Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th

centuries
Author(s): Caesar E. Farah
Source: Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, Vol. 33, Papers from at the
thirty-sixth meeting of the Seminar for Arabian Studies held in London, 18-20 July 2002
(2003), pp. 117-132
Published by: Archaeopress Publishing Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41223757
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Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 33 (2003): 1 17-132

Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf

in the late 19th and early 20th centuries

Caesar E. Farah

This paper attempts to trace the evolving imperial

to have no endealings with other foreign powers without
first consulting the British Government. It was similar
Oman with focus on the Arabian side. Pressures
to the proviso that had been inserted in the agreement of
mounted for an extension of domination and the Otto22 December 1880 with Shaykh cIs of Bahrain. In remans failed to resist successfully such encroachments, turn for not allowing the Ottomans to have a representacroachments on both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of

and manoeuvrings which were mounting in the lasttive in Kuwait, he was to receive an agreed sum of
quarter of the 19th century began to bear fruit for themoney which, not to be conspicuous, was to be sent to
British who were the power most concerned with the him via Bahrain. Meade had been instructed in a confidential note from the Government of India to conclude
status of the Gulf, as challenges from rival European

powers became increasingly more manifest. The prob- an agreement similar to that with Muscat and not prelem facing the Ottomans was how to contain the rival-clude the shaykh, Mubarak al-Sabb, from receiving
ries and disputes among the rulers of the Gulf emiratesrepresentatives from any power without the previous
sanction of the British. Meade was now instructed to
and neighbouring regions in the Arabian Peninsula. The
British consul had complained of disturbances in Basra watch carefully Mubarak's relations with the Ottoman
Government.3
itself which the local police were unable to quell. The
governor petitioned the central government to boost the In his dispatch from Therapia of July 5 1899 to the
police force of the Gulf region given the range of unrest
Marquess of Salisbury (No. 38 Secret), Ambassador
and foreign encroachments and he recommended that O'Conor, responding to the latter's telegram NO. 64 of
the Ministry of Marine authorize one of the armoured 17 June 1899, stated that he had instructed Consul Wraships in the Mediterranean be sent to the Gulf with antislaw by telegram to warn the vali of Basra not to mo-

accompanying steam transport ship. Dispatching a gun-lest the Shaykh of Kuwait or send an expedition against
boat from the Red Sea to patrol the shores of Basra washim. He was not sure what the sultan might do in redeemed insufficient.1 But the ministry was not preparedsponse to the secret deal.4
to take on patrolling off Jeddah and the Yemen in the
Consul Wratislaw had reported to Ambassador
Red Sea and now the Gulf without firm expenditures O'Conor on 3 June 1899 that Vali Hamdi Pasha had told
being allocated to that end.2
him that the sultan was much disturbed over reports that
Great Britain had designs on Kuwait. Representatives of

Problems at the head of the Persian Gulf

France, Russia and Germany wasted no time pumping

him up and the consul claimed it would be better if his

ambassador explained this directly to the sultan, AbdlThe main concern of the Ottomans was to stabilize and
hamid, and alerted him to the fact that these three powpreserve within their jurisdiction the emirates at the ers had designs of their own on Kuwait, it being the best
head of the Gulf, specifically Kuwait, Shammar, Qatar port for shipping in the Gulf.5
and Bahrain where the British were determined to exerFerk Mutisin Pasha, the commandant of Basra, had
cise direct control. Kuwait had the best port and thesent a dispatch to the headquarters (Seraskeriyet) in IsEmir of Kuwait was officially serving as kaymakam ontanbul on 1 October 1899 stating that he had formerly
behalf of the Ottoman administration in Basra, but wasreceived instructions to watch out for the seditious acts
of dubious loyalty to the Ottoman sultan, all claims to of Shaykh Mubarak, but the commission appointed to
the contrary notwithstanding. In 1899 he entered into areport on him claimed that he had assured them of his
secret agreement with Lt. Col. Meade, the India Gov-loyalty to the sultan. Hence it was deemed unnecessary
ernment agent at Bushire on the Persian side, promisingto keep him under further observation. A telegram dated

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118

Caesar

E.

Farah

stabilize the
Gulf and keepeffect
the Ottomans at bay, was se
28 September 1899To to
that
albeit this was their after
territory, the British
found themRiza by Mufrsin Pasha
consulting
The sadrazam received these assurances from the
selves having to become actively involved in controlling
serasker in a memorandum dated 2 October 1899.6 the hostile manoeuvres of local chieftains which were
the broader aims of British strategies. SpecifiThe Germans were not prepared to see the Gulfupsetting
becally,
come a British lake; they proceeded with their plans
to what were their areas of primary concern? The
first
have the Baghdad Bahn acquire a suitable terminus
atwas to insure that the governor of the province
which encompassed the emirates bordering on the Gulf
its head. In a secret telegram to Rear-Admiral Bosanwith headquarters at Basra would be amenable to their
quet of the Melpomen at Bushire of 16 January 1900,
presence
by preventing turmoil and tribal feuds from
Captain Denison reported that the Germans had gone
to
affecting their interests. Then, next to Basra,
Kathama Bay to inspect it for the railway terminus negatively
with
direct instructions from the Ottoman Governmentwas
and
the on-going rivalry of the House of Sacd of Najd
with
urged that it should not be lost to England as it could
bethe 1 Rashd in Shammar for domination in that
made a most important naval and military station.7 region. The 1 Rashd had been designated governors of
Shammar and Najd by the Ottoman authorities, but the
Not to be denied, the Russians diverted their gunSacud would not accept their official role. The latter
boat, Gilyak, from its course to the Far East to show1the

had the support of their fellow tribesmen, the Al Sabati

flag by making a stop at Bandar c Abbs. Salisbury sugof Kuwait, hence British interests in strengthening the
gested that, if it could be arranged, the British should

Sabati
position a British warship of superior force close
at and encouraging them with arms smuggled via

on the Persian side, where the British had an

hand during the visit of the Russian cruiser.8 With Bushire
the
Russian consul on board, the cruiser left Basra for official
Ku- political resident. This, of course was a direct
affront to the Ottomans who had no inkling at first of
wait on February 5.9
thetodual role of Shaykh Mubarak in proffering loyalty to
With both the French and Russians not prepared

sultan while secretly labouring to undermine his

see the Persian Gulf be annexed by the British andthe
also
to forestall the Russian drive there, the Pall Mall Gaauthority in the Gulf. They found themselves embroiled
seriously in the affairs of Qatar, Bahrain, and to some
zette proposed a solution, namely to partition Persia
extent Oman whose ruler had a feud with his
between them. Otherwise, it was argued, the British
neighbours.
would have to station a fleet there to protect her interThe Government of India had sought since 1853 to
ests, which would immobilize her navy.10
enter into treaty arrangements with the contentious
The traditional wisdom has held to the assumption
of the Gulf in order to control their actions that safeguarding the sea route to India through the emirates
Perat that time, piracy against their shipping from bases in
sian Gulf was the primary motivation for British inUmm al-Qaywayn under cAbdallh ibn Rashd, Ajman
volvement. While this may be considered as significant
under Sacd ibn Butya, Dubai under Sacd ibn Tahnn,
for the Government of India which had primary respon-

and Banys under Sultan ibn Sughghar. The British

sibility for influencing British policy towards the region,
signed a treaty with these chieftains to prevent their acts
research into European and Ottoman archives, on which
of piracy.11 But this was not enough to prevent piracy as
the findings for this paper are based, suggests that more
emirates inside the Gulf were reluctant to abandon a
than concern for the safe route, trade connections with
lucrative source of gain. Less than half a century later
the Persian side were also of important concern, especially after the German ambassador to Tehran filedthe
a British found themselves having to interfere directly
in the affairs of these emirates in order to regulate their
lengthy report with his government outlining the lucraconduct
and bring them into line with their own policy
tive commercial potential for his country, which in
an

Increased British activity in the Gulf

era of mounting Anglo-German rivalry played aobjectives.
not

the French L'Orient to comment under the

insignificant role in shaping a British policy aimedprompted
at
title "Empitement de l'Angleterre sur le Golfe Perbarring German shipping to the Gulf (Farah 1996: 186sique", "Since when has the Persian Gulf become a Brit189). The political manoeuverings to prevent the Ottoish lake?" On a sarcastic note the article continues,
mans from having a rail terminus at Kuwait, the only
viable outlet, was integral to British policy since"Now
the we read of a British Political Resident in Turkish

Arabia" at Baghdad. The question the editor raises is,

Germans were financing to a large extent the constructhis not compromise Ottoman territorial sovertion of the rail line termed historically the Berlin "does
to
Baghdad Bahn.

eignty and integrity?"12

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 1 19
The matter had to be addressed first at the headquarters of the province, namely Basra, and the Ottomans
soon appreciated the need to take more direct interest
lest they should lose control over the emirates. The one
next door, that of Kuwait, was becoming a thorn in the

branch of the same royal house. The article alleged that

the uprising caused losses to British trade and that England was seeking to bring Muscat under British administration by supporting the rebels with munitions and

side of the Basra vali. Shaykh Mubarak's intrigues

Zanzibar sultanate governed by a rival clan of the same

family, and was asking large sums of money to compensate British subjects for their losses.15 A German report
alleged that c Abdallah ibn Salit, was chief of the rebels
against Sacd ibn Faysal, Sultan of Muscat. His brother

spilled over into the critical neighbouring kaymakamate

(sub-governorate) of Shammar and Najd because of the
rivalry of the two houses. When word reached Istanbul
that the Emir of Najd was dispatching emissaries with
"valuable gifts and dangerous advice" to the khdive of
Egypt, presumably for assistance against his adversary
of Shammar, designated as the official administrator of
the northern territory, the sultan purportedly personally
sent orders to his vali to arrest these emissaries immedi-

ately. Abdiilhamid was also very concerned over the

safety of the Arab coast of the Gulf and in order to establish quick lines of communication he issued orders

for the construction of a telegraph line from Fao to

Qafff. He also ordered the dismissal of the deputy governor and adviser of the Shaykh of Qatar for failing to
report regularly on the state of affairs there.13

A confidential report from C. Harding at St. Petersburg raised additional concern in the sultan's circle. An
item appearing in the local newspaper Novoe Vremya of
13 September 1891 alleged that both Russia and France
were seeking to assert their interest in the Persian Gulf.

Indeed, it was further alleged that both Russia and

France were promoting an alliance to participate in the
Baghdad rail project while the English were endeavour-

ing to assert their own dominance in that region by

building coal depots in the ports of the Gulf, interfering

in the affairs of Arab shaykhs, causing agitation in

Oman, intriguing in Kuwait, Najd and the Yemen, and
consolidating sovereignty in Baluchistan.
As proof of their determination not to be left out, the

Russians established consulates at Bandar, Bushire, and

Basra and started direct steamship communication between Odessa and Persian Gulf posts. But there was no
fear that either Russia or France could obtain cargo for
their ships because the British gave it only to their own.

The French got around this ban by working directly

with Arab traders.14

As the report from St. Petersburg alleged, France did

have important contacts with Arab traders in Muscat.
The Germans allegedly were also seeking to enter the
Gulf trade. A report from Muscat, which found its way
into the German Neue Preussische Zeitung, called attention to the state of unsettled political affairs in Muscat,
stating that the sultan was being attacked by his own
subjects. The dispute emanated from a controversy over

the Sultanate of Zanzibar which was ruled by a rival

guns, as it had already exercised protection over the

Muljsin ibn cAmr was seeking guns and ammunition

from Hilal ibn cAmr of Zanzibar.16

British concern arose also from the meddling of the

French, who encouraged Arab dhows to fly the French
flag in order to avoid capture by the British when suspected of raiding British shipping. Word reaching London alleged that Major Fagan, the British resident consul at Muscat, had threatened to pull down French flags
from suspected dhows. However, when the French ambassador to London denounced this, he was assured by
Lord Salisbury that no such threat had been made.17 To
avert the possibility of a serious confrontation, the sultan travelled on board the British Sphinx to Sr on the
coast south of Muscat to demand that the tribes there

return to the French the papers empowering them officially and the French flags which they hoisted on their
dhows. It is alleged he branded the French as their enemies who were seeking to control half of Oman. Ottavi,
the French consul, purportedly refused to receive back
the flags and Ambassador Cambon in Istanbul told his
British counterpart that he considered the matter to be
between the French Government and the Sultan of
Oman. The British on the other hand insisted that the

French had no right to protect the citizens of another

power in such a way as to prevent the stopping of vessels engaged in the slave trade.

The pro-Islam Arabic newspaper Fath al-Basyir of

Beirut published an article in its 9 January 1900 issue
denouncing both the Ottomans and the sultans of Muscat for opening the door to foreign intervention. It accused Britain first of despoiling India, and now of trying
to prevent the French from having a port in Muscat. The
Government of India suspected that Goguyer, who spied
first for the French then for the Russians, was behind
the intrigue. The sultan allegedly requested that the di-

rector of the post office in India discreetly weed out

defamatory material from the mail. Goguyer allegedly
went to Sur to inquire from the shaykhs who had reluctantly surrendered the flags and was told that it was both
the British and the sultan who had insisted on the surrender, but they had used no compulsion. The sultan's

journey to Sr on board the Sphinx was to let the

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120

Caesar

E.

Farah

who had oncebearing

been Sultan of both Oman French
and Zanzibar.
shaykhs know that
pa
from his sovereignty.
But
the
Frenc
Hilal now intrigued to
recreate the
sultanate of
his
government saying
grandfather
that
in himself. His
those
brother Mutisin who
ibn cAmr
su
so under compulsion.18
was involved in the exchange
The
of Saliti ibn
French
cAl for the
d
whom they had held hostage.
c Abdallah
ibn Saliti mat
did sympathetic sultan
shaykhs,
and
the
years with the British
had led an assault to capture
unwilling
Muscat to free his father.to c
He visited Mombasa and received arms and ammunition

at sea.

An interview with the qadi of Sr, Atrniad Maw-to support his rebellion. Under the influence of Hilal,
law, revealed that he would not interfere if flags were
Hamd ibn Thuwayn gave money and munitions to the
returned as the sultan had no means to protect them
uprising with the aim of deposing Sacd and replacing
him with a member of his own family. Hilal wielded
from the menace of the French warship Drme; besides,
the tribesmen sailing the dhows knew they would not great
be
influence in Muscat-Oman-Zanzibar and the Govsearched while flying the French flag.19

ernment of India decided he had to be removed from the

scene and exiled to Bombay where his grandfather had

Confronted with strong resistance from the British

and not prepared to yield preponderant influencebeen

to sent when he was deposed and where he had died.
They stationed a gunboat without cannons off the coast
them in this strategic region at the entrance to the Gulf,
to monitor closely the whole affair. It was the Laurence,
the French ambassador to Rome, Baron Courcel proand it belonged to the Imperial Indian Marine.
posed to his German counterpart that Germany should
acquire Oman because of its close relations with Zanzi- Sultan SacTd ibn Fayal's troubles grew when in 1896
he sought to take the forts of Hazm and al-Rustq in the
bar and East Africa, given the growing conflict with
interior
in order to contain a rebellion of tribesmen
Russia, claiming that France would not oppose such
a

move. 20

against him instigated by his cousin Hamid ibn Thu-

The affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar

wayn, ruler of Zanzibar. His father Thuwayn ibn Sacd

had succeeded to the Sultanate of Oman but had been

driven out of the country and had died in Bombay. He

succeeded, as Sultan of Oman, by his nephew Sacd
The French also sought to have coal depots of theirwas
own
ibn
Fayal.
His first secretary Hilal ibn cAmr was acon the coast of Muscat and were assured by Fagan,
cused
of
supplying
the rebels with guns and money to
through the sultan, on behalf of the Government of India
topple
him.
The
Government
of India, eager to exercise
that there were no objections to their having coal sheds
direct
influence
in
the
Sultanate
of Oman urged the Sulin Muscat provided no settlements, political or territorial
tan
of
Zanzibar
to
exile
Hilal
who
had been exercising
rights were involved, as the British did not enjoy such
undue
influence
in
that
sultanate
through
his frequent
concessions. The British hoped to entice them away by
offering to share a coal depot at Makall covevisits.
near Indeed, Harding, the governor-general, stopped in

on his way to England on a vacation to exMuscat harbour which Capt. Denison had inspectedMombasa
and
press clearly the Government of India's view that the
sheltered from the sea and lighters could tie up therepresence of Hilal was undesirable given his clandestine

deemed suitable for such a station because it was well

hostility to the Sultan of Muscat.23

safely in all weather conditions, and it was also large
enough to store 10,000 tons of coal. However, the The British were monitoring the affair by means of
the gunboat Laurence, which had been stripped of its
French ambassador was not interested in the offer of
cannons so as to arouse no alarm over its intent.24
dividing Makall equally between the British and the
Omani
merchants, like their Persian counterparts at
French,21 arguing that it was not large enough to exBushire were profiting from the trade in arms. Neither
pand, while Denison dubbed the assertion absurd.22 Adthe British nor the Germans saw any need to promote
ditionally the French were not to fly their flag or erect

the shipment of arms from Oman to the interior of Arafortifications, an assurance made by the French ambasbia or to Africa at this juncture.25 The Sultan of Oman
sador in advance to Salisbury.
did not object to the trade in arms as long as he could
levy his 5% on the value of all goods and merchandise
of whatever description imported by sea from foreign
The intrigues of Hilal ibn cAmr
countries into his dominions. Duties were levied at ports

In 1895, agitation against Sultan Fayal ibn Sacd ofof entry upon the landing of goods.26
Oman was allegedly instigated by Hilal ibn cAmr, his According to Fagan's report to Lord Hamilton of the
Government of India, via Lt. Col. Meade, the sultan set
first secretary. Hilal's grandfather was Sacld ibn Sacd,

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 121
out on 11 May 1899 to wrest control of the two forts
either by trickery or bribery. That of Hazm was under
the control of Sayyid ibn Ibrahim of al-Rustq and garrisoned by ten of the sultan's and 50 of Sayyis men.

His son Taymr approved the plan and one hundred

men came with him but Taymr only permitted three or
four to enter. Thus, the trick did not work. As for al-

Rustq, the sultan sent two messengers to the garrison,

which consisted of Ban Ruwa^ah tribesmen, offering
them a bribe of 2,500 Maria Theresa dollars to deliver
up the fort. They agreed but only on condition that they
could continue to garrison the fort in his name. The sul-

tan refused and returned to Muscat on 26 September

1899. He had spent 3,000 Maria Theresa dollars to no
avail, and to add insult to injury he was thrown off his
camel and was severely shaken up.27

Bahrain

be witnessed. The Ottoman mdr disappeared, as did

the zaptiye (police), who were killed, and the material
loss was estimated at 20,000,000 Maria Theresa dollars.

The refugees' camp was destroyed and the survivors

were taken back to Bahrain on board British warships.31
Acts of piracy by Shaykh Jsim al-Thn, a relative

of the Emir of Bahrain, who was causing problems for

the Ottoman Government in al-Has and Qatf was appointed kaymakam of Qatar in order to appease him, but
his continuing hostility to the British and his support of
the Shaykh of Bahrain precipitated the British attack.32
The Germans were not convinced that that was the

reason for Britain's brutal response. An article published

in the Levant Herald under the title "Les Iles Bahrain",
asserted, on the basis of a telegram from Zanzibar, that
Commodore Pelly had summarily settled the affair of
the island. The German comment thereon was that a

great number of dhows, allegedly carrying troops,

which were gathered opposite the principal island were

ordered to go back. Pelly, commander of the Sphinx,
In 1895, the German consulate in Baghdad reported that
Britain was interested in the island of Bahrain and was
then destroyed forty of them. The article continued by
saying that the immediate effect had been to start negomanoeuvring to create a protectorate over it. Its strategic
location between both ends of the Gulf no doubt invited
tiations, the natives had surrendered their camp at
Ferdha
the intervention which the Ottomans strongly sought
to (sic), and the region was now declared pacified.
commentators declared that Pelly's assertion
head off. The immediate reaction was the flight ofGerman
the
important families to the mainland in order to work
that
forthe Arabs had threatened Bahrain from Qatar was
the restoration of Ottoman influence in the island
false, as were the claims that the dhows had carried
through their connections with the neighbouring dis-troops, and that the island was pacified and calm.33
tricts of al-Has and Qatf.28 A similar report from Cal- Under the heading "Violation of International Law",
the Russian newspaper Moskovizkija Wjedomoskoi, iscutta states that the Arabs of Bahrain were leaving for
sue of 7 December 1895, echoed the Czar's reaction to
Zabarah, close by on the mainland, and that the British

the bombardment of Zabarah by dubbing the British

opposed this, sending the warships Sphinx, Pidgeon and
Plasey (?) to interdict their migration, since they be-action as lawlessness and calling on the great powers to
put pressure on England by sending their gunboats to
lieved that this might be an occasion for assaulting the
the Gulf to liberate the prisoners taken by force to BahBritish residents who by now were heading for the boats
rain.34 The British countered with an official denial
to get out. The India navy also sent its own gunboat, the
Laurence to the area to assist in whatever combat that which was published in every newspaper in Europe and

might ensue.29 The British Government accused the

its government agencies in Bombay claimed that the

of Zabarah had been shorter than was

Sultan of Zanzibar of instigating a revolt against them bombardment
in
Bahrain by sending his agent 'Abdallah ibn Saliti withclaimed, that there was no Shaykh of Qafff, and that the
newspapers reporting the incident had made mistakes.35
arms and ammunition. Encouraged by Ottoman offi-

cials, the Arabs threatened an attack on Bahrain. By Another version of the affair appears in a report

from the German ambassador to London, Hatzfeld, to

brute force the British reminded the Arabs that they (the
British) were in Bahrain to stay.30
the Imperial Chancellor in Berlin, under the title "Op-

At the peak of disorder in the Gulf, the Germans erations of English Gunboats in the Persian Gulf. It is
dispatched their warship Comoron to the scene, afterbased on a debate in the House of Commons on 21 Decalling on the harbours of Muscat, Bushire, and Basracember 1896, as summarized in The Times the next day.

now shadowed by the British warship Sphinx, which

Sir C. Dicke asked why Lord Hamilton, Secretary of
bombarded Zabarah on Qatar where the defiant ArabsState for India, had ordered the operations by the
Sphynx and the Pidgeon in the Gulf. The answer he rehad allegedly congregated as refugees with the intent of
returning to Bahrain. In the aftermath of the bombardceived claimed that the struggle had been precipitated
by a quarrel with cAl ibn cAl, who was allegedly supment, sickness, hunger and the razing of the city could

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122

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E.

Farah

A subsequent reportcAls
from India of 10 February
1900,
ported by the Turks.
followers
entitled
"movement of M.N. Goguyer,at
French Zabarah
suspect in
themselves on the
mainland
Muscat", claimed that Goguyer
had met his friend
rain, and had reportedly
assembled
tw
Shaykh cAbd
al-Wahhb
of Bahrain on board the
Bomto attack the island.
To
prevent
the
att
bay mail ship
- the latterdhows
was prevented fromto
landing disp
peace, Pelly ordered
the
quarantine regulations - where
close confidential
refused to do. He bytherefore
attacked
th
talks reportedly were held. He
was allegedlythe
a good
ber and 44 were destroyed,
with
re
friend of the French
consul,allegedly
Ottavi, who provided him ree
day peace in the Gulf
was
It was Colonel with
Wilson,
money so that he could the
study Arabic British
classical literature ordered
at night and tour the bazaarsthe
by day to determine
Bushire, who had
bomb
goods were popular in the market-places
of Musintense negativewhat
criticism
he receive
cat.39 In a subsequent
report Goguyer was rumoured to
report to the British
consul-general
in
be a Russian
spy, who
sent and received
mail through
his visit lasted for
ten
days
according
and avoided contacts with
Europeans, while bereceived by the France
German
ambassador
ing financed totally by Ottavi.
kept under
Consul-General Richartz
in Documents
Baghdad.
T

lock when not burnt

pointed to his selling
arms to
speculation in Ottoman
circles
concerni
"Shahristan"
and
cleared
from
Muscat,
not
taken
by
tions in the Gulf since Wilson called
on
him.
The
report
ends
with
the
question
"who
is
he?"40
sular agent nor any of the Ottoman ad

Baghdad. The Germans saw the visit

The rolelead
of trade andto
commerce
trigues which could
the Brit
Ottoman

territory in the vilayet of

The economics of the region apparently aroused equal
interest. An article in the St. Petersburg Herald of 29
The British were not the only ones interested in BahOctober 1895 entitled "England's Fishing Rods in the
rain. According to a report from India, the Frenchman
Persian Gulf claimed that until now Bahrain had been
Goguyer had shown up in Muscat and had been secretly
known only for pearl diving but Britain saw in the area
received by the French consul there. He then went on to
great potential for trade. Her interest in Bushire
Bahrain where cAbd al-Wahhb, a Turkish subject with
stemmed
from the realization that it was the ultimate
"very pernicious influence over Sheikh Isa", met

troops.37

Goguyer who allegedly told him that the French would

harbour for north and west Persia, and the only point for

issue certificates of naturalization to ex-patriots and

locating European trade establishments. The article

sympathetic Bahraynis, but these could not be corroborated. Nevertheless, the British agent in India alleged
that the French had been working for some time on Bah-

quoted from the work of Baron Rausch von Traubenberg's Haupt Verkehrswege Persiens, published in Halle

rain to gain followers as protgs and that many in Bahrain were not against the idea as they did not consider
themselves subjects of cIsa. Goguyer reportedly planned
to visit Qatar and Bushire, ostensibly for commercial
reasons, having stated his interest in the arms traffic;
and it was likely that a French-flagged ship would bring
him and a companion to the Gulf, even though Shaykh
cIs agreed not to permit the importation of arms. Two
Russians dressed as Arabs in Bandar c Abbs and one
German in Kuwait were denied access to cIsa. The Rus-

commodities imported and exported and said that England's interest in Bushire now interfered with Russia's

sian consul at Baghdad allegedly sent two Russian Armenians to collect information on Kuwait. Lt. Col.

in 1890, in which he gave detailed statistics on the

interest in the Gulf.41

The Bombay Gazette (n.d.) alleged outright that political affairs in the Persian Gulf were connected with
trade and urged the establishment of special trade organizations there. It also alleged that the German consul
thought that it was the political not the trade aspect that
was of primary concern, albeit he saw the establishment
of German trade companies such as Berth, Pttmann &
Co. a good sign for German trade in Baghdad.42 German
traders did not manage well in Bahrain as an incident in

Meade who reported this information from Bushire to1905 proved. It seems that a German merchant was
the Government of India said that "this proves Britainbeaten by cAl Abmad, the nephew of cIs ibn cAl, the
needs representatives at Bahrain and Bandar Abbas",Shaykh of Bahrain, and his men. No details were given,
who can move about freely, Englishmen "of good posi-but the governor of Najd reported the incident to the
Sublime Porte, which passed it on to the Ottoman amtion who knew Arabs and Arabic, and who also could
encourage British trade more than we have done, espe-bassador in London accompanied by letters from Bahcially with Bahrain whose trade is rapidly expanding."38rain by merchants of al-Has relaying news of the beat-

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 123
ing of the German. Two British warships hastened to the
scene and the commanders demanded that the culprits

be handed over to them. Meanwhile, cAl had fled to

Fitrah but his men had not, and they were handed over
to the British who gave them a severe beating and then
set them free after they had paid a fine of 6,000 rupees.43
The British were determined to keep out rival traders

from the whole neighbourhood, and on 19 February

1905, the resident at Bushire asked his agent on the

his judgement on the basis of his officers and agents

observing the ships that transported goods and their destination.50

In his estimation, trade was the key to political in-

fluence, which Russia recognized and which underscored her activities in north Persia, which she used as
the springboard for combating English political influence. Nevertheless, he argued, British trade dominated
the whole region of the Gulf, except for Baghdad and
Isfahan. Almost all the goods shipped into the Gulf re-

gion, he alleged, were of Indian origin, and the ships

carrying them were almost always flying the British
flag. One saw nothing but English establishments and
the red oxide mines on the island of Abu Musa and the
merchants; the posts and telegraph were in English
shaykh replied that he would not do anything withouthands; public news there had its origin, he claims, in
the resident's approval.44 Meanwhile, Wnckhaus had
British sources, and was censored by the British reprealready mined 1,810 tons of oxide and had about 400
sentative. Other purely political factors proving this
more to ship. The British consul-general at Bushire was
influence, he states, were consular employees, and the
helping the German. Wnckhaus was trying to prevailjourneys of British officers, missionaries, and warships.

Arab coast to warn the chief of Sharjah and his uncle

Shaykh Slim against entering into any agreement with
M.R. Wnckhaus of the German trading firm to lease

on the shaykh to let him have the large quantity which

he had already extracted before his lease was cancelled
The role of missionaries
and which was stored near the pit.45 The German consul
at Bushire reported that all oxide mined on Abu Musa The ambassador reported that there were many missionmight be exported directly from the island and advised
aries operating in the area. Americans were in Muscat,

Wnckhaus to give notice when shipping was reBahrain and Basra, while the missions in Baghdad and

sumed.46

The shipment of arms into the region stimulated

Isfahan were sponsored by the Church of England Missionary Society. Yet in spite of all their work they made

zero converts from the Muslims. Americans he claimed

trade. The Government of India reported that arms were

increasingly being sent into the interior of Arabia, as a
result of conflicts between rival tribes, and British en-

made no converts after six years of hard work at it. The

three missions in Isfahan since 1869 converted only 184

couragement of the tribes to fight the Ottomans and

drive them out of Arabia.47 The Jabr and Abu Musa

served as part of British propaganda. Proof of this could

Bedouin tribes along the Euphrates clashed over the

payment of tribute, leaving over a thousand dead on

be seen in a recently published booklet The Mission

Field (dated February 1896) by the Mission Board of

Armenians. Here as in Africa and China, missionaries

each side.48 On the other hand, trade generally had in-

the Reformed Church of America in which Samuel

creased considerably. The Times of India of 7 March

Zwemer in Bahrain wished openly that England would

take Muscat and Bahrain and exercise a full protectorate

1896 reported an increase of 62% for imports and 20%

for exports based on a report from Wilson, in spite of a

over the Persian Gulf in order to facilitate the mission's

series of drawbacks (unspecified), the sharp increase

activities. It is little wonder, states the ambassador, that

was attributed to transshipment of arms to Bahrain, and

to improvement in the export of wheat, wool and carpets, also to the rise in the price of opium.49
The trade potential of the Gulf, and particularly Persia, induced the German ambassador at Tehran to make

protectorate. Lord Curzon, he alleged, already used directly the expressions "British protectorate of the Persian Gulf or "Persian Gulf on the south dominated by
the British Government". The British official expression

people already believe the Gulf has become a British

an extensive study tour of the region. His findings were

thereof is seen also in the title of "Political Resident for

embodied in a 121-page report to Berlin under three

headings: Persian Gulf, Persia, and Political observa-

the Persian Gulf of the consul-general of Bushire. The

consul-general at Baghdad bore the title "Political Resi-

tions. He cites a British report which puts the annual

imports at about 61,000,000 marks and exports at about
45,500,000 marks, figures he claims were deliberately
kept at the low end so as not to arouse potential rivalry

over the worth of British trade. The ambassador made

dent", while those at Basra and Muscat held the title

"Political Agent", the same title accorded by the India

Government to its representatives in Aden. On top of it
all, these agents flew the India flag, which they have no
right to do since this self-proclaimed protectorate is not

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124

Caesar

recognized

As

for

E.

Farah

internationally.
on the Persian Gulf, with trade reports and statistics,

Muscat, which
a was
treaty
ofResidency
1860
submitted to the Political
and to

be

and England was to

guarantee
its
indepe
the Political
Agency in Muscat, as well
as for
there is no doubt Mubammarah,
that together
England
with meteorological planned
tables.51
regardless of international
protests,
st
The French were allegedly fully
engaged in the sellambassador. The French
aware
thi
ing of arms to the were
region from Djibouti
to the interior of
of
reason were eager
to
acti
Abyssinia
and become
from there to the south more
and south-west.
consulate in Baghdad,
vice-consulate
in
French trade establishments
in Obak and Djibouti aplar agency in Basra
and
vice-consulate
i
pear to have
received large
regular shipments of good

1894. Their creating

Messagerie
quality guns fromthe
Europe and were
selling them very
Bombay to the Persian
was
f
cheaply according toGulf
German reports.52
Guns were only
besons, to counter British
influence
ing now shipped in greater
quantities to Red Sea ports,in th
must not be left especially
out,
argued
the
ambas
the Yemen
where they were used
to threaten
Reichskanzler agreed.
Opening
Ottoman sovereignty
and create disorders in up
the Gulf the G
trade and industry
was
to
be
actively
pu
according
to the Times
of India
and Bombay
Gazette of
the importation to
Germany
fr
January
1898, also reports in the of
German wheat,
newspapers
skin, fiirs, pearls
and
silk.
An 1898)
active
p
Klnische
Zeitung
(issue of 13 February
and
pursued to prevent
Persia,
Norddeutsche
Allgemeine ZeitungArabia
(issue of 6 February and r
falling into the hands
1898) in which troop
of
movements
Great
in all directions
Britain
of the
German trade.
region are mentioned.53 Talks of constructing a rail line
Increasing German
inacross
the G
from Suez influence
to Basra and from Cairo to Agadir
north Africa were seen as schemes
accelerate
and
preceded by the creation
of toa
consulate
not only where there
trade
facilitate Britishexisted
transit to India and firm
up her grip onest

cause there were times when there was need to deal with

the regions in between. Newspapers like the Pioneer

the Persian court and customs. Two of the largest Ger- (issue of 27 May 1898) were full of speculation over the
man firms, Hotz and Ziegler had to rely on British pro- prospect. Under the title "England and Arabia" The
tection. Creating a consular agency in Basra was a ne- Standard (issue of 8 August 1898) speculated on rucessity since conditions there were bad. It would also mours that Great Britain planned to annex the region
help to get the Ptmann firm to establish a branch in from Bb al-Mandab to Oman and said that it was time
Basra. He also advised that the warship Comoran should to state the real facts as they were creating serious permake frequent calls on Gulf ports since its visit the pre- turbation in St. Petersburg.54

vious year had made a good impression in that it

showed that Germany could defend its own interests.
Qatar and "piracy"
The chancellor approved the idea of assigning a special
gunboat for service in the Gulf for three to four months Qatar, which was administratively part of the sancak of
only, and not one off the coast of Africa. He suggested Najd, had served as a point of refuge for those engaged
also the creation of a direct express steam-line between in illicit activities off the waters of Bahrain. The chief
Germany and Bombay on a regular basis; extending the culprit was Atimad ibn Salman, cousin and subject of
rail line from Ankara to Baghdad, and having a more Shaykh cIsa of Bahrain. Consul Wratislaw complained
active policy in Persia, convincing the Persian leaders to Mutafa Nun, the vali at Basra that acts of piracy
that it was in their interest to have a power like Ger- directed against pearl beds were staged by Aljmad who,
many involved.
outlawed by the Khalfahs of Bahrain, took up residence
The trade in arms

at Qatar and transported what loot he gained to the district of al-Has. The vali replied that he would take all

necessary action through his deputy in Najd to force

There was much written about the Baghdad Bahn
Afrmad
in to make restitution. The Shaykh of Qatar
blamed
various reports, but no special directions were given
on the Bani Haj ir of making trouble for him with
his neighbour. The ruler of Bahrain wanted to send an
how to anchor it in the Gulf. English warship activities
increased after the Bahrain incident and the secret imarmed boat to operate in the neighbourhood of the Qatar
port of arms was allegedly encouraged by the English peninsula.55
whose firms were involved in ferrying arms into Arabia. The deputy governor reported that he was unable to
This was shown in the admiral's report for 1896-1897 control the "notorious pirate Abmad ibn Salman" who,

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 125
with three to four companions and cAmay tribesmen

which offer he refused.

was encamped on the outskirts of Qatf, awaiting an

In 1873 a mail agent in the employ of the British

opportunity to pounce again. The British agent, Capt.

De Vere Hunt wrote to Acting Consul Crow from Basra
on 13 July 1903 asking if he could get the vali to arrest
Atimad.56 An effort was made by the Ottomans to do so

trading company was imprisoned and cIsa did not abide

by the advice of the political resident nor show friendship,

by Sayyid Tlib Pasha, mutasarrif of al-Has, but

"but all you would say to me on my visit

Atimad had fled meanwhile in the direction of Kuwait,

of 8 December was 'nothing not sanctioned by my own Sharf at and al-cUrf

court will I abide by.1 Then in spite of
mine and Assistant Political Agent at

and his acts of piracy apparently went on unchecked

until 1905 with no one able to catch him.57

A report to the Government of India detailed some

13 acts of piracy (some were considered doubtful) since
1899 and alleged that the Ottoman governor of al-Has
was taking no action to put an end to them. A proposal
in a secret dispatch of 9 September 1904, suggested that
the time might be right to give special consideration to
extracting a treaty of protectorate from Shaykh Atimad
ibn al-Than of Qatar in view of his argument that he
had no power by the treaty with Great Britain to check
piracy on sea, even though heavy losses were being sustained by Bahrainis and Qataris. 8
Concern of the Ottoman Government was voiced at

a meeting of the Council of Ministers when it was decided that troop reinforcements from Najd be placed in
Qatar and a fortress be constructed there to provide defence for the peninsula, especially when it became ob-

Bahrain, Captain Prideaux's pleas, you did

not control your nephew Sheikh cAl who

has committed new outrage on Persian,

beside on German M. Bahnson, also illegal application of suhrah (forced labour)
on employees of German Wnckhaus and
for forcible removal from the British mail

steamer Kangra of certain baggala [mule-

loads] last December for his own work so now / demand: 1) you expel the six
ringleaders identified in the attack on Persians from Bahrain, 2) payment of 2,000
rupees in compensation through Prideaux,
3) station your own trusted guard on duty
to maintain order in the bazaar of Man-

vious to them that the British were manoeuvring to

mah, 4) cAl to leave Bahrain forthwith

place Qatar under their authority. Further to calm the

situation, the ministers recommended that the shaykh be
replaced by his brother as the official kaymakam.59
Other members of the shaykh's family were involved

for five years, 5) stringently forbid suhrah

on employees of foreigners, 6) if no com-

pliance, there will be no more support for

you of any kind."

in acts of piracy, namely his nephew cAl whom cIsa

alleged he was trying to apprehend but was unsuccessfulHe was given twenty-four hours to comply and told to
even when a reward of 10,000 rupees had been offered.appear in person with ten named individuals and 2,000
Captain Eustace, senior naval officer, Persian Gulf Di- rupees. The son was to be detained in Muscat, and 50
vision, reported from the Fox on 2 March 1905 that hetrustworthy men were to guard the bazaar by 26 Febru-

had given chase to cAl, surrounding Mullah Jasim'sary.61

house searching for him with marines to no avail. Major
The position of the Ottoman Government concernCox also had no luck and the political agent feared thating British undertakings to extend protectorates to the
cAl might arouse hostile tribes or engage in piracy. Heshaykhs of the Gulf was communicated to the British
suggested that, for his own safety, cIsa might wish to Government following a telegram from the commandant
reside in Manmah instead of Muarraq during the visitat Baghdad to the Ottoman ambassador in London,
of the Political Resident to Bahrain.60
Musurus Pasha, in which he stated that Bahrain was part
Captain P.Z. Cox, the officiating political resident in of Najd district and the Ottoman empire yet the British
the Persian Gulf submitted a memorandum of demands Government had concluded arrangements with the
by order of the Government of India to Shaykh cIs ibnshaykhs of the territory by virtue of which they promcAl, chief of Bahrain, on 25 February 1905 recountingised to protect them and their ships in return for a third
first the favours done him by expelling the usurper M. of the fishing. Then as a result of an incident between a

bin cAbdul and installing him on 6 February 1901 asEuropean and Shaykh cAls men, a son of Hakm and
chief of Bahrain, even recognizing his son Hamd asnephew of cIsa, a British warship had showed up and
successor and offering the service of an officer to ad- demanded reparations (of 4,000 rupees) and punishminister more efficiently the customs of the island,ment. Recently another vessel had come and dredged

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126

Caesar

E.

Farah

the British cruiser Menor

to venture into theto
port of th
the coast to facilitate
access
manded surrender
of
and
Ban
Basra.67 Report
of the cAl
bold move of the
Menor aroused
concern
in both Istanbul and Europe.
It may havethe
roused
who had secured
refuge
with
k
the When
Ottomans to appoint
a new vali,
Feiik Nun Pasha,
Shaykh of Qatar.
cIsa
refused
t
for Basra
province.son
It also disturbed
Sultan Abdlhamid
they imprisoned
his
and
even
demolished
and made a

the house
of
cAl,
set
to learn that Mubarak
of Kuwait
who already
had won fir
some
concessions,
still
turned
to
England
for
protection
present of his valuables
- to Mubarak of Kuwait. When the latter did not acand then supported military action against cAbd al-cAzz
ibn Rashd, the Ottoman kaymakam of Shammar. The
cept them, they sold them in the market of the city and
now recommended that concessions be made to
occupied militarily the city of Manmah, took charge sultan
of
the shaykhs of Najd to prevent them from turning to the
Bahrain's customs and proceeded to control fishing

British.68
rights. Shaykh cIs no longer pretended to be independThe Seraskeriyet in Istanbul met in council and isent. He had declared himself an Ottoman subject.62
It had been clear for some time that Ottoman adminsued orders to mobilize military units and dispatch them

istrators in the Gulf emirates lacked the police powertotothe Gulf - four battalions of the Sixth Anny in Medina and three battalions stationed in the Najaf area maintain order and prevent the acts of lawlessness
after disturbing news reached the high command that
which provided pretexts for foreigners, namely the Britthere had been defections, with soldiers fleeing towards
ish, who had ambitions to fulfil there. A patrol in the

Qam. The command also authorized that supplies be

neighbourhood of its barracks in Qatar drew fire from
provided from depositories at Hanafiyyah (lower Iraq)
some people and, to avoid antagonizing Jsim al-Than
to the troops being mobilized in the direction of the Gulf
and his brother, the Seraskeriyet ordered the incident
to contain any movement by the British.69
not be dealt with harshly.63 A few years earlier the Sublime Porte relayed a message from the Interior MinistryThe Menor was not the only warship moving in that
direction. A telegram from the director of telegraphs at
to the Imperial Divan (No. 136) saying Zyid ibn KhalFao reported by cipher that the British warship Laurfah of Oman (sic) planned to attack the Shaykh of Qatar
ence was on its way to Basra and that the Persepolis had
and force him out; also that Shammar's shaykh had bepassed by Fao on the 12th heading also for Basra. He
come the target of the British according to a telegram
wanted its officials in Basra alerted.70 The Imperial
from the vali of Basra and his memorandum of 16 September 1905 asking that instructions be issued to theGovernment had issued instructions to get ammunition
pouches through the customs of Qatar for use there,
serasker to order a proper response to Shaykh Zayid's

reasons not stated, but presumably for use by police

planned attack and to alert also the vali of Basra and
warships patrolling there.64

units.71

To guard against smugglers, pirates and troublemakers generally, the Sublime Porte and supervisor of the

Unsettled affairs in Najd and Mubarak'sTreasury received requests for several warships and
involvement

10,000 lira in funds for immediate delivery to the Otto-

man navy to mount its own patrols in Basra and Jeddah

Qatar was the main staging point for the attemptsrather
to than rely on the arbitrary deterrence of a potenrelieve Bahrain of its foreign intruders. It also wastially
thehostile Great Britain.72
In his report to Reichskanzler von Btilow from Kuconnecting link to events in the interior of the Peninsula
wait, the German consul in Baghdad reported that the
where the houses of Sacud and Rashd were in a strugEnglish planned to explore Najd after they had congle, the one supported by the British through her surrogates in Kuwait, and the other by the Ottomans whocluded
had their treaty with Mubarak, the kaymakam of
Kuwait. He consulted Mr Aljmed Feyzi, commanappointed the 1 Rashd official governors of the Najd-

Shammar region. In Istanbul serious discussions dant

wereof the Sixth Army - a good friend of Germany

a source of reliable information - to verify the

held at the turn of the century on how to deal withand
this
threat to Ottoman control in Arabia.65 The constant
matter, and Feyzi allegedly responded saying there was
treaty. The British agent at Bushire reported to the
presence of four to five British gunboats at Bahrainnoincreased Ottoman concerns for the interior and the Basra
German consul at Baghdad that Mubarak had indeed

signed a treaty in the spring of 1896 committing himself

administration was urging Istanbul to dispatch three
to accept none but British protection, but 14 days later
heavier armed warships to counter the British pres-

ence.66 The Seraskeriyet considered it a bold move "the

forold pig" had sent a cable to the sultan saying that he

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 127
was "forever loyal" to him. The German consul discussed the matter with Ferk Kzim, commandant of the
Sixth Army and brother-in-law of the sultan, who confirmed the treaty's existence but alleged that Mubarak
had not signed it.73

But there was no denying that the Shaykh of Kuwait

was involved in the import of arms, taking advantage of
a situation that permitted him to collect transit customs

he should journey to Istanbul and convince the sultan of

his loyalty, which the British immediately protested.

The Germans by now were ready to tone down their

involvement maintaining the affair of Kuwait had become an English-Russian question.77

The war against Ibn Rashd continued in the next

two years and the Ottomans were determined to provide

all the military assistance they were capable of musteron them. Some of the arms that led to clashes on the
ing.78 Orders came from the grand vizier to the vali of
Mosul to assemble 1000 camels to transport military
lower Euphrates allegedly came from Kuwait, according
stores. The battalion of troops was going to Najd via
to the German consul, who reported that the irregular
troops of Sacdun Pasha and his ally Mubarak, had been
Baghdad, part of a new and powerful expedition to supdefeated by Ibn Rashld. Reporting again to Marschall,press Ibn Sacd, an ally of Mubarak who, on informathe consul claimed the situation was now favourable for
tion received from the Sharf of Mecca was being instiestablishing the Baghdad Bahn terminus on the Gulf.gated by a foreign power to rise against the 1 Rashd.
However, according to a report which appeared in the The British ambassador in Istanbul commented that "in
Novji Wremja of St. Petersburg, Mubarak's defeat did all the communications reaching me about Ibn Saud, the
not enable Ottoman troops to control Kuwait. Captain name of Mubarak al-Sabbah, shaykh of Kuwait is assoCox nevertheless was in favour of Kuwait serving asciated with the Wahhabi chief." Ferk Fyzee was put in
terminus for the Bahn.

More ominous for the Ottomans were unconfirmed

charge of the semi-independent kaymakam of Qatar

who, like Ibn Sacud, had sent a telegram to the sultan

reports that Ibn Rashd had plans of his own, namely toproffering his loyalty while stressing hatred for Ibn
make himself king of Arabia, perhaps taking advantage
Rashd and asserting that, if troops land on Qatar, the
of the concentration now of Ottoman troops in the lower
emirate might become another Kuwait, i.e. a protg of
Euphrates and the presence of Ottoman warships in
the British. The British representative in Istanbul raised
Kuwait. The British, on the other hand, were striving to
the question: how can the Turkish Government afford it
stop military action by the Ottomans and to come to
with the uprising in Yemen being so very costly?79
Kuwait's support by announcing openly the official In another communiqu to London, the British amtreaty of protection with Mubarak. Abdlhamid now
bassador complained that he had relayed a Government
turned to the German ambassador for advice.74
of India request to the Ottoman Government seeking
As the Ottomans sought to bolster their position inpermission for two of its officials, Lorimer and Gabriel,
the Gulf where they held sovereign rights, the Britishto go to the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad to collect
challengers, having got their foot in the Gulfs stirrupstatistics and acquire general information for the Gazetwere moving to firm up their newly gained position. teer of India, but that the sultan would not concur, enThe British fleet sought to hold demonstrations there as
dorsing the vali of Basra's stance that the two were seekEuropean newspapers continued to report on the situa-ing an excuse to make contact with Ibn Sacd's agents to
tion under the title "Kuwait Affair". It was also reurge him to continue resistance to the Ottoman troops.
Sadrazam Fend Pasha skirted the issue of the ambassaported that the British consul in Basra offered to Ibn
Rashd to mediate peace with Mubarak but the former
dor's request who did not hesitate, he claims, to register
refused. The Times of India criticized German interferhis indignation.80
ence in the Kuwait question and the British warship
The secretary-general of the Ottoman Ministry of
Pomerone with six cannons on board steamed to Kuwait
Foreign Affairs passed on to the British ambassador a
ministerial letter from Mukhlis Pasha, commandant and
to prevent the Ottomans from landing troops.76 The Ottomans nevertheless issued orders to reinforce their convali of Basra, stating he wanted directives from the mintingents in the south by ordering the dispatch of addi-istry authorizing him to put a stop to the two Englishtional units from Samarra3 to Kuwait, to be added to the
men's activities, i.e. inciting Ibn Sacud.81
command of Kzim Pasha, the commandant. The Aus- The expedition sent against Ibn Sacud in the summer
trian ambassador for the first time took a position in of 1904 in support of Ibn Rashd failed entirely, for out
favour of the Ottoman stance towards Kuwait and the
of 2,000 troops only about 700 soldiers remained near
Petersburger Herold protested the British involvementHaDil. The heavy loss resulted from disease and deserin the affair of Kuwait. The naqib of Basra sought to tion. They lost one out of six guns, three more recapdefuse the situation by recommending to Mubarak that
tured from Ibn Sacud were damaged and useless in

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128

Caesar

E.

Farah

when the inhabitants

learned that the Ottomans
planned
combat. Such failure
might
explain
w
take a census of the inhabitants
and cattle of the
oasis
October of 1904 toFakhri
Pasha,
the
act
of al-Has and the people there
announced
that they
invited cAbd al-Rahmn
ibn
Faysal,
t
would
not permit it. The Ottomans,
it was alleged,
then
Sacud to come to
Qasm
in the
Najd
d

evacuated their military

outpost to al-Hufuf.87
affair in a friendly
meeting.
The re
An enciphered telegram
from BaghdadMukhlis
to the Forsecretary of Mubarak
to Vali
Ministry of the Sublime Porte stated
that England's
Jsim al-Than, eign
kaymakam
of
Qatar,
of Ibn Sacud and consul
had
endorsed
cAbd
al
at the port
of Bushire was leading a caravan
of

the

of

loyalty

to

mutasarrif
arms

ten men
and fifty camel-loads
to Ibn Sacd vali
in Najd and
the
Sultan.
The

dism

asked that an immediateon

investigation
be authorized.
al-Has
grounds

of

and

munitions
to the
Ibn
Sacud,
The reply confirmed
information
was correct and the but
vali of Basra had relayed on
good authoritythe
the intelli- Ott
denied. It was alleged
that
gence reported to
the sultan's
government.88
peaceful garrisoning
of
Qam
but stil
By 1909 it was clear that the
British had not let upinto
large force from Baghdad
vilayet
on theirambassador,
plans to win over Ibn Sacd in order tothe
cement
In a report to his
Bri
all ties with military
the emirates bordering the Persian
Gulf.
tach described the
moveme
had won out against
the Ottomans
and theirbattal
Euroattack on Ha3il:They
Feyzi
led
six
pean rivals in their
sustained endeavours
to render
the
from Medina, Sidq
Pasha
led
anoth
Gulf indeed "a British lake".
planned pincer movement
but Feyzi

problems

and

the

attack

bogged

do

Notes
meant that Ibn Sacud captured
HaDil
to the sultan to recognize his emirs
Mtenewi, 181/81 ofthat
19.4.1316 (1900).
hereditary right1 Yildiz
alleging
Ibn Ras
but the British ambassador
doubted
th
2 See its petition to the sadrazam in Yildiz
Miitenewi,
so.83

222/4 of 2 1319/15 October 1901.

Ibn Sacud followed up his triumph at HDil with a

letter to the British political agent in Bahrain saying that

Incl. 3 in No. 6 Confidential. Government of India to

Lt. Col. Meade from Simla, 29 April 1899, and Incl.

2 in No. 6. A. Godley of the India Office to the Marquess of Salisbury, 5 July 1899. F.O. 416/1.

he had sent a letter to Muscad ibn Suwaylim to tell

Prideaux that he was strong enough to turn the Turks
out of al-Has and Qafff, offering to enter into a treaty
relations with the British and allow them to have a political officer there in return for the British protecting
him from a sea attack by the Turks. Captain Prideaux
doubted that Ibn Sacud was strong enough to make good
such a commitment, hence he turned him down.84 Al-

4 F.O. 416/1 (Confidential 7381).

5 Incl. in No. 9. Consul Wratislaw to O'Conor (No. 27.
Confidential) and No. 10 O'Conor to Salisbury.
Constantinople 6 July 1899 (No. 330. Secret) asking
how he learned that Mubarak al-Sabb had an offi-

cial appointment by the Ottoman Government as

most simultaneously Ibn Sacud had Jasm al-Than,

kaymakam of Qatar send a telegram to the sultan

kaymakam (Incl. 2 in No. 10 Consul-General Meade

to Vice Consul Wratislaw (No. 240. Confidential)

from Bushire on May 30 1899 and Wratislaw's reply

that he learned of the appointment through a report
of his own dragoman of 8 December 1897 which he
had filed in his archives including a telegram of in-

through a qadi of the judicial district of Qatar pleading

that he not send troops against him because troublemakers were misrepresenting his loyalty for monetary

gain. He claimed that cAbd al-cAzz ibn Rashld was a

bad man who had massacred his own people and plundered the property of the faithful while Ibn Sacud had
done the opposite.85 Meanwhile Mubarak and Mukhlis
Pasha had established friendly relations with each other,
with Mubarak surrendering to the vali deserters from alQam and allowing the building of a fort on the edge of
his land at Fao, a situation disturbing to the British in
that there were now friendlier ties than before between
Ottomans and the Shaykh of Kuwait.86
The same could not be said as concerns al-Hufflf

quiry to the acting vali, Mufesin Pasha, who confirmed the official appointment as recorded in the
Saname (almanac) of the vilayet of Basra. For compensation Mubarak receives 150 kgs of dates per an-

num from the Ottoman Government, as did his

predecessors. F.O. 416/1.

0 Yildiz Tasnifl. Mtenewi Maruzat 194/1 14.
7 Incl. 2 in No. 70 (Admiralty to the Foreign Office of
February 1900. Secret). F.O. 416/2.
No. 63. Foreign Office to the Admiralty of 6 Febru-

where it was reported that disturbances had broken out

ary 1900 (Confidential), copy by telegram from

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 129
French consular allegations of the use of compulsion
(Incl. in No. 72 extract of 16 June 1900). All in F.O.

Aden (Incl. in No. 61) informing of the Russian war-

ship's stop at Aden. Signed by .. Anderson. F.O.

416/2.

9 Original information was supplied by the British

agent at Aden by telegram (No. 128. O'Conor to

46/4.

19 Fagan's interview with the qadi of Sr, Incl. 2 in No.

139 (No. 2 to Foreign Office of 22 October 1900);

also No. 208, Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson forwarding to India Ottavi's alleged remarks.

Salisbury (No. 215) telegram from Constantinople of

18 March 1900 relaying telegram from Consul Wra-

tislaw. F.O. 416/2.

Foreign Office, 26 June 1900. F.O. 416/3.

Report of the Imperial German consulate-general 20 No. 50 (Secret) Berlin, 21 January 1896. Marschall

from Baghdad to Reichskanzler Hoehnlohe-

Schillingfflrst of 10 January 1896. Trkei No. 165

Arabien I (January 1885-December 1895).

to the ambassador in Rome. Trkei 165, Arabien I.

Zl See No. 135. Salisbury to Sir E. Monson (No. 86).

F.O. 21 March 1900. F.O. 416/2.

The treaty was concluded on 4 May 1853 and approved by the governor-general in council on 24
August 1853. The signatories promised 1). not to

Capt. Demson to Capt. Cox of the Melpomene at

Muscat 1 February 1900 replying to the letter of
January 31 ruling against the Riym and Kalbh

stage any more raids on British vessels at sea, 2). to

mete out punishment to an aggressor, and 3). not to
retaliate against an aggressor but rather to report the
incident to the British resident at Bassidor (sic), who
would undertake to redress the complaint of the injured party. The British Government was to ensure
the enforcement of these articles. See F.O. 406/9

coves on the grounds that both were most unsuitable

as coaling stations - Riym only slightly less so

than Kalbuh - since they enjoyed no shelter from
the north wind, were open to the sea, had no deep

water close to shore albeit both could be defended

by fortifying the hills above them. See Incl. 5 in No.

1 1 1 (Admiralty to the Foreign Office of 6 March

1900). F.O. 416/2.

(Confidential Print 6148).

Issue no. 44 (Paris) of 22 October/8 November

1891.

13 Incl. in No. 70 (O'Conor to Salisbury. Constantinople, 1 December 1899 [No. 557] ). Consul Wratislaw to O'Conor from Basra 27 November 1899 (No.

For more details from the German perspective on the

struggle see the report from the Imperial German
consulate in Zanzibar No. 76 to the Reichkanzler

Hohenlohe-Schillingfrst of 30 May 1896 in Trkei

165, Arabien II.

9. Secret and Confidential telearanhicV F.O. 416/1

No. 185 from the consul-general of the Imperial
14 For details see No. 1 M.C. Harding to Lansdowne
German consulate at Calcutta of 17 September 1895
(No. 277) of 27 September 1901. Incl. in No. 1: Exfrom Simla to the Reichskanzler in Trkei 165,

Arabien I.
tract from the Novoe Vremya of 13 September 1901;

also Journal des Dbats, which supported the

Report from Simla of 4 August 1897 appearing in
Franco-Russian involvement in the Baghdad Bahn
The Times of India an excerpt of which was ad-

project. F.O. 416/7 (Confidential 7947).

dressed to Waldthausen on the importation of arms

15 Article dated 21 September 1995. See Trkei No.

into the Persian Gulf being destined mostly for Per165, Arabien, Vol. 1, June 1885-December 1895.

sia and constituting a source of profit to traders at

Imperial German consulate in Zanzibar. No. 76 Bushire.

of
Trkei 165, Arabien II.
26 ibid.
30 May 1896 to Reichskanzler Hohenlohe-

Srhillinafhrt in 1fiS Arabian TT

No. 158, India Office to Foreign Office on instruc-

tions from Lord Hamilton of 18 November 1899

17 No. 131 from the Foreign Office of 18 October

1899. F.O. 416/1.

with Incls. Re the Muscat affair. Meade's report forFor relevant exchanges over the affair see Incl. 3 in warding Fagan's of September 26 from Bushire (sie)
No. 3 (India Office to the Foreign Office of 3 July of 9 October 1899. FO 406/1.
1900); Inc. 2 of 18 April 1900 to Lt. Col. Meade German consul-general at Baghdad to Reichskanzler
suspecting Goguyer of being behind the article; Hohenlohe-Schillingfrst of 8/20/95 in ibid.
Government of India to Director-General of Post OfReport No. 185 from the German consulate at Cal-

fice in India (Inc. 10 in No. 3); Captain Cox to the

Government of India (confidential) of 18 July 1900

cutta to the Reichskanzler of 17/9/95 in ibid.

JU No. 188 from Calcutta of 21/9/95 in ibid.

(Incl. in No. 63) saying there had been no compul- J1 Report from Baghdad No. 69 of 30/10/95 based on
sion by the sultan to surrender the flags; Commander
Phillips to Admiralty on the role of the Sphinx and

the account of the Ottoman commander of the Sixth

Army, Aljmed Feyzi Pasha, ibid.

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130

32

Caesar

Report

E.

Farah

rachi, Basra, Baghdad, BahrainNo.

and Fao. He also
deBaghdad,
73

from

Ottoman

of

scribes the European trade

establishments
in the
Government
was
aware

Gulf inin
1894, with
special reference
to Persia where
Jsim was causing
the
Gulf,
which
sued orders to restrict
he describes its culture,his
fertility, people,
activities.
cities, caravans, trade, the administration
of the country,
public
Arivi. Yildiz Tasnifi.
Resmi
Siyasi
M
security, courts, military, mullahs, demography
and
(YT.RSME) 40/25/1315.7.9
(six
e
the role of the shah since he does not see a central
YT.RSME trade 90/30/1315.7.10 (two enclosures).

government. See No. 122 of 6 June 1896 to the

33 Article dated 21/9/95, copy in a dispatch from

Reichskanzler. Arabien II.

Baghdad to the Reichskanzler, No. 63 of 13/10/95.

ibid.

51 Arabien Vol. Ill (1 November 1896 to 31 December

34 Report from St. Petersburg No. 496 of 9/12/95. ibid

35 Report from Baghdad No. 81 of 5/12/95. ibid.
Hatzfeld to the Reichskanzler from London. No.

1897).

52 Copy of No. 99 of von Oppenheim from Baghdad to

the Reichskanzler of 26 December 1897. Vol. IV (1

2148 of 2/22/96. ibid.

January-3 March 1898).

53 Details in report No. 8 from Bombay to the Reich37 Telegram from the German consul-general in Baghdad, relayed to Berlin by the German ambassador toskanzler of 14 January 1898 in Arabien IV.
the Sublime Porte. No. 4 of 1/8/96. Arabien Vol. 2
54 Report No. 581 and Incl. from the German ambassaof Trkei 165.

dor in London to the Reichskanzler of 18 August

38 Inci. to No. 123. Lt. Col. Meade to the Government

of India. Bushire, 28 May 1899 (No. 12. India Office55
to the Foreign Office of 10 July 1899). (Continuation of a previously sent secret telegram). F.O.

Incls. 14 (Consul Wratislaw to Mustafa Nur Pasha.

Basra 3 September 1902) and 15 (Nus reply of
September 6) and 16 (Lt. Col. Kembell to the Gov-

bici. 2 in No. 118 India Office to the Foreign Office

ernment of India of 8 December 1902 from Bushire).

F.O. 406/20 (Confidential).

416/1.

of 12 March 1900. F.O. 416/2.

JO Incl. 20 in No. 17. F.O. 406/20.

40 Incl 2 in No. 6. Memorandum by Capt. D.Z. Cox to

the Government of India from Muscat of 24 Febru-

1898 to Berlin.

Incl. 26 in No. 17. Gaskin to Hunt. Bahrain 4 August

1903. F.O 406/20.

58 Inc. in No. 17. India Office to the Foreign Office of

ary 1900. F.O. 416/3.
7 January 1905 (Secret) and the Government of InIncl. to report No. 64 to Berlin from Baghdad of 1
dia to Brodrick from Fort William of 8 December
May 1896 in Arabien, Vol. II.
1904. F.O. 406/20 (Confidential).
4Z Excerpt in No. 65 of 21 October 1895 to Berlin.
For the Council's decision see Meclis-i Viikel MazTrkei 165, Arabien Vol. I.
^ No. 80 (No. 16: Lansdowne to O'Conor. Foreign batalar. Defter 78, no. 131/1.

Office of 8 March 1905). F.O. 406/21 (Confiden-60 Incl. 2 in No. 96. Admiralty to the Foreign Office
(Confidential of 1 April 1905) Captain Eustace to
Rear Admiral Atkinson- Willes. F.O. 406/21 (Confi" No. 134. India Office to the Foreign Office ot 18
tial).

April 1905. Incl. in No. 134 "Extract from the Diary

of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the week

dential).

ending February 19, 1905". Bushire 10 February,

by the officiating Political Resident in the Persian

Gulf upon Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali, chief of Bahrain by

from the Resident to the Agent. F.O. 406/21 (Confidential).

45 F.O. 424/2 1 6 (Confidential 9480).

46 [24904] No. 25. India Office to the Foreign Office

(telegram) from A. Godley of 16 July 1908.

47 No. 30. Imperial German embassy in Baghdad of 23

March 1896 to Berlin. Arabien Vol. II.

48 No. 34 of 2 April 1896 Baghdad to Berlin, ibid

Incl. 3 in No. 96: "Memorandum of Demands made

order of the Government of India, 25 February,

1905". F.O. 406/21 (Confidential).

62 No. 135. Telegram of the commandant communicated to the British Government as a statement not a

protest. F.O. 406/21 (Confidential).

w Yildiz Mtenewi 178/152 of 26.1. 1316.

64 Yildiz Mtenewi 40/23 of 5 S 1307/1 December

49 Marschall to Schillingfrst A5595. Baghdad No. 37 1889.

to the Reichskanzler. Cairo of 21/5/96. Arabien II.
65 YT.SRME. 92/69/1315.12.9 (13 enclosures).
He provides a lot of statistics for the years 1890-66 Yildiz Mtenewi 195/56 of 1317/17 October
1899.
1894 and mentions ports of destination: Muscat,
Gwadar, Lingeh, Task, Bandar cAbbs, Bushire, Ka- 67 ibid. 198/76 f 17 N 1317/19 January 1900.

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Anglo-Ottoman confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 131
68 News relayed by telegram to Istanbul by the vali of
Basra found a lengthy assessment of the situation in
the Gulf in the Allgemeine Zeitung issue of 5 October 1901 with a translation relayed back to Istanbul.

75 Specifically in the German Berliner Tageblatt and

Yildiz Mtenewi 222/8.

Frankfurter Zeitung, the French Le Figaro, and the

English The Standard and The Times. The Russian

press was mild by comparison as their country enter-

tained no territorial ambitions in the Gulf.

69 For details of the decision of the Seraskeriyet (War 76 Trkei 165. "Kuwait" Vol. Ill: 2/10/1901 to
Command headauartersi see ibid. 270/152.

30/11/1901 for details.

" ibid. Vol. IV 1/12/1901 to 31/12/1901.

70 No. 1 of 20 June 1903, also No. 178 of two days
later. Yildiz Mtenewi 246/82.
78 The resources of Mosul were to be called up for the

71 YT.SRME 129/45 of 1322.10.25 (4 enclosures).

u Request of the Supervisor of 2 1319/15 October
1901. Yildiz Mtenewi 2221 A.

purpose; the Third Battalion was assembled from the

24th Firka (division) - of the 47th Uva (brigade)

and the 93rd alay (regiment) - for transportation to
the front. Report from the consular agent at Mosul to

73 For relevant data see newspaper clipping from the

Consul-General Newmarsh, forwarded to ConsulTimes of India of 24 November 1900 entitled "Persian Gulf, report from Baghdad of 1 December
General Townley from Baghdad 2 December 1904
1900, no. 32 to von Biilow claiming Turkish troops
and on to Contantinople. Incl. 1 in No. 32 to Lanshad suppressed the action of the shaykhs of Najd
downe from Constantinople of 10 January 1905. No.
along the lower Euphrates and Kuwait; German
988/76. F.O. 407/20 (Confidential).
vice-consul at Bushire to von Blow, no. 369 of 13
No. 2. Confidential. Walter Townley to Marquess of
December 1900 relaying English plans for Najd;
Lansdowne. Constantinople. 2 January 1905 relayNeue Freie Presse article of 5 February 1901 entiing telegram from the acting consulate at Basra. F.O.
406/20.
tled "Bloody Fight about Kuwait"; no. 1 from Baghdad of 3 January 1901 to von Blow entitled "Treaty 0 No. 30. Townley to Lansdowne. Constantinople, 10
January 1905.
between British consul at Bushire (political resident)
and Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabh (qDim maqm of
Incl. in No. 30: "Memorandum" of Harry H. Lamb
Kuwait)"; from Baghdad to von Billow of 4 Febru- of 5 Januarv 1905.
ary 1901 reporting the fighting between cAbd al-82 No. 8 (Incl. in No. 50: Lt. Col. Maunsell to O'Conor.
cAzz ibn Rashid, Shaykh of Najd and Arab shaykhs
Constantinople 13 March 1905). No. 7 (No. 20: Actin the lower Euphrates and Sacdn Pasha; the Gering Consul Monahan to Townley from Basra, 18
man ambassador, Marschall, to the Foreign Ministry,
February 1905). F.O. 406/21 (Confidential).
telegram no. 65 of 7 April 1901 and the telegram of
Incl. in No. 53 (Townley to Lansdowne. Constantinthe consul from Baghdad reporting the defeat of ople, 24 January 1905). F.O. 406/20.
Mubarak by Ibn Rashid at HaDil; Baghdad to von 84 Incl. 3 in No. 10. Major Cox to the Government of
Blow no. 8 of 27 March 1901 reporting fighting beIndia from Bushire, 23 February 1906 (Confidential)
tween Ibn Rashd on one side, Mubarak and Sacdn
relaying the message received by the political agent
on the other; Marschall to von Blow of 24 May
at Bahrain of 12 February 1906.
1901 asserting that he had advised the sultan upon
Incl. 4 in No. 10. Translation of the telegram to the
the defeat of Mubarak to push for Ottoman legal Sultan bv a renresentative of Ibn Sac0d. F.O. 406/28.
domination in Kuwait and the sending of Muhsin86 No. 1 (Confidential). Consul Crow to O'Conor.
Basra. 4 Januarv 1906. F.O. 406/27.
Pasha to Kuwait "proved that they had listened" but
could expect formal protest from Britain; telegram 87 Incl. in No. 53 (India Office to the Foreign Office,
no. 175, Marschall to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin
29 May 1906, summarizing external affairs). Memoof 25 June 1901 relaying one from Baghdad reportrandum received April 1906 regarding the external
ing that all troops stationed along the lower Euphraaffairs relating to Arabia by R.E. Holland from
Simla 1 Mav 1906. F.O. 406/28.
tes were ordered to support Ibn RashTd. For details
of these documents see Trkei 165. "Kuwait". Vol.
88 Enciphered telegram no. 52 of 23 March 1329 from
I: 1/1/1901 to 30/6/1901.
Vali Msr Zaki. Dahiliye Siyasiye 25/70.

74 Relevant reports in ibid. Vol. II: 7/1/1901 to

10/1/1901.

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132

Caesar

E.

Farah

Reference
Farah C.E.

1996. Beginning of Imperial Rivalry in the Persian Gulf. Anatolia Moderna 6: 175-189.

Sources of documents
Great Britain:
London

India Office Library

Public Records Office

Confidential Print

Cambridge
Cambridge University Library

Confidential Print

Germany
Bonn

Politisches Archiv des Auswrtiges Amtes

1. Trkei 165: "Arabien" Vols. I, II, III, IV.
2. Trkei 165: "Kuweit" Vols. I, II.
3. Trkei 76: Secret.

Turkey
Istanbul

Babakanlik Arivi
Meclis-i Vkela Mazbetalar
Yildiz Tasnifi - YT
Mtenewi Maruzat - YT.MM

Siyasi Resmi Maruzat Evraki - SRMAE

Author's address

Professor Caesar E. Farah, Department of History, University of Minnesota, 839 Social Sciences Tower, 267-1 9th
Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA.
e-mail farah001@umn.edu

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