Infante, Janileah Judette B.

Case Digest (Set 10 a)

LLB-1

Title: ENDENCIA vs. DAVID

Reference: G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
Facts:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino
David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum
of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19,
1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to
December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
Discussion:
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office,
provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on
public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is
relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one
generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the
aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that
he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive
the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the
exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the
meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its
diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and
onerous.
Ruling:
In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably
by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying
taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher
considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt
judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra,
to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation
and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Title: NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Reference: G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and
53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with
stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating
that (d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as
it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not there is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries
of Judges/Justices?
Discussion:
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates
that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and
Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision
in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they
are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those
appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision
an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.

Ruling:
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so
violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should
bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the
burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED.

The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution
thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David must be deemed discarded.

Title: DE LA LLANA vs. MANUEL ALBA

Reference: G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Facts:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be
one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security
of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional in violation of the
security of tenure expressed in Sec. 11 and Sec. 2 , Art. VIII of the Constitution
Discussion:
The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform
his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that
the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an
added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which
they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus
subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national
consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and
action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench.
The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they
are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or
to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will
be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of
the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress we do not say
unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall
one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he
would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge."
Ruling:
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It
does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one
recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith
will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be
denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any
administration.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.

Title: SANTIAGO vs. BAUTISTA

Reference: G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
Facts:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation,
Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They
filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on
rating honors. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even
assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (the graduation already
proceeded. They also argue that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not
a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy
against judicial function.

Issue: Whether or not judicial power can be exercised in this case.

Discussion:
The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be
applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine
the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific
controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department
of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its
construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in
the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine
when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the
power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion
in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons
or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and
determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have
jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which
adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that
end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and
the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not
everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power"
does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the
nature of a suit or action between the parties.'
Ruling:
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of
students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor
quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted
portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may
exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to
some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal,
board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

Title: DAZA vs. SINGSON

Reference: G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Issue:
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Ruling:

Title: GARCIA vs. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

Reference: G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
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Title: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES vs.

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Reference: G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
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Title: TAN vs. MACAPAGAL

Reference: G.R. Nos. L-34161 February 29, 1972
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Title: DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

Reference: 95 SCRA 392, January 22, 1980
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Title: OPLE vs. TORRES

Reference: G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
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Title: THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP)
Reference: G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
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Title: KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

Reference: G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
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Title: Kilosbayan vs. Morato

Reference: G.R. NO.118910 July 17, 1995
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Title: Joya vs PCGG

Reference: G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993
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Title: Demetria vs. Alba

Reference: G.R. NO. 71977 Feb. 27, 1987
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Title: Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Reference: G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
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Title: Umali vs. Guingona

Reference: G.R. NO. 131124 March 21, 1999
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Title: Laurel vs. Garcia

Reference: 187 SCRA 797
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Title: Liban vs Gordon

Reference: G.R No. 175352 January 18, 2011
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Title: Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB

Reference: 38 SCRA 42
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Title: Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,

Reference: G.R. No. 171101 November 2, 2011
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Title: IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

Reference: G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
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Title: People vs. Ramos

Reference: 88 SCRA 486
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Title: People vs. Mateo

Reference: G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7, 2004
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This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation
to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the annulment of
the Memorandum of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17 July 1997, in Adm. Case
No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by the Ombudsman, which recommended the
dismissal of petitioner from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu, as
well as the Order dated 30 January 1998 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch
responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn by him,
which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected to sell all withdrawn
tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets to ticket outlets and/or to
engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers and hawkers.
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