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I.

INTRODUCTION
a.
b.

Republic Act No. 6735


Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Two impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, the first one was
dismissed for being insufficient in substance
Whether or not the 2nd impeachment complaint was unconstitutional
Yes. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year
Requisites of judicial review
1. Actual case or controversy - a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination
o
Moot questions a case or question is moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale or where no practical relief can be granted
o
General rule courts will not decide moot and academic issues.
Exceptions
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution
2. There is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public is involved.
3. The constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public
4. The case is capable or repetition yet evasive review
o
Ripe a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the
governmental act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.
2. Proper party must raise the constitutional question (locus standi) one who
has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the
act complained of.
o
Elements of standing
1. The petitioner must have suffered injury in fact which can be
legal, economic, or environmental
2. The injury must be traceable to the government act challenged
3. The injury must be redressable by the remedy being sought by
petitioner.
o
Liberal approach on locus standi
For taxpayers there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional
For voters there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question
For concerned citizens there must be a showing that the issue raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled
For legislators there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators
Government of the Philippines is a proper party to question the validity
of its own laws
3. Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity
o
General rule must be raised in the pleadings
Exceptions
1. Criminal cases at any time at the discretion of the court
2. Civil cases at any stage of the proceedings, if necessary for the
determination of the case itself
3. Every case (except where there is estoppels) at any stage if it
involves the jurisdiction of the court
4. Constitutional question must be the very lis mota of the case to doubt
is to sustain. The constitutionality of a law will be sustained if the issue can be
determined without having to decide its validity

c.

d.

e.

f.

o
Every law has in its favor the presumption of validity
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
GSIS held a public bidding to sell the outstanding share of MHC
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, and Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation
participated in the bidding whereby Renong Berhad won offering a higher share
than Manila Prince Hotel.
Manila Prince Hotel later matched the offer of Renong Berhad
GSIS disregarded the offer of Manila Prince Hotel
Whether or not Sec. 10 is self executing
Yes. Sec. 10 of Art. XII (Filipino First policy) is self executing
People vs. Pomar, G.R. No. L-22008. November 3, 1924
Pomar, a manager of Tabacco factory refuses to pay the private respondent, whom
he granted a vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy, of what is due to her
according to Act. 3071 which insures support for the pregnant labourers of one
month before and after their delivery.
Whether or not Act. 3071 is unconstitutional
Yes. the right of contract is protected by due process of law
Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Lambino gathered signature for peoples initiative to shift the Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
Whether or not Lambinos petition is valid exercise of peoples initiative
No. They didnt comply with the basic requirement, since the petition where theyve
collect the signature did not contain the full text of the proposed amendments
The proposed petition is a revision not an amendment. Revision cannot be effected
through peoples initiative
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution
Amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved
Two test to determine whether the proposal was a revision or amendment
1. Quantitative test whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substance entirety of the Constitution
2. Qualitative test whether the change will accomplish such far- fetching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision
Steps in the amendment or revision
1. Proposal for amendment or revision may be made by
o
Congress acting upon a vote of of all its members
o
Constitutional Convention, called by 2/3 vote of all the members of
Congress
o
Peoples Initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters therein
people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments
Revision cannot be effected through initiative and referendum
2. Ratification
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997
Petition to lift the term limits of elective officials
Whether or not petition is valid exercise of peoples initiative
No. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII (Peoples Initiative) is not self executing. Without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. No law has been passed by the
Congress
The petition is a revision not an amendment
What has been delegated cannot be delegated
o
Test for valid delegation
1. Completeness test it must be complete

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

2. Sufficient standard test it must fix a standard to which the delegates must
conform in the performance of his function
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196. November 9, 1967
House of representative passed 3 resolution to increase the seats of the House of
Representatives, calling a convention to propose amendments, and to allow the
member of Congress become delegate to the constitutional convention
Whether or not the resolutions are valid
No. The members of the Congress are de facto Congressman
Congress may not avail both propose amendment and call a convention at the
same time
the people have not given an opportunity to grasp the nature of the proposed
amendments
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990
Sanidad a columnist assailed the constitutionality of sec. 19 of COMELEC
Resolution which limits the right of freedom of expression
Whether or not Sec. 19 of COMELEC Resolution is unconstitutional
Yes. Sec. 19 of COMELEC Resolution has no statutory basis. Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, which the respondent relies as basis does not grant them the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners of their right to
expression during plebiscite, since they are neither franchise holders nor
candidates.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991
Bondoc and Pineda are candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
district of the province of Pampanga. Pineda having the highest no. of votes won
the election
After re examination of the ballots, Bondoc has the higher no. of votes, thus
proclaiming him the winner of election
Congressman Camasura got expelled for allegedly helping to organize the political
party
Whether or not the expulsion of Congressman Camasura by the House of
Representatives constitute a grave abuse of discretion
Yes. The House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of the election
Members of HRET as sole judge are entitled to security of tenure. No member
may be terminated except for a just cause
Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001
PNB financed the petitioners Mirasols, who are sugarland owner and planters.
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 579 authorizing the purchase of sugar allocated
for export to foreign market, and whatever profit shall be remitted to a special fund
of national government
When Mirasols failed to pay the debt, PNB proceeded to extrajudicially forclose the
mortgaged properties.
Petitioners request to account the proceeds of their sugar sales to offset their
outstanding obligations, but were denied contending that there was nothing to
account.
Whether or not P.D. 579 is u, but were denied contending that there was nothing to
account.
Whether or not judicial review can be exercise
No. The requisite to question the constitutionality of the law, LIS MOTA, is absent
therefore cannot rule on the constitutionality
Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Ecija wants to run for the same position.
He assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 4 Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
disqualifies any retire elective official
Whether or not judicial review can be exercise
No. The requiste to exercise judicial review are not present except for the 3 rd
requisite,

l.

m.

n.

o.

p.

Actual case petitioner has not been adversely affected since no petition has been
filed to disqualify them
Proper party petitioners are not convicted nor disqualified
Lis Mota there is no cause of action
Lascon vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001
President arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion, nad General order No. 1 to call out the Armed forces to suppress the
rebellion
She lifted the declaration of state of rebellion
Whether or not the case become moot and academic
Yes. it became moot and academic when President Arroyo lifter the declaration of
state of rebellion
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest
No. warrantless arrest by the petitioner is not based on the declaration of state of
rebellion. Only those suspected of rebellion can be arrested.
SANLAKAS vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004
President arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion, nad General order No. 4 to call out the Armed forces to suppress the
rebellion
At the same day after long hours of negotiation, she lifted the declaration of state of
rebellion
Whether or not the case become moot and academic
Yes. it became moot and academic when President Arroyo lifter the declaration of
state of rebellion. But Court still recognizes jurisdiction over cases that are capable
of repetition yet evading review
Whether or not the calling out forces is valid
Yes. It does not need the conditions required: the actual invasion and that public
safety requires it. It is only required to suspension of writ of habeas corpus and
declaring martial law
Joya vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993
PCGG have entered to a consignment agreement with Christie for the art pieces
which were seized from the alleged ill gotten wealth of President Marcos
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing
No. the ownership of the art pieces belongs to the corporation not the government
Whether the petition became moot and academic
Yes. the consummation of the sale which the petitioners wanted to prevent have
already took place
Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
Minors, represented by their parents, instituted a complaint as a tax payers to
cancel all existing timber license agreement
Whether or not they have a cause of action
Yes. Under Art. II sec. 16, not only the petitioner have the cause of action but all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines
cause of action an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other
Whether or not granting relief would result in the impairments of contracts
No. Timber license are not contract, they are only privileges and no irrevocable
rights has been granted
Even if it is a contract, non impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state
Agan vs. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003
AEDC protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO, since the project
which was subject to bidding was amended, thereby making it an entirely different
contract
Whether or not the Concession agreement as well as the other 3 supplemental
agreements are void

q.

r.

s.

Yes. All bidders must be on equal footing


Only amendments that would not materially affect the proposal would be valid, for it
is unlawful to change it to an entirely different contract
Umali vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 131124. March 29, 1999
Umali, as an appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was
dismissed from the service.
Whether or not he was denied of due process of law
No. He failed to adduce evidence that he is a carrer executive service officer. He
was not denied of due process of law for he was able to file his answer and other
pleadings, and attended the hearings.
A career service officer can only be removed for a cause; loss of confidence is not
one of the legal grounds for removal.
He also failed to raise the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, because it was
too late to raise for the first time in his motion for reconsideration
earliest opportunity
In Re: Cunanan, March 18, 1954
The Congress passed R.A. No. 972 known as the Bar flunkers Act of 1953
Whether or not R.A. No. 972 is unconstitutional
Yes. Supreme Court has the power to render decision on who may be admitted and
may continue to the practice of law
Province of North Cotabato vs. Govt. of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008
A Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain by the Government of the
Philippines and the MILF was not materialezed
Whether or not the petitions became moot and academic
Yes. it is moot and academic

d.

e.

f.

g.

II. POLICE POWER


a.

b.

c.

Agustin vs. Edu [88 SCRA 195]


President Marcos issued a letter of instruction No. 229 requiring the owner of motor
vehicles shall have at least one pair of early warning devices
Whether or not Letter of Instruction No. 229 is unconstitutional
No. It is intended to promote public safety.
Philippines is a part of Vienna Convention which recognizes the hazards posed by
such obstruction to traffic. Philippines adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land
Ichong vs. Hernandez [101 Phil 1117]
Congress enacted R.A. No. 1180 prohibiting aliens from engaging to retail trade,
but allowing aliens who have already engaged in business to continue until their
death or voluntary retirement.
Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 is a valid exercise of police power
Yes. the Act proposes to regulate the retail business, preventing aliens from
controlling the nations economy. The Philippines must not entrust the economy to
the aliens, they lacked loyalty and enthusiasm for this country, they dont really
contribute to the national income and wealth, and when the time comes they may
become a potential enemy of the state. The Act is necessary for the nations
survival. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State
treaty can never restrict the scope of police power
Lutz vs. Araneta [98 Phil 148]
Congress promulgated Commonwealth Act. No. 567 to adjust the benefits derived
from the sugar industry
Petitioner contend that such tax not being levied for a public purpose but
exclusively aid and support of the sugar industry, Act is unconstitutional
Whether or not Commonwealth Act. No. 567 is unconstitutional

h.

i.

j.

No. the general welfare demands the sugar industry to be stabilized


the power of taxation may be used as an implement of police power
It is inherent that the State be free to select the subject of taxation
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [151 SCRA 208]
An Act was enacted to regulated and supervise the videogram industry
Whether or not Act imposed is harsh and oppressive and in restraint of trade
No. the tax is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
the power of taxation may be used as an implement of police power
ALSP vs. Sec of DAR [175 SCRA 343]
A decree was promulgated to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for the distribution among tenant-farmers
Whether or not the decree is a valid exercise of police power
No. since it lacks the 2nd requisite
Requisite of police power
1. Lawful subject purpose of agragarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself
2. Lawful means - ? it is not enoughthat there be a valid objective
the power of eminent domain may be used as an implement of police power
Lozano vs. Martinez [146 SCRA 323]
bouncing check law was approved to stop the practice of issuing check that are
worthless
Whether or not it is a valid exercise of police power
Yes. because the issuance of worthless check affect public order
whether or not it is contradictory to equal protection clause
No. since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila [41 Phil 103]
Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requires receipts in duplicate in English and
Spanish to protect the customers who cannot decipher Chinese characters from
being defrauded
Whether or not the ordinance is valid exercise of police power
Yes. the object of the ordinance was, to avoid disputes between laundrymen and
their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. There is valid exercise of police power
for the legislature has the duty and power to promote peace and order, thus such
ordinance is necessary to prevent fraud, deceit, cheating.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [152 SCRA 730]
the petitioner failed to be admitted to colleges of medicine
Whether or not the resolution is valid
No. it is a valid exercise of police power to protect the health and safety of the
public
Govt of QC vs. Ericta [122 SCRA 759]
the petitioners assailed the validity of the ordinance which a at least 6% of total
area of memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial for the poor.
Whether or not the ordinance id a valid exercise of police power
No. the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit
MMDA vs. Bel-Air [ SCRA ]
MMDA requested Bel-Air to open a street for public vehicular traffic and informed
the wall separating the subdivision would be demolished
Whether or not the MMDA has the authority to enact ordinances
No. MMDA have no capacity to exercise police power; authority is primarily lodged
in the National Legislature. Police power may be delegated to the President and
administrative boards as well as the local government units. MMDA is neither a
local government unit nor a public corporation authority
Police power may be delegated to:
1. President
2. Administrative bodies

k.

3. law making bodies of LGUs


Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac [207 SCRA 157]
Resident of barrio Sta. Elena complained the disturbance cause by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside the petitioner warehouse
Whether or not ordinance declaring the warehouse a public nuisance is valid
exercise of police power
Yes. it is a valid exercise of police power to protect the safty of the lives and
properties of the neighbourhood
Ordinance No. 13 have also complied with the basic principles of a valid ordinance
requisite of a valid ordinance
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. must not be unfair or oppressive
3. must not be partial or discriminatory
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. must be general and consistent with public policy
6. must not be unreasonable

d.

e.

III. Eminent Domain


a.

b.

c.

Republic vs. Tagle (GR No. 129079, 2 Dec. 1998)


Benitez have agreed to lease and/or sell 2 parcels of land in favour of PHRDC. the
land was occupied.
After the expiration of lease, negotiation began and upon the preparation of deed of
absolute sale, Benitez refuse to sign it.
whether or not the power of eminent domain can be exercised
Yes. private property may not be taken without just compensation
the expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or
occupation of the land
City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery (40 Phil. 349)
City of Manila instituted expropriation proceeding to take a portion of land of the
cemetery, allegedly a private property for public use, for street purpose
City of Manila assert that neither court nor the owners of the land may inquire the
purpose of expropriation
Whether or not the court may inquire into, and hear proof upon necessity of the
expropriation
Yes. Generally, the question raised is political in nature, but it becomes a justiciable
question since the power was exercise by a delegate. The court may inquire since it
must determine whether said delegate has the authority to exercise such power.
power when exercised by:
1. Congress political question
2. Delegate
a. grant of special authority for special purpose political question
b. grant of general authority justiciable question
political question - Is one which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government
justiciable question is one which affect personal or property rights accorded to
every member of the community in cases properly brought before the judicial
tribunals
Private property devoted for public use are exempt from expropriation
Republic vs. PLDT (26 SCRA 320)
PLDT leased its trunklines to the Gov. with a condition that it may not be used for
private
When the gov. violated said agreement, PLDT cut the lines.
Whether or not the court may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff

f.

g.

Yes. generally, all private property capable of ownership may be expropriated;


public utility
People vs. Fajardo (104 Phil 443 (1958))
An ordinance was passed prohibiting any construction that will destroy the view of a
plaza
Notwithstanding the rejected permit to construct, Fajardo constructed a building
because they needed a place of residence badly, since their former house was
destroy by a typhoon. They were charged for the violation of such ordinance
Whether or not there is taking
Yes. When the owner is deprived of jurisdiction, supervision, and control of his
property, there is taking.
Whether or not Ordinance was valid
No. the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently deprive
owners of the beneficial use of their property and confiscate them solely to preserve
or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community
City of Baguio vs. NAWASA (106 Phil (1959))
Plaintiff City of Baguio, a municipal corporation filed a complaint for declaratory
relief contending that said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio
Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is unconstitutional
because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership, control and
operation of said waterworks system without compensation and without due
process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and
other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1383 is a valid exercise of police power or power
of eminent domain.
Republic Act No. 1383 is not a valid exercise of police power, since the Act does not
confiscate, nor destroy, nor appropriate property belonging to appellee. It merely
directs that all waterworks belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts
in the Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of placing them
under the control and supervision of one agency with a view to promoting their
efficient management, but in so doing it does not confiscate them because it directs
that they be paid with an equal value of the assets of the NAWASA.
Waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city, and being owned by
a municipal corporation; it cannot be taken away.
NPC vs. Guttierez (193 SCRA (1991))
NPC filed an eminent domain proceedings to have the right of way on the property
of the respondent to construct electric transmission lines.
NPC objected to pay full compensation for the land contending that the private
respondents are not deprived of the use of the land and still fully owns the property;
they merely seeks the right of way.
Whether or not acquisition of right of way constitute taking
Yes. Even though NPC only seeks a right of way, it perpetually deprives defendants
of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters
is allowed.
Republic vs. Castelvi (58 SCRA 336)
Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain over two parcels of
land.
Petitioner is not satisfied of the Commissioners recommended price whereby
determining the land in question as residential lands. He alleged that the fair market
value should be followed
Whether or not there is taking
No. In the case at bar, not all elements are present when the Republic entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
Requisites of TAKING
1. Expropriator must enter a private property

2.
3.
4.

h.

Entry must not for a momentary period only


Entry must be under a warrant or color of authority
Property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected
5. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property
Whether or not expropriation commenced with the filing of action
Yes. Reckoning point is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain; EXCEPT: where the filing of the complaint occurs after the actual
taking of the property, just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking.
Whether or not fair market value or just compensation should be followed
Fair market value vs. just compensation = which is lower
EPZA vs. Dulay (148 SCRA 305)
petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation over a parcel of land for the
establishment of an export processing zone
P.D. No. 1533 allegedly superseded sec. 5 to 8 of rule 67 of the rules of court,
which provides"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall
not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real
Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property."
Whether or not P.D. No. 1533 is unconstitutional and void
P.D. No. 1533 is unconstitutional and void. It limits the determination of just
compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined
by the Assessor, whichever is lower, resulting the deprivation of the landowner's
right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation.

i.

j.

the valuation may serve as a serving guide in determining just compensation but
may not substitute the courts own judgment
Amigable vs. Cuenca (43 SCRA 360)
Amigable filed a complain for the recovery of ownership and possession of the land
and the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation of her land
against the government
Whether or not the appellant may sue the government
Yes. the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument
for perpetrating injustice on a citizen
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
(244 SCRA 272)
PPI filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of resolution No. 2772 which
requires every newspaper to give free print space of not less than one half page for
use as COMELEC Space. They contend that its constitutes taking without just
compensation
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional
Yes. Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. To compel print media
companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use
or purposes.
The requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are: (1)is
the necessity for the taking; (2)the legal authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec.

The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation". Therefore Section 2 does not constitute
a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain; neither does it constitute a valid
exercise of the police power, for there was no attempt to demonstrate the urgent
necessity for the taking of the print space
k.

Reyes vs. NHA (GR No. 147511, 20 January 2003)


Petitioners land was expropriated to accommodate the squatters
Petitioner filed a petition to recover their land alleging that NHA have abandoned
the public purpose of the expropriation by failing to relocate squatters and entering
a contract with a real estate developer.
Whether or not properties should be returned to the petitioner
No. The taking here is absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer
cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their
taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance
and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later
sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns

l.

public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. it is synonymous to public


interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience
if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different
from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private
person, there is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the
expropriated land.
Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty (292 SCRA 676)
Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation over two parcels of
land for the purpose of providing homes for the homeless
respondent filed its Answer alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause
of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
Whether or not a Local government unit can authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution.
No. the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance
with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body.
Requisites for the exercise by LGUs through a valid delegation
1. Ordinance by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive
to exercise the power of eminent domain
2. For public use, purpose, or welfare or for the benefit of the poor or of the
landless
3. Payment of just compensation
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated but such offer was refused

Whether or not the complaint state a cause of action

The project of NIA affected the respondents land for the construction of the main
irrigation canal of the NIA.
Right of way was executed
respondent demanded payment for taking of property but refused to do so
Petitioner filed an Answer, contending that the government had not consented to be
sued and respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
- there is taking. acquisition of right of way constitutes taking
- the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating injustice on a citizen
Whether or not just compensation is determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint

No. Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action because it was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack
of cause of action.
m.

ASLP vs. Sec of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343)


R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code was
superseded by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972 to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
Several petitions have been filed, questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 constitutionality on grounds of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation
the petitioners argue that under sec. 2 of Proc. No. 131, the money needed to cover
the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
appropriated at this time; the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation

No. The value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking
of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. It was, therefore,
error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to
respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not
the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in
its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint.
o.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator.

Knecht vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 108015, 20 May 1998)


City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes
on the property. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the
property at public auction, whereby respondent spouses Babieras and spouses
Sangalangs are the highest bidders.
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the date of sale. The
land was granted to the respective private respondent upon their request, allegedly
without notice to the Knecht.
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government
to expropriate certain properties. . The subject property was part of those
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340.
Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem instituted for
unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and
building. The Municipal Trial Court, however, granted the complaint and ordered the
Knechts' ejectment

There is compensable taking when the following conditions concur:

Whether or not the Knechts had right to intervene the proceeding.

Whether or not the questioned statutes are violate just compensation


No. The contention of the petitioners that Section 18 of the CARP Law is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to
accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of
payment allowed, is also unatenable. This case is one of the exemptions, in view
that it would be impractical to produce far and equivalent value since that program
involves not mere millions of pesos.

1.

the expropriator must enter a private property;

2.

the entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3.

the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

4.

the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally


appropriated or injuriously affected; and

5.

the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

All requisites are present at the case at bar.


n.

Eslaban vs. Onorio (GR No. 146062, 28 June 2001)

No. The Knechts lost whatever right or colorable title they had to the property after
we affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. The fact
that the Knechts remained in physical possession cannot give them another cause
of action and resurrect an already settled case.
If a known owner is not joined as defendant, he is entitled to intervene in the
proceeding; or if he is joined but not served with process and the proceeding is
already closed before he came to know of the condemnation, he may maintain an
independent suit for damages.

p.

The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming
to own the property.
Republic vs. Ker (GR No. 136171, 2 July 2002)
Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P.
Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the value fixed by the trial
court as just compensation for Site I should be reduced.
Whether or not the court err in not upholding petitioners claim that the valuation for
the lot in Site 1 is excessive and unreasonable
No. statement made in tax documents cannot prevail over a court determination
q.

c.

offices in the city but practice their profession therein are not subject to the tax, and
that it constitute double taxation.
Whether or not it constitute double taxation
No. there is no double taxation where one tax to imposed by the State and the other
by the City
the legislature may select what occupation shall be taxed
Osmena vs. Orbos - 220 SCRA 703
President Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). OPSF was designed to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum
products. Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account,"

Manosca vs. CA (252 SCRA 412)


the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provide that: All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If
the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

Whether or not the questioned land may be expropriated


Yes. National landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event,
achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in
Philippine history.Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late
Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and
culture has been declared as a national landmark.
national landmarks are subject to expropriation

The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D. 1956 must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a
special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated there from
shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and
not channeled to another government objective."

IV. Taxation
a.

b.

Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works - 10 Phil 331


Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works" was
approved on June 20, 1953, containing an item of P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals.
Zulueta, while he was a member of the Senate, executed an alleged deed of
donation of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in
favor of the Government. Such donation violated the provision of our fundamental
law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as
well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in
question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from
the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"
Whether or not R.A. No. 920 is unconstitutional
Yes. it is unconstitutional. public funds may only be used for public purposes
The land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then
to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and hence, was null and void.
Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila - 95 Phil 46
Municipal board of the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 3398, which imposes
a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city
and penalizes non-payment of the tax, pursuant to 18 of the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the
Municipal Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 3398 together with the
provision authorizing it. They contend contend that it is unjust and oppressive
because they say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders who have no

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28
(2). Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government;
Whether or not it is a special fund
Yes. While the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from
the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability
account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund."

d.

Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation


No. the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to
impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by
which the authority must be exercised
Lladoc vs. CIR - 14 SCRA 292
a cash of 10,000 was donated to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality.
the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. Respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax
against the petitioner who was now thw priest of said parish

Petitioner questioned the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. He


contended that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest; that there is
no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias,",
therefore, he should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. And that such donation
was for religious purpose therefore should be exempted, thus such assessment
violates sec. 22(3) of art VI of the constitution

b.

Whether or not the assessment of the gift tax violates Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the
Constitution
No. Under Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution, the exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as
contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector
assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties
themselves.
c.
Gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift
tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax
Whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed donee's gift tax
Petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and
that the Head of the Diocese, herein substitute petitioner, should pay. The head of
the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of
the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
e. Casanova vs. Hord - 8 Phil 125
the Spanish Government, granted to the plaintiff certain mines
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties of the
petitioner, contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls
within the provisions of sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act
which imposes annual taxes
The plaintiff brought action, to recover the amount paid, claiming it impair the
obligation of contract
Whether or not Sec. 134 of Act No. 1189 is void.
Yes. The concessions granted by the Government of Spain to the plaintiff,
constitute contracts between the parties; that section 134 of the Internal Revenue
Law impairs the obligation of these contracts, and is therefore void as to them.
Whether or not it violates uniformity of taxation
the Court found it unnecessary to consider the claim in view of the result at which
the Court has arrived.
V. Due Process
a.

Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. Manila [20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693;
31 July 1967]
lower court rendered Ordinance No. 4760 violative of due process
Ordinance No. 4760 requires motels an annual fee and certain minimum facilities;
and prohibit them from accepting person less than 18 years old and those
customers who would not fill up a prescribe form in the lobby.
Petitioner alleged said ordinance would result them to lose income
Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is violative of the due process clause
No. Due process is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice.
court held that Ordinance No. 4760 is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Said
ordinance was intended to discourage immoral or illegitimate use of such premises,
such as prostitution, adultery and fornication.

d.

e.

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong [86 SCRA 270; No.L-29646; 10 Nov. 1978]
Ordinance No. 6537 was rendered null and void
Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is violative of the due process clause
Yes. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because
it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it.
It is also void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to
guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the
ordinance.
it denies the aliens the basic right to engage in a means of livelihood, such right
cannot be deprived without due process of law.
Due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial. The shelter of
protection under the due process, and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Namil vs. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553; G.R. No. 150540; 28 Oct. 2003]
Two (2) sets of winning candidates were proclaimed as members of Sangguniang
Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
Commissioner submitted his Recommendation with a finding that the first COCVP
proclaiming the petitioners as the winning candidates was fictitious and falsified,
that the second certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) which
proclaiming the respondents as the winning candidates is the valid proclamation.
COMELEC issued a resolution to install the respondent as members of Sanguniang
Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
Whether or not Resolution No. 4615 violates due process of law
Yes. petitioner was not given the opportunity to be heard.
Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial
functions, requires due notice and hearing
Ichong vs. Hernandez [101 Phil 1155; L-7995; 31 May 1957]
Congress enacted R.A. No. 1180 prohibiting aliens from engaging to retail trade, but
allowing aliens who have already engaged in business to continue until their death
or voluntary retirement.
Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 violate the due process clause
No. law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
Phil. Phosphate vs. Torres [231 SCRA 335; G.R. No.98050; 17 Mar. 1994]
PMPI filed a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner. Such petition was not opposed by PHILPHOS.
PHILPHOS submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that its
management welcomed the creation of a supervisory employees union
PMPI amended the petition seeking to represent not only the supervisory
employees but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. Such
petition was granted
PHILPHOS appealed but was dismissed. and its move for reconsideration was
denied
Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process
No. petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to present its side when he filed its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

f.

g.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to


administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [39 Phil 660; G.R. No. 14078; 7 Mar. 1919]
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro obliging them to live in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake as the permanent settlement of the Mangyanes.
Section 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 penalizes the refusal of a nonChristian to take up appointed habitation, by imprisonment.
Rubi and the other Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus, alleging that
the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
of that province. They are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of
the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
Whether or not the action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 deprives a person of liberty of abode
No. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Due process of law requires:
1.
that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government;
2. that this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
3. that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and
4. that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
the action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Whether or not the class is valid
Yes. Non-Christian is considered a class, not by reason of the fact that they do not
profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. Thus section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not
discriminate between individuals on account of religious differences.
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct. 1920]
Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requires receipts in duplicate in English and
Spanish to protect the customers who cannot decipher Chinese characters from
being defrauded
Whether or not the ordinance violates due process clause
No. The petitioners at the case at bar are Chinese laundrymen. Their rights are not
less because they are aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot
be taken without due process of law. They are entitled to the equal protection of the
laws without regard to their race.

h.

it does not violate the due process clause; It applies to all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other
nationality
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [47 Phil 385; G.R. No. 20479; 6 Feb. 1925]
Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was enacted,
prohibiting any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in commerce,
industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, to

i.

keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local
dialect.
Upon finding the inspected the books of account of the Chinese merchant were not
kept in accordance with Act No. 2972, a criminal case was filed against him.
Whether or not of Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional
Act No. 2972 is valid and constitutional. It is not intended for the convenience of the
trader or the protection of the creditors, but has relation to the public welfare, to the
power of taxation, to the right of the government to exist
Power of taxation is one of the strongest powers of the government. In order to
bring taxation imposed by a state within the scope of the due process of law, the
case should be so clearly and probably an illegal encroachment upon private rights
as to leave no doubt that such taxation by its necessary operation is really
spoliation under the power to tax.
Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile
legislation, for the law applies to all regardless of their citizenship.
Aniag vs. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. No. 104961; 7 Oct. 1994]
Resolution No. 2323 Gun Ban was issued in preparation for the election.
Petitioner instructed his driver, Arellano, to return the firearms to Congress, as
requested by Mr. Taccad. Arellano was then apprehended and detained, at a
checkpoint, but was released upon authentication of his sworn statement that he
was ordered to return the firearms
petitioner was invited to a preliminary investigation to acquit Arellano.
COMELEC issued a resolution questioning the petitioner why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position.
Petitioner argued that the rules and regulations of an administrative body must
respect the limits defined by law; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms are
not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. He
contend the manner by which the PNP conducted the search is illegal Petitioner
further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the
preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the
charge sheet. Thus, making him a respondent in the criminal information would
violate his constitutional right to due process.
Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process
The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process.
Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to
trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process.

j.

Javier vs. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194; G.R. Nos. L-68379-81; 22 Sept. 1986]
The petitioner Javier and the private respondent Pacidicador were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.
The petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. The second division dismissed his complaint and the private
respondent was proclaimed winner.

The petitioner came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision, on the ground
that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. He added that
one of the commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacifidor

k.

Whether or not there had been due process


No. the questioned commissioner who has connection with the private respondent,
by providing a vote, which would be adverse to the petitioner, has rendered the
proceeding null and void. He should have recognized his duty and abided by this
well-known rule of judicial conduct.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with
what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to
be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing.
Ynot vs. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. No. 74457; 20 Mar. 1987]
Executive Order No. 626-A. was enacted prohibiting the interprovincial movement
and slaughtering of carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat and were confiscated
Whether or not E.O. 626-A violates due process of law.
Yes. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard and is immediately condemned and punished. It cannot
be said that such measure to be urgent as to deny the petitioner the right to be
heard.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing. Judicial hearing
may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
Measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary and is unduly oppressive.

l.

Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz [180 SCRA 218; G.R. No.84818; 18 Dec. 1989]
Philcomsat was granted a franchise to operate in the Philippine for international
satellite communications
Philcomsat filed an application for authority to continue its operations. Such
application was granted but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced
rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.

Whether or not the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and


confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
Yes. The court found the order unreasonable and improvident. Respondent failed to
adduce evidence how it arrived at the prescribe rates. Any regulation which
operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary
or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
m.

Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 July 1985]
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the
mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged
that no hearing was held
Petitioner sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Mr. Pastrana. Respondent
NTC granted the new owner the license to operate. The case has become moot
and academic since the petitioner has no longer any interest in the case.
Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process
Since the case has become moot and academic, the courts did not ruled whether
the petitioner was denied due process of law.

n.

Judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and
all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this
Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations should be followed before a
broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR [69 Phil 635; G.R. No. 46496; 27 Feb. 1940]
Petitioner claimed that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the workers from the National Labor Union
Inc.

Whether or not the questioned order violates procedural due process for having
been issued without prior notice and hearing

National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off. They
contend: (1) that the lack of leather materials as claimed by Teodoro was only a
scheme to prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with
the Philippine Army; (2) National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company
or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal; (3) That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining
is indispensable;(4) Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of
American industrial origins. (5) That the employer Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

Yes. notice and hearing is necessary. Where the function of the administrative
agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required by due process of law, but
where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory.

Whether or not motion for new trial should be granted


Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103) It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes

o.

between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of


disputes between employers and employees.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character.
The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
1. the right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence presented;
2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. the decision must have something to support itself;
4. evidence must be substantial;
5. Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing;
6. the tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and
facts and not simply accept subordinates views; and
7. Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know
the various issued involved and reason for decisions rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth. So ordered.
Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 May 1993]
Two first year law students, Villa and Marquez tried to join Aquila Legis. Due to
initiation rites, the former died while the latter suffered serious physical injuries.
A Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee to investigate the
incident; said notice also required the respondent student to submit their written
statements, but they failed to reply; instead they requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges.
After receiving written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness,
the respondents are found to have violated of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
which prohibits hazing activities
a Disciplinary Board was created to hear the charges against respondent students.
the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students.
As requested by the respondents, TRO was granted
Whether or not there denial of due process against the respondent students.
No. There was no denial of due process, Notice and hearing are present. The dean
has notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on
the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al.,
filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and
use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under
Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
VI. Equal Protection
a.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:(1)
That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;(2) That it is
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.(3) That it is improper
exercise of the police power of the state.
Whether or not Act No. 1639 is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws
No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. Act No. 1639 satisfies these
requirements And the classification, to be reasonable:
1. must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage" but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The
term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization.
The Court found it reasonable for the Act is designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non-Christian tribes.
b.

p.

Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita (469 SCRA 1)

The People of the Philippines vs. Cayat [68 Phil 12; G.R. No. 45987; 5 May 1939]
Cayat, was prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 which prohibit members of the
non-Christian tribesto buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves

PASEI vs. Drilon [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 June 1988]


The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for

overseas placement assailing the Constitutionality of Department Order No. 1,


Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment.
They contend such order is a discrimination against males and females; and that it
does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills; and that it is violates the right to travel.
Whether or not the classification is valid
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. That it does not apply to
"all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been
given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary.
For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the
Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons
within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
Classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure which is to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" Discrimination in this case is
justified.

c.

Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of laws

e.

Requisites of classification
Dumlao vs. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 Jan. 1980]
Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Ecija wants to run for the same position.
He assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 4 Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
disqualifies any retire elective official
Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, 53 are discriminatory and contrary to
the equal protection clause
No. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of
equal protection is without merit. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years
of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

d.

Petitioners further complain that it singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time. They contend that newspapers and magazines are not
similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v.COMELEC, thus violates
the equal protection clause.

in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, by retiring he had declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work
Telecom and Broadcast Attorneys vs. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. No. 132922;
21 Apr. 1998]
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines and GMA
Network, Inc, challenged the validity of section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the ground (1)
that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election.
The case was accepted even though only GMA Network, Inc. has the legal standing
to sue. Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies
to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign
and other political purposes. GMA Network Inc. contend that such provision
constitute taking without just compensation

f.

No. It cannot be said that it is discriminatory, for the two industries have different
circumstances that must be given different treatment, otherwise shall be arbitrary.
The government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the
broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require
the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the
COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Lacson vs. Exec. Sec. [301 SCRA 298; G.R. No. 128096; 20 Jan. 1999]
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions
seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case
No. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving
certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases
pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is
not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but
also in any court.
Requisites of classification
International School Alliance vs. Quisumbing [333 SCRA 13; G.R. No. 128845, 1 June
2000]
International School, Inc hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The
School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires
Petitioner International School Alliance of Educators contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire
classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
Whether or not point-of-hire classification is discriminatory
Yes. The employer in this case has failed to adduce evidence why foreign-hires are
entitled more benefits. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services
as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.

g.

Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 Feb. 1968]
the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint alleging that the afore-stated
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and
the rule of uniformity of taxation.

Whether or not Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964 violates the equal protection clause

resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when
they are, by law, already considered candidates.
Whether or not the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Yes. the court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt
squarely challenge sec.66
said resolution unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4
requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second req.
must be germane to the purpose of the law

Yes. The court ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

h.

The questioned ordinance did not meet the requisites, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. Therefore it is violative of equal protection clause.
Phil. Judges Association vs. Prado [227 SCRA 703; G.R. No. 105371; 11 Nov. 1993]

VII. Search and Seizure


a.

Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation


through its Circular No.92-28, thereby withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and
its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
Petitioners, as members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced, assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the
grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.

b.

Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory and encroaches on


the independence of the Judiciary.
Yes. The respondents contention that because of considerable volume of mail from
the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. The argument is selfdefeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be
extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all but not to those who
need it badly
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor
to some and unjustly discriminate against others. Classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.
i.

Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, 1 December 2009


Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their government offices because at such
time they are not yet treated by the law as candidates. They should be considered

c.

Pp vs. Marti [193 SCRA 57; G.R. No. 81561; 18 Jan. 1991]
appellant handed over four packages to a forwarding agency to send it to a friend.
He refused to let the packages to be inspected. But before delivering the appellants
box to the Bureau of Customs, the proprietor opened the package for final
inspection. Because of a peculiar odor of the package, he took samples and send it
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment, thereby finding dried
marijuana leaves, and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Whether or not the appellants constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures has been violated, therefore the evidence is inadmissible
No. By merely observing and looking at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, for Mr. Reyes, the proprietor is
the one who made search/ inspection of the packages
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law, and not to private individuals.
Waterous Drug vs. NLRC [280 SCRA 735 ; G.R.No. 113271, 16 Oct. 1997]
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Corporation
was found
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having
received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually
received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana
why the enveloped was open. It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had
been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side. Through her counsel,
explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a
refund of overprice. She further protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy when she
opened the questioned enveloped. She was dismissed from the service.
Whether or not Catolicos right of privacy of communication and correspondence is
violated, thereby evidence adduced is inadmissible.
The check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to
privacy and communication; hence it was inadmissible in evidence.
Whether or not Catolico was unjustly dismissed
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed, for no hearing was ever conducted, thereby
denying her due process. It is also settled that the burden is on the employer to
prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge
that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified
Stonehill vs. Diokno [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 June 1967]
Petitioner alleged that the 42 search warrants against him is null and void
contending: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books, and
things to be seized; (2) case money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures

d.

e.

f.

were made in an illegal manner; (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law
Respondents contend: (1) that the search warrant are valid; (2) that the defects of
said warrant, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; (3) effects seized are
admissible in evidence against the petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the search and seizures
Whether or not evidence obtained is inadmissible
Yes. Evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2 Art 3 shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
(1) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision, and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 800; G.R. No. 64261; 26 Dec. 1984]
their office were searched and properties were seized, which discontinued the
printing and publication of the newspapers.
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants. They contend: (1) respondent
judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses; (2) the search warrants pinpointed only one address; (3) articles
belonging to his co petitioner were also seized although the warrant were only
directed against Burgos; (4) real property were seized; (5) the application along with
a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in
accordance with sec 3 art. 4 of the 1973 Constitution
Whether or not the search warrant were validly issued
No. court declared the two warrants null and void. The affidavits submitted for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be
searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the
said items.
Tambasen vs. Pp [246 SCRA 184; G.R. No. 89103; 14 July 1995]
P/Sgt. Natual applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received
information that petitioner had in possession at his house rifles, pistols, hand
grenades, dynamite sticks, and subversive document, which were used or intended
to use for illegal purposes. the application was granted
police team search the house of the petitioner and seized 2 envelopes containing
cash, handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academic
notebook, and assorted papers and handset battery pack.
Whether or not the seizure of the articles not mentioned in the search warrant was
legal
No. Sec. 2 Art 3 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized. the police acts beyond the
paramenters of their authority by seizing articles not describe in the search
warrants.
Placer vs. Villanueva [126 SCRA 463; G.R. Nos. L-60349-62; 29 Dec. 1983]
The Congressman of the municipality of Masbate and his security escorts (were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. One security escort survived the
assassination plot but suffered a gunshot wound.
Vicente Lim et al. was accused of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder.
The Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, concluded that a probable cause had been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the Lim,
et.al. Therecommended amount for bail of each of the accused was Php
200,000.00. Except for Cabarles, all of the accused posted bail.

g.

h.

The Fiscal issued a resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case
against Lim, et.al. but differed in the designation of the crime. He ruled that all of the
accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder with Frustrated Murder,
but for a case of murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical
injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks ofSiblante. Said Fiscal
filed with the RTC of Masbate four separate in formations of murder against the 12
accused with a recommendation of no bail.
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying
on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists
the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of a probable cause
Soliven vs. Makasiar [167 SCRA 393; G.R. No. 82585; 14 Nov. 1988]
Beltran wrote in the Philippine Star that during the August 29 coup attempt,
the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on. Due to this, the
President filed a libel complaint against petitioners.
Beltran argues that the addition of the word personally after the word determined
and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
to other responsible officers as may be authorized by law. This interpretation
convinced him that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
Whether or not Beltrans constitution rights were violated when the respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant of arrest without personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses to determine probable cause
The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility ofthe
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Instead, he shall
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. This procedure should be followed, otherwise judges would be unduly laden
with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Salazar vs. Achacoso [183 SCRA 145; G.R. No. 81510; 14 Mar. 14, 1990]
Petitioner was charged by a Rosalie Tesoro with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. According to Tesoro, after she surrendered her PECC
Card to petitioner, she promised her of booking in Japan. However, after 9
months, Tesoro was still in the Philippines and was never able to travel to Japan,
and that her PECC card was not released by Salazar.
a closure and seizure order was issued
After proceeding to petitioners residence, the team, assisted by policemen and
mediamen, went to Hannalie Dance Studio, which petitioner operated.
Before entering Hannalie Dance Studio, the team served said order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. When
required to show credentials, Salazar was unable to produce any. The team
confiscated assorted costumes when they chanced upon 12 talent performers
practicing a dance number. The confiscation was duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Salazar.
Petitioner, through a letter to POEA, requested that the personal properties seized
at her residence be returned.
Whether the POEA validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article38 of the Labor Code.

i.

j.

k.

Under the present Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search
and arrest. It was declared that mayors may not exercise this power, neither by a
mere prosecuting body. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may
order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for purpose of deportation.
the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Article 38(c) of the Labor Code is declared unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.
Morano vs. Vivo [20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 June 1967]
Chan Sau Wah left China, leaving her children by first marriage.
She entered the Philippines under temporary visitors visa
She got married with a Filipino citizen.
The Commissioner of Immigration ordered her to leave the country with a warning
that upon failure to do so, an arrest warrant will be issued and their bond will be
confiscated
Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid
Yes. it is valid. an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her
status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements
of Immigration Act. The marriage to a Filipino is not a ground to allow her to ignore
the law.
she must depart first to some foreign country, procure the proper visa,and undergo
examination by the Bureau of Immigration
Harvey vs. Santiago [162 SCRA 840; G.R. No. 82544; 28 June 1988]
Petitioners were among the 22 alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three
of close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation agents
inPagsanjan, Laguna. They were the only ones who have chosen to face
deportation.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious (lustful) poses as well as boys and
girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes.
Deportation proceedings were instituted against the petitioners
They question the validity of their detention on the ground that, respondent violated
Section 2, Article III prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID
agents were not clothed with warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by
said provision.
Whether or not there is violation of constitutional right against search and seizures
No. An arrest may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person, even
without warrant, when the offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this
case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three months during which period their activities were
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of
the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by Article
III,Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid
search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
Sales vs. Sandiganbayan [369 SCRA 293 G.R. No. 143802, 16 Nov. 2001]
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former
mayor and his political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered
himself and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal
complaint for murder against him.
The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary
investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the
prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a subpoena directing him to

l.

m.

file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting documents. He
did it the following day.
While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the C.A
alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who issued it was a
relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal and
irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the case.
Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary
investigation.
The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed
because of the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom completed the preliminary
investigation There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing
the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan.
Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense
alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation.
The OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft
investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution
of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under preliminary investigation by
the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of
Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral
part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the
denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
Silva vs. Presiding Judge [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct. 1991]
Sgt. Villamor filed an application for search warrant and desposition of witness
against petitioners.
search warrant was issued with probable cause to believe that petitioner possess
marijuana leaves, cigarette and joint.
In the course of search, the officers seize money belonging to the petitioner
Whether or not the search warrant is valid
No. it is invalid due to failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of
searching questions and answers
Whether or not the seizure of money was proper
No. the seizure of money is also beyond the officers authority, for the warrant did
not indicate moneyto be seized.
Veroy vs. Layague [210 SCRA 97; G.R. No. 95630; 18 June 1992]
Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being used as
a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the
caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they
did not have a search warrant.
Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by
Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers.
Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the
search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major
Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family
friend of the Veroys.
conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy.
The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to
Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a
locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock
of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then
entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .
45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch
bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed
materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the
children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing

assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve
striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A.,
one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic
Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a
plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the
master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an
inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house.
W/n the evidence are inadmissible
s.
Yes. permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search
once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence against them.
n.

o.

p.

q.

r.

Pp vs. Del Rosario [234 SCRA 246; G.R. No. 109633; 20 July 1994]
accused was charged and convicted of illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession and sales of drugs.
A search warrant was issued to seize methamphetamine and its paraphernalias
the officers seized shabu, its paraphernalias and a caliber pistol
Whether or not the seizure of firearms was proper
No. Sec. art 3 specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe
the things to be seized.
Pp vs. Gesmundo [219 SCRA 743; G.R. No. 89373; 19 Mar. 1993]
there were two contradicted testimonies
(1) police went to the residence of the accused with a search warrant. The accuse
begged the police not to search and leave the house. Through the search dried
marijuana flowering tops were seized, it was found hidden in the metal basin on top
of the table and in the cabinet
(2) accused claims that the marijuana was planted by the police
Whether or not the search was proper
No. document of PAGPAPATUNAY was inadmissible as the accused was not
informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she
has the right to the assistance of a counsel. It was not proved that the marijuana
belonged to her
Umil vs. Ramos [187 SCRA 311; G.R. No. 81567; 3 Oct. 1991]
military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, o verify a confidential
information about a sparrow man was admitted with a gunshot wound. That
wounded man was among the 5 sparrows who murdered 2 Capcom mobile patrols
Whether or not the arrest was lawful
Yes. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified.
Pp vs. Sucro [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar. 1991]
police officers monitored Sucro to have selling marijuana
They arrest the buyer and seller of marijuana
Whether or not the arrest was proper
Yes. warrantless search and seizures are leagal as long as probable cause existed.
The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
from the surveillance of the activities of the accused.
Pp vs. Rodriguez [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb. 1992 ]
NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation. participating agents were given
money with ultra violet powder
the money was exchanged with marijuana contained in a plastic
the agent went back to the headquarters and made a report.
they raid the house of the father of the accused without search warrant and were
able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and plastic syringe among others.
Accused was also found positive of ultraviolet powder

Whether or not the search was valid


No. that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling
marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after
the actual exchange
it violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation
did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even
without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when
it involves prohibited articles in plain view
Pp vs. Sy Chua [ 396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67, 4 February 2003]
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in
Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting
the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just
arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted
from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accusedappellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline
substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected
him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm
bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of
the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the
twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accusedappellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene
brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a
different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and
his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to
buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and
examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the
man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised
hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the
arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He
refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this
time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud,
who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while
the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for
about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the
media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accusedappellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.
Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search
of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him
were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
No. neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest
1. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

t.

u.

In Stop and frisk:


1. the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
2. the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
Go vs. CA [206 SCRA 138; G.R. No. 101837; 11 Feb. 1992]
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver
of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take
down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner
presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police
detained him.
a criminal charge was brought against him.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails
such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any
crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation
should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a
substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a
criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted,
prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case
is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered
released upon posting a bail bond.
Callanta vs. Villanueva [77 SCRA 377; G.R. Nos. 24646 & L-24674; 20 June 1977]
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The
City Judge of Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the
complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme
Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by
respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary
investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity.
After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner
posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this
case did not disagree with the judges investigation, and agreed with the complaints
filed.
Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit.
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has
filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever
defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the
validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond.
Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary
investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City Court of
Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without
regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any
person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper

v.

w.

court. Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted
and set aside.
Posadas vs. CA [188 SCRA 288; G.R. No. 89139; 2 Aug. 1990]
a six-man team was formed in order to execute a buy-bust operation against de
Lara and his group. .
Orolfo and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of de Lara where he
was seen standing outside. The informant introduced Orolfo as an interested buyer
of marijuana. When de Lara handed the two foils, he sensed the presence of the
police; thus, he tried to retrieve the two foils from Orolfo to which the
latter prevented him from doing so. He ran inside the house, with Orolfo in
pursuit. When he was subdued,de Lara admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his
house and even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with white
lining containing prohibited drugs
de Lara was convicted of violation of Sec. 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous
DrugsAct of 1972). In his appeal, he questioned the legality of his arrest and
seizure of prohibited drugs found in his house.
Whether or not the arrest was legal
Yes. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures enumerates
situations when an arrest may be lawful even without a warrant. Two of said
situations applicable to the case are:
1.
that when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer/private
person, and
2.
that when an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace
officer/private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar, de Lara was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of
marijuana to Orolfo. Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buybust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest.
The policemens entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in
hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that
followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
Moreover, the seizure is valid. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited
drugs was the result of appellants arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediatevicinity where the arrest was made
Pp vs. Mengote [210 SCRA 174; G.R. No. 87059; 22 June 1992]
On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
When the surveillance team arrived therein, they saw the accused looking from
side to side and holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen that is why they tried to ran away because of
the other lawmen, they were unable to escape;
After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the
accused and several days later, an information for violation of PD 1866 was filed
against him;
After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence.
Hence this automatic appeal.

Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?

him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object
turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered,
the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

No. there was nothing to support the arresting officers suspicion other than
Mengotes darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen.
There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie presence, to say
that the warrantless arrest is lawful.

accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there
were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after
the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:


Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:

x.

y.

a.

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually


committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b.

When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

c.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

Pp vs. Tangliben [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr. 1990]


Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San
Fernando Victory Liner Terminal.
At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag
who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves.
The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.
The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
W/n there was a valid search
Yes. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a
warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. the accused was
found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore
searched lawfully even without a search warrant.
Pp vs. Malmstedt [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 June 1991]
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third
time in December 1988 as a tourist
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.
They set up a temporary checkpoint.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting
the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport
and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers
opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
w/n the warrantless arrest is valid
Yes. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught
in flagrante delicto. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause
for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
z.

Pp vs. Aminnudin [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 July 1988]


Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo
City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him,inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to
their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to
the NBIlaboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Aliy Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. According to
the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana.
He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of
June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.
WON the marijuana allegedly found in his possession is inadmissible in evidence
arrested because he was searched without warrant
Yes [Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution]. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of
arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause.Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed.
aa. Pp vs. Saycon [236 SCRA 325; G.R. No. 110995; 5 Sept. 1994]
the Coastguard personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben
Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on
board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City.

Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed
them to intercept the suspect.
Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He
willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open
his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong
wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the
suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his
head.
Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.
Yes. The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor
vehicle. There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying
prohibited drugs.
ab. Pp vs. Musa [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. No. 96177; 27 Jan. 1993]
A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana
Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance
and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave
the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved
in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but
did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white
and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its
contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana
leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Yes. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. The plain view does not
apply. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises
or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object.
ac. Pita vs. CA [178 SCRA 362; G.R. No. 80806; 5 Oct. 1989]
Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign, members of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. The said materials
included Pinoy Playboy whose co-editor and publisher is the petitioner (Leo
Pita).The said materials were burned in public

Petitioner, prayed for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,to restrain the
confiscating Pinoy Playboy magazines or from preventing the sale of the said
magazine for it, according to Pita, is a decent, artistic, and educational magazine
Five days later, petitioner filed an urgent motion for issuance of a TRO against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of the said magazine
In opposing petitioners application f or a writ of preliminary injunction,
MayorBagatsing pointed that during the anti-smut campaign, the materials
confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers, who voluntarily
surrendered their reading materials and that petitioners establishment was not
raided.
Whether or not there is unlawful seizure
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. Pertinent
provisions state that the search must have been incident to a lawful search, and the
arrest must be on account of a crime committed. In the case at bar, no party has
been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party.
The Court rejected the argument that there is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been
no warrant and that violation of penal law must be punished. For starters, there is
no accused here to speak of, who out to be punished. Second, to say that the
respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, violation of penal laws has been committed, is
to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury and executioner rolled into one
ad. Guanzon vs. De Villa [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 Jan. 1990]
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged
that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The
residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The
residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings
and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations
The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends
that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted.
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human
rights.
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure
used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts
stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals
roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to
be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one
violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no
erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of
clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
ae. Pp vs. Aruta [ 288 SCRA 626; G.R. No. 120515; 13 Apr. 1998]

P/Lt. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of
marijuana.
the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo,
near Rizal Ave. When the accused got off, she was pointed to by the informer. She
was carrying a traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. She was
arrested without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was convicted
and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in
evidence.
No. The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as
evidence for the following reasons:

af.

1.

the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed
to do so;

2.

the accused was not acting suspiciously;

3.

the accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant


should have been easy;

4.

the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street

b.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In order that the information received
by the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause, it must be
based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been committed or
is about to be committed.
Rule 113 and 126 of the Rules of Court

VIII. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL


a.

Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]


After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, he wishes to return to the Philippines to die. President
Aquino barred their return for reasons of national security and public safety.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under Sec. 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights. They contend that the
President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further
assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed.
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The State, acting through the

c.

d.

Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its
existence. There exist factual bases for the Presidents decision, that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the State and instigate more chaos.
The powers of the President is not limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect
the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. This case calls
for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Furthermore, the right to return to ones country is not included in the right to travel.
The right to travel only includes:
1. the right to travel from the Philippines to another country;
2. the right to travel within the Philippines.
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc.
petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home to file a petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management
committee. Such was granted.
However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, six separate criminal
complaints were filed against petitioner and he subsequently admitted to bail in all
cases.
Petitioner filed for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US
relative to his business transactions and opportunities. The prosecution opposed
said motion and both trial judges denied the same.
He then filed a petition to reverse the decision. He contend that having been
admitted to bail, neither the courts nor the SEC could prevent him from exercising
his constitutional right to travel.
WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.
No.The court find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's
motion for permission to leave the country. The constitutional right to travel being
invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Such right shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court as stated in the Constitution.
Petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration
thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to
show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in
his behalf could undertake such business transaction.
The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country
because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. If the accused be will be allowed to leave the country
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991]
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold
departure order.
The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that
the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accused has left the country without the knowledge and the permission of the court.
Whether or Not the right to travel of the petitioner has been impaired
No. The preventing his departure from the Philippines is considered a valid
restriction on his right to travel. The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled
and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason of his failure to
appear at scheduled arraignments. A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country. The right to travel is not absolute,
such may be impaired upon lawful order of the court as stated in the Constitution.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919)

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro obliging them to live in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake as the permanent settlement of the Mangyanes.
Section 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 contains penal provision for the
refusal to live in the appointed land.
Rubi and the other Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus, alleging that
the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
of that province. They are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of
the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
Whether or not the action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 violates the liberty of abode
The liberty of abode may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court and within
the limits prescribe by law. It is held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty.
It is considered purely as an exercise of the police power; they are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines. It is held that the law is
reasonable since it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class, which in this case the Non
Christians.
IX. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
a. Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
The petitioner, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent
the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of section 23, subsection 3, Article
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides No public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution,
or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
Respondent contends that Act No. 4052, which issued the postage stamps in
question, contemplates no religious purpose in view. They assert that the purpose
in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist to this country, thus advantageous to the Government.
Whether or not Act No. 4052 violates sec. 23 Art. VI of the Constitution
Act No. 4052 did not violate sec. 23 Art. VI of the Constitution.
The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. Its
purpose was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country,
as stated in the Act it is deemed to be advantageous to the Government , the
phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
b. Garces vs. Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]
Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted:
1. Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every
fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron
saint of Valencia". It designated the members of nine committees who would
take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through
the selling of tickets and cash donations "

2.

c.

d.

Resolution No. 6, The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor.
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saints feast day.
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were duly ratified. Funds were raised and successfully
acquired the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer. The image was temporarily
placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees
could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta.
After the mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the
barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because
church funds were used for its acquisition. He further contended that said
resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec.
18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).
Whether or not Resolution No. 5 and 6 violated the freedom of religion
Petitioners contention is without merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public
money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. If in case the image would be
given to the Catholic church, such action would still not violate the Constitution
because it was acquired with private funds.
Furthermore, it does not show that it favors the Catholic church, for the wooden
image purchased is for the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron
saint, San Vicente Ferrer.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila [G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957]
Plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel
portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialects.
The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000,
as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to
secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees
To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties, plaintiff
paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees.
They filed a complaint, praying that Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,
and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 be rendered illegal and unconstitutional,
on the ground that they do not made any profit from selling bibles and that it was
purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.
Whether or not said ordinances would impair the freedom of religion clause
The act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall
under the above legal provisions.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason, Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996]

e.

This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent
Board of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they
offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law.
Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and
suppression of freedom of expression.
Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for
their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending
other religious sectors from their program.
In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order
of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of
their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted.
Respondent board appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower
court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In
their petitionfor review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board
over reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to
review if they are indeed vested with such.
whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it
has acted with grave abuse of discretion
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing
of a substantive and imminent evil.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu [G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993]
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students
Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265.
They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious
worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom.
The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of
Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt
involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting
of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and
demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship
Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Yes. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during
ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so
evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools.

f.

g.

h.

The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation
of a citizens right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony
does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love
for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of
government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious
beliefs is unjustified.
Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this
right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies.
The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship is:
1. Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.
2. Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to
prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified.
Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003]
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before
she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her
partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 [1985]
Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel,
which adjoined Malacaang. Respondent barred them for security reasons.
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.
Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.
No. Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to
conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised
their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans.
While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in
good faith.
the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the
President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests
transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure
the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks
and disturbances.
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, GR No.153888, 9
July 2003

Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) claims to be a


federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international
organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and
the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP
accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal
food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also
due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection
thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to
issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo
registered in the Philippine Patent Office.
On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee
its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State.
It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the
halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. A
government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot perform a religious function
like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food
product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from
the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption.
X. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
a.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.
The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this
Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the
latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service
eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the
alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the information
regarding the eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City?

b.

This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the
desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not
of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by
law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access
by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to information
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit
the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's
civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
Petitioners, media practitioners, requested that GSIS be compelled, by mandamus,
a) to furnish them with the list of names of Batasan members belonging to UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
election through intercession of Imelda Marcos; b) to furnish them with certified true
copies of the document evidencing their respective loans and/or; c) to allow
petitioners access to public records for the subject information
Separate comments were filed. The respondent maintains that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers, therefore petitioners
request intrudes the right to privacy. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality
restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Respondent next asserts
that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in
nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS.
Yes. the petition is granted and respondent GSIS is ordered to allow petitioners
access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the
former Batasang Pambansa, in view of Art. IV Sec. 6
Respondents claim that the right to information is not absolute. It is limited to
matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. cannot be invoke at the present case. The court that the
information sought is clearly a matter of public interest and concern and such
information is not among those excluded by law. Respondent has failed to cite any
law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality.
Respondents contention that it intrudes the right of privacy is also without merit.
The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no

right of privacy since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the
feelings and sensibilities of the part, thus not applicable to a corporation. Neither
the borrowers can invoke their right to privacy considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.

dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks and
(2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government and the
Marcos heirs.
Petitioner invoke his right to information to disclose publicly all its transaction
w/n sec. 7 art. 3 guarantees access to information regarding ongoing negotiations
or proposals prior to the final agreement
Yes. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill gotten wealth

And lastly, Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
c.

d.

e.

Province of Cotabato vs. The Govt. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
[G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
the Province of North Cotabato filed a petition, for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the
holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Several petitions followed with the same
purpose.
Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article
III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving
public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. NO. 132601, October 12, 1998
Echagarays counsel filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and/or Temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of the petitioner
under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing the rules as these are unconstitutional
and void.
Manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison
personnel (Sec. 19 execution procedure
W/n Sec. 19 unduly suppress the convicts and his counsels constitutional right to
information
Yes. R.A. No 8177 is declared invalid because sec. 19 unjustifiably makes the
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government [G.R. No. 130716,
December 9, 1998]
Petitioner, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the
prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies, alleges that what impelled him to
bring this action were several news report bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in Sept. 1997. The news referred to: (1) alleged discovery of billions of

XI. RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION


a.

SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
After the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, the SSSEA went on strike. SSS
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that they be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the
application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court a quo
denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction
upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. Petitioners' motion
for the reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioners contend that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case and to issue
the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, since the case involves a
labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS claimed that they do not have the right to on the ground
that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC
has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees
from striking.
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to
strike.
While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the
right to strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
The employees being part of the civil serviceare covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

b.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union [G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974]

c.

The unions closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement which
requires all permanent employees must be a member of the union and later was
amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization"
Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the Inglesia ni Cristo, resigned from his affiliation
to Elizalde Rope Workers' union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its
members to become affiliated with any labor organization.
The management of the Company notified him, that the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. The appellee filed an action for
injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.
Union contented that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that
membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such
religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization deprives said
members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association. . It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating
with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join.
It is clear that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union, therefore in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.
In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon [A.C. No. 1928,
August 3, 1978]

b.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
Respondent contended that the provision which requires every member of the
Integrated Bar to pay annual dues are void on the ground that it violates his rights
to liberty and property as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Whether or not the provision which requires every member of the Integrated Bar to
pay annual dues violates his rights to associate.
No. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State.

Furthermore The Four Day Revolution is not a film biography, more or less
fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. It is a reenactment of a historical
peaceful revolution, which private respondent have participated in. To remove the
role of private respondent would make it unhistorical. Enrile is a public figure, thus
such event could no longer be regarded as their own private business.
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce
motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them
through television.

XII. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION/ASSEMBLY


a.

United States vs. Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]

numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled and a petition charging


Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal.
They claimed that Punsalan was bribing money in consideration of favorable
decisions.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the
district, whom recommended the removal of Punsalan.
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for new trial. He asserted that he was
charged by the justice of the peace, Agustin Jaime, for personal reasons. The judge
of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of
the peace of the same.
Criminal action was instituted against the petitioners, claiming that the accused
have voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent prejudice and
defame Punsalan. Defendants are found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine. The
case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review of the evidence.
whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel
No. Defendants and appellants are acquitted. People have a right to scrutinize and
comment or condemn the conduct of their chosen representatives in the
government. As long as their comments are made in good faith and with justifiable
ends, they are insulated from prosecution or damage suits for defamation even if
such views are found to be inaccurate or erroneous. A public officer must not be too
thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988]
Petitioner informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected
motion picture"The Four Day Revolution".
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema
or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation.
Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
Enrile filed a complaint, invoking his right to privacy. Petitioners asserted that they
are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression.
Whether or Not the production and filming of the projected mini-series would
constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy.
No. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The
Four Day Revolution" does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy." There was no "clear and present danger". The
projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any
audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like.

c.

Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]


Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally
starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy.

d.

The request for permit was denied because of reports of plans of


subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations
where a large number of people is expected to attend.
Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured.
An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino
dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
which prohibits the holding of rallies within 500 feet of the US Embassy.
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble
violated.
Yes. Peaceful assemblies are guaranteed in the freedom of speech. They have
failed to prove the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. It is settled law that as
to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access.
Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group.
Ordinance No. 7295 would be unconstitutional for "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989
Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign, members of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. Said materials were
burned in public, including Pinoy Playboy whose co-editor and publisher is the
petitioner, Leo Pita.
plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said
defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and
of the press.
plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order. against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. Such
restraining order was granted.
defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence
reading materials, but claimed that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered
by the vendors to the police authorities and that petitioners establishment was not
raided.
Whether or not petitioners Pinoy Playboy is considered obscene
To test whether a material is obscene, as to constitute a clear and present danger,
which would be a valid ground for restraining the freedom of expression:
1. whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the
work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.
2. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensiveway, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.

3.

e.

whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001]
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which prohibits the
publication of surveys affecting national candidates, 15 days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates, 7 days before an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
Whether or not 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 violates freedom of expression.
R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press. 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
the suppression of freedom of expression.

f.

The test employed to determine the constitutional validity is the Obriens test.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified
1.
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest
Primicias vs. Fugoso [G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948]
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a
permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances
to the government.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and
high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities,
which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving
emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body
or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged
in any lawful assembly."
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for
two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others,
and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The

g.

h.

court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing


the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the
government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil
to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There
must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Malabanan vs. Ramento [G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984]
Petitioners, officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University,
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting
They held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. They marched toward the Life
Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their
permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly
they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly.
They question the validity of their suspension for one academic year, invoking their
right to peaceably assembly and free speech.
Whether or not imposing a penalty of 1 academic year suspension violate their right
to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Petitioners are entitled of their rights to peaceably assembly and free speech. Such
right is to be exercised without censorship or punishment, except when there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil. In the case at bar such danger is
absent.
The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private premises, property
of respondent University. Only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, which they have successfully acquired.
Though they are entitled to freedom of to peaceably assembly, they should take
responsibility for violating the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place
other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court,
of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the
period allowed. It is held that a one-week suspension would be enough as a
punishment.
PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills [G.R. No. L-31195, June 5,
1973]
Petitioners they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
The Management, informed PBMEO that the demonstration should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company and warned them that workers who
belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers
of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company, the company filed
a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for

i.

a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing
for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstrationon March 4, 1969; that
the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of
speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against
the respondent firm.
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable
assemble violated.
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.
Bayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006]
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when
the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply
to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion,
protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies
to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and
two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution
of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005
Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people
of the right to peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power
to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be

j.

peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Chavez vs. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent
DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.
He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had
ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread,
the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a
petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC
directly with the Supreme Court.
Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental
action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies
equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have
the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the
press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There
is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

On 1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land for P9,600 of which P4,800
were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or
before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at
the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800,
a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff.
Upon failure of Esteban to pay the two installments as agreed upon, Rutter
instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's
fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in
accordance with law.
In his defense, Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that
he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and
that under section 2 of RA 342 (moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot
be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A
motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342.
The court dismissed the complaint holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to
enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium law. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration raising the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion
was denied. Hence this appeal.
Whether or Not RA 342 is unconstitutional for violating non-impairment clause
Yes. The court held that the enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present
time is unreasonable and oppressive, therefore, the same should be declared null
and void and without effect.
The constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period
of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.The enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 would make obligations be unenforceable during the eightyear period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves. It compels the creditors to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years
before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
This period seemed to be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
b.

Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-24670,
December 14, 1979]
Plaintiff and Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed
the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez.
Eventually defendant acquired the lots.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT were imposed as part of its
general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiffappellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.
While Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA, from
Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial
zone, per Resolution No. 27.

XIII. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE


a.

Rutter vs Eteban [G.R. No. L-3708, May 18 1953]

Defendant began the construction of a building to be devoted to banking purposes


but which defendant also claims that it could be devoted to, and used exclusively

for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff that defendant to stop the
construction. But the latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that it
was constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, and it had accordingly
obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction.

c.

The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint on the
ground that it was a valid exercise of police power. Motion for reconsideration was
filed, it averred that defendant "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the
contract of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer
Certificates of Title issued in Chavezs favor." And that the Municipal Council had no
power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant corporation."
Motion was denied, hence the appeal.
whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant
Yes. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and
commercial zone, is a valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the
health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Lozano vs Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22. They moved seasonably to quash
the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case, hence this appeal.
Whether it impairs freedom of contract
No. The court found no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs
freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy
are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as
mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

XIV. EX POST FACTO LAWS


a.

People vs. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382


Feliciano Co together with Nilo Tayag and other petitioners was criminally charged
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act by:
1) being an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
to overthrow the Government of the by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung
University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army
2) Nilo Tayag and five others knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined
and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODYknowingly, willfully
became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also of the New People's and that all the above-named accused,
commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the
people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on
the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than

one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.

b.

The trial Court declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder
and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the information against the two
accused. Hence the Government appealed.
Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
No. RA 1700 is not a bill of attainder.
1) The Act is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of
the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not
only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct.
2) Even assuming the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder.
3) It is not enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall
within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that
it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. The RA 1700 is prospective in
nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members
of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an
opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8.
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 128 SCRA 383
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than
one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
It was alleged that he is involved, as a government auditor of the Commission on
Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some
officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teachers
Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks
for non-existent obligations of the Teachers Camp resulting in damage to the
government of several million pesos.
The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978.
In the meantime, petitioner was elected as the municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite
in the local elections held in January 1980. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision convicting the accused. Hence the present appeal.
On March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among
others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had
been filed against him."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 as the present case would be violative of the
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law"

c.

Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex


post facto law.
No. It does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. The court
finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195 is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of ex post facto law.
Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension
from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension.
Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely
preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore,
the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes
mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not
violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law.
People vs. Sandiganbayan 211 SCRA 241

The motion to quash on the ground of prescription was granted.


Whether or Not to apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post
facto law
Yes. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law.
Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer
be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before
B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under
that law should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval
of B.P. 195.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending
Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period
for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was
committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the
accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years)
prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019
XV. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Two letter-complaints were filed by Teofilo Gelacio questioning the issuance to


Governor Paredes of a free patent title for Lot in the Rosario public land subdivision
in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

a.

Serafin, borrowed the sum of P1,500.00 without any collateral or security from an
old friend. When they wrote her a letter of demand, she promised to pay them and
said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her
home.

The subpoena was served without notice to Paredes. A preliminary investigation ex


parte was conducted. Information was recommended to be filed. Paredes was
arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Paredes refused to post
bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his
release. However the petition was denied because the proper remedy was for
Paredes to file a bail bond, and move to quash the information before being
arraigned.

Upon failure to pay the debt, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against
Serafin. Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest; which then was served on
Saturday, a time when the bonding companies are closed, thus cannot raise bail
and compelled to be detained for three days.
Serafin filed an instant administrative complaint for capricious and malicious
admission a criminal complaint for estafa against her and causing her wrongful
arrest and detention, against respondent Santiago Lindayag, municipal judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. She contend that the charged against her was baseless, for
there are no elements of estafa present but only failure to pay a debt. Respondent
then dismissed the case.
Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Yes. Respondent judge have grossly failed to perform his duties by issuing a
warrant without first examining the witness personally.
He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for complaint involved here is a mere
failure to pay a simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the herein
complainant's guilt of estafa.
It is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much
less estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged and punished for nonpayment of a loan of a sum of money.

On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:
1.

he is charged for an offense which has prescribed, asserting that since at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21, 1976) the period of
prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime
should have prescribed in 1986.

2.

the preliminary investigation, Information and the Warrant of Arrest were


invalid for lack of notice to him of the preliminary investigation

3.

his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation.

4.

Notice to the whole world must be presumed when the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate

5.

The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice
duly given to the various offices and officials of the government. If the land in
question was indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department
(Ministry) of Education would also know or would be presumed to know.

Serafin vs. Lindayag 67 SCRA 166

Respondent judge is dismissed from the office of municipal judge of Guiguinto,


Bulacan.
b.

Lozano vs. Martinez


Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law) was approved on April 3, 1979.
It punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for

value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22. They moved seasonably to quash
the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case, hence this appeal.

XVII. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


a.

Whether or not BP 22 is repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against


imprisonment for debt.
No. BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order.
While the debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can validly
punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt trough fraud
XVI. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
a.

Caunca vs. Salazar


This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau,
owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the
province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without returning the advance payment it gave?
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement.
The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element
that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

b.
c.

Lansang vs. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971]


In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections, two hand grenades were
thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight
persons were killed and many more injured.
On August 23, the President Marcos issued Proclamation 889, suspending privilege
of writ of habeas corpus for the persons detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offense incident thereto. Petitions for writ
of habeas corpus were filed, by the persons, who, having been arrested without a
warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of
actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it
became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that
public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is
no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward
incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said
plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the
Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has risen requiring
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus belongs to the President
and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the
writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger
thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The
President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are
present.
The court rendered judgment declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in
issuing Proclamation No. 889; dismissing the petitions; directed the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to conduct the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners, and
to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist
against them, or, otherwise, to order their release
The supreme Court has the power not just to determine executive arbitrariness in
the manner of arriving at the suspension but also the power to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension
Rules on Habeas Data
Rules on Writ of Amparo

XVIII. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED


Custodial Investigation
a. Gamboa vs. Cruz [G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988]
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant and was detained in Precinct
2 Manila together with several others.
During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by
complainant as one of the companion in the robbery. He was ordered to sit down in
front of her and got interrogated by the police investigator.
Information for robbery was filed against him. Petitioner was arraigned and hearing
were held.

b.

Petitioner, instead of presenting his defense, filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground
that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied
said motion. Hence the petition.
Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
No. Petitioners right to counsel was not violated.
The Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the
waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest. Since petitioner in the
course of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for
a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because he is not yet entitled to counsel and the accusatory process had
not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and
due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact,
when he was Identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any
statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not
facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that
stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down
in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated"
People vs. Macam [G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994]
A robbery killing took place.
Appellants were detained by the security guards at the factory of the father of
accused Macam. They were brought to the Police Headquarters for investigation.
Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime,
appellants were then brought to the General Hospital and were made to line-up
together with several policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam
and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during
the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the perpetrators.
Appellants were charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled
identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital
are violative of their constitutional rights under Section 12, Article 3 of the
Constitution
Whether or not the rights under custodial investigation of the accused were
violated.
No, no rights has been violated.
Though, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's
identification at the police line-up, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission
in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be
applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification
made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the
identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified
appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the
prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin
Furthermore, though the arrest was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest,
appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is
being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. They have not moved
for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any
irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial

c.

However, after the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an


uncounseled accused mde in a police line up is admissible
People vs. Judge Ayson [G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989]
Private respondent Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines was
allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets.
On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave a handwritten note (exhibit K),
stating his willingness to settle the irregularities with an amount of P76,000.
At the day of the investigation, Ramos made a statement (exhibit A) that he had not
made disclosure of the tickets; that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from
doing so; that he was still willing to settle his obligation and proferred a
compromise; that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place; and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;"
and; that he was willing to sign his statement.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging
him with the crime of estafa. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered
a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued.
Respondent judge admitted all the exhibits except the statement (exhibit A) for he
was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and
handwritten not (exhibit K) for he was not assisted by counsel; thus inadmissible in
evidence.
Whether or Not the respondent Judge have gravely abused his discretion by
making the admission and statement of accused inadmissible in evidence.
Yes. respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate
rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Felipe Ramos was not under custodial interrogation, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he
appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
the first day of the administrative investigation, and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the
criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A. Also the handwritten
note ,Exhibit K, that he sent to his superiors, offering to compromise his liability in
the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They
may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been
accorded to Ramos.

d.

The rights under the custodian investigation are not available in administrative
proceedings
People vs. Pinlac [G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988]
The accused was convicted of two criminal cases for robbing Mr. Sato and killing
Mr. Osamu.
He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his
extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture,
and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the
assistance of counsel.
He provided his version of the incident, which is contrary to the facts presented by
the plaintiff. He claimed that he was arrested without any Warrant of Arrest shown
to him despite his demand; that he was ordered to reenact the crime, thereby
leaving his fingerprints and sole prints all over the premises of the crime scene; and

that during the investigation at the Police Headquarters, he was tortured and forced
to admit the crimes charged
Whether or not that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial
confession

In his defense, he contend that he have been deprived of his constitutional rights
under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. He claimed that signed the
cash count only because he was pressured by Macasemo who assured him that
Macasemo would settle everything. The collections in 1976, reflected in the
Statement of Accountability, were not his but those of Macasemo, his superior, who
had unliquidated cash advances. He also admitted having received the demand
letter but he did not reply because he was already in Manila looking for another
employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not
exert any effort to have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying
instead on Macasemo's assurance that he would settle the matter.

Yes. the trial court have erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession,
for it was obtained thru force, torture, violence and intimidation, without having been
apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf.
The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

g.

Accused, Arnel Alicando Briones, was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide
of a 4 year old girl.

Furthermore, the evidence were mere circumstantial evidence regarding the


fingerprints of the accused, which then was satisfactorily explained, the accused
being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato. The court held that the guilt of the
accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus acquitted.
e.

When he was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan, he verbally confessed
his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal
confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri
mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence
for the prosecution.

People vs. Bolanos [G.R. No. 101808, July 3, 1992]


When they apprehend the accused for murder, they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated.
They boarded the accused on the police vehicle. While on their way to the police
station to be investigated, the accused, after he was asked by the police if he killed
the victim, admitted that he killed the deceased because he was abusive.
The statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence against him
by the Court because it was given freely and before the investigation.

f.

Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to


counsel.
Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol
jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been
conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
Any extrajudicial confession he makes without his counsel is deemed
inadmissible to court. Appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt, thus he was acquitted.
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994]
Petitioner Ernesto Navallo, as the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia
National Vocational School was charged of malversation. A warrant of arrest was
issued, but he was not immediately found. When he was finally arrested, he posted
bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court, he pleaded not guilty.

Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the
certification prepared by State Auditing Examiner
No, A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation.
An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer.
Thus he cannot invoke such right for he was not under custodial investigation.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that he has been pressured to sign the auditors
report, but may have been persuaded only.
People vs. Alicando [G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995]

h.

The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death
penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review.
Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the
accused
No. Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation at the
case at bar. He was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making
his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a
language he could not understand and was not explained to him.
His uncounselled confession is inadmissible in evidence. Furthermore, adopting the
rule fruit of the poisonous tree , the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains, which are evidence derived from the uncounselled confession, are
equally inadmissible in evidence. For once the primary source is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is
also inadmissible. Thus suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Republic Act No. 7438

Right to Bail
a. People vs. Judge Donato [G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991]
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion. Private
respondent filed with a Motion to Quash. This was denied.
private respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent
is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD
1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President
issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and

b.

1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as
it existed before the amendatory decrees. Respondent Judge Donato, taking in
consideratopm of E.O. No. 187, granted the bail with a condition that he shall report
to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof.
Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, asking the court to deny
bail to the private respondent, claiming that in case he will be released he will not
appear in court for trial. The supplemental motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence the appeal.
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not
a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only
when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was
wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing
the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of
reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is
not favorable to him.
The court, however, agree with the petitioner that the accused has validly waived
his right to bail in another case, as agreement for remaining under custody, his co
detainees will be released immediately. It ruled that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the
accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting bail to the private respondent.
Comendador vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991]

c.

Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right.


The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the
same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were
directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the
alleged participation the failed coup on. Petitioners now claim that there was no pretrial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for
dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then
granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC
now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the
right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the
right to bail
The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and
national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that
mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to

continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the
lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
Traditionally, the right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the
military, as an exception to the Bill of Rights
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
Petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his costockholders, to file a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
appointment of a management committee. Such was granted. However, pending
disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this
effect was issued.
They were charged with estafa and subsequently admitted to bail in all cases.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country
stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. The prosecution opposed said motion and both trial judges denied
the same.
He then filed a petition to reverse the decision. He contend that having been
admitted to bail, neither the courts nor the SEC could prevent him from exercising
his constitutional right to travel.

d.
e.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country
because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. If the accused be will be allowed to leave the country
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
Petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration
thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to
show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in
his behalf could undertake such business transaction. The court find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave
the country
Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court
Government of HK vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675
Private respondent Juan Antonio Munoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail
term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge
He was arrested and detained. Petitioner Hongkong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner.
Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is
a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo inhibited himself from further hearing, such case
was raffled. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail, which then was granted by the respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;

that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail
Yes. Extraditee has also the right to apply for bail. The right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail,
aright to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback
in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. Therefore, extraditee
cannot be deprived of his rights to apply for bail
An extraditee has also the right to apply for bail

Criminal Due Process


a. Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988.]
Antonio de los Reyes, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head
of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no
action was taken on said report. Five years later, it became publicly known that
petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which was
subsequently accepted by President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a
complaint with the same charges.
An investigation took place, and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity, but was denied.
Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner
Tatad. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution
deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of
the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and
the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Yes. Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case found to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation can not be
corrected
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling
out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The long delay in resolving the case
under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the facts on
record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to
resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Though
the period fixed by law is merely "directory," it cannot be disregarded or ignored

completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar.
b. Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986]
An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case
involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority
reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the
assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to
the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the
Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the
intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the
acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan
and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert
genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence
and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the
charges against them.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process
and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the
due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since
legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of
acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the
authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and
closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary.
The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed
void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with
lack of due process on the account of collusionbetween the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set
aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order
for a re-trial was granted.
Presumption of Innocence
a. Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Ecija wants to run for the same position.
They contend that Sec. 4 Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 contravenes constitutional
presumption of innocence because candidate is disqualified on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him. Thus, he is placed in the same category
as a person already convicted of a crime.They contend that the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence

Yes. The Court held that the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact", violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused, thus null and void.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard.
b.

Marquez vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]


Marquez, a candidate in the election, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under
section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification, which states
that The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective
position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
He claimed that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. And
that a warrant was issued but has yet to be served on account of his alleged "flight"
from that country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was
proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

c.

Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to
be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest
comes within the term fugitive from justice.
No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive
from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is
an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice
includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.
Corpus vs. People [G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]
Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for
malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the
Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount
of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds
contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their
paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave
and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in
his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.
Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the
accused of the charge against him
No. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and
conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive

finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public
whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
Equipoise Rule it states that when the evidence of both sides are equally
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor
of the accused.
Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel
a. People vs. Holgado [G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]
Appellant was charged with slight illegal detention for kidnapping and detaining one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty as instructed by Mr. Ocampo, who
had nothing to do with the case.
The court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask
him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court did not inquire whether or not the
accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or
assign an attorney de oficio.
Whether or Not there was denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process
clause
Yes, this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained
in our Constitution. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. Under the rules
of Court, Rule 112, sec. 3: when a defendant appears without attorney, the court
has four important duties to comply with:
1.

It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned;

2.

After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid
of an attorney;

3.

If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign


attorney de oficio to defend him; and

4.

If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied
with by the trial court.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused.
The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was
real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making
of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the
presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the
supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the
confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that
he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with
this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere
statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the
accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be
assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

b.

People vs. Agbayani [G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]


The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty
of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new
counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his
right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day
preparation for trial.
Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the
judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases,
and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or
that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right
to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such
right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty,
the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good
cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be
expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute
reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare
for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the
counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records
showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to
claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed
the decision of the lower court.

Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation


a. Pecho vs. People [G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996]
The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex
crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was
assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted
of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation
of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated
crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the
accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is
necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double
jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for
prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against
him in the filing of the information.
Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to
which he is convicted
No. there is no merit in the petitioners claim that he could not be convicted of the
said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could
be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents.
The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense;

2.

b.

To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further


prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions
of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature
and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in
the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a
crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It
has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two
offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be
convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that
would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime
of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be
based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984]
Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was
assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded
Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI
which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had
supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding
the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan,
hence this instant petition. He contended that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on
the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Whether or Not the petitioner was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
No. The petitioners contention that he cannot be convicted of bribery because to do
so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, is untenable. A reading of the information
which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

c.

Borja vs. Mendoza [G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977]


Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was
not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with
the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by
respondent Judge Mendoza. He alleged that without any notice to petitioner and
without requiring him to submit his memorandum, and the failure to arraign him is
violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, more specifically of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of
his right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.

Yes. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal


prosecution. Procedural due process demands no less. Accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has
to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him It is
required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made
fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of
the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why
the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a
vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With
the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being
thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the
sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an
arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process
to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial


a. People vs. Tee [G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003]
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of
Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at
premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities
of marijuana.

after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the
prosecution went to the extent of praying that the trial court order the arrest of
Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the
NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus custody, but to no avail.
Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present
Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered.
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of
time. Delay of less than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an
unreasonably lengthy period of time.
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the
inability of the prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could
have moved the trial court to require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that
the latter would testify when required. Appellant could have moved to have
Abratique found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit
too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional right to
speedy trial was violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject
to postponements and other causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing that
delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a
reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused.
b.

Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general
and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI operative
who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given
credit at all by Judge Reyes.

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced
to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors,
has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight
different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to
come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from
a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Appellant also insists that the prosecutions unjustified and willful delay in presenting
witness Abratique unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a
total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful
refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the
prosecutions part violated Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98. Appellant now
alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying the case to cause him
untold miseries.

Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia
Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if
innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of
law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of
the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.

For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not
such a great length of time as to amount to a violation of appellants right to a
speedy trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but
absent any showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the State
should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prosecute the criminal action.
Whether or not there is violation of the appellants right to speedy, impartial and
public trial
No. his constitutional right to speedy trial was not violated. In the present case,
although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing
days, there is no showing that prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques
absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. On record,

Conde vs. Rivera [G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924]

c.

In Re: Request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of
the Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph Estrada [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC,
September 13, 2001]
The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the
Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the

Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings
of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar
N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo
Romulo.
Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the
court.
No. petition is denied. Live coverage of the trial is not permitted by the court.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of
publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any
outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the
public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to
suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. The right of the accused must be
preferred to win.

Right of Confrontation
a. United States vs. Javier [G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918]
Doroteo Natividad fastened his carabao in his corral. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that
the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a
patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased.
The Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro
Monterola. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had
been taken from his corral.
The lower court admitted Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the
sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased.
Whether or not Exhibit B is admissible
No. the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, is not admissible for it
violates the opportunity of cross examining the witness. Such right is guaranteed in
the Bill or rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and
to cross-examine the witnesses against him." Confrontation is essential because
cross-examination is essential.
Two fold purpose of right to Confrontation
1. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by
cross-examination
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness
Testimony of witness who was not cross examined is not admissible as evidence for
being hearsay
b. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987]

The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not
needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. The cases were tried jointly for
all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio,
Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused
continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them,
Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his
participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang
Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while
absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now
challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation
as guaranteed by the Constitution.
whether or not such testimony that was considered by the respondent court against
the petitioner, have violated his right of confrontation
Yes. It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants,
his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible
against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat
because, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were
presenting their defenses. The latter's testimonies can not now be considered
against said three accused.

Right Against Self-Incrimination


a. United States vs. Tan Teng [G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912]
The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was
gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that the defendant
followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave
him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the
said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that
position for some little time. Several days later they discovered that the Oliva was
suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister
what happened. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim
identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a
policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman
took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned
it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony
of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not
be given credit. He further contended that the result of the scientific examination
made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about
the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that
he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the
defendant to testify against himself.
Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the
defendants rights against self-incrimination.
The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of
the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any

questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was
examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same
as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be
used as evidence against him.

intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
An order requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated
with the documentary evidence covered by the constitutional proscription against
self incrimination.
d.

b.

Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. An information


was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with
intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took
the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal asked roger
Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia
contends that the accused will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness.
Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the judge ruled
in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted.

Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery.


The court ordered the defendant to submit her body to the examination of one or
two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not.
The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her
person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.

Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been
violated

Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his
right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer
himself as a witness. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his
original claim remains valid.

Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners


constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be
avoided.

c.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968]

Villaflor vs. Summers [G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920]

A woman accused of adultery may be compelled to be tested for pregnancy


Beltran vs. Samson [G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]
The petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before
the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting, for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
He refused to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeking refuge in the
constitutional provision right against self-incrimination because such examination
would give the prosecution evidence against him and that such an act will make him
furnish evidence against himself.
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of

e.

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969]
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of
Medical Examiners, alleging that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that they present the
petitioner as their first witness. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse
of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against selfincrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded
against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by
respondent Board.
Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants
violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to
testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the

revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee


protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain
silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of
a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
Prohibited Punishment
a. People vs. Estoista [G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953]
The defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima a laborer of the
family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not
perceived by the accused. He was prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information. The appellant
was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was
sentenced to one year imprisonment.
whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment
No. The court held that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying
firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which
the law proposes to suppress or curb.
To violate the constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly
oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the senses of
the community.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or
excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to
note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested
neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was raised
for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also
noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction to the duration of the
imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first
expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the
appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.
b. People vs. Esparas [G.R. No. 120034, August 20, 1996]
Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of
"shabu"
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On
March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the
death penalty.

c.

whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence


No. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under
that law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and
legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It
gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for
the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The
supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him.
He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were
denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177,
designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from

carrying out the lethal injection against him contending that it is a cruel, degrading,
or unusual punishment.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty
is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection,
as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier
to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
No. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. The lack in particularity as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection would not render it cruel, degrading or inhuman
Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required
the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to
be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged
and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.
Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to
the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted
with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
punishment. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying
out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment
imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to
go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

Double Jeopardy
a. People vs. Obsania [G.R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968]
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal
of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted.
From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in
P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of
the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense because his action in
having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court
from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him.

b.

c.

d.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the
express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can
be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
Paulin vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993]
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust
when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by
such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an
establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of
the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed
their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police
and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police,
petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No.
5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo
filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for
certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being
a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this
instant petition.
Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by
dismissing CEB-9207.
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or
with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his
protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted
upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always
based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty.
While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding
was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its
error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the
prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on
summary procedure was correctly applied.
People vs. Balisacan [G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966]
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being
arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel.
At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently
testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that
he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the
testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of pleais an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered aplea of guilty but
however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the
effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to
plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for
him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the
judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the
appeal herein.
Esmea vs. Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981]
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of
Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money
worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of
chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after

the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime
later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick.
The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the
case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests
telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another
hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due
to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double
jeopardy
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which
would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to
complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the
witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites
should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second,
that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused
has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at
bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in
a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information.
When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent
constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.
In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy
trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean
that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which
would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent
court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which
will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.
e.

People vs. Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]


private respondent, was separately accused of having committed the crime of
estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and of falsification in Criminal
Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
of the Seventh Judicial District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, she sought the quashal of
the latter charge on the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the
same felony. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled
against her for falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her
motion to quash.
Whether or not there was double jeopardy
No. the mere filing of two information charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of a double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has
not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without
the consent of the accused. Double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary
investigations

f.

People vs. Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977]

g.

Margarito Fama Jr., while armed with a piece of stone, assault, attack and useperso
nal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone,hitting
said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries whichre
reuired medical attendance from 5 to 9 days baring complications. The accused
entered a plea of not guilty for slight physical injuries. When Viajar developed a
permanent scar and deformity on the face, he filed a more serious charge &serious
physical injuries' arising from the same incident.
Whether or not there double jeopardy in this case
No. When the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had
passedsince the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there
were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said
offended party. Evidently, it was only later that the alleged deformity became
apparent. In People v. Yorac, it was held that if after the First prosecution a new fact
supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the
character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to bein second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. In other
words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of
private respondent Fama Jr. cannot hold.
People vs. Relova [G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987]
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set
aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for
theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together
with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the
Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered
electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said
devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery
when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and
prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed
against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a
Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting
damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before
arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense
charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices

without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was
punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the
second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal
Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense
to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on
the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal
Code.
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense
because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give
two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second
sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction
or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it
was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2 nd kind
or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged
are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that
the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making
it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on
the first offense should bar the 2 nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
XIX. CITIZENSHIP
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Co vs. House of Representatives [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]


Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago [G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989]
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]
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Labo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]
Aznar vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990]
Mercado vs. Manzano [G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999]
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