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Appellant
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
2
Miller, however, testified that on two occasions, she saw Arrington deliver drugs
to Davenport. On one occasion, Miller stated that she was sitting in the living room
when Arrington arrived and that she saw Davenport give Arrington a bag containing
cash. (App. 186.) Miller testified that on another occasion, she saw Arrington deliver a
package containing a block of heroin to Davenport. (App. 188.)
Arrington argues that the Government committed misconduct by vouching for the
contradictory testimony of Davenport and Miller and for failing to correct Millers
alleged perjury at trial. 2 In order to assert a due process violation premised on perjury by
a government witness, the defendant must show that (a) the witness committed perjury;
(b) the Government knew or should have known of the perjury; (c) the testimony went
uncorrected; and (d) there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have
affected the verdict. See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008).
As a threshold matter, we cannot conclude that Miller committed perjury. A
witness commits perjury if he or she gives false testimony concerning a material matter
with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion,
mistake, or faulty memory. Id. (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94
(1993)). However, even assuming that Arrington can establish that Miller perjured
herself, Arrington cannot show that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the verdict. Arrington actually used these inconsistencies
to his advantage; during his closing argument, Arringtons counsel highlighted these
Arrington apparently assumes that Millers testimony was perjurious and that
3
Arrington also alleges that perjury occurred when Miller testified that Davenport
threatened to kill her several times and once threatened to cut off her fingers while
Davenport denied that these incidents occurred. This inconsistent testimony was also
likely favorable to Arrington, as it may have diminished Davenports credibility, a fact
4
later, Arrington was arrested in Baltimore, Maryland. At the time of arrest, he was using
the name Richard Bloomfield.
Prior to trial, the Government gave Arrington notice that it intended to introduce
evidence that at the time of the arrest of his alleged co-conspirators, Arrington absconded
from parole. Arrington objected, and in a written opinion, the District Court held that the
evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of proving Arringtons consciousness of
guilt. At trial Arringtons parole officer testified that Arrington was initially a model
parolee, but that when his alleged co-conspirators were arrested, he absconded from
parole. The parties stipulated that Arrington was arrested in Baltimore and that he was
using the name Richard Bloomfield. The District Court provided jury instructions that
this evidence could only be used for the limited purpose of deciding whether Arrington
had a consciousness of guilt, and could not be used for the improper purpose of
concluding that Arrington has bad character or a propensity to commit crimes.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. While
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not allow the admission of evidence of an action to
prove a persons character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), such evidence can be
admitted for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident, Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(2). Here, the Government introduced the evidence, not to prove that Arrington
has bad character and acted in accordance with that character, but rather to show that
fleeing from parole is evidence of his consciousness of guilt, and the District Court
provided clear instructions to the jury about the proper use of this evidence. While the
evidence can only be admitted if the probative value of the evidence outweighs any
unfair prejudice, see Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988) (citing Fed.
R. Evid. 403), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
evidence is more probative than prejudicial.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence
of the District Court.