Jesus Dela Rosa & Lucila Dela Rosa v.

Santiago Carlos & Teofila

Pacheco

Ruling:

Facts:

This case stemmed from a complaint for forcible entry, filed

by Spouses Dela Rosa against Santiago Carlos and Teofila
Pacheco with the MTC of Paombong, Bulacan.
Sps. Dela Rosa alleged that they are the owners of the house
and lot, purchased from Leonardo Carlos, and that they have
been exercising various acts of ownership upon the property
(renovated, furnished, occupied, paid taxes, built a perimeter
fence). They also claim that through stealth and without their
knowledge and consent, Santiago built a house of strong
materials on a vacant lot on the property.
Santiago and Teofila claim that they are the surviving heirs
of Spouses Leonardo and Benita Carlos; and that along
Lucila Dela Rosa, are co-owners of the property. They
contended that the Spouses Dela Rosa obtained the Deed of
Sale through fraud and undue influence; that the Spouses
Dela Rosa were never in possession of the property since
they only went there to visit their parents.
MTC ruled in favor of Sps. Dela Rosa; RTC affirmed in toto;
CA held that the execution of the deed of sale did not
transfer physical possession of the property.

Issue:

Did the Spouses Dela Rosa acquire possession of the

property?

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession.
Article 531 of the Civil Code: Possession is acquired by the
material possession of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that iti is subject to the action of our will or by
proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such
right
The acts of dominion by Sps. Dela Rosa are clear indications
that they were indeed in possession of the property. Santiago
and Teofila could not cogently explain how the Sps. Dela
Rosa were able to renovate, furnish the house and construct a
perimeter fence around the property without physically
possessing the same.
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is
mere physical or material possession, and not juridical
possession nor ownership of the property involved. Being a
case of forcible entry, the issues of validity of the deed of
sale and the alleged fraud and undue influence attending the
same cannot be addressed in the present action. Ejectment
cases proceed independently of the claim of ownership.
The MTC ruling was reinstated.

Cornelio Ramos v. Director of Lands

Facts:

Restituto Ramos y Ponce apparently gained possession of a

considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija by taking advantage of the Royal Decree
in 1894. This land was later sold to Cornelio Ramos
(petitioner) and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca in 1907.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands
on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from
the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on
the ground that the first parcel was forest land.
It is admitted that Ramos only cultivated about one-fourth of
the entire tract.
The trial court ruled in favor of the objectors, and excluded
parcel no. 1 from registration.

(as regards the additional issue)

Issue:

Is Ramos actual occupancy of the land sufficient to give

title to the entire tract of the land?
(additional issue) Is the subject property indeed forest land?

Ruling:

YES. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation

of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.
The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the

adverse possession of another. (DOCTRINE OF

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION)
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is possession. Ramos and his
predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law
on the supposition that the premises consisted of public
agricultural land.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he
has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a
portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community
and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.

When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the

Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality
a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
The Court found that Ramos has proved a title to the entire
tract of land for which he asked registration.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

Peterson, et al., defendant-appellees. (February 6, 1907)

James

Facts: Under a contract entered into on March 4, 1905, Francisco

Reyes acquired a loan from the Spanish-Filipino Bank in the amount
of P141,702. Having already been indebted to the latter for
P84,415.38, the amount of his loan totaled P226,117.38. To secure
payment of these sums, Reyes, executed a mortgage in favor of the
bank several pieces of property belonging to him, as well as pledged
to the said bank part of his personal properties which included: a
stock or merchandise, consisting of wines, liquors, canned goods,
and other similar articles valued at P90,591.75, then stored in the
warehouses of Reyes, in the city of Manila, which said goods and
merchandise were liable for the payment of the said sum of
P90,591.75. It was agreed that the goods should be delivered to
Ramon Garcia for safe-keeping, the debtor having actually turned
over to the said Garcia the goods in question by delivering to him the
keys of the warehouse in which they were kept. In a subsequent
contract which modified the earlier one made by Reyes and the
Bank, the depositary was made liable only for the amount of P40,000
instead of the P90,000, and Luis M. Sierra substituted Garcia as the
depositary of the goods pledged.
In an action brought by Garcia against Reyes and Ramon Agtarat, the
CFI of Manila rendered a decision against the two for the sum of
P15,000, to be paid by them severally or jointly, upon which
judgment execution was issued against their property. For the
purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants in that case,
the sheriff at the request of Garcia, entered the warehouse where the
goods pledged to the plaintiff bank were stored under the custody of
the depositary, Sierra, and levied upon them. The sheriff seized the
goods which had been pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of the
possession of the same. The Bank filed a complaint against the

sheriff and Garcia praying that judgment be rendered declaring that

the execution levied upon the property was illegal, and directing the
defendants to return the said goods to the plaintiff corporation.
Issue: WoN the Contract of Pledge entered into between Reyes and
the Bank was invalid on the ground that the property was never
placed under the possession of the depositary If valid, WoN the
bank's claim had preference over the claim of a third person not
secured, in this case, the claim of Garcia
Ruling: Yes. The contract in question complies with all the requisites
provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code, such as that the property
was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms of
the pledge, and the property pledged, all of which appears in a public
document, and the property pledged was placed in the hands of a
third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the
supervision of an agent of the bank.
From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary,
it appears that a third person, appointed by the common consent of
the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in
favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank
expressly appointed for this purpose, and it has not been shown that
the said Reyes continued in the possession of the goods after they
had been pledged to the plaintiff bank. The contract in question was,
therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863
of the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the
pledgee took charge and possession of the goods pledged through a
depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a
duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored,
and that the pledgee, itself, received and collected the proceeds of the
goods as they were sold.

The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which was
formerly rented by the pledgor, Reyes, does not affect the validity
and legality of the pledge, it having been demonstrated that after the
pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed
with the common consent of the parties had taken possession of the
said property, the owner, Reyes, could no longer dispose of the same,
the pledgee being the only one authorized to do so through the
depositary and special agent who represented it, the symbolical
transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the
warehouse where the goods were stored being sufficient to show that
the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties was
legally placed in possession of the goods.
Yes. The plaintiff corporation, under and by virtue of the contract of
pledge in question, had a preferential right over that of the defendant,
Juan Garcia, to the goods pledged or the value thereof, the value to
be applied to the payment of the debt of P40,000, Philippine
currency, for the security of which said property was pledged, and
the defendants were accordingly ordered to return to the plaintiff
Bank the property improperly levied upon, or to pay its value,
amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, without special provision
as to costs.

Miguel Escritor, et al., petitioner, vs. IAC and Simeon Acuna,

respondents. (November 12, 1987)
Facts: Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject
of cadastral proceedings. Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed an
answer thereto declaring his ownership over the lot alleging that he
acquired it by inheritance from his deceased father. As required, a
notice of hearing was duly published, after which an order of general
default was entered. The lot having become uncontested, only
Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his evidence of
ownership. The Court rendered a decision adjudicating the lot with
its improvements in favor of claimant Escritor and confirming his
title thereto. Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession of the
property.
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a
petition for review of the above-mentioned decision contending that
it was obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and
misrepresentation. The petition was granted and a new hearing was
set. While the proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died,
and his heirs, the petitioners in this case, took possession of the
property.
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision
was rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of
respondent Acuna, ordering petitioners to vacate the land. A writ of
possession was later issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up their
possession.
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975 respondent Acuna
filed with the same Court a complaint for recovery of damages
against petitioners for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly
possessed by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According to

respondent Acua, the registration of the said lot was effectuated by

the deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice, and
misrepresentation. The lower court, however, rendered a decision
dismissing Acua's complaint for damages, finding that though
petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property, they were in good faith
possessing under a just title, and the cause of action, if there was any,
has already prescribed. On appeal, the CA reversed.
Issue: WoN petitioners are liable for damages on the ground that they
were possessors in bad faith
Ruling: No. As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in
possession of property knowing that his title thereto is defective.
Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title.
Nor was it proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their
predecessor had any defect.
It should be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral
court, Lot No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In this decision, the said court
found to its satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the land by
inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and
that his open, public, continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious
possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish Revolution. On the
basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that
he is the legal owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief of
ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This
cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad
faith, this should not prejudice his successors-in-interest, petitioners
herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw in

one's title or mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad

faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person to another,
not even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides, "one who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not
shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..." The reason for
this article is that bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects
must, therefore, be suffered only by the person who acted in bad
faith; his heir should not be saddled with such consequences. 16
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith,
like in this case, the presumption of good faith remains.

which could not be the source of any right to occupy and that they
are planters in bad faith who had no right to reimbursement.
Issue:
Heirs of Pedro Laurora vs Sterling Technopark

Whether or not respondents have the right to eject petitioners despite

their resistance and objection without court order?

Facts:

Ruling:

Petitioners filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with

Damages against the respondents alleging that they were the owners
of Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the Yaptinchay Estate with an area of
39,771 sqm located in Carmona, Cavite. They planted trees and has
possessed the land up to the present. That respondents, through their
engineer bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants and with the aid
of armed men succeeded in forcibly ejecting the petitioners.

Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property,

a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror
-- not even by the owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is
employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves prior
possession -- in this case, petitioners -- can recover possession even
from the owners themselves.

In their answer to the complaint, the respondents averred that

the said land was disposed of by the owners in 1976. In 1969, an
order of award was issued in favor of petitioners, to purchase the lot
from the government. In 1974, their request to transfer the lot to Juan
Mananig was granted by the government who paid the required
amount of P10,643.35. The deed of sale was subsequently executed
in favor of Juan Mananig which was approved by the DAR. The tax
declarations of the said land were cancelled and transferred in the
name of Juan Mananig. The heirs of Juan Mananig sold the said land
until it was purchased by respondent SP Properties.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint while the RTC reversed.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling that there was no evidence to
support the claim of petitioners. That they already sold the land and
their subsequent entry and possession constituted plain usurpation

Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and

occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take
the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the
occupants therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned
by respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it until they
are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances,
respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit, an accion
publiciana -- a plenary action intended to recover the better right to
possess, or an accion reivindicatoria -- an action to recover
ownership of real property.
The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal
alternative to prevent breaches of peace and criminal disorder
resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain

possession.The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the
privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their
alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.

present site after plaintiffs sold to defendants a portion of their land

which includes the site of the present house and after the sale,
defendants have occupied the said portion legally and with
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs.
The municipal court decided in favor of the plaintiffs and
ordered the defendants to vacate the said premises. On appeal, the
CFI dismissed the case, ruling that it is of forcible entry and was
started beyond the reglementary one-year period.
Issue:

Sarona et.al vs Villegas

Whether or not the present case is one of forcible entry or unlawful

detainer?

Facts:

Ruling:

Plaintiffs lodged a complaint in the Municipal Court of

Padada, Davao a complaint entitled Unlawful Detainer. It stated that
on April 1, 1958 defendants enter Lot F and constructed residential
house thereon and up to date remains in possession unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiffs. That on December 28,
1962 plaintiffs demanded defendants to vacate the premises and thus
became unlawful after such demand. They asked that they be
restored onto possession and asked defendants to pay rental and
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and cost.

Section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Section 10, Rule 72) of the

Revised Rules of Court, states that a person deprived of possession
of land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," or a
person against whom the possession of any land "is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied," may at any
time "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession.

Defendant met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the

sole ground of lack of jurisdiction. They say that the case is one of
forcible entry and the one-year period had lapsed before the suit was
started. The municipal court overturned the motion.
In their answer the defendants stated that plaintiffs have no
cause of action and that the residential house was transferred to the

It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely

distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession
founded on illegal occupation from the beginning forcible entry;
and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who
originally acquired possession lawfully unlawful detainer. 3

The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that

what determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry
into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may
be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession
became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand.
In the course of the hearing of this case it is clear that,
according to the plaintiff, Margarito Sarona, the defendants
transferred their house on April 1, 1958 to the litigated area
which is designated as Lot F, (Exhibit "C-1") without their
consent and permission. At that time he was just living 200
meters away from the lot. He requested the defendants not to
place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants
refused. He did nothing and only on December 28, 1962,
when the formal letter of demand to vacate and to pay rental
was made by the plaintiff through their lawyer, Atty.
Palabrica, and addressed the said letter to the defendants but
the defendants refused to vacate the area and to pay a rental
of P20.00. . . .
It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the
land on April 1, 1958 without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that
plaintiff Margarito Sarona "requested the defendants not to place the
said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused.
The findings of the municipal court itself may not be
downgraded in the present case. Since the parties went to trial on the
merits, and it came to light that defendants' entry was illegal at the
inception, the municipal court should have dismissed the case.

Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of

forcible entry.

title than the tax receipts and declarations presented by

petitioners.
Issue: WON petitioners have a preference of possession over
Honorata. WON petitioners have a better title.
Held: 1st issue - No

Fernanda Cequena and Ruperta Lirio vs Honorata Mendoza

Bolante
Facts:

Sinforo Mendoza owns a land situated in Brgy. Bangad,

Rizal with an area of 1728 sq. m. and originally declared in
his name for taxation purposes. After his death, the tax
declaration of the land in the name of Sinforo was cancelled
and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza, his brother.
Petitioners were daughters of Margarito while Honorata of
Sinforo and currently occupying the land.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the
decision because Honoratas proof of ownership which is her
actual, physical and continuous possession gave her a better

Possession by petitioners does not prevail over that of

Honorata. Petitioners did not lose possession because
possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.
Indeed, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed
the legal possessor and any person who can prove prior
possession may recover such possession.
o Honorata is the preferred possessor because based
on Art. 538, she has been in possession of the land
for a longer period of time. Honorata was benefiting
from her fathers tax declaration of the land since
1926 while Margarito Mendoza acquired possession
only in 1952.

2nd issue - No

Art. 541 is merely disputable, it prevails until the contrary is

proven. Art. 538 settles only the question of possession and
not of ownership.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession for 10 years.
o Honorata showed through her fathers tax receipts
that she had been in possession of the land for more
than 10 years since 1932. When Sinforo, her father,
died she continued to reside there with her mother.
Her possession was not disturbed until 1953 when

Margarito Mendoza claimed the land. But by then,

her possession, which was in the concept of an
owner - public, peaceful and uninterrupted -, had
already ripened into ownership. Further she herself
declared and paid realty taxes for the land.
Tax receipts and declarations, when coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners did not acquire
ownership. Ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation. Unless coupled with hostility toward the
true owner, occupation and use however how long
will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession.

Phil. Trust Co. vs CA and Simeon Policarpio shipyard and

shipbuilding co.

Facts:

Lumen Policarpio obtained a loan from Philtrust in the sum

of P300k. As security, her parents mortgaged some of their
lands to Philtrust situated in Manila and Rizal.
When Lumen failed to pay the loan, Philtrust foreclosed the
properties and purchased them at auction sale and a title was
issued in the name of Philtrust.
Then a typhoon destroyed the ancestral house of the
Policarpios so Lumen sent a letter to Philtrust informing it of
her plan to rebuild the house but Philtrust did not respond.
Lumen proceeded to construct the house but then Philtrust
filed a motion for a writ of possession of the properties. The

trial court issued the writ for failure of Lumen to show cause
that she is a builder in good faith despite the opportunity
given to her to prove the same. CA affirmed the issuance of
the writ.
After 11 years and 6 months, Philtrust was finally placed in
possession of the properties. Thereafter, Simeon Shipyard
filed a motion for intervention as successor-in-interest of the
Policarpios. It appears that the land sold to the Simeon
Shipyard was the same land that was foreclosed by Philtrust.
Hence, the writ of possession is likewise enforceable against
it.
Simeon Shipyard filed a case for injunction and mandamus
against Philtrust alleging that by virtue of a writ of
possession, the sheriff together with counsel of Philtrust
opened the gates of the shipyard without notice to the
owners and with the use trickery and took possession of it.
Simeon shipyard likewise alleges that the land on which the
shipyard was built was not the same land which was
mortgaged to Philtrust.
Philtrust claims that Simeon Shipyard has no cause of action
for the land was no longer owned by Simeon Shipyard but
by Landbank as the property was mortgaged to the bank by
Simeon Shipyard to secure a loan. It claims that Landbank
foreclosed the property and Simeon Shipyard failed to
redeem the same.

Issue: WON Simeon Shipyard has a cause of action against Philtrust.

Held: Yes

Art. 539 - Every possessor has a right to be respected in his

possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be

restored to said possession by the means established by the

laws and rules of court.
The phrase every possessor in the article indicates that all
kinds of possession, from that of the owner to that of a mere
holder except that which constitutes a crime, should be
respected and protected by the means established and the
laws of procedure.
o In this case, despite failure of Simeon Shipyard to
redeem the land after foreclosure, Landbank
deferred consolidation of title and has given Simeon
Shipyard the option to re-acquire the land under
certain terms and conditions.
o Simeon Shipyard was in possession of the land when
the writ of possession was implemented. Thus,
having been in lawful possession of the land, even if
Simeon Shipyard is not the owner thereof, it may
institute an action for having been disturbed in its
enjoyment.
o It is elementary that a lawful possessor of a thing has
the right to institute an action should he be disturbed
in its enjoyment.

Respondent Judge Querubin granted the petition, ordering that a writ

of preliminary injunction be issued "restraining the defendants and
their agents from the possession of the land in question, upon filing a
bond in the sum of P1,000". Respondent Judge found that Saturnina
had really been placed in possession by the sheriff (evidence:
Sheriff's Return of Service and Minutes of the Delivery of
Possession, the declaration of the sheriff himself to the effect that he
delivered possession of the land to Saturnina); that on the occasion of
the delivery of possession to her, the petitioners herein were not
present; that when the sheriff returned to the land to execute the
order for the demolition of the house on it, the petitioners opposed
the demolition, claiming that the house belonged to them and that
they were the exclusive owners of the land. The respondent Judge
found that the occupation of the land by the defendants began only
after Saturnina had been placed in possession.
EUTIQUIO TORRE, TRANQUILINO TORRE and BENITO
TORRE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. QUERUBIN, Judge of the Court of First
Instance, Branch II, of Capiz, and SATURNINA UY BIEN
PIAO, respondents. April 15, 1957
Facts: Saturnina alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in
Capiz(2.5 Hectares); that the lot was adjudicated to her in a civil
case; that after the decision in said case had become final and
executory by virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff
placed her in actual and material possession of the land; that after she
had been placed in possession, the petitioners herein, without any
legal right of title and by means of force and intimidation, entered
the land deprived her of the possession thereof and enjoyment of the
products, and had been continuously interfering with her possession
and usufruct; and that the petitioners refused to vacate the property.

Issue: WON respondent Judge Querubin was authorized to issue the

writ of preliminary mandatory injunction during the pendency of
Civil Case.
Ruling: Yes. Prior to the promulgation of the New Civil Code of
1950, during the pendency of an action for the recovery of
possession of real property, it was improper to issue a preliminary
writ of injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken
complete material possession of the property involved (reason: the
effect of the writ would be to deprive the actual possessor of his
material and actual possession and place the plaintiff in possession,
all without due process of law).
However, under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is now available to the plaintiff
during the pendency of his action to recover possession. Reason for
the change in the law: there are at present prolonged litigations

between the owner and usurper, and the former is frequently

deprived of his possession even when he has an immediate right
thereto. (Report of the Code Commission)
According to the findings of the trial court, plaintiff Saturnina was
actually placed in possession on the land in question by the sheriff, in
execution of a final judgement in her favor. The petitioners herein
were appraised of said action of the sheriff, knew that Saturnina was
placed in material possession of the property, yet they apparently
entered the land and deprived Saturnina of the possession given to
her by the sheriff. It will also be remembered that Saturnina, in her
complaint against the petitioners herein, asked for the issuance of the
writ of injunction, at the same time offering to file a bond. It is
therefore clear that the case comes under the provisions of Article.
539 of the New Civil Code, authorizing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as was done by respondent Judge
Querubin.

SPS. RONALD HUTCHISON and VALENTINE NAVALLEHUTCHISON, petitioners,

vs.
ENRIQUE
M.
BUSCAS, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner spouses purchased from V.A. Development
Enterprises, Inc. a 76,207-sq. m. land in Pampanga. They occupied
the land after a title was issued in their names. One Juanita Arrastia,
the owner of a lot adjacent to that of petitioner spouses, sold a
portion of her land (7,581 SQ.M) to respondent. The transaction was
evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of respondent. Respondent
occupied 1,100 sq. m. of his land. However, he failed to register the
portion of the lot in his name and title to the property remained in
Arrastias name.
Respondent commissioned geodetic engineer to survey his
property. The survey revealed that 6,471 sq. m. thereof was occupied
by petitioner spouses. Petitioner spouses refused to vacate the area
and insisted that it was part of their land. Respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner spouses before the
MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the RTC
dismissed the case. It ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter as it is a boundary dispute and the proper action
should have been an accion reinvindicatoria before the RTC.

Respondent filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria against petitioner

spouses with the RTC. The RTC dismiss the complaint for lack of
merit. It ruled that respondents Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient
proof of ownership; that respondent failed to clearly identify the
property claimed as it was only marked with an X sign, and; that
petitioner spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of
the disputed lot. CA: reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled
that respondent is entitled to possession of the disputed area as he
was able to prove his claim of ownership and the identity of the
subject land.
Issue: WON the respondent was able to identify the portion of the
land he was claiming and prove his ownership thereof.
No. Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to successfully
maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the
person who claims a better right to it must prove two things: first,
the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.
In this case, the Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area
sold of Arrastias land. Annex A of the Deed, where the entire lot
of Arrastia was particularly described and where the specific portion
of the property sold to respondent was marked, was not presented by
respondent at the trial. The presentation of the Annex A is essential
as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the
instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and
indicate its exact limits
The records show that when geodetic engineers surveyed the lands,
they merely relied on the self-serving statement of respondent that he
owns the portion of the lot adjacent to petitioner spouses. They were
not shown the Deed of Quitclaim and its Annex A or any other

document of title which described the specific portion of the land

allegedly conveyed to respondent.
The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the
document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument
itself. In the case at bar, the identity of the land claimed and
respondents ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best
evidence to prove these facts is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex
A where respondent derives his title and where the land from
which he purchased a part was described with particularity,
indicating the metes and bounds thereof.

SOTERA PAULINO MARCELO, GABRIELA M. ANGELES,

SIMEONA CUENCO, EMILIA MARCELO and
RUBEN MARCELO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, FERNANDO CRUZ and SERVANDO
FLORES, respondents.
In 1982, Petitioners, heirs of the deceased Jose Marcelo, filed an
action for the recovery of a portion of unregistered land in Sta.
Lucia, Angat, Bulacan. The complaint averred that two parcels of
land owned by their parents, Jose Marcelo and Sotera PaulinoMarcelo, had been encroached, to the extent of 7,540 sqm thereof, by
Fernando Cruz and Servando Flores.
The spouses Marcelo had been in continuous possession of said
property since 1939. After the death of Jose Marcelo, the petitioners
discovered the encroachment by Cruz in 1967.

On the part of Cruz, he purchased his 13,856 sqm property from the
family of Sarmientos but only for the 6,000 sqm portion. The
adjoining disputed property classified as Parang (pasture land)
with an area of 7,856 sqm was thereafter declared by Cruz in his
name which increased his landholding to 13,856 sqm. And then in
1968, Cruz sold the same to Flores.
When the petitioners attempted to cultivate the disputed property,
they were barred by Flores.
Respondent Cruz and Flores denied the allegations and assailed at
the same time the jurisdiction of the trial court to act on the
complaint which, it was claimed, had effectively asserted a cause of
action for ejectment (unlawful detainer).
The RTC decided for the petitioners on the ground that the sale by
the Sarmientos to Cruz did not include the Parang as indicated by
the fact that the same was only declared in the tax declaration by
Cruz in 1961 after the sale. The said land had been in the possession
of plaintiff prior to WW2 and evidenced by their tax declarations.
However, the CA reversed on the ground that it found the
extrajudicial partition with sale between the Sarmientos and Cruz to
include the Parang. Moreover, the same property was later sold to
Flores who had been in possession for 14 years in the concept of
owner.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a

possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public
peaceful and uninterrupted.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law;[15] without good faith and just title, acquisitive
prescription can only be extraordinary in character.
The records of the case amply supports the holding of the appellate
court that the requirements for ordinary prescription hereinabove
described have indeed been duly met. Flores took possession of the
controverted portion in good faith and with just title. This is so
because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral part
of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Cruz.
Parenthetically, at the time of the sale, the whole area consisting of
the riceland and pasture land was already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Cruz. Hence, appellant Flores possession
of the entire parcel was not only in the concept of an owner but also
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it is true that the
possession Cruz may not have been peaceful as it was indeed
characterized with violence which resulted in the death of Jose
Marcelo, this cannot be said of appellant Flores possession of the
property, in respect of which no evidence to the contrary appears on
record.

Who has the better right?

SC sustained the CAs ruling.

ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator

of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos vs.
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants.
CITY OF DAGUPAN,

Gist: The Core issue of this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel
of land by the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a
petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed
and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the
decedents.
Facts:
Margarita died intestate, leaving her husband Severo Maneclang and
nine children. The eldest of her children at 21, Hector Maneclang,
petitioned for the settlement of the estate. No guardian ad litem was
appointed for any of the minor heirs.
In September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs but to
only to their father Severo, the intestate court issued an Order
"authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the
properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the
obligations" referred to in the petition. Pursuant to this, Oscar
Maneclang (the 3rd eldest) sold some properties; the City of Dagupan
bought a parcel of land and built a market on it known as Perez
Boulevard Public Market at a cost of P100,000. It has been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession.
Come 1965, the newly appointed administratrix, Adelaida
Maneclang (5th child) contested said sale, saying that no sale can be
valid with the absence of notice to the heirs who were minors and did
not even have a guardian ad litem to begin with. She prayed for the
cancellation of titles and recovery of possession and damages against
several vendees including the respondents.
The RTC ruled for the annulment of the sale and demanded that the
City of Dagupan return the properties it bought. Aggrieved, the City
appealed the RTC decision.

Issue: whether or not the sale was valid, considering no notice of

assailed sale was ever made to the heirs.
Held:
1. Without notice and hearing, the sale, mortgage or encumbrance is
void. Notice is mandatory. Noncompliance therewith under the sale
is null and void.
The contention of the City of Dagupan that notice to the father was
sufficient since he is the designated legal representative of the minor
children as provided under the Civil Code is without merit. Nor the
argument that Oscar, as the administrator, signed the deed of sale and
sent copies thereof to the other heirs who are of legal age and to
through the lawyers of those who are minors be given credence.
Under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is NOT
a notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state
explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing, must be given
to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time
and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to
the interested parties.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children the sale are all
void ab initio as against said children. Severo Maneclang, however,
stands on different ground altogether. Having been duly notified of
the application, he was bound by the said order, sale and approval of
the latter.
Reason: The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs are the
presumptive owners. Since they succeed to all the rights and
obligation of the deceased from the moment of the latters death,
they are the person directly affected by the sale or mortgage and
therefore cannot be deprived of the property, except in the manner
provided by law.

2. Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix

of the estate and against the children.
As to the former, this Court, in Boaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the
rule "that a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the
validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land; 22 and if this
be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his
successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor
are not conformable to law."
24
In estoppel by conduct, on the other hand, (a) there must have been
a representation or concealment of material facts; (c) the party to
whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the
matter; and (d) it must have been made with the intention that the
other party would act upon it. 25

As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who

executed the deed of sale in his capacity as judicial administrator, the
rest of the heirs did not participate in such sale, and considering
further that the action was filed solely by the administratrix without
the children being impleaded as parties plaintiffs or intervenors, there
is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these heirs in estoppel. For
having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to
have assented to both the motion for and the actual order granting the
authority to sell. Estoppel operates solely against him.