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MENS LEGISLATORIS
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow.
As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called
upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant
Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold
its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as
yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was
appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response
that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between
common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary
to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question,
she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to
defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the
Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did
not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on
November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The
plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;
(2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February
20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the
donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made
during the common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendantdone and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married
on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being
the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an
KAPUNAN, J.:
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in
a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity
and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede
ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent
was not illegal under the said act. 10
Contrary to law.
We disagree.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,"
provides:
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of
life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.
17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MUTUC,
petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,
2
which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters,
fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed
that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November
3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.
Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the
election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a
minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of
statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of
the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction
placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious
doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech
of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for,
respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited
from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order
banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us
was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify
such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was
granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one
of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent
Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the wellknown principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain
a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission
was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than
repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain
4273, Ormoc Cadastre be reopened, and that they be allowed to file their
cadastral answer.
On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition on the
ground that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening
cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on December 31, 1968
and this period has not been extended under the provisions of Rep. Act 6236
because the latter applies only to the extensions of time limit for the filing of
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972, denied the opposition for lack
of sufficient merit and set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.
On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the decision
of the cadastral court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No. 4273 public
land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents in undivided
interest in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed this instant
petition assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings.
In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
proceedings for reopening of the cadastral case because under the provision of
Rep. Act 931, the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings expired on
December 31, 1968, and that period has not been extended by Rep. Act 6236
which applies only to the extension of the time limit for the filing of applications
for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and
not to reopening of cadastral proceedings. In the Manifestation and Motion, 3
respondents Aotes claim that considering the time limit for firing applications for
free patents and for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles has
been extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases
should also be extended until December 31, 1980 in fairness and justice to them.
The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is whether or not Rep.
Act 6236 which provides for the extension of the time limit to file applications for
free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1976 applies also to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
certain lands which were declared public lands.
There is merit in the petition.
By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was approved on June 20, 1953, is
and the natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had intended
that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it
would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to
file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings
or certain lands which were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer
by reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases,
but not so included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which is the
sole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from
"filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September 28, 1940, the
respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also to
reopening of cadastral proceedings, thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That cannot
be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to the
legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals: 5 "It has
been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law,
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions
have consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, no
interpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written, 7 for application is
the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal application is
impossible or inadequate. 8
More importantly, the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain the
petition filed by respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings because the
latter, as we have noted, did not file the aforesaid petition within the period fixed
by the applicable laws to wit: Rep. Act 931 and 2061. Consequently, the decision
dated September 30, 1940 of the Cadastral Court declaring the land in question a
public land has become final and conclusive. It has also acquired the status of res
judicata. It must be remembered that generally, the fundamental principle of res
judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration or
cadastral proceedings. 9 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from
relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.
It is well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between
the same parties on the subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not
only as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to every
other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit. 10
Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem,
Although the title of Jesus Vao over said Lot 1-B is not as yet indefeasible, no
decree having been issued in his favor, all rights, interests or claims existing
before said date are deemed barred by said decision, under the principle of res
judicata, once the decision become final, upon expiration of the thirty-day period
to appeal therefrom. 13
By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that Rep.
Act 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and as a
consequence, the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the petition of the
respondents Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions dated July
22, 1972 of the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the Cadastral Court
dated September 28, 1940. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.GUILLERMO
the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in
the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,
answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms
that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then
Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the
accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect
that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused
then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to
submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed
and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement
of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the
costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of
the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such
Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense
charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First
Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information
is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one
(1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over
Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more
than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or
both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But
considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the
appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than
one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or
more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense,
therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was
appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4
Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties
and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed by
Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to
register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could
not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M.
Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that
no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed
as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the
appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the
doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in
question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General,
SO ORDERED.