Dacoycoy v.

CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991)

FACTS Jesus Dacoycoy filed before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal a complaint against private
respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of
riceland located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce, and damages. Before
summons could be served on de Guzman, RTC judge ordered counsel for petitioner to confer
with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, RTC dismissed the
complaint due to improper venue. RTC found that petitioners action is a real action as it sought
not only the annulment of the deeds of sale but also recovery of ownership of the riceland which
was outside of the RTCs territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed to IAC which affirmed RTCs
order of dismissal.
Petitioner faults the IAC in affirming RTC finding that the venue was improperly laid when de
Guzman has not even answered the complaint nor waived the venue.
HELD Petition granted. The court can not motu proprio dismiss the case on ground of improper
venue. Objections to venue may be waived by the parties. Improper venue does not necessarily
divest the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Even granting that the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a RTC vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.
de Leon: This does not apply in summary procedure cases where the court may motu propio
dismiss the complaint even on the ground of improper venue (SC Resolution 15 October 1991,
Sec. 4).
Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)
FACTS Metrobank extended various loans to Fortune which was secured by a real estate
mortgage on the Fortune building and lot in Makati. For failure of Fortune to pay the loans,
Metrobank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notice were served, posted and
published, the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction to Metrobank as the highest
bidder.
3days after the expiration of the 1yr redemption period, Fortune filed a complaint for annulment
of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature because its
obligation to Metrobank was not yet due, publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there
was no public auction, and the price for which the property was sold was shockingly low.
Before summons could be served, Metrobank filed a MtD the complaint on the ground that the
venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the subject real property is situated in
Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in Makati RTC.
MtD was opposed by Fortune alleging that its action is a personal action and that the issue is
the validity of the extrajudicial proceedings so that it may have a new 1yr redemption period.
Manila RTC issued an order reserving the resolution of Metrobanks MtD until after the trial on
the merits as the grounds relied upon by the defendant were not clear and indubitable.
Metrobank filed a MfR but was denied by Manila RTC. Metrobank appealed to CA. CA granted
and dismissed the annulment case without prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue.
HELD An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to
annul a private sale of real property. Both are actions that affect title and seek recovery of the
real property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the

province where the property or part thereof lies. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Clavecilla Radio v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379 (1967)

FACTS New Cagayan Grocery Bacolod Branch sent a message (REURTEL WASHED NOT
AVAILABLE REFINED TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP LATER REPLY) to New
Cagayan Grocery CDO Branch thru Clavecilla Radio Bacolod. Clavecilla Radio Cagayan
received the message. However, in delivering the same to New Cagayan Grocery CDO, the
word NOT between the word WASHED and AVAILABLE was omitted, thus changing
entirely the contents and purport of the message and causing the addressee to suffer damages.
New Cagayan filed a complaint against Clavecilla in the MTC. After service of summons,
Clavecilla filed MtD the complaint on the grounds that it states no cause of action and the venue
is improperly laid. New Cagayan interposed opposition to which Clavecilla filed its rejoinder.
Thereafter, MTC judge Antillon denied MtD for lack of merit.
Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition and prelim injunction with the CFI praying that judge
Antillon be enjoined from further proceeding with the case on the ground of improper venue.
Respondents filed MtD the petition but was opposed by Clavecilla. CFI held that Clavecilla may
be sued in Manila where it has its principal office or in CDO where it was served with summons
thru the branch manager. In other word, CFI upheld the authority of MTC to take cognizance of
the case.
In appealing, Clavecilla contends that the suit against it should be filed in Manila where it holds
its principal office.
HELD The residence of the corporation is the place where its principal office is established.
Branch offices are not residences where it may be sued. The phrase where he (defendant)
may be found as to venue of actions applies only to non-residents. It does not apply to
defendants residing in the Philippines.

Young Auto v. CA, 223 SCRA 670 (1993)

Facts: Young Auto (YASCO) sold its shares of stock in Consolidated Mktg & Devt Corp (CMDC)
to Roxas. Purchase price 8M, dp 4M check bal 4M in pd checks 1M each. After execution of
the agreement, Roxas took full control of the four markets of CMDC. However YASCO held on
to stock certificates as security pending full payment. First 4M was honored but the four 1M
checks were dishonored. Roxas sold one of the markets to a 3rd party. Out of the proceeds,
YASCO rcvd 600k leaving a bal of 3.4M
YASCO filed a complaint against Roxas in Cebu RTC praying that Roxas be ordered to pay the
bal or that full control of the 3 markets be turned over to YASCO. Roxas filed MtD, ground:
improper venue. RTC dismissed MTD.
Roxas appealed to CA. CA ordered dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper
venue. YASCO appealed to SC.
The Articles of Incorporation of Young Auto Motors stated that its principal office was in Cebu. In
its transactions with Roxas, Young Auto stated in its letterhead that its principal office was in
Manila. Young Auto sued Roxas in Cebu based on such transactions. Roxas files MTD on the
ground of improper venue.

Held: A corporation is a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in the
articles of incorporation. Hence, Cebu was a valid venue for Youngs action.
Escolin: If it was Roxas who filed the case against Young in Pasay City based on the address in
the letterhead, Young would be estopped from objecting on the ground of improper venue.

Hernandez v. DBP, 71 SCRA 290 (1976)

Facts: Hernandez resides in Batangas. He was awarded a lot in Quezon City by DBP.
Subsequently, DBP refused to accept Hernandezs payment and cancelled the award.
Hernandez filed an action to annul the cancellation of the award in Batangas. DBP filed MTD on
ground of improper venue.
Held: Hernandez's action is not a real but a personal action. His action is one to declare null and
void the cancellation of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership
over said properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and
subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and to accept payment. Such an
action is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his residence.
Lizares v. Calauag, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)
FACTS: Flaviano Cacnio bought from Dr. Antonio Lizares on installment a parcel of land located
in Sinkang Subd Bacolod City. Cacnio made a dp of Php1,206 bal Php10,858 to be paid in
10yearly installments.
Cacnio received a letter from Lizares demanding payment of arrears in installment payments,
interests, and taxes. Cacnio sent a check to pay the amount due but Lizares returned the check
and refused the tender of payment. Cacnio instituted a civil case in the Rizal CFI praying that
Lizares be ordered to accept the payment being made by him.
Petitioner MtD the complaint due to improper venue for the action affects the title or possession
of real property located in Bacolod. CFI denied MtD holding that it was a personal action.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA denied petition.
HELD: An action praying that defendant be ordered "to accept the payment being made" by
plaintiff for the lot which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis from the former, to pay
plaintiff compensatory damages and attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents
from repossessing the lot in question, is one that affects title to land, and "shall be commenced
and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies," because, although the
immediate remedy is to compel the defendant to accept the tender of payment allegedly made,
it is obvious that this relief is merely the first step to establish plaintiff's title to real property.
Escolin: In the Bar exams of 1978, Wigberto Taada was the Bar examiner. There was a
question using the facts of Lizares. The consensus was the case should be filed in the place
where the property was located. Taada cited the Hernandez case in ruling that the case should
be filed in the residence of the plaintiff. Eventually, both where considered correct.
de Leon: So where should we side now?

Esuerte v. CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991)

For purposes of venue of personal actions, the venue is to be determined where the plaintiff or
the defendant is actually located. It is actual residence, not legal domicile, which is relevant.

de Leon: The meaning of residence in determining venue of personal actions is the same as
residence in determinng venue of estate proceedings.

Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794 (1982)

Stipulation as to venue which uses the word may is permissive and does not limit the venue of
the action only to the venue stipulated.

Unimasters v. CA, 267 SCRA (1997)

Stipulation as to venue which uses the word shall is permissive and does not limit the venue of
the action only to the venue stipulated.
Escolin: They should have used the words solely, exclusively, or only. Shall is not enough
to confer exclusive venue with a court.

Diaz v. Adiong, 219 SCRA 631 (1993)

Filing of answer waives MTD on ground of improper venue.
Escolin: the rules now allow raising the issue of improper venue as an affirmative defense in the
answer even if there was failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec. 6).

Sweetlines v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978)

Facts: Boat tickets stipulated that the venue of actions arising out of the tickets should be filed in
Cebu City.
Held: Although venue may be changed or transferred by agreement of the parties in writing,
such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants.
Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to
prosecute a claim in the Cebu City, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all.
The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. On the other hand,
Sweetlines has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to
litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in residence of plaintiff, as was done
in the instant case, will not cause inconvience to, much less prejudice Sweetlines. The
stipulation, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in
meritorious cases, actions of passenger claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing Sweetlines
company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims
against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary
to public policy
Escolin: The SC characterized a contract of adhesion as void for being against public policy.
de Leon: Contrast the rationale in the cases of Sweetlines and Clavecilla re: confusion and
untold inconvenience on the part of defendants.