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No. 08-1738
Appellant Elton Spencer pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The District Court sentenced
him to 140 months imprisonment, the bottom of the guideline range of 140 to 175
months. Spencer appeals that sentence, which we review for reasonableness.1 See
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). We will affirm.
Spencer first asserts the District Court erred procedurally by not giving
meaningful consideration to the fact that the evidence strongly favored a sentencing
goal of rehabilitation over imprisonment. Appellants Br. at 13. Because he raises this
challenge for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. See United States v.
Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009).
[A] sentence must reflect a district courts meaningful consideration of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203
(3d Cir. 2007). The sections of the statute to which Spencer refers require a District
Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant as well as the need for a sentence that provide[s] the
defendant . . . correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.] 18 U.S.C.
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D).
At sentencing, the District Court explained that Spencers offense was very
serious[,] . . . involv[ing] a significant amount of drugs, and also noted that Spencer had
begun his life of crime as a juvenile and continued on almost predictably every two
years or so . . . . App. at 89. As noted in the Presentence Report (PSR), Spencer was
also a career offender and possessed other controlled substances at the time of his
offense.2 Our review of the record demonstrates that the District Court meaningfully
considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). See Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.).3 Accordingly, it did not
procedurally err.
Spencer next asserts that the District Court erred substantively by giving undue
consideration to the goals of deterrence and retribution. We review this challenge for an
abuse of discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Tomko, 562 F.3d
at 564-67, giving great deference to the District Courts determination, Lessner, 498
F.3d at 204. In doing so, we ask whether the final sentence was premised upon
appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As already stated, the District Court characterized Spencers offense as very
serious and emphasized that the sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offense,
the need to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment. App. at 90; see
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A). It also noted that Spencer had committed prior offenses and
that the District Courts sentence must specifically deter [him]. App. at 90; see 18
U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B). The Court also considered in mitigation that Spencer had not
engaged in criminal activity for some time, and had accepted responsibility. Spencer
argues that the District Courts undue emphasis on the generic need for deterrence and
retribution suggests that the Court had predetermined its sentence. Appellants Br. at
14. We disagree. Indeed, the Court merely considered relevant factors. We find no
abuse of discretion.4