,
rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco,
coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law which
single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is
not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by
the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to
fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other
product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws
should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust
discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and
inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion
and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell
rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any
cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also
to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any
cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,"
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different
grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than
that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it
undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and
profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an
emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a
particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or
against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability
protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and
that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition.
The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the
Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We
make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of
government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever
enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was
not dealing with government property. It was dealing with private property and
private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be
sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature
could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell
any product at any other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the
provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains
that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that
power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be,
and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the
war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which
wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United
States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it
was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same
act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took
possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself became
the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not
this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the
defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought
and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of
the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the defendant. It may be
that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this
court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it
ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions.
Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government
ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix
the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad
statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be
found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No.
2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of
the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be
sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the
right of the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act,
to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which
holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to
construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So
ordered.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the
first place, as to the facts, one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation
of a law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged
violation thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in
question was not published until August 13, 1919, and the order was not
published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to the law, one
cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of
guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4
of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, invalid.)
In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would
respectfully invite attention to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the
legislative regulation of the prices charged by business affected with a public
interest, and to another decision of the United States Supreme Court, that of
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which adopts as its own
the principles laid down in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491),
namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this
would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation."
Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
People vs. Vera

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative
Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed
a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied.
He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was
also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a
motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to
the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act
No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of
the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands
of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of
the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no
probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no

argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual
situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without the probation system.
Araneta vs. Dinglasan
Facts:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62
which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael
Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62
was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed
ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by
Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing
funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating
funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF
TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the
first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC
is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a
special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such
subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to
the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.
Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early
repeal.

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Delegation

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT

G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

valorem imposed on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of

hundred per cent ad valorem.

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA

welfare and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered

oppressive upon individuals. ...

G.R. No. 17122

February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendantappellant.

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or

Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

People vs. Vera

provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no

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