Advanced Placement United States History

Document-Based Question

Mona Matsumoto-Ryan
May 25, 2010
Question: Considering the real and perceived tensions in the United States
before and during the time of the Cold War, was the war inevitable?

Document A
“The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and
Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in
foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia’s conduct as a
member of international society…It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the
aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime; and therefore, to
the interests to the peoples it controls…And from it flow many of the phenomena
which we find disturbing in the Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness,
the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic
unfriendliness of purpose…It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the
foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue
to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.”
George F. Kennan on Soviet Conduct, 1947
 Document B

QuickTimeª and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

“Quantitative Reportage of Rosenberg Trial.” National Archives and Records

Administration. 1951.
 Document C
Question: Mr. President…What are the possibilities for peaceful co-existence
between Soviet Russia and Communist China, on the one hand, and the non-
communist nations on the other?
Eisenhower: For a long, long time, everybody in the United States had urged that
we attempt to reach a proper basis for peaceful co-existence. We had found,
though, and aggressive attitude on the part of the other side that had made such an
accomplishment or consummation not easy to reach. In other words, there had to
be good faith on both sides. Moreover, we had to make certain that peaceful co-
existence did not mean appeasement in the sense that we were willing to see any
nation in the world, against its will, subordinated to an outside nation.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, On Peaceful Co-existence, 1954
 Document D

QuickTimeª and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

“Enlightening Rumors from Yalta.” Chicago Daily Tribune. 1945.

 Document E

“The power of the hydrogen bomb has, it is plain, given pause even to the
leaders of our Government. … Do they suspect that the American people are
still sane enough to halt the blind automatism that continues, in the face of
Soviet Russia’s equal scientific powers, to produce these fatal weapons? …
There are many alternative courses to the policy to which we have committed
ourselves, practically without debate. The worst of all these alternatives, a
policy of working firmly toward justice and cooperation, and free intercourse
with all other peoples, in the fait that love begets love as surely as hatred
begets hatred—would, in all probability, be the one instrument of piercing the
strong political armor of our present enemies.”
Lewis Mumford on Foreign Policy, 1954
 Document F
“On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is
imminent. … I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the
fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we
have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war
and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible
in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to
them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be
relieved by a policy of appeasement. ...From what I have seen of our Russian friends
and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as
strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military
weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound… If the
western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United
Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no
one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty,
and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may
overwhelm us all.”
Winston Churchill, Iron Curtain Address, 1946
 Document G
“I have no objection to saying in open session what I have said before: namely, that we
shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates
one-third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend
its rule to many others…. Therefore, we must always have in mind the liberation of these
captive peoples…. The present tie between China and Moscow is an unholy arrangement
which is contrary to the traditions, the hopes, the aspirations of the Chinese people.
Certainly we cannot tolerate a continuance of that, or a welding of the 450 million people of
China into the servile instrument of Soviet aggression…. It is only by keeping alive the hope
of liberation, by taking advantage of that wherever opportunity arises, that we will end this
terrible peril which dominates the world.”
John F. Dulles on the Policy of Liberation, 1953
 Document H
“I suppose that every realist knows that the democratic way of life is at this moment
being directly assailed in every part of the world…I find it unhappily necessary to
report that the future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are
overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders. …We are committed to
the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will
never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors…We know that
enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other peoples’ freedom. … The
happiness of future generations of Americans may well depend on how effective and
how immediate we can make our aid felt…This nation has placed its destiny in the
hands, heads, and hearts of its millions of free men and women, and its faith in
freedom under the guidance of God…Our support goes to those who struggle to gain
those rights and keep them. Our strength is in our unity of purpose. To that high
concept there can be no end save victory.”
F.D.R, Four Freedoms Speech, 1941
DBQ: Cold War

Background Information:

Legacy of Mistrust
- Delay on opening 2nd front in WW2 (High Russian casualties, felt they were
fighting the brunt of the war, acting as a buffer)
- Territorial debates: Germany split after WW2
-> Berlin Wall
- Anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, no diplomatic relations 1930s
- Red Scare, Senator McCarthy
Two World Views
- Capitalism, free markets (USA) vs. Communism, controlled economy (Russia)
- American morality and dedication to freedom and democracy
Wartime Diplomacy
- Atlantic Charter
- Four Freedoms (FDR)
- Tehran—Big 3: FDR, Churchill, Stalin; Decision on Second Front of WW2
- Yalta: Meeting on how to partition Germany: East vs. West Berlin (esp. access
to Berlin, traveling from one to another)
-> Berlin Blockade, Berlin Airlift
- Russo-Japanese War
- Poland (Soviets march in, question of control—West vs. Soviets)
- Potsdam Conference
- Dropping the Bomb (Truman, controversy)
Post-War Policies
- Greece and Turkey
- Truman Doctrine
- Marshall Plan: Economic support
- Japan as new ally; Emperor
- Chinese “civil war”: Mao v. Nationalist Chaing Kai Shek (support)
Military Response
- CIA, NATO
- NSC-68: Information to President
- Containment Policy
- LBJ continuing Vietnam War after JFK was assassinated
-> Domino Theory
DBQ: Cold War
Analysis of Documents (A-H)

Document A: Kennan’s speech on Soviet Conduct is rich with information that

would support a student’s argument that the Cold War was, in fact, inevitable.
Such a student would consider the two world views that Kennan points out the
“innate antagonism” of, and could write on the differences between the
capitalistic, free-market world view (possessed by the United States) and the
communistic, controlled economy world view of the Soviet Union. She could also
write on the legacy of mistrust surrounding Soviet-US relations, especially in
international situations such as the Yalta Conference and go on to speak about
the “Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy,” including the many times the Soviets
disregarded agreements made, especially those at Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam.
As an example, the student could also write about the Berlin Blockade, and the
Soviets marching into Poland. If the student wanted to, she could also connect
this point to the one made in Document D, “Enlightening Rumors from Yalta.”

Document B: The effect of the Red Scare in the United States in the 1950s is
clearly portrayed in the graph of number of lines of newspaper reports on topics
related to atomic espionage, communists as spies, the atomic bomb, and
Rosenberg-Sobell Case (of citizens acting as spies). A student on the most
basic level could easily refer to many events of the Red Scare, which lasted from
1947-1957, with Joseph McCarthy as the main anti-communist action galvanizer.
With so much reportage on espionage, the Soviet-US legacy of mistrust and
pervasive anti-Bolshevik rhetoric are clearly outlined, so the student should at
least be able to mention something along those lines. The student should also
notice the relation between the amount of information on the atomic bomb and
atomic espionage at the beginning of 1950 and the decision to drop the bomb at
the end of World War II, and could even relate this topic to the later document E,
Mumford on Foreign Policy. The student would use this best as support to the
position that the war was inevitable, and could also relate it to the problems of
the two world views (Communist v. Capitalist) expressed in Document A,
Kennan’s speech.

Document C: The beginning of this document, the question to President

Eisenhower, should be a clear sign to the student of an example of pointing out
the inherent differences of the two world views (that were already discussed in
the two previous documents). The student should also be able to note the
widespread awareness of the differences between communism and capitalism,
which could indicate that pressure from the public was one of the probable
causes of the Cold War. On a rather advanced level, the careful reader should
be able to note Eisenhower using vague language, almost evading the question,
and could go on to explain why he might do so. However, he is quite clear at the
beginning that the US’ foreign policy was not quite adequate, and a student could
discuss whether or not the policy of containment was a failure, or the results of it.
Eisenhower’s last sentence points to the opposing two world views, especially to
American morality and our dedication to democracy and freedom. This topic will
also be discussed in documents G and H (Dulles and FDR). Depending upon
how she interprets it, a student could use this excerpt backing both arguments.

Document D: On a most basic level, the student should be able to recognize

that the artist is using irony to comment on the naïveté of the politicians at the
Yalta Conference who believe that Stalin will hold his word. There are many
examples of him defying his word, that a student should mention, for example,
the Soviets marching into Poland despite objections, prompting a strong and
controversial West vs. Soviet control debate, and Stalin ignoring demands for
holding free elections. The cartoon also portrays Stalin pretending to agree
happily by bowing deeply and fashioning almost obscene angel wings that look
derived from a dead bird, and a crude halo, displaying the over-the-top ridiculous
airs that Stalin puts on to deceive the ignorant politicians. This cartoon is a
fantastic example of the media trying to gain the American peoples’ support
against the Stalin and the Soviets. A student might also want to mention that
discussions over how to partition Germany, and might go on to discuss the Berlin
blockade and subsequent airlift. This document could be used as support for
both views— for example, to argue that it was not inevitable, the student could
say that the American government could have been more aware or careful with
agreements involving Stalin.

Document E: Seeing as the author himself, Lewis Mumford, believed that there
could be a better way of dealing with the Soviets than launching into war,
students could use this document well as support for the position that the war
was not inevitable, but the issues between the United States and Russia instead
dealt with in a “policy of working firmly toward justice and cooperation.” A student
who wishes to use this document as evidence that the war was inevitable also
can find some information to speak about. For example, a student could mention
the controversial decision to drop the bomb at the end of World War II and
discuss the possible reason that it was dropped as a form of deterrence and
competition against the Soviets (and therefore between the two world views).
Mumford also speaks for the people, somewhat similar to the artist of Document
D, “Enlightening Rumors from Yalta,” foreshadowing later anti-war sentiment and
power of the people in decisions regarding war.

Document F: Churchill’s Iron Curtain Address is often noted to be one of the

catalysts of the Cold War, as it almost calls for action and emphasizes the
differences in the two world views (of Britain and the United States versus the
Soviet Union). A student should also mention the Atlantic Charter, another
example of Britain and the United States joining forces. On a more advanced
level, a student could mention the post-war policy of making Japan into a new
ally—letting them keep their emperor, for example. In his last two sentences,
beginning: “If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the
principles of the United Nations Charter…,” Churchill almost “rubs in” the fact that
a majority of the world is allied with Britain and the United States against the
Soviet and Communistic world view. A student could also mention Churchill’s
tone of disapproval of the Soviet actions and use of phrases that are obviously
reminiscent of the views of American morality and dedication to freedom—“But
what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent
prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy
as rapidly as possible in all countries.” Churchill’s rallying cry for unification
against a common evil, or the Soviet Union, could also be mentioned as one of
the catalysts for the creation of NATO.

Document G: Students should really enjoy this document should they be arguing
that the Cold War was inevitable, for Dulles’ words in a sense foreshadow the
reasons LBJ had to continue the Vietnam War, namely the domino theory.
Students could also mention the Chinese civil war of Mao vs. the Nationalist
Chiang Kai Shek, as Dulles speaks about the “unholy arrangement” between
China and the Soviet Union, showing his disapproval of the pair (for obvious
reasons). Interestingly, he speaks about the Chinese with a tone that suggests
that he knows best, a tone often held by Wilson, especially in his Fourteen
Points, demonstrating the strong effect of American morality and belief about
fighting for freedom and democracy. Students could also mention the Truman
Doctrine.

Document H: Much like the previous document, Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms

Speech galvanizes public support for the United States war effort (at the moment
of its being given, for the World War as opposed to the Cold War) by appealing to
America’s famous dedication to freedom and democracy, and the student could
relate almost every single one of Roosevelt’s points in this excerpt to the domino
theory, LBJ, and every subsequent President’s hesitation against evacuating
Vietnam for fear of the spread of communism. This could also do with the
opposing two world views of communism and capitalism and how their inherent
differences may not allow them to coexist peacefully, as mentioned in Document
C with President Eisenhower. Several reasons outlined in the Four Freedoms
also provide reasons for the creation of NATO (along with Churchill’s Iron Curtain
Address) and possibly even NSC-68. A student arguing that the war was
inevitable would likely say that this display of such dedication to high concepts
such as freedom and democracy even from the time of FDR could only mean
that the United States feels so strongly that it could never sit back without trying
to assert itself for the good of the world, leading to a war between the two great
world views—capitalism in the United States and communism in the Soviet
Union.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Churchill, Winston. “Churchill's Iron Curtain Address.” 1946. Reproduced in

History Resource Center. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/History/> Document Number:
BT2701450001

Dulles, John Foster. “Testimony on the Policy of Liberation.” 1953. Great Issues
in American History: From Reconstruction to the Present Day, 1864-1981
(Vol III); Hofstadter. 1969.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Remarks on Peaceful Co-Existence.” 1954. Great Issues

in American History: From Reconstruction to the Present Day, 1864-1981
(Vol III); Hofstadter. 1969.

“Enlightening Rumors from Yalta.” 1945. Chicago Daily Tribune. SIRS Decades;
SIRS Knowledge Source. <http://www.sirs.com> 13 May 2010.

Kennan, George F. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” 1947. Great Issues in

American History: From Reconstruction to the Present Day, 1864-1981
(Vol III); Hofstadter. 1969.

Mumford, Lewis. “Letter on American Foreign Policy.” 1954. Great Issues in

American History: From Reconstruction to the Present Day, 1864-1981
(Vol III); Hofstadter. 1969.

“Quantitative Reportage of Rosenberg Trial.” 1951. National Archives and

Records Administration. SIRS Decades; SIRS Knowledge Source.
<http://www.sirs.com> 19 May 2010.