Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409

May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485

May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,

MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL.
GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B.
MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN
P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL,
ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO
GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V.
PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF
PNP,Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483

May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY
GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO
(NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C.
PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M.
TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171400

May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171489

May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO,
ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD
L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP
CHIEF,Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424

May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP);
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior strength
the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving
liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights
come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity." 2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and
protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free
people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which,
liberty becomes license?3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)

armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of
the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance
and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance including hindering
the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the
future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening
to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute aclear
and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in
May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this
country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a
clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the
Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these
petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were
directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as
well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and
rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a
clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President
in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown
that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind
the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the
issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They
called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust,
not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for
bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to
assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. 6 Upon the advice of her
security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the
celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group
and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of
subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day
would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action
Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr.
to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the
effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother,
businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly
Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official
about his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon
identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go
for the planned movement against Arroyo."8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical
mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2)
officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of
command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his
Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col.
Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger"
Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the
possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it
to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao,
publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the
economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counterinsurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the antiArroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is
probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan
was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an
army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of
the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to
assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account
for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students
from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the
entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
"warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLUKMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who
were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching
forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot
policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their
assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The
raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. 13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of
another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong presence, to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP
warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government
during the state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards
and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is
in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications
Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration
of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend
the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party
and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant
for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to
rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these
petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted
because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by
the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at
the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.

Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his
wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel
Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo,et
al., are not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with
this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on
the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition
of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of
raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term
"emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no
emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other
members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of
legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that
President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual
basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their
issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c)Section
2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of
Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without
congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a
proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her
election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed
for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485

(Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead
President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; andfifth, PP 1017 does not
violate the peoples right to free expression and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues
which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated
in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It
confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its
unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in
the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial
review.22
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." 23 Courts may exercise
such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy;second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual
case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President
Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners,
committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be
stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;32third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the
bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject
to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices
very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right
within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more
than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 37 In private suits,
standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a
"citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction
was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different
category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public
funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York

Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the
real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence
be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain
the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which
he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United
State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed inTileston
v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action,
and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as,Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the
"transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity
nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching
implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to
file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional
right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental
importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit
to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces
Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity
as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing
requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give
it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any
issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being
misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct
injury" test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a
showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official
act."
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a
real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have
standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the
emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the
LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds
true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury"
resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so,
the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also
raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident
to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented
by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v.
Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest
in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be
deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance
of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.

In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no
allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She
can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that
she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not
sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the
transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be
doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to
the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the
ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental
importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017
cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by
the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people 68 but he may
be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. 69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue
such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief
power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v.
Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tugof-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." 75Barcelon and
Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to
the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There,
the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the
existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of
powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x
x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in
turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court ofLansang was divided in Aquino v.
Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial
Law is a political or justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It
declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government
is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a
principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out" power as a discretionary power

solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of
the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms
of power but also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President
did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally
bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing
the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise
of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the
various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope
with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be
inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations,
the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the
proscription of the law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might
not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and
how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other
remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government
in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases,
render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their
operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...

If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to
nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In
such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State
shall not perish.86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it
would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead,
he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases
of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government,
furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm
in democratic political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures; for although
they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good
objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever
be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for
applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized
system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He
attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its
application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional
democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why
absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to
protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency
and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key
elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing
administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that
power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of
success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should
always be strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given
case must never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should
be "strict political conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating power in a
government where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of unprecedented magnitude
and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise
such powers, when, for how long, and to what end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any
of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional
means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency;
emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency
action must be the defense of the constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France,
Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as
solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the
conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is
necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order

2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men
who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its
termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be
effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more
than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent
in character or effect
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in
the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in
the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was
instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and
governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship 99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins.
He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he
places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees. 100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying
that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time
of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in
terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not
whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace
all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be
divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the
"concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which
is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any
means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full
emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the
need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that
the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping
government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an
exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found
that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in
the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism
with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly
procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a
complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101

In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks "theory of
prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwains "principle of
constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting
increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be
exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986
Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of
Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the
President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none
has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or
check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of
McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to
operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement
encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a
"chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes infree
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the
US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct."
InBroadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when
such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited
one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only
as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed
to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of
the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and
above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid
if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is
subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that
PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction;"
Third provision:

"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court,
through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call
the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present
in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it
necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine
the actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies
the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos
authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited
in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words ofSanlakas,
is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her callingout power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the
executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain
of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order
and the enforcement of law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should
not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping
of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they
can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the
President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that
only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature
and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the
laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to
the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws." 116 In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all
the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and
Local Government.119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo
the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to
enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
\
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from
Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in
Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations
in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those
issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category
and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are
void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts
and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call
the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the
provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2
dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and
operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and)
Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end
the present national emergency."

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other
national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant
it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of
national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of
Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation
of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the

President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the
Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The
contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution.
Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-inChief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in
military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here.Even
though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system
hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession
of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nations
lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive
power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And
the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to
"tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of
intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since
1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a)economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131This is
evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page
5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service. 132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could
this be economic emergency?"

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore,
unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are
exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference
to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the
time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of
enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and
the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict,
many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right
against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assemblyunder
the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without
warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP
1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006,
the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard
their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away
and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People
Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from
theimplementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general,does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute
or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,not from
its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished
the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the
police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed
illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the
essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138This is
logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers
implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the
cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared
unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They
are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficientadministration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the
official who issues them and the official who receives them. 139 They are based on and are the product of, a
relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. 140 For these reasons, one requirement for
these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is
invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous
and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our
country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic
slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating
internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being
updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic
interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the
United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed
groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom fighter." The
apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the
historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib
Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by
those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from
eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on
the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the
gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state
functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of
force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups
within a state is concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting
categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a
terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who
are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua
freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani
Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom
fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and
on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way because of
opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same
group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the
divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a
rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A
state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will
therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and
vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because
of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed
movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double
standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in spite of the
emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even more serious in the present global
power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the
Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even
more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States. 141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or
military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the
police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously,
this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if
there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981
enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on
Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is
mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished byreclusion temporal x
x x."

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by
President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since
there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over
the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President.
Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of
terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
arenecessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in
pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 142 The plain import of the
language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by
a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse
to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143
In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal,
Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated
brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged
with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7)
hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest
for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further,
he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known
whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest
violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It
is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of
freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the
freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be
conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if
the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument,
failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot
be made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political
action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on
that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but
whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the
persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against
the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a
different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of
KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that
an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed,
respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units.
They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the
determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on
the revocation of their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of
notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the
press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the
following: first, theDaily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized
several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February
25, 2006; fourth,the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was
quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or

do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further
stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability
in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will
recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio
networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that
his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of
search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society
rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties.
The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily
Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious
functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
disobey.153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its antigovernment sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves
the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and the
seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any
purpose," thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the
purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in
admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are
inadmissible for any purpose.155

xxxxxxxxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So
why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly
part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation
1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could
go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone
this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are
remedies for this.156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General,
illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of
1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the
law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in
no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively
presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court
has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an
integral part of this ponencia.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally
rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed
allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be
issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the
May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not
be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that
under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-inChief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a
valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from
the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the
military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O.
No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless
arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press;
and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and
other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on
the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The
civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court.
Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in
themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily
trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency,
governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to
unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two

vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political
responsibility of the government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(On leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Asscociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21897

October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO
GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and
SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of
the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition herein,
averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or
amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the
parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner
prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to
import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction
permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's pray for a
writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a
memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said
incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case,
the same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally,
although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act
No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to
dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ...
." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance
to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will
have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner
must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance
with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however, that the principle requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one",3 or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear
the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in
question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive
measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our
armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for any special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein - on
which our view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No.
2207 is still in force that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the
language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the
Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation
orgovernment agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it
adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any
government agency that he may designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency"
from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation
of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself",
because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee
of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by
the Government as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the Philippines"and,
hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing
rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of rice and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under
its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for
those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant
thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject
to the additional penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished
from officers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are
those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this
respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the
Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply
the same to transactions made by the very government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth
Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of
articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and employees of the
municipal and provincial governments and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards,
commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including
government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles,
materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ...
produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow
specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed
forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar
violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security predicated upon the
"worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" - and the
alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of
the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice
and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities
constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing
goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the
importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency is within the
purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to
accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the
administration throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not selfexecutory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those
objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as
indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth
Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense
may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9which does not
exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such
manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows that
Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time"11 or when he has placed the country or a part
thereof under "martial law".12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that
respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the
Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should,
nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is
said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It
implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at
liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people,
it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt
means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation but under certain conditions,
which have not been, and should be complied with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the
Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts
constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon
the signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty
and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence
in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive
relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned
contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the
rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no merit
in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But,
even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as
well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest
in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, alsoinsist that
the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the
United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII
thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case
academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice,
but from importing rice, except under the conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No.
3452 has two (2) main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directlyfrom our

local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such
importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importation which has not
been consummated as yet is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in
the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because,
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines,
the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative
view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power
to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation
is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction
prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Under Republic Act No. 2207, which took effect on May 15, 1959, it is unlawful for any person, association,
corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines. The exception is if there
is an existing or imminent shortage of such commodity of much gravity as to constitute national emergency in which
case an importation may be authorized by the President when so certified by the National Economic Council.
However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was enacted providing that the importation of rice and corn
canonly be made by private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or modified
those parts thereof that are inconsistent with its provisions. The question that now arises is: Has the enactment of
Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting completely the government from importing rice and corn into the
Philippines?
My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in any manner provide for the importation of rice and corn in
case of national emergency, the provision of the former law on that matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent
with any provision embodied in Republic Act 3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government
agency, may therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as provided in Republic Act 2207 if there is a
declared national emergency.
The next question that arises is: Can the government authorize the importation of rice and corn regardless of
Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military
precautionary measure for military stockpile?
Respondents answer this question in the affirmative. They advance the argument that it is the President's duty to
see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are geared to the defenses of the country as well as to the
fulfillment of our international commitments in Southeast Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in
danger. The stockpiling of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense preparation in view of the limited
local supply and the probable disruption of trade and commerce with outside countries in the event of armed

hostilities, and this military precautionary measure is necessary because of the unsettled conditions in the
Southeast Asia bordering on actual threats of armed conflicts as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the Military
Department of our Government. This advocacy, they contend, finds support in the national defense policy embodied
in Section 2 of our National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:
(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the freedom,
independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all
citizens, without distinction of sex or age, and all resources.
(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national defense shall be effected by a national
mobilization.
(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures necessary to pass from a peace to a war
footing.
(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all
military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the security of the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the core of
the preservation of our State which is the basic duty of every citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the
President employ all the resources at his command. But over and above all that power and duty, fundamental as
they may seem, there is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be supreme. This injunction can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and preservation of the State and to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil
authority. Military authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil authority, the only exception being when
the law clearly ordains otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452, contains any exception in favor
of military action concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception must be strictly construed.
A distinction is made between the government and government agency in an attempt to take the former out of the
operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the Revised
Administrative Code refers to that entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including the
various arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form
of local government, whereas a government instrumentality refers to corporations owned or controlled by the
government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people. A government agency, therefore, must
necessarily refer to the government itself of the Republic, as distinguished from any government instrumentality
which has a personality distinct and separate from it (Section 2).
The important point to determine, however, is whether we should enjoin respondents from carrying out the
importation of the rice which according to the record has been authorized to be imported on government to
government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking
being its implementation. This is evident from the manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it
appears that the contract for the purchase of 47,000 tons of rice from had been sign on October 5, 1963, and for the
purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized representatives of both our government
and the governments of Vietnam and Burma, respectively. If it is true that, our government has already made a
formal commitment with the selling countries there arises the question as to whether the act can still be impeded at
this stage of the negotiations. Though on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is gratifying to note that the
majority has expressed itself against it. This is a plausible attitude for, had the writ been issued, our government
would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was avoided by the judicial statesmanship
evinced by the Court.

BARRERA, J., concurring:

Because of possible complications that might be aggravated by misrepresentation of the true nature and scope of
the case before this Court, it is well to restate as clearly as possible, the real and only issue presented by the
respondents representing the government.
From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, we quote:
The importation of the rice in question by the Armed Forces of the Philippines is for military stockpilingauthorized by
the President pursuant to his inherent power as commander-in-chief and as a military precautionary measure in
view the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it may added, the recent, tension created by the Malaysia
problem (Answer, p. 2; emphasis supplied.)
During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appealing in behalf of the respondents, likewise reiterated the
imported rice was for military stockpiling, and which he admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn
Administration, he emphasized again and again that rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution to people, as
there was no shortage of rice for that purpose but it was only exchanged for palay because this could better
preserved.
From the memorandum filed thereafter by the Solicits General, again the claim was made:
We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer dated October 4, 1963 that the importation of rice sought be
enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the authority vested in the President of the Philippines as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces, as a measure of military preparedness demanded by a real and actual threat of
emergency in the South East Asian countries. (p. 1, Emphasis supplied.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely our intention to show the necessity for the
stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is the very reason for the importation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As it is, the importation in question is being made by the Republic of the Philippines for its own use, and the rice is
not supposed to be poured into the open market as to affect the price to be paid by the public. (p. 4, Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

What we do contend is that the law, for want of express and clear provision to that effect, does not include in its
prohibition importation by the Government of rice for its own use and not for the consuming public, regardless of
whether there is or there is no emergency. (p. 5, Emphasis supplied.)
From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the respondents were not concerned with the present rice
situation confronting the consuming public, but were solely and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for
thefuture use of the army. The issue, therefore, in which the Government was interested is not whether rice is
imported to give the people a bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per ganta for, to quote again
their contention: "the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market to affect the price to be paid by the
public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency", but whether
rice can legally be imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the
prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority opinion ably sets forth the reasons why
this Court can not accept the contention of the respondents that this importation is beyond and outside the operation
of these statutes. I can only emphasize that I see in the theory advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous trend
that because the policies enunciated in the cited laws are for the protection of the producers and the consumers,
the army is removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of
three economic groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is
more portentous is the effect to equate the army with the Government itself.

Then again, the importation of this rice for military stockpiling is sought to be justified by the alleged threat of
emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the existence of this supposed threat was unilaterally determined
by the Department of National Defense alone. We recall that there exists a body called the National Security Council
in which are represented the Executive as well as the Legislative department. In it sit not only members of the party
in power but of the opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the highest consultative body which deliberates
precisely in times of emergency threatening to affect the security of the state. The democratic composition of this
council is to guarantee that its deliberations would be non-partisan and only the best interests of the nation will be
considered. Being a deliberative body, it insures against precipitate action. This is as it should be. Otherwise, in
these days of ever present cold war, any change or development in the political climate in any region of the world is
apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and thereupon attempt to override
our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary
mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. One need not, be too imaginative to
perceive a hint of this in the present case.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion unanimously reached, is fully aware of the difficult and delicate
task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be exploited by some for their own purposes by claiming and making
it appear that the Court is unmindful of the plight of our people during these days of hardship; that it preferred to give
substance to the "niceties of the law than heed the needs of the people. Our answer is that the Court was left no
alternative. It had, in compliance with its duty, to decide the case upon the facts presented to it. The respondents,
representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and insisted that there is no rice shortage; that the imported
rice is not for the consuming public and is not supposed to be placed in the open market to affect the price to be
paid by the public; that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a measure of mobilization in the face
of what the Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened armed conflict in Southeast Asia.
Confronted with these facts upon, which the Government has built and rested its case, we have searched in vain for
legal authority or cogent reasons to justify this importation made admittedly contrary to the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because respondents never as much as pretended that the importation
fulfills the conditions specified in these laws, but limited themselves to the contention, which is their sole defense
that this importation does not fall within the scope of said laws. In our view, however, the laws are clear. The laws
are comprehensive and their application does not admit of any exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance
therewith is not difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if at all, is not urgently immediate.
In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the Supreme Court has a duty to perform under the
Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in an appropriate proceeding, all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order or regulation is in question. We can not
elude this duty. To do so would be culpable dereliction on our part. While we sympathize with the public that might
be adversely affected as a result of this decision yet our sympathy does not authorize us to sanction an act contrary
to applicable laws. The fault lies with those who stubbornly contended and represented before this Court that there
is no rice shortage, that the imported rice is not intended for the consuming public, but for stockpiling of the army.
And, if as now claimed before the public, contrary to the Government's stand in this case, that there is need for
imported rice to stave off hunger, our legislature has provided for such a situation. As already stated, the laws are
adequate. The importation of rice under the conditions set forth in the laws may be authorized not only where there
is an existing shortage, but also when the shortage is imminent. In other words, lawful remedy to solve the situation
is available, if only those who have the duty to execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for the
importation of rice, who adopt some dubious means which necessitates resort to doubtful exercise of the power of
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not comply with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed
to be a regime under the rule of law. Adoption as a government policy of the theory of the end justifies the means
brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.
For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.

Separate Opinions
Footnotes

1 The Secretary of National Defense, the Auditor General, the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and the
Secretary Justice.
2 275 hectares.
3 Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March 30, 1963.
4 Mangubat vs. Osmea, L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, L-11078, May 27, 1959;
Pascual Provincial Board, L-11959, October 31, 1959.
5 Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, L-15982, May 31, 1963.
6 In the present case, respondents allege in their answer that "the importation ... in question ... is authorized by the
President.
7 Alzate vs. Aldaba, L-14407, February 29, 1960; Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, L-13000, September 25, 1959.
8 Which provides that the national defense policy of the Philippines shall be follows:
(a) The preservation of the state is the obligation of every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the freedom,
independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all
citizens, without distinction of sex or age, and all resources.
(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national defense shall be effected by a national
mobilization.
(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures necessary to pass from a peace to a war
footing.
(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all
military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.
xxx

xxx

xxx

9 In line with the provisions of paragraphs b), c), e), and f) of section 2 of said Act.
10 The Constitution and What It Means Today, pp. 95-96.
11 The Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is primarily that of military command in wartime, and as such
includes, as against the persons and property of enemies of the United States encountered within the theater of
military operations, all the powers allowed a military commander in such cases by the Law of Nations. President
Lincoln's famous Proclamation of Emancipation rested upon this ground. It was effective within the theater of military
operations while the war lasted, but no longer. (p. 93, Emphasis supplied.)
12 From an early date the Commander-in-Chief power came to be merged with the President's duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. So, while in using military force against unlawful combinations too strong to be
dealt with through the ordinary processes of law the President acts by authorization of statute, his powers are still
those of Commander-in-Chief. ...
Under "preventive martial law", so-called because it authorizes "preventive" arrests and detentions, the military acts
as an adjunct of the civil authorities but not necessarily subject to their orders. It may be established whenever the
executive organ, State or national, deems it to be necessary for the restoration of good order. The concept, being
of judicial origin, is of course for judicial application, and ultimately for application by the Supreme Court, in
enforcement of the due process clauses. (See, also, Section III of this Article, and Article IV, Section IV.) (Pp. 95-96,
Emphasis supplied.)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 202242

April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading,
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos.
111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On August 3,
2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from
notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately executory." 9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing
members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the
government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution 11 and the 1935

Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the
members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the
appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive
and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and
partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in
this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was
added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a
shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not
subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the
Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly
correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first
and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second
grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are
established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their
safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one
suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society

were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution
clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret
it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one
(1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with
the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election
shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." 20Another is
Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the
bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a
matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision
to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function to
legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was
merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The
need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs
precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses
consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its nonlegislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of
each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all
these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with
keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks
and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four
(4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as exofficio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7),
not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest
of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao,
submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance
with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to
mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of
Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief
Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail
the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons
will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the
framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes
for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of
even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives
coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a
single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is
beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have
only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC
consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commissions desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The exofficio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while the
regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the
JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice
of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch
in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers
requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness
of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts
with the other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have

any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and viceversa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted
constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what
cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or
more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the
Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this
representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply
because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still
safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it
was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the
rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the
Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To
reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation: 32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. 33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in
the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its
express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction
the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration." 35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under
its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against
usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. 38 In cases like this, no amount of practical
logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the
manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the
Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, T hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco &
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco &
Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho,
Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA DirectorGeneral, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacioRikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo
Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali,
THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of

Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in
his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA,
CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes,
Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL
ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in
her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO
L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem
that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to
the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement
these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant
is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary
then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that
holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children;
and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and
on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate
of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of
the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:

 The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive
health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides
that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal
Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health
nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean
that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing
the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of
conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and
what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

 The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups,
they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended
that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional
right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on
matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is nonabortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of
the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of
Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act
to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale,
dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug
or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and
Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed
physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or
limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference
on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable
pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76
million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures
were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods,
supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that
"the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained." 73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic
Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed
by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH
Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them
to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative
and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a
product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The
OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speechregulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature,
it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its coequal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution
has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes
upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this,
the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its
sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because
the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete
and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in
question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court
ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under
a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that
is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar,
the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution
are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124and
that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of
the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make

decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized
ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms
that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies
shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of
numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which
reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a wellsettled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should
ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the
male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment
of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?

xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is
human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is
the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it
takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process
of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized
ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the
nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive
and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization"
was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase
"from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission,
he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I
was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that
we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to

travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity
for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when
life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision
on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only
to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time.
Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is
yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intrauterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if
we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied
Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines,
also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of
male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and
ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus
results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed.
The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately
at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent
with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or
of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a
living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to
the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religiousbased divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any proabortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court
has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be
afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive
health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive
health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of
the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using
the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any
drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the
FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
(third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device
from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the
point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included
or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available
on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,

cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present
in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent
with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive
pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if
its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as
abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL
will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical
cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them.
They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that
the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the
RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by
a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As
aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly
governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution
is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in
the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made
available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not,
is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs
and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply
and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices
must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to
their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the
RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the

various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are
in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim
that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their
taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts
to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly
limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l)
and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to
in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter
to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service

providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector
to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act
on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the
rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of
religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the
social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his
free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning
methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on
one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally.
For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to
the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on
account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They

are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight
the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together.
It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the nonbelievers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs
of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State
cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It
cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia,
or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.

xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form
of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single
goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is
quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was
stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is
not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that
laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions
of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test
and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear
and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this
test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule
that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was
the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously,
the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of

the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is
the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so,
in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections
7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive.
They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the

individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to
provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law.
If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff
on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity
and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section
23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the
Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty
to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should

not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is
replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed
this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of
the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with
this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their
choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent
in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious
objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty
to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the
other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have
not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective
is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of
religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State
to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may

still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365
or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna
Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide
for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of
a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in
the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions,
the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice
to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall
be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's
health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development
of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however,
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for
blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance
of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering
that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the
life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the
forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child
is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would
be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are

not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution
by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact,
one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall
defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive
a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just
one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood,
as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the
right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own
parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort.
To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest
can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to
make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information
with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage
and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no
person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the
right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental

authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed
above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should
not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition,
it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious
groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if
these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but
at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must
be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity,
or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such
by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide

with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead
or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health
and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must
be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition
of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to
charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into
its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private
educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency
to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to
the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or
not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid
for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved
to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. 268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit

concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and
services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There
is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the
ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No.
9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.
These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve
as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medicallysafe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose
its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these
perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The
number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like
the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court
is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as
enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in
a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question
the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry
out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task
of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729)
and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption
of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have

suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 ,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Tingnan ang aking opinyong
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Concurring Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

See: Separate Concurring Opinion

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

See Concurring Opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

See concurring and dissenting

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

See Separate dissent

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the
incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the
interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section
4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions
to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim
Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who
shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent
President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while
the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner
of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of
the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members,
convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected.
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the
responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires
may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of
the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called
at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and
effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been
ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting

the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to
propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution,
which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is
now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry
out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain
the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.
8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the

constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes
ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought
to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of
the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word
in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court
is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments
to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore
a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or
not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's
majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the
Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No.
73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in
the Ratification Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was
dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because,
they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in

Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The
return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by
the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially
the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature
and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention
to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred
with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention
may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with
the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of
that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor,
Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V)
was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support
from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the

convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had
already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending
process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. 17Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more
or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power,
and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental
action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all
powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a
constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is
evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the
former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither
guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy
than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims
for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of
special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency
powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the
crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear
authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to

exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional
Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and
knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise,
with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental
machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which
extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a
distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause
for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by
the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political,
social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during
the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of
the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body
in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments
to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to
say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in
behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President
to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the
objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential

initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975,
the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations,
Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that
the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan
presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held
on October 16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
(executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the
people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the
issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission
of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal
of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22,
1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in
which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It
means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus
write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional
prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all
experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation
should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a selflimiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single
man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority
who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed
amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
- is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the
Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of
voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will
have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the
referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for
ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots
of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age
and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead
of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the
referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two
boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in
character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their
consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39It is
participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded,
or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to
dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is
impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of
the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendumplebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself
had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not
interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus,
the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled
matter. 43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public
discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not
without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30,

1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated TydingsKocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20
days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep.
Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission
involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially
political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time;
second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In
the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining,
does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient
and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of
the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and
Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in
the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile
(59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be
extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and
therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate
Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the

constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the
controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to
dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando
concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125346

November 11, 2014

LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 136328-29
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 144942
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 148605
STERLING TOBACCO CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 158197
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 165499
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by cigarette
manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC), before it was amended on December 19, 2012 through Republic Act No. 10351 1 (Sin
Tax Law), stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to an excise tax of P0.75 for each kilogram thereof. 2 The 1997 NIRC
further provides that stemmed leaf tobacco - "leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib removed" 3 - "may be
sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another without payment of the tax, under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Finance." 4
This is a consolidation of six petitions for review of several decisions of the Court of Appeals, involving three
cigarette manufacturers and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. G.R. No. 125346 is anal 5 from the Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division) that rever LEONEN, LEONEN, sed 6 the Court of Tax Appeals' decision7 and held petitioner
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory (La Suerte) liable for deficiency specific tax on its purchase of imported and
locally produced stemmed leaf tobacco and sale of stemmed leaf tobacco to Associated Anglo-American Tobacco
Corporation (AATC) during the period from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989. GR. Nos. 136328-29 is an appeal 8 by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) from the decision9 of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
Court of Tax Appeals' rulings10 that Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune) was not obliged to pay the excise tax on
its importations of stemmed leaf tobacco for the periods from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989 and July 1, 1989 to
November 30, 1990. In G.R. No. 148605, Sterling Tobacco Corporation (Sterling) appeals 11 the decision12 of the
Court of Appeals that reversed the Court of Tax Appeals decision13 and held it liable to pay deficiency excise taxes
on its importation and local purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco from November 1986 to June 24, 1989. G.R. No.
144942is an appeal14 from the Court of Appeals decision15 that affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals decision16 and
ordered the refund of specific taxes paid by La Suerte on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in April 1995. In
G.R. No. 158197, La Suerte sought to appeal17the decision18 of the Court of Appeals holding it liable for deficiency
specific tax on its local and imported purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco and those it sold for the period from June
21, 1989 to November 20, 1990. Finally, in G.R. No. 165499, La Suerte again sought to appeal by certiorari 19 the
decision20 of the Court of Appeals reversing the Court of Tax Appeals and holding it liable for deficiency specific tax
on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in March 1995.
Factual background
Overview of cigarette manufacturing
The primary component of cigarettes is tobacco, a processed product derived from the leaves of the plants in the
genus Nicotiana.21 Most cigarettes contain a mixture or blend of several types of tobacco from a variety of sources.
The tobacco types grown in the Philippines are: Virginia (or fluecured),22 which accounts for 59.35% of tobacco
production, Burley (or bright air-cured),23 which makes up 22.21%, and the Native (or dark air-cured), 24 which
makes up the remaining 18.44%.25 "[T]he native type is normally categorized into three: cigar filler type, wrapper
type and chewing type, or . . . Batek tobacco."26 Virginia and Burley, considered as the aromatic type, are intended
for cigarette manufacturing.
Growing and harvesting
"Tobacco seeds undergo a process of germination, which takes about 7 to 10 days, depending on the tobacco
varieties. . . . The tobacco seedlings are then sown in cold frames or hotbedsto prevent attacks from insects, and
then transplanted into the fields"27 after 45 to 65 days.28 Harvesting begins 55 to 60 days after transplanting. 29 A
farmer carries out either priming(leaf by leaf) or stalk harvesting (by the whole plant). 30
Curing
"After harvest, tobacco is stored for curing, which allows for the slow oxidation and degradation of carotenoids. This
allows for the leaves to take on properties that are usually attributed to the smoothness of the smoke." 31
"Curing methods vary with the type of tobacco grown. The tobacco barn design varies accordingly." 32 There are two
main ways of curing tobacco in the Philippine setting:

1) Air-curing (for Burley and Native tobacco) "is carried out by hanging the tobacco in well-ventilated barns,
where the tobacco is allowed to dry over a period of 4 to 8 weeks. Air-cured tobacco is generally low in
sugar content, which gives the tobacco smoke a light, smooth, semi-sweet flavor. These tobacco leaves
usually have a high nicotine content[;]"33 and
2) Flue-curing (for Virginia tobacco) process "starts by the sticking of tobacco leaves, which are then hung
from tier-poles in curing barns. The procedure will generally take about a week. Fluecured tobacco generally
produces cigarette tobacco, which usually has a high content of sugar, with medium to high levels of
nicotine."34
Once cured, the leaves are sorted into grades based on size, color, and quality, and packed in standard bales. 35The
bales are then moved to accredited trading centers where they are purchased by leaf buyers such as wholesale
tobacco dealers and exporters or cigarette manufacturing companies.36
Redrying and aging
After purchase, leaf tobacco is re-dried and then added with moisture to make the tobacco pliable enough to remove
its large stems.37 The leaves are stripped or de-stemmed, eitherby hand or machine, cleaned and compressed into
boxes or porous wooden vats called hogsheads, and aged.38 Thereafter, the leaves are either exported or used for
the manufacture of cigarettes, cigars, and other tobacco products.
Primary processing39
In the cigarette factory, the tobacco leaves undergo a conditioning process where "high temperatures and humidity
restore moisture to suitable levels for cutting and blending tobacco and completing the cigarette-making process." 40
"[T]obaccos are precisely cut and blended according to . . . formulas, or recipes, to produce tobaccos for various
brands of cigarettes. These brand recipes include ingredients and flavors that are added to the tobacco to give each
brand its unique characteristics."41
Cigarette making and packing42
"The blended tobacco often referred to as "filler" or "cut-filler" . . . is delivered by a pneumatic feed system to
cigarette making machines . . . within the factory."43 The machine disperses the shredded tobacco over a continuous
roll of cigarette paper and cuts the paper to the desired length. The completed cigarettes are subsequently packed,
sealed, and placed in cartons.
Cigarette manufacturers
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory (La Suerte),44 Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune),45 and Sterling Tobacco
Corporation (Sterling)46 are domestic corporations engaged in the production and manufacture of cigars and
cigarettes. These companies import leaf tobacco from foreign sources and purchase locally produced leaf tobacco
to be used in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes.47
The transactions of these cigarette manufacturers pertinent to these consolidated cases are the following:
1. La Suertes local purchases, importations, and sale of stemmed leaf tobacco from January 1, 1986 to
June 30, 1989 (G.R. No. 125346), and from June 1989 to November 1990 (G.R. No. 158197), and
importations in March 1995 (G.R. No. 165499) and April 1995 (G.R. No. 144942); 2. Fortunes importation of
tobacco strips from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989, and from July 1, 1989 to November 30, 1990 (G.R.
Nos. 13632829); and
3. Sterlings importations and local purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco from November 1986 to June 24,
1989 (G.R. No. 148605).
History of applicable tax provisions

The first tax code came into existence in 1939 with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 466 48 (1939 Code).
Section 136 of the 1939 Code imposed specific (excise) taxes on manufactured products of tobacco, but excluded
cigars and cigarettes, which were subject to tax under a different section. 49 Section 136 provided thus:
SECTION 136. Specific Tax on Products of Tobacco. On manufactured products of tobacco, except cigars,
cigarettes, and tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for consumption in any other manner,
but including all other tobacco twisted by hand or reduced into a condition to be consumed in any manner other than
by the ordinary mode of drying and curing; and on all tobacco prepared or partially prepared for sale or
consumption, even if prepared without the use of any machine or instrument and without being pressed or
sweetened; and on all fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, and sweepings of tobacco, there shall
be collected on each kilogram, sixty centavos.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for use in any other manner, on each kilogram,
forty-eight centavos. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 132 of the 1939 Code, however, by way of exception, provided that "stemmed leaf tobacco . . . may be sold
in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Department of Finance, without the prepayment of the tax." Section 132 stated:
SECTION 132. Removal of Tobacco Products Without Prepayment of Tax. Products of tobacco entirely unfit for
chewing or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use, under such conditionsas may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Department of Finance; and stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of
fine-cut chewing tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings and sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as raw
material byone manufacturer directly to another, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations of
the Department of Finance, without the prepayment of the tax.
"Stemmed leaf tobacco," as herein used means leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib removed. The term
does not include broken leaf tobacco. (Emphasis supplied)
On September 29, 1954, upon the recommendation of then Acting Collector of Internal Revenue J. Antonio Araneta,
the Department of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. V-39 (RR No. V-39), or "The Tobacco Products
Regulations," relative to "the enforcement of the provisions of Title IV of the [1939 Tax Code] in so far as they affect
the manufacture or importation of, and the collection and payment of the specific tax on, manufactured tobacco or
products of tobacco."50 Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39, which lays the rules for tax exemption on tobacco products,
states:
SECTION 20. Exemption from tax of tobacco products intended for agricultural or industrial purposes. (a) Sale of
stemmed leaf tobacco, etc., by one factory to another. Subject to the limitations herein established, products of
tobacco entirely unfit for chewing or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use;and
stemmed leaf tobacco, finecut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and
sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as raw materials by one manufacturer directly to another without the
prepayment of specific tax.
Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and
sweeping of leaf tobacco or partially manufactured tobacco or other refuse of tobacco may be transferred from one
factory to another under an official L-7 in voice on which shall be entered the exact weight of the tobacco at the time
of its removal, and entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page of removals.
Corresponding debit entry will be made in the L-7 register book of the factory receiving the tobacco under heading
"Refuse, etc., received from other factory," showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice numbers, name and
address of the consignor, form in which received, and the weight of the tobacco. This paragraph should not,
however, be construed to permit the transfer of materials unsuitable for the manufacture of tobacco products from
one factory to another. (Emphasis supplied)
Sections 10 and 11 of RR No. V-39 enumerate and describe the record books to be kept and used by manufacturers
of tobacco products, viz:

SECTION 10. (a) Register, auxiliary, and stamps requisition books for manufacturers. The Collector of Internal
Revenue shall from time to time supply provincial revenue agents or the Chief of the Tobacco Tax Section with the
necessary number of manufacturers official register books and official auxiliary register booksas may be required in
each locality by manufacturers of tobacco products. Whenever any manufacturer shall have qualified himself as
such by executing a proper bond, registering his factory, and paying the privilege tax and shall have complied with
all the requirements ofengaging in such business contained in the National Internal Revenue Code and in these
regulations, the internal revenue agent within whose district the factory is located shall deliver to said manufacturer
the necessary official register books and auxiliary register books. These books consist of the following:
B.I.R. No. 31.09Official RegisterBook, A-3 for manufacturers of chewing and smoking tobacco. B.I.R. No.
31.10Manufactured tobacco (Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.18Official Register Book, A-4, for manufacturers of cigar.
B.I.R. No. 31.19(Transcriptsheet of the above).
B.I.R. No. 31.27Official Register Book, A-5, for Manufacturers of cigarettes.
B.I.R. No. 31.28(Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.01Official Register Book, L-7, record of raw materials for manufacturers of any class of
tobacco products.
B.I.R. No. 31.02(Transcript sheet of above)[.]
B.I.R. No. 31.46Auxiliary Register Book, L-7-1/2, bale book, for manufacturers of any class of tobacco
products.
B.I.R. No. 31.47(Transcript sheet of above).
B.I.R. No. 31.12Stamp requisition book, for manufacturers of manufactured tobacco.
B.I.R. No. 31.21Stamp requisition book, for manufacturers of cigars.
B.I.R. No. 31.30Stamp requisition book, for manufacturers of cigarettes.
B.I.R. No. 31.05L-7 Official Invoice Book for, use in connection with L-7 register book.
B.I.R. No. 31.05L-7-1/2 OfficialInvoice Book, for use in connection with L-7-1/2 bale book.
(b) General nature of official register and auxiliary register books. The L-7 official register book isthe
record of all raw materials used in the manufacture of tobacco products of all description in the factory.It is
the primary record of the internal operations of the factory. It shows the raw materials used in the
manufacture and the articles actually manufactured or produced. The Schedule A register books are the
record of the articles actually manufactured or produced, and transferred from the credit side of the official
register book, L-7. They show the amount of taxes paid and the name of the person to whom the finished
products is consigned or sold when leaving the factory. The bale book[,] L-7-1/2, is an auxiliary to the L-7
official register book.
All official register books and other official records herein required of manufacturers shall be kept in the
factory premises, or in the factory warehouse, in the case of bale books, and open to inspection by any
internal revenue officer at all times of the day or night.
....

SECTION 11. Entries to be made in the official register and auxiliary register books; monthly transcripts. (a)
Official bale book (L-7-1/2). All leaf tobacco received in any factory or factory warehouse shall be debited, and any
removal of tobacco from the factory shall be credited in the official bale book; except cuttings, clippings, sweepings,
and other partially manufactured tobacco, which shall be credited in the L-7 register book.
The Collector of Internal Revenue may in his discretion waive the requirements of keeping an official bale book by
small factories.
(b) The Official Register Book (L-7). One L-7 books shall suffice for each manufacturer of tobacco products,
regardless of the classes of tobacco manufactured by him.All loose leaf tobacco received in the factory proper and
all bales of leaf tobacco which are opened in the factory for use in the manufacture of tobacco products shall be
entered in the L-7 official register book under the heading "Received from Dealers" at the net weights. In the column
headed "Name["] and "Address" shall be shown the words "Transferred from tobacco factory warehouse". All leaf
tobacco received into a factory must be entered in the official bale book pertaining to the factory and bales of leaf
tobacco shall not be taken up in the L-7 register book until said bales are transferred for use and credited in the
official bale book. While leaf tobacco must be taken in the official bale book, this is done for statistical purposes only.
As soon asit enters the factory for use in manufacture it should be taken up in the L-7 register book and credited in
the official bale book.
All removals of waste of tobacco, whether transferred to other factories, removed for agricultural orindustrial
purposes, or destroyed on the premises or elsewhere, shall be entered in the official register book, L-7, under the
heading "Raw Materials Removed", showing all information required therein. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of RR No. V-39 broadly defined "manufactured products of tobacco" and "manufacturer of tobacco
products" as follows:
Section 2. Definition of terms. When used in there [sic] regulations, the following terms shall begiven the
interpretations indicated in their respective definitions given below, except where the context indicates otherwise:
(a) "Manufactured products of tobacco" shall include cigars, cigarettes, smoking tobacco, chewing, snuff,
and all other forms of manufactured and partially manufactured tobacco, as defined in section 194 (M) 51 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
(b) "Manufacturer of tobacco products" shall include all persons engaged in the manufacture of any of the
forms of tobacco mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
In 1967, the Secretary of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 17-67 (RR No. 17-67), as amended, 52or
the "Tobacco Revenue Regulations on Leaf, Scrap, Other Partially Manufactured Tobacco and Other Tobacco
Products; Grading, Classification, Inspection, Shipments, Exportation, Importation and the Manufacturers thereof
under the provisions of Act No. 2613, as amended." Section 2(i) of RR No. 17-67 defined a "manufacturer of
tobacco" and included in the definition one who prepares partially manufactured tobacco. Section 2(m) defined
"partially manufactured tobacco" as including stemmed leaf tobacco. Thus, Sections 2(i) and (m) read:
(i) "Manufacturer of tobacco" Includes every person whose business it is to manufacture tobacco o[r] snuff or who
employs others to manufacture tobacco or snuff, whether such manufacture be by cutting, pressing (not baling),
grinding, or rubbing (grating) any raw or leaf tobacco, or otherwise preparing raw or leaf tobacco, or manufactured
or partially manufactured tobacco and snuff, or putting up for consumption scraps, refuse, or stems of tobacco
resulting from any process of handling tobacco stems, scraps, clippings, or waste by sifting, twisting, screening or by
any other process.
....
(m) "Partially manufactured tobacco" Includes:
(1) "Stemmed leaf" handstripped tobacco, clean, good, partially broken leaf only, free from mold and dust.

(2) "Long-filler" handstripped tobacco of good, long pieces of broken leaf usableas filler for cigars without
further preparation, and free from mold, dust stems and cigar cuttings.
(3) "Short-filler" handstripped or machine-stripped tobacco, clean, good, short pieces of broken leaf,
which will not pass through a screen of two inches (2") mesh.
(4) "Cigar-cuttings" clean cuttings or clippings from cigars, unsized with any other form of tobacco.
(5) "Machine-scrap tobacco" machine-threshed, clean, good tobacco, not included in any of the above
terms, usable in the manufacture of tobacco products.
(6) "Stems" midribs of leaftobacco removed from the whole leaf or broken leaf either by hand or machine.
(7) "Waste tobacco" denatured tobacco; powder or dust, refuse, unfit for human consumption; discarded
materials in the manufacture of tobacco products, which may include stems.
Section 3 of RR No. 17-67 classifiedentities that dealt with tobacco according to the type of permit that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue issued to each entity. Under this classification, wholesale leaf tobacco dealers were considered L3 permittees. Those (referring to wholesale leaf tobacco dealers) that reprocess partially manufactured tobacco for
export, for themselves, and/or for other L-6 or L-7 permittees were considered L-6 permittees. Manufacturers of
tobacco products such as cigarette manufacturers were considered L-7 permittees. Section 3 of RR No. 17-67
reads:
(a) L-3 Wholesale leaf tobacco dealer.
(b) L-3F Wholesale leaf tobacco dealer. Issued only in favor of Farmer's Cooperative Marketing
Association (FaCoMas) duly organized in accordance with law. [This function relative to tobacco trading was
transferred to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) under Section 15 of Republic Act No.
2265].
(c) L-3R Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers. Issued only in favor of persons or entities having fully equipped
Redrying Plants.
(d) L-3-1/4 Buyers for wholesale leaf tobacco dealers.
(e) L-4 Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers. Issued only in favor of persons or entities having flue-curing
barns, who may purchase or receive green Virginia leaf tobacco from bona fide tobacco planters only, or
handle green leaf of their own production, which tobacco shall be sold or transferred only to holders of L-3
and L-3R permits after flue-curing the tobacco.
(f) L-5 Tobacco planters selling to consumers part or the whole of their tobacco production. (g) L-6
Wholesale leaf tobacco dealers who, exclusively for export, except as otherwise provided for in these
regulations, perform the following functions:
(1) Handstripped and/or threshwhole leaf tobacco for themselves or for other L-6 or L-7 permittees;
(2) Re-process partially manufactured tobacco for themselves, or for other L-6 or L-7 permittees; (3)
Sell their partially manufactured tobacco to other L-6 permittees.
(h) L-7 Manufacturers of tobacco products. [L-7 1/2 designates an auxiliary registered book (bale books),
for manufacturers of tobacco products.]
(i) B-14 Wholesale leaf tobaccodealers (Privilege tax receipt)
(j) B-14 (a) Retail leaf tobacco dealers (Privilege tax receipt)

La Suerte contends that on December 12, 1972, then Internal Revenue Commissioner Misael P. Vera issued a
ruling which declared that:
. . . . The subsequent sale or transfer by the L-6/L-3R permittee for export or to an L-7-1/2 for use in the
manufacture of cigars or cigarettes may also be allowed without the prepayment of the specific tax. 53
Almost 40 years from the enactment of the 1939 Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 1158-A, otherwise known as the
"National Internal Revenue Code of 1977," was promulgated on June 3, 1977, to consolidate and integrate the
various tax laws which have so far amended or repealed the provisions found in the 1939 Tax Code. Section 132
was renumbered as Section 144, and Section 136 as Section 148. Sections 144 and 148, read:
SEC. 144. Removal of tobacco products without prepayment of tax.Products of tobacco entirely unfit for chewing
or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Department of Finance, and stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of
fine-cuts chewing tobacco, re-refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings, stems or midribs, and sweepings of tobacco may
be sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another, under such conditions as may be prescribed
in the regulations of the Department of Finance, without the prepayment of the tax. "Stemmed leaf tobacco", as
herein used means leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib removed. The term does not include broken leaf
tobacco.
....
SEC. 148. Specific tax on products of tobacco.On manufactured products of tobacco, except cigars, cigarettes,
and tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for consumption in any other manner, but
including all other tobacco twisted by hand or reduced into a condition to be consumed in any manner other than by
the ordinary mode of drying and curing; and on all tobacco prepared orpartially prepared for sale or consumption,
even if prepared without the use of any machine or instrument and without being pressed or sweetened; and on all
fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings,cuttings, stems, and sweepings of tobacco, there shall be collected on
each kilogram, seventy-five centavos: Provided, however, That fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings,
cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco resulting from the handling, or stripping of whole leaf tobacco may be
transferred, disposed of, or otherwise sold, without prepayment ofthe specific tax herein provided for under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Finance upon recommendation
of the Commissioner if the same are to be exported or to be used in the manufacture of other tobacco products on
which the specific tax will eventually be paid on the finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for use in any other manner, on each kilogram,
sixty centavos.
Sections 144 and 148 were subsequently renumbered as Sections 120 and 125 respectively under Presidential
Decree No. 1994,54 which took effect on January 1, 1986 (1986 Tax Code); then as Sections 137 and 141 under
Executive Order No. 273;55 and finally as Sections 140 and 144 under Republic Act No. 8424 or the "Tax Reform Act
of 1997." However, the provisions remained basically unchanged.
The business transactions of La Suerte, Fortune, and Sterling that the Commissioner found to be taxable for specific
tax took place during the effectivity of the 1986 Tax Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 273. The pertinent
provisions are Sections 137 and 141, thus:
SEC. 137. Removal of tobacco products without prepayment of tax. Products of tobacco entirely unfit for chewing
or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of Finance. Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut
chewing tobacco, scraps, cuttings, clippings, stems or midribs, and sweepings of tobacco may be soldin bulk as raw
material by one manufacturer directly to another, without payment of the tax under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of Finance.
Stemmed leaf tobacco,' as herein used, means leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib removed. The term
does not include broken leaf tobacco.

....
SEC. 141. Tobacco Products. There shall be collected a tax of seventy-five centavos on each kilogram of the
following products of tobacco:
(a) tobacco twisted by hand or reduced into a condition to be consumed in any manner other than the
ordinary mode of drying and curing;
(b) tobacco prepared or partially prepared with or without the use of any machine or instruments or without
being pressed or sweetened; and
(c) fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco. Fine-cut shorts
and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco resulting from the handling or
stripping of whole leaf tobacco may be transferred, disposed of, or otherwise sold, without prepayment of the
specific tax herein provided for under such conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Finance upon recommendation of the Commissioner, if the same are to be exported or to
be used in the manufacture of other tobacco products on which the excise tax will eventuallybe paid on the
finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for use in any other manner, on each kilogram,
sixty centavos.
Parenthetically, the present provisionsexplicitly state the following:
Stemmed leaf tobacco, tobacco prepared or partially prepared with or without the use of any machine or instrument
or without being pressed or sweetened, fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems, midribs, and
sweepings of tobacco resulting from the handling or stripping of whole leaf tobacco shall be transferred, disposed of,
or otherwise sold, without any prepayment of the excisetax . . . if the same are to be exported or to be used in the
manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, or other tobacco products on which the excise tax will eventually be paid on the
finished product, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner.56
BIR assessments
G.R. No. 125346
Sometime in June, 1989, a team of examiners from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, led by Crisanto G. Luna,
Revenue Officer III of the Field Operation Division of the Excise Tax Service, conducted an examination of the books
of La Suerte by virtue of a letter of authority issued by then Commissioner Jose U. Ong.
On January 3, 1990, La Suerte received a letter from then Commissioner Jose U. Ong demanding the payment of
34,934,827.67 as deficiency excise tax on La Suertes entire importation and local purchase of stemmed leaf
tobacco for the period covering January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989.
On January 12, 1990, La Suerte . . . protest[ed] the excise tax deficiency assessment . . . stressing that the BIR
assessment was based solely on Section 141(b) of the Tax Code without, however, applying Section 137 thereof,
the more specific provision, which expressly allows the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one
manufacturer directly to another without payment of the excise tax. However, in a letter, dated August 31, 1990,
Commissioner Jose U. Ong denied La Suertes protest, insisting that stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise tax
"unless there is an express grant of exemption from [the] payment of tax."
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Commissioner Ong reiterated his demand for the payment of the alleged
deficiency excise taxes due from La Suerte, to wit:
"Please be informed that in an investigation conducted by this Office, it was ascertainedthat you incurred a
deficiency specific tax on your importation and local purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco covering the period from
January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989 in the total amount of 34,904,247.00 computed as follows:

STEMMEDLEAF TOBACCO
Imported

13,918,465 kls. x 0.75

P10,438,848.00

Local

32,620,532 kls. x 0.75

24,465,399.00

Total Amount Due (Basic Tax)- - - - - - - - - - - -

P34,904,247.00

. . . ." (page 99, Rollo)

On December 6, 1990, La Suerte filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a Petition for Review seeking for the annulment
of the assessments. . .
. . . On July 13, 1995, the Tax Court rendered [its] Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads[:]
"WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, the assessment of alleged deficiency specific tax in the amount
ofP34,904,247.00 issued by the Respondent is hereby CANCELLED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."57
The Commissioner appealed the Court of Tax Appeals decision before the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
1995, the Court of Appeals Sixth Division ruled against La Suerteand found that RR No. V-39 limits the tax
exemption on transfers of stemmed leaf tobacco to transfers between two L-7 permittees. 58 The Court of Appeals
ruled as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ordered to pay the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue the amount of P34,904,247.00 as
deficiency specific tax on its importations and local purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco and its sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco to Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation covering the period from January 1, 1986 to June 30,
1989, plus 25% surcharge for late payment and 20% interest per annum from October 17, 1990 until fully paid
pursuant to sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code.
SO ORDERED.59
La Suerte filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its June 7, 1996
resolution.60
On August 2, 1996, La Suerte filed the instant petition for review,61 praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision and cancellation of the assessment by the Commissioner. La Suerte raises the following grounds in
support of its prayer:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED SECTION 20 (A) OF RR NO. V-39, SINCE
THE COMMISSIONER RAISED IT FOR THE FIRST TIMEIN THE COURT OF APPEALS
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT SECTION 20(A) OF RR NO. V-39
RESTRICTS THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 137 OF THE TAX CODE, SINCE LANGUAGE IN SEC. 137
IS UNQUALIFIED, WHILE SEC. 20(A) CONTAINS NO RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED SEC. 43 OF RR NO. 17-67 AS WELL AS
OPINIONS OF BIR OFFICIALS WHICH CONFIRMED THE EXEMPTION OFSTEMMED LEAF TOBACCO
FROM PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT SEC. 43 OF RR NO. 17-67 DID NOT
REPEAL SECTIONS 35 AND 20(A) OF RR NO. V-39, SINCE THEIR PROVISIONS ARE REPUGNANT TO
EACH OTHER

E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT RR NO. V-39 IMPOSES SPECIFIC TAXES
ON STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO, SINCE IT MAKES NO MENTION AT ALL OF TAXES ON STEMMED
LEAF TOBACCO
F. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD RR NO. V-39 APPLIED TO L-6 PERMITTEES OR
MANUFACTURERS OF STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO, SINCE L-6 CLASSIFICATION WAS NON-EXISTENT
AT THE TIME
G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT INTERPRETED SECTION 20(A) OF RR NO. V-39 IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO RESULT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION, SINCE THE INTERPRETATION
SANCTIONED THE RESTRICTION OF AN UNQUALIFIED PROVISION OF LAW BY A MERE
REGULATION
H. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT GAVE NO WEIGHT TO THE DECEMBER 12, 1972 BIR
RULING AND OPINIONS OF OTHER BIR OFFICIALS WHICH CONFIRMED THE EXEMPTION OF
STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO FROM PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD [THAT] NONAPPLICATION OF [THE] DECEMBER
12 RULING DID NOT IMPINGE ON PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY OF RULINGS BECAUSE THE
ASSESSMENT DID NOT CITE THE RULING, SINCE CITATION OF A RULING INAN ASSESSMENT [IS]
NOT NECESSARY FOR PRINCIPLE TO APPLY
J. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF
BIR FOR OVER HALF A CENTURY OF NOT SUBJECTINGSTEMMED LEAF TOBACCO TO SPECIFIC
TAX
K. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT SUBJECTING STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO
TO SPECIFIC TAX IS NOT PROHIBITED FORM OF DOUBLE TAXATION, SINCE A TAX ON BOTH
STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO AND CIGARETTES INTO WHICH IT IS MANUFACTURED IS DOUBLE
TAXATION
L. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD LA SUERTE LIABLE FOR SPECIFIC TAX EVENIF
NO EFFORT WAS FIRST MADE TO COLLECT THE TAX FROM THE MANUFACTURER OF STEMMED
LEAF TOBACCO, SINCE TAX CODE ALLOWS THIS ONLY IF SPECIAL ALLOWANCE IS GRANTED,
WHICH IS NOT THE CASE
M. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE REENACTMENT OF
THE 1939 CODE AS THE 1977 CODE AND 1986 TAX CODES ADOPTED THE INTERPRETATION IN THE
DECEMBER 1972 BIR RULING
N. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION ON
EXEMPTION FROM TAXES, SINCE NO TAX EXEMPTION WAS INVOLVED BUT MERELY AN
EXEMPTION FROM PREPAYMENT OF TAX.62
G.R. No. 13632829
In the letter dated November 24,1989, the Commissioner demanded from Fortune the payment of deficiency excise
tax in the amount of P28,938,446.25 for its importation of tobacco strips from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989.
Fortune requested for reconsideration, which was denied by the Commissioner on August 31, 1990. Undaunted,
Fortune appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals through a petition for review, which was docketed as CTA Case No.
4587.63
In the decision dated November 23, 1994, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of Fortune and set aside the
Commissioners assessment of P28,938,446.25 as deficiency excise tax. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1991, Fortune
received another letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, demanding payment of 1,989,821.86 as deficiency
specific tax on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco from July 1, 1989 to November 30, 1990. 64 Fortune filed its
protest and requested the Commissioner to cancel and withdraw the assessment. 65 On April 18, 1991, the

Commissioner denied with finality Fortunes request.66 Fortune appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and the case
was docketed as CTA Case No. 4616.67
In the decision dated October 6, 1994, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of Fortune and set aside the
Commissioners assessment of P1,989,821.26 as deficiency excisetax on stemmed leaf tobacco.
The Commissioner filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals, challenging the decisions rendered by the
Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case Nos. 4587 and 4616. These petitions were consolidated on November 28, 1996. 68
In the decision dated January 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division dismissed the consolidated
petitions filed by the Commissioner and affirmedthe assailed decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. It also denied
the Commissioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the Commissioner filed the present petition69 on January 8, 1999. The Commissioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred (1) "in holding that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax imposed under Section 141
of the Tax Code[;]"70 (2) "in not holding that under Section 137 of the Tax Code, stemmed leaf tobacco is exempt
from specific tax when sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another under such conditions as
may be prescribed in the regulations of the Department of Finance[;]" 71 and (3) "in holding that there is double
taxation in the prohibited sense when specific tax is imposed on stemmed leaf tobacco and again on the finished
product of which stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw material."72
G.R. No. 144942
In April 1995, "[La Suerte] imported stemmed leaf tobacco from various sellers abroad." 73 The Commissioner
"assessed specific taxes on the stemmed leaf tobacco in the amount of 175,909.50, which [La Suerte] paid under
protest."74 "Consequently, [La Suerte] filed a claim for refund with [the Commissioner], [who] failed to act on the
same."75 Undeterred, La Suerte appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which in its March 9, 1999 decision, ruled in
its favor. The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals Third Division, which on August 31, 2000, rendered its
decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 51902, affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Commissioner then filed the instant petition for review76 asking this court to overturn the Court of Appeals
decision. It avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Section 137 of the Tax Code applied "without any
conditions as to the domicile of the manufacturers and that [the Commissioner] cannot indirectly restrict its
application to local manufacturers."77
The Third Division of this court initially denied78 the petition due to an insufficient or defective verification and
because "the petition was filed by revenue lawyers and not by the Solicitor General." 79
The Commissioner filed a motion for clarification80 seeking to clarify whether the Bureau of Internal Revenuelegal
officers can file petitions for review pursuant to Section 220 of the Tax Code without the intervention of the Office of
the Solicitor General.
The motion was referred to the En Banc81 on August 7, 2001, which issued the resolution on July 4, 2002, holding
that "Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act must not be understood asoverturning the long established procedure
before this Court in requiring the Solicitor General to represent the interest of the Republic. This Court continues to
maintain that it is the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in appellate
proceedings."82 In the same resolution, this court also declared the following:
The present controversy ruminate upon the singular issue of whether or not Revenue Regulation 1767 [sic] issued
by petitioner, in relation to Section 137 of the InternalRevenue Code in the imposition of a tax on stemmed-leaf
tobacco, deviated from the tax code. This question basically inquires then into whether or not the revenue regulation
has exceeded, on constitutional grounds, the allowable limits of legislative delegation.
Aware that the dismissal of the petition could have lasting effect on government tax revenues, the lifeblood of the
state, the Court heeds the plea of petitioner for a chance to prosecute its case. 83 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

This court resolved to reinstate84 and give due course85 to the Commissioners petition. G.R. No. 148605
"On January 12, 1990, [Sterling] received a pre-assessment notice for alleged deficiency excise tax on
itsimportation and local purchase of stemmed-leaf tobacco for P5,187,432.00 covering the period from November
1986 to January 1989."86 Sterling filed its protest letter87 dated January 19, 1990. The Commissioner, through its
letters88 dated August 31, 1990 and October 17, 1990, denied the protest with finality.
Sterling filed before the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review89 dated January 3, 1991, seeking the cancellation
of the deficiency assessment and praying that the Commissioner be ordered to desist from collecting the assessed
excise tax. On July 13, 1995,the Court of Tax Appeals rendered its decision ordering the cancellation of the
assessment for deficiency excise tax.
The Commissioner then appealed90 to the Court of Appeals. On March 7, 2001, the latter, through its Ninth Division,
rendered a decision reversing the Court of Tax Appeals ruling, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 4532 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent is ORDERED to pay to the public petitioner the amount
ofP5,187,432.00 as deficiency specific tax on its imported and locally purchased stemmed leaf tobacco from
November 1986 to June 24, 1989, plus 25% surcharge on P5,187,432.00, and 20% interest per annum on the total
amount due from December 07, 1990 until full payment, pursuant to Sections 248-49 of the Tax Code.
SO ORDERED.91
Sterling filed a motion for reconsideration,92 which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its June 19, 2001
resolution.
Hence, on August 13, 2001, Sterling filed the instant petition for review.93
Sterling argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) then Section 141 of the Tax Code subjects
stemmed leaf tobacco to excise tax; (2) Section 137 of the Tax Code did notexempt stemmed leaf tobacco from
prepayment of excise tax; (3) Section 20(A) of RR No. V-39 restricts the application of Section 137 of the Tax Code
since its language was unqualified, while Section 20(A) contained no restrictive language; (4) RR No. V-39 imposed
specific taxes on stemmed leaf tobacco since its language made no mention of taxes on stemmed leaf tobacco; (5)
the reason behind limiting exemptions only to transfers fromone L-7 to another L-7 is because sale has previously
been subjected tospecific tax; and (6) the exemption from specific tax did not apply to imported stemmed leaf
tobacco.94
Sterling further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that (1) the Commissioners interpretation of
Section 141 of the Tax Code and Section 20(A) of RR No. V-39 amounts to an amendment of Sections 141 and 137
of the Tax Code by a mere administrative regulation; (2) a December 12, 1972 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling
and opinions of other Bureau of Internal Revenue officials confirmed the exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco from
prepayment of specific tax; (3) the administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for over half a century
of not subjecting stemmed leaf tobacco to excise tax proves that no excise taxes were ever intended to be imposed;
(4) imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco would result in the prohibited form of double taxation; and (5)
the re-enactment of the relevant provisions in the 1977 and 1986 Tax Codes adopted the interpretation in the
December 1972 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling. 95 Sterling also contends that the "Court of Appeals erred in
applying the rules of construction on exemption from taxes, since no tax exemption was involved, but merely an
exemption from prepayment of excise tax."96
G.R. No. 158197
On January 10, 1991, the Commissioner sent a pre-assessment notice to La Suerte demanding payment of
11,757,275.25 as deficiency specific tax on its local purchases and importations and on the sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco during the period from September 14, 1989 to November 20, 1990. 97 On February 8, 1991, La Suerte
received the formal assessment letter of the Commissioner.98

La Suerte filed its protest on March 8, 1991.99 On May 14, 1991, La Suerte received the Commissioners decision
"denying the protest with finality."100
"On June 13, 1991, the Court of Tax Appeals promulgated a Decision finding for . . . La Suerte and disposing [as
follows:]"101
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We find the petition for review meritorious and the same is hereby
GRANTED. Respondents decision dated April 29, 1991 is hereby set aside and the formal assessment for the
deficiency specific tax in the sum of P11,575,275.25 subject of the respondents letter, dated January 30, 1991, is
deemed cancelled.
No pronouncement as to costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.102
The Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals in its April 5, 1995
resolution.103
The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.104 In its decision dated July 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. It cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Campaa
Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc.105 as basis for its ruling. La Suerte filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the resolution106 dated May 9, 2003.
La Suerte prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution in its petition for review,107wherein it
raises the following arguments:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT SECTION 20(A) OF REV.
REGS. NO. V-39 LIMITED THE CLASS OF MANUFACTURERS WHOSE SALES OF STEMMED LEAF
TOBACCO WERE EXEMPT FROM PRE-PAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX.
II. EVEN IF SEC. 3 OF RR NO. 17-67 HAD BEEN WAS [sic] INTENDED TO LIMIT MANUFACTURERS
EXEMPT FROM PREPAYMENT OF SPECIFIC TAX, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III. RR NO. 17-67 WAS NEITHER ISSUED TO AMEND RR NO. V-39 NOR TO AMEND THE TAX CODE,
BUT SOLELY TO IMPLEMENT ACT NO. 2613, AS AMENDED, WHICH WAS ENACTED IN 1916 AND HAD
ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH TAXES.
IV. SECTION 2(H) OF RR NO. 17-67 EXCEEDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
V. SECTION 3(M) OF RR NO. 17-67 AS INTERPRETED BY COMMISSIONER EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE
LIMITS ON DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 20(A) OF RR NO. V-39 TO
LA SUERTES IMPORTS OF STEMMED LEAF TOBACCO, FOR THE APPLICABLE PROVISION IS
CHAPTER V OF RR NO. V-39.
VII. THE COMMISSIONERS PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 2(M)(1) AND 3(H)OF RR NO.
17-67, WAS NOT THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO THOSE SECTIONS BY ITS FRAMERS, AS SHOWN
BY THE LONG ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF RR NO. 17-67 AND THE BIR
RULING DATED DECEMBER 12, 1972, WHICH CONFIRMED THE TAX-FREE TRANSFER OF
STEMMED- LEAF TOBACCO.108
G.R. No. 165499

On various dates in March 1995, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . collected from La Suerte the aggregate
amount of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P325,410.00) for
specific taxes on La Suertes bulk purchases of stemmed-leaf tobacco from foreign tobacco manufacturers. La
Suerte paid the said amount under protest.
....
On September 27, 1996 and October 2, 1996, La Suerte instituted with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . .
and with Revenue District No. 52, a claim for refund of specific taxes said to have been erroneously paid on its
importations of stemmed-leaf tobacco for the period of November 1994 up to May 1995, including the amount of
Three Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P325,410.00). . . .
Inasmuch as its claim for refund was not acted upon by petitioner and in order to toll the running of the two-year
reglementary period within which to file a judicial claim for such refund as provided under Section 229 of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, La Suerte filed on February 8, 1997 a petition for review with the
CTA.109
On September 23, 1998, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment granting the petition for review and ordering
the Commissioner to refund the amount of P325,410.00 to La Suerte.110 The Commissioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals on December 15, 1998. 111
On appeal, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division reversed112 the Court of Tax Appeals ruling. It also denied113 La
Suertes motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed, 114 reiterating the same arguments already
presented in the other cases.
This court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 13632829 and 125346. 115 Thereafter, this court consolidated G.R.
Nos. 165499, 144942, and 148605.116 Finally, this court approved the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 125346, 136328
29, 144942, 148605, 158197, and 165499.117
Issues
I. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise (specific) tax under Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code;
II. Whether Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code exempting from the payment of specific tax the sale of
stemmed leaf tobacco by one manufacturer to another is not subject to any qualification and, therefore,
exempts an L-7 manufacturer from paying said tax on its purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco from other
manufacturers who are not classified as L-7 permittees;
III. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco imported by La Suerte, Fortune, and Sterling is exempt from specific tax
under Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code;
IV. Whether Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39, in relation to RR No. 17-67, which limits the exemption from
payment of specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco to sales transactions between manufacturers classified as
L-7 permittees is a valid exercise by the Department of Finance ofits rule-making power under Section
338118 of the 1939 Tax Code;
V. Whether the possessor or owner of stemmed leaf tobacco may be held liable for the payment of specific
tax if such tobacco product is removed from the place of production without payment of said tax;
VI. Whether the August 31, 1990 ruling of then Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Jose U. Ong
denying La Suertes request for exemption from specific tax on its local purchase and importation of
stemmed leaf tobacco violates the principle on non-retroactivity of administrative ruling for allegedly
contradicting the previous position taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue that such a transaction is not
subject to specific tax as expressed in the December 12, 1972 ruling of then Bureau of Internal Revenue
Commissioner Misael P. Vera; and

VII. Whether the imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code
constitutes double taxation.
Arguments of the cigarette manufacturers
The cigarette manufacturers claim that since Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code and Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39
do not distinguish "as to the type of manufacturer that may sell stemmed-leaf tobacco without the prepayment of
specific tax[,] [t]he logical conclusion is that any kind of tobacco manufacturer is entitled to this treatment." 119 The
authority of the Secretary of Finance to prescribe the "conditions" refers only to procedural matters and should not
curtail or modifythe substantive right granted by the law.120 The cigarette manufacturers add thatthe reference to an
L-7 invoice and L-7 register book in the second paragraph of Section 20(a) cannot limit the application of the tax
exemption provision only to transfers between L-7 permittees because (1) it does not so provide; 121 and (2) under
the terms of RR No. V-39, L-7 referred to manufacturers of any class of tobacco products, including manufacturers
of stemmed leaf tobacco.122
They further argue that, going by the theory of the Commissioner, RR No. 17-67 would have unduly restricted the
meaning of "manufacturers" by limiting it to a few manufacturers suchas manufacturers of cigars and
cigarettes.123 Allegedly, RR No. 17-67 cannotchange the original meaning of L-7 in Section 20(A) of RR No. V-39
without exceeding constitutional limits of delegated legislative power.124 La Suerte further points out that RR No. 1767 was not even issued for the purpose of implementing the Tax Code but for the sole purpose of implementing Act
No. 2613; and Section 3 of RR No. 17-67 restricts the new designations only for administrative purposes. 125
Moreover, the cigarette manufacturers contend "that Section 132 does not operate as a tax exemption" because
"prepayment means payment of obligation in advance or before it is due." 126 Consequently, the rules of construction
on tax exemption do not apply.127 According to them, "the absence of tax prepayment for the saleof stemmed leaf
tobacco impliedly indicates the underlying policy of the law: that stemmed leaf tobacco shall not be taxed twice, first,
as stemmed leaf tobacco and, second, as a component of the finished products of which it forms an integral part." 128
Fortune, for its part, claims that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to excise tax. It argues that stemmed leaf
tobacco cannot be considered prepared or partially prepared tobaccobecause it does not fall within the definition of
a "processed tobacco" under Section 1-b of Republic Act No. 698, as amended. 129 Furthermore, it adds that Section
141 should be strictly construed against the taxing power.130 "There being no explicit reference to stemmed leaf
tobacco in Section 141, it cannot be claimed or construed to be subject to specific tax." 131
According to Fortune, "a plain reading of Section 141 readily reveals that the intention was to impose excise taxes
on products oftobacco that are not to be used as raw materials in the manufacture of other tobacco
products."132"Section 2(m)(1) unduly expanded the meaning of prepared or partially prepared tobacco to includea
raw material like stemmed leaf tobacco; hence, ultra viresand invalid." 133
As regards the taxability of their importations, Sterling argues that since locally manufactured stemmed leaf
tobaccos are not subject to specific tax, it follows that imported stemmed leaf tobaccos are also not subject to
specific tax.134 On the other hand, La Suerteclaims that Section 20(A) of RR No. V-39 does not apply to its imports
because the applicable provision is Section 128(b) of the 1986 Tax Code, which states that "imported articles shall
be subject to the same tax and the same rates and basis of excise taxes applicable to locally manufactured articles,"
and Chapter V of RR No. V-39 (Payment of specific taxes on imported cigars, cigarettes, smoking and chewing
tobacco).135
Finally, La Suerte and Sterling136 argues that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ignoring Section 43 of RR No. 17-67,
December 12, 1972 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling and other Bureau of Internal Revenue opinions confirming
the exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco from prepayment of specific tax;137 (2) in disregarding the Bureau of Internal
Revenues practice for over half a century of not subjecting stemmed leaf tobacco to specific tax; 138 (3) in failing to
consider that the re-enactment of the 1939 Tax Code as the 1977 and 1986 Tax Codes impliedly adopted the
interpretation in the December 12, 1972 ruling; and 4) in holding that nonapplication of the December 12, 1972
ruling did not impinge on the principle of non-retroactivity of rulings. 139 Moreover, it argues that the Tax Code does
not authorize collection of specific tax from buyers without a prior attempt to collect tax from manufacturers. 140
Respondents arguments

Respondent counters that "under Section 141(b), partially prepared or manufactured tobacco is subject to specific
tax."141 The definition of "partially manufactured tobacco" in Section 2(m) of RR No. 17-67 includes stemmed leaf
tobacco; hence, stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to specific tax. 142 "Imported stemmed leaf tobacco isalso subject to
specific tax under Section 141(b) in relation to Section 128 of the 1977 Tax Code." 143 Fortunes reliance on the
definition of "processed tobacco" in Section 1-b of Republic Act No. 698 144 as amended by Republic Act No. 1194 is
allegedly misplaced because the definition therein of processed tobacco merely clarified the type of tobacco product
that may not be imported into the country.145 Respondent posits that "there is no double taxation in the prohibited
sense even if specific tax is also imposed on the finished product of which stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw
material."146 Congress clearly intended it "considering that stemmed leaf tobacco, as partially prepared or
manufactured tobacco, is subjected to specific tax under Section 141(b), while cigars and cigarettes, of which
stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw material, are also subjected to specific tax under Section 142." 147 It adds that there is
no constitutional prohibition against double taxation. 148
"Foreign manufacturers of tobacco products not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines cannot be classified
as L-7, L-6, or L-3R since they are beyond the pale of Philippine laws and regulations." 149 "Since the transfer of
stemmed leaf tobacco from one factory to another must be under an official L-7 invoice and entered in the L-7
registers of both transferor and transferee, it is obvious that the factories contemplated are those located or
operating in the Philippines and operated only by L-7 permittees." 150 The transaction contemplated under Section
137 is sale and not importation because the law uses the word "sold."151 The law uses "importation" or "imported"
whenever the transaction involves bringing in articles from foreign countries. 152
Respondent argues that "the issuance of RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67 is a valid exercise by the Department of Finance
of its rule-making power" under Sections 132 and 338 of the 1939 Tax Code. 153 It explains that "the reason for the
exemption from specific tax of the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one L-7 directly to another L-7 is
that the stemmed leaf tobacco is supposed to have been already subjected to specific tax when an L-7 purchased
the same from an L-6."154 "Section 20(A) of RR No. V-39 adheres to the standards set forth in Section 245 because
it provides the conditions for a tax-free removal of stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 137 without negating the
imposition of specific tax under Section 141(b)."155 "To construe Section 137 in the restrictive manner suggested by
La Suerte will practically defeat the revenue-generating provision of Section 141(b)." 156
It further argues that the August 31, 1990 ruling of then Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Jose U. Ong
denying La Suertes request for exemption from specific tax on its local purchase and importation of stemmed leaf
tobacco does not violate the principle on non-retroactivity of administrative ruling. It alleges that an erroneous ruling,
like the December 12, 1972 ruling, does not give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by La Suerte. 157
Finally, respondent contends that under Section 127, if domestic products are removed from the place ofproduction
without payment of the excise taxes due thereon, it is not required that the tax be collected first from the
manufacturer or producer before the possessor thereof shall be liable. 158
Courts ruling
Nature of excise tax
Excise tax is a tax on the production, sale, or consumption of a specific commodity in a country. Section 110 of the
1986 Tax Code explicitly provides that the "excise taxes on domestic products shall be paid by the manufacturer or
producer before[the] removal [of those products] from the place of production." "It does not matter to what use the
article[s] subject to tax is put; the excise taxes are still due, even though the articles are removed merely for storage
in someother place and are not actually sold or consumed."159 The excise tax based on weight, volume capacity or
any other physical unit of measurement is referred to as "specific tax." If based on selling price or other specified
value, itis referred to as "ad valorem" tax.
Section 141 subjects partially
prepared tobacco, such as
stemmed leaf tobacco, to
excise tax
Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code provides:

SEC. 141. Tobacco Products. There shall be collected a tax of seventy-five centavos on each kilogram of the
following products of tobacco:
(a) tobacco twisted by hand or reduced into a condition to be consumed in any manner other than the
ordinary mode of drying and curing;
(b) tobacco prepared orpartially prepared with or without the use of any machine or instruments or without
being pressed or sweetened; and
(c) fine-cut shorts and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco. Fine-cut shorts
and refuse, scraps, clippings, cuttings, stems and sweepings of tobacco resulting from the handling or
stripping of whole leaf tobacco may be transferred, disposed of, or otherwise sold, without prepayment of the
specific tax herein provided for under such conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Finance upon recommendation of the Commissioner, if the same are tobe exported or to
be used in the manufacture of other tobacco products on which the excise tax will eventually be paid on the
finished product.
On tobacco specially prepared for chewing so as to be unsuitable for use in any other manner, on each kilogram,
sixty centavos. (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident that when tobacco is harvested and processed either by hand or by machine, all itsproducts become
subject to specific tax. Section 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of manufactured tobacco in
contrast to raw tobacco leaves including tobacco refuse or all other tobacco which has been cut, split, twisted, or
pressed and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing.
Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially prepared tobacco. The
removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting stemmed leaf tobacco a prepared or
partially prepared tobacco. The following is La Suertes own illustration of how the stemmed leaf tobacco comes
about: In the process of removing the stems, the whole leaf tobacco breaks into pieces; after the stems or midribs
are removed, the tobacco is threshed (cut by machine into fine narrow strips) and then undergoes a process of
redrying,160 undoubtedly showing that stemmed leaf tobacco is a partially prepared tobacco. Since the Tax Code
contained no definition of "partially prepared tobacco," then the term should be construed in its general, ordinary,
and comprehensive sense.161
RR No. 17-67, as amended, supplements the law by delineating what products of tobacco are "prepared or
manufactured" and "partially prepared or partially manufactured." Section 2(m) states:
(m) "Partially manufactured tobacco" Includes:
(1) "Stemmed leaf" handstripped tobacco, clean, good, partially broken leaf only, free from mold and dust.
(2) "Long-filler" handstripped tobacco of good, long pieces of broken leaf usableas filler for cigars without
further preparation, and free from mold, dust stems and cigar cuttings.
(3) "Short-filler" handstripped or machine-stripped tobacco, clean, good, short pieces of broken leaf,
which will not pass through a screen of two inches (2") mesh.
(4) "Cigar-cuttings" clean cuttings or clippings from cigars, unsized with any other form of tobacco.
(5) "Machine-scrap tobacco" machine-threshed, clean, good tobacco, not included in any of the above
terms, usable in the manufacture of tobacco products.
(6) "Stems" midribs of leaftobacco removed from the whole leaf or broken leaf either by hand or machine.
(7) "Waste tobacco" denatured tobacco; powder or dust, refuse, unfit for human consumption;

discarded materials in the manufacture of tobacco products, which may include stems.
Insisting on the inapplicability of RR No. 17-67, La Suerte points to the different definitions given to stemmed leaf
tobacco by Section 2(m)(1) of RR No. 17-67 and Section 137. It argues that while RR No. 17-67 defines stemmed
leaf tobacco as handstripped tobacco of clean, good, partially broken leaf only, free from mold and dust,Section 137
defines it as leaf tobacco which has had the stemor midrib removed.The term does not include broken leaf tobacco.
We are not convinced.
Different definitions of the term "stemmed leaf" are unavoidable, especially considering that Section 2(m)(1) is an
implementing regulation of Act No. 2613, which was enacted in 1916 for purposes of improving the qualityof
Philippine tobacco products, while Section 137 defines the tobacco product only for the purpose of exempting it from
the specific tax. Whichever definition is adopted, there is no doubt that stemmed leaf tobacco is a partially prepared
tobacco.
The onus of proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax lies with the cigarette
manufacturers. Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception.162 Accordingly, statutes granting tax exemptions
must be construed instrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. The cigarette
manufacturers must justify their claim by a clear and categorical provision in the law. Otherwise, they are liable for
the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco found in their possession pursuant to Section 127 163 of the 1986 Tax Code,
as amended.
Stemmed leaf tobacco
transferred in bulk between
cigarette manufacturers are
exempt from excise tax under
Section 137 of the 1986 Tax
Code in conjunction with RR
No. V-39 and RR No. 17-67
In the instant case, an exemption on the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco is found in Section 137, which provides
the following:
SEC. 137. Removal of tobacco products without prepayment of tax. Products of tobacco entirely unfit for chewing
or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of Finance. Stemmed leaf tobacco,fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut
chewing tobacco, scraps, cuttings, clippings, stems or midribs, and sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as
raw material by one manufacturer directly to another, without payment of the tax under such conditions as may be
prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of Finance.
Stemmed leaf tobacco,' as herein used, means leaf tobacco which has had the stem or midrib removed. The term
does not include broken leaf tobacco. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 137 authorizes a tax
exemption subject to the following: (1) that the stemmed leaf tobacco is sold in bulk as raw material by one
manufacturerdirectly to another; and (2) that the sale or transfer has complied with the conditions prescribed by the
Department of Finance.
That the title of Section 137 uses the term "without prepayment" while the body itself uses "without payment" is of no
moment. Both terms simply mean that stemmed leaf tobacco may be removed from the factory or place of
production without prior payment of the specific tax.
This court has held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Campaa Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., 164 reiterated in
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of Appeals165 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc.166 that the exemption from specific tax of the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco
is qualified by and is subject to "such conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations of the Department of
Finance." These conditions were provided for in RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67. Thus, Section 137 must be read and
interpreted in accordance with these regulations.

Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39 provides the rules for tax exemption on tobacco products: SECTION 20. Exemption
from tax of tobacco products intended for agricultural or industrial purposes. (a) Sale of stemmed leaf tobacco,
etc., by one factory to another. Subject to the limitations herein established, products of tobacco entirely unfit for
chewing or smoking may be removed free of tax for agricultural or industrial use; and stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut
shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, refuse, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and sweepings of tobacco may be
sold in bulk as raw materials by one manufacturer directly to another without the prepayment of the specific tax.
Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts, the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps, cuttings, clippings, and
sweeping of leaf tobacco or partially manufactured tobaccoor other refuse of tobacco may be transferred from one
factory to another under an official L-7 invoiceon which shall be entered the exact weightof the tobacco at the time of
its removal, and entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page of removals.
Corresponding debit entry will be made in the L-7 register book of the factory receiving the tobacco under heading
"Refuse, etc., received from other factory," showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice numbers, name and
address of the consignor, form in which received, and the net weight of the tobacco. This paragraph should not,
however, be construed to permit the transfer of materials unsuitable for the manufacture of tobacco products from
one factory to another. (Emphasis supplied)
The conditions under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be transferred from one factory to another without
prepayment of specific tax are as follows:
(a) The transfer shall be under an official L-7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact weight of the
tobacco at the time of its removal;
(b) Entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for removals; and
(c) Corresponding debit entry shall bemade in the L-7 register book of the factory receiving the tobacco
under the heading, "Refuse, etc.,received from the other factory," showing the date of receipt, assessment
and invoice numbers, name and address of the consignor, formin which received, and the weight of the
tobacco.
Under Section 3(h) of RR No. 17-67, entities that were issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue with an L-7 permit
refer to "manufacturers of tobacco products." Hence, the transferor and transferee of the stemmed leaf tobacco
must be an L-7 tobacco manufacturer.
La Campaaexplained that the reason behind the tax exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco transferred between two
L-7 manufacturers is that the same had already been previouslytaxed when acquired by the L-7 manufacturer from
dealers of tobacco, thus:
[T]he exemption from specific tax of the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one L-7 directly to another
L-7 is because such stemmed leaf tobacco has been subjected to specific tax when an L-7 manufacturer purchased
the same from wholesale leaf tobacco dealers designated under Section 3, Chapter I, Revenue Regulations No. 1767 (supra) as L-3, L-3F, L-3R, L-4, or L-6, the latter being also a stripper of leaf tobacco. These are the sources of
stemmed leaf tobacco to be used as raw materials by an L-7 manufacturer which does not produce stemmed leaf
tobacco. When an L-7 manufacturer sells the stemmed leaf tobacco purchased from the foregoing suppliersto
another L-7 manufacturer as raw material, such sale is not subject to specific tax under Section 137 (now Section
140), as implemented by Section 20(a) of Revenue Regulations No. V-39. 167
There is no new product when stemmed leaf tobacco is transferred between two L-7 permit holders. Thus, there can
be no excise tax that will attach. The regulation, therefore, is reasonable and does not create a new statutory right.
RR Nos. V-39 and 17-67 did
not exceed the allowable
limits of legislative delegation
The cigarette manufacturers contend that the authority of the Department of Finance to prescribe conditions is
merely procedural. Its rule-making power is only for the effective enforcement of the law, which implicitly rules out
substantive modifications. The Secretary of Finance cannot, by mere regulation, limit the classes of manufacturers

that may be entitled to the tax exemption. Otherwise, Section 137 (Section 132 in the 1939 Tax Code) would be
invalid as an undue delegation of legislative power without the required standards or parameters.
The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only by the legislature. 168Moreover,
this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other branch of government or private
persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself. 169 Hence, the discretion to ascertain the
following (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and
exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax may not be delegated away by Congress.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and administration of
a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case. 170
This court in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.171 explained the rationale behind the permissible delegation of legislative
powers to specialized agencies like the Secretary of Finance:
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of
governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required directand efficacious, not to say specific solutions. 172
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit whatis general,
which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the law.173 Such rules and regulations, when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,174"deserve
to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them
and their specific expertise in their respective fields." 175 To be valid, a revenue regulation mustbe within the scope of
statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the
object and purpose of the law;176 (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes;177 and (3) be
issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws. 178
Section 338 authorizes the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the 1939 Tax Code.
The specific authority of the Department of Finance to issue regulations relating to the taxation of tobacco products
is found in Section 4179 (Specific provisions to be contained in regulations); Section 125180 (Payment of specific tax
on imported articles to customs officers prior to release from the customhouse); Section 132 (Removal of tobacco
products without prepayment of tax); Section 149181 (Extent of supervision over establishments producing taxable
output); Section 150182 (Records to be kept by manufacturers; Assessment based thereon); and Section
152183 (Labels and form of packages) of the 1939 Tax Code.
RR No. V-39 was promulgated to enforce the provisions of Title IV (Specific Taxes) of the 1939 Tax Code relating to
the manufacture and importation of, and payment of specific tax on, manufactured tobacco or products of tobacco.
By an explicit provision in Section 132, the lawmakers defer to the Department of Finance to provide the details
upon which the removal of stemmed leaf tobacco may be exempt from the specific tax in view of its supposed
expertise in the tobacco trade. Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39 adhered to the standards because it provided the
conditions the proper documentation and recording of raw materials transferred from one factory to another for
a tax-free removal of stemmed leaf tobacco, without negating the imposition of specific tax under Section 137. The
"effective enforcement of the provisions of [the Tax Code]" in Section 338 provides a sufficient standard for the
Secretary of Finance in determining the conditionsfor the tax-free removal of stemmed leaf tobacco. Section 4
further provides a limitation on the contents of revenue regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Finance.
On the other hand, RR No. 17-67 was promulgated "[i]n accordance with the provisions of Section 79 (B) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2803."184 Among the specific administrative powers conferred upon a
department head under the Administrative Code is that of promulgating rules and regulations, not contrary to law,
"necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices

and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution ofthe laws relative to
matters under the jurisdiction of said Department."185 Under the 1939 Tax Code, the Secretary of Finance is
authorized to prescribe regulations affecting the business of persons dealing in articles subject to specific tax,
including the mode in which the processes of production of tobacco and tobacco products should be conducted and
the records to be kept by manufacturers. Clearly then, the provisions of RR No. 17-67 classifying and regulating the
business of persons dealing in tobacco and tobacco products are within the rulemaking authority of the Secretary of
Finance.
RR No. 17-67 did not create a
new classification
The contention of the cigarette manufacturers that RR No. 17-67 unduly restricted the meaning of manufacturers of
tobacco products by limiting it to a few manufacturers suchas manufacturers of cigars and cigarettes is misleading.
The definitions in RR No. 17-67 of"manufacturer of tobacco" and "manufacturer of cigars and/or cigarettes" are in
conformity with, as in fact they are verbatim adoptions of, the definitions under Section 194(m) and (n) of the 1939
Tax Code.
The cigarette companies further argue that RR No. 17-67 unduly restricted the meaning of L-7 in Section 20(a) of
RR No. V-39 because when RR No. V-39 was issued, there was no distinction at all between L-7, L-3, L-6
permittees, and L-7 referred to manufacturers of any class of tobacco products including stemmed leaf tobacco.
This argument is similarly misplaced.
A reading of the entire RR No. V-39 shows that the regulation pertains particularly to activities ofmanufacturers of
smoking and chewing tobacco, cigars and cigarettes.186 This was rightly so because the regulation was issued to
enforce the tax law provisions in relation to the manufacture and importation of tobacco products. Clearly apparent
in Section 10(a) is that when a manufacturer of chewing and smoking tobacco, cigars, or cigarettes has been
qualified to conduct his or her business as such, he or she is issued by the internal revenue agent the
corresponding register books and auxiliary register books pertaining to his business as well as the official register
book, L-7, to be used as record of the raw materials for his or her product. It is, therefore, logical toconclude that the
L-7 invoice and L-7 register book under Section 20(a) refers to those invoice and books used by manufacturers of
chewing and smoking tobacco, cigars or cigarettes.
RR No. 17-67 clarified RR No. V-39 by explicitly designating the manufacturers of tobacco products as L-7
permittees (Section 2), in contrast to wholesale leaf tobacco dealers and those that process partially manufactured
tobacco such as stemmed leaf tobacco. RR No. 17-67 did not create a new and restrictive classification but only
expressed in clear and categorical terms the distinctions between "manufacturers" and "dealers" of tobacco that
were already implicit in RR No. V-39.
Indeed, there is no repugnancy between RR No. 17-67 and RR No. V-39, on the one hand, and the Tax Code, on
the other. It is safer to presume that the term "manufacturer" used in Section 137 on tax exempt removals referred to
an entity that is engaged in the business of, and was licensed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a, manufacturer
of tobacco products. It does not include an entity engaged in business as a dealer in tobacco that, incidentally or in
furtherance of its business as a dealer, strip or thresh whole leaf tobacco or reprocess partially manufactured
tobacco.187
Such construction is consistent with the rule that tax exemptions, deemed to be in derogation of the states
sovereign right of taxation, are strictly applied and may be granted only under clear and unmistakable terms of the
law and not merely upon a vague implication or inference.188
RR No. V-39 must be applied
and read together with RR
No. 17-67
The cigarette manufacturers argument is misplaced, stating that RR No. 17-67 could not modify RR No. V-39
because it was promulgated to enforce Act No. 2613, as amended (entitled "An Act to Improve the Methods of

Production and the Quality ofTobacco in the Philippines and to Develop the Export Trade Therein"), which allegedly
had nothing whatsoever to do with the Tax Code or with the imposition of taxes.
"The Tobacco Inspection Service,instituted under Act No. 2613, was made part of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and Bureau of Customs administration for . . . internal revenue purposes." 189 The Collector of Internal Revenue was
charged to enforce Act No. 2613, otherwise known as the Tobacco Inspection Law, with a view to promoting the
Philippine tobacco trade and thereby increase the revenues of the government. This can be inferred from a reading
of the following provisions of Act No. 2613:
SEC. 6. The Collector of InternalRevenue shall have the power and it shall be his duty:
(a) To establish general and local rules respecting the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco for
domestic sale or factory use and for exportation so far as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good
quality and to secure its handling under sanitary conditions, and to the end that leaf tobacco be not mixed,
packed, and marked and of the same quality when it is not of the same class and origin.
(b) To establish from time to time adequate rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which shall be exported, as well also as the manner in which standard tobacco, shall
be packed. Before establishing the rules above specified, the Collector of Internal Revenue shall give due
notice of the proposed rules or amendments to those interested and shall give them an opportunity to
present their objections to such rules or amendments.
(c) To require, whenever it shall be deemed expedient the inspection of and affixture of inspection labels to
tobacco removed from the province of itsorigin to another province before such removal, or to tobacco for
domestic sale or factory use.190
SEC. 7. No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported until it shall have been inspected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative and found to be standard for export.Collector of
customs shall not permit the exportation of tobacco from the Philippines unless the shipment be in conformity with
the requirements set forth in this Act. The prohibition contained in this section shall not apply to waste and refuse
tobacco accumulated in the manufacturing process when it is invoiced and marked as such waste and
refuse.191 (Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 9. The Collector of Internal Revenue may appoint inspectors of tobacco for the purpose of making the
inspections herein required, and may also detail any officer or employee of the Bureau to perform such duty. Said
inspectors or employees shall likewise be charged with the dutyof grading leaf tobacco and shall perform such other
duties as may be required of them in the promotion of the Philippine tobacco industry. The Collector of Internal
Revenue shall likewise appoint, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, agents in the United States for the
purpose of promoting the export trade in tobacco with the United States, whose duty it shall be to inspect shipments
of tobacco upon or after their arrival in that country when so required, to assist manufacturers of, exporters of, and
dealers in tobacco in disseminating information regarding Philippine tobacco and, at the request of the parties, to act
as arbitrators between the exporter in the Philippine Islands and the importer in the United States whenever a
dispute arises between them as to the quality, sizes, classes, or shapes shipped or received. When acting
asarbitrator as aforesaid, the agent shall proceed in accordance with the law governing arbitration and award inthe
locality where the dispute arises. All agents, inspectors, and employees acting under and by virtue of this Act shall
be subject to all penal provisions applicable to internal-revenue officers generally.192(Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 12. The inspection fees collectedby virtue of the provisions of this Act shall constitute a special fund to be
known a the Tobacco Inspection Fund, which shall be expended by the Collector of Internal Revenue, with the
approval of the Secretary of Finance, upon allotment by a Board consisting of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the Director of Plant Industry, the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, two manufacturers
designated by the Manila Tobacco Association, and two persons representing the interests of the tobacco producers
and growers, appointed by the President of the Philippine Islands[.]

These funds may be expended for any of the following purposes:

(a) The payment of the expenses incident to the enforcement of this Act including the salaries of the
inspectors and agents.
(b) The payment of expenses incident to the reconditioning and returning to the Philippine Islands of
damaged tobacco and the reimbursement of the value of the United States internal-revenue stamps lost
thereby.
(c) The advertising of Philippine tobacco products in the United States and in foreign countries. (d) The
establishment of tobaccowarehouses in the Philippine Islands and in the United States at such points as the
trade conditions may demand.
(e) The payment of bounties to encourage the production of leaf tobacco of high quality.
(f) The promotion and defense of the Philippine tobacco interests in the United States and in foreign
countries.
(g) The establishment, operation, and maintenance of tobacco experimental farms for the purpose of
studying and testing the best methods for the improvement of the leaves:Provided, however, That thirty per
centum of the total annual income of the tobacco inspection fund shall be expended for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of said tobacco experimental farms and for the investigation and discovery of
efficacious ways and means for the extermination and control of the pests and diseases of tobacco:
Provided, further, That in the establishment of experimental farms, preference shall be given to
municipalities offering the necessary suitable land for the establishment of an experimental farm.
(h) The sending of special agentsand commissions to study the markets of the United States and foreign
countries with regard to the Philippine cigars and their propaganda in said markets.
(i) The organization of exhibits of cigars and other Philippine tobacco products in the United States and in
foreign countries.193
SEC. 13. The Collector Internal Revenue shall be the executive officer charged with the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued in accordance therewith, but it shall be the duty of the Director of
Agriculture, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Instruction, to execute and enforce the provisions hereof
referring to the cultivation of tobacco. (Emphasis supplied)
The cigarette manufacturers, thus, erroneously concluded that Act No. 2613 does not involve taxation.
Parenthetically, Section 8 of Act No. 2613 pertained to the imposition of tobacco inspection fees, which are National
Internal Revenue taxes, these being one of the miscellaneous taxes provided for under the Tax Code. Said Section
8 was in fact repealed by Section 369(b) of the 1939 Tax Code, and the provision regarding inspection feesare
found in Section 302 of the 1939 Tax Code.
Since the two revenue regulations, RR Nos. V-34 and 17-67, are in pari materia, i.e., they both pertain specifically to
the regulation of tobacco trade, they should be read and applied together. Statutes are in pari materia when they
relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or
particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but
also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,"or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.194 (Citation omitted)
The foregoing rules on statutory construction can be applied by analogy to administrative issuances suchas RR No.
V-39 and RR No. 17-67, especially since both are issued by the same administrative agency.

Importation of stemmed leaf

tobacco not included in the
exemption under Section 137
The transaction contemplated in Section 137 does not include importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the reason
that the law uses the word "sold" to describe the transaction of transferring the raw materials from one manufacturer
to another.
The Tax Code treats an importerand a manufacturer differently. Section 123 clearly distinguishes between goods
manufactured or produced in the Philippines and things imported. The law uses the proper term "importation" or
"imported" whenever the transaction involves bringing in articles from foreign countries as provided under Section
125 (cf. Section 124). Whenever the Tax Code refers to importers and manufacturers, they are separately
mentioned as two distinct persons or entities (Sections 156 and 160). Under Chapter II, whenever the law uses the
word manufacturer, it only means local manufacturer or producer of domestic products (Sections 150, 151, and 152
of the 1939 Tax Code).
Moreover, foreign manufacturers oftobacco products not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines cannot be
designated as L-7 since these are beyond the pale of Philippine law and regulations. The factories contemplated are
those located oroperating only in the Philippines. Contrary to La Suertes claim, Chapter V, Section 61 of RR No. V39195 is not applicable to justify the tax exemption of its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco because from the title of
Chapter V, the provision particularly refers to specific taxes on imported cigars, cigarettes, smoking and chewing
tobacco.
No estoppel against government
The cigarette manufacturers contend that for a long time prior to the transactions herein involved, the Collector of
Internal Revenue had never subjected their purchases and importations of stemmed leaf tobacco to excise taxes.
This prolonged practice allegedly represents the official and authoritative interpretation of the law by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue which must be respected.
We are not persuaded.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 196 this court has held that this principle
is not absolute, and an erroneous implementation by an officerbased on a misapprehension of law may be corrected
when the true construction is ascertained. Thus:
The appellant argues that the Collector of Internal Revenue, previous to the transactions hereininvolved, had never
collected the franchise tax on items of the same nature as those herein in question and this is strong evidence that
such transactions are not subject to tax on the principle that a prolonged practice on the part of an executive or
administrative officer in charge of executing a certain statute is an authoritative construction of great weight. This
contention may be granted, but the principle is not absolute and may be overcome by strong reasons to the
contrary. If through a misapprehension of law an officer has erroneously executed it for a long time, the error may be
corrected when the true construction is ascertained. Such we deem to be the situation in the present case.
Incidentally, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply here.197 (Emphasis supplied)
This court reiterated this rule in Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 198 where it rejected petitioners claim
that the prolonged practice (since 1939 up to 1988) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in not subjecting political
contributions to donors tax was an authoritative interpretation of the statute, entitled to great weight and the highest
respect:
This Court holds that the BIR isnot precluded from making a new interpretation of the law, especially when the old
interpretation was flawed. It is a well-entrenched rule that[:]
. . . erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application
of the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. 199 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Prolonged practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in not collecting the specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco
cannot validate what is otherwise an erroneous application and enforcement of the law. The government is never
estopped from collecting legitimate taxes because of the error committed by its agents. 200
In La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Court of Tax Appeals,201 this court upheld the validity of a revenue
memorandum circular issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to correct an error in a previous circular that
resulted in the non-collection of tobacco inspection fees for a long time and declared that estoppel cannot work
against the government:
. . . the assailed Revenue Memorandum Circular was issued to rectify the error in General Circular No. V-27 and to
interpret the phrase "tobacco for domestic sale or factory use" with the view of arresting huge losses of tobacco
inspection fees which were not collected and imposed since the said Circular (No. V-27) took effect. Furthermore,
the questioned Revenue Memorandum Circular was also issued to apprise those concerned of the construction and
interpretation which should be accorded to Act No. 2613, as amended, and which respondent is duty bound to
enforce. It is an opinion on how the law should be construed and there was no attempt whatsoever to enlarge or
restrict the meaning of the law.
The basis for the issuance of said Memorandum Circular was so stated in Resolution No. 2-67 of the Tobacco
Board, wherein petitioners as members of the Manila Tobacco Association, Inc. were duly represented, the pertinent
portions of which read:
". . . .
WHEREAS, this original recommendation of Mr. Hernandez was perfectly in accordance with existing law, more
particularly Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 31 which took effect since September 25, 1946, but perhaps thru oversight by
the former Commissioners and officers of the Tobacco Inspection Service the propriety and legality of effecting the
inspection of tobacco products for local salesand imported leaf tobacco for factory use might have overlooked
resulting in huge losses of tobacco inspection fees. . ." (Italics supplied)
....
Tobacco Inspection fees are undoubtedly National Internal Revenue taxes, they being one of the miscellaneous
taxes provided for under the Tax Code. Section 228 (formerly Section 302) of Chapter VII of the Code
specificallyprovides for the collection and manner of payment of the said inspection fees. It is within the power and
duty of the Commissioner to collect the same, even without inspection, should tobacco products be removed
clandestinely or surreptitiously from the establishment of the wholesaler, manufacturer or redrying plant and from
the customs custody in case of imported leaf tobacco. Errors, omissions or flaws committed by BIR inspectors and
representatives while in the performance of their duties cannot beset up as estoppel nor estop the Government from
collecting a tax legally due. Tobacco inspection fees are levied and collected for purposes of regulation and control
and also as a source of revenue since fifty percentum (50%) of said fees shall accrue to the Tobacco Inspection Fee
Fund created by Sec. 12 of Act No. 2613, as amended and the other fifty percentum, to the Cultural Center of the
Philippines. (Sec. 88, Chapter VII, NIRC)202 (Emphasis in this paragraph supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, the December 12, 1972 ruling of Commissioner Misael P. Vera runs counter to Section 20(a)of RR No.
V-39 in relation to RR No. 17-67, which provides that only transfers of stemmed leaf tobacco between L-7
permittees are exempt. An implementing regulation cannot be superseded by a ruling which is a mere interpretation
of the law. While opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws command much respect and weight, courts are not bound to accept the same if they override,
instead of remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. 203
Double taxation
The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed because they are paying the specific tax on the
raw material and on the finished product in which the raw material was a part is also devoid of merit.
For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, "the same property must be taxed twice, when
it should be taxed but once."204 "[B]oth taxes must be imposed on the same property or subject- matter, for the same

purpose, by the same. . . taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same taxing
period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax."205
At all events, there is no constitutional prohibition against double taxation in the Philippines. 206 This court has
explained in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte: 207
There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the theory of
double taxation.1wphi1 It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates
the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the
same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law, since
We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United
States and some states of the Union. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for
the benefit of the same governmental entity or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case
where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.208 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
"It is something not favored, but is permissible, provided some other constitutional requirement is not thereby
violated, such as the requirement that taxes must be uniform." 209
Excise taxes are essentially taxes on property210 because they are levied on certain specified goods or articles
manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic saleor consumption or for any other disposition, and on
goods imported. In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific tax is imposed
by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2)
on cigar or cigarette.211
WHEREFORE, this court:
1. DENIESthe petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 125346 and
AFFIRMSthe questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 38107;
2. GRANTS the petition for review filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. Nos. 13632829
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. Nos. 38219 and 40313. Fortune Tobacco Corporation is ORDERED to pay the following taxes:
a. P28,938,446.25 as deficiency excise tax for the period covering January 1, 1986to June 30, 1989,
plus 20% interest per annum from November 24,1989 until fully paid; and
b. P1,989,821.26 as deficiency excise tax for the period covering July 1, 1989 to November 30,
1990, plus 20% interest per annum from March 1,1991 until fully paid.
3. GRANTS the petition for review filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 144942 and
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 51902.
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factorys claim for refund of the amount of P175,909.50 is DENIED.
4. DENIES the petition for review filed by Sterling Tobacco Corporation in G.R. No. 148605 and AFFIRMS
the questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 38159;
5. DENIES the petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 158197 and
AFFIRMS the questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 37124; and
6. DENIES the petition for review filed by La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory in G.R. No. 165499 and
AFFIRMS the questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 50241.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
(On official leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Chief Justice
(No part)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
Acting Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA***
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN****
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance;
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR.,
JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L.
GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"),
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO
TAADA,petitioners,
vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOK
SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of
the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in
G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines,
Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan
T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a
rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,
Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous
claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required
by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives
where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred
to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,
1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by

striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a
House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the
Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the
enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING FROM FIVE
(5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL
EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No.
34254, which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the
Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO
ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This
Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989,
and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the consolidation of
House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on which the laws were approved by
the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28,
1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE THE
PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE THE
PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992

Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992

4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,
INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE
RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND
SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS
(April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK
LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL
PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN
SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to
propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a House revenue
measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of
the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.

On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a mere matter
of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this
case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, "taking into
Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the subject matter
of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which covers a subject
distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less
power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between constitutional provisions giving them the power
to propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other
Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution to
restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word
"exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to
show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional intent are
nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935
Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a
bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House
of Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was done by the National Assembly,

acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking
powers, sought to curtail the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a twothirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may
be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to
finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular
session of the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be
submitted to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It deleted
everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National Assembly and embodied
in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66
(1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June
18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the present Constitution was
derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from which the framers of the
Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of
the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete
"as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is
passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same
subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is clear from the
following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It
would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come
from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For example, a general revenue bill passed
by the lower house of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an
inheritance tax . This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending authority of
the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to
make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it
is more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover,
its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the
enactment of the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur with
amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed
inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of
Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).

In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also
adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee
to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or
altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it
will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing
that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text
of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere
technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as
much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is
an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that
there is something substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197.
From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is
the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of
Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the
corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the
two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments
to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere
amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three
readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills
could be referred to the Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the House bill
and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a
conference committee, the question was raised whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference,
considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran
put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is passed by
the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the
Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject of a conference, and can a
law be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does
not refer to investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of deposits in banks
but also investigation of investments in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in their
subject matter, I believe that no law can be enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:

THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in cases like this
where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been approved by the Senate, there would
have been no need of a conference; but precisely because the Senate passed another bill on the
same subject matter, the conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the
report of that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and unrelated
measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President
separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and
void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills
as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already
certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration.
Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that
matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the
one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills,
by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not
only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days
before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three
readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its
final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days before its passage,
except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of the present
Constitution, thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are
required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered
academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country like the
Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does
not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an
emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an
urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the
bill on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's
acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a
stay of the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed
for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting
on second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission
of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally
voted on by the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members
of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the
enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference
to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These
purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of the constitutional policy of full public
disclosure and the people's right to know (Art. II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met for two days in
executive session with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions with only the
conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was adopted requiring open
sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open
hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff members
were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be
their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the conference were excluded.
There is no showing that the conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner
Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees keep
notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in
this case submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must contain "a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached
to the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been
made in the original bills without the need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of
1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:

MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the conference
committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the
Rules of this House which provides specifically that the conference report must be accompanied by
a detailed statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This conference
committee report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out of
order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with the point of
order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan,
butthis provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill have been amended. In this
case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the reading of the bill
what the provisions are. Besides, this procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the provisions of
the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in or deleted from the
provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we cannot understand what those words
and phrases mean and their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but when the entire bill
itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the
Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was appealed, it was
upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as these are
germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA
703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to
resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is
important is that its report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it
would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there
was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copiesthereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may be given
instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to as "the little
legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the
original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference committees are
difficult to determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on
export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have
done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both houses, and usually it
is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is discharged and new members are
appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND LEGISLATURES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to say that
conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we
noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the
power "to determine the rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the
method and procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, 26 (1) of the
Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption
from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other taxes,
duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed,
levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or national authority or government
agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending 103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential
Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND

REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS

AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY]
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING
AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend any
provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D.
No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated
in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to
widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the
subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of the NIRC as
among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency
of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A.
No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS,
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was contended
that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient
description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly
explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment
of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create
in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If
such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title. (Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not
exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws
which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation
of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law
could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI.
The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be
discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation
was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large
papers were critical of Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The
censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d
295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales
tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was
not. Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a specialuse tax on the
cost of paper and ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods
to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal
of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would
therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in
that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely and
unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted to PAL,
petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority, and many more are
likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of
the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are
profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will
suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor
General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other
cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn,
sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of
feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional instruments and implements, by
persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this
assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First
Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity
because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not
save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred
position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence,
although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious
groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which
invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It
was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining
the free exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is
not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales
are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax
the sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the
resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any
other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow
the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on
the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended by 7 of R.A. No.
7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions
such as those relating to accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not
liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate
whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt
without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress
shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real
property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly

amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the
buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous sources are
cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one,
interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation
may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may
impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless
prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal
sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing
laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be
understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government
and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L.
Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products,
food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property
which is equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax,
but CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless,
should likewise be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services
was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in
error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to
the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor"
in the example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the
meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is
inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912
(1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, 28(1) which provides
that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at
the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms
and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716
merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned in Kapatiran ng
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in
these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI,
28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public,
which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner
sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales
of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they
are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the
general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of the Philippines,
Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the mandate of Congress to provide for a
progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all
taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has
been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes
should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)).
Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales
taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art.
VIII, 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also
regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid
them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the
regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending
102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the
NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn
livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn
sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of
feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional instruments and implements,
by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and services which
are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and
other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion
picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants
and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common
carriers, services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by tendering issues
not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to adjudication
the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in the concrete the application of the law to actual
contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been
assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as
here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering
that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he has not made out a
case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal
protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that postponement of
adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of the law may
give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus
be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication
would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our
jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of
that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a court to hear and
decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb
v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be
directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII,
5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power
conferred by law upon a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v.
Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire into any
allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines
(CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax

exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject
cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No.
175 was promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984,
because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in
1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991,
but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution
"repudiated the previous actions of the government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the
repeated revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the
cooperatives by way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and
similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as
instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out cooperatives by
withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, 5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was
to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore granted to private business enterprises in
general, in view of the economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had
restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but
then again cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax
incentives applied to all, including government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not
really require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence,
there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of
vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this indecision that
the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax
exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption and there is no
discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation.
Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the equal protection
of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The classification between electric and other
cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a
congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as
possible, especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We
cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.

We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in
fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come
to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment
by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its
necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible,
remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,
270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should
enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it
in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court
does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate opinion.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ, maintained their dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted
by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and

Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on
the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for
any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off
the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
"the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an
inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative
inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech,
articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication
of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged
illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200
and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci"
tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment 16 on
the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first
is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued at
length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member
of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the
acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,
echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping
with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person
alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly
injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned
citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello
Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and
individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative
inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of

Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners
Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the
questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. 32 It should be noted that
inFrancisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for,
as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal professionwhich were also
supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A
case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a
case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive
writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in
their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. 39 There is also
the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to
the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due

process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules
of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years
each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires
a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault v.
Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators. 47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same
case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there
is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,
but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of
the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of
its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of
its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure)
states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall
begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day
before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until
they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after
an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in
which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the
date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from
theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate
rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come
within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. 49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the
Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. 52 It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact,
the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.
Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention
of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED.
Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in
1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised
to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates

who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in
bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fiftyone bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar:Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168,
classified as follows:

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738 1,033

426

1953

2,555

284

TOTAL

968

12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions
for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who
have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor

of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and
Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new
member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in
the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the
legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which
continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from
the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has
been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than
half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar
law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646),
of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original
bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law

under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They
shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years,
of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the
judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted
was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in
this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this
prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications
to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the
legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals
said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a
certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should
inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply
prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations
be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function
and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of
legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to
its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which
we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed
rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar.
An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts
themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter
of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law
is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it
is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution,
but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution
along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the
framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in
order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard
and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of
an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a
judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of
the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565;Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am.
St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that
State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of
the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470,
471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at
law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as
are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department
of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in
this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.
Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination
of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their
admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors,
and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise
of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.
A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province
of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the
law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps
shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is
the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by
this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the
place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to
the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with

the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill
up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty
objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant
Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus
falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our
duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to
be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the
Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this

mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act
No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of
Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid
and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had
been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when
he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment
to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications
of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary
grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such
marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to
the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597
in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon
his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and
had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies
after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others,
a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the

application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so
far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the
bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules".
In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this
court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the
student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be
received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different
one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35
N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must
have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first,
to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into
two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between
the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school,
but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made allsufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law
resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well
as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while
those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years
before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot
rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession
he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real
or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the
time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this
general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute
him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select
from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members
of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause
for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general

average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated
by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is
curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could
be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued to
those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do
so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to
practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the
Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not
the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing
directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other
words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different,
seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal
defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of
article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious
that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and
who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of
the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have
voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief
Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates

206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

12

73'S

72'S

Number of candidates who passed

85

Number of candidates who failed

121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

18

Percentage of success

(per cent)

41.62

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

58.74

Passing grade

(per cent)

72

November, 1946

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

Number of candidates

481

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

19

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Number of candidates who passed

249

Number of candidates who failed

228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

43

Percentage of success

(per cent)

52.20

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

47.80

Passing grade
(By resolution of the Court).

(per cent)

72

October, 1947

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos
B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates

749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per

cent

43

69 per cent

40

68 per cent

Number of candidates who passed

409

Number of candidates who failed

340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

972

Percentage of success

(per cent)

54.59

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

45.41

Passing grade

(per cent)

69

(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.

August, 1948

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis

P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates

899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

71's

64

29

70's

35

Number of candidates who passed

490

Number of candidates who failed

409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

11

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.40

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.60

Passing grade

(per cent)

70

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1949

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,

Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.

Number of candidates

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

1,218

55

Number of candidates who passed

686

Number of candidates who failed

532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

164

Percentage of success

(per cent)

56.28

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

43.72

Passing grade

(per cent)

74

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1950

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A.
Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates

1,316

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and

authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed

432

Number of candidates who failed

894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

26

Percentage of success

(per cent)

32.14

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

67.86

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1951

Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates

2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

112

Number of candidates who passed

1,189

Number of candidates who failed

879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

196

Percentage of success

(per cent)

57.49

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

42.51

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1952

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates

2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

163

Number of candidates who passed

1,705

Number of candidates who failed

1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

426

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.27

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.73

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1953

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed

2,555

100

1,570

Number of candidates who failed

986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

284

Percentage of success

(per cent)

61.04

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

38.96

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the
bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD),
and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L.

66

71

61

76 80

83

73

75

71.4

MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

76

72

74

75 70

70

65

72

71.45

MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V.

64

64

65

68 83

74

68

80

69.85

MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R.

71

68

66

75 63

75

70

88

69.9

MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu.

75

73

73

65 63

66

65

80

69.95

MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud

72

66

71

75 78

68

65

50

69.65

1948

1949

7. Abaya, Jesus A.

69

79

75

75 71

89

55

75

70.8

76

80

62

86 81

72

60

65

70.5

63

85

70

77 80

81

65

80

71.8

10. Alacar, Pascual C.

61

63

83

79 71

85

65

80

72.05

11. Amog, Pedro M.

75

66

76

78 81

74

55

85

72.2

12. Apolinario, Miguel S.

75

84

78

78 70

70

60

75

71.95

13. Aquino, Maximo G.

82

77

71

77 76

77

60

75

73.15

14. Asinas, Candido D.

75

83

69

80 81

83

55

85

72.65

15. Baldivino, Jose B.

75

65

72

82 82

69

60

80

71.95

16. Balintona, Bernardo

75

80

64

78 74

67

65

70

70

17. Banawa, Angel L.

78

70

70

75 81

83

60

60

72.3

18. Bandala, Anacleto A.

66

80

66

71 93

72

55

70

69.6

19. Bandon, Alawadin L.

74

79

69

77 91

73

60

80

73.35

20. Baquero, Benjamin

76

79

64

77 85

72

65

75

72.5

21. Blanco, Jose

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.5

22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.

75

71

72

78 67

82

60

75

70.85

MRD- 8. Advincula, David D.

9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.

23. Canda, Benjamin S.

75

72

75

82 76

77

65

75

73.55

24. Canon, Guillermo

77

86

67

88 75

69

70

85

73.9

25. Carlos, Estela S.

75

81

81

79 72

73

65

70

73.8

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O.

69

76

76

79 71

80

55

80

70.4

27. Clarin, Manuel L.

75

82

76

81 73

69

70

75

73.95

28. Claudo, Conrado O.

76

62

78

77 73

72

60

70

71.4

29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68

65

74

80 85

75

60

75

71.65

72

75

69

82 83

79

65

80

73.4

31. Corona, Olvido D.

68

76

73

81 81

72

60

75

71.15

32. Dizon, Marcial C.

76

86

69

83 75

74

65

80

73.1

33. Enriquez, Agustin P.

75

77

70

81 81

77

65

80

73.75

34. Espiritu, Irineo E.

80

88

69

75 76

77

65

75

73.8

35. Fernandez, Macario J.

63

82

76

75 81

84

65

75

72.95

36. Gallardo, Amando C.

78

79

67

77 76

75

60

65

70.95

37. Garcia, Freidrich M.

76

80

66

75 72

70

60

75

69.7

38. Garcia, Julian L.

64

77

68

82 89

77

65

75

72.15

MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R.

39. Garcia, Leon Mo.

77

86

71

80 60

82

65

75

71.85

40. Garcia, Pedro V.

76

82

73

81 74

83

60

85

73.6

41. Garcia, Santiago C.

62

91

79

75 72

75

65

80

71.8

42. Genoves, Pedro

75

83

70

78 87

76

55

80

72.7

43. Gonzales, Amado P.

75

71

71

75 86

75

60

75

72.65

44. Guia, Odon R. de

77

76

66

81 74

76

60

75

70.9

45. Fernandez, Simeon

62

68

71

80 74

90

65

75

70.85

46. Jakosalem, Filoteo

82

83

73

82 61

87

65

70

73.6

47. Jesus, Felipe D. de

75

83

67

79 78

85

60

75

72.45

48. Jocom, Jacobo M.

77

77

74

77 74

64

55

85

70.65

49. Juares, Nicolas

77

84

56

76 73

82

60

85

70

50. Kalalang, Remigio

65

75

74

80 70

70

65

85

70.3

51. Layumas, Vicente L.

67

84

65

75 89

66

60

80

70.3

52. Leyson, Amancio F.

69

83

75

76 81

75

65

75

73.15

53. Libanan, Marcelino

71

83

61

77 80

81

65

85

71.75

54. Lim, Jose E.

77

77

72

76 72

64

65

70

71.15

55. Lim, Jose F.

70

75

62

83 80

71

65

80

70.4

56. Linao, Mariano M.

66

84

76

78 80

75

60

75

71.75

57. Lopez, Angelo P.

67

81

75

72 79

81

55

80

71

58. Lopez, Eliezar M.

77

75

60

75 77

85

60

75

70.7

59. Lopez, Nicanor S.

72

71

70

78 77

84

60

75

71.55

60. Manoleto, Proceso D.

72

70

65

78 81

90

60

80

71.95

61. Mancao, Alfredo P.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

62. Manera, Mariano A.

75

78

75

75 68

79

60

65

71

63. Mercado, Arsenio N.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

64. Miranda, Benjamin G.

76

81

67

82 74

77

65

80

72.55

65. Manad, Andres B.

77

75

68

82 69

72

65

75

71.15

66. Orosco, Casimiro P.

72

84

69

81 70

82

65

75

71.9

67. Padua, Manuel C.

76

76

68

80 79

79

50

75

70.1

68. Palang, Basilio S.

71

75

82

71 55

87

55

75

69.6

69. Palma, Cuadrato

62

75

69

93 80

79

55

80

69.5

1948

70. Paganiban, Jose V.

67

83

61

81 91

74

60

75

70.6

71. Pareja, Felipe

66

71

75

81 67

74

60

70

68.75

72. Patalinjug, Eriberto

73

77

78

73 78

71

55

75

71.25

73. Paulin, Jose C.

66

69

71

77 83

82

65

75

72.1

74. Pido, Serafin C.

72

78

63

80 71

85

70

80

72.05

75. Pimentel, Luis P.

77

75

76

81 76

68

55

80

71.6

76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C.

72

78

68

89 79

81

65

85

73.55

77. Regalario, Benito B.

72

80

64

80 75

81

55

80

69.55

78. Robis, Casto P.

62

77

74

73 68

80

70

80

70.9

79. Rodil, Francisco C.

68

69

70

81 76

75

65

75

70.75

80. Rodriguez, Mariano I.

80

75

69

80 72

80

65

80

73.35

81. Romero, Crispulo P.

78

75

66

77 76

83

65

75

72.85

82. Saez, Porfirio D.

75

75

72

81 69

77

60

75

71

83. Saliguma, Crisogono D.

79

79

74

78 69

65

65

70

71.8

84. Samano, Fortunato A.

75

84

72

77 70

82

60

75

71.9

85. Santos, Faustina C.

71

68

68

76 75

85

55

75

69.5

86. Santos, Josefina R.

68

69

76

71 77

82

65

75

72.3

87. Seludo, Ananias G.

75

80

69

79 77

82

65

75

73.25

88. Semilia, Rafael I.

68

85

55

83 89

79

65

80

71.25

89. Telan, Gaudencio

77

79

70

75 70

75

60

75

70.85

90. Tesorero, Leocadio T.

75

71

63

75 82

62

65

63

69.65

91. Torre, Valentin S. de la

85

81

71

76 69

65

55

70

70.4

92. Torres, Ariston L.

78

71

72

81 61

84

55

85

70.4

93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de

70

75

71

79 65

80

65

80

70.65

94. Viado, Jose

67

70

74

75 75

90

55

80

70.7

95. Villacarlos, Delfin A.

73

87

71

82 69

70

75

85

73.85

96. Villamil, Leonor S.

73

81

76

86 86

73

55

85

73.6

97. Zabala, Amando A.

76

70

67

75 76

76

60

75

70.6

70

71

78

81 76

72

64

96

73.4

99. Espaola, Pablo S.

71

78

55

76 85

69

65

93

70.2

100. Foronda, Clarencio J.

60

78

68

79 84

88

62

93

71.9

1950

MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la

101. Hechanova, Vicente

59

76

75

75 69

68

75

96

71.3

MRD- Pealosa, Osias R.

102.

80

78

61

76 61

77

66

85

70.2

103. Sarmiento, Floro A.

65

86

63

82 89

72

60

72

70.15

75

85

68

78 69

67

65

69

70.25

105. Ungson, Fernando S.

61

87

75

70 57

85

83

82

72.8

106. Abasolo, Romulo

77

70

64

65 76

70

76

64

71.7

107. Adeva, Daniel G.

75

59

74

65 69

51

78

67

70.4

108. Aguilar, Vicente Z.

73

63

68

75 70

69

75

75

71.25

109. Amodia, Juan T.

75

76

66

75 76

60

77

76

72.35

MRD- Aosa, Pablo S.

110.

76

78

63

75 74

61

75

79

71.6

111. Antiola, Anastacio R.

68

76

75

70 71

70

81

66

73.05

112. Aquino, S. Rey A.

70

71

71

60 74

62

76

77

71.1

113. Atienza, Manuel G.

71

78

68

80 86

51

82

75

73.85

114. Avancea, Alfonso

71

71

65

75 70

72

78

80

71.8

MRD- Torre, Catalino P.

104.

1951

MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N.

115.

75

73

75

70 72

65

75

76

73.25

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L.

68

69

73

70 74

50

80

79

71.2

MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

117.

76

60

67

55 74

63

77

62

70.25

MRD- Benitez, Tomas P.

118.

67

75

75

60 73

72

75

78

72.2

119. Biason, Sixto F.

73

82

67

65 66

72

77

68

71.25

MRD- Brias, Isagani A.

120.

71

69

74

70 76

52

79

72

71.95

121. Buela, Arcadio P.

72

77

61

70 71

58

79

71

69.75

122. Cabilao, Leonardo S.

73

50

75

75 75

60

71

79

71.25

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M.

75

66

70

65 72

81

70

79

72.4

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

127. Calimlim, Pedro B.

66

82

69

60 69

52

83

75

70

128. Camello, Sotero H.

70

77

63

65 75

66

84

64

71.55

129. Campos, Juan A.

71

88

70

75 64

69

71

62

70.15

124. Cacacho, Emilio V.

125. Calilung, Soledad C.

MRD- Calimlim, Jose B.

126.

130. Castillo, Antonio del

78

78

70

60 79

67

69

76

72.65

MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad.

131.

75

61

72

75 74

71

67

66

71.1

MRD- Castro, Jesus B.

132.

72

86

72

75 65

75

76

71

72.85

133. Casuga, Bienvenido B.

75

72

72

70 69

61

75

60

70.95

134. Cabangbang, Santiago

B.

77

67

61

80 73

59

83

76

72.2

135. Cruz, Federico S.

69

74

75

75 68

65

76

70

71.65

136. Dacanay, Eufemio P.

70

73

62

75 72

69

85

71

72.05

137. Deysolong, Felisberto

66

62

72

75 70

62

83

62

70.85

MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.

138.

78

79

63

75 73

75

81

59

73.5

139. Espinosa, Domingo L.

78

63

58

70 70

67

87

63

71.6

MRD- Farol, Evencia C.

140.

80

78

66

75 81

72

62

73

72.25

141. Felix, Conrado S.

71

71

75

65 70

58

75

69

70.75

142. Fernan, Pablo L.

67

88

66

85 73

68

78

75

72.35

143. Gandioco, Salvador G.

64

58

66

65 76

70

89

75

72.1

144. Gastardo, Crispin B.

70

69

68

75 78

66

86

72

73.9

145. Genson, Angelo B.

75

57

73

65 67

54

78

56

69.55

146. Guiani, Guinald M.

68

60

75

65 74

67

75

77

71.5

147. Guina, Graciano P.

66

69

67

60 78

52

83

61

69.6

74

74

75

75 71

69

75

71

73.35

149. Ibarra, Venancio M.

60

75

74

70 74

70

80

75

71.9

150. Imperial, Monico L.

72

78

75

75 72

56

82

77

73.7

MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

151.

71

70

63

85 71

60

85

53

70.85

152. Inandan, Fortunato C.

77

77

67

53 73

75

79

57

72.5

153. Jimenez, Florencio C.

75

70

70

75 72

61

75

78

72.05

154. Kintanar, Woodrow M.

70

83

72

65 76

73

75

69

72.95

155. Languido, Cesar V.

63

71

63

85 70

61

85

79

70.55

156. Lavilles, Cesar L.

61

89

75

55 73

63

75

78

70.55

157. Llenos, Francisco U.

64

70

65

60 72

65

92

75

71.75

MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P.

148.

158. Leon, Marcelo D. de

63

73

60

85 75

75

90

70

72.75

159. Llanto, Priscilla

72

68

60

65 76

67

84

68

71.35

160. Machachor, Oscar

68

59

78

70 67

57

75

75

70.15

MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion

161.

77

66

70

70 76

71

75

61

72.75

MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M.

162.

70

61

75

65 75

50

91

51

72.3

163. Manio, Gregorio

67

67

69

80 71

67

75

75

70.65

164. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

82

60

60 69

70

68

72

62.05

MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R.

165.

66

75

74

70 75

67

81

75

73.15

166. Martin, Benjamin S.

68

72

63

75 69

63

84

62

70.1

MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S.

167.

70

80

75

80 76

66

82

51

73.95

MRD- Montero, Leodegario C.

168.

73

67

66

80 81

65

81

75

73.75

169. Monzon, Candido T.

70

72

74

75 67

70

77

69

72.05

170. Natividad, Alberto M.

73

79

68

65 73

69

75

79

72.2

MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C.

171.

70

72

68

85 81

66

71

74

72.1

172. Nisce, Camilo Z.

66

66

75

65 79

68

85

62

73.5

75

81

76

65 74

67

75

69

73.75

174. Olaviar, Jose O.

72

70

69

55 66

70

77

75

70.5

MRD- Perez, Cesario Z.

175.

75

76

66

80 72

63

82

69

72.95

70

66

65

70 75

64

75

70

69.95

177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75

73

62

65 78

59

75

66

70.2

178. Recinto, Ireneo I.

73

76

68

75 74

68

80

53

72.3

MRD- Redor, Francisco K.

179.

62

77

73

75 69

64

76

69

70

MRD- Regis, Deogracias A.

180.

76

74

68

65 65

65

88

75

73.35

67

78

61

80 71

77

79

65

70.9

70

72

62

60 88

66

67

79

70.15

183. Rosario, Prisco del

70

64

70

70 72

73

85

57

72.65

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del

75

91

65

75 68

68

79

62

72.2

185. Saavedra, Felipe

73

80

63

75 76

73

68

62

70.35

186. Salazar, Alfredo N.

66

72

73

75 67

68

77

69

70.85

MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de

173.

176. Pogado, Causin O.

181. Rigor, Estelita C.

MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela

182.

187. Salem, Romulo R.

77

81

72

65 73

60

76

75

73

188. Foz, Julita A.

75

72

75

75 65

70

76

64

72.5

189. Santa Ana, Candido T.

77

69

65

75 81

75

70

75

73

190. Santos, Aquilino

72

66

69

65 68

70

81

71

71.7

191. Santos, Valeriano V.

76

72

75

75 68

62

76

79

73.1

192. Suico, Samuel

73

79

72

75 71

59

84

65

73.3

193. Suson, Teodorico

74

68

66

80 66

59

79

67

70.35

194. Tado, Florentino P.

64

76

67

65 76

72

76

53

69.7

195. Tapayan, Domingo A.

69

72

69

70 76

73

82

79

73.75

MRDTiausas, Miguel V.
196.

67

60

71

75 79

67

84

60

72.7

197. Torres, Carlos P.

68

71

71

70 70

63

82

71

71.6

198. Tria, Hipolito

69

72

75

60 69

54

78

66

70.05

199. Velasco, Avelino A.

65

72

75

75 71

67

78

76

72.1

200. Villa, Francisco C.

65

80

73

75 68

79

65

75

70.2

201. Villagonzalo, Job R.

78

67

74

65 72

51

69

71

70.25

202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro

75

74

75

55 75

66

67

75

71.45

203. Abacon, Pablo

75

72

78

81 78

72

64

55

72.7

MRP- Abad, Agapito

204.

73

76

73

85 75

63

62

75

70.95

MRP- Abella, Ludovico B.

205.

70

81

76

81 70

66

77

58

72.7

MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F.

206.

75

79

79

87 76

51

63

70

71.7

MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N.

207.

71

72

78

84 70

75

69

70

72.9

208. Alandy, Doroteo R.

64

83

93

91 68

59

60

60

71.2

209. Alano, Fabian T.

70

83

61

83 72

87

72

70

71.9

71

79

80

81 73

70

72

62

73.65

211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag.

75

85

71

73 76

65

68

65

71.85

212. Acosta, Dionisio N.

75

81

78

87 56

65

77

70

72.8

MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C.

213.

66

85

80

84 75

58

76

75

73.65

1952

MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V.

210.

214. Adove, Nehemias C.

76

86

78

77 66

78

69

62

73.55

215. Adrias, Inocencio C.

75

83

61

88 76

67

79

75

73.4

216. Aglugub, Andres R.

75

83

73

88 72

62

72

62

72.65

217. Andrada, Mariano L.

76

85

66

87 63

77

75

77

73.

MRP- Almeda, Serafin V.

218.

72

72

75

81 61

67

73

65

70.75

219. Almonte-Peralta,
Felicidad

73

71

72

91 75

67

65

53

70.7

MRP- Amodia, Juan T.

220.

75

79

68

85 62

64

75

78

71.4

MRP- Antonio, Felino A.

221.

71

76

81

83 79

52

72

70

73.3

MRP- Antonio, Jose S.

222.

75

92

90

68 65

64

68

60

73.75

223. Aonuevo, Ramos B.

71

87

78

81 64

63

74

76

72.7

224. Aquino, S. Rey A.

67

77

57

78 69

70

69

80

67.7

225. Arteche, Filomeno D.

78

83

50

89 76

77

70

70

70.8

MRP- Arribas, Isaac M.

226.

75

78

70

81 73

70

67

78

72.2

MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D.

227.

72

67

78

89 72

67

77

65

73.95

228. Atienza, Ricardo

72

87

70

79 66

55

75

75

70.85

229. Balacuit, Camilo N.

75

78

89

75 70

54

66

75

73.3

MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S.

230.

77

84

83

80 69

70

61

65

73

231. Balcita, Oscar C.

75

77

79

90 64

60

67

50

70.65

232. Barilea, Dominador Z.

71

67

82

77 64

61

65

80

70.5

MRP- Banta, Jose Y.

233.

75

80

77

81 75

63

71

75

73.95

MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

234.

76

70

67

80 67

65

70

81

70.7

235. Batucan, Jose M.

66

76

78

88 62

76

67

78

71.2

236. Bautista, Atilano C.

70

82

84

85 58

61

71

62

71.25

237. Bautista, Celso J.

71

68

63

87 80

67

80

70

72.75

238. Belderon, Jose

76

81

76

92 70

66

67

62

72.65

MRP- Belo, Victor B.

239.

76

77

64

73 75

71

76

76

72.85

MRP- Bejec, Conceso D.

240.

79

80

73

82 63

77

75

50

73.15

MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M.

241.

72

75

81

73 75

57

75

80

73.95

MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74

242.

84

77

84 75

63

68

62

72.85

MRP- Beria, Roger C.

243.

70

80

79

79 68

72

64

78

71.85

MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M.

244.

75

86

65

92 64

64

84

75

73.45

MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M.

245.

73

69

78

83 73

59

70

82

72.75

MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B.

246.

76

86

76

83 68

59

71

78

73.05

247. Buenafe, Avelina R.

78

80

75

75 70

55

72

80

72.75

248. Bueno, Anastacio F.

73

78

71

78 71

67

71

60

71.15

249. Borres, Maximino L.

67

85

62

91 72

63

76

80

70.9

MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V.

250.

72

71

76

75 74

70

71

60

72.2

MRP- Cabello, Melecio F.

251.

72

78

78

89 58

70

67

71

70.5

MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M.

252.

79

88

53

91 71

85

75

76

73.3

253. Cabreros, Paulino N.

71

79

83

84 60

62

71

50

70.85

254. Calayag, Florentino R.

69

79

66

88 69

75

68

76

70.6

MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la

255.

76

72

80

67 62

71

66

62

70.85

70

82

81

77 78

51

75

75

73.7

MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N.

257.

76

87

69

80 58

64

78

75

71.8

258. Calagi, Mateo C.

73

93

71

87 70

66

69

62

71.8

259. Canda, Benjamin S.

72

71

77

90 62

75

66

82

71.95

260. Cantoria, Eulogio

71

80

71

89 70

55

72

75

71

261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado

67

78

71

90 65

75

72

60

70.65

262. Capitulo, Alejandro P.

75

70

53

87 78

63

76

91

71.2

MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo

263.

75

93

81

76 64

75

68

56

73.15

MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V.

264.

75

86

70

87 77

52

77

82

73.9

MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B.

265.

80

75

78

77 73

71

63

76

73.65

MRP- Campos, Juan A.

266.

66

85

83

84 67

61

80

57

73.25

267. Cardoso, Angelita G.

78

71

73

76 79

56

69

60

71.8

268. Cartagena, Herminio R.

71

72

65

89 64

73

80

70

71.65

256. Canabal, Isabel

MRP- Castro, Daniel T.

269.

65

75

77

76 85

60

75

69

73.15

270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V.

70

78

72

73 77

69

64

80

71.2

271. Castro, Pedro L. de

70

68

69

87 76

75

72

70

73.35

272. Cerio, Juan A.

75

82

75

86 60

54

76

75

71.75

273. Colorado, Alfonso R.

68

75

80

74 77

66

67

80

72.6

274. Chavez, Doroteo M.

73

65

79

84 73

69

66

84

73.1

275. Chavez, Honorato A.

77

76

79

86 74

53

71

75

73.65

MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69

276.

81

74

82 76

61

78

80

73.85

277. Cortez, Armando R.

78

60

88

86 60

66

69

64

73.1

278. Crisostomo, Jesus L.

76

87

74

76 62

55

76

66

71.45

MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R.

279.

68

87

78

86 79

50

80

60

73.7

MRP- Cruz, Raymundo

280.

75

81

79

85 72

57

68

75

72.95

MRP- Cunanan, Jose C.

281.

78

92

63

83 76

72

68

65

72.4

282. Cunanan, Salvador F.

70

82

64

92 67

75

73

76

71.45

283. Cimafranca, Agustin B.

71

76

76

80 70

71

75

71

73.35

284. Crisol, Getulio R.

70

91

78

85 68

55

71

50

70.8

MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R.

285.

76

82

69

82 66

62

80

71

72.85

MRP- Datu, Alfredo J.

286.

70

75

72

86 80

55

68

79

71.5

287. Dacuma, Luis B.

71

67

87

83 71

50

65

70

71.25

MRP- Degamo, Pedro R.

288.

73

80

82

74 80

67

67

57

73.65

70

84

82

84 77

52

73

50

72.65

75

83

86

73 54

54

75

75

72.25

73

84

64

89 71

78

75

66

72.8

MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M.

292.

71

77

71

81 69

75

80

70

73.65

MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R.

293.

70

76

82

73 79

70

72

56

73.9

MRP- Delgado, Abner

294.

75

84

63

67 64

60

70

72

68.35

MRP- Domingo, Dominador T.

295.

70

69

81

82 68

63

71

75

72.2

70

78

53

88 75

77

62

76

68.05

289. Delgado, Vicente N.

MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A.

290.

291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo

296. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRP- Duque, Antonio S.

297.

75

77

78

86 76

72

64

75

73.9

298. Duque, Castulo

75

80

73

83 66

67

65

66

70.65

299. Ebbah, Percival B.

70

80

85

76 66

63

76

75

73.95

300. Edisa, Sulpicio

65

77

75

89 75

62

75

65

72

301. Edradan, Rosa C.

70

75

84

84 71

59

69

86

73.4

MRP- Enage, Jacinto N.

302.

66

70

88

93 72

67

65

75

73.2

MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B.

303.

75

86

73

81 63

77

69

75

72.65

304. Encarnacion, Cesar

65

78

58

68 66

64

75

78

67.1

305. Estoista, Agustin A.

78

76

74

86 58

67

70

76

71.7

MRP- Fabros, Jose B.

306.

66

75

80

82 80

71

67

70

73.05

MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P.

307.

77

69

82

83 65

60

75

75

73.9

308. Fajardo, Genaro P.

70

79

77

79 79

50

73

75

72.5

309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75

75

72

87 63

63

77

70

72.15

310. Familara, Raymundo Z.

75

87

83 64

65

68

65

71.85

68

311. Farias, Dionisio

70

78

89

66 65

75

70

50

72.75

312. Favila, Hilario B.

71

84

74

70 75

67

73

59

72.2

MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I.

313.

71

69

70

85 69

81

72

70

72.25

MRP- Fernando, Lope F.

314.

73

77

86

79 70

76

64

50

73

MRP- Flores, Dionisio S.

315.

78

72

77

83 67

60

68

73

72.05

MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B.

316.

70

82

70

70 78

65

64

75

70.35

MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la

317.

76

88

72

74 60

71

79

79

73.55

72

79

71

77 68

61

76

60

70.9

MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B.

319.

76

81

74

69 71

71

73

60

72.85

320. Gabuya, Jesus S.

70

83

82

83 70

63

75

65

73.75

321. Galang, Victor N.

69

83

84

76 70

57

71

60

71.95

322. Gaerlan, Manuel L.

73

87

77

90 67

61

72

75

73.15

323. Galem, Nestor R.

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

318. Fohmantes, Nazario S.

324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B.

75

88

75

75 63

70

70

65

71.85

70

78

84

91 80

51

65

70

72.85

326. Galindo, Eulalio D.

70

89

87

65 78

71

62

62

73.4

327. Galman, Patrocinio G.

72

72

80

85 71

56

70

53

71.15

328. Gamalinda, Carlos S.

76

79

81

86 67

63

69

55

72.55

329. Gamboa, Antonio G.

71

67

70

72 76

60

75

68

70.95

330. Gannod, Jose A.

69

80

75

81 68

62

73

68

71.25

MRP- Garcia, Matias N.

331.

67

78

74

90 79

59

76

65

72.8

MRP- Ganete, Carmelo

332.

75

87

77

82 74

57

68

81

73.3

333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R.

75

67

80

82 67

57

64

70

70.5

334. Gofredo, Claro C.

68

78

72

86 78

52

70

76

70.9

335. Gomez, Jose S.

71

76

71

81 76

63

69

62

70.85

MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.

336.

68

93

85

78 64

69

70

54

72.35

MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C.

337.

77

75

71

89 55

70

70

60

70.05

MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de

66

68

90

84 77

59

69

65

73.3

MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B.

325.

338.

339. Grageda, Jose M. A.

70

85

72

67 70

60

73

73

70.75

340. Guzman, Juan de

75

86

69

84 64

79

75

76

73.6

MRP- Guzman, Mateo de

341.

76

79

79

73 72

69

68

80

73.9

342. Guzman, Salvador B.

71

61

74

72 61

66

78

75

70.75

343. Guzman, Salvador T. de

75

84

64

81 74

61

78

58

71.75

344. Habelito, Geronimo E.

71

76

71

87 73

60

67

55

69.65

345. Hedriana, Naterno G.

75

68

84

76 66

58

76

60

72.9

346. Hernandez, Quintin B.

67

75

72

81 72

72

66

76

70.6

347. Homeres, Agustin R.

73

84

65

86 70

77

63

76

70.7

348. Ines, Leonilo F.

65

88

71

88 77

73

61

70

70.55

349. Jamer, Alipio S.

68

75

83

89 80

61

65

50

72

MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

350.

75

65

68

85 76

70

83

54

73.8

MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio

351.

73

86

72

78 82

67

67

64

72.8

1952

MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F.

352.

76

75

78

84 71

66

70

77

73.85

353. Jaring, Antonio S.

72

77

79

70 72

57

71

50

70.75

MRP- Javier, Aquilino M.

354.

75

84

79

78 77

61

66

66

73.05

75

75

72

88 78

58

76

43

72.4

MRP- Jose, Nestor L.

356.

78

61

64

73 68

76

64

80

69.7

357. La Q, Jose M.

75

71

75

72 70

67

81

59

73.5

358. Leon, Brigido C. de

67

75

78

91 78

51

72

80

72.55

359. Leones, Constante B.

68

81

79

84 73

60

77

60

73

360. Liboro, Horacio T.

72

69

80

87 73

62

70

61

72.4

361. Llanera, Cesar L.

77

81

80

78 64

59

75

63

73

362. Lomontod, Jose P.

75

76

69

70 73

76

74

75

73.2

363. Luna, Lucito

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

MRP- Luz, Lauro L.

364.

76

90

78

88 64

58

75

77

73.95

MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S.

365.

73

81

72

83 66

75

72

70

72.5

80

67

84

76 70

62

65

68

73.05

355. Jomuad, Francisco

366. Magbiray, Godofredo V.

367. Majarais, Rodolfo P.

70

62

64

82 88

75

71

79

72.85

MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo

368.

75

90

77

83 59

71

72

78

73.3

MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S.

369.

74

83

74

89 58

60

72

76

71.1

370. Maloles, Iluminado M.

70

87

73

76 77

50

76

76

72.3

371. Maniquis, Daniel R.

75

80

73

91 69

71

65

70

72.1

372. Maraa, Arsenio

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

373. Marasigan, Napoleon

75

71

83

75 69

62

69

70

72.75

MRP- Marco, Jaime P.

374.

75

67

74

76 64

75

75

57

71.9

MRP- Martir, Osmundo P.

375.

70

86

76

78 72

71

75

53

72.95

MRP- Masancay, Amando E.

376.

73

87

75

77 72

50

78

80

73.2

MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T.

377.

62

87

72

79 73

76

69

77

71.3

378. Mara, Guillermo L.

70

78

78

89 75

67

66

65

72.35

MRP- Mercado, Felipe A.

379.

73

77

82

82 78

52

69

85

73.9

MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P.

380.

70

82

73

86 77

52

79

65

72.8

381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,

79

78

73

75 71

68

69

53

71.95

MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio

382. D.

79

79

68

88 64

78

69

83

73.1

MRP- Montero, Leodegario C.

383.

72

89

69

89 70

68

70

75

72.15

384. Morada, Servillano S.

75

76

67

71 65

66

75

76

70.9

385. Mocorro, Generoso

78

84

78

84 60

73

68

70

73

75

78

75

85 72

55

77

66

73.15

387. Motus, Rodentor P.

80

78

70

94 72

75

70

57

73.75

388. Macario, Pedro R.

70

67

74

86 78

63

72

66

72.15

MRP- Nadela, Geredion T.

389.

72

64

64

81 73

50

75

75

69.15

MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P.

390.

67

70

71

76 76

79

75

57

72.05

391. Nieto, Benedicto S.

69

79

77

77 72

62

76

76

72.9

MRP- Noguera, Raymundo

392.

71

86

81

80 73

56

72

70

73.15

MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L.

386.

MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R.

393.

70

70

69

73 57

37

64

72

63.6

394. Nono, Pacifico G.

67

77

78

67 75

59

71

76

71.35

MRP- Nuval, Manuel R.

395.

78

72

67

90 72

68

78

67

73.65

396. Ocampo, Augusto

75

90

77

72 69

55

65

67

60.7

397. Oliveros, Amado A.

72

75

68

72 84

50

75

79

71.9

398. Opia, Jr., Pedro

76

77

74

67 73

66

68

70

71.85

MRP- Olaviar, Jose O.

399.

70

62

85

81 74

50

68

79

71.8

MRP- Olandesca, Per O.

400.

70

91

76

87 72

66

70

79

73.45

401. Orden, Apolonio J.

72

65

84

86 66

50

72

68

71.45

402. Ortiz, Melencio T.

71

75

78

81 66

67

70

78

72.1

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S.

403.

72

64

76

86 72

61

76

75

72.95

404. Pacifico, Vicente V.

76

79

69

80 76

52

72

80

71.95

MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D.

405.

75

69

72

75 78

58

75

70

72.6

406. Padlan, Crispin M.

71

66

76

79 68

67

74

66

71.65

407. Padilla, Jose C.

70

65

67

82 78

75

78

75

73.3

408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71

88

78

86 59

75

78

50

72.95

MRP- Palma, Bartolome

409.

67

81

80

82 71

75

69

75

73.25

MRP- Papa, Angel A.

410.

75

72

85

85 77

59

63

71

73.45

MRP- Parayno, Mario V.

411.

71

88

74

89 69

66

76

73

73.65

412. Paria, Santos L.

70

87

85

77 64

67

63

76

71.85

MRP- Pasion, Anastacio

413.

63

80

68

81 82

79

76

58

72.55

414. Pastrana, Rizal R.

69

76

71

76 68

63

77

83

71.65

MRP- Paulin, Jose O.

415.

70

66

80

87 75

50

65

80

70.9

MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.

416.

79

87

73

83 69

71

68

65

73.2

417. Pea, Jesus

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

418. Perez, Toribio R.

71

64

81

92 69

58

67

70

71.25

419. Pestao, Melquiades

77

81

74

87 59

68

76

75

73.2

77

81

72

82 69

71

60

75

71.15

MRP- Pido, Serafin C.

420.

421. Pinlac, Filemon

67

76

74

86 65

79

65

72

70.55

422. Poblete, Celso B.

72

79

82

76 66

64

74

50

72.15

68

70

75

87 74

67

64

75

70.8

424. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

80

81

69 72

53

67

70

71.05

425. Quetulio, Josefina D.

75

90

60

93 64

78

76

83

72.9

MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V.

426.

69

88

79

82 65

62

71

66

71.55

MRP- Quietson, Bayani R.

427.

73

75

76

77 70

81

71

53

72.85

428. Racho, Macario D.

68

75

81

82 78

53

66

54

70.55

429. Ramirez, Sabas P.

71

80

73

87 62

62

75

80

71.65

MRP- Raffian, Jose A.

430.

80

83

79

79 62

72

68

65

73.25

MRP- Ramos, Patricio S.

431.

75

87

76

75 72

72

61

75

72.25

MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78

432.

84

76

90 48

75

80

65

73.45

MRP- Raro, Celso

433.

81

76

67 75

77

55

77

71.4

MRP- Piza, Luz

423.

75

MRP- Rayos, Victor S.

434.

75

86

79

91 71

67

67

70

73.9

435. Revilla, Mariano S.

75

78

81

90 70

54

69

81

73.35

436. Reyes, Abdon L.

72

64

81

78 76

73

69

53

72.85

437. Reyes, Domingo B.

72

87

78

83 72

75

62

70

72.7

438. Reyes, Francisco M.

75

85

84

68 75

71

68

50

73.9

439. Reyes, Lozano M.

80

57

78

79 78

65

64

79

73.35

75

75

82

82 76

64

68

60

73.65

441. Rigonan, Cesar V.

71

85

65

86 75

70

76

70

72.7

442. Rivera, Honorio

71

56

70

90 71

65

75

71

71.2

MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A.

443.

72

88

72

94 68

73

66

80

72.6

MRP- Robles, Enrique

444.

75

77

75

77 82

64

69

70

73.7

445. Rodriguez, Orestes

Arellano

76

75

76

63 69

77

65

78

72.25

446. Roldan, Jose V.

67

80

79

83 73

71

75

70

73.9

447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del

80

75

65

70 68

72

80

70

73.15

448. Rosario, Restituto F. del

75

75

79

90 68

65

66

63

72.1

MRP- Reyes, Oscar R.

440.

MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S.

449.

71

81

69

75 77

71

75

70

72.95

450. San Juan, Damaso

77

86

72

89 59

76

65

72

71.6

451. Saiel, Felix L.

72

93

76

80 67

75

66

62

72.1

452. Samaniego, Jesus B.

75

80

76

72 60

67

68

70

70.6

MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75

453.

83

70

83 77

67

77

60

73.95

MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.

454.

71

75

81

90 62

64

76

68

72.95

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal

75

76

84

93 63

65

59

70

71.8

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll.

76

89

83

83 63

58

65

52

71.25

MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C.

457.

75

75

78

82 73

76

66

70

73.7

MRP- Santos, Ruperto M.

458.

67

54

69

76 63

64

71

60

66.75

MRP- Santos, Aquilino C.

459.

72

71

73

79 73

79

71

85

73.8

MRP- Santos, Rufino A.

460.

75

81

79

85 74

72

66

54

73.3

461. Suanding, Bantas

75

67

67

92 79

59

76

76

73.1

MRP- Sulit, Feliz M.

462.

76

79

76

78 72

75

68

67

73.5

463. Songco, Felicisimo G.

70

68

82

84 60

69

76

65

73.35

464. Soriano, Aniceto S.

64

79

77

80 80

53

70

65

70.7

465. Suarez, Pablo D.

73

85

70

87 76

70

64

70

71.9

MRP- Sybico, Jesus L.

466.

79

70

70

72 75

75

72

60

73.05

69

68

77

79 74

68

72

60

71.85

MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita

468.

81

79

72

80 62

75

73

80

73.95

MRP- Tando, Amado T.

469.

71

82

78

83 71

61

71

60

72

470. Tasico, Severo E.

71

69

75

89 70

75

67

63

71.65

471. Tiburcio, Ismael P.

73

82

72

93 76

57

68

54

71.15

MRP- Tiongson, Federico T.

472.

70

70

76

84 77

75

75

50

73.45

MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C.

473.

75

89

63

84 85

73

73

50

73.4

474. Torrijas, Alfredo A.

77

66

67

83 68

75

71

63

71.3

MRP- Tobias, Artemio M.

475.

69

58

74

81 71

55

65

57

67.55

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R.

MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio

476.

76

86

76

86 70

68

75

50

73.8

MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O.

477.

66

91

83

75 63

66

67

65

70.8

478. Trinidad, Pedro O.

66

78

78

85 78

51

64

75

70.8

80

82

77

82 67

56

68

75

72.6

480. Umali, Osmundo C.

68

75

81

80 71

69

68

60

71.7

481. Umayam, Juanito C.

77

75

87

85 56

56

66

60

71

75

72

75

74 73

76

71

70

73.55

483. Valino, Francisco M.

72

81

80

84 62

78

71

75

73.7

484. Varela, Dominador M.

67

75

81

86 72

57

81

70

73.85

485. Vega, Macairog L. de

78

62

79

87 70

70

71

65

73.8

MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D.

486.

71

80

74

85 60

66

76

76

71.85

487. Velez, Maria E.

73

70

89

80 56

50

72

67

71.05

MRP- Venal, Artemio V.

488.

78

91

58

67 76

55

75

73

73.65

69

81

74

85 62

66

72

77

77.05

MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J.

479.

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U.

482.

489. Venus, Conrado B.

MRP- Verzosa, Federico B.

490.

75

79

72

88 76

68

74

59

73.7

MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V.

491.

75

83

70

76 64

64

75

65

71.2

MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C.

492.

75

85

79

88 66

77

67

70

73.95

73

69

70

88 76

66

69

50

70.75

80

85

67

77 62

75

76

73

73.15

495. Viterbo, Jose H.

80

77

65

93 70

65

65

65

70.65

496. Yaranon, Pedro

70

77

76

85 72

50

75

75

71.85

MRP- Yasay, Mariano R.

497.

75

75

72

76 63

77

70

60

71.1

MRP- Ygay, Venancio M.

498.

73

80

83

84 62

59

72

77

72.65

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro

73

82

78

75 60

81

75

75

73.95

500. Zamora, Alberto

70

65

76

79 62

77

69

82

71.3

501. Rigonan, Felipe C.

70

79

69

89 76

62

71

64

71.2

493. Villar, Custodio R.

MRP- Villaseor, Leonidas F.

494.

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous
examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and
averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials
MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Lan
d

Merc. Int. Pol. Crim Rem Leg. Gen.

.
.
Av.

1946

68

67

76

76 73

73

49

50

66.5

1950

59

80

67

77 62

80

71

57

67.4

1951

65

76

58

55 59

63

75

72

64.9

1952

65

68

75

84 72

59

73

57

69.75

1953

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

MRD-1949

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.15

1951

64

71

58

65 68

70

75

71

66.95

1950

71

80

62

75 75

81

55

92

69.3

1951

70

60

61

65 77

64

67

81

67.85

1. Amao, Sulpicio M.

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.

3. Blanco, Jose B.

4. Condeno, Mateo

5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRD-1949

69

70

76

73 76

71

55

60

68.65

1950

60

71

55

67 67

75

56

89

68.1

MRD-1949

60

70

82

79 70

69

60

80

69.25

1950

57

65

51

69 54

85

56

84

60.3

1946

63

53

69

76 75

76

57

69

66.55

1952

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

1949

72

68

68

75 75

72

60

75

69.35

1952

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

1951

61

60

58

60 70

63

75

64

64.8

1952

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

7. Luna, Lucito A.

8. Maraa, Arsenio s.

9. Montano, Manuel M.

1953

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

1950

25

75

45

75 45

52

46

71

46.2

1951

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

1952

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

1950

68

78

70

75 69

70

58

69

67.75

1951

65

62

75

60 73

57

75

71

66.8

1949

65

75

72

75 60

75

55

85

66.65

1951

68

57

48

60 91

66

55

75

64.05

1952

68

53

68

67 58

56

75

64

65.7

1952

67

80

51

69 69

77

73

53

66.35

1953

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

10. Pea, Jesus S.

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

1951

67

60

70

65 68

56

75

66

67.75

1952

70

71

67

78 67

75

71

70

70.1

1948

39

69

82

75 76

72

55

50

63.5

MRD-1949

67

56

69

75 72

77

60

75

68

1951

70

59

55

60 68

57

78

67

65.8

1952

62

76

54

82 72

77

66

65

66.65

1953

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

1951

60

64

55

70 68

52

70

75

62.85

1952

75

64

70

81 76

55

61

75

69.1

1953

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

16. Santos, Constantino

17. Santos, Salvador H.

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

MRD-1948

50

64

76

66 66

69

60

52

63.1

MRD-1949

47

66

78

64 71

86

65

85

68

1950

35

65

40

75 63

57

27

49

45

MRD-1951

68

59

72

55 69

65

75

75

69.3

1953

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for
reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates
separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic
act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int Pol. Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

1. Acenas, Calixto R.

73

70

68

62 82

51

67

77

73.45

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Alejandro, Exequiel

67

72

71

75 80

76

75

77

73.4

4. Andres, Gregorio M.

70

73

86

58 79

50

71

78

72.7

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E.

66

80

76

58 79

68

77

81

73.4

6. Asis, Floriano U. de

66

78

75

81 77

55

73

69

71.25

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M.

71

65

76

68 76

50

75

70

70.95

8. Bala, Florencio F.

64

82

47

70 82

58

75

82

67

9. Baldo, Olegario A.

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

10. Barrios, Benjamin O.

65

71

76

75 80

62

83

73

73.95

11. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

12. Burgos, Dominador C.

72

80

89

61 66

37

69

68

70.05

13. Cario, Eldo J.

79

81

60

75 74

74

76

74

73

14. Casar, Dimapuro

67

73

84

79 77

61

71

74

73.35

15. Castaeda, Gregorio

70

73

80

71 75

70

73

78

73.95

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R.

67

79

64

73 82

62

71

74

70.2

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C.

70

72

68

69 77

60

76

74

71.1

18. Feril, Domingo B.

75

71

84

65 70

60

65

70

71.6

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)

76

80

86

77 64

74

66

69

73.9

21. Garcia, Rafael B.

70

86

70

75 73

63

73

75

71.65

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de

73

68

75

59 80

51

72

71

71

23. Gungon, Armando G.

68

76

76

84 77

57

77

83

73.6

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S.

68

77

66

70 72

59

71

74

69.1

25. Ilejay, Abraham I.

77

70

76

77 81

62

70

68

73.7

26. Leon, Benjamin La. De

66

66

75

70 77

55

71

82

70.35

27. Lugtu, Felipe L.

62

70

78

65 78

56

69

81

69.9

28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid

76

64

67

69 73

59

73

75

70.45

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.

77

76

68

68 71

51

75

78

70.85

30. Maloles, Julius G.

77

71

60

71 79

62

68

72

69.75

31. Mandi, Santiago P.

65

76

70

61 79

68

75

72

71.1

32. Margete, Rufino C.

70

76

66

75 85

73

71

75

72.75

33. Melocoton, Nestorio B.

70

81

73

78 83

52

72

75

72.35

34. Molina, Manuel C.

75

78

70

61 75

63

66

85

70.95

35. Muoz, Mariano A.

75

80

86

67 74

57

68

76

73.75

36. Navarro, Buenaventura M.

80

75

65

75 83

55

73

79

73

37. Nodado, Domiciano R.

60

67

67

50 70

50

56

75

61.7

38. Papas, Sisenando B.

65

62

71

61 70

56

66

67

66

39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando

63

75

71

62 83

67

70

72

70.4

40. Padula, Benjamin C.

70

77

54

62 74

78

75

68

69.05

41. Pasno, Enrique M.

78

72

66

54 71

58

72

78

69.85

42. Pea, Jr., Narciso

70

95

81

78 67

66

67

73

72.55

43. Peralta, Rodolfo P.

70

70

52

81 68

63

59

69

63.7

44. Pigar, Leopoldo R.

76

75

78

61 72

72

71

79

73.75

45. Publico, Paciano L.

68

69

76

76 70

59

74

67

70.6

46. Radaza, Leovigildo

75

78

76

61 77

50

71

86

72.2

47. Ramos, Bernardo M.

64

62

75

93 81

52

66

80

70.1

48. Rabaino, Andres D.

68

72

75

73 78

55

69

76

70.65

49. Ravanera, Oscar N.

70

77

80

71 82

62

69

78

73.6

50. Renovilla, Jose M.

65

75

80

68 79

52

62

78

69.5

51. Sabaot, Solomon B.

69

73

80

69 82

69

69

79

73.85

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S.

66

76

69

76 74

56

72

68

69.1

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O.

70

77

74

75 73

50

68

72

69.55

54. Vera, Federico V. de

60

61

47

77 69

50

67

77

60.9

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos

65

67

67

52 73

64

71

65

67.15

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)

63

70

56

75 68

54

70

77

64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int Pol. Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

1. Ala, Narciso

70

71

73

59 73

74

81

77

73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Arellano, Antonio L.

74

66

73

60 78

63

78

72

72.9

4. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

5. Calautit, Celestino R.

71

78

84

75 75

61

68

72

73.2

6. Casuncad, Sulvio P.

61

73

82

69 81

68

71

84

73.05

7. Enriquez, Pelagio y
Concepcion

84

69

76

75 82

50

58

79

72.05

8. Estonina, Severino

80

74

64

89 81

56

68

82

72.4

9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

10. Fernandez, Luis N.

70

75

77

75 78

67

72

73

73.35

11. Figueroa, Alfredo A.

70

75

87

78 75

50

68

68

72.3

12. Formilleza, Pedro

65

75

89

68 83

51

70

75

73.25

13. Garcia, Manuel M.

69

68

83

83 73

62

62

70

71

14. Grospe, Vicente E.

68

75

78

66 79

61

69

82

71.6

15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952)

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

16. Jacobo, Rafael F.

76

76

75

74 76

50

72

76

72.3

17. Macalindong, Reinerio L.

67

77

79

79 74

72

68

77

72.75

18. Mangubat, Antonio M.

70

70

78

61 80

74

62

70

71.45

19. Montano, Manuel M.

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

20. Plomantes, Marcos

73

67

74

58 68

70

76

71

71.6

21. Ramos, Eugenio R.

70

80

76

67 72

69

72

79

72.6

22. Reyes, Juan R.

71

73

77

76 81

59

72

74

73.2

23. Reyes, Santiago R.

65

78

83

60 76

75

70

70

72.9

24. Rivera, Eulogio J.

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

25. Santos, Constantino P.

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

26. Santos, Salvador H.

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

27. Sevilla, Macario C.

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

28. Villavicencio, Jose A.

78

75

70

67 69

77

64

77

73.2

29. Viray, Ruperto G.

76

73

76

73 80

58

68

83

73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who
have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since
1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law
to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections
14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a
rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due
credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of
this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain
from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not
be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed
the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the
firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers
only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between

each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is
more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects
at the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor
of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to
the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of
the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the
effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of
the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to
serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a
special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall
be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed.
The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It
reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose
of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to
74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all
parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the

preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well
as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing
what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the
passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should
be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which
they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or
vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability,
attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different
rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for
by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must
apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as
the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when
there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin
of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent
in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked
the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that,
with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned
dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which
it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as
No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because
lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the
interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is
used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate
admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the
Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination,
the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power
to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with
this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per
cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination,
is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is
an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing
grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because
it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently
to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of
successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion

for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average
of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in
addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect
made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being
noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from
69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but
said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later
bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of
law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners
before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid
by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the
will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953
bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and
failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt
had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations
and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII,
section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to
the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to
the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In
my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by
flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when
they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the
law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no
longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent
had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the
reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public
hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for
the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor
of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar
after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said
statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar
admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per
cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to
pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it
in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and
August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this
Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the

1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is
addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators,
loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because
lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the
interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is
used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate
admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the
Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination,
the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power
to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with
this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per
cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination,
is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is
an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing
grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because
it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling

below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently
to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of
successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion
for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average
of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in
addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect
made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being
noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from
69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but
said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later
bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of
law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners
before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid
by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the
will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953
bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and
failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt
had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations
and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII,
section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to
the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to
the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In
my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by
flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when
they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the
law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no
longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent
had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the
reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public
hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for
the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor
of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar
after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said
statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar
admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per
cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to
pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it

in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and
August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this
Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the
1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is
addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators,
loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO
S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province
of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their

famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district
and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations. 8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected
to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides
that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects 13"shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The
committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made
by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the
same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the
areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the
mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or
civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government
councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions
that were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount each legislator
would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then
integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act. 17 In the
1960s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial
Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature," 19 the reprieve was only
temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the
article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports, 20 it was under the SLDP that
the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman
receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to
the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the
city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as
those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood. 22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million
and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President,
to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it
has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they
could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be
made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President. 29 As
such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each,
and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in
the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be
published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated
herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda. 37 It
has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments,
they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers
themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38Examples of these CIs are the Department of
Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works
Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building

Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative
district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and
the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special
provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the
GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before
PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in
the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly
allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other
personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the reenactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government
unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same single provision
was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless,
the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and
the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted. 53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept, 55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted 56 in 2006 and
hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently
integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification
of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the
DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly
required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress 61anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In
the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs
were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at
least P250 Million of the P500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings
shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven
track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same allocation was made
available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget. 63 Also, it was in 2007 that
the Government Procurement Policy Board64(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29,
2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations 65 of RA
9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter

into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article
included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President: Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard
projects" and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as
the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and
Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment
is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of
work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. 71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in
the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification,
as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project", 83 the
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by
Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD
1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. 90 It was in
1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the
kickbacks were SOP (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent
to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money
trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an
illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage." 94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos
from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While
the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers
chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the
several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of
the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the application of
these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of
the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co As findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103
Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009
GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to
the government.

 Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement
projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to P6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003
to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget,

lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23,
2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and
the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing
(1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of
even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica,
et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the
Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present
cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the
Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely
answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral
Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Courts
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b)
the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766,
and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24,
2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and

Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers;
(b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." 122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass
upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for

adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for
the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as
a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. 125 Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget,
and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage
of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during
the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that
(interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is
unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of
the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside
of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty
.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate,
and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or
this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the

situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have
never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous
whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of
the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is
also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of
note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs
disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the
Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on
the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA
Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of
these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be
guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014." 134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners
claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition
but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging." 137The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that "the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 138 Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v.
Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within
its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right
to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and
its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or
the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 144 To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is
by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed intention that
a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but,
in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best
interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards
achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert
that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these
cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls" 149 amplifies, in addition
to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis
which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and
LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held,
in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata
principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article
8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation
of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal
and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of

powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only
those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify
of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should
not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits
from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon
its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in
view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be
discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare
decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork
Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing
discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer
is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how
to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are
intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised
of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD
910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159
Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the

Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the funds utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a postenactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; 160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall
delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of
powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the others
performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,"
the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on
the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive." 176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft
of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1wphi1 In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179 They
state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive
the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist
on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate
their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion
to reject" the legislators proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the
power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows
the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional." 184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be
the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls
under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing
agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative
of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of
the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is
contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment
of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be ; and, second , paragraph 1,
also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process: 192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator
be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would
doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and
the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can
a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that
sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not
be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do
exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive
nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget
process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress
has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the
2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a
certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. 195 Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rulemaking).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People
v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate

system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item written into
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of itemveto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified
under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill
to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication." 205
Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of
the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must
determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it
is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branchs role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against
the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may
be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise
his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which
state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio
correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item veto power.
Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of
item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said
funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto.
As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as
not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises
non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to
meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress
to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. 214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion

PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. 215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation abovecharacterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable
ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners." 219 They also claim that
the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they
add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, to well, accelerate
the decisions of senators."220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are
designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is
the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another
office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF
for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action. 226Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy
which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The
decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and
budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a
worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based

on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even
the Vice-President who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment
authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law," an appropriation law may according
to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals
in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of
time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws,
such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The
word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the
sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular
form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary
and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service
contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if
the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund
to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00"
(also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed,
they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by
the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article
does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators
to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used." 243 Respondents, on the other
hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related
"to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines
for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that
a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only
to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the Executive department has,
in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the
avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already
been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same. 252 Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used
"to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he
may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to
support commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on
Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency
in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records
cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any

whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v.
Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare
the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the
Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latters duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any
petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the
conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of
significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as
not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition,
access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians reasonable regulations,viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executives Social Funds." 260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds.
In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for
the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF
funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments."
They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF
funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as
remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO should be
lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as
declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence,
from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether
or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount

during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments: 265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate
the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for
the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects
covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn
by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In
this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and
without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even
though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However,
these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored." 268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, nonoversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system
so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic
unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that
no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and
no others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively organized
into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may

be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time
this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment
Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by
this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to
the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners access to official documents already
available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Concurring Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

NO PART
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

I concur and also join the concurring opinion of

Justice Carpio.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to

my Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T. Carpio of

the ponencia
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

See Concurring Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED

VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). 3 It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization. 6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the

constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature
as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate
the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the
resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system
will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the
declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform
are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a
sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures
the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication.
And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of
the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete
legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal
stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The
grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And
where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of
the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the
needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily
obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. 15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere
conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty
hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To invalidate RA 9335
based on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but
also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as
well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws
against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in
detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence
of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or
mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary
measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners,
and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or
acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a
result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on

substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,20 this Court
declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.21 (emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the
law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the
BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and
subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by
the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24

xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the
management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have
the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all
ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 27 To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to fix
revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the
Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the

Excess the Revenue Targets

Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to

Accrue to the Fund

30% or below

15%

More than 30%

15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the

remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)
submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution
of the agencies revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the
collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes
the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration
of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations
promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation,
as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the
period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or
potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of
responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities orforce majeure or economic causes as may be

determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria
for the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to
the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays
down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with
due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least
two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed
by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot
and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance
its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered,
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative

authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Congress
has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform
their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and
report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
xxx

xxx

xxx

b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of
Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article
VI, xxx
xxx
xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny
and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of
a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the
legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to
the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this

arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of

unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our
law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could
be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative
power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing
post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether
its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive
or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers
as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They
submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize
only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive
proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions
of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority,
they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control
over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of
legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States
House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the aliens appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without
constitutional authority to order the aliens deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional
doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from
the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is
subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court
decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes
containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both
Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto
provisions were not even exercised.35(emphasis supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the
nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in
RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee
was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend
and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on
the constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system
of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power
in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members
with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, 39 including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation 40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains
a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in
the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power
as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. 44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility
for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what is left for
the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing
the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. 49 Such rules and regulations partake of the
nature of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not
pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power
unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is vested in Congress which consists
of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the
act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee
of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto
and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative
act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani
Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some
measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same
nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee
bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its
entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and
explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers 59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes
effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those
entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process
clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute
the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving
or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows
Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged
with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be
similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is
brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the
other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the
statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some
parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with
them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision
from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete,
intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is
shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de-Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,

CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12thCongress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No.
1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC, 14 like the
Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner
League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the
League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto." 15 Petitioners-inintervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as
Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds,
like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without
the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100
million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood
bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign
them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective
on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of
laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being
applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely
in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,

Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a
fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes.
Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they
prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the
letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the
cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section
450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality
into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress
cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a
city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations
in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through
a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent
Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress
become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the
next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13 th Congress, the bills
had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the
filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at
the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no
adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities,
have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on
the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal

protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled
and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities,
even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their
income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the
time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms,
Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at
a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and
may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples
are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent
to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings,
or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The
challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an
activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter
the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the
public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any
abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11thCongress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

*CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196271

October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E,
KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS
NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197392
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
DECISION

BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes" was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of
May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity;
House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous
regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully
establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the
basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 91401 - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA
No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to
join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333
was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013,
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement
of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6,
2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
1962713 - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari
Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The
law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition5 filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6 filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction 7 filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo
against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8 filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus 9 against the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity
Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated
July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the
consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit
their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No.
10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054
and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and
representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they
also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments
of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under
paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in
support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,10 which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to
the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. 11
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years. 12 This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.13
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,14 we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to
end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three
years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized
as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.1avvphil
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.15 As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as
this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and
again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution18 which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,19 explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in
the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the
bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic
Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14,
1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections.20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition
to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial
review.21
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while
the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches
of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. 22
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three
readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of
Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is in progress through the enactment process.23
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the
proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.
10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or
later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the
regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular
elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by
providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA
No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,24 leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, 25 RA
No. 8176,26 RA No. 8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and RA No. 901229 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 30to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9333,31 which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 905432 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of
majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served
to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as
they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and
a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within
its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication
by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself
or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures
or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the
plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous
regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous
regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement
in order to become effective,35 questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise
because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite
were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. 36
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the
Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress
must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact
already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the
synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides
is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law,
given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition. 37
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; 38 (2) to
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA
No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to
appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The firstis
the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of
elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 39 The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 40 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 41 Except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.42
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally
provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections
1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are
found "in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the
enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law."43
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution
constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters,
thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous
region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure
of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of
which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not
encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in
Section 17, Article X, "all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions
shall be vested in the National Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in
dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no
doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate
on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the abovequoted Section 17 and in Section 15.44 In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they
now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio45 in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are
recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling
force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country,
while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No.
10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period
between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21)
months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim

measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory
Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new 46 and for the
introduction of new concepts.47 As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards
the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look
far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would
entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the
creation of Quezon del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an
interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are
essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have
been elected and qualified.50 A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from a
sub-province to a province.51
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches
were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of
wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding
of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No.
10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted,
did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed
by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC: 52
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to
continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of
which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution." [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that
where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the
applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can
deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.53 If at all, Congress may
only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by

legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation
is appropriate and called for.54
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation
from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the
elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act
in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.55 Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. 56 Hence, holdover whichever
way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and
given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with
contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, 57 Adap v. Comelec,58 and Montesclaros v.
Comelec,59 where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the
ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms
fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,60 we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as
an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality
or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately
conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held
on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.63
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and
other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to
declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion.64 But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is
not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of
its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to
call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of
Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of
special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP
881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can
only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction
of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of
a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu
proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested
parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to electbut not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspendedbefore
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already
been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction
of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the

principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected
events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These "analogous causes" are further defined by the
phrase "of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible."
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do
not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspendedbefore
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in
Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended
because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is
pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or
Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure,
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and
this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the
power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, 67 is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,68 and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President69 in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is
that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. 70 More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In
sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead
of acting on their term (where the "term" means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the "tenure" represents
the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office). 72 As with the fixing of the elective term, neither
Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an
unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by
the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any
attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order
to be recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. 74
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law
facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No.
10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be "elective
and representative of the constituent political units." This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose nonobservance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic
law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does
is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected
in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality
is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. 75 Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to
adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and
based on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the
unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the
choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would
extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not "democratic
and republican." For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically
withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the "elective
and representative" governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA
No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for
the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community,
the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and
as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local
government units76 and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.77 These measures, too, are
used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional
interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of
the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim
measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the "elective" aspect
shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms
in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not
violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in
the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress,
not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect
to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA
No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be
transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of
elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress
to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration
of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to
2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new
ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current teach
us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span

of time in the way they transpired in the past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting
ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away
with even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute
necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:79
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President
is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur.
Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any
contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason
why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated
or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor
is missing.80 (Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of
basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding
to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that
there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy
such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis
valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, 81 and one mandate should not be given
importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.82 We refer to the Courts
declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,83 thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that
may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that
this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any
way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local
elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of
the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national
government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination.
As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the
nation.84[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be
unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to "make it clear, once
and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are
actually to be exercised by the national government[.]" 85 Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Hon. Aguirre86 which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns.
Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it;
the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance
with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and
local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress
undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.87 As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it.88
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping
the exclusive prerogative of Congress.89 The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special
elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial

legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government the
separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting
RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.90
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave
abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every
statute is presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the
party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. 92 Any reasonable doubt
about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.93 As this Court declared inGarcia v.
Executive Secretary:94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must
support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment
of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on the

power of the Pres. to appoint OIC-Governor of
ARMM
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of Justice Velasco

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Velasco

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089

October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill

which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are
separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of
the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province
of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of
which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall
comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos,
and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and
Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Katbo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act
4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second.

The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." 3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In
fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to
its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And
this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the
following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details
set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the
purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind
by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and
(2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not
be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another

of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those
of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not
in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that
the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were
not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said
provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly
germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a
different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a
natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the
two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648,
649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of
Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the
following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is
hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void
by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control,
including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which
reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree
voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity.
The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and
that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the
words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the
purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in
the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took
away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.
Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part
is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature
would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . .
Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since
the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the
towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out
the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision
of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill
1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine
barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality
of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the
consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with
the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate
obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to
these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to
impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say
that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent
beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on

legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast
Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if
these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that
petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the
subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial
rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is
residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that
the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in
this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it
was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his
actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into
the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the
rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a
lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit,
amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to
vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission
from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23326

December 18, 1965

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B.

GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M.
SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves
and for other petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators
and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated
under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of
the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and
from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the
House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise
restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office
from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement of the
members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the
constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the
title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary
for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree,
while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service,
which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836

The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years
of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and the
payment of the corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof,
without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the
highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee
has been in the service of the said employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his
retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective
officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member,
he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of
Representatives, and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he must have served the
government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of which must have been rendered as such
elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of
Representatives, or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four
years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be
neither liable to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its
appropriations or saving in its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may
have to their credit at the time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963.
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and
contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the
petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the
Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.

4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are authorized to approve
vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to be
presented for payment under said items, were not included in the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature
of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R.
Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same
date, it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No.
3129, recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as
filed representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to
retirement under the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted,
namely, "AND THE SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR
REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed amendments was approved on
second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate,
which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended, will enable
them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a Member of
Congress. This gratuity will insure the security of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter
engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is
expected that with this assurance of security for his loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men
will be attracted to serve their people in Congress.
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of
the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be
eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the
House of Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least
twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity
payable by the employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the
government. Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This Court has
not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the
petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests,
they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of
life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things,
that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public

funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the
taxpayers."1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in
the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any
payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of equity.
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis
supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section
14 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems andother
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in
the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case
of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions
upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective
seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have
been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress;
(Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and

6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is
accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to
have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution
authored by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and
prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the and
balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We
conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without
violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the
compensation act including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at
P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional
amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two
bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the
salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies
a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to
increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the
Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the
temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified
by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 1940 2
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other
emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefits as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office,
as salary, fees and perquisites.3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and
perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition
or significance of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit,
or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d.
897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548,
138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are part of compensation of public
officials; otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional.

In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of
the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of
which have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the
expiration of his term of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but
includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such
office and performed some service required of the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are
patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of
provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered
cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case
ofPeople v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be reasonable must be based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the
requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the
benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not
reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [193862], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve
years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits
after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their
length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits
or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is
suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic
Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws
have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System. 4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress
are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the
Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the
benefits of retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the
Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed
in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional
provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the
public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of
Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer
of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and
he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid P210,000.00.
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the
House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P300,000.00
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,300,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for
the Senate:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid P100,000.00.
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement
Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the
House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,200,000.00.

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service
regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In
other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers,
such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed
in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is
satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be
a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably
construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a
practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.
(Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained inCentral
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as
the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also
extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the
public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this
provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not
conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
pp. 162-164;5 See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is
void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase
in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title
of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so
far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional.
The restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ.,concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177508

August 7, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST,

represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction2 filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) 3and enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December
2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before
the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and
Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that
RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 4 Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections
34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful
validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both
maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare
Section 43 as unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate
shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided That, candidates for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket
shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in accordance
with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos
(400.00).
"There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political parties excluding
the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the said
parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the
following circumstances:
"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed them, taking into
account, among other things, their showing in past election;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the date of
election;
"(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and strengths."
2. Section 37 which provides:
SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President: The
Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination of Authenticity
and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice president and senators,
respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each
certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass
contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator, as the case may be, and
their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; (3) there exits no

discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as
statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the certificate; and (4) there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered
by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may
be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city of district, appears
to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as the case may be, shall require the
board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the election returns form polling places that were
not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by
personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct
bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may
affect the result of the election, upon requested of the presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidate
concerned or his party, Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for president, vice president or senator, count the votes as they appear in
the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the procedure on preproclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section 17,18,19 and 20.
"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of
votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes bearing a simulated
certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense shall be penalized in accordance with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881."
3. Section 38 which provides:
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for president, vice president, senator, and member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as
provided for in Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body
motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns before it.
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or
directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila
Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the respective proceedings."
4. Section 43 which provides:
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power,
concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution;
Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI5 and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII6 of the
Constitution;
Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 7 and
Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.8
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional.9 The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one;
otherwise, the petition must fail.10
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections
34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which
deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent,
credible, fair, and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. 11 The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve.12 The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the
matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 13 Moreover, a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act
need not be further stated.14
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and
in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and
Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166
and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Clearly, the subject matter of
RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), 15 Republic Act No. 7166 (RA
7166),16 and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and
accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific
provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA
7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed
provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner, under the amended
provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President

(Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election
of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and
Senators. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc
undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and
application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness,
erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that
Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective
posts.1avvphi1
OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts.
According to the OSG,
only Section 15 of RA 716617 expressly disallows pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts but this
provision was subsequently amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC,18 we already discussed the implications of the amendments introduced by Sections 37
and 38 to Sections 15 and 3019 of RA 7166, respectively and we declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15
and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates
of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to
treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a preproclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies to such a case
the same procedure provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation
controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there
are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution
of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369.20
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET
and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc,
on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different
purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once
the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other
hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power
before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43
is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the
COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.21
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the "exclusive power"
to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.

Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to "investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices." This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision
was not in the 193522 or 197323 Constitutions.24 The phrase "[w]here appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power
to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other
prosecuting arms of the government.
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That
in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)
This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such
"exclusive power" was ever bestowed on the COMELEC. 25
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the
COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.26 The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution were to give the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the
framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.
In People v. Basilla,27 we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants
and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be
possible.28 In COMELEC v. Espaol,29 we also stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its
workload, the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to
prosecute such cases.30 The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 31 Thus, given the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP
881, such law does not violate the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and
dominant minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to
contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner
adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to
previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired.

Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a
contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the
solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be
regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll
watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this
was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the
election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws
that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties.32 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes
new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the
parties.33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable
obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007
elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. 34 The constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 140535 specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers:
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the space reserved for them inside the polling place. They shall have the
right to witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the board; to take notes of what they may see or hear,
to take photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the counting of votes, as well as the election
returns, tally board and ballot boxes; to file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe
may have been committed by the board or by any of its members or by any person; to obtain from the board a
certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of the resolution thereon; to read the ballots after they shall have
been read by the chairman, as well as the election returns after they shall have been completed and signed by the
members of the board without touching them, but they shall not speak to any member of the board, or to any voter,
or among themselves, in such a manner as would disturb the proceedings of the board; and to be furnished, upon
request, with a certificate of votes for the candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and all the
members of the board of election inspectors.
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if available, affix their
signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct. 36 The dominant majority and minority parties
shall also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass37 and election returns38 through their respective poll
watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in the elections.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may
deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.39
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health,40 we said:
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must
be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional because the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with
the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that
poll watchers not only guard the votes of their respective candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the

votes are properly counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that
the elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the poll watchers of the
dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general welfare of the community and is a valid exercise of
police power.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 188179

January 22, 2013

HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known
as the Fair Election Act. The present Petition also seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
further implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fa1r Election Act, on the ground that these provisions would
enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds from the time they file
their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.
On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair
Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: "Every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner avers that

these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section
12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed,
while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of
elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that
which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the Petition and argues
inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Farias v. Executive Secretary.1
Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr., and Ricardo L. Baes Jr. filed their respective petitions-inintervention,2which essentially reiterated the ratiocinations of Giron.
Issue
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule.
Ruling
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislation,3 as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law.4 Because of this strong
presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. 5
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we find that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable
to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of
the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in Farias, in which
we have already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects
other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Below is a reproduction of our
exhaustive exposition on the matter in the 10 December 2003 En Banc Decision: 6
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SECTION 67. Candidates holding elective office.
Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
xxxx
The proscription under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision
merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of
principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to
reply, for public information campaigns and for among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subjectone title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.
xxxx
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title
is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. (Emphases supplied
and citations omitted)
The reasoning behind Farias similarly applies to the claim of unconstitutionality with respect to Section 12 of the
Fair Election Act. The questioned provision reads:
SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed,
the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole
ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the
substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the
same family name, this provision shall not apply.
To give a contextual background, we observe that Congress consciously looked for a more generic title in order to
express the thrust of the law. Below is an excerpt from the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations: 7
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. x x x x. First of all, we will need to answer when we get back to our own chamber what it is
that there seems to be a rider here that does not seem to be pertinent or relevant to the...germane to the spirit. And
in fact that title and the purpose for this very Act -It is an Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections through fair election practices.

It is the opinion of many of us in the House that this should be the subject of another legislation rather than a rider
"kuno" on legislation that is...that refers totally to a different subject matter. So thats one. x x x x
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Okay. May we jump a little ahead of ourselves, no. But I think its necessary to get a little
ahead so that we can be enlightened as to how this will fit, these particular things will fit into the whole pie, no. So,
what sort of title then would emanate so as to accommodate a subject matter which under the present title or the
proposed titles or the title from the House or the title from the Senate would seem to be more appropriately the
subject of another legislation?
May I draw on the experience of the Chairman for this, please?
CHAIRMAN ROCO. Yes. We really studied that very carefully and we weighed, and thats why we recommended as
a last thing was fair election practices, and we combed in fact the laws. It becomes fair election practices. We went
through all the different laws pa kung meron pa kaming maii-spot na unfairness para ipapasok pa, pero wala na eh.
The unfairness were in the opportunity lang to run and then youre disqualified when you run for something else.
Ngayon we restrict it only for President and Vice President. You forfeit...its the reverse really of the present law. x x
x x.
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Okay. So do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that we can find an appropriate title for this so that it
will not stick out like a sword and seem to be inappropriate as part of the whole body?
CHAIRMAN ROCO. Will you feel comfortable with fair election practices? Baka okey na because its really fair na. x
x x x.
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. So if the scope can be widened so as to cover this as well, then it should be all right.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to clarify. So all were looking for now is appropriate
title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision. Is that correct? CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Were looking for
an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE. Because I really do not believe that it is out-of-place. I think that even with the term FAIR
ELECTION PRACTICE it really covers it. Because as expressed by Sen. Roco, those conditions stated earlier
seemed unfair and it is an election practice and therefore, I think Im very comfortable with the title FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICE so that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean
its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides
for fairness in election practices as the title implies. x x x x.
CHAIRPERSON MARCOS. Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of
provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that indulge
full coverage. It says, AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, etcetera
ELECTIONS through fair election practices. But as we said we will put that aside to discuss later on.
Secondly, I think the declaration of principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2, is perfectly adequate and that it
says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely, this provision in Section 67 of the old Election
Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination.1wphi1 And so I think that in
the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider. x x x x.
CHAIRMAN ROCO. Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this but we are looking for a title
that is more generic so that then we have less x x x of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the theory. So,
there is acceptance of this. Maybe we should not call it nga limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say,
special provision on elected officials. So, how is that? Now, also, then we say On the short title of the Act, we
say (unfinished) x x x x.
CHAIRMAN ROCO. It's done. So, okay na iyun. The title will be FAIR ELECTION ACT. The rest are wala nang
problema, ana? Wala na. Wala na. (Italics and boldface supplied)

What the above discussion tells us is that Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After
combing through various laws, they found other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of these
practices included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates and the ipso facto
resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing
field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they determined were unfair election practices; hence, the
birth of the Fair Election Act.
After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we find that the assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and
Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The
title was worded broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we
dismiss the Petition and the petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.
On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise various arguments that we deem are
matters of policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate that the power of this Court is limited to
the interpretation of the law. Judicial power does not include the determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness,
or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the Court may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress
that is empowered by the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we feel that petitioner's
reasoning would be best addressed by the legislature.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On wellness leave)

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, VicePresident for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila,
ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of
all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts
throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is
itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the
same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge,

because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but
in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by
the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar
as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have
first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is
clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore
be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered
flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall
cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the
expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may
properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which
the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the
way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section
in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations
connected therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute;
and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one
case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which
repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within
the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition,
violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of
both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the
second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate
and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving
the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by
rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell,
1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification
by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas andnays on the final reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such

official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary,
it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the
Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office;
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors;
the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language;
the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1.,
of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting
mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon,
by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care
or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments
the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used
for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even
some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee
for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that
has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that
needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the
franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from
January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank
mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails
coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total
amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from
the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended
only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who
need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery
although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem
is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created
and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in
exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its
charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is
supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10,
on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will
cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of
the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by
the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for
communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation
in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for
1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased
difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their
judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or
things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article
3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our
ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life
in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can
only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light
to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20740

June 30, 1964

BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, CHRONICLE BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., and

MONSERRAT BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDO VALENCIA, Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications and
ROBERT SAN ANDRES of the Radio Control Division, respondents.

V. J. Francisco, A. Almeda and San Juan, Africa Benedicto for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Enrique Fernando as amicus curiae.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao
Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners
and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works
and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as
operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor
having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
From the various pleadings presented by the parties including their written memoranda as well as the oral
arguments adduced during the hearing of this case, the issues presented to the Court for resolution are: (1) whether
the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their
station licenses, has any legal basis; (2) whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3) whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service
can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations
thereof. 1wph1.t
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications (formerly Commerce And Communications), provides:
SEC. 3.
(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license; Provided, however,
That no application for renewal shall be disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing.
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents allegedly are now conducting the investigation in connection
with the petitions for renewal.
The notices of hearing, sent by respondents to petitioners, in connection with the applications involved herein, are
uniformly worded, thus:
(Name of station operator)
____________________
(Address)
____________________
____________________
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your application for renewal of your radio station license No. ____________ authorizing you to
operate (Name of station), a (broadcast or TV) station, which expired on (Expiration date of previous license.)
It is noted that said application was received in this Office on (Date of receipt of application) or (length of period
delay) month after said license has expired which is a clear violation of Section 12 and 14 of Department Order No.
11, which is hereunder quoted:
"SEC. 12. License Required for Operation of Transmitter, Transceiver, or Station. No radio transmitter
or radio station shall be operated without first obtaining from the Secretary of Public Works &
Communications a radio station license.

"SEC. 14. When to Apply for Renewal. If renewal of a station license is desired, the licensee shall
submit an application to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications two (2) months before the
expiration date of the license to be renewed. Application should be made on prescribed forms furnished for
the purpose."
Please take notice that on January 28, 1963, at 9:00 a.m., the matter will be heard before the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, at the Conference Room, Office of the
Secretary, Third Floor, Post Office Building, Plaza Lawton, Manila (Commonwealth Act No. 3846, Sec. 3. subsection
h). Your failure to appear at the said hearing will be construed as a waiver on your part to be heard and this Office
shall forthwith act on said application in accordance with existing Radio Laws, Rules and Regulations.
Very truly yours,
s/ Jose L. Lachica
t/ JOSE L. LACHICA
Acting Undersecretary
Also, passing upon petitioners' motion for dismissal of the aforementioned investigation conducted by respondents it
was ruled, thus:
The present hearing, as the notices quoted above show, is precisely the hearing required by Section 3 (1) of
Act 3846, as amended. It is an indispensable step in the processing of application of licenses when and if
summary approval for one reason or another, real or fancied, could not be given as in the instant case.
Certainly, the respondents (movants) themselves would be the first ones to raise their voice of protest if their
application for renewal were to be summarily disapproved, without benefit of any hearing. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for
renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the ground for the disapproval of the applications, is the
alleged late, filing of the petitions for renewal. The notices to petitioners (which in effect take the place of complaint
in civil or administrative cases or an information in a criminal action) alleged only one supposed violation which
would justify, disapproval. But petitioners claim that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July 24, 1962, which in its pertinent
part, reads:
CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS,
MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO TRAINING
SCHOOLS
It has come to the attention of this Office that a great number of radio station operators have been conducting their
operations resorting to practices which are in violation of existing radio laws and regulations, such as:
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. Late submission of applications for new and renewal licenses.

It is no the intention of this Office to correct whatever laxity which in the put has encouraged this illegal practices, to
strictly others the radio regulations and to take drastic action against violators of these regulations.

You are, therefore, requested to examine closely your operating practices, permits and licenses and take remedial
measures as soon as possible but not later than August 10, 1962.
(SGD.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES
Radio Regulation Chief
APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. Feliciano
Undersecretary
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that the previous non-observance by station
operators of radio laws and regulations of the Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among
others, was condoned if the necessary steps were taken to correct their records and practices before August 10,
1962. It is not denied that herein subject applications for renewal were all made before said date, or even before the
issuance of the circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners'
applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and,
hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. The raison d'etre for it has disappeared. Its
continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation of the law authorizing investigations in connection with
applications for renewal of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon violations of the radio control regulations
cannot be upheld. Firstly, by specific provision of law,1 the respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion
either to "bring criminal action against violators of the radio laws or the regulations and confiscate the radio
apparatus in case of illegal or simply suspend or revoke the offender's station or operator licenses or refuse to
renew such licenses; or just reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited circular specifically approved by the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications (who has not been shown to have acted beyond his powers
as such in representation of the Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act authorized under the
law. Secondly, the circular having been issued by respondents themselves, the latter can not now claim its illegality
to evade the effect of its enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by petitioner CBN of its right to operate on
Channel 9. It is admitted that there was no express agreement to this effect. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9",
appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued
to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control authority
and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10. As explained
by petitioner, it was made to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in connection with the planned transfer
of its station to Baguio, was to be effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to avoid
interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force Base station in Pampanga, which is operating on
Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to
operate. When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean abandonment by the
station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks appearing in the construction permit No. 793, issued to the
Philippine Broadcasting Service that "construction of this station shall be begun after DZXL-TV (Channel 9) Manila
of Chronicle broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved." It is claimed that upon the approval of the
request to transfer, the petitioner was deemed to have renounced or abandoned on Channel 9. This statement
cannot bind petitioner. In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause "Chronicle broadcasting Network's
permit to transfer is approved" was merely played by respondent's personnel after erasing the original words written
therein. And, it does not appear what were really written there before the erasure. In the second place, CBN had no
participating in the preparation of said permit. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an inter alios acta which can
not bind it. And, finally, the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue operating on Channel 9
even after the approval of its proposed transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that

channel upon the approval of its petition to transfer. There being no proof that petitioner had really waived or
renounced its right to operate on Channel 9, respondents committed error in refusing to grant or approve petitioner's
application for renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state that it having failed to prove the
alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right
belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give up its present operation of Channel 9.
However, it may also be added that as the records show, the appropriation to operate Philippine Broadcasting
Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines, was
provided as follows:
PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, including promotion, programming,
operations and general administration; Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation
of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television stations. ... P300,000.00.
xxx

xxx

xxx

VI SPECIAL PROVISIONS
1. ...
xxx

xxx

xxx

5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General Fund shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television stations. (Emphasis supplied).
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President included the following in his veto
message:
(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
IV SPECIAL PURPOSE
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, ...: Provided, That no portion of this
appropriation shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where
there are television stations.
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General Fund shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television stations.
These two provisions if approved will render inoperative the television stations currently operated by the Philippine
Broadcasting Service which started last September, 1961, in Manila.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill.
However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto
the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)

It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the
Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for
operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television stations. This gives
rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough
authority to guide action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was already declared that such
action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. 3 If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever,4and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station
in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for
the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to
prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ prayed for by petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1123

March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose
W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of
both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto." The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and
the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the
facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose
it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by
a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election
of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned
resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court
has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in
the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness
of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely
academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their
operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on
the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by

express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty
lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further
held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an
amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not
subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted
that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only)
two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding
that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed,
or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital
force from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an
established form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The
means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their
constitution in the mode prescribed by the instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A.,
N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive
upon the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution.
However, whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification
conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a
type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the
"political department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all
other officers, citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an
amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has
taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be
accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the
extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments, we are unable to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements
upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or
whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are
all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably
embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were
intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted
amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions"
of whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently
reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead
because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial branches
of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to
Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely
to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the
same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court a point which not having been
raised by the parties herein we will not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of
the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees
the matter as political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66
Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine
and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S.
Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the
plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of
action because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of
course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That
private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has
been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court."
"Private damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as
well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with
the conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact
amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45
Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this
matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my
Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament
cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary
controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies who are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for
different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted surely are

matters that not merely concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has
any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12
S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are
they matters of "private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have
courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been
doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White
has not been sought to be put to purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators
have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court
should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the
fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United
States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions
which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at
the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case.
Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our
labor in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one
members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to
erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon
the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress
in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was
introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of
whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his
vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had
been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and
that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had
lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the judgment of
the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it
being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his
relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant
Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted
to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and
third, the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.

The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally
divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the
conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise
of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its
control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution
has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions
raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable;
that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed
by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court
was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be
reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas,
on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that
part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly
queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below
and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices
who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right
of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court
would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did
happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or
is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking
in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of
irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have
required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of the
case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of
numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have
changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are
not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It
is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which
favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Fieldvs. Clark, 36 Law.
ed., 294.)

If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the
rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents
may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to
pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments
under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost
decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the
enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and
it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the
frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also
one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to
look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which
might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence
of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that
these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act
of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might
not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more
mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should
look at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the
Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it
has any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the
enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the
test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws
which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain
than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We
have before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if
the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated,
the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of
this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be
at the mercy of all persons having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in
Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition

of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and
political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that
the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to
say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with
faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot
authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer,
J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted
jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenthcentury law in form to be used in a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in
the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e.,
the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action,
says:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are
bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if
therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds,
this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals
may not represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown
beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact
was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted
upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal
as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in
short, is to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly
enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members
present is not allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable,
after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any
cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes
into the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and
practical convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and
pushed only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose
defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests
on the fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the
Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly
a large field of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may
remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such
provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for
a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to
act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be
had by imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia
whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in
truth he has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief?
Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in
their belief certain conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that
the Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the
Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not
consult one; what is to be done?

These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be
treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions
in matters leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience
of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the
same nature as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to
vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole
Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature
alone, in the latter case as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the
function of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them
a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4
Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out
whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed
before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the
copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it
"passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its
passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each
other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."

In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and
representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of
Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931

February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95.
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said
fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding

lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor the
aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of
the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the
corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit
and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the
Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from
the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as
"ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of
the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity,
and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs.
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games &
Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses
the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;

Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29658

November 29, 1968

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,

vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as captain in the police department of a
city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police.
The question calls for an interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic
Act 4864):

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a
city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the
rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position.
Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief
of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation
of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and
called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filling of a
vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan
newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants
should possess.
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and
qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his
service alone as captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment.
The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed
the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel
the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR
(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's
insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police
department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police service on a professional
level,"1 and contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good
policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel
"meets the test of professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not see how the requirement of a college
degree as additional qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think

that the requirement of such additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument
lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who has served long and loyally in a city police agency and
another who, not having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue
rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have
educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in
a provincial, city or municipal police agency although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service
examination are considered as civil service eligibles for the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency
is considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a
bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification.
For the statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack
of educational qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of apolice agency only. On the
other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which
states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification:
Provided, further, That in no case shall such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid
cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the
case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of
police. On the contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally
appointed2 chief of police "[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational qualification," the Act
makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an
indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary
record or as a captain in a city police department for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in
which a person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law considered the equal of another
who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a city police agency for at least three years. From this it is
concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and Police
Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been
rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel
acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the
NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the petitioner's argument that a
person who has served as captain in a city police department for at least three years need not have a bachelor's
degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case would there still
be need for a person to be at least a high school graduate provided he has had at least eight years of service as
captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of
the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and
service qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original

provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now
section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief of a police agency of a
province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a
bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second
class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the
police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree
course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case
shall such appointment exceed beyond six months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational and service qualifications that
the following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides
that the chief of a police agency of a province or a chartered city should be at least a member of the
Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in
Police Administration or Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum requirements; but I find such
requirement very rigid because it would not allow a man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose
from the ranks. He became a corporal, a sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher?
If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of police of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of the bill because it is a very
high qualification. However, somebody insisted that in order to professionalize our police system and also to
attain a high standard of police efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The
point which the gentleman is now raising was brought up by one Member in the sense that a policeman who
rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving for fifteen or twenty years in the police
force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up during the
period of amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is that
because I made a number of proposed amendments, I will not be ready to submit them immediately. We
should just limit ourselves to the sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the bill that objections were
expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this requirement during the period of amendment, no motion was ever
presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a
substitute measure.5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.

Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute
bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so
as to make the provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner
herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the
law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was dropped and only
the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and
painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the
President and found that the text of section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of
the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the
House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the
Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act must be deemed as
importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall
Field & Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill,
thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and
of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent department requires
the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 10

To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in
conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby
accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no
matter how long he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for
eight years irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who
holds an A.A. degree, completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14
years, holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he was awarded
three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional Commendation the highest award ever conferred in
the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading
it in the law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the
judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
much later wisdom may recomment the inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the past, and merely
carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to
courts and the extent to which interpreting law is inescapably making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for
appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty
and therefore may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes)
on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de
Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to
a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48
a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento,
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What
happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that
the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the
session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of
the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound
recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the
transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it
is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as
petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding,
the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the
years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule
XVI, 97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and
afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII,
109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point

of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption
of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained
upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by
the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the
enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House
and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art.
VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in
the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of
petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240
are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea
v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will

not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings
does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme
Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution
declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its
power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set
aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of
procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry
will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their
procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules
of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will.
If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in
case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not
been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner.
It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision
for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from
legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh

and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule
which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by
the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185;
In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark.
101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on
the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however,
to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for
the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII,
1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was
still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was
saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal
voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the
way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has
been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then
the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor
on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with
the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there
was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce
how many are in favor and how many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and
third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of
the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members
by yeas and nayshad already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of
Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say.
The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to
the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of
privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn
would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot
be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996,
only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on
H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by
which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved;
while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference
committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice
Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision
in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In
one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them
a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions
which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions
into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI.
26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow
an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed
from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members
(Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the
membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief
that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530

August 12, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to
wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the
value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together
and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in
the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing
that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from
a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been
arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in
Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed
upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the elaborate
printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's
motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record
establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be
punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last
day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative
journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. These questions
will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be
required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative
Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission
shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct
journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary
and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a
Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner
Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine
Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the
journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p.
1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially

recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the
subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same
Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That
in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a
copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take judicial
notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts
in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44
Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take
judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals
are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that
the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence
as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the
purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is
clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws
of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight
on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous
evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as
to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature
and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any
matter in question or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the
fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the
appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of
witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature
and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an
adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these
considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the
laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in
1886, said:

Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question; and, out of a
multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the
legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a
law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not
generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public
policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent,
that right acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the
American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later
date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states,
we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain,
bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte.
Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office
and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five
barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as
follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to
the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to
the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery.
Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had
been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants, and having
some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of
April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the
shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to
arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived
at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the
two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded
in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart.
This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twentyfive and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano.
This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their
investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date
before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed under
arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels
could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents
that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The
agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found the five missing barrels,
which were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were
empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in size to
the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime
scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these
baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was discovered which bore
the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No.
144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon investigation, to be
Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the
lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia,
by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty

barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to
contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin contained
75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found at
144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons,
apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to
the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed
his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle
General Solano represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels
contained the opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel,
which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium
taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a
Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that the house at No.
144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the
prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that
he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs agents then went with Pons to his
house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General
Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco
merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and
admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that
Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a
house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter
arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because he feared
that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from Beliso, in
receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia
told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto
Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him from
Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and
profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in
similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity
as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF
MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES
TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO
QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE
VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R.
Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil
Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065,
"An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the
Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known
as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed
by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment,
suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal
Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266
had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the

amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were
the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House
Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified
and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four
printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on
June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew
immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually
passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate
floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July
11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress
and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July
21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the
bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill
No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of
Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this
Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil
Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply
with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually
passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court
issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any
of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic
Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this
Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila.
Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and
have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and
State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule
should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions

in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the
Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest
and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the
(1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed
by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article
XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F.
Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of
the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied
upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds
the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had
jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution
and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by
Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the
only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in
the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either
house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary,
printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of
their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this
procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him
has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is
therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such
attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are
mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be
in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is
less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide
that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this
provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding
officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in
the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch

of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that
all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated
in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is
not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof
of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as
to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the
presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the
last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in
this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it
invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers.
It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both
Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final
passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the
proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not
affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This

argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the
effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While
it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is
irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances
of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that
error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN
ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF
MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining
order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.