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DANIEL G. BOGDEN
United States Attorney
District of Nevada
STEVEN W. MYHRE
NICHOLAS D. DICKINSON
Assistant United States Attorneys
NADIA J. AHMED
ERIN M. CREEGAN
Special Assistant United States Attorneys
501 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 1100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 388-6336
steven.myhre@usdoj.gov
nicholas.dickinson@usdoj.gov
nadia.ahmed@usdoj.gov
erin.creegan@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States
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Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN W. PAYNE,
Defendant.
2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PAL
GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
RYAN PAYNES OBJECTIONS TO
THE REPORT OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO MOTION
TO DISMISS
(ECF No. 612)
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the Report of Findings and Recommendation To Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 612)
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incorporates in full its Corrected Response to Paynes Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
The Court should overrule Paynes Objections, adopt the Report of Findings
and Recommendation entered by United States Magistrate Judge Leen (ECF No.
589) (hereinafter the F&R) and enter an Order denying Paynes Motion to
Dismiss, for the following reasons: (a) the F&R is correct in fact and law; (b) Payne
has not, and cannot, assert any violation of the Speedy Trial Act (STA) 1 and,
attaches when a trial complies with its requirements; and (c) Payne cannot
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BACKGROUND
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In brief
summary:
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February 3, 2016:
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March 2, 2016:
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ARGUMENT
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In its Opening Response (ECF No. 414), the government demonstrated that
the Motion to Dismiss should be denied for the following reasons:
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complies with the requirement of the STA, all time between Paynes
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objection ((United States v. Baker, 63 F.2d 1478, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995)
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(A trial which complies with the [Speedy Trial] Act raises a strong
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12; F&R, ECF No. 589 at 11); and (b) the trial is set to occur in less
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than one year from the date of Paynes initial indictment (Barker v.
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Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972) (holding that trials that occur in less
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than one year from the date of indictment are presumed to meet the
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seeks more time to adequately prepare for trial, he may file a motion
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The F&R recommended denial of the Motion to Dismiss because trial has
been set within a year of the initial indictment and the time between Paynes
arraignment and the trial date has been excluded under the STA with no objection
from any of the defendants. ECF No. 589 at 11. The F&R further noted that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to consider Paynes interlocutory appeal
from the transfer Order in the Oregon case. Id.
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None of Paynes objections to the F&R has merit; he simply disagrees with
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it and raises nothing new. His claim that the prosecutions in Oregon and Nevada
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forced him to waive, or give up, his right to a speedy trial (Obj. at 4) is premised
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on the false assumption that his right to a speedy trial has been violated in the
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first instance. No such violation has occurred. As demonstrated in the F&R, the
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that it occurs within a year of initial indictment and there is no violation of the
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STA.
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setting or the exclusions of time Magistrate Judge Leen painstakingly set out in
Moreover, he fails to cite any authority for his stunning claim that the Sixth
based on sufficient evidence of violations of federal law. Here, Payne was indicted
occurring at different times, based on different acts. None of the cases cited by
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Payne remotely addresses these facts or otherwise holds that the Sixth
Amendment bars the returning of an indictment under any circumstances let
alone these circumstances.
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constitutionality in this case and, instead, urges the Court to leap immediately to
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the Barker v. Wingo factors. While the Court should refuse the invitation to do so
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(since Payne has shown no violation of the STA), even these factors are unhelpful
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While Payne speculates that witness memories may fade or witnesses may
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not be available to him (Obj. at 7), he does not identify any witness who will be
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unavailable to him in February 2017. Nor does he explain how a February 2017
trial date will otherwise impede the memory of any witness available to him now
recollections.
Similarly, Payne fails to show any prejudice based on his claim that his
complaining that he cannot be ready for trial by February 2017, citing the volume
Oregon. Obj. at 8-10. But this is August 2016, not February 2017. Payne cannot,
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and does not, know that he will not be prepared for trial by February 2017 and,
even if he is not, the remedy is to move for a continuance (as is done routinely),
not to dismiss the Indictment. Paynes dire prediction about his future readiness
for trial is no substitute for the tangible prejudice that he must show under
Barker v. Wingo.
The same is true with regard to Paynes claims of due process violations and
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ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial has yet to occur. It is impossible for
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Payne to show that he was not rendered effective assistance of counsel at trial or
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that his right to procedural due process has been denied when the trial has yet to
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occur.
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Lastly on this point, Payne has pleaded guilty in the Oregon case and has
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been ordered transferred to Nevada to resolve his case here. Oregon Case, ECF
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No. 916.
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circumstances that make it impossible for Payne to predict the future or otherwise
show prejudice. See also, Opening Response at 13-14 (demonstrating that Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not require constant in-
requests that the Court deny Paynes Objections, adopt the F&R, and enter an
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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TO DISMISS was served upon counsel of record, via Electronic Case Filing
(ECF).
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