2.

1 INTRODUCTION

Peace has always been among humanity's highest values-for some, supreme. Consider: "Peace at any price." 1 "The
most disadvantageous peace is better than the most just
war."2 "Peace is more important than all justice."3 "I prefer
the most unjust peace to the justest war that was ever
waged."4 "There never was a good war or a bad peace."5
Yet, we agree little on what is peace. Perhaps the most
popular (Western) view is as an absence of dissension,
violence, or war, a meaning found in the New
Testament and possibly an original meaning of the Greek
word for peace, Irene. Pacifists have adopted this
interpretation, for to them all violence is bad. This
meaning is widely accepted among irenologists6 and
students of international relations. It is the primary
dictionary definition.
Peace, however, is also seen as concord, or harmony and
tranquility. It is viewed as peace of mind or serenity,
especially in the East. It is defined as a state of law or civil
government, a state of justice or goodness, a balance or
equilibrium of Powers.
Such meanings of peace function at different levels. Peace
may be opposed to or an opposite of antagonistic conflict,
violence, or war. It may refer to an internal state (of mind
or of nations) or to external relations. Or it may be narrow
in conception, referring to specific relations in a particular
situation (like a peace treaty), or overarching, covering a
whole society (as in a world peace). Peace may be a
dichotomy (it exists or it does not) or continuous, passive
or active, empirical or abstract, descriptive or normative,
or positive or negative.
The problem is, of course, that peace derives its meaning
and qualities within a theory or framework. Christian,
Hindu, or Buddhist will see peace differently, as will
pacifist or internationalist. Socialist, fascist, and
libertarian have different perspectives, as do power or
idealistic theorists of international relations. In this
diversity of meanings, peace is no different from such
concepts as justice, freedom, equality, power, conflict,
class, and, indeed, any other concept.
All concepts are defined within a theory or cognitive
framework--what I have called elsewhere
a perspective.7 Through a perspective peace is endowed

with meaning by being linked to other concepts within a

particular perception of reality; and by its relationship to
ideas or assumptions about violence, history, divine grace,
justice. Peace is thereby locked into a descriptive or
explanatory view of our reality and each other.
My perspective, which sees peace as a phase in a conflict
helix, an equilibrium within a social field, has been
presented in the previous four volumes.7a In this Chapter I
will review this perspective, make clear the imbedded
meaning of peace, describe its related qualities and
dimensions, and prepare for considering alternative
conceptualizations in the next Chapter. This and Chapter
3are thus the prologue to my subsequent theory of a just
peace.

2.2 PEACE AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT

My perspective and associated meaning of peace are best

summarized through a number of social principles. These
have been documented and the evidence given for them
elsewhere,8 as will be noted for each.
2.2.1 The Conflict Principle

Conflict is a balancing of powers among interests,

capabilities, and wills.9 It is a mutual adjusting of what
people want, can get, and are willing to pursue. Conflict
behavior, whether hostile actions, violence, or war, is then
a means and manifestation of this process.

2.2.2 The Cooperation Principle

Cooperation depends on expectations aligned with

power. Through conflict in a specific situation, a balance of
powers and associated agreement are achieved. This
balance is a definite equilibrium among the parties'
interests, capabilities, and wills; the agreement is a
simultaneous solution to the different equations of power,
and thereby the achievement of a certain harmony-structure--of expectations. At the core of this structure is
a status quo, or particular expectations over rights and
obligations. Conflict thus interfaces and interlocks a
specific balance of powers and an associated structure of
expectations.

Cooperation--contractual or familistic interactions 10-depends on a harmony of expectations, a mutual ability of

the parties to predict the outcome of their behavior. Such
is, for example, the major value of a written contract or
treaty. And this structure of expectations depends on a
particular balance of powers.11 Thus, cooperation depends
on expectations aligned with power.

2.2.3 The Gap Principle

A gap between expectations and power causes conflict. A

structure of expectations, once established, has
considerable social inertia, while the supporting balance
of powers can change rapidly. Interests can shift, new
capabilities can develop, wills can strengthen or weaken.
As the underlying balance of powers changes, a gap
between power and the structure of expectations can
form, causing the associated agreement to lose support.
The larger this gap, the greater the tension toward
revising expectations in line with the change in power, and
thus the more likely some random event will trigger
conflict over the associated interests. Such conflict then
serves to create a new congruence between expectations
and power.
Conflict and cooperation therefore are interdependent.
They are alternative phases in a continuous social
process12 underlying human interaction: now conflict, then
cooperation, and then again conflict.13 Cooperation
involves a harmony of expectations congruent with a
balance of powers achieved by conflict.

2.2.4 The Helix Principle

Conflict becomes less intense, cooperation14 more

lasting. If interaction occurs in a closed system or is free
from sudden, sharp changes in the conditions of a
relationship (as, for example, if one party to a business
contract goes bankrupt, or a signatory to a regional
military alliance with the United States has a military
coup), then through conflict and cooperation people
gradually learn more about each other, their mutual
adjustments come easier, their expectations more
harmonious and lasting. Conflict and cooperation thus
form a helix, moving upward on a curve of learning and
adjustments, with the turn through cooperation being

more familistic and durable; that through conflict shorter

and less intense.15
2.2.5 The Second and Fourth Master Principles

Through conflict is negotiated a social contract.16 As

mentioned, conflict is a balancing of powers--a conscious
or subconscious negotiation of opposing interests,
capabilities, and wills. This process determines some
implicit or explicit, subconscious or conscious social
contract. It is social in involving a relationship or
interaction between two or more wills. It is a contract in
that there is an agreement--a harmonization of
expectations.
It is this social contract that is peace within social field
theory. Peace, then is determined by a process of
adjustment between what people, groups, or states want,
can, and will do. Peace is based on a consequent balance
of powers and involves a corresponding structure of
expectations and patterns of cooperation. Moreover,
peace may become unstable when an increasing gap
develops between expectations and power, as here
defined,17 and may collapse into conflict, violence, or war.

2.3 THE NATURE OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT

Social contracts, the structural basis of peace as here

defined, take many forms that interconnect and overlap in
diverse, complex ways to order social communities and
organizations. I can hardly engage here this variety, which
would itself require a volume.18Rather, I shall simply
outline the diversity of social contracts, especially so that
the nested, overlapping, and multilayered nature of social
contracts, and thus peace, is clear.
Throughout the following discussion three points should
be kept in mind. First, as mentioned, a social contract is
the outcome of parties balancing their mutual interests,
capabilities, and wills, and is based on a particular
balance thus achieved--a balance of powers.
Second, the powers constituting the balance are not
necessarily coercive or authoritative; threat or legitimacy
are not the only bases for social contracts. Altruistic,
intellectual, or exchange powers (based on love,
persuasion, or promises, respectively) may dominate.
Thus, a social contract may be a marriage agreement, an

understanding developed among scientists over a

disputed theory, or a sale in a market.19
Third, a social contract--this peace--is only a phase in a
conflict helix and is thus a temporary equilibrium in the
long-term movement of interpersonal, social, or
international relations.

2.3.1 Expectations

As used here, an expectation is a prediction about the

outcome of one's behavior.20 A social contract harmonizes
certain expectations between the parties; that is, it
enables each to reliably predict the other's
responses. Such expectations are varied; our vocabulary
for discriminating among them is well developed.
Remembering my fundamental concern with social peace
and conflict (and thus I am uninterested in, for example, a
legal classification of contracts), these can be divided into
status quo and non-status quo expectations. Within these
two divisions I can define five types, as shown in Table
2.1.

A. Status quo. The concept of status quo is basic to these

volumes. In previous volumes21 I argued that a breakdown
of status quo expectations is a necessary cause of
violence and war, and I tried to verify this against
empirical results.22 The reason for this necessity is that
status quo expectations define the
basic rights and obligations of the parties involved, and
therefore affect vital values. These rights and obligations
form the two types of status quo expectations. As Table
2.1 shows, they involve claims, privileges, responsibilities,
duties, and so on. Note especially that expectations about
property--who owns what--are part of the status quo.

Obviously, the division between status quo and non-status

quo expectations is not clear-cut. The criterion of
discrimination is salience to fundamental values, and thus
intensity of feeling and commitment. For example,
agreements over property (such as territory) will usually
involve strong emotion and commitment, while agreed
upon rules or practices, advantages or benefits are less
vital and violations more tolerable. However, we are
dealing here with a great complexity of social contracts
and the subjectivity of underlying interests, meanings,
and values. In some situations a rule, payment, or service
may be a life-or-death matter or a question of
fundamental principle to the parties involved and thus, for
this case, a matter of the status quo. Therefore, the
classification of expectations under status quo or nonstatus quo divisions in Table 2.1 simply attempts to make
intelligible the diversity of expectations, rather than to
construct conceptually tight demarcations covering all
possibilities.
B. Non-Status Quo. One type of non-status quo
expectations is distributional, establishing which party
can anticipate what from whom, such as benefits,
advantages, and services. The two remaining
types guide or prescribe behavior between the parties.
The social contract often includes rules, customs, or
practices that provide standards or define customary or
repeated actions. Such may be commands, authoritative
standards, or principles of right actions. They may be
binding, acting to control or regulate behavior. Such
prescriptive expectations in social contracts are mores
(long-term, morally binding customs), norms, the lawnorms of groups,23 or the customary or positive law of
societies or states. Even the "rules of morality constitute a
tacit social contract" (Hazlitt, 1964: xii).
C. Overall. Regardless of whether the focus is the rights or
obligations, the distributions, or the guides or
prescriptions between parties structured by their social
contract, these expectations share one
characteristic: they circumscribe a region of predictability,
or social certainty, between the parties. With a social
contract, each party can reliably foresee and plan on the
outcome of its behavior regarding the other, as over, for
example, claims, privileges, duties, or services. What
responses to anticipate, the prospect of reciprocity, the
likelihood of particular sanctions, are clear. Social
contracts are thus our social organs of peace, extending

into the future mutual paths of social certainty and thus

confidence.

2.3.2 Theoretical Dimensions

A. Actuality. In Table 2.2 I list 11 theoretical dimensions

along which social contracts vary, and have organized
them into four general types.24 To begin with, social
contracts may be informal, as are unwritten
understandings between friends or allies; or they may
be formal, as with treaties. They may be implicit, tacit
agreements that the parties choose not to mention, as a
wife's acceptance of her husband's affairs; or they may
beexplicit, such as a verbal contract. They may
be subconscious, as when co-workers unconsciously avoid
sensitive topics over which they might fight. Or, of course,
the social contract may be conscious.
These three dimensions--in formal versus formal, implicit
versus explicit, and subconscious versus conscious-concern the actuality of social contracts, whether they are
a latent agreement underlying social behavior or a
manifest compact of some kind.25 A fourth, quite
important dimension defines how a social contract is
manifested.
A direct social contract is a specific agreement between
particular parties. It gives or implies names, dates, places,
and definite expectations. Contracts are usually thought
of as this kind, such as a construction contract between
two firms or a trade treaty among three states. However,
direct contracts may overlap or be interconnected through

the different parties, and thus form a system of contracts.

And these systems themselves may overlap and be
interdependent. Out of these diverse, interconnected, and
related direct contracts and systems of contracts will
develop more general expectations, such as abstract
rules, norms, or privileges at the level of the social system
itself. No one will have agreed to these expectations per
se, nor are they connected to any particular interest, but
they nonetheless comprise a social contract (albeit
an indirect one) covering the social system. The prices of
goods in a free market comprise such an indirect social
contract evolving from the diverse direct contracts
between buyers and sellers.26 InSection 2.3.3 I will present
some of the major forms direct contracts may take; in
subsequent sections I will describe several orders of direct
and indirect contracts.
B. Generality. A second type of theoretical dimension
delineates a social contract's generality. One such
dimension concerns whether a contract
is unique or common. A unique social contract is a onetime-only agreement within a unique situation and
concerning nonrepetitive events or interaction between
the parties. Such is the implicit agreement wrought in an
alley by a thug, whose knife coerces you to hand over your
money; another example is a two-hour ceasefire
agreement to enable combatants to clear the battlefield of
wounded, or a neutral state granting American relief
planes a once-only flyover to rush food and medicine to
earthquake victims in a neighboring state. By contrast, a
common social contract involves repeated events or
patterns of interaction. Treaties, legal contracts,
constitutions, and charters are usually of this type.
Clearly, the unique-common dimension is a continuum,
since between the unique two-minute holdup and the
common, overriding political constitution of a state are a
variety of social contracts combining in different ways
unique and common expectations.
Turning to the second generality dimension shown in Table
2.2, social contracts may be bilateral, involving only two
parties,multilateral in covering more than two parties,
or collective. The latter covers a society, community, or a
group. Constitutions or charters are of this type, as are an
organization's bylaws. While this may seem clear enough,
there is an intellectual trap to avoid here--that of always
viewing collective social contracts as necessarily
constructed, designed, or the explicit and conscious
outcome of a rational process of negotiation.27 Collective

contracts also may emerge from the interwoven,

multilayered, bilateral and multilateral social contracts
crisscrossing a society. The integrated system of abstract
rules, norms, mores, and customs spanning a society form
an indirect, collective social contract. It is implicit and
informal; its expectations are partly conscious, partly
unconscious. The system of informal rules of the road is
such a collective agreement governing, along with
coextensive formal traffic laws, a community of drivers.
While no group of people may have formally or consciously
agreed to a collective social contract--while such may
emerge from various, lower-level social contracts, many of
which are conscious agreements--it is still based on a
particular balance of powers, now involving all members
of the collective. Consider, for example, the historically
rapid dissolution and restructuring of collective
expectations involving rules, customs, and laws that have
occurred as a result of conquest (such as Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia conquered and absorbed by the
Soviet Union in 1939), of military defeat and occupation
(as of Hitler's national socialist, totalitarian Germany), or
revolution (witness the French and Russian Revolutions, or
the 1974-1978 Cambodian social revolution of the Khmer
Rouge). Of course, not all norms, customs, or customary
laws are changed, no more than a new bilateral or
multilateral contract will discard all previous expectations.
New social contracts build on the old. However, a new
social contract, collective or otherwise, will be
meaningfully different; associated interaction between the
parties will change significantly.
Finally, the third dimension defining a contract's
generality may be narrow, middle range, or overarching. A
narrow contract concerns only a few interests, events, or
behaviors, such as a contract to paint a car, a trade treaty
increasing the quota on imported sugar, or the price of a
Sony television set.28 An overarching contract develops
from, refers to, or spans a whole system of relationships,
such as those of a family, the larger society, or an
organization. A marriage contract stipulating duties and
rights of spouses, an organization's constitution, or the
system of norms covering a society are some examples.
Between the narrow and overarching are a variety of
middlerange social contracts covering or involving a large
amount of behavior, but not the whole society. One's work
contract, an alliance between states, and a peace treaty
are examples in this middle range.

C. Polarity. The third type of dimension shown in Table

2.2 concerns a social contract's polarity. In the dimension
of coerciveness, the parties to social contract may
voluntarily accept it, or one or more parties may
be coerced into it, either by other parties to the contract
or by a third party, such as in a shotgun wedding or
governmentally imposed, union-management contract.
Between freely determined and coerced contracts are
those which one or more parties agree to out of necessity.
That is, circumstances, the environment, or events leave
virtually no realistic or practical choice. In a one-company
mining town where a person has his roots, he may have
little, socially meaningful choice but to contract for work
with the company. To defeat Hitler in the Second World
War, Churchill felt he had little choice but to form an
alliance with Stalin.
A second polarity-type dimension concerns whether a
social contract is solidary,
neutral, or antagonistic.29 Solidary expectations derive
from helpful, altruistic, or compassionate behavior. Such
expectations are common among close friends or
relations, lovers, or close-knit communal or religious
groups. Antagonistic expectations, however, derive from
mutually competitive, divergent, or opposing behavior.
They involve a perception of incompatible purposes,
temporarily bound in a social contract, and a belief that
satisfying one's interests entails frustrating those of the
other parties. A labor-management contract achieved
after a long, violent strike is such an antagonistic
contract; or a truce between traditional enemies, such as
Pakistan and India, North and South Korea, or Israel and
Syria. Between solidary and antagonistic contracts lie
neutral contracts,30 those which are strictly a matter of
business, a question of the parties coolly and objectively
satisfying rather specific interests. Examples are
agreements for a bank loan, renting an apartment,
importing cotton, or increasing the postage on
international mail.
D. Evaluative. Finally, there is the evaluative dimension.
One of these concerns whether a social contract is good or
bad. Fundamental philosophical controversy centers on
the idea of good. For the moment, I mean "good" simply in
the sense that one might say a treaty is a good one
because it has characteristics that one desires or believes
rationally commendable or divinely inspired.31

A contract may be positive or negative in the same sense

as "good" or "bad." There is a potential confusion in the
use of these terms, however, since here a social contract
equals peace. "Positive peace" has come to mean,
especially among Scandinavian irenologists32 an existing
or ideal social state, such as the achievement of individual
potential, as reflected in social equality, for example.
"Negative peace" is then simply the absence of violence.
This, however, is a confusion of categories, and leads to
such strange but consistent (by definition) expressions as
"a positive, negative peace."33 Simply, I will mean positive
as good and negative as bad in qualifying social contracts
or peace.
A second evaluative dimension defines one kind of good
social contract: whether it is just or unjust. It is this
dimension of social contracts that is the major focus of
this book. Understanding that a social contract defines a
particular peace, my question is: What is a just peace? My
answer, developed in Part II is that justice is the freedom
of people to form their own communities or to leave
undesirable ones . For large-scale societies, just peace is
promoted through a minimum government.

2.3.3 Forms

Table 2.3 presents major forms of direct social contracts.

There is no need to describe each in detail here. Suffice to
say that each is a structure of expectations based on a
definite balance of interests, capabilities, and wills. Each
is a social island of peace.
2.3.4 Social Orders

A social order is a particular arrangement of direct and

indirect social contracts forming a meaningful, causalfunctional34 whole. Two types of social orders are of
concern here. One is that of groups; the other ofsocieties.
A. Groups. A group is structured by a direct, overarching
social contract that defines members' rights, obligations,
and authoritative roles. Behavior is guided and prescribed
by sanction-based law-norms. All this may be codified in
organizing documents, such as a charter, constitution, or
bylaws; or these may be informal, implicit, or even
subconscious understandings and norms evolving from the
spontaneous interaction and conflicts of group members,
as in a family or clan.35
In any case, this social contract may be solidary, neutral,
or antagonistic (as in family, work group, and prison,
respectively); it may tightly organize members or leave
them unorganized; and it may recruit members
voluntarily, through coercion, or out of necessity. Group

goals may be diffused or superordinate; the basis of

authoritative roles may be legitimacy or threats. These
diverse characteristics shape the five groups shown in
Table 2.4.36

For my purposes here, the most important distinction is

between spontaneous groups and voluntary associations
on the one hand, and voluntary, quasi-coercive, and
coercive organizations on the other. An organization is
structured by an explicit, formal social contract aimed at
achieving some superordinate goal (profit for a business,
military victory for an army, segregating criminals for a
prison, education for a university). Expectations are
wrapped around this goal: it determines roles, rights, and
obligations, as well as law-norms prescribing behavior. An
organization is then anantifield.37 Spontaneous interaction
is circumscribed, consigned to regions of social space (the

interstices of the organizational chart) irrelevant to an

organization's goals. By contrast, voluntary groups and
associations are less organized, not as strongly directed
toward some superordinate goal. Goals may even be
absent, diffuse, or unarticulated. Coercion or authority
play minor roles. Within these groups and associations
field forces and processes have considerable freedom and
scope, as in a family, friendship group, or neighborhood
association.
These different groups define different structures of
peace, different patterns of our interests and capabilities,
of our powers.
B. Societies. The second kind of social order shown
in Table 2.4 is the society. The three pure types listed
have been discussed at length in Vol. 2: The Conflict
Helix38 and their empirical validity was assessed
there.39 Here, I need only note the more important
relevancies.
A society is defined by a division of labor40 and,
accordingly, certain shared meanings, values, and norms;
social interaction; and a communication system. It is
shaped by an indirect, overarching, collective structure of
expectations--a mainly informal and implicit social
contract. The form of social power primarily underlying
this contract determines the type of society. An exchange
society is dominated by exchange power; an authoritative
society by authoritative power; a coercive society by
coercion. By virtue of the dominating form of power and
associated social dynamics, each society manifests a
particular dimension of conflict, with exchange societies
least violent; coercive, the most.41 Each type of society is
thus a different kind of peaceful order.
International relations among societies are of special
importance here. Nation-states form an exchange
society42 with a libertarian government, pluralistic
conflict,43 and associated pluralistic structure of peace. In
later discussing international peace I will make use of this
social fact.
C. Summary. I have shown the diversity of social
contracts, and thus peace, through detailing their various
expectations, dimensions, forms, and orders. I need only
underline now the nested, overlapping, and hierarchical
complex of such contracts filling out the structure of a
group or society. Consider, for example, a voluntary
organization such as a university. It has an overarching

contract defining its purposes, organizational structure,

positions, and attendant rights and obligations, and
associated rules and law-norms. Under the cover of these
expectations are defined related social contracts and
systems of contracts governing separate administrative
functions (such as admission and financial aid), colleges,
divisions, and departments. Within the constraints of the
university's overarching expectations, each contract or
system has a certain life, depending on the
administrators, deans, and faculty involved. Each teaching
department within a college of division achieves its own
informal or formal social contracts establishing rights,
obligations, and privileges attendant upon faculty and
student rank and defining the role of students and rules
for judging issues before the department. As should be
clear, each department, college, and administrative
division will be an arena of conflict establishing or revising
such expectations, although the overarching social
contract that constitutes the university remains stable--a
region of social peace at its level.
The university itself is within an overarching social
contract that is the larger society. Families, Businesses,
universities, governments, churches, are all are collective
social contracts within society, which also includes the
numberless bilateral and multilateral social contracts
among groups, subgroups, and individuals and the
collective contracts ordering subsocieties. Each social
contract is a specific peace within a particular conflict
helix; each may have within it lower-level conflict (for
example, a state within a region of international peace
may suffer internal guerrilla war and terrorism); each
peace may exist within an ongoing, antagonistic conflict
(as internally peaceful states engage in war).
Peace is therefore complex, multilayered. To say the least,
discussing peace requires being specific about the social
contract involved. To present a theory about a just peace
demands clarity about the associated expectations,
dimensions, and social orders.

2.4 CONCEPTUAL LEVELS AND DIMENSIONS OF PEACE

The dimensions, forms, and orders of social contracts

described above are also, by definition, those of peace.
What must be added here and in the next Section are
additional distinctions not usually applied to social
contracts but which help locate peace as a social contract

among our diverse conceptualizations of peace. This

and Section 2.5 also represent part of my effort at
vocabulary building--developing in a systematic manner,
and locating in one place, those terms applicable to peace
that will be used in subsequent chapters.

Table 2.5 presents the conceptual level and dimensions of

peace to be discussed here.

2.4.1 Conceptual Levels

A. Levels. Undoubtedly, peace is often conceptually

opposed to war. Obviously, then, one conceptual level for
analyzing a just peace involves those social contracts
determined by international, civil, or revolutionary war.
Peace, however, especially among pacifists, is also
opposed to violence. This includes war, of course, but
additionally covers violent acts not ordinarily thought of
or legally defined as war. Indeed, in the contemporary
world legal war (that is, war as a legal state of relations
invoking special international laws) is rare, while warlike
violence is as intense and prevalent as wars were during
past centuries. Nonetheless, this is more than a matter of
defining war empirically. Many do feel that peace,
conceptually, applies only to those human relations which
exclude personal, organized, or collective violence.
Those opposing the idea of peace to violence or war
usually see peace as an absence of such behavior. But a
different view, especially in the East, sees peace as
harmony, tranquility, concord. Peace is then conceptually
opposed to nonviolent, antagonistic conflict, such as that

manifesting threats and accusations, hostile quarrels,

angry boycotts, and riotous demonstrations.
Another concept goes even further, seeing peace as
absolute harmony, serenity, or quietude; that is, as
opposed to any kind of conflict, antagonistic or otherwise.
Conflict is a general concept meaning, in essence, a
balancing of power,44 which may involve not only hostile or
antagonistic balancing but also that of intellectual conflict
(as in friendly disagreement over facts), bargaining
conflict (as in haggling over a sale price), or a lover's
conflict (as when each tries to give the other the choice of
a movie to see). Each of these conflicts ends in a social
contract, and therefore in a kind of peace. I mention this
conceptual level for completeness, however. My
conceptual focus here, as for all irenologists, will be on
peace at the level of antagonistic conflict, whether violent
or not.
B. A Threshold. Especially significant for a theory of just
peace is the distinction between nonviolent, antagonistic
conflict on one side and violence on the other. There is an
empirical threshold here. As I will argue later in Section
7.4.2 and Section 8.2, the conditions for a just peace at
the level of violence will increase the amount of
nonviolent conflict. A just peace free from long-term
violence is, at the level of societies at least, only possible
at the price of peace from nonviolent conflict.

2.4.2 Social Levels

A. Levels. Clearly, peace as a social contract occurs at

different levels of social relationships. Table 2.5 lists four
of concern here. One is international, the level of most
historical concern about peace. A second level concerns
the central government or ruling power (such as a
dominant religious leader or political party) of a state.
Peace here is the outcome of, or can disintegrate into,
revolution or civil war; guerrilla war and terrorism;
political turmoil involving riots, demonstrations, general
strikes, and assassinations.
A third level involves group relations within states, such
as among religious and ethnic groups, nationalities,
classes, castes, unions, and families. A state, at the level
of its central government, may be peaceful, manifesting a
stable social contract, while some of its regions may
experience continuing group violence. The final level

involves the interpersonal relationships

among individuals.
B. Crosscutting Levels. Social levels of peace are
crosscutting: each of the conceptual levels may refer to
any one of the social ones. Even war is applicable to
individual relations, as when conflict goes beyond a
violent incident to involve a campaign of violence to
defeat or destroy another person.
It should, be clear, then, that there may be peace from
war, but not from antagonistic, nonviolent conflict.
Moreover, there may be peace from international war,
while internal war rends a state. Conversely, a state may
be at peace while engaged in international war. Peace
among states may be widespread, central state
governments may be stable and secure, while some
groups in one province, region, or other political
subdivision are locked in total war. From the perspective
of a particular citizen, his state and social groups all may
be at peace, while personal peace eludes him--he simply
may not get along with his neighbors or co-workers.
Peace is thus multilayered and complex. This must be kept
in mind in defining a just peace.

2.4.3 Conceptual Dimensions

A. The Metalevel. Section 2.3.2 presented major

theoretical dimensions of social contracts, and thus of
peace. The dimensions considered here and shown
in Table 2.5 refer only to peace as a concept and not the
concept of peace. This is like the difference between
ethical and metaethical concepts, or political and
metapolitical ones. In each case, the former refers to the
content; the latter to the concept about the
contents.45 For example, a peace can be overarching
(Table 2.2); a concept of peace can be abstract.
B. Empirical Concept. The first such dimension defines
whether the concept is empirical, abstract, or theoretical-a construct.46 An empirical concept47 of peace refers to
readily observable phenomena. It is measurable
(operational). Peace as absence-of-killing violence is such
a concept; as is peace as an absence of legally declared
war or a peace treaty (or any written social contract, for
that matter).

C. Abstract Concept. While also referring to empirical

phenomena, an abstract concept of peace is not directly
observable. Rather, it usually denotes a bundle of
empirical attributes or qualities, or is reflected in patterns
of behavior. Examples are concepts such as status, power,
or ideology, which are detached from particular instances
or events or specific empirical characteristics. Abstract
concepts provide general, theoretical understanding of
social reality, while empirical concepts are usually
common-sense descriptions of immediate perception.48 For
general use peace as a social contract would be an
abstract concept, although some social contracts may be
quite concrete and hence empirical. The abstraction
involved is clearest when we consider implicit, or even
subconscious, agreements involving tacit expectations.
The abstract, nonformal rules of the road are part of such
an abstract social contract. And consider the overarching
social contract whose expectations define rules and norms
spanning society but which no one signed or directly
agreed upon, which few are aware of, but which most
obey. Most families are integrated by such expectations
that wife and husband, parents and children have of each
other but which an observer would have difficulty defining
empirically (although certainly indicators could be
developed, as for status or power).
Peace as a social contract is an abstraction within the idea
of a conflict helix, which is part of social field theory. This
theory provides an explanation of conflict, violence, war,
and peace. So much, I trust, was made clear in Vol. 2: The
Conflict Helix and Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace.
There are other abstract definitions of peace: For
example, peace as law or justice; or peace as concord,
harmony, or tranquility. Often the theoretical context for
an abstract definition of peace is not explicit, but
nonetheless is clear from the context within which the
concept is developed or used.
D. Construct. Finally, peace as a construct49 means that
"peace" serves a stepping-stone role in theory. It is a
theoretical concept; analytic, not synthetic. The content
given to a construct is not defined independent of a
theory but wholly within the operations and deductions of
a theory. By contrast, while measurements or indicators of
an abstract concept certainly would be directed by a
theory, the actual data (or content) are collected (or
observed) independently.

This is a difficult but important idea, and I would like to

take a moment to make it clear. Consider a simple
explanatory theory that y = h + tx, where y is the level of
armaments of state i, x is the level of armaments of an
opposing state j, and t and h are theoretical coefficients
conceptualized as "x's perception of threat from y," and
"the hostility that j feels toward i," respectively. 50 This
simple explanatory theory says that one state's
armaments are a function of those of the opposing state's,
depending on its perception of the threat from the other
and its hostility toward it. Now y and x are abstract
concepts, since "armaments" is a concept covering a
tremendous empirical diversity of weapons and indicators.
Nonetheless, by adding auxiliary statements to the theory
one might measure armaments through such indicators as
defense expenditures or number of armed military
personnel. Data on these indicators could then be
collected from sources readily available and independent
of the theory.
However, within this theory, threat and hostility are
constructs. No measurement of them or indicators need by
given; no data collected specifically on them. Rather, the
coefficients are totally defined by fitting y = h + tx to the
data on x and y. Such a fit could be made by bivariate
regression analysis where h is the intercept and t the
regression coefficient; y the dependent and x the
independent variables. This gives numerical values to h
and t without any specific data collected on them. As
constructs, they would have been given empirical content
totally dependent on the theory y = h + tx and data on x
and y.
Keeping this simple arms theory in mind, I must now
discriminate between the loose and tight versions of
social field theory. In the loose version (specifically, that
presented in most of these volumes, especially concerning
the conflict helix), the mathematical structure of field
theory is usually background;51 content, conceptual
understanding, and explanation are usually foreground. A
structure of expectations--social contract--is treated as an
abstraction. It is given ostensive content, such as in
discussing a union-management contract, an implicit
agreement ending a family quarrel, an international
settlement of a dispute, or the law-norms integrating a
group.
In the tight theory,52 mathematical structure, substantive
interpretation of primitive terms or

constructs,53 operationalization, and empirical tests are of

concern. The tight theory is meant to be as explicit,
formal, and general as possible. Expectations are
constructs weighting behavioral dispositions in a social
field and technically function as canonical coefficients in
application.54 And to enhance the theory's generality, I
have considered a structure of expectations as implicitly
an indirect, overarching social contract of a social field
(such as a spontaneous or self-organizing55 society). This
structure is a cooperative component--another
construct56--underlying the variation in manifest
interaction. It is reflected in common patterns of social
interaction, and thus is empirically measured indirectly
only by a mathematically defined axis lying through an
empirical pattern of social interaction spanning society. 57
For the tight theory, then, applicable to an indirect,
overarching social contract for social fields, peace is a
construct. Its whole meaning is given by the theory; it
serves to aid empirical explanation and theoretical
understanding; its empirical content is traced by the
cooperative patterns of social interaction.
In this Vol. 5: The Just Peace I will not deal with the tight
theory, whose role is precise and testable scientific
explanation, not intuitive understanding. The loose theory
will provide sufficient framework for our purposes here.
And, as in previous volumes, I will treat peace as an
abstraction, even when referring to indirect, overarching
social contracts.
Incidentally, peace as a construct is not unique to field
theory, although as far as I know no other such tight
theory so treats it. Peace as divine grace in Christian
theology or as shalom in Judaism, of which one meaning is
a covenant with Jehovah, are constructs. Their empirical
meaning is not given directly or abstractly; rather, they
are primitive terms whose content comes from the
empirical nature of other, linked theological concepts.
Moreover, the concept of "positive peace" developed by
Johan Galtung is a construct within a neo-Marxist theory of
exploitation; "positive peace" has no direct empirical or
indirect abstract empirical content, but is defined as the
ability of individuals to realize their potential, which in
turn is equated in theory with equality, itself an
abstraction measured by various indicators of equality. 58
E. Descriptive-Normative. The empirical-abstract-construct
dimension of peace concepts is the first conceptual
dimension. The second defines whether the concept of

peace is descriptive or normative. A descriptive concept is

one simply denoting some aspect of reality, such as trade,
state, or president.
A normative concept is evaluative, denoting or implying
goodness, desirability, what ought to be, or the negation
of these denotations. Compassion, equality, and
exploitation are such normative concepts. Clearly, the
same concept may be used descriptively or normatively
depending on context and intent. However, some concepts
have a built-in evaluation that even a careful descriptive
analysis may not avoid, such as with the concepts murder,
torture, exploitation, charity, and love. As with love, peace
undefined is an implicit good, a hope, desire, a human
ideal. "Give peace in our time, 0 Lord."59 In its common
usage, peace is normative.
However, regardless of the affective connotation of peace,
the concept can be used descriptively. For example, if
peace is conceived as an absence of war or a peace treaty,
it is possible to write about the peace in Europe since
1945, the peace of the Versailles Treaty, or the average
periods of peace in history, without necessarily connoting
that these are good historical periods (although for
pacifists, peace as an absence of war is, ipso facto, good
in all contexts).
My use of peace as a social contract is meant
descriptively. Not all social contracts are good. Some are
quite bad,60 as was the horrible peace (as absence of
international war) of the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia in
1974-1978 (before the Vietnamese invasion). Since peace
is meant here to be (normatively) as neutral a concept as
possible, it is sensible to ask when peace is good, or (as a
subcategory of the good) when it is just--or when bad or
unjust. For the very reason I have treated peace
descriptively in previous volumes, even though it is my
fundamental normative goal, I now must conclude by
pointing out in this Vol. 5: The Just Peace when peace, so
described, is just or unjust and, given my analyses and
results, what will foster a just peace.

2.5 QUALITIES OF PEACE

2.5.1 An Existent

Table 2.6 presents four qualities of peace entailed by my

conceptualization. Clearly, from Section 2.2, peace is a
sociopsychological existent. It has dispositional and
manifest61 being. In this it is on a par with
conflict.62 Conflict is manifested in particular patterns of
behavior; so is peace.63 Conflict and peace may be absent,
as when two individuals or groups lack contact or
awareness of each other. And conflict and peace are
coupled existents, closely related within a social process I
call the conflict helix.
Other conceptualizations also treat peace as an existing
something, such as peace as harmony, integration, or
virtue. However, the currently conventional definition of
peace as the absence of violence or war treats peace as a
void, a nonexistent. This creates several analytical
problems, which will be mentioned below.64

2.5.2 Dichotomous

Peace as an existent is dichotomous: it is or it is not. It

would be meaningless to talk about more or less
of a peace, as it would be meaningless to talk about more
or less of a contract, a nation-state, a president, or an
elephant.65 Of course, a state may be large or small, rich
or poor. Likewise, peace varies along several dimensions;
it may take on different forms or social orders.66
It is necessary here, then, to remember the distinction
between a peace existing or not and the attributes, form,
or order of the peace that exists. Thus, I might say that
peace in the world is increasing and mean that more
states are subscribing to a particular overarching,
international peace. Or by saying that peace is more
intense I might imply that a specific peace is involving
more and more cooperative interaction.

2.5.3 Internal and External

In my view, peace is internal and external. It is a social

contract among people or groups involving
these psychological and socialrealities. The former
comprises the parties' expectations and the congruence of
these expectations with their mutual interests,
capabilities, and wills. These are all psychological
variables. The social reality, manifesting the
harmonization of certain expectations among the parties,
may be evidenced in specific documents (such as a written
contract), physical structures (such as certain government
buildings), and patterns of cooperative interaction. To say,
then, that peace is an existent means that the particular
expectations, meanings, and values within the minds of
the parties and their social manifestations are all causallyfunctionally67integrated into a social contract. Thus, like
an iceberg, peace seen on the surface of social relations is
only a small part of the overall structure.68
2.5.4 Active

Finally, peace as a social contract is active, not passive. It

is created through negotiation, adjustment, resolution,
decisions. It comprises predictions (expectations) about
the future. It is manifested through cooperative
interaction. Its existence depends on congruence with the
balance of powers. It is a phase in the dynamics of the
conflict helix.
By contrast, peace as the absence of violence or war is
passive. True, it may be generated by negotiation and
resolution. But the resulting peace is inactive, inert. It is a
social void-something to build a wall around to protect
and maintain. Any condition or structure or lack thereof
constitutes such a peace as long as there is no social
violence-even a desert without human life.69

2.6 ADVANTAGES OF
THIS CONCEPTUALIZATION

Peace conceptualized as a social contract has a number of

advantages. First, peace is then defined as part of a
dynamic social process with a well-defined nature; it is
given meaning and substance in definite relationship to
conflict and cooperation.

Second, peace stands in clear theoretical and substantive

relationship to such important concepts as perception,
situation, expectations, interests, capabilities, will, power,
status, class, and behavior.70 This gives the nature of
peace considerable substantive and theoretical clarity.
That is, peace is locked into an overarching social theory.
Third, as a social contract peace is operational, and
empirical patterns of peace, so defined, have been well
delineated.71
Fourth, because of the theoretical and substantive
meaning of peace, peacemaking and peacekeeping
policies are given concrete direction and crucial variables
are spotlighted. For example, keeping the peace then
depends, most generally, on maintaining congruence
between the balance of powers and the structure of
expectations (social contract). This might be done by
altering expectations unilaterally to adjust to changing
capabilities, or strengthening will to lessen a developing
gap with expectations.72
Fifth, peace as conceptualized embodies a number of
psychological principles, such as subjectivity,
intentionality, free will, and individualism. 73 This, plus the
social principles mentioned in the previous Section,
enable a clear and straightforward application of the
social contract theory of justice. As will be shown in the
next part, a just peace is a hypothetical social contract of
a particular kind, one to which individuals would fairly and
impartially agree.