Admin Law

Administrative Law
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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
J-LAMAT REVIEWER
INTRODUCTION
I.
Concept/definition of administrative law
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and determines
competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual remedies for the
violations of his rights.
II.
Scope of administrative law
Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the
administrative operations of the government.
III.
Classification of administrative law

A. That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative agencies and endowing
them with power and duties;
B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and orders promulgated in the
exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions;
C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents which conflict with
private rights;
D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of administrative bodies made in
the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.
IV.
Origin and development of administrative law
V.
Advantages of the administrative process

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I.
Concept
A.
Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency is defined as
"[a] government body charged with administering and implementing particular
legislation. Examples are workers' compensation commissions, x x x and the like. x x x
The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."
Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

(Ma. Lourdes C. Genio)
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Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the decision of
the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it by law and
those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body charged with the
administering and implementing particular legislation examples are workers compensation
commissions and the like. The term agency includes any department, independent
establishment, commission, administration, authority or bureau.
B.
Test for determining administrative nature
1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the citizens and by
a disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected;
2. Directory if no substantial right depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring
it and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed and substantially, the same results attained.
C.
Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy
of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of its existence
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the appointment by executive
order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial
committee on justice created pursuant to presidential order. That his membership in
committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as executive
judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue: What is an administrative agency?
Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
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regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII,
Constitution.)
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of
government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of
supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence "we can readily see that membership in the Provincial
or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long
as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved
in their implementation.
D.
Public office, defined in relation to administrative law

Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity
of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of the
Commission to issue the same.
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Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations, both
at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.
While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of
the Commission, was issued .
Issues :
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 943710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA
[Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form
the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and
(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security
of tenure.
Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPERA and ORR, and
as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is
in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises groups of positions
within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more
or less definable function or functions these functions are related to one another, each of them
being embraced by a common or general subject matter. These offices relate to the internal
structure of the Commission.
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in
that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the
Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal
organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution
of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and
ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the
Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that
they are mandated to serve.
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not
appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or
ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the
position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer
II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director
IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the
other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
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E.
Reasons for creation of administrative agencies Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable.
Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to
create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice.
Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned
by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend
that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to governmentowned or controlled corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of
the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. x x x (d) such
nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity." (Italics supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long
established rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may
be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.
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E. Types of administrative agencies

1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity,
grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO)
2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain
functions of government; (BIR, LRA, BoC, BI)
3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business
service for the public; (Bureau of Posts, PNR, MWS)
4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate
business affected with public interest; (LTFRB, ERB, HLURB)
5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police
power to regulate private business and individuals; (MTRCB, GAB, DDB)
6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved. (NLRC, ECC,
DAR, COA)
F. Relation between administrative agencies and courts

Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows them to
interpret and apply rules and regulations. Findings of these administrative agencies are
rendered conclusive on the courts.
G. Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 292)
Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538
1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the Phils. - refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.
2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers to any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
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usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered

institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
4. Definition of Administration US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332

(Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime of libel together
with Eduard OBrian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, and each
was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $1,000, United States
currency. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.
During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking that they be
granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution of the
United States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which motion was denied
by the court, and an exception was also taken to this ruling.
Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of the United
States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being.
1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by and
belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the territories
which are a part-of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris, under which
the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory
was to be determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the
Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental
limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and
which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those
express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their
contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution
relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right
to trial by jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the Constitution relating to
jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession,
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for trials by jury, and consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the
defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in
overruling their application for a trial by jury
The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other
purposes, in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly all of the provisions of the
Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there was excepted from it the provisions of the
Constitution relating to jury trials contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth
amendment.
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body expressly recognized
and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to pass laws, and has the power to pass
the libel law under which the defendants where convicted.
II.
Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies

A.
Creation of administrative agencies

Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993,
she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 934359. The
resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer,
Rank IV.
Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service board.
Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not
restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself
what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is
necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to
determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached
to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly
within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers
and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
B.
Abolition of administrative agencies

Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787
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(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector,
classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but was laid off due to the
destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to
traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to
resume his duties, but he was refused reinstatement.
Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position of toll collector.
Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or less temporary,
transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them.
But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired
while the offices exist, except for cause.
De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the president his authority to fix compensation and allowance
of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed a
defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore
may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the
power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil College of
Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives, organizational structure and
functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC into what is
now the PUP.
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Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution not
in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it
with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the creation of a new
one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as
transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the
institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to create a new
one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization bring about its abolition
and the creation of a new one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
C.
Reorganization of administrative agencies
1. Reorganization, defined
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a First
grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent
status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529,
to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September
1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9,
1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers
therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October
1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to
the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for
reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was
administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said
case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a
Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the
ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took
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effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee
which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification requirement
prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of
and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the
LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the
abovesaid Executive Order.
Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions,
duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one
abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be
considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is
true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing
officer or office.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the
requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to
meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia
who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It
is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NILTDRA. The additional
qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed
concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
III.
Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President

A.
Executive power, defined

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668
(Lourdes Genio)
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the
Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
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The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the marcoses to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of presidential
power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by
"executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by
the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and
no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners
advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations
on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive.
The Power Involved
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The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and
5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus,
in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things,
and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic
principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by
"executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by
the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. (more than the sum of the powers
enumerated)
B.
Power of control, defined power of the president to nullify, modify, alter or set
aside the decisions of a subordinate.
Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290
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(Mark Roy Boado)

Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975 otherwise known as the PNP
Organic law placing the Philippine National Police under the reorganized Department of Interior
and Local Government in pursuant to the provision of the constitution that the state shall
establish and maintain one police force which is national in scope and civilian in character. The
petitioner alleged that the said law limits only the power of the National Police Commission into
an administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department Secretary
under whom both the PNP and NAPOLCOM were placed.
Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the Department Secretary of
the DILG.
Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the President to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. This Presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers
from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the
Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who,
in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code,
issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with
prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The
petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been
impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
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The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He
may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it
had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he
veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction,
no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a
regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the banning of trawl
fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said
executive orders alleging the same as null and void.
Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.
Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl fishing, the
President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over from him such authority and
issue the executive order to exercise it. The Presidents power of control means that if a cabinet
secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by
law, the President has the power not only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant
the rules by another set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.
C.
Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego doctrine;
Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

(Lourdes Genio)
Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles (Torrens titles)
covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed
corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered by said titles. The
corresponding certifications of the verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land
Registration Office, headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the
court, in instances where the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office being
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sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however, it turned out that the
increases in said various amendments were far in excess of the respective corresponding real
areas of the lands involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters of the public
domain not capable of appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within
the expanded titles.
Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the accused because it used him as
a prosecution witness in cases similar to this case and because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino,
with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the defendant from any criminal
complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.
As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code places him under the
'general supervision and control' of the Department of Justice together with other prosecuting
officers and under Section 74 of the same Code, the Secretary of Justice as 'Department
Secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility of all activities of the Government under
his control and supervision. Consequently, the constitutional power of the President of control
of all executive departments, bureaus or offices (sec. 10, Art. VII, Constitution of the
Philippines) should be considered as embracing his office.
Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.
Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President (and naturally of his alter
ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. The provisions of the existing law
to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to
act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said
chief of bureau, office, division or service. Accordingly, the law confers upon the Secretary only
'general supervision and control' may not be construed as limiting or in any way diminishing
the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control which is constitutionally based, since he
acts also as alter ego of the President. Acts of the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that of
the president.
D.
Limitations on the power of control
Does not include:

1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;
2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees without due
process of law;
3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies,
including the office of the President, on contested cases to have become final pursuant
to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law;
E.
Power of supervision
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Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143

(Angel Pascual)
Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit,
province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn
complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape
committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her
daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive
Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the
provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint
filed by the provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial,
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter,
the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his
objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him
and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor
is illegal and without legal effect.
Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and supervision
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and, offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to
order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of the Constitution. In administrative law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and
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if they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.
Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court by the Provincial
Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of
the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution abolishing the positions of three special counsel in
the province, to prohibit the provincial treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if
three special counsel and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the
functions incident to their positions.
Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the power to revise
their budget, local governments should be given a large degree of freedom in determining for
themselves the propriety and wisdom of the expenses that they make provided that the
expenses contemplated are within their financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the
President over local governments is limited by the phrase as provided by law and where there
is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be exercised in
accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central
government, not of provincial governments, which are distinct and separate. The power of
general supervision granted to the President over local governments, in the absence of any
express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the
Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or
comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act of the provincial board in
suppressing the positions of three special counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of
maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of
Finance acting as a representative of he President by virtue of the latters power of general
supervision over local governments.
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to
hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial
Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto
Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo
Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T.
Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC
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and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted.
Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in
Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent
Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils.
Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or
not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the
election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with
the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local
Government Code.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." The general
supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.
F.
Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294
Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts
of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising
control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the
subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the
official exercising the power of supervision and review over him.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I.
Doctrine of separation of powers

A.
Distribution of powers of government:

1.
laws.
2.
Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal

Executive power is the power to execute and implement the laws.
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3.
Judicial power is the power of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned anywhere by such name in the
1987 Constitution, can be inferred from its provisions. The heart of the doctrine is that the
basic powers of the government must be kept separate from each other, each power being
under the principal control of a branch of government. The legislative power is granted to the
Congress, the executive power to the President, and the judicial power to the Judiciary. The
President as Chief Executive exercises control over agencies and offices which perform rulemaking or adjudicatory functions. If the agency is created by Congress, consider the law that
created it. If the law is silent as to the control which the President may exercise, the President
can only supervise, i.e., to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed.
B.
Purpose of doctrine
So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one department (one person
or group of persons) that would lead to abuse.
C.
Blending of powers though each department has their own duties and
functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that they can work with other
departments and conduct checks and balances regarding the actions of each.
Basis for blending of powers:

1.
No function is capable of exact definition. Description is only a
generalization concerning its principal but not all of its characteristics;
2.
The Constitution allocated to the several departments specific powers
which in their nature did not ordinarily pertain to them.
3.
Practical necessity of exercising powers incidental to those that are
express or are appropriate to it, even if such incidental powers should fall within
the category of functions pertaining to another department.
II.
be delegated.
A.
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - what has been delegated cannot
General rule
US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must
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remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution
itself is changed.
B.
Exception to the general rule

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
(Mark Boado)
Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth

Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the recommendation of the Director
of Public Works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule
closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative to the
regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is invalid
delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in connection with
the powers vested to them by the said law.
Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of power. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.
C.
Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions
KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386
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Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the memoranda no. 92-009 issued by
the DOTC and LTFRB which, among others, to authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators
to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application there for with
the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency and other matters.
Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?
Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid. Legislature delegated to
the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services.
Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under
Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order
authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land
transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt
to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply,
so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing
and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the
power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case,
the LTFRB may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by neither filling in" the
details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However,
nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other
public service.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and
above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to art undue
delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been
delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its far-reaching effects on
millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of
those who would benefit and profit from the industry.
American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with preliminary
injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and cancellation proceedings,
questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases as amended which authorized the Director of Patents to designate
any ranking official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also
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provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment made by the Director on the Rule
vesting hearing officers authority to hear their cases was illegal and void because under the
law, it is the Director who should personally hear the cases of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.
Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the
administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate
source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or
by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law and RA 165
and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation of hearing examiners is
concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director suggests that the
aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative
flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that
the parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor the requirements of fair
hearing require the actual taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the
decision.
III.
Powers of administrative agencies, in general

A.
Sources of powers of an administrative agency

1.
Constitution is the body of rules and principles by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined.
2.
Statutes rules and regulations promulgated by the legislature.
B.
Limitations to the powers of an administrative agency
Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1

(Angel Pascual)
Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators. Private respondents filed
their petitions with the respondent board for the legalization of their unauthorized taxicab
units citing PD 101 in order to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators.
Petitioners contend that the BOT does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law
provided a period of six (6) months which limited the time period to legitimize such clandestine
operations by certain taxicab operators.
Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab operators under PD
101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.
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Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers granted to the
BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled principle of law that in determining
whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally
necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane
to the law.
Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA 619

(Aileen Angue)
Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case against herein
petitioner with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the reason that latter
were encroaching a part of the river with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that they
were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries. The secretary of public works designated the
City Engineer to conduct hearings on the same and eventually ordered the same be removed.
Petitioners went to the Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the secretary and obtain
an injunction which were ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower courts decision.
Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation and order the
removal of the encroachment made on the river.
Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or provisions of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams, dikes x x x which
encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable
public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered removed as public nuisance or as prohibited
construction as herein provided x x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit
was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more
specific authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede
the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause inundation of agricultural
areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of
Public Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments and
obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been
upheld by this Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v.
Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos
etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).
C.
Nature of the powers of administrative agencies
Quasi legislative consists of issuance of rules and regulations; general applicability;

and prospective in application;
Quasi Judicial refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies to a specific situation; and
determination of rights, privileges,etc. (fact finding investigate)
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Depends on the enabling statute

D.
Express and implied powers

Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which provided for the
procedure of removal and suspension of policemen. Petitioner herein contends that the Civil
Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others, that charges against
policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by the city or municipal council.
Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest
in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and
separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in competitive service.
Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not inconsistent with the
power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against policemen and the
power of the City Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city
employees in the classified service.
Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal, suspension or separation
effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be passed upon or reviewed by the
Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension" of classified service employees presupposes, rather
than negates, the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the removal,
separation or suspension which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.
Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation contained in Section 16(i), namely,
the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, it does not obtain at all in
those instances where the power of removal is by law conferred on another body alone, with no
appeal therefrom, as in the case provided for in Section 14 of Republic Act 296.
LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292
Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the laguna lake region from the deleterious effect of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding area. It has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order under RA 4850 and its amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly bestowed upon LLDA by EO
927.
Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers
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It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has only such power as are
expressly granted to it by law, likewise an administrative agency has also such power as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of explanation and appeal
from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA. The case stemmed from the hiring of a
private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the NPC
and the former. The COA held several persons liable for payment of the amount due to said
lawyer which included herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services that was
contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a memorandum prohibiting
the hiring of private lawyers without following the necessary procedures required by the COA.
Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case?
Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government agencies and
instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or
handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers unless
prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of
the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to
private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in line with the Commission on
Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411

(Angel Pascual)
Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies
who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO
292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos
("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and
reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"),
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment
of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1
hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a
period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order." In
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compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned,
who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances
of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from
making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before
the Supreme Court to seek relief.
Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.
Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission,
the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever
necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees
of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other
personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government
operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in
connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized
to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers
and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of
the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237

Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645
(Angel Pascual)
Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption.
Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend government officials and
employees pending investigation of administrative complaints.
Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively suspend officers as contained
in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.
E.
Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty

Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the respondent Judge
and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof. AMA Computer College situated in
Davao city operated as an Educational Institution without the required authorization that must
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be secured first before the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the
closure of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental
agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from
implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate of the said school.
The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the
Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent appeal before the
CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a
petition before the RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of
the parents of their students. The said court presided by the respondent Judge issued the
preliminary injunction sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private
respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate because DECS is only
performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other hand contended
that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the provisions of law with respect to
educational institutions.
Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or discretionary function.
Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power with respect to
the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution. The Court further
distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely ministerial act or duty to a
discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of the DECS in
securing the quality education that an educational institution should provide pursuant to the
constitutional provision on education and the organic law authorizing said department to issue
rules and regulations pertinent thereto.
Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280

(Aileen Angue)
Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled in favor the
petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent. Petitioner filed relief from
judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.
Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is ministerial?
Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the appeal is
discretionary.
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1.
Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment (remedy mandamus)
2.
Discretionary power, defined - If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed (remedy certiorari)
3.
Importance of knowing distinction to determine the remedies
available
4.
Delegation of ministerial and discretionary power
Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to the Office of General
Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986, petitioner was designated by then Minister
Gonzales as General Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the president
which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent was the new Secretary of Tourism and
asked for the resignation of the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho
designating him as General Manager for the reason that petitioner was not appointed by the
President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid.
Petitioner contends that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of then
Minister Gonzales was also the act of the president which presumes that the act of the
department heads were the act of the president.
Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.
Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of
that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the
petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption
being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another.
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F.
Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and powers

Article 5 Civil Code
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
1.
Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and effect

Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715
Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that something be
done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the
person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.
2.
Permissive/directory statute, defined and effect

Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA 804
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by Judge
Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the amount of 51M by way of
alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay
private respondents 25% of the total amount collectible as informers reward.
Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of
enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes has after a mature and
thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his
decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the
President unless reprobated), such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the
performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A
contrary view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the
official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and
confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the operations of the government.
Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or discretionary in nature and
merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or
that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that prescribed and substantially the
same result obtained.
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G.
Error in the exercise of powers

1.
Doctrine of non-suability of the state inapplicable the state cannot be
sued without its consent.
Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713
(Mark Boado)
Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school (navy based)
which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case against the military officials
concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the non-suability of the state.
Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is questioning the
personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office by virtue of their official
capacity.
2.
Estoppel inapplicable
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348
(Aileen Angue)
Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of administrative agency
cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does not apply.
3.
Presumption of regularity
Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority and established
a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11 but reduced to 7. Thereafter,
respondent chairman of the coconut authority initiated a special coconut end-user companies
which included the petitioner. The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced
subsidies to apply the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to
release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the disputed claim.
Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor had no
jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to the court.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decision had became
moot.
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Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it is
'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with powers said to be quasijudicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of
activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special
training, 'aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said
fields, containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said
administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such
evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.
Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.
IV.
Investigatory Powers
A.
Scope and extent of powers
De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to inspect, secure, require the
disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise. They are conferred on practically all
administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory powers of administrative agencies, or their
power and facilities to investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is one
of the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the court.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance of concerned teachers
(ACT) undertook what they described as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances
that had time and again been bought to the latters attention. As a result of the said action, the
DECS secretary dismissed from the service one of the private respondents and the other nine
were suspended.
Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won the CHR can
try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies do?
Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions.
Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain specific type of
cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.
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The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is that it may
investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as regard claimed human rights
violation involving civil and political rights.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not judicial function.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in
controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritively, finally
and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.
The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate.
Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate?
Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate depending on the law
granting such power.
Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without quasi-legislative or quasijudicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies are formed for the sole purpose of
investigation only (fact finding, etc.)
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order to provide about
1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the Metropolitan area. The project
was financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National
Government.
MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification and bids. The major
factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants financial condition, technical
qualification and experience to undertake the project. Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter
Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association sent letters offering suggestions on the technical
specifications.
Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE recommended F.F Cruz and
Inc. but other members both disagreed and opted for a rebidding bating the contract to be
awarded to Joint Venture. But MWSS Board Committee on construction Management and
Board Committee on Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the
lowest complying bidder.
PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes and
urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there on.
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Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and duties of the
office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside the recommendation of MWSS
to award contract.
Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent Ombudsman acted
beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act, which
enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may not be the subject of investigation
clearly among the cases exempts the same by his office.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMAs
complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of
the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CTSE.
Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and public assistance
duties that can be found in the first and second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution.
While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which xxx
appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede
however, that the constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon it veto or
provisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the Constitution and Republic Acts
No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and
the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over
an exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of whether to
accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by law in a government agency, which involves
the exercise of discretion, the Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and
granting it to another bidder.
Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was charged
before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said
referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the case for being
irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official function as governor.
Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any public
officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special
Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend his
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prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not required that the act or omission
be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.
B.
Requirement of notice and hearing when the law is silent, notice and
hearing may be dispensed with, which depends upon the stage of the proceedings.
(substantial right can be given notice and hearing)
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

(Angel Pascual)
Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for alleged violation of many
criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a panel of lawyers to review and study the request.
Pending the review, MJ requested copies of all documents and papers relative to the request
that the proceedings be suspended for the meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ
filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish him the
documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo ante, hence the DOJ
filed an appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the preliminary or the
evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against him.
Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is silent
as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the court of appeals
consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the
executive secretary.
Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was dismissed by the
President of the Philippines from his position after investigation of a committee on several
charges against him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same which
respondent Drilon, as executive secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer. After eight days, petitioner
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO. The
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was not meritorious and a case of
forum shopping. The SC dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public
respondents it being that the pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for
them to act on said petition.
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Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or any act
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed administrative orders. / Was the
petitioner entitled to be informed of the findings of an investigative committee created to inquire
into charges against him?
Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating committees.
Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular
courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by Secretary Pefianco, praying that
she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said
report. Moral was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not appeal
the judgement .
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action but the trial
court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which
sustained the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for Certiorari for
failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to
dismiss.
Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings
and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accorded these rights.
C.
Right to counsel in administrative investigations a counsel may or may not
assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)
D.
Importance of administrative investigations
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Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge
in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining
respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation
against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers
of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in
its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action,
any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.
E.
Executive power to investigate, source

Section 64c Revised Administrative Code
Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government
service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by
whom such investigation shall be conducted.
Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code
Residual Powers unless congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.
Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of the BIR
being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the
Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting on a report by then acting
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Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum
creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently,
the president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR abolishing
some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another memorandum
dismissing herein petitioner from office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that
he is a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On the other hand,
respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the
disciplining authority of the president.
Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have the power to
order an investigation against herein petitioner?
Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive
Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a presidential appointee who
belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining authority
of the president in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which
created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant to
the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not absolute since the
petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may
only be removed through a cause enumerated by law.
Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge
in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining
respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation
against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers
of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas
Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando
Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
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Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether
or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before
the issuance of a complaint.
Requirements in issuing a subpoena:
1. Within the authority of the agency
2. Information is reasonably relevant
3. Demand is not indefinite
V.
Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers

Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304
(Aileen Angue)
Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in Infanta, Quezon,
District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil Service Commission as to the status of
the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report of
rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. After an investigation, Remolonas name is
not in the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in
acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he did it because
he wanted them to be together.
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and Atty. Hadji
Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSS found Estelito
Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was absolved from legibility. On
appeal, CA dismissed the petition and therefore a review by the SC.
Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact that the offense
committed was not done in the performance of his official duty.
Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his
right to continue in office.
Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.
A.
Nature of power, definition Administrative agencies are endowed with powers
legislative in nature or quasi-legislative, and in practical effect, with the power to make
law. However, the essential legislative functions may not be delegated to administrative
agencies and in this sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no legislative
power and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.
People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450
(Tristan A. Reyes)
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Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water.
Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The lawmaking body cannot
delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act constitute a criminal offense.
Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation must
be in harmony with law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for
violation of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope
of the authority conferred by law.
1.
-
Ordinance power of the President/Delegation to the President
The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive orders,
proclamations, etc.)
Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution
Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall
be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
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Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance,
shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
special orders.
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328
(Aileen Angue)
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and banning trawl
fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said
executive orders alleging that the same is null and void.
Issue
: Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed thrall fishing.
Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or
determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the
administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said
policy.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies functions.
Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and
export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippines assailed the constitutionality of Act
2613, allegedly depriving them of their right of exporting cigars to the United States due to the
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refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were
not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of Cagayan,
Isabela or Nueva Viscaya.
Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make rules and
regulations which are not within the scope of Act 2613.
Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was that a proper
standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined and that all of these who
produce tobacco of the same standard would have equal rights and opportunities. Such
delegated power the rules and regulations promulgated should be confined to and limited by
the power conferred by the legislative act.
The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and regulations is specified
and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, marking and packing
of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and the handling of it under sanitary
conditions.
2.
Delegation to the Supreme Court

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by changing scope of its reg
product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic stiles. Mariwasa oppose filed motion for
reconsideration. Mariwasa filed petition for review with respondent CA. it is temporarily
restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20 days lapsed without respondent court issuing
preliminary injunction. Lepanto filed motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over BOI
vested with SC.
Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.
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Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply deals with
procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of its cons rule-making
power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as the manner of appeal. Appeals
from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.
3.
Delegation to LGUs
Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be
prescribed by law.
Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160

SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the
provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive
concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which
may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the
local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance
or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the Sanggunian
within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a
municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all
its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may
veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare,
stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a
local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment
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of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which
are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the Sanggunian
overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the
appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be
deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The Sanggunian
may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the
Sanggunian Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt
of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its
decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the
power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall
declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with
law and therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay
shall furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law
and city or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take
action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed approved.
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(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the
Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the Sanggunian
concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its
comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay concerned for adjustment,
amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is
suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.
B.
Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends
twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law
also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all
energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the
programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the
energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil
Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8
180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372
void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its
present form, the law violates the Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the
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sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running not. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegates who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape.
As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the
increasing complexity of the task of government. To cede to the Executive the power to make
law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise
of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose
action cannot infringe the terms of agency.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of
money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to
petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees
prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no
discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a
conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221
(Aileen Angue)
Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in transporting passengers in
Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and Zambales by means of TPU buses for 20 years. It
filed with Public Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten additional new Brockway
Trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its
current certificates. As a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public
Service Commission denied it. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Petition for a writ of
certiorari filed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by
Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete and total abdication of the
Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional and void.
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(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority.
Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art. XIII of the
Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be for a longer period than fifty years and when it was
ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 454 that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a
certificate. That it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period
shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the commission is
the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
towards the approval of the practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police
power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation.
Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth
Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the recommendation of the Director
of Public works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule
closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative to the
regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is an invalid
delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in connection with
the powers vested to them by the said law.
Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of power. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
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Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.
C.
Limitations on the rule-making power
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003

(Angel Pascual)
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago,
Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an
action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer
goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of
Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is
oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the
prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers
and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rulemaking power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in
the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
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upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of Labor issued on May 1, 1977
a set of rules which exempts not only distressed employers but also "those who have granted in
addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after
January 1, 1977, provided that those who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference
(paragraph k of said rules).
Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the
Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void. The recognition of the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the administration of the statute, necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. It is of elementary knowledge that
an act of Congress cannot be amended by a rule promulgated by an administrative agency. "It
seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer cannot change a law
enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once
determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity."
D.
Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative power
Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330

(Ma.Lourdes C. Genio)
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends
twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law
also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all
energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the
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programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the
energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil
Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8
180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372
void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with
deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the
law violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil
deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of
striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses
in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our
Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the
supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but
to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and
guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates
this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights
as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater
importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the
esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court
be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the
powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot
be half-hearted.
1.
Completeness test the law must be complete in all its items and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing they will have to do is enforce it (Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)
What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in nature. He cannot
determine what the law shall be.
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US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of
money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to
petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees
prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no
discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a
conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial
court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states
in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he
has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of
Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April
1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section
2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article
III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act
endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on
Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the
private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality
of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that
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Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the
Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937,
counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of
intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new
trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31
July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a
motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just
been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion
with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in
said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10
August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the lastmentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but,
upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of
both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August
1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at
this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process
to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which
fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the
sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and
ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing
before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining
order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of
the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People
of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in
having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own
laws.
2.
Sufficient standard test to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority by defining legislative policy and indicating circumstances under
which it is pursued.
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Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.
Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734, authorizing the President
of the Philippines to merge by administrative determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President
pursuant to such authority, Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in
Mindanano. Four provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted
in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as
amended by E.O 439 was issued by the Chief Executive providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the Petitioners contends that R.A 6734
is unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly delegates the legislative power to the President by
authorizing him to merge the existing regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.
Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to
be guided in the exercise of the power granted.
Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject expressed in the title of
the law.
Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied, nor
it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
provisions of the statute are pertinent to that subject. The Reorganization of the remaining
administrative regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it
be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing
administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to
the President in the law.
Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
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Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers Corporation. Its board of
directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to the control of the government
enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA 51 for approval, the resolution was
disapproved on recommendation by auditor general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted
additional compensation prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/
Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is unconstitutional being an undue
delegation of legislative power to executive.
Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a standard is established
by the statute there is no undue delegation. RA 51 is authorizes the president to make reforms
and changes in the government controlled corporation for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant to
this authority, the president promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises council with
power to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of member corporations.
Petition is dismissed.
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code,
issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with
prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The
petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been
impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by the President
of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
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carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with
respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner was affected to the said order with the contention that
the said order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The
Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper delegation of legislative power to the
President of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power. The court
further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the court
declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
3.
Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient legislative standards

1.
power which is not directly or exclusively a legislative one and has
no relation whatsoever to personal or property rights;
2.
power to regulate a mere matter of privilege
E.
Issues on validity of legislation

1.
Against the delegating statute itself --- whether or not the requisites of
valid delegation are present;
2.
Against the exercise of the delegated power --- whether or not the rule or
regulation conforms with what the statute provides and whether the same is
reasonable.
Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837

(Angel Pascual)
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a
memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic
District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his
own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned
decision in a memorandum.
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Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.

Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all law-enforcement
authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except
when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations within
the said area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by
virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains
effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila.
An ordinance to be valid:
Must not be in contravention of the constitution
Must not be oppressive
Must not be discriminatory
Must not regulate or prohibit trade
Must not be against a statute
F.
Rule and rule-making, defined

Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law,
fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its
regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available
to, the public.
Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161
(Tristan A. Reyes)
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Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University asked the SC to
set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per diems claimed under the National
Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not agree at least not
before such law or regulation was set aside by authorized agency of government as
unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law
have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
Supplementary legislation A statute which leaves to the executive the power to fill in the
technical details in view of the latters expertise is a recognized delegation of legislative power.
Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not
1.
2.
G.
Classification of rules and regulations

a. Those issued by an administrative superior and directed exclusively
to the subordinates --- rules and regulations of internal administration to
be observed by subordinate officials for the prompt and efficient dispatch
of government business and to facilitate the transactions of the general
public with the government;
b. Those directed not only to the inferior officers but also and primarily
to private individuals, fixing the manner by which the terms of a statute
are to be complied with.
Types of rule-making powers
2.1.
Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority
(supplementary or detailed legislation)--- refers to the power to issue
rules and regulations which have the force and effect of law;
2.2.
Rule-making by the construction and interpretation of a statute
being administered (interpretative legislation)--- refers to the power to
interpret and construe the statutes entrusted to them for
implementation;
2.3.
The ascertainment of facts which will form the basis for the
enforcement of a statute (contingent legislation or determination).
Supplementary/detailed legislation
1.
Source enabling law;
2.
Requisites for validity:
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Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the decision of the
Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that
petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two
mining claims.
Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private respondents for
alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped
and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to
petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for
subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the
Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
"Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2) should public respondents
have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners had filed the
protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with
jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon
recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the
statutory grant of rulemaking power.
Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their
jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head
pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128
merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It
does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies.
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4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation

must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
conform to the standards that the law prescribes
must be reasonable
must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions of law
UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376

(Aileen Angue)
Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as an educational
institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance
disputing the decision of the latter as regard the taxability of the formers income from tuition
fees.
The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance with the rules romulgated
by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of
respondent to take cognizance of the petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the reason that it deprives
the CFIs of their jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases involving recovery of taxes.
Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an instrumentality of the Dept
of Finance may properly come within the purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving
the CFIs of their jurisdiction to act on internal evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and
which comes within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor
can that power be delegated by Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.
Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary regulation issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment Secretary regarding the application and implementation
of 13th month pay law. The Department order included commission as part of the computation
of determining the 13th month pay of the employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were
found to be violators of the law for not including the commission on its employees in the
computation of the 13th month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary Drilon is acting
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same.
The Secretary however contended that the said order was just a supplementary to the law
which the same tried to erase the cloud thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative regulation.
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Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further ruled that the
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more
emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic
salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3th-month pay.
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling
Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic
salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal
of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion
is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the
seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and earnings within the
definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which are deemed not part of
the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays, pays for regular holidays and
right differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be
considered i the computation of the 13th month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find
any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of the 13-month
pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79

(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision1 of
the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission
(hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to
heretofore sit and act en bane, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a
valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to
legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not
the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the
NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each
has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is
subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
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Toledo vs CSC 264 SCRA 19

Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of serious misconduct
and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to
reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, its agencies and
instrumentalities or GOCC.
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992 election he run
again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time petitioner Grego a
registered voted file a petition with comelec for disqualification and suspension of his
proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion
seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not
applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under
Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those
removed from office on or after January 1, 1992.
"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect
what is provided in the legislative enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'
Conte vs COA 264 SCRA 19
China Banking Corp vs HDMF 307 SCRA 44

Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777
(Angel Pascual)
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Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Issue: WON the amendments are valid
Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have
both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the
Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.
Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667
3.
Requirement of reasonableness
a.
Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished;
b.
Supported by good reasons;
c.
Free from constitutional infirmities or charge of arbitrariness
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any handouts, review material or any tip
from school or any review center during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day.
Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.
Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.
To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the
end view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized
to be issued, then they must be held invalid.
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment.
H. Interpretative legislation
1.
Distinction between rule and interpretation
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Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555

Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in the exercise of its
rule making power delegated to it by the legislature, it makes a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely advisory.
2.
Types of executive construction/interpretation

a.
Construction by an executive officer directly called to implement
the law. It may be express (embodied in a circular, directive or regulation)
or implied (practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to
certain situations; by usage or practice);
b.
Construction by the Secretary of Justice as chief legal adviser of
the government. May be reversed by President in the exercise of the
power to modify, alter or reverse;
c.
Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the
form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.
2.
Weight accorded to administrative constructions
Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the silence of the Tariff and
Customs Code which extends the period of exportation of a specific containers in which the
petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner questioned the said order alleging that the
construction of a specific statute by an administrative body must not be observed.
Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative construction.
Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the
stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to construction by administrative or
executive departments of the state. The construction of the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.
Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262

(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing and
promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying with the provisions of
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Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of
Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig
City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner
(Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997,
private respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all fortyseven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing
or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of failure to comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket
fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not jurisdictional.
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the payment of the
filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and,
hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the
Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is hereby denied.
When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is
the court that finally determine what the law means.
Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425
United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of commissioner in dismissing
the petition, on the ground that in the absence of express provision in Social Security act,
vesting in the commission the power to condone penalties. Petitioners contention that they had
under the impression that international organization, they were not cover under SSC. They
paid their premiums and ask for condonation, which was denied by commissioner.
ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under SSC to condone the
penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.
RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC precisely enumerates
the power of the commission, nowhere from the said powers may it shown that the
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commissioner is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties

imposed by the act.
3.
Construction of administrative rules and regulations

Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072
Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and such interpretation
becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such
interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better
qualified to interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its
interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable, should be
followed.
I.
Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts

Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557
J.
Penal rules and regulations

1.
Requisites for validity of penal rules and regulations

Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843
US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of Pampaga of a
violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous diseases
known as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein
accused by way of permitting and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral
while the quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant
interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do not fall within
any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said finding does not prevent the court
from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the revised penal code.
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People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125

People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450
2.
Imposition of penalties by administrative authorities
K. Rate-fixing power
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
(Aileen Angue)
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside an order
issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which directs the provisional
reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its
services by 15% with the reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial or
procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is
allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting
its rate-fixing powers; and E.O. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent
NTC.
Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates
provided therein, being violative of due process clause is void and should be nullified . Thus,
temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from the procedural requirement of notice and
hearing. Moreover the temporary rate-fixing becomes final legislative act as to the period
during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case.
In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the admin authority is that the rate reasonable and just. However,
it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. The fixing of rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines, in which case,
notice and hearing are not required for their validity.
L. Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations

1.
Publication requirement
Section 2, Civil Code
Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following their
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless otherwise provided.
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Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.
Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases
of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding
quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect,
together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit
from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome,
expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on
application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the
general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
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(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law
Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified
rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the
National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to
such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price
sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule
duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446
(Angel Pascual)
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in
his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is
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correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the
New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of
a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of its contents.
2.
Notice and hearing requirement
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63

3.
Application, general rule that the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the law does not require that there be prior notice and hearing
conducted by the administrative agencies. However, if the statute making the
delegation requires such hearing, then one must be conducted before such rules
and regulations are issued. On the other hand, if the statute is silent on the
matter, a public hearing, if practicable, may be conducted.
VI.
Adjudicatory Powers
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a.
Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making power.
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

(Maria Angela A. Pascual)
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power
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Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency
is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the school
year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students For Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor
students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of
the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C.
Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises
were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the
invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned
civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the District
Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to
errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to a real grave abuse of discretion that would
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may
not be corrected by means of certiorari.
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to
define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the
decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari, it is
clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board,
or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice,
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but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making
their decision, whatever may be their public character. . ..'
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or
ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may
involve the performance of legislative or administrative dudes, and the performance of
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.
Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer
Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter
known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was
filed and registered with the OIC.
While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in
his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products.
Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore
these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the
contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate
their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in
asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the
alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the
existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice."
Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision
within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell
moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.
Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes between
a gasoline dealer and an oil company.
Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act
will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear
and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a
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well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative

agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.
As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):
" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies
quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the
performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the legislature must state its
intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives
must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the
performance of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a
matter exclusively vested in the courts."
b.
Distinguished from judicial power
Judicial Power is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case of controversies involving
legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there is
grave abuse of discretion.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14,
1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the
CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced.
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807."
Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers over, or
the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violation involving civil or political rights.
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Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears
any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required
by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue:
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
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Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a
panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the
"(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
c.
Distinguished from administrative function
Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the
organic law of existence.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm
assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country. PADS
issued search warrants against certain companies.
Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the 1973
Constitution?
Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court
and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as
follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering
some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans
Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking
to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of
Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the
Philippines.
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(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the
Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine
National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections
Board, the Philippine Patent office, office of the Insurance Commissioner.
under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the
Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of
Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust
individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor
Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to
determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing
authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to
exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments.
As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing
and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of
such activities, but nothing more.
Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons
involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor
General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all
persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO.
1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President
not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former
President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the
investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the
complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and
equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary
investigation.
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Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor
General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of
coconut levy funds.
Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant
provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is
indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima facie
factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an
adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.
Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided into two
stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the
factfinding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they
gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second
stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above
discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time."
Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected
to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a
public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG
would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of
this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.
Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas and Rufino
Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of the waters flowing through
the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor
in interest of his father constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards
interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in 1911,
1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is, is not quite clear on the facts
before us. However, it appears that they made application to the Director of Public Works, only
to meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas the right, in
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preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the
proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered,
dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the
administrative authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of the findings of
the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.
Issue: WON
Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of waters is
provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be submitted to the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications through the Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the
Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty
days after the date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such appeal the
court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method
is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it the duty of the
Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of
priorities. In the performance of this work, the Director of Public Works or any official
especially authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this
purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.)
"Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the date of the
publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL RECORD.-The decision
of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications,
containing as it does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation
engineering, should invariably be made a part of the judicial record because (1) the
determination of these officials would be most useful to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the
decision is of moment since it decides whether the appeal was taken in time.
Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
d.
Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
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Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its
"Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of
the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall
be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly
situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or
preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with
all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological
make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages
and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss,
then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended
or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail
of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
e.
Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation

sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment
payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to
the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint
against them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and
decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was
denied by the court contending that it had jurisdiction over the matter.
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Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing
Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957,
specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by
expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing
problems of the modem world.
f.
Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being
"notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities
in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the
Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without
formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission ruled that the
dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the
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CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of
the investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs
of the deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed
and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute
its resolution or judgment.
Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.
Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not
only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has
the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and
putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest
cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The
provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the
Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light
of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to
the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the
years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the
grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute
the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary
administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased
employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far
as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or
decree a useless exercise.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of
the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission.
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Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no
protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as
a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been
good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the
time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation
alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member.
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in
industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with
the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among
which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private
respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from
Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed
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with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin
the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case
asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of
petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is
to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same
cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of
the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court
cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is with its
prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its
jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

(Aileen Rose Angue)
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Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200
square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that
petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in
case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the
petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the
respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the
demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the
same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money. Respondents
herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The
same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner
argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim
for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and
not that of the HSRC.
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.
Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of law that
makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word
"buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money.
Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who
buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have since been transferred to the
HLRB.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein provided that the
HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against project owners,
developers, and dealers, among others.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies
relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in
this case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a
subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged
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in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect
by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained
of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
g.
Classification of adjudicatory powers

2.
Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of public utility
commissions, powers of assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under
public utility laws and awards under;
3.
Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or authorization;
1.
Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or relax a general
prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative duty. The licensing power
sets or assumes a standard, while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation
from a standard;
2.
Summary powers. To designate administrative power to apply compulsion
or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a
judicial warrant to authorize such action;
3.
Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having power to determine
the law upon a particular state of facts has the right to and must consider and
make proper application of the rules of equity.
VII.
The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836
Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required her to appear
before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for she was not aware of any
case filed against her. When she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena,
she was berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount
of the life insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request
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by Generosa Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share of
the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted under the laws
of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be
issued purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact,
issued in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for any
investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. It was
designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way
connected with or related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the
beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa.
Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was
received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court for her
claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What
Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and absolutely a private
matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his official functions and duties,
accommodating the request and using his official functions and office in connection therewith
was, by any yardstick, improper.
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned "subpoena
duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of redress.
Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition in the lower
court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private respondents witnesses,
they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of herein
petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded
as a fishing bill to discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable
in a case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.
Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for unfair competition.
Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and damages. As a general
rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an
accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident
to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In
such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his
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gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the
wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an
equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by
him.
In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it must appear. By
clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains
evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper
or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be
identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if
the issuance therof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents
or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena duces tecum are
relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private respondent for unfair
competition.
Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with several others
for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons
and/or parties indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why they should
not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and
imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy
that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come
under its jurisdiction.
When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish
for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any
judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt
as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
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The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the, administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of
courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the
power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
VIII.
The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said contempt is [clearly considered
and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised
administrative code. The refusal to comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is
neither contempt nor a penalized offense.
Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX.
Power to impose penalties

Scotys Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store situated at
615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si
Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed
charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by
them because of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her
separation, said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership
in said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was dismissed from the
service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co
employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of
Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same
are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
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Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the penalties
prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the penalties
provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the
Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in
section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine
of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations in dealing
with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And
this is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act
that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court
shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of
all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well-informed
persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may
be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on
preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.
This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be contended that this
gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the
rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would
be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of
our Government.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
X.
Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction
A.
Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an appealed
contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability should be extinguished.
The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope
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of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said
article, he concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot
extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not section 2 of Act No.
1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability
is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that the marriage of
the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish the criminal liability in the
cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes,
such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the
liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a
stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not
denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in
every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the crime
of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No.
1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the offended party in the present
case has extinguished his criminal liability.
B.
Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial acts

Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to

hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial
Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto
Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo
Sales. Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent
Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of
the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it
was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers
of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as
early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent
Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions
of respondent for being null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay
Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
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whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in

nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with
the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local
Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;"
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of administrative
authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them;
they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations."
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary
implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President
over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in
effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a
purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
II.
Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A.
Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara won. The
provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes, the petitioner took
his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
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Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the
National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should
be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
B.
Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30
C.
Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment of publics
respondents. The arbitrations decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public respondents in their
appeal questioned the validity of the NLRCs decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously,
patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch
are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1) there was no
valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no
authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal
to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are
based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
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Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first to
arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the
parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside
and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further
proceedings.
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute,
but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct Court
of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its
decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and
instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate
said respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality with back
salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement.
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Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C. Ibea was
deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No.
48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legal
requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case without
stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of
the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall
be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and
stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The
proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the
principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in
court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties
are heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.
D.
Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738
(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers in a case
involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the decision of the SEC
which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed
fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and adjudicative
functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon applications for, or
may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of registration of
corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners'
associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections;
and impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as well as
implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace the subject
shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of the buyers" clearly calls
for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of
their certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been
transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate
adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's
exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another
who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an
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exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who
are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory
judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000 fine on each of
FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power
of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the
fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a
nominal party but a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
Hearing
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2.
Clear and convincing evidence
Blacks Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3.
Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4.
Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
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J.
K.
III.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

1.
Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2.
Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3.
Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4.
Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5.
Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6.
Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
Due process of law in administrative adjudication
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A.
Substantive and procedural due process, defined
DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting ones person or property. It is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to
sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it condemns; which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property
without due process of law, which clause optimizes the principle of justice which hears
before it condemns which upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and 97. He was
arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him. From the proven facts and
the admission likewise of the respondents, the court martial which tried his case was not
properly convened. There was no special order published by the headquarters Philippine
Constabulary creating or directing the General Court Martial composed of the respondents to
arraign and try however was already an existing court trying another case.
The validity of the court martial proceeding was challenged by the petitioner at the
regular court on the ground of due process.
Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court martial amount to denial of
due process
Held: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE LAW A DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.- The failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a
valid court martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. There is such a denial not
only under the broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due process
requirement, but also under one of the specific elements of procedural due process.
LACK OF AUTHORITY OF COURT-MARTIAL TO TRY PETITIONER.- Nor is such a reliance on
the broad reach of due process the sole ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of die courtmartial convened in this case could be predicated. Recently, stress was laid anew by us on the
first requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal
clothed with judicial, or quasi-judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. This is
a requirement that goes back to Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, a decision rendered half a
century ago. There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a
court martial, were not convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against
petitioner being induced solely by a desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow
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then that the absence of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a
denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner. The writ of
certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower court, to repeat, ought not to
have dismissed his petition summarily. The significance of such an insistence on a faithful
compliance with the regular

Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules
to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States. private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given
ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Petitioner refused because it is not included in the procedure of the RP-US Treaty.
Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under
the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict
between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly
granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights.
Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order
or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993
ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also
known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the
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records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a
useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948

Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of contract. Albert
died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was
substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff
was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand.
From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in L-15275 was to be
executed, the corporate existence of University Publishing Company, Inc. appears to have been
taken for granted, and was not then put in issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued on July 22, 1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company,
Inc., a new problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of the
City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf and
as President of University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity
exists. A verification made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On
July 31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this Commission do
not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or
partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the
issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the
judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the
case.
All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University Publishing
Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that it had in its possession copies of its
certificate of registration, its article of incorporation, its by-laws and all other papers material
to its disputed corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent.
On August 11, 1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and
Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered plaintiff's petition for
execution as against Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego
is not a party to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.
Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case
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Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative of a nonexistent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he was the one who
reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial payment of the consideration
were made by him; that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and
that in the litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice,
responsibility under the judgment falls on him.
"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns; which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581);
or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law' contemplates notice and opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of
Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32).' (Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not
be amiss to mention here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is designed to
secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For
substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none the less apt, to quote what long
ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321-322: 'A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement
and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should he no
vested rights in technicalities.
B.
Cardinal primary requirements of due process
1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing
6. The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy
7. The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involves and
reason for the decision rendered
8. The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be vested with competent
jurisdiction
A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings renders any judgment or order issued therein null and void and can
be attacked in any appropriate proceeding
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Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of
the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to
the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.
Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights?
Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The
Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of
its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
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Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the former DECS Secretary
against the public school teachers who were illegally dismissed for staging a mass action and
failure to heed to the return-to-work order, filed a petition for the judgment of the trial court
holding that said public school teachers were denied of due process in the proceedings. It was
held that the proceedings contravened RA 4670 which required that administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding school
superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who at least have the rank
of a supervisor, where the teachers belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and supervisor of the
Division, the last 2 to be designated by the Director of Public Schools.
Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because all the teachers who were
members of the various committee are members of either the QC Teachers Federation or the
QC Elementary teachers Federation and are deemed representatives of teachers organization.
Issue: WON there was denial of due process
Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process. Mere membership of said
teachers in their respective organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of the organizations. Under the law, the teachers organization possess the right
to indicate its choice of representatives. Such right cannot be usurped by the Secretary of
Education or the Director of Public Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by the
DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a
teachers organization as its representatives in said committee.
Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested no jurisdiction to the
committee to hear the case. Respondent teachers were denied of due process.
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489

Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been referred to a hearing
examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights
that included the same Mercury night flights and this was allowed by Board Resolution No.
139(68). The Board's action was impelled by the authorizations of certain flight schedules
previously allowed but were incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule
had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were not to be
suspended. In short, the temporary permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation of
services in the affected areas.
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The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner, passed Resolution No. 190
(68) approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July 1968, only three or four frequencies of
the seven proposed new flights. There is no proof, not even allegation, that in all those hearings
petitioner was not notified or give opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.
Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due process
Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for which no
previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for
reception of evidence on its economic justification."
It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of
certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16 SCRA 921). And this administrative due process
is recognized to include (a) the right to notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of
the proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear
and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor: (c) a tribunal so
constituted* as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction. and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial
evidence* presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the
parties affected
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
C.
Necessity for notice and hearing
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are necessary only
where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the enabling statute which
clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain duties and responsibilities in the
discharge of which some persons may adversely affected.
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25
March 1953
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on the basis of an
ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an
ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such a
lay off
Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely acted on the
strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company was
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incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the
place of labor specially when conducted at the request of the interested.
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437

Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a corporation engaged in the
garments and textile import business for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government
requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations issued by
the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board.
Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the petitioner. These
export quotas have been granted annually to the Petitioner since 1976. They are automatically
renewed every year provided the grantee has utilized its quotas during the previous years.
On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it that its 1983
export quota allocations were revoked effective February 1983. Furthermore, its major
stockholders and officers were also distinguished from engaging in business activities involving
garment and textile exports.
Issue: WON the revocation of the quota is valid
Held: "The summary revocation of the export quotas and export authorizations issued in favor
of the petitioner without hearing violates not only the above-mentioned provisions of the Raise
and Regulations of the respondent board but also the 'due proem of law' clause of the
Constitution of the Philippines to the effect that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws.'(Article TV, Sec. 1. New Constitution). According to Daniel Webster in the Dartmouth
College case. due proem is the equivalent of the law; a law which hears before it condemns.
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general
rules which govern society.' (cited in Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by Neptali Gonzales,
1975 ed.)
"Administrative due process requires that there be an impartial tribunal constituted to
determine the right involved; that due notice and opportunity to be heard be given; that the
procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; and that the
proceedings be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for a court to determine
whether the applicable rules of low and procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur. p. 451, cited by
Neptali Gonzales, p. 183, Philippine Constitutional Law). "
Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the character of ones property.
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
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Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the NAPOLCOM: The fact
that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house being occupied by herein respondentappellant, the apprehension of his wife and brother in two (2) successive raids effected by law
enforcement authority and his intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in consequence
thereof, are tangible proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in said
gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and informed of the nature
of such charges; that no hearing had actually been held by the summary dismissal board: and
that at any rate he was not heard.
Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit
Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the
fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is - in the opinion of his
superiors - strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this
case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to
clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder,
those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF REQUIRED IN SUMMARY
DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided under P.D. No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1707.
While Sec. 8-A of the Decree authorizes summary dismissals "without the necessity of a formal
investigation" of members of the INP "when the charge is serious and the evidence is strong,"
the Decree and the implementing rules nonetheless give the respondent the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint and to file an answer within three (3) days. The filing of
charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the charges
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. In summary dismissal proceedings it is
mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be
attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the
respondent can be brought to his knowledge. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with,
refers to the presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to the requirement
that the respondent be notified of the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD; BASIS OF
DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary dismissal board appears to have done in this
case was simply to receive the report on two raids allegedly conducted on petitioner's house in
the course of which what were believed were gambling paraphernalia were allegedly found and
two witnesses allegedly admitted they were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go.
But the report is not in the record of this case which the NAPOLCOM transmitted to the Court.
Nor does the decision of the summary dismissal board disclose on what the supposed report
was based. This is in violation of the rule that in administrative proceedings "the decision must
be rendered on the evidence contained in the record and disclosed to the party affected." In all
probability, said report was not in writing and the supposed testimonies of the two witnesses
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were not taken down. This is evident from the decision of the board which refers to the result of
an -investigation.- The facts found by the board were not the result of any investigation
conducted by it but by some other group.
D.
Cold neutrality of a judge
A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must refrain from participating in
reviewing any decision rendered or concurred by him in another official capacity. The reviewing
officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review, otherwise there would be
no different views or there could be no real review of the case, in violation of due process of law.
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261

Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case
filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of
Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover
any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law.
The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
While the appeal was pending. Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, as if he was
adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction
over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the
appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate
judge in the same case.
We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as
Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative
justice.The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the
Director of Mines for decision:
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process when Gozon reviewed his own
decision
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Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when
Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,
the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view
since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
E.
Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due process
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are necessary only
where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the enabling statute which
clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain duties and responsibilities in the
discharge of which some persons may adversely affected.
Essential elements of due process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for the
court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence
In
a.
b.
c.
d.
administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following
The right to actual or constructive notice
A real opportunity to be heard
A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34

(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City Engineer to contrcust a
funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to the court in his suit to enjoin the construction of
the funeral parlor, Veneracion, instead of appealing the judgment, lodged a complaint with the
HSCR on substantially the same ground litigated in the action relative parlors distance from
hospitals whether public or private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC through
Commissioner Dizon requesting transmittal of proof of location clearance granted by this
Office. Villa sent a reply telegram reading: Locational Clearance based on certification of City
Planning and Development Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies mail.
Subsequently, Villa received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of Locational Clearance.
Since she had already sent the required locational clearance, Villa made no response. Then
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Villa received a show cause Order, requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be
imposed on her or a cease-and desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of
locational clearance. In spite of her communication that she had already mailed all required
documents, she received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease
operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the order. A motion for
reconsideration to which she attached copies of the Commission Proper was also denied on
account of the finality of the Order. An appeal to the office of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs, and so was the motion for reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the Commision, ever made known
the complaint of Veneracion to Villa until much later, after the Commission has rendered
several adverse rulings against her; the orders of the Commission made no reference whatever
to the documents Villa had already sent by registered mail; and the resolutions of the
Presidential Assistant Lazaro likewise omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents sent by
Veneracion
Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of failure of Villa to take
timely appeal will not avail.
Held: Yes. These facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross negligence and
abdication of duty, if not active bias and partiality that is most reprehensible. The result has
been to subvert and put to naught the judgment rendered in a suit regularly tried and decided
by a court of justice, to deprive one party of rights confirmed and secured thereby and to
accord her adversary, by resorting to the prescribed practice of forum-shopping, the relief he
had sought and had been denied in said case.
The mischief done by the commissioner Dizons baffling failure even to acknowledge the
existence of the documents furnished by petitioner was perpetuated by the Commissioner
proper and respondent Lazaro, who threw out petitioners appeals with no reference that
would have been decisive.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an administrative
proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint which initiated the case; for
conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communication
requiring submission of certain documents, which left the impression that compliance was all
that was expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously complied.
The court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is foreclosed to Villa because her
motion for reconsideration of Nov. 22, 1982 was filed out of time. The very informal character of
the so-called administrative proceedings, an informality for which Com. Dizon himself was
responsible and which he never sought to rectify, militates against imposing strict observance
of the limiting periods applicable to proceedings otherwise properly initiated and regularly
conducted.
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420

(Aileen Rose Angue)
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Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company, wherein both companies agreed to establish telephone services between the
Philippines and the United States. As it lacked the necessary equipment and facilities, PLDTCO
on the same date entered into another agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself
a carrier of PLDTCO's telephone messages to and from the United States. The term of the
agreement was for five years and "shall thereafter continue in force until terminated by either
party giving the other 24 calendar months previous notice in writing."
On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of termination of its arrangements
with the latter, the same to be effective not later than February 2, 1958, and three months
later, filed an application with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, through the
Radio Control Board, for authority to construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its
own at Marilao, Bulacan, and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio frequencies.
RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of Manila to prevent
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Radio Control Board from
proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending application. The complaint alleged that the approval
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of the construction permit in favor of
PLDTCO without previous hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in
support of its opposition was without due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present case.
Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only necessary in those cases where
the statute so requires. A cursory reading of the Radio Control Law (Act No. 3846, as amended)
shows that, unlike in other proceedings or instances specified in section 3, paragraphs d and
1, of the said law, no, hearing is required in the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications of any application for the installation, establishment, or operation of a
radio station (paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a hearing is required, RCA must
be considered to have waived its right thereto, its counsel having addressed a letter to the
Radio Control Board saying that "little would be gained by arguing the matter both before
yourselves and before the Public Service Commission."
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103

(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. information was filed against him
and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
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That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO
ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one
hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos
(P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said
item was only Fifty-Five Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pews
(P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of FortyNineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00) CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's
suspension, citing see. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.-Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book 11 of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that preventive suspension should therefore be
ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order x x x
prevent(s) the accused from using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the
legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be
decreed
Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension was proper.
Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging
violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property is filed.5 The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue
committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unIess the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether
the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
F.
Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
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1.
Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive suspension of public servant
facing administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536

(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of Triumph Savings
Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership,
and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No.
596, with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of
R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes the
Central Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any
few or regulation, much less found guilty thereof.
The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of TSB for
injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under the receivership of the officials of the Central
Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without first hearing the side of the bank. They
further admit that said resolution can be the subject of judicial review and may be set aside
should it be found that the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial of "due
process.
Held:
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be
directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as
amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver
takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should
precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no
prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul
it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17
It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional
requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the. Monetary Board' s resolution
to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before making the resolution
effective, It is enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided.
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595

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Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving
spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period
of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for
the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San
by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up
campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the
notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the
demolition of petitioner's Quonset building.
Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a
permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected.
It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an
impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did
constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows
then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their
authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of
its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and
was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the
demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a
judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458

2.
Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary
distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement
of a temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497

(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because
she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge of
attempted rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo as ordered by the
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect
of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the
Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the
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Office of the Ombudsman and were placed under preventive suspension. It appears that
petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts
of lasciviousness had been committed.
Issues:
1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.
2. Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it denied them opportunity to
refute the charges against them
Ruling:
1. Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed
by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a
municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
As held in Nera v. Garcia:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to
the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a
punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as
a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence.
3.
Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.
Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a requirement before an
agency action, which refers to the whole or part of every agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof, can be done,
compliance with the requirement of prior notice and hearing depends upon the
nature of the power to be exercised or the end to be achieved.
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Prior notice and hearing is not required in the exercise of police power
Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting provisional reliefs

Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
(Aileen Rose Angue)
Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of Examiners for Surveyors
administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct against petitioner Cleto Asprec. He
requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur. That
no survey was conducted and that it was a mere copy of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was
guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous
decision of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of
registration as a private land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in the hearing.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his case.
Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As
he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law o
r to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in p
rotest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because
without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from
the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due proces
s. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is that the parties
be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th.
More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their c
ounsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited his
right to be heard in his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal in nature. From this
he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself ther
efrom. We do not see eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of t
he court below, thus The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the re
spondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was
previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered h
im arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity
to be heard
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767

G.
Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission
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Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise
to construct, maintain and operate an electric light heat and/or power plant for the purpose of
generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several
Municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letter-petition of
"Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan, Ilocos, Sur", charging the
following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to
Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by
the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much more
than the actual consumption.
The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in excess of
the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest
and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the
extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates for its electric
service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of May 17,
1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letterpetition of Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then expressed the view that there
was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely
holding informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of
its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which
the order complained of is based, that such order had been issued without notice and hearing;
and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?
Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of
partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without
previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and,
hence, null and void.
Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service commission are necessary
depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings,
which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature
and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand,
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legislative and rule-making in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ON

DUE PROCESS), or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL
INSTANCES, DUE PROCESS IS REQUIRED), affecting the rights and property of private or
specific persons.
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.
H.
Motion for reconsideration as a cure
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures the defect in the
lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from claiming denial of due process
assumes that the other requirements of due process have been complied with. However such
opportunity is nothing and he is still denied due process, where the decision against him has
nothing to support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process being that the
decision or ruling of an administrative body must be supported by substantial evidence.
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as Public Officer II. Later on, she
was detailed as Technical Assistant in the office of the assistant secretary for the admin. and
manpower management. On Jan. 2, 1989, petitioner was appointed to the contested position
of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rankemployees} jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force re-organization contesting the
appointment of petitioner. The task force dismissed the protest of the respondents thereby
appealing before the Civil Service Commission. The Commission disapproved the appointment
of the petitioner reversing the ruling of task force. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
before the CSC but to no avail, hence , the petition then was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of petitioner and that WON the
petitioner was denied of due process of law in the absence of notice?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in disapproving the appointment of
petitioner. The CSC is limited only to determine whether the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility and not whether another is more qualified than the
petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the appeal before the Commission. The essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice but the absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Any defect may be cured
by the filing of motion of reconsideration.
i.
Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
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There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall
not be bound by such proceedings
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from
that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of
Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed
at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated
July 31, 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office,
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of
then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from
the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.
ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
the respondent's capacity to represent himself and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding such as the
one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the
services of counsel or not.
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Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings attended by Lumigued clearly
show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted he represent himself.
The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
IV.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

A.
Definition and objective
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek relief in an
administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though the matter is
properly presented to the court, which is within its jurisdiction. The court will not determine a
controversy:
1. Where the question demands administrative determination requiring special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
2. Where the question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of fact
3. Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
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B.
Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES applies where a claim is

cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency; judicial intervention is withheld
until the administrative process has run its course.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body;
in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C.
Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
(Aileen Rose Angue)
FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of Petitioner Vicente Villaflor complaint
against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.
Villaflor in a Lease Agreement leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of land. Villaflor
claimed having discovered that after the execution of the lease agreement, that Nasipit Lumber
'in bad faith surreptitiously grabbed and occupied a big portion of plaintiff's property.
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Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a 'Deed of Relinquishment of Rights, in favor of

Nasipit Lumber.
The Director of Lands issued an 'Order of Award in favor of Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc.
Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber,
claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights.
The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in the Deed xxx and
the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of
Villaflor's protest and gave due course to the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber.
ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case?
RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality of Factual Findings of
the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary Jurisdiction;
courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
Jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case,
since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private
respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the
Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters.
Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand
aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete and 11 others. The
complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons
landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay
private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated
demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective rentals. Private
respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and damages.
Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with
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agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers under the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose
from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the
agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in
nature. The laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parries thereto
are necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the
application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have
been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA found the
petition to be impressed with merit. E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those failing under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.
Issue: WON the CAs decision is correct.
Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by
the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract
with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial
court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. Thus, respondent appellate court erred in
directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal
battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was quite
emphatic in Quismundo v. Court o Appeals,the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage
of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further,
the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other
issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and
28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
(Aileen Rose Angue)
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Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation

engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and
Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In
consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated"
products. Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more
containers of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., of the Department of Natural
Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents
Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "woodderivative" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the
importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import
ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the
Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the
Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of
which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is
to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same
cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of
the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
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Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court
cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is with its
prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it claerly abuses or exceeds its
jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which are covered
by Transfer Certificates. The lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner
filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The petition was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which dismissed the petition on
the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB. Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period
provided for under Section 51 of Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law within which to appeal, already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision was affirmed. It was held that: Jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion
was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just
compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15day period of appeal provided from the decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand,
respondents argue that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the
appropriate courts within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator,
otherwise such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant to 51 of R.A. No. 6657.
Issue: Which contention is meritorious?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special Agrarian
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.
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The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
D.
When doctrine does not apply
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not apply. It does not
apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was
instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging road without
authority.
From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private respondent
EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway, through their security force, to
prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs for the Japanese vessel. Private respondent
claim that they were the only authorized timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case
before the trial court, which was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding that
the issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have heard the case before
filing t case in court.
Issue : WON the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry applies.
Held : The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have
jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding
that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging
road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vast any power in the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal
or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be
maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a
matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the
private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is
beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the
unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on
such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forest Development.
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V.
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

A.
Definition and purpose
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the remedies have
been exhausted at the administrative level.
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344

Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court
action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the
administrative level.
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government,
but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall
decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but
likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the
government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court."
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to show that their case
falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were made to avail in
the same administrative agency, the opportunity or right to oppose, which in fact they did,
when they filed a motion for reconsideration and later when the motion was denied, they
appealed to the Secretary of Education and Culture.
Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the issue of alleged
denial of due process.
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed Principal of the
Lambunao High School established in the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High
School was later converted into a Regional Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo
Vocational High School. Gonzales then received a letter from the Secretary of Education
appointing him as Head of the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He
also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to respondent Alfredo
Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade School, appointing him as Principal of the
Iloilo Vocational School. When Pineda came to assume the office of Principal of the latter
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school, Gonzales refused to yield the same to him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's
appointment as well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related Subjects
Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades, who
forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public Schools by a second indorsement.
Without waiting for any action on his protest-in fact even before said protest could be forwarded
and submitted to the Director of Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to restrain the
Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from giving effect to the appointment
of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School, and to recover damages. After due
trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment. Appellants claimed that the lower court
erred in not holding that the present action was instituted prematurely.
Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative proceeding.
Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate administrative
procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered prejudicial to his rights by
means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This
protest was forwarded by the latter to the Director of Public Schools, but even before this date
appellee instituted the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior
officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking judicial
intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before resorting to the courts to
seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the present case where, according to the
record, appellant Pineda and the superior officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted
any undue pressure upon him to compel him to yield and give up the position in question. The
decision appealed from is reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts: Private respondent Pontejos was issued a permanent appointment as Labor Arbitration
Associate by herein petitioner Carale who is the NLRC Chairman. Carale, pursuant to his
exercise of admin. authority and supervision over all NLRC officials , issued an admin. Order
detailing and re-assigning private respondent to NLRC 4th division in Cebu. In this regard,
private respondent filed a case before the RTC of Cebu against petitioner for Illegal Transfer
tantamount to removal without cause in violation of the security of tenure under the
Constitution. Petitioner moved for a motion to dismiss the case but RTC denied the petitioner.
Petitioner questioned the courts jurisdiction to try the case without first resorting to
exhaustion of administrative remedy to the Civil Service Commission.
Issue: WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him?
Ruling: Private respondent did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.
Respondent Pontejos is subject to civil service laws and regulations pursuant to the
Constitution as Labor Arbitration Associate.
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Respondents grievances must be first raised before the Civil Service Commission before
resorting to judicial intervention. Therefore the instant case is premature and that respondent
should exhaust all the available remedies to his grievances before resorting to courts.
The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was ordered to dismiss the case filed
by Pontejos.
The exceptions under the Doctrine of Exahaustion of Administrative Remedies mentioned in
this case are the following;
1) where the question is purely legal,
(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
B.
Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance with the rule
is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is ground for a motion to
dismiss. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ground for motion to dismiss or is a
defense which may be raised in the answer.
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City dismissing
a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga, the engineer of that city, to authorize de los
Santos to construct a residential house on the land described in the petition. It is alleged the
respondent without any lawful cause refused to grant said permit; and that in view of this
refusal, petitioner suffered damages.
In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied the allegations
of the petition and interposed the following affirmative defenses: that after a fire which
occurred in Lamitan that raged down a major portion of the market site therein, the city
government approved the purchase of an additional area to enlarge the said site and that,
incidentally, the lot claimed by the petitioner was included in the area; that by virtue thereof,
expropriation proceedings had been instituted thereon, hence, the denial of the permit applied
for by petitioner. The city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: that
mandamus will not lie since the issuance of the permit applied for was a discretionary and not
a ministerial duty on the part of the city engineer to which the trial court agreed.
Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with the DEAR.
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Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as the record shows,
the land in question is already the subject matter of expropriation proceeding instituted by
Basilan City pursuant to a resolution approved by the City Council, which proceeding is now
pending in the Court of First Instance of Basilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner should have first brought the
matter to the Director of Public Works who, under the law, exercise supervision and control
over city engineers of chartered cities (see Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not
satisfied with the Director's decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications.
The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative official
should. before coming to court, apply for review of such decision by higher administrative
authority. This principle rests on the presumption that the administrative agency if afforded a
complete chance to pass upon the matter.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C.
When applied
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the agency
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does not apply in the exercise of its rule-making
power or legislative power.
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila, alleges in substance (1) that it
had placed orders for textiles amounting to about P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders
were accepted before July 31, 1949; (2) that in November 1950 it requested the respondent to
allow importation of the textiles against its quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No. 12 and (3)
but that respondent with grave abuse of authority and discretion has denied the request and
instead ordered that said orders of Ang Tuan Kai & Co., be charged against the firm's 1951
quota and exchange allocations in pursuant to the order issued previously by the same board.
Hence this case.
Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the court.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import Control
Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate remedy by an appeal to the
President. Certiorari or mandamus against administrative officers should not be entertained if
superior administrative officers can grant relief. Thus, the petition is denied.
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D.
Exceptions to the doctrine

When there is a violation of due process
When the issue involved is purely a legal question
When the administrative agency is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
When there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned
When there is irreparable inquiry
When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President hears the implied and assumed approval of the latter
When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
When the subject matter is private land in land cases proceedings
When the rule does not provide a plain speedy and adequate remedy
There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention (Paat vs. CA)
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut,
remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in
Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious
violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies;
and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by Section I of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987,1 and the motion
for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988,3
and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
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Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the reasons for the doctrine
of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy
of noninterference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence
of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do
so. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not
acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the
DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner
has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations.21 The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting
evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing
their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts
may step in to exercise their powers of review. here is no question that Civil Case No. 2732
comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the
complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws
and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this
question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The
application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is
a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a
court of justice.
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802

(Ma. Lourdes Genio)
Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation of several tons of foreign rice
to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of
the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation.
Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association engaged in the
production of rice and corn, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to
make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals
or amends Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the
Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; that petitioner has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a prelinainary
injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of
this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Respondent, among
others, countered that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available to
him before coming to court.
Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case.
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Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore,
untenable.
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private
respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued
on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15)
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No.of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this court. Invoking the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the buck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private
respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting
that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1)
due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the
seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting
illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one
thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
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disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of
comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to
reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while
the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." To sustain the claim of private
respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated.
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor
of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he was charged in an administrative case, for alleged
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct,
etc., preferred against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the
Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The
committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent therein, the committee
heard the case, receiving testimonies of witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the
committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent conclusion and recommendation therein
reading as follows: "(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon
which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent and therefore respectfully
recommends that he be immediately reinstated." Unable to agree with the committee report,
the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered "the
respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension." The pertinent
portion of the resolution reads thus:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the aforesaid fact finding
committee, in conjunction with the entire records of the case and representations of both
complainants and respondent, through their respective counsel; and, further, after a thorough
review of the service record of the respondent, particularly the various cases presented against
him, object of Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves
fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor
that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and InCharge of the Export Department (such position being primarily confidential and highly
technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the
service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to be best interests of the Central Bank, and,
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therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the
respondent, Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the .date of his suspension."
Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July 23, 1959,
approving the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place
of petitioner R. Marino Corpus. The lower court was of the opinion that petitionerappellant
should have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260, or the President of the Philippines
who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments of the
government including its agencies and instrumentalities. This is the main issue disputed in
this appeal.
Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or the
Civil Service Commission. However, it is our opinion that a resort to these administrative
appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. (1)
There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. The fact that
the President had, in two instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from
decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as precedents,
but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. (2)
While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to
observe them, considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo vs,.
Bayona, et al., 106 Phil., 1121, We said that Section 14, Republic Act 265, creating the Central
Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof, "is sufficiently broad to vest the
Monetary Board with the power of investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor
thereof. In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation,
suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of
law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central
Bank-, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects."
In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned from the office to
which he has been legally appointed as of the date of his suspension, after he has been duly
indicted and tried before a committee created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to the
Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of supererogation, requiring the presentation
of practically the same witnesses and documents produced in the investigation conducted at
the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover, Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Law provides
that "except as otherwise provided by law," the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have "final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officials and
employees in the competetive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such officials and employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that
the Charter of the Central Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board,
relative to the investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor,
coupled with the fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-competetive or
unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil
Service is not required or at most is permissive and voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it
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may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or
bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper
judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil.
621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public interest requires that the
right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable."

Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
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Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works

8 SCRA 179
(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner was denounced before
the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making certain constructions near the mouth of Calatan Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental; that on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served with
copy of the charges filed against it by two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works
and Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges; that on the basis of this
investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated January 16, 1959 ordering the
petitioner herein to remove the causeway illegally constructed at the mouth of the Calat-an
River and restore the bed of said river to its original condition within thirty days from receipt of
copy of the decision, otherwise, the removal shall be effected by the government at the expense
of herein petitioner. Without appealing the decision of the respondent Secretary to the
President, herein petitioner has filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari seeking
that the decision of respondent be annulled."
Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of Republic Act No. 2056, is it
required that appeal to the President should precede recourse to the courts. The silence of the
statute, to be sure, does not mean that the President may not review the action of the
Secretary. His power to do so is implicit in his constitutional power of control of all the
executive departments (Section 10, Works and Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution). This, however, does not resolve the issue, which is not whether petitioner could
have appealed to the President but whether he should have done so before seeking judicial
relief. The answer depends, in turn, upon whether an appeal to the President would have been
sufficiently effective, adequate and expeditious, a negative finding in this respect being the
basis on which the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for by petitioner, may be issued.
The absence of an express provision in Republic Act No. 2056 for an appeal to the President
from the decision of the Secretary, considered together with the peremptory character of the
periods therein prescribed, shows that such an appeal-assuming that it may be taken in view
of the President's constitutional power of executive control-would not affect the inexorable
requirement that those periods be observe& the only exception being in favor of Works and
Communications the Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid reason for his failure or delay to
terminate and decide a case or effect the removal of the illegal construction such as, for
Instance, an injunction issued by a court. We are of the opinion that an appeal to the President
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from the order of respondent Secretary would not have been expeditious enough for petitioner's
purposes and hence the latter did not have to resort to it before seeking judicial relief. In any
event, we believe the facts of this case place it within the rule enunciated in Dimaisip vs. Court
of Appeals, 106 Phil., 237, as follows: "Such failure (to appeal from the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President) cannot preclude the plaintiffs
from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a Department is merely an
alter-ego of the President; the assumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied
sanction of the President, unless the same is disapproved by the latter."
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No. 48 with the
Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano, C. Bueno and one Juanito Merin, for
injunction and damages. In his amended petition, Patanao alleged that on March 10, 1958 the
respondents therein disturbed him in his, possession of his timber concession by illegally
entering the same and cutting and hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop
said respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and hauling logs "he
was met with riot guns, pistols and other firearms"; and that defendants were able to cut no
less than one million board feet of exportable logs worth not less than $64,000.00 and would
be able to cut and haul even a bigger amount in the space of one month as they had allegedly
concentrated all their logging machineries and equipment with the apparent intention of
illegally denuding the forest area covered by his license. Patanao thus urged the court below to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the respondents, their agents, laborers
and lawyers, from entering the area and cutting and hauling logs therein pending trial and,
after trial, to make the injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents
liable in an amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs.
Ruling: At first glance, petitioner's argument appears to be tenable. True, the common
boundary of the parties was verified by the Bureau of Forestry way back in March 1955. It
seems, however, that while petitioner Bueno had endeavored to respect the verification report,
respondent Patanao had refused to conform thereto, so much so that the conflict was brought
anew to the attention of the Director of Forestry who has formally taken a hand therein. On or
about April 8, 1958, before Patanao instituted Civil Case No. 48 with the respondent court, he
was officially requested to designate a representative to accompany Forestry officials in the
verification of the common boundary line between him and petitioner (Exhibit 8, letter
addressed to Patanao by Anastacio G. Sison, officer-incharge, Esperanza Forest Station,
Agusan, p. 5; Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction, dated,
July 23, 1958.) That said boundary dispute is still pending in the Bureau of Forestry at the
filing of this petition is shown by the letter of the District Forester of Agusan, now in the record
as Annex A-Opposition. The record also discloses that Patanao's application for renewal and
consolidation of his timber licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon the consideration of the Director
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of Forestry. The granting of timber licenses, their renewal or cancellation, and the
determination of conflicting claims or boundary lines involving forest zones, such as those
presently occupied by the parties hereto, are all vested by law primarily upon the Director of
Forestry and ultimately upon his Department head.
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151

(Tristan A. Reyes)
Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent Rodito Nasayao claimed
that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed plant manager of the petitioner corporation,
with an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or 25% of the monthly net income of the
company, whichever is greater, and when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of
May, June, and July 1974, Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The case was docketed therein
as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was
employed in the company as plant manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They
claimed that the undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort of
partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good working condition
and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users for the installation of marble
products, in which the company would not interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao
was to receive an amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation
would realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no profits
during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount. The case was submitted
for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the herein respondent Jose T. Collado as
voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the proceedings, however, the herein petitioners
challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked
him to desist from farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In due
time, or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the complainant, ordering the
herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice.
Upon receipt of the decision, the herein petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to
hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and
that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. On 18 March 1976, Rodito Nasayao
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator
is final, appealable, and immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the motions, the respondent Commission, in a
resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision appealed
from is final, unappealable and immediately executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to
comply with the decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the
resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out
the questioned decision and resolution.
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Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the petitioner failed to
follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is tenable.
Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot be invoked in this case, as contended. In the recent case of John Clement Consultants,
Inc. versus National Labor Relations Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no law
provides for an appeal from decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission; hence, there
can be no review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal conclusions.
When, however, it decides a case without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, the party thereby adversely affected may obtain a review and nullification of that
decision by this Court through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Since, in this case, it
appears that the Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal sought to be taken from a decision of Labor
Arbiter and thereafter reversing it, the writ of certiorari will issue to undo those acts, and do
justice to the aggrieved party."
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter,
Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract
with the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MCA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG
PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager,
Amado Perez, for the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market.
The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985,
renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of
the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by
the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which shall, however, be increased by
ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years only. Following his assumption into
office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to
be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the
provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently
inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both
the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the in
strument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken
towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted the Municipality
authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation. rescission of the above cited
contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the
possession, management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal
Government of Muntinlupa." Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the
Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45 abrogating the
contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of
the Capital Command of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the
public market and announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that the
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Municipality was taking over the management and operation of the facility, and that the
stallholders should thenceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market
Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion
of admin remedies.
Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an
alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved
by him.69 This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when
most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President;
recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is
purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland
or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda
Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be
petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action,
petitioner reiterated her application sometime in 1979-1985 alleging that her tenant
deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the
Ming of the said application and, that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children.
A reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985 filed
his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. Said report was elevated
to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo
manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of the
petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27167,
27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program. Juanito L.
Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred therewith. However, in the order dated
February 13, 1986, then Minister Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention.
On April 17, 1986, petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The case
was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 08550. Private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. However, it was denied in an order dated May
28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. After the parties filed their
respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dated June 29, 19871
dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to
whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land holdings, if
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administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be
reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.2 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution
dated October 22, 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable.

Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that questions as to whether a landowner
should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the
Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of
the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from
those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a
decision of the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that
this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals
has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to appeal to the
Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a
violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of
the President.
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the Conservatory Music in UP as
recommended by the President of the University of the Philippines after compliance of the
required qualifications under the Charter of the same. Consequently, the Board of Regents of
the said University issued a resolution fixing the terms of the office of the Dean and Directors
thereof allegedly in pursuant to same charter. Thereafter, the University President issued a
memorandum reminding the Deans and Directors whose terms are about to expire that unless
they are recommended by the same for reappointment, their assumption to their respective
office is deemed terminated. Tapales was injured by the said resolution and memorandum as
such filed before the court a question on the validity of the said resolution and memorandum.
The respondent on the other hand alleged that the petitioner failed to exhaust the required
administrative remedies available.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
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Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies by not asking the Board of Regents to reconsider the challenged resolution before
bringing the matter to court. An administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial
relief against a statute or ordinance which is claimed to be unconstitutional and void (73 C.J.S.
357), or where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done (73 C.J.S. 354). Here, appellee impugned the constitutionality
and validity of the Resolution of October 2, 1959, and appellee's objection thereto is a purely
legal one.
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly and officially registered
with NSF and for which he is issued a certificate of registration, thereby entitling it to
participate in horse races and sweepstakes draws in legally authorized racing clubs or tracks.
In line with the SOP and usual racing practices for horse owners, Quintos applied for inclusion
of his horse in a particular race 3 days before the date of the race which application was duly
approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos race-horse was scheduled to
participate in race no. 15, the PRC announced thru the PA system before the start of race no.
13 that his horse was being excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then alleged that
the cancellation of the certificate of registration of his horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due
process being denied him in the absence of a formal investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The
trial court dismissed the complaint primarily on the ground of lack of EAR that the admin
remedy of Quintos was to ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its resolution
cancelling the certificate of registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
Amusement Board or to the Office of the President. The CA certified the case to the SC since it
found that a purely legal question was involved, to wit: WON the trial court correctly dismissed
the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Does Quintos have a valid cause for complaint?
Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The reason for this shortcircuiting of administrative processes is not explained by Quintos. His gives no reason for his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, there is none. The order of dismissal,
therefore, certainly cannot be considered as being in derogation of the due process guarantee.
The judicial forum sought by Quintos was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept of
primary jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative law, the stage of ripeness for
judicial review had not been reached. Quintos ignored factors not predetermined by formula
but by seasoned balancing for and against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had been
said so far would seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower courts insistence of the
fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is more than justified.
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Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672
COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO. Specifically, the change sought
is in the civil status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner wants to be described in the
certificate of title as married to her rather than as a widower.
The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January 1933 to the
petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent, describing himself as
"married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the original certificate over the homestead was
issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter
the petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that
his description as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the
couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933, the
oppositors nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with
another man. Later, they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom
she begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was their father himself who had
described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since
1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered conjugal and therefore
equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed for, but later it
reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its reason
was that there was no observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of a certificate of title
without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The
only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of
action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to private
lands, as also settled in a number of decisions rendered by this Court. Once registered, the
homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to have the character of public land and so was
removed from the operation of the said doctrine. But notwithstanding the above principles, the
petition will still have to be dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under
Section 112 of Act 496, as interpreted by this Court.
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Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer Services and
Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits. The labor arbiter rendered a
decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the
petitioners, issued a writ of execution to enforce said decision. The following day, the sheriff
served a notice of garnishment to the Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount
of P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over to the petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents' office premises.
ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A., through its Chairman, Dulay
filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the ground that it is the real owner of the
computers levied upon and scheduled for auction. This third-party claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief from judgment in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. The NLRC then issued the questioned resolutions incidental to
Injunction Case. The petitioners filed before the NLRC a motion to dismiss and/or answer to
the petition on the ground that a petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor
Code and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss, the petitioners filed the
present petition. This petition seeks to annul the three NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC
from taking further proceedings in Injunction Case and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said
injunction case and to order the full execution of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for being premature, applying
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He further stressed the jurisdiction of
the NLRC and its exercise of sound discretion.
Issue: WON the Soc Gens position is tenable.
Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among others, that the instant
case falls under the exceptions to the general rule. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not an inflexible rule. In fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we have
noted in a number of cases, exhaustion is not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable delay or official action
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant: where the amount involved is relatively small
so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice.
At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. There had been no action on the challenge to the petition for relief from judgment for
almost a year. This is considerably long considering that the labor arbiter's decision had
already become final and in fact has been partially executed. The main case had been filed as
early as June 20, 1986.
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Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the suspension of an execution
would only be further delayed if we remand it to the NLRC, only to have any decision raised
again before this Court.
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant
Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay
high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for
their monthly tuition few. Since at that time also, the President of the Philippines who was
earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio
council through proper resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of
the high school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a
barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. The
only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said barrio council
to withdraw the above amount and which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's
Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of the
herein petitioner as it involves the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds
and of its technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a sentence of
one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner appealed his case to
the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals modified the decision by eliminating the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being
involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to
proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With this instrument on hand, the
herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to
the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary
School Principal I.
Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.
Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position
is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case,
if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified
by the requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on
the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be sued, the
only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again,
We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this government agency.
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Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer, who claims that poverty
denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court set aside the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.
The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to the
position of Elementary School Principal I or its equivalent
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

(Mark Roy Boado)
Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him
bad sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care). the
Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee.
But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of
contributory negligence in not pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement
at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but
the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had
not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598,
which provides: The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear
and decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases
shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 in the
instant case.
Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been rendered by the
Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and that the tendency of courts has
been not to subject the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued that if
decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board
of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be had to the
courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final
and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action would be derogatory to the
high office of the President. The judgment appealed from is thus affirmed.
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Administrative Law

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Concept/definition of administrative law

Scope of administrative law

Classification of administrative law

Origin and development of administrative law

Advantages of the administrative process

Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Test for determining administrative nature

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Public office, defined in relation to administrative law

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

JRU LAW SCHOOL

By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

E. Types of administrative agencies

F. Relation between administrative agencies and courts

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered

4. Definition of Administration US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies

Creation of administrative agencies

Abolition of administrative agencies

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(Mark Roy Boado)

De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Reorganization of administrative agencies

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President

Executive power, defined

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290

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By: Angue, Boado, Genio, Pascual, Reyes, Villamor

(Mark Roy Boado)

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

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Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238

Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego doctrine;

Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

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Limitations on the power of control