INVESTIGATION OF THE

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CIVILRIGHTSDIVISION

August10,2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ExecutiveSummary3
I.

Background...............................................................................................................................................................

12
A. Baltimore,Maryland............................................................................................................................................12
B. TheBaltimorePoliceDepartment...................................................................................................................15
C. BPDsEnforcementPrioritiesandRelationshipwiththeBaltimoreCommunity...................................

16
D. FederalInvolvement...........................................................................................................................................

19

II. BPDEngagesinaPatternorPracticeofConductthatViolatestheUnitedStatesConstitutionandLaws,

andConductthatRaisesSeriousConcerns..................................................................................................................

21
A. BPDMakesUnconstitutionalStops,Searches,andArrests........................................................................24
1. BPDsUnconstitutionalStops,Searches,andArrestsResultinPartfromItsZeroTolerance
EnforcementStrategy.............................................................................................................................................

24
2.

BPDUnconstitutionallyStopsandSearchesPedestrians........................................................................

27

3.

BPDMakesUnconstitutionalArrests.........................................................................................................

34

4. BPDsUnconstitutionalStops,Searches,andArrestsResultfromaLongstandingPracticeof

OverlyAggressiveStreetEnforcementwithDeficientOversightandPolicyGuidance.............................

40
B. BPDDiscriminatesAgainstAfricanAmericansinitsEnforcementActivities........................................

47
1.

BPDsEnforcementActivitiesDisproportionatelyImpactAfricanAmericans..................................

48

2. RacialDisparitiesinBPDsEnforcement,AlongwithEvidenceSuggestingIntentional

DiscriminationAgainstAfricanAmericans,ExacerbatesCommunityDistrust...........................................62
C. BPDUsesUnreasonableForce........................................................................................................................74
1. BPDsOverlyAggressiveTacticsUnnecessarilyEscalateEncountersandResultinExcessive

Force..........................................................................................................................................................................76
2. BPDUsesUnreasonableForceAgainstIndividualswithaMentalHealthDisabilityandThosein
CrisisandFailstoMakeReasonableModificationsWhenInteractingwithIndividualswithMental

HealthDisabilities....................................................................................................................................................

80
3. BPDUsesUnreasonableForceAgainstJuvenilesAndIgnoresWidelyAcceptedStrategiesFor

PoliceInteractionsWithYouth.............................................................................................................................

85
1

4.

BPDUsesUnreasonableForceAgainstPeopleWhoAreNotaThreattoOfficersorthePublic.88

5. BPDsDeficientPolicies,Training,CrisisInterventionProgram,andLackofOversightUnderlie

ThePatternOrPracticeOfExcessiveForceandViolationsoftheAmericansWithDisabilitiesAct.....

98
6.

BPDsTransportPracticesCreateaSignificantRiskofHarm.............................................................112

D. BPDUnlawfullyRestrictsProtectedSpeech................................................................................................116

1.

BPDUnlawfullyDetainsandArrestsMembersofthePublicforProtectedSpeech

.......................116

2.

BPDRetaliatesbyUsingForceAgainstIndividualsWhoEngageinProtectedSpeech..................118

3.

ConcernsthatBPDInterfereswiththeRighttoRecordPublicPoliceActivity...............................119

E. BPDsHandlingofSexualAssaultInvestigationsRaisesSeriousConcernsofGender-Biased

Policing.........................................................................................................................................................................122

1.

EvidenceofGenderBiasinBPDsResponsetoSexualAssault..........................................................122

2.

BPDFailstoAdequatelyInvestigateReportsofSexualAssault..........................................................123

III. SystemicDeficienciesinBPDsPracticesContributetoConstitutionalViolations,ErodeCommunity

Trust,andInhibitEffectivePolicing...........................................................................................................................128

A. BPDFailstoAdequatelySuperviseItsOfficersEnforcementActivities..............................................129

1.

BPDDoesNotProvideAdequatePolicyGuidanceandTrainingtoitsOfficers............................129

2.

BPDDoesNotAdequatelySuperviseOfficersorCollectandAnalyzeDataontheirActivities..134

B. BPDFailstoAdequatelySupportitsOfficers

.............................................................................................137

C. BPDFailstoHoldOfficersAccountableforMisconduct.........................................................................139

1.

BPDLacksAdequateSystemstoInvestigateComplaintsandImposeDiscipline...........................140

2.

BPDsInternalCultureisResistanttoEffectiveDiscipline..................................................................149

D. BPDDoesNotCoordinatewithOtherAgenciesAppropriately

.............................................................154

E. BPDFailstoEngageinEffectiveCommunityPolicing.............................................................................156

1.

TheRelationshipBetweenthePoliceandtheCommunityinBaltimoreIsBroken.........................157

2.

BPDHasFailedtoImplementCommunityPolicingPrinciples..........................................................158

3. BPDRecognizesthatItMustImproveItsRelationshipwiththeCommunitiesItServes,ButMuch

WorkRemains........................................................................................................................................................159

Conclusion163
2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Today,weannouncetheoutcomeoftheDepartmentofJusticesinvestigationofthe

1
BaltimoreCityPoliceDepartment(BPD). Afterengaginginathoroughinvestigation,initiatedat
therequestoftheCityofBaltimoreandBPD,theDepartmentofJusticeconcludesthatthereis
reasonablecausetobelievethatBPDengagesinapatternorpracticeofconductthatviolatesthe
Constitutionorfederallaw.BPDengagesinapatternorpracticeof:

(1)makingunconstitutionalstops,searches,andarrests;

(2)usingenforcementstrategiesthatproducesevereandunjustifieddisparitiesintheratesof
stops,searchesandarrestsofAfricanAmericans;

(3)usingexcessiveforce;and

(4)retaliatingagainstpeopleengaginginconstitutionally-protectedexpression.

ThispatternorpracticeisdrivenbysystemicdeficienciesinBPDspolicies,training,
supervision,andaccountabilitystructuresthatfailtoequipofficerswiththetoolstheyneedtopolice
effectivelyandwithintheboundsofthefederallaw.

WerecognizethechallengesfacedbypoliceofficersinBaltimoreandothercommunities

aroundthecountry.Everyday,policeofficersrisktheirlivestoupholdthelawandkeepour

communitiessafe.Investigatorystops,arrests,andforceincluding,attimes,deadlyforceareall

necessarytoolsusedbyBPDofficerstodotheirjobsandprotectthesafetyofthemselvesand
others.ProvidingpolicingservicesinmanypartsofBaltimoreisparticularlychallenging,where
officersregularlyconfrontcomplexsocialproblemsrootedinpoverty,racialsegregationand

deficienteducational,employmentandhousingopportunities.

Still,mostBPDofficersworkhardto
providevitalservicestothecommunity.

ThepatternorpracticeoccursasaresultofsystemicdeficienciesatBPD.

Theagencyfails
toprovideofficerswithsufficientpolicyguidanceandtraining;failstocollectandanalyzedata

regardingofficersactivities;andfailstoholdofficersaccountableformisconduct.BPDalsofailsto
equipofficerswiththenecessaryequipmentandresourcestheyneedtopolicesafely,
constitutionally,andeffectively.Eachofthesesystemicdeficienciescontributestotheconstitutional
andstatutoryviolationsweobserved.

1TheSpecialLitigationSectionoftheCivilRightsDivisionconductedtheinvestigationpursuanttotheViolentCrime

ControlandLawEnforcementActof1994,42U.S.C.14141(Section14141),TitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof

1964,42U.S.C.2000d,theOmnibusCrimeControlandSafeStreetsActof1968,42U.S.C.3789d(SafeStreets

Act);andtheAmericanswithDisabilitiesActof1990,42U.S.C.1213112134.Theinvestigationdidnotexamine

theactionsofofficersinvolvedinFreddieGraysarrestonApril12,2015,orthemeritsofanycriminalorcivil
proceedingsconnectedtothatincident.

Throughoutourinvestigation,wereceivedthefullcooperationandassistanceofBPDand

theCityofBaltimore.WeinterviewedcurrentandformerCityleaders,includingcurrentBPD

CommissionerKevinDavisandformercommissioners.Wealsointerviewedcurrentandformer
officersthroughouttheBPDcommandstructure.Weparticipatedinride-alongsineachdistrict,
interviewednumerouscurrentandformerofficersindividually,andmetwiththeleadershipofthe

BaltimoreCityLodgeNo.3oftheFraternalOrderofPolice,whichrepresentsallswornBPD
officers.WealsoheardfromhundredsofpeopleinthebroaderBaltimorecommunitywhoshared
informationwithourinvestigation.Wemetwithreligiousorganizations,advocacygroups,

communitysupportorganizations,neighborhoodassociations,andcountlessindividualswho
providedvaluableinformationabouttheirexperienceswithBPD.Wethankeveryoneforsharing
theirexperiencesandinsightswithus.

Inadditiontotheseinterviews,wereviewedhundredsofthousandsofpagesofdocuments,
includingallrelevantpoliciesandtrainingmaterialsusedbytheDepartmentsince2010;BPDs

databaseofinternalaffairsfilesfromJanuary2010throughMarch2016;BPDsdataonpedestrian
stops,vehiclestops,andarrestsfromJanuary2010toMay2015;incidentreportsdescribingstops,

searches,arrests,andofficersuseofnon-deadlyforcefrom2010to2015;allfilesondeadlyforce

incidentssince2010thatBPDwasabletoproducetousthroughMay1,2016;andinvestigativefiles

onsexualassaultcasesfrom2013to2015.Wewereassistedbyadozencurrentandformerlaw
enforcementleadersandexpertswithexperienceontheissuesweinvestigated,andweretained

2
statisticalexpertstoanalyzeBPDsdataonitsenforcementactivities.

Inthecourseofourinvestigation,welearnedthereiswidespreadagreementthatBPDneeds
reform.AlmosteveryonewhospoketousfromcurrentandformerCityleaders,BPDofficers
andcommandstaffduringride-alongsandinterviews,communitymembersthroughoutthemany
neighborhoodsofBaltimore,unionrepresentativesofalllevelsofofficersinBPD,advocacygroups,
andcivicandreligiousleadersagreesthatBPDhassignificantproblemsthathaveunderminedits

effortstopoliceconstitutionallyandeffectively.Aswenoteinthisreport,manyofthesepeopleand
groupshavedocumentedthoseproblemsinthepast,andalthoughtheymaydisagreeaboutthe

nature,scope,andsolutionstothechallenges,manyhavealsomadeeffortstoaddressthem.

Nevertheless,workremains,inpartbecauseoftheprofoundlackoftrustamongthesegroups,and
inparticular,betweenBPDandcertaincommunitiesinBaltimore.Theroadtomeaningfuland
lastingreformisalongone,butitcanbetaken.ThisinvestigationisintendedtohelpBaltimore
takealargestepdownthispath.

Recenteventshighlightthecriticalimportanceofmutualtrustandcooperationbetweenlaw
enforcementofficersandthepeopletheyserve.Acommitmenttoconstitutionalpolicingbuilds

trustthatenhancescrimefightingeffortsandofficersafety.Conversely,frayedcommunity
relationshipsinhibiteffectivepolicingbydenyingofficersimportantsourcesofinformationand
placingthemmorefrequentlyindangerous,adversarialencounters.Wefoundtheseprinciplesin
starkreliefinBaltimore,wherelawenforcementofficersconfrontalonghistoryofsocialand

economicchallengesthatimpactmuchoftheCity,includingtheperceptionthattherearetwo
2Inaddition,theDepartmentofJusticesOfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices(COPS)hasbeenengagedin

acollaborativereformprocesswiththeCityandBPD.TheCOPSofficehascontinuedtoprovidetechnicalassistance
toBPDduringourinvestigation,alongwithothercomponentsoftheDepartmentofJustice.

Baltimores:onewealthyandlargelywhite,thesecondimpoverishedandpredominantlyblack.

CommunitymemberslivingintheCityswealthierandlargelywhiteneighborhoodstoldusthat
officerstendtoberespectfulandresponsivetotheirneeds,whilemanyindividualslivinginthe
CityslargelyAfrican-Americancommunitiesinformedusthatofficerstendtobedisrespectfuland
donotrespondpromptlytotheircallsforservice.MembersoftheselargelyAfrican-American
communitiesoftenfelttheyweresubjectedtounjustifiedstops,searches,andarrests,aswellas

excessiveforce.Thesechallengesamplifytheimportanceofusingpolicingmethodsthatbuild
communitypartnershipsandensurefairandeffectiveenforcementwithoutregardforaffluenceor
racethroughrobusttraining,closesupervision,datacollectionandanalysis,andaccountabilityfor
misconduct.

Startinginatleastthelate1990s,however,CityandBPDleadershiprespondedtotheCitys

challengesbyencouragingzerotolerancestreetenforcementthatprioritizedofficersmakinglarge
numbersofstops,searches,andarrestsandoftenresortingtoforcewithminimaltrainingand

insufficientoversightfromsupervisorsorthroughotheraccountabilitystructures.Thesepractices
ledtorepeatedviolationsoftheconstitutionalandstatutoryrights,furthererodingthecommunitys

trustinthepolice.

Proactivepolicingdoesnothavetoleadtotheseconsequences.Onthecontrary,
constitutional,community-orientedpolicingisproactivepolicing,butitisfundamentallydifferent
fromthetacticsemployedinBaltimoreformanyyears.Communitypolicingdependsonbuilding

relationshipswithallofthecommunitiesthatapolicedepartmentserves,andthenjointlysolving
problemstoensurepublicsafety.WeencourageBPDtobeproactive,togettoknowBaltimores

communitiesmoredeeply,buildtrust,andreducecrimetogetherwiththecommunitiesitserves.

Fortunately,thecurrentleadershipoftheCityandtheBPDalreadyhavetakenlaudable
stepstoreversethiscourse,includingbyrevisingBPDsuseofforcepolicies,takingstepstoward
enhancingaccountabilityandtransparencythroughouttheDepartmentby,forexample,beginning
toequipofficerswithbodyworncameras,andtakingstepstowardimprovingandexpandingits

communityoutreachtobetterengageitsofficerswiththecommunitytheyserve.Still,significant

challengesremain.

Unconstitutional Stops, Searches, and Arrests

BPDslegacyofzerotoleranceenforcementcontinuestodriveitspolicingincertain

Baltimoreneighborhoodsandleadstounconstitutionalstops,searches,andarrests.ManyBPD

supervisorsinstructofficerstomakefrequentstopsandarrestsevenforminoroffensesandwith

minimalornosuspicionwithoutsufficientconsiderationofwhetherthisenforcementstrategy
promotespublicsafetyandcommunitytrustorconformstoconstitutionalstandards.These
instructions,coupledwithminimalsupervisionandaccountabilityformisconduct,leadto
constitutionalviolations.

Stops.BPDofficersrecordedover300,000pedestrianstopsfromJanuary2010May

2015,andthetruenumberofBPDsstopsduringthisperiodislikelyfarhigherdueto
under-reporting.ThesestopsareconcentratedinpredominantlyAfrican-American
neighborhoodsandoftenlackreasonablesuspicion.
5


o BPDspedestrianstopsareconcentratedonasmallportionofBaltimore

residents.BPDmaderoughly44percentofitsstopsintwosmall,

predominantlyAfrican-Americandistrictsthatcontainonly11percentofthe
Cityspopulation.Consequently,hundredsofindividualsnearlyallofthem

AfricanAmericanwerestoppedonatleast10separateoccasionsfrom2010

2015. Indeed,sevenAfrican-Americanmenwerestoppedmorethan30times

duringthisperiod.

o BPDsstopsoftenlackreasonablesuspicion.Ourreviewofincidentreportsand

interviewswithofficersandcommunitymembersfoundthatofficersregularly
approachindividualsstandingorwalkingonCitysidewalkstodetainand
questionthemandcheckforoutstandingwarrants,despitelackingreasonable

suspiciontodoso.Only3.7percentofpedestrianstopsresultedinofficers

issuingacitationormakinganarrest.And,asnotedbelow,manyofthose
arrestedbaseduponpedestrianstopshadtheirchargesdismisseduponinitial
reviewbyeithersupervisorsatBPDsCentralBookingorlocalprosecutors.

Searches.Duringstops,BPDofficersfrequentlypat-downorfriskindividualsasa

matterofcourse,withoutidentifyingnecessarygroundstobelievethatthepersonis
armedanddangerous.Andevenwhereaninitialfriskisjustified,wefoundthatofficers

oftenviolatetheConstitutionbyexceedingthefriskspermissiblescope.Welikewise
foundmanyinstancesinwhichofficersstripsearchindividualswithoutlegaljustification.
Insomecases,officersperformeddegradingstripsearchesinpublic,priortomakingan

arrest,andwithoutgroundstobelievethatthesearchedindividualswereconcealing
contrabandontheirbodies.

Arrests.WeidentifiedtwocategoriesofcommonunconstitutionalarrestsbyBPD

officers:(1)officersmakewarrantlessarrestswithoutprobablecause;and(2)officers
makearrestsformisdemeanoroffenses,suchasloiteringandtrespassing,without
providingtheconstitutionally-requirednoticethatthearrestedpersonwasengagedin
unlawfulactivity.

o Arrestswithoutprobablecause:from20102015,supervisorsatBaltimores
CentralBookingandlocalprosecutorsrejectedover11,000chargesmadeby

BPDofficersbecausetheylackedprobablecauseorotherwisedidnotmerit
prosecution.Ourreviewofincidentreportsdescribingwarrantlessarrests
likewisefoundmanyexamplesofofficersmakingunjustifiedarrests.

Inaddition,
officersextendstopswithoutjustificationtosearchforevidencethatwould
justifyanarrest.Thesedetentionsmanyofwhichlastmorethananhour

constituteunconstitutionalarrests.

o Misdemeanorarrestswithoutnotice:BPDofficersarrestindividualsstanding

lawfullyonpublicsidewalksforloitering,trespassing,orothermisdemeanor
offenseswithoutprovidingadequatenoticethattheindividualswereengagedin

unlawfulactivity.Indeed,officersfrequentlyinverttheconstitutionalnotice

requirement.WhiletheConstitutionrequiresindividualstoreceivepre-arrest

noticeofthespecificconductprohibitedasloiteringortrespassing,BPDofficers
approachindividualsstandinglawfullyonsidewalksinfrontofpublichousing
complexesorprivatebusinessesandarrestthemunlesstheindividualsareableto
justifytheirpresencetotheofficerssatisfaction.

Discrimination against African Americans

BPDstargetedpolicingofcertainBaltimoreneighborhoodswithminimaloversightor
accountabilitydisproportionatelyharmsAfrican-Americanresidents.Raciallydisparateimpactis

presentateverystageofBPDsenforcementactions,fromtheinitialdecisiontostopindividualson

Baltimorestreetstosearches,arrests,andusesofforce.

Theseracialdisparities,alongwithevidence
suggestingintentionaldiscrimination,erodethecommunitytrustthatiscriticaltoeffectivepolicing.

BPDdisproportionatelystopsAfrican-Americanpedestrians.Citywide,BPDstopped
African-Americanresidentsthreetimesasoftenaswhiteresidentsaftercontrollingfor

thepopulationoftheareainwhichthestopsoccurred.IneachofBPDsninepolice
districts,AfricanAmericansaccountedforagreatershareofBPDsstopsthanthe
populationlivinginthedistrict.AndBPDisfarmorelikelytosubjectindividualAfrican
Americanstomultiplestopsinshortperiodsoftime.Inthefiveandahalfyearsofdata

weexamined,AfricanAmericansaccountedfor95percentofthe410individualsBPD

stoppedatleast10times.OneAfricanAmericanmaninhismid-fiftieswasstopped30
timesinlessthan4years.Despitetheserepeatedintrusions,noneofthe30stops
resultedinacitationorcriminalcharge.

BPDalsostopsAfricanAmericandriversatdisproportionaterates.AfricanAmericans
accountedfor82percentofallBPDvehiclestops,comparedtoonly60percentofthe

drivingagepopulationintheCityand27percentofthedrivingagepopulationinthe

greatermetropolitanarea.

BPDdisproportionatelysearchesAfricanAmericansduringstops.BPDsearched

AfricanAmericansmorefrequentlyduringpedestrianandvehiclestops,eventhough

searchesofAfricanAmericanswerelesslikelytodiscovercontraband.Indeed,BPD
officersfoundcontrabandtwiceasoftenwhensearchingwhiteindividualscomparedto

AfricanAmericansduringvehiclestopsand50percentmoreoftenduringpedestrian
stops.

AfricanAmericanssimilarlyaccountedfor86percentofallcriminaloffenseschargedby
BPDofficersdespitemakinguponly63percentofBaltimoreresidents.

o RacialdisparitiesinBPDsarrestsaremostpronouncedforhighlydiscretionary
offenses:AfricanAmericansaccountedfor91percentofthe1,800people
chargedsolelywithfailuretoobeyortrespassing;89percentofthe1,350

chargesformakingafalsestatementtoanofficer;and84percentofthe6,500

peoplearrestedfordisorderlyconduct.Moreover,bookingofficialsand

prosecutorsdeclinechargesbroughtagainstAfricanAmericansatsignificantly
7

higherratesthanchargesagainstpeopleofotherraces,indicatingthatofficers

standardsformakingarrestsdifferbytheraceofthepersonarrested.
o WealsofoundlargeracialdisparitiesinBPDsarrestsfordrugpossession.While
surveydatashowsthatAfricanAmericansusedrugsatratessimilartoorslightly
exceedingotherpopulationgroups,BPDarrestedAfricanAmericansfordrug
possessionatfivetimestherateofothers.

BPDdeployedapolicingstrategythat,byitsdesign,ledtodifferentialenforcementin

African-Americancommunities.ButBPDfailedtouseadequatepolicy,trainingandaccountability

mechanismstopreventdiscrimination,despitelongstandingnoticeofconcernsabouthowitpolices
African-AmericancommunitiesintheCity.BPDhasconductedvirtuallynoanalysisofitsowndata
toensurethatitsenforcementactivitiesarenon-discriminatory,andtheDepartmentmisclassifiesor
otherwisefailstoinvestigatespecificcomplaintsofracialbias.NorhastheDepartmentheld
officersaccountableforusingracialslursormakingotherstatementsexhibitingracialbias.Insome

cases,BPDsupervisorshaveorderedofficerstospecificallytargetAfricanAmericansforstopsand

arrests.ThesefailurescontributetothelargeracialdisparitiesinBPDsenforcementthatundermine

thecommunitystrustinthefairnessofthepolice.BPDleadershiphasacknowledgedthatthislack
oftrustinhibitstheirabilitytoforgeimportantcommunitypartnerships.

Use of Constitutionally Excessive Force

Ourreviewofinvestigativefilesforalldeadlyforcecasesfrom2010untilMay1,2016,anda

randomsampleofovereighthundrednon-deadlyforcecasesrevealsthatBPDengagesinapattern
orpracticeofexcessiveforce.DeficienciesinBPDspolicies,training,andoversightofofficers
forceincidentshaveledtothepatternorpracticeofexcessiveforcethatweobserved.Weidentified
severalrecurringissueswithBPDsuseofforce:
First,BPDusesoverlyaggressivetacticsthatunnecessarilyescalateencounters,

increasetensions,andleadtounnecessaryforce,andfailstode-escalateencounters

whenitwouldbereasonabletodoso.Officersfrequentlyresorttophysicalforce
whenasubjectdoesnotimmediatelyrespondtoverbalcommands,evenwherethe
subjectposesnoimminentthreattotheofficerorothers.Thesetacticsresultfrom

BPDstrainingandguidance.

Second,BPDusesexcessiveforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilities

orincrisis.Duetoalackoftrainingandimpropertactics,BPDofficersendupin

unnecessarilyviolentconfrontationswiththesevulnerableindividuals.BPD

provideslesseffectiveservicestopeoplewithmentalillnessandintellectual
disabilitiesbyfailingtoaccountforthesedisabilitiesinofficerslawenforcement
actions,leadingtounnecessaryandexcessiveforcebeingusedagainstthem.BPD

hasfailedtomakereasonablemodificationsinitspolicies,practices,andprocedures
toavoiddiscriminatingagainstpeoplewithmentalillnessandintellectualdisabilities.

Third,BPDusesunreasonableforceagainstjuveniles.Theseincidentsarisefrom
BPDsfailuretousewidely-acceptedtacticsforcommunicatingandinteractingwith

youth.Instead,officersinteractingwithyouthrelyonthesameaggressivetactics
theyusewithadults,leadingtounnecessaryconflict.

Fourth,BPDusesunreasonableforceagainstpeoplewhopresentlittleornothreat
toofficersorothers.Specifically,BPDusesexcessiveforceagainst(1)individuals

whoarealreadyrestrainedandunderofficerscontroland(2)individualswhoare

fleeingfromofficersandarenotsuspectedofseriouscriminaloffenses.

o Forceusedonrestrainedindividuals:wefoundmanyexamplesofBPD
officersusingunreasonableforceonindividualswhowererestrainedandno
longerposedathreattoofficersorthepublic.

o Forceusedonfleeingsuspects:BPDofficersfrequentlyengageinfoot

pursuitsofindividuals,evenwherethefleeingindividualsarenotsuspected
ofviolentcrimes.BPDsfootpursuittacticsendangerofficersandthe

community,andfrequentlyleadtoofficersusingexcessiveforceonfleeing
suspectswhoposeminimalthreat.BPDsaggressiveapproachtofoot
pursuitsextendstoflightinvehicles.
WealsoexaminedBPDstransportationofdetainees,butwereunabletomakea
findingduetoalackofavailabledata.Wewereunabletosecurereliablerecords
fromeitherBPDorthejailregardinginjuriessustainedduringtransportorany
recordings.Nonetheless,wefoundevidencethatBPD:(1)routinelyfailsto
properlysecurearresteesintransportvehicles;(2)needstocontinuetoupdateits
transportequipmenttoprotectarresteesduringtransport;(3)failstokeepnecessary

records;and(4)mustimplementmorerobustauditingandmonitoringsystemsto
ensurethatitstransportpoliciesandtrainingarefollowed.

OurconcernsaboutBPDsuseofexcessiveforcearecompoundedbyBPDs
ineffectiveoversightofitsuseofforce.Ofthe2,818forceincidentsthatBPD
recordedinthenearlysix-yearperiodwereviewed,BPDinvestigatedonlyten

incidentsbasedonconcernsidentifiedthroughitsinternalreview.Oftheseten
cases,BPDfoundonlyoneuseofforcetobeexcessive.

Retaliation for Activities Protected by the First Amendment

BPDviolatestheFirstAmendmentbyretaliatingagainstindividualsengagedin

constitutionallyprotectedactivities.Officersfrequentlydetainandarrestmembersofthepublicfor

engaginginspeechtheofficersperceivetobecriticalordisrespectful.AndBPDofficersuseforce

againstmembersofthepublicwhoareengaginginprotectedspeech.BPDhasfailedtoprovide

officerswithsufficientguidanceandoversightregardingtheirinteractionswithindividualsthat
implicateFirstAmendmentprotections,leadingtotheviolationsweobserved.

Indications of Gender Bias in Sexual Assault Investigations

Althoughwedonot,atthistime,findreasonablecausetobelievethatBPDengagesin
9

gender-biasedpolicinginviolationoffederallaw,theallegationswereceivedduringthe
investigation,alongwithourreviewofBPDfiles,suggeststhatgenderbiasmaybeaffectingBPDs

handlingofsexualassaultcases.Wefoundindicationsthatofficersfailtomeaningfullyinvestigate

reportsofsexualassault,particularlyforassaultsinvolvingwomenwithadditionalvulnerabilities,

suchasthosewhoareinvolvedinthesextrade.

Detectivesfailtodevelopandresolvepreliminary

investigations;failtoidentifyandcollectevidencetocorroboratevictimsaccounts;inadequately
documenttheirinvestigativesteps;failtocollectandassessdata,andreportandclassifyreportsof
sexualassault;andlacksupervisoryreview.Wealsohaveconcernsthatofficersinteractionswith
womenvictimsofsexualassaultandwithtransgenderindividualsdisplayunlawfulgenderbias.

Deficient Policies, Training, Supervision, and Accountability

BPDssystemicconstitutionalandstatutoryviolationsarerootedinstructuralfailures.BPD

failstouseadequatepolicies,training,supervision,datacollection,analysis,andaccountability

systems,hasnotengagedadequatelywiththecommunityitpolices,anddoesnotprovideitsofficers

withthetoolsneededtopoliceeffectively.
BPDlacksmeaningfulaccountabilitysystemstodetermisconduct.TheDepartment
doesnotconsistentlyclassify,investigate,adjudicate,anddocumentcomplaintsof

misconductaccordingtoitsownpoliciesandacceptedlawenforcementstandards.
Instead,wefoundthatBPDpersonneldiscouragecomplaintsfrombeingfiled,
misclassifycomplaintstominimizetheirapparentseverity,andconductlittleorno

investigation.Asaresult,aresistancetoaccountabilitypersiststhroughoutmuchof
BPD,andmanyofficersarereluctanttoreportmisconductforfearthatdoingsois
fruitlessandmayprovokeretaliation.TheDepartmentalsolacksadequatecivilian
oversightitsCivilianReviewBoardishamperedbyinadequateresources,andthe
agencysinternalaffairsanddisciplinaryprocesslackstransparency.

NordoesBPDemployeffectivecommunitypolicingstrategies.TheDepartments
currentrelationshipwithcertainBaltimorecommunitiesisbroken.Asnotedabove,
somecommunitymembersbelievethattheDepartmentoperatesasiftherearetwo
BaltimoresinwhichtheaffluentsectionsoftheCityreceivebetterservicesthanits
impoverishedandminorityneighborhoods.Thisfracturedrelationshipexistsinpart
becauseoftheDepartmentslegacyofzerotoleranceenforcement,thefailureofmany

BPDofficerstoimplementcommunitypolicingprinciples,andtheDepartmentslackof

visionforengagingwiththecommunity.

BPDfailstoadequatelysuperviseofficersthroughpolicyguidanceandtraining.Until

recently,BPDlackedsufficientpolicyguidanceincriticalareas,suchasbias-freepolicing

andofficersuseofbatonsandtasers.Inotherareas,suchasitspolicygoverningstop

andfrisk,BPDpolicyconflictswithconstitutionalrequirements.TheDepartment

likewiselackseffectivetrainingonimportantareas,suchasscenario-basedtrainingfor
useofforce,anadequateFieldTrainingprogram;andsupervisoryorleadershiptraining.

BPDalsofailstocollectdataonarangeoflawenforcementactions,andevenwhenit
collectsdata,failstostoreitinsystemsthatarecapableofeffectivetrackingandanalysis.

10

Partlyasaresult,theBPDdoesnotuseaneffectiveearlyinterventionsystemtodetect

officerswhomaybenefitfromadditionaltrainingorguidancetoensurethattheydonot
commitconstitutionalandstatutoryviolations.

Inaddition,BPDfailstoadequatelysupportitsofficerswithadequatestaffingand

materialresources.TheDepartmentlackseffectivestrategiesforstaffing,recruitment
andretention,forcingofficerstoworkovertimeafterlongshifts,loweringmorale,and
leadingtoofficersworkingwithdeteriorateddecision-makingskills.Moreover,BPD
lacksadequatetechnologyinfrastructureandtoolsthatarecommoninmanysimilar
sizedlawenforcementagencies,suchasin-carcomputers.Thesetechnologydeficits
createinefficienciesforofficersandinhibiteffectivedatacollectionandsupervision.The
Citymustinvestinitspolicedepartmenttoensurethatofficershavethetoolstheyneed
toproperlyservethepeopleofBaltimore.

*
*
*

Notwithstandingourfindings,weareheartenedbythesupportforpolicereformthroughout
BPDtheCity,andthebroaderBaltimorecommunity.Basedonthecooperationandspiritof
engagementwewitnessedthroughoutourinvestigation,weareoptimisticthatwewillbeableto

workwiththeCity,BPD,andthediversecommunitiesofBaltimoretoaddresstheissuesdescribed

inourfindingsandforgeacourt-enforceableagreementtodevelopenduringremediestothe
constitutionalandstatutoryviolationswefound.Indeed,althoughmuchworkremains,BPDhas

alreadybegunlayingthefoundationforreformbyself-initiatingchangestoitspolicies,training,data
management,andaccountabilitysystems.

Tothatend,theDepartmentofJusticeandtheCityhaveenteredintoanAgreementin

Principlethatidentifiescategoriesofreformsthepartiesagreemustbetakentoremedythe
violationsoftheConstitutionandfederallawdescribedinthisreport.BoththeJusticeDepartment
andtheCityseekinputfromallcommunitiesinBaltimoreonthereformsthatshouldbeincludedin
acomprehensive,court-enforceableconsentdecreetobenegotiatedbytheJusticeDepartmentand

theCityinthecomingmonths,andthenenteredasafederalcourtorder.

AswehaveseeninjurisdictionsacrossAmerica,itispossibleforlawenforcementagencies
toenhancetheireffectivenessbypromotingconstitutionalpolicingandrestoringcommunity

partnerships.StrengtheningcommunitytrustinBPDwillnotonlyincreasetheeffectivenessof

BPDslawenforcementefforts,itwilladvanceofficerandpublicsafetyinamannerthatservesthe
entireBaltimorecommunity.TogetherwithCityofficialsandthepeopleofBaltimore,wewillwork

tomakethisareality.

11

I. BACKGROUND

A. BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

BaltimoreisthelargestcityinthestateofMarylandwithapopulationofapproximately

621,000. TheBaltimoremetropolitanareas2.7millionresidentsmakeitthenations21stlargest

urbancenter.TheCityspopulationisapproximately63percentAfricanAmerican,30percent

white,and4percentHispanicorLatino. 3WhiletheCityhostsanumberofsuccessfulinstitutions

andbusinesses, 4mosteconomicmeasuresshowthatlargeportionsofBaltimorespopulation
struggleeconomically.Comparedtonationalaverages,Baltimoreexhibits:lowerincomes,witha

medianhouseholdincomenearly20percentlowerthanthenationalaverage;higherpovertyrates,

5
with24.2percentofindividualslivingbelowthefederalpovertylevel;

elevatedunemployment,with
aratehoveringaround7percent,andaverageunemploymentratespermonththatwere50percent

higherthanthenationalaveragefrom2014to2015. 6Baltimorealsoscoresbelownationalaverages
ineducation:80.9percentofthepopulationhasgraduatedfromhighschool,while27percenthasa

bachelorsdegreeorhigher. 7Inmostgradesandsubjects,thepercentageofstudentsbelowbasic
8
proficiencyinBaltimorewastwicetherateseeninMarylandasawhole.

ThesesocioeconomicchallengesarepronouncedamongBaltimoresAfrican-American
population,owinginparttotheCityshistoryofgovernment-sponsoreddiscrimination.Schools

andmanyotherpublicinstitutionsintheCityremainedformallysegregateduntilthe1950s,and

starkresidentialsegregationhasmarkedtheCityshistory.In1910,Baltimorebecamethefirstcity

inAmericatopassanordinanceestablishingblock-by-blocksegregation,apolicythatwasfollowed

byotherdiscriminatorypractices,includingrestrictivecovenants,aggressiveredlining,acontract
systemforhousingloans,andraciallytargetedsubprimeloans. 9Thislegacycontinuestoimpact
currenthomeownershippatterns,asBaltimoreremainsamongthemostsegregatedcitiesinthe
country. 10In2008,theCityofBaltimoresuedWellsFargoundertheFairHousingAct,allegingthat
thecompanysteeredminorityhomebuyersintosubprimeloans.Tosettlethislitigation,WellsFargo
agreedtoprovide$4.5millioninlendingassistancetoBaltimoreresidentsand$3milliontoaddress
3U.S.CensusBureau,AmericanFactFinder-Results,accessedApril11,2016,

http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF.

4Forexample,BaltimoreistheheadquartersforJohnsHopkinsUniversityHospital,UnderArmour,Inc.,andLegg

Mason,Inc.,amongmanyothers.
5U.S.CensusBureau,AmericanFactFinder-Results,accessedApril11,2016,

http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF.

6DepartmentofLabor,LocalAreaUnemploymentStatistics(LAUS)
WorkforceInformation&Performance,

https://www.dllr.state.md.us/lmi/laus/.
7Bureau,AmericanFactFinder Results.Nationally,over88percentofadultAmericanshavehighschooldiplomas

and32percentholdabachelorsdegreeorhigher.
8NationalCenterforEducationStatisticsInstituteofEducationSciences,2009NationalAssessmentofEducational

Proficiencydataexplorer,http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/naepdata/dataset.aspx.
9See generallyAnteroPietila,NOTINMYNEIGHBORHOOD(2010).
10FreyW.H.,New Racial Segregation Measures for States and Large Metropolitan Areas: Analysis of the 20052009 American
Community Survey, http://censusscope.org/ACS/Segregation.html

12

issues connected to foreclosures.11 Certain neighborhoods, such as all of the census tracts in South
Baltimore, have been at least 90 percent white since the 1970s. Other areas, including all of the
tracts in Cherry Hill, Sandtown-Winchester, and Upton/Druid Hill, have been at least 90 percent
black for the past five census periods and are currently more than 95 percent black.12

Similarly, Wells Fargo paid $234 million to settle a Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act suit brought
by the U.S. Department of Justice that alleged discriminatory lending practices against minorities, including payments to
the City of Baltimore and many Baltimore residents that were alleged victims of the discriminatory practices. Wells
Fargo agreed to provide $5.7 million in down payment assistance and pay an additional $1.6 million directly to victims
with homes in the City.
12 Place Matters for Health in Baltimore: Ensuring Opportunities for Good Health for all, Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, November 2012, 19-20; 9. http://jointcenter.org/docs/40925_JCBaltimoreReport.pdf
11

13

Thishistoryofracialdiscriminationhascreatedpersistentracialdisparitiesineconomic
opportunityandeducation.Roughly100,000AfricanAmericanBaltimoreresidentsliveinpoverty,
accountingformorethanthree-fourthsofBaltimoreanswhodoso.Manycommunities,particularly
low-incomecommunities,confrontgravechallengeswithrespecttoupwardmobility.Indeed,a
recentHarvardUniversitystudyfoundthatBaltimorehastheleastupwardmobilityinAmerica.In
13
thenations100largestjurisdictions,Baltimoreschildrenfacetheworstoddsofescapingpoverty.

Consequently,theunemploymentrateamongAfricanAmericansisroughlydoublethatofwhite
individuals.Inaddition,whiteadultsare3.5timesmorelikelythanblackadultstohaveearneda

bachelorsdegree.AfricanAmericansarealsosignificantlylesslikelytoholdahighschool

diploma. 14Moreover,whitechildrenmakeuponepercentorlessofthestudentbodyinnumerous
schoolsthatservedisproportionatelylow-incomechildren,perpetuatingsegregationbyraceand

class. 15

Theimpactsofsegregationandeconomicinequalityarefurtherevidentinleadpoisoning
patternsacrossBaltimore.TheCityhasnearlythreetimesthenationalrateofleadpoisoningamong

children.Thisburdenweighsheaviestonpoor,African-Americancommunities.Theareaswiththe

highestpercentageofchildrenwithelevatedbloodleadlevelsaretheheavilyAfrican-American

neighborhoodsofSandtown-Winchester/HarlemPark(7.4percent),Midway/Coldstream(6.1
percent),andEdmondsonVillage(5.3percent). 16AccordingtotheCenterforDiseaseControl,
evenlowlevelsofleadareassociatedwithlearningandbehavioralproblems,includingdecreased

17
cognitiveperformance.

WhilecrimerateinurbanAmericahasdeclinedsignificantlysincethe1990s,Baltimorehas

experiencedviolentcrimeratesrelativelyhigherthanmanyotherlargecities.Accordingtodata

fromtheFederalBureauofInvestigation,in2014Baltimorehadthesixthhighestrateofviolent
crimesoutofthecountrys76citieswithatleast250,000residents.Baltimoresviolentcrimerateis
roughlyequaltothatofCleveland,albeitlowerthantherateofviolentcrimeinDetroit,Memphis,

andMilwaukee. 18Thispastyearreflectedanotablesurgeinviolence.

Onaper-capitabasis,2015
wasthedeadliestyearinBaltimoreshistorywith344homicides.TheCitysoverallgunviolence

increasedmorethan75percentcomparedtothepreviousyear,withmorethan900peopleshot.As

13RajChettyandNathanielHendren,The

Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility,HarvardUniversity,April

2015.http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/images/nbhds_exec_summary.pdf

14Place Matters for Health in Baltimore: Ensuring Opportunities for Good Health for all,JointCenterforPoliticalandEconomic

Studies,November2012,11.http://jointcenter.org/docs/40925_JCBaltimoreReport.pdf
15Ayscue,J.B.,&Orfield,G.(2015).Schooldistrictlinesstratifyeducationalopportunitybyraceandpoverty.Race and
Social Problems, 7(1),520.doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.princeton.edu/10.1007/s12552-014-9135-0
16Vital Signs,BaltimoreNeighborhoodsIndicatorAlliances,http://bniajfi.org/wp
content/uploads/2014/04/VS12_Children_and_Health.pdf.
17CenterforDiseaseControl,ChildhoodLeadPoisoningData,Statistics,andSurveillance,accessedJune14,2016,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/data/index.htm.;U.S.DepartmentofHealthandHumanServices,National
Toxicology

Program Monograph: Health Effects of Low-Level Lead,June2012,

http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/ohat/lead/final/monographhealtheffectslowlevellead_newissn_508.pdf;AiminChenet
al.,LeadExposure,IQ,andBehaviorinUrban5-to7-Year-Olds:DoesLeadAffectBehaviorOnlybyLoweringIQ?,
Pediatrics119,No.3(March1,2007):e65058,doi:10.1542/peds.2006-1973.
18InSectionII.B,infra,wecomparelawenforcementactivityinthesecitieswithenforcementactionstakenbyBPD.

14

inothermajorcities,gangactivityandadrugeconomyarealsoprominentfeaturesofBaltimores
19
crimelandscape,althoughBaltimoreresidentsusedrugsatsimilarratestothenationalaverage.

Despitesuchchallenges,Baltimoreremainsavibrantculturalcenterintheregion.Ithasa
significantconcentrationofeducational,medical,cultural,andsportsinstitutions,andarich

collectionofneighborhoods.Asweheardthroughoutourinvestigation,residentstakegreatpridein
theirneighborhoodsandtheirCityasawhole,andhaveinvesteddeeplyinthem.Theseresidentsare

supportedbyavastarrayofcommunityleaders,grassrootsorganizations,andserviceproviders,and
togethertheycomprisearesilientanddiversecollectionofcommunities.

B. THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT

TheBaltimorePoliceDepartment,orBPD,istheeighthlargestmunicipalpolice

departmentinthenation.BPDemploysnearly3,000personnel,includingapproximately2,600
swornofficers,althoughthisnumberhasdeclinedoverthelastyear.TheDepartmentisledbya
policecommissionerappointedbythemayorofBaltimoreandapprovedbytheBaltimoreCity
Council.ThecurrentcommissionerisKevinDavis,whowasappointedinterimcommissionerby
MayorStephanieRawlings-BlakeonJuly8,2015,andswornintothepositionpermanentlyon

October19,2015.

MostBPDofficersworkineitherthePatrolDivisionortheCriminalInvestigations
Division,eachofwhichisoverseenbyachief. 20Patrolofficersaredividedgeographicallyamong
ninepolicedistrictsthatincludelocalpolicestationhouses,referredtoasdistrictheadquarters.Each
districthasacaptainandisledbyamajorwhoseprimaryresponsibilityisdirectingenforcement

activitiesandsupervisingofficers.BPDcurrentlyemploysapproximately1,300patrolofficerswho

haveprimaryresponsibilityforrespondingtocallsforserviceandpatrollingBaltimorestreets.

TheCriminalInvestigationDivisionandOperationalInvestigationDivisionhouseBPDs
specializedunits,suchastheHomicideSection,andtheSpecialInvestigationSection,whichfocus

oninvestigatingviolentoffenders,gangs,andguncrimesacrossBaltimore.TheDivisionincludes
unitsthatperformtacticaloperations,usespecialweapons,andservewarrants.Thenamesofthese
specializedenforcementunitshavechangedseveraltimesoverthepastdecade.Specialenforcement

unitshavepreviouslybeencalledtheViolentCrimeImpactDivision(VCID),ViolentCrimeImpact

Section(VCIS),andtheViolentRepeatOffenderUnit(VRO).BPDalsoassignsasmallnumberof

officerstoitsCommunityCollaborationDivision,whichfocusesonbuildingpolice-community

relationsthroughouttheCity.

TheDepartmenthasacomplexprocessforaccountabilitythatisdetailedinSectionIII(C),

infra.BPDallowsdistrictsupervisorstoresolvecomplaintsofofficermisconductthataredeemed
lessseriousoffenses,carryingpunishmentofnomorethanathree-daysuspension.Complaints
deemedtoallegemoreseriousmisconductareassignedtotheInternalInvestigationDivision.

In
19AccordingtodatacollectedbytheSubstanceAbuseandMentalHealthServicesAdministration,42.9percentof

Baltimoreresidentsoverage12haveusedmarijuana,comparedto40.7percentnationally.Fordrugsotherthan

marijuana,SAMHSAreportsthat3.28percentofBaltimoreadultshaveusedthesedrugswithinthepast30days,

comparedto3.35percentnationally.
20BPDalsohasanAdministrativeBureauthatconsistsofbooking,humanresources,informationservices,inspections,

andothermanagementfunctions.

15

addition,BaltimoreestablishedaCivilianReviewBoardtoprovideapublicvoiceinBPDs

accountabilityprocess.MembersofthepubliccanlodgecomplaintswiththeBoarddirectly,and

BPDisrequiredbystatutetosharewiththeBoardallcomplaintsitreceivesthatfitwithincertain

categories,includingexcessiveforceanddiscourtesy.TheBoardisauthorizedtoconductparallel
investigationsandmakedisciplinaryrecommendations.Inpractice,however,theBoardsrolehas

beendiminishedbyseverelylimitedinvestigativeresources,inconsistentcomplaintreferralsfrom
BPD,andtheCitysfailuretofilltheBoardsseats.

BPDofficersarerepresentedbytheFraternalOrderofthePoliceLodgeNo.3(FOP),

whichhasacollective-bargainingcontractwiththeCityandservesasthesolecollective-bargaining

agentforofficersbelowtherankoflieutenant,makingmembershipinclusiveofbothlineofficers

andtheirdirectsupervisors.InadditiontotheFOP,theVanguardJusticeSociety,Inc.,isa

membershiporganizationthatadvocatesonbehalfofminorityofficers.BPDdidnothireitsfirst

African-Americanofficeruntil1937anddidnotallowminorityofficerstodrivepatrolcarsuntil

1966. Priorto1966,theDepartmentssmallnumberofAfrican-Americanofficerswererequiredto
workfootpatrolandwerenotpermittedtoworkinpredominantlywhiteneighborhoods.Inrecent
years,theDepartmenthasmadeeffortstoattractandpromoteminoritycandidates.Asof2015,
AfricanAmericansaccountedforapproximately42percentofBPDofficers.Aboutone-fifthof
BPDofficersarewomen.MostBPDofficersareneitheroriginallyfromBaltimorenorliveinthe
City,andmanycommutelongdistancestoworkattheDepartment.

Indeed,BPDleadership
informedusthatroughlythree-fourthsofBPDofficersliveoutsidetheBaltimoreCitylimits.

BPDcoordinateswithseveralauxiliarylawenforcementagencies,andhasdoneso

increasinglyinrecentyearstocompensatewhendistrictsdonothavesufficientofficerstostaff
shifts.TheseagenciesincludetheBaltimoreSchoolPolice,thepoliceforceoftheBaltimoreCity
PublicSchoolSystem.BaltimoreSchoolPoliceofficershaveallthepowersoflawenforcement

21
officersinthestate,includingarrestpowers.

Amemorandumofunderstandingbetweenthe
PublicSchoolSystemandBPDauthorizestheschoolpolicetoexercisefullpolicepoweranywhere

withinthejurisdictionoftheCityofBaltimore,andtoassistininvestigationsandfollow-upin

criminalcases. 22Thedeploymentplanfortheschoolpoliceindicatesthattheseofficersareassigned
23
tofootpatrol,bikeunits,andmobileresponseunitsoutsideofschools.

Theseofficersalso

respondtocallsforserviceintheCitywhenBPDpatrolshiftsareunderstaffed.

C. BPDS ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

BALTIMORE COMMUNITY

Baltimoreslegacyofgovernment-sanctioneddiscrimination,serioushealthhazards,and
highratesofviolentcrimehavepersistedandcompoundedforyearsmakingBaltimorea
challengingcitytopolicefairlyandeffectively.Indeed,officersconveythatworkinginBaltimore
affordsauniquelyintenseanddemandingexperience.OnememberofBPDrecentlyasserted,a

21Md.CodeAnn.,Educ.4318(c)and(d)(1)(2015).

22MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweentheBaltimoreCityPublicSchoolSystemandBaltimorePoliceDepartment

at12(June27,2007).

23MarshallT.Goddwin,Chief,BaltimoreSchoolPoliceForce,Deployment

16

For SY 2015/2016,July2,2015.

24
five-yearcopinthecityhastheequivalentexperienceofaten-yearcopanywhereelse.

These
challengesareamplifiedbylong-simmeringdistrustoflawenforcementfromsegmentsofthe

Baltimorecommunity.Indeed,whenaskedwhencommunitydistrustofBaltimorelawenforcement
began,aformertopcityofficialdeadpannedtoJusticeDepartmentofficials,1729theyearof

theCitysfounding.Thesetensionshardenedduringthe1990sand2000sastheCityrespondedto
increasingviolentcrimeratesbyemphasizinganaggressive,zerotolerancepolicingstrategythat

prioritizedmakinglargenumbersofstops,searches,andarrestsoftenformisdemeanorstreet
offenseslikeloiteringanddisorderlyconduct.Throughoutthe1990sand2000s,arrestinglarge
numbersofpeopleforminoroffenseswascentraltoBPDsenforcementparadigm;in2005,BPD

mademorethan108,000arrests,mostfornonviolentoffenses.

Arrestnumbersdeclinedstartinginthelate2000sinresponsetofallingcrimeratesand
effortstomovetowardsamoreholisticpolicingmodelfocusedonbuildingcommunity
partnerships.Indeed,currentBPDCommissionerDavisandhispredecessor,AnthonyW.Batts,

havebothacknowledgedpubliclythatthezerotoleranceapproachtopolicingerodedcommunity

trustandimpededeffortstobuildpartnershipsthatarecentraltoeffectivepolicing.Despitethese

efforts,however,thelegacyofzerotolerancepersistsinmanyaspectsoftheDepartments

enforcement.Manysupervisorswhowereinculcatedintheeraofzerotolerancecontinuetofocus

ontherawnumberofofficersstopsandarrests,ratherthanmorenuancedmeasuresof
performance.Asoneexampleofthisapproach,supervisorsfrequentlyencourageofficerstoclear
cornersaninstructionmanyofficersunderstandtostop,disperse,orarrestgroupsofindividuals
standingonpublicsidewalks.ThecontinuedemphasisonthesetypesofstatsdrivesBPDs
tendencytostop,search,andarrestsignificantnumbersofindividualsonBaltimorestreetsoften

withoutrequisitelegaljustificationandinsituationsthatputofficersinadversarialencountersthat
havelittleconnectiontopublicsafety.Althougharrestnumbershavedeclinedfromtheirpeakin
themid-2000s,BPDofficersmadeover200,000arrestsand300,000pedestrianstopsinthefive
25
yearsofdataweexamined.

AdiversearrayofstakeholdershashighlightedproblemswithBPDspolicingstrategy.For
example,theFraternalOrderofPolices2012BlueprintforImprovedPolicinginBaltimore

advocatesdiscontinuingthepracticeofrewardingstatisticallydrivenarrests,noting:

[N]umbersdriveeverythingintheBPD,whichhasledtomisplacedpriorities.Asa
result,officersintheBPDfeelpressuretoachievenumbersforperceptionssake

Thefocusonassigningblameforless-than-satisfactorynumbersratherthan
problem-solving,iscompletelyunproductiveandweakensthecollectivemoraleof

26
theBPD.

CityofficialsalsoadmitthattheDepartmentsapproachhasbeenproblematic.MayorRawlingsBlakehaslongrecognizedtheneedforreformandrepeatedlycriticizedtheaggressivepolicing

24FraternalOrderofPoliceLodge3,Blueprint

for Improved Policing,5,http://www.fop3.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/blueprint.pdf.

25AsexplainedfurtherinSectionII.A,thetruenumberofpedestrianstopsislikelyseveraltimeshigherthanthe

recordedfigureduetoBPDsunder-reporting.
26FraternalOrderofPoliceLodge3,Blueprint
for Improved Policing,89,http://www.fop3.org/wp
content/uploads/2015/05/blueprint.pdf

17

strategieschampionedintheyearsbeforeherterm.InSeptember2013,shetoldresidents,Asthis
conversationisgoingon,thereisananxietythatisbuildinginsomeofourcommunitiesthatwe're

goingbacktoatimewhencommunitiesfeltliketheirkidswereundersiege...Iwanttoallayany

concernsouttherethatthatisthetacticwe'regoingtoreturnto.

That'snotgoingtohappen. 27
Andinthefallof2014,heradministrationnotedthatthezerotolerancestrategyignitedarift
betweenthecitizensandthepolice,whichstillexiststodayandthatthereisabrokenrelationship

28
betweenlawenforcementofficialsandcommunitymembers.

ThelargerBaltimorecommunityhasvoicedsimilarconcerns.Newsoutlets,community

advocates,andgrassrootsorganizationshavefrequentlycriticizedBaltimoresapproachtopolicing.

In2006,theACLUofMarylandsuedBPDoveritsallegedpatternofmakinghighnumbersof

unlawfulstopsandarrests.Inaddition,thepolicedepartmenthaslongfacedallegationsof
unreasonableforce.Insomeoftheseallegations,thepoliceinteractionswerefatal.

Inothers,
Baltimoreresidentswereleftseverelyandpermanentlyinjured.InSeptember2014,theBaltimore

SunpublishedUndueForce,anarticledocumentingcasesofallegedpolicebrutalityandthe

millionsofdollarsthecityhaspaidtosettlelawsuitsallegingthatofficersusedexcessiveforce.The
articlenotesthatmorethan100peoplehavewoncourtjudgmentsorsettlementsrelatedto

allegationsofbrutalityandcivilrightsviolationssince2010. 29Morerecently,NoBoundaries

Coalition,aresident-ledadvocacyorganizationoperatinginWestBaltimore,releasedareportin
March2016detailingstoriesofpolicemisconducttoldbywitnessesandvictimsintheSandtownWinchesterneighborhood.Thecommunityrecollectionsrevealabeliefthatthereisracisminlaw
enforcement,unnecessaryforceandverbalabuse,anus-versus-themattitudeamongpolice

officers,alackofpositiveinteractionswiththepolice,andstrongfeelingsofrecrimination,
resentment,fear,andmistrustamongresidents. 30

In2012,MayorRawlings-BlakehiredCommissionerBattstoinitiatereformsthroughoutthe

policedepartment.Thefollowingyear,CommissionerBattsissuedPublic Safety in the City of Baltimore,

afive-yearplanintendedtoreducecrime,improveservice,increaseefficiency,redoublecommunity

31
engagement,andprovideforthehigheststandardsofaccountabilityandethicalintegrity.

The
reportdiscussednumerouschallengesfacingBPD,including:equipment,accountability,training,
andcommunicationfailures;strainedpolice-communityrelations,andlowcommunityengagement;

anddecreasedmoraleandmotivationamongofficers. 32Thereportincludedaninternalsurveythat
revealedthatonly14percentofBPDemployeesbelievedtheBaltimorecommunitysupportsthe

policedepartment.ThereportalsolaidoutaplanforimprovingBPDsworkintheseareas.During

asimilartimeperiod,theCitysubstantiallyincreasedtheresourcesofthepolicedepartment.

While
27LukeBroadwaterandEricCox,GovernorsPushforMoreArrestsCausingAnxietyinBaltimore,MayorSays,

Baltimore Sun,September25,2013,http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/blog/bs-md-ci-srb-arrests20130925-story.html.
28JohnFritze,Rawlings-BlakeCriticismHighlightsDebateoverPoliceStrategyunderOMalley,Baltimore

Sun,
October13,2014,http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-police-omalley-politics-20141007
story.html.
29MarkPuente,UndueForce,Baltimore Sun,September28,2014,http://data.baltimoresun.com/news/policesettlements/.
30NoBoundariesCoalition,Over-Policed,
Yet Underserved,March2016,http://www.noboundariescoalition.com/wp
content/uploads/2016/03/No-Boundaries-Layout-Web-1.pdf.
31AnthonyBatts,Public
Safety in the City of Baltimore: A Strategic Plan for Improvement,2013,5.

32Id.at4548.

18

thecityfacesseriousbudgetconstraints,thefiscalyear2016policebudgetwasapprovedat$476
million,representingadramaticincreasefromthe2010policebudgetof$340million.

AsthereformplansCommissionerBattsinitiatedwereintheirearlystages,theunrest
followingthedeathofFreddieGrayinpolicecustodyinApril2015demonstratedthedeepand
enduringdividebetweenpoliceofficersandpartsoftheBaltimorecommunity.Commissioner

DavisacknowledgedthatBPDslegacyofzerotoleranceenforcementcontributedtothesetensions:

Someofthingsthatwedidinthepast,likezerotolerancepolicing,didn'tworkandarguablyledin

parttotheunrestthatweexperiencedin2015. 33Hehasalsoacknowledgedthatimproved
34
relationswithCityresidentsrequireBPDtochangeitsculture.

Thedesireforsuchreformis
apparent.CommissionerDavisbeganaHistoryofBaltimorespeakers-seriesinearly2016to
provideofficerswithanunderstandingoftheCityshistoricalbackground.Thetopics,whichrange
fromhousingandsegregationtothedevelopmentofBaltimoresport,wereselectedtoprovidea
deeperappreciationofthediversecommunitiesthatthepoliceserve.ThereleaseofanewCore
OperatingProceduresManualduringthesummerof2016alsorepresentsanattempttoimprove
standardsandguidelineswithrespecttoofficersuseofforce.

Wecommendtheseefforts,butfindthatsignificantobstaclesremaintoachievingthe

changenecessarytoensurethatBPDspolicingisbotheffectiveandconstitutional.Asdescribed
below,wefindthatBPDhasengagedinapatternorpracticeofconductthatviolatesthe

constitutionalandfederalstatutoryrightsofCityresidents,andthattheDepartmentlackssufficient

systemstominimizetheseviolations.

D. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

NumerousfederalcomponentshaveassistedBPDsreformeffortsinrecentyears.In
October2014,MayorRawlings-BlakeandCommissionerBattsrequestedtoenteracollaborative

reformprocesswiththeDepartmentofJusticesOfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices

(COPS).ThisfederalreviewinvolvedanassessmentofBPDspolicies,training,andoperationsas

theyrelatedtotheuseofforceandinteractionswiththemembersofthecommunity.Throughthis

process,subjectmatterexpertsidentifiedbytheCOPSofficebegantoexamineBPDscommunity
policingandengagementeffortsandprovidedadditionalresourcesandtrainings,suchaspeer-to
peerexchangestofacilitatesharingbestpracticesfromotherpolicedepartments.Overthepast
severalyears,theOfficeofJusticeProgramsalsoawardedByrneJusticeAssistancegrantstoBPD,
tosupportcertaininitiatives,including:acomprehensivereviewofBPDstechnologysystemsand

capabilities;ananalysisofBPDsgrantdevelopmenteffortsandstrategy;andacustomized
workshopforBPDcommandstafftoeffectivelydevelopandmanagecrimeanalysiscapabilities.In

responsetoanotherrequestfromCityleadership,theJusticeDepartmentprovidedfederallaw

enforcementresourcestohelptheCitycombatitscrimeandpublicsafetychallengesinAugust

2015. Followingthisinitialassistance,theBureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,FirearmsandExplosives,

theFederalBureauofInvestigation,theDrugEnforcementAdministration,andtheU.S.Marshals

33MaryRoseMadden,BaltimorePoliceChiefWantsToReformDepartment,NPR:

All Things Considered,April24,

2016,http://www.npr.org/2016/04/24/475511963/baltimore-police-chief-wants-to-reform-department.
34KevinRector,JustinGeorge,andMarkPuente,BaltimoresNewPoliceCommissionerHasaFullPlateandan

Opportunity,Baltimore Sun,July12,2015,http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-davis-challenges20150711-story.html.

19

Serviceallagreedtomakealongertermcommitmentofresourcestolawenforcementeffortsin
Baltimore. 35

ThedeathofFreddieGrayandensuingunrestoccurredduringtheearlystagesofthe
collaborativereformeffortsbetweenBPDandCOPS.Theseeventsunderscoredthecriticallackof
trustbetweenBPDandasignificantportionoftheCitysresidents,especiallyAfricanAmericans.

AfterreviewinginformationithadreceivedaboutBPDspolicepracticesandreceivingrequests

fromMayorRawlings-Blake,membersofCongress,andnumerousothermembersoftheBaltimore
community,theJusticeDepartmentdeterminedBPDwarrantedacomprehensivecivilrights

investigationtodeterminewhethertheDepartmentengagedinapatternorpracticeofconstitutional

andstatutoryviolations.TheCivilRightsDivisionthusopenedaformalinvestigationintoBPDon

May8,2015.Sincethecivilrightsinvestigationopened,theCOPSofficehascontinuedtoprovide

technicalassistancetoBPD.

Ourinvestigationrecognizesthat,asCommissionerDavisaptlynoted,Baltimoreofficers
havetheburdentoaddressracismandpovertyandeducationandhomelessness.Theseproblems,
whichconfrontofficerseverydayonthestreetandarenottheirresponsibilityalonetofix,are
neverthelessintertwinedwithcrimeconditionsacrosstheCity.Butthisburdenonofficersdoesnot
excuseBPDsviolationsoftheconstitutionalandstatutoryrightsofthepeoplelivinginthese

challengingconditions.

WefindthatBPDspracticesperpetuateandfuelamultitudeofissues

rootedinpovertyandrace,focusinglawenforcementactionsonlow-income,minoritycommunities
inamannerthatisoftenunnecessaryandunproductive.Inotherwords,BPDslawenforcement
practicesattimesexacerbatethelongstandingstructuralinequalitiesintheCitybyencouraging

officerstohaveunnecessary,adversarialinteractionswithcommunitymembersthatincrease
exposuretothecriminaljusticesystemandfailtoimprovepublicsafety.

35Duringthissametimeperiod,theOfficeofJusticeProgramsOfficeforCivilRightsinitiatedalanguageaccess

compliancereviewofBPD,andthatreviewisstillongoing.

20

II. BPD ENGAGES IN A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF CONDUCT

THAT VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS, AND CONDUCT THAT RAISES SERIOUS CONCERNS

TheCivilRightsDivisionoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeopenedthis
investigationpursuanttotheViolentCrimeControlandLawEnforcementActof1994,42U.S.C.

14141(Section14141),TitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964,42U.S.C.2000d(TitleVI),

andtheOmnibusCrimeControlandSafeStreetsActof1968,42U.S.C.3789d(SafeStreetsAct

orSSA),andTitleIIoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesActof1990(ADA),42U.S.C.12131

12134.Section14141prohibitslawenforcementagenciesfromengaginginapatternorpracticeof

conductthatviolatestheConstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedStates.Wheresuchapatternorpractice

exists,Section14141grantstheAttorneyGeneralauthoritytobringsuitforequitableand
declaratoryrelieftoremedyit.Apatternorpracticeexistswhereviolationsarerepeatedratherthan

isolated.Intl Bd. of Teamsters v. United States,431U.S.324,336n.l6(1977)(notingthatthephrase

patternorpracticewasnotintendedasatermofart,butshouldbeinterpretedaccordingtoits
usualmeaningconsistentwiththeunderstandingoftheidenticalwordsusedinotherfederalcivil
rightsstatutes).Anunlawfulpatternorpracticedoesnotrequireanyspecificnumberofincidents.

United States v. W. Peachtree Tenth Corp.,437F.2d221,227(5thCir.1971)(Thenumberof

[violations]...isnotdeterminative....Inanyevent,nomathematicalformulaisworkable,norwas

anyintended.Eachcasemustturnonitsownfacts.);see

alsoStastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,628

F.2d267,278(4thCir.1980)(holdinginthecontextofemploymentdiscriminationthataplaintiff
mayshowapatternorpracticethroughstatisticalevidenceorasufficientnumberofinstancesof
similardiscriminatorytreatment).TitleVIanditsimplementingregulationsprohibitrecipientsof

federalfinancialassistance,suchasBPD,fromdiscriminatingonthebasisofrace,color,ornational

origin.TitleVIprovidesthatnopersonshallbeexcludedfromparticipatingin,bedeniedthe

benefitsof,orbesubjectedtodiscriminationunderanyprogramoractivityreceiving[f]ederal
financialassistancebasedonrace.42U.S.C.2000d.TheTitleVIimplementingregulationsban
recipientsoffederalfundsfromusingcriteriaormethodsofadministrationthathavean

unnecessarydisparateimpactbasedonrace.28C.F.R.42.104(b)(2).TheSafeStreetsActlikewise

prohibitslawenforcementpracticesthatcausedisparateimpactbasedonraceexceptwheresuch

impactisnecessarytoachievenondiscriminatoryobjectives.See28C.F.R.42.203.TheADA,

whichappliestoBPDsservices,programs,andactivities,includingon-the-streetencounters,arrests,

andtransportationtoahospitalformentalhealthevaluation,See 42U.S.C.12132;28C.F.R.
35.130(a);requiresBPDtomakereasonablemodificationsinpolicies,practices,orprocedures
whenthemodificationsarenecessarytoavoiddiscriminationonthebasisofdisability.28C.F.R.

35.130(b)(7);Title

II Technical Assistance Manual II-3.6100,at14.

OurinvestigationfindsthatBPDengagesinapatternorpracticeofconductthatimplicates

ourstatutoryauthority.ThispatternorpracticeisrootedinBPDsdeficientsupervisionand
oversightofofficeractivity,leadingdirectlytoabroadspectrumofconstitutionalandstatutory

violations.ThislackofsupervisionandoversightincludesBPDsfailuretouseeffectiveandwidely
acceptedmethodstosuperviseofficers,collectandanalyzedataonofficeractivity,andclassify,

investigate,andresolvecomplaintsofmisconduct.Thispatternorpracticeisalsomanifestedin

severalwaysthatviolatespecificconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisions:(1)BPDstops,searches,

21

andarrestsindividualsonBaltimorestreetswithoutthereasonablesuspicionorprobablecause

requiredbytheFourthAmendment;(2)BPDdisproportionatelystops,searches,andarrestsAfrican

AmericansinviolationofTitleVIandtheSafeStreetsAct,andthisdisparateimpact,alongwith

evidencesuggestingintentionaldiscriminationagainstAfricanAmericans,exacerbatescommunity
distrustofthepolice;(3)BPDusesunreasonableforceinviolationoftheFourthAmendment;

(4)BPDviolatestheFirstAmendmentrightsofBaltimoreresidentsbyusingforceorotherwise

retaliatingagainstindividualsexercisingconstitutionallyprotectedactivity,suchaspublicspeechand

filmingpoliceactivity;and(5)BPDsuseofforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilities

orexperiencingcrisisviolatestheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct.Toillustratetheseviolations,

throughoutthisletterweprovideseveralexamplesofeachtypeofviolationthatwefoundduring
ourinvestigation.Insomesectionsweprovidemoreexamplestoillustratethevarietyof
circumstancesinwhichtheviolationoccurs,whileinotherswefocusononeortwoexamplesthat
demonstratethenatureoftheviolationswefound.Thenumberofexamplesincludedinaparticular
sectionisnotindicativeofthenumberofviolationswefound.Theseexamplescompriseasmall
subsetofthetotalnumberofincidentsuponwhichwebaseourconclusions.

Wemakethesefindingsafteracomprehensive14-monthinvestigationintoBPDspractices.
TogainthebroadestpossibleperspectiveonthechallengesfacingBPD,ourinvestigationinvolved

reviewinganexhaustivesetofdocumentsandmeetingwithhundredsofofficers,community

members,cityleaders,andotherstakeholders.Intotal,wereviewedhundredsofthousandsof
pagesofdocuments,includingallrelevantpoliciesandtrainingmaterialsusedbytheDepartment

since2010;BPDsdatabaseofinternalaffairsfiles;arandomsampleofabout800casefilesonnon

deadlyforceincidents;filesonalldeadlyforceincidentssince2010thatBPDwasabletoproduceto
usthroughMay1,2016;asampleofseveralhundredincidentreportsdescribingstops,searches,and
arrests;investigativefilesonsexualassaultcases;databasesmaintainedbyBPDandtheStateof
Marylandcontaininginformationonhundredsofthousandsofpedestrianstops,vehiclestops,and
arrests;andmanyothers.Throughoutourreview,wewereassistedbyadozenlawenforcement

expertsfromacrossthecountrywithexpertiseontheissuesweinvestigated.

OurinvestigationalsoreliedonnumerousinterviewswithcurrentandformerBPDofficers

andcityofficials.Atalltimes,BPDleadershiptookacooperativeandprofessionalapproachtoour

investigationandprovidedimportantinsightsintothechallengesfacingtheDepartment.Wemetat

lengthwithcurrentCommissionerKevinDavis,formerCommissionerAnthonyBatts,andleaders

throughouttheBPDcommandstructure.WevisitedeachofBPDsninepolicedistricts,wherewe
metdistrictleadershipandspokewithlineofficers.Wealsoaccompaniedlineofficersondozensof
ride-alongsthattookplaceineverydistrict.Lineofficerssharedmanykeyinsightsduringthese
ride-alongsandotherinterviews.Wearegratefulfortheircandorindiscussingtheserious

challengestheyfaceandtheirgenuineinterestinpreventingthetypesofissuesdiscussedinour

findings.WearelikewisegratefultotheleadershipoftheBaltimoreFraternalOrderofPolice,

whichmetwithusonmultipleoccasionsandinvitedustospeaktounionmembersatalodge
dinner.TheVanguardJusticeSocietysimilarlyinvitedustospeakwiththeirmembersandprovided
highlyrelevantinformation.Togainthebroadestpossibleperspectiveonthechallengesfacing
BPD,wealsometwithcurrentandformerofficialsinCitygovernment,includingcurrentand
formerelectedofficialsandprosecutorsfromtheStatesAttorneysOffice.

22


Asinallofourinvestigations,wealsometwithlargenumbersofpeopleinthebroader
Baltimorecommunity.Ourcommunityoutreachincludedmeetingsatchurchesandwithreligious
leaders;meetingwithadvocacyandcommunitysupportorganizations;attendingavarietyof

neighborhoodgatherings,fromformalmeetingsofneighborhoodassociationstosummer
barbecues;andcanvassingneighborhoodsonfoottocollectstoriesaboutinteractionswiththe
police.Wealsometindividuallywithnumerousindividualswhocontactedustoshareinformation.
Insum,wemetwithmorethan500individualsduringourinvestigation.Weareextremelythankful

forthemanymembersoftheBaltimorecommunitywhocameforwardtoshareinformationwith

us,evenwhendoingsoinvolvedrelivingdifficultpersonalexperiences.Weareleftwiththefirm
impressionthat,despitethesignificantobstaclestorestoringcommunitytrustinBPD,thereisa
deepdesireacrossdiverseelementsoftheCityforapoliceforcethatisresponsive,effective,and

fair.

23

A. BPD MAKES UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOPS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS

WefindthatBPDengagesinapatternorpracticeofmakingstops,searches,andarrestsin

violationoftheFourthandFourteenthAmendmentsandSection14141.BPDfrequentlymakes
investigativestopswithoutreasonablesuspicionofpeoplewhoarelawfullypresentonBaltimore
streets.Duringstops,officerscommonlyconductweaponsfrisksormoreinvasivesearches
despitelackingreasonablesuspicionthatthesubjectofthesearchisarmed.Thesepracticesescalate
streetencountersandcontributetoofficersmakingarrestswithoutprobablecause, 36oftenfor
discretionarymisdemeanoroffenseslikedisorderlyconduct,resistingarrest,loitering,trespassing,
andfailuretoobey.Indeed,BPDsownsupervisorsatCentralBookingandprosecutorsinthe
StatesAttorneysOfficedeclinedtochargemorethan11,000arrestsmadebyBPDofficerssince

2010.

1. BPDs Unconstitutional Stops, Searches, and Arrests Result in Part from Its Zero
Tolerance Enforcement Strategy

ThepatternofconstitutionalviolationsdescribedbelowresultinpartfromBPDszero

toleranceenforcementstrategy,datingtotheearly2000s.Thatstrategyprioritizedattemptsto

suppresscrimebyregularlystoppingandsearchingpedestriansandarrestingthemonanyavailable

charges,includingdiscretionarymisdemeanoroffenses.RecentBPDleadership,includingthetwo

mostrecentpolicecommissioners,hasacknowledgedsomeoftheproblemscreatedbythiszero
toleranceapproachtoenforcementandhasattemptedtoshiftBPDsfocustoamoreholistic
policingmodelwithgreateremphasisonbuildingcommunitypartnerships.Forexample,inApril
2015BPDenactedanewpolicyonmisdemeanorqualityoflifeoffensesthatinstructedofficers

thataverbalwarningandcounselingispreferabletoacriminal/civilcitation,andacriminal/civil

citationispreferabletoanarrest.Despitetheselaudableefforts,however,thelegacyofthezero
toleranceeracontinuestoinfluenceofficeractivityandcontributetoconstitutionalviolations.

Indeed,manyBPDsupervisorswhoweretrainedunderthepriorenforcementparadigm
continuetoencourageofficerstoprioritizeshort-termsuppression,includingaggressiveuseof
stops,frisks,andmisdemeanorarrests.AcurrentBPDsergeantrecentlyendorsedthisapproachto
policing,postingonFacebookthatthesolutiontothemurderrateiseasy.Flexcuffsandalineat

[CentralBooking].CJIScode2-0055.CJIS2-0055istheoffensecodeenteredforloiteringarrests.
Similarly,aflyercelebratingloiteringarrestswaspostedinseveralBPDdistricts.Theflyerdepicted
threeofficersfromoneofBPDsspecializedunitsknownasViolentCrimeImpactDivision,or

VCID,leadingahandcuffedmanwearingahoodiealongacitysidewalktowardsapolicetransport

van,withthetextVCID:Strikingfearintoloiters[sic]City-wide.Andadeploymentmemo
postedinoneofBPDsdistrictsinthesummerof2015likewiseencouragedofficerstosuppress

crimethroughproactiveenforcement,includingstopandfrisk,streetleveldrugenforcement,

warrantchecks,footpatrol,carstops,andqualityoflifearrests.

36AsdetailedinSectionII(C)below,thesestreetencountersalsocontributetoofficerspatternorpracticeofusing

excessiveforce.

24

TheseinfluenceshavecontributedtoBPDofficersmakinglargenumbersofstops,searches,

andarrests,oftenwithdubiousjustification.FromJanuary2010May2014,BPDofficersrecorded

over301,000pedestrianstops.AndthetruenumberofstopsislikelyfarhigherbecauseBPD

officersdonotdocumentstopsconsistently.BPDsdatasuggeststhatstopsaresignificantlyunderreported.In2014alone,BPDofficersrecordedapproximately124,000stops,butaninternalaudit

foundthatofficerscompletedreportsforonly37outofasampleof123investigativestopscaptured
onthecomputer-aideddispatch(CAD)system.IfthisauditaccuratelycapturesBPDsoverallrate
ofreportingstopsin2014,itindicatesthatofficersmaderoughly412,000stopsthat

year alone,which

ismorethanseventimestheaveragenumberofstopsthatBPDreportedperyearfrom2010to

2015. Othermeasuressuggestthateventhisestimatemaybeconservative.BPDs2014auditof

handgunchargesthatarosefromstopsfoundthatofficersdidnotcompleteastopforminasingle
oneofthe335cases.ThesedataareconsistentwithinterviewsandobservationsduringtheJustice
Departmentsinvestigation,whichrevealedthatmanyofficersfilloutstopreportsrarely,ifatall.In

short,ourinvestigationsuggeststhatBPDofficerslikelymakeseveralhundredthousandpedestrian
stopsperyear 37inacitywithonly620,000residents.

37Duringthisperiod,BPDpolicyrequiredofficerstorecordallstopsonaformtitledStopandFrisk.Someofthe

activityrecordedbyofficersonthisformmayreflectencountersthatdonotrequirereasonablesuspicion,suchas

25

Moreover,BPDsdatashowthatthesestopsareconcentratedonasmallsegmentofthe

Cityspopulation.From20102014,BPDofficersintheWesternandCentralDistrictsrecorded

morethan111,500stopsroughly44percentofthetotalstopsforwhichofficersrecordeda

districtlocation. 38YetthesearethetwoleastpopulatedpolicedistrictsinBaltimore,witha
39
combinedpopulationofonly75,000,or12percentofCityresidents.

Thesedistrictsincludethe
Cityscentralbusinessdistrictandseveralpoor,urbanneighborhoodswithmostlyAfrican-American
residents. 40Inthesedistricts,policerecordednearly1.5stopsperresidentoverafour-yearperiod.

ThisdatarevealsthatcertainBaltimoreresidentshaverepeatedencounterswiththepoliceonpublic

streetsandsidewalks.Indeed,thedatashowthatoneAfrican-Americanmanwasstopped34times

duringthisperiodintheCentralandWesternDistrictsalone,andseveralhundredresidentswere
stoppedatleast10times.CountlessindividualsincludingFreddieGraywerestoppedmultiple

41
timesinthesameweekwithoutbeingchargedwithacrime.

Thedatalikewiseindicatethattheseencountersproducelargenumbersofarrests.

Whilea
significantportionofthesearrestsreflectBPDseffortstocombatviolentcrimeinBaltimoreCity,

morethan25,000arrestswerefornon-violentmisdemeanoroffensesforwhichofficershave

significantdiscretionaboutwhethertomakeanarrest.

BPDarrestedapproximately6,500people
fordisorderlyconduct,4,000forfailingtoobeyapoliceofficer,6,500fortrespassing,1,000for
hinderingorimpeding,3,200forinterference,760forbeingrogueandvagabond,and650for

playingcardsordice.Thesehighlydiscretionaryoffensesoftenarenotaneffectivewaytopromote

publicsafetyandaresubjecttoabuse.Indeed,supervisorsatCentralBookingandlocalprosecutors

dismissedasignificantpercentageofthesechargesupontheirinitialreviewofarrestdocuments.

Thisinitialreviewresultedindismissalof1in6ofthesehighlydiscretionarycharges.Over20
percentofalldisorderlyconductchargesand25percentoffailuretoobeychargesweredismissed.

Carefuloversightisnecessarytoensurethatthesefrequentstreetencountersandarrestsdo
notresultinconstitutionalviolations.Ourinvestigationfinds,however,thatBPDhasamplifiedthe
riskofconstitutionalviolationsinitsstreetenforcementeffortsbyrelyingoninadequatepolicies,

training,supervision,andaccountabilitymechanisms.TheDepartmentdoesnotcollectreliabledata

onstopsandsearches,hasnomechanismforidentifyingpatternsortrendsinitsofficersstops,

voluntarysocialcontactsandwitnessinterviews.Thelargemajorityofstopsrecorded,however,appeartoreflect
situationsinwhichthesubjectisnotfreetoleaveandreasonablesuspicionisrequired.Thisconclusionstemsfrom
interviewswithofficerswhoexplainedthattheycompletedaStopandFriskformonlywhenmakinganinvestigative
stop,andanalysisofasampleofover7,000stopsexaminedbyJusticeDepartmentinvestigators,whichrevealedthat73

percentofstopsinvolvedofficersdetainingsubjectsatleastlongenoughtocompleteawarrantcheck.Thestopdata

discussedherethusoverwhelminglyreflectstopsthatrequirereasonablesuspicion.In2015,BPDaddressedthisissue
bychangingitsdocumentationprotocolssothatofficerscompletecitizen/policecontactformsforvoluntaryfield
interviewsandaForm309forinvestigativedetentions,weaponsfrisks,andsearches.

38Officersrecordeddistrictinformationinapproximately254,000outof301,000totalrecordedstops.

39PopulationdataonBPDspolicedistrictswasprovidedbytheDepartmentandwascompiledfromtheU.S.Census
Bureaus2014AmericanCommunitySurvey5-yeardata.
40Accordingto2014estimatesfromtheU.S.CensusBureau,AfricanAmericansaccountfor83percentofthe
populationintheCentralDistrictand96percentintheWesternDistrict.
41ThedatashowthatBPDrecordedstopsofFreddieGrayonFebruary16thand20th,2014.Thedatanonetheless

recordonlythreetotalstopsofFreddieGraybetween2010and2015.TheserecordsfurtherindicatethatBPDofficers

under-reportpedestrianstops.AlthoughBPDarrestedMr.Grayatleastfourtimesfrom20102014oncharges
stemmingfromstreetencounters,noneofthesearrestshaveacorrespondingstopreportinBPDsdata.

26

searches,andarrests,andconductslittlesubstantivereviewofofficersreasonsfortakingparticular
enforcementactions.Indeed,BPDhasfailedtotakecorrectiveactionevenwherethirdparties

includinglocalprosecutorshaveidentifiedofficerswhomaybemakingstops,searches,orarrests
inviolationoftheConstitution.Asaresult,thepatternorpracticeofconstitutionalviolations
describedbelowhaspersistedformanyyears,underminingtrustinlawenforcementandimpeding
BPDsabilitytoformcommunitypartnershipsthatareessentialtoeffectivepolicing.

2. BPD Unconstitutionally Stops and Searches Pedestrians

TheFourthAmendmentprotectsindividualsfromunreasonableseizureswhentheystep

fromtheirhomesontothepublicsidewalks.Delaware v. Prouse,440U.S.648,663(1979).Contrary
tothisprinciple,wefindreasonablecausetobelievethatBPDofficersregularlystopandsearch

individualswhoarelawfullypresentonBaltimoresstreets,despitelackingtheconstitutionally
requiredindiciathatcriminalactivityisafoot.

Ourfindingsarebasedonstatisticalanalysisofstopoutcomes,interviewswithofficersand

communitymembers,complaintsfiledagainstBPD,andourreviewofarandomsampleofseveral
hundredincidentreportsthatofficerscompletedforarreststhatstemmedfrompedestrianstops.

Officersdescriptionsoftheunderlyingstopsintheseincidentreportsrevealedfrequent
constitutionaldeficiencies.Wewereunabletosystematicallyanalyzethesufficiencyofreasonable

suspicioninallstopsmadebyBPDofficersasopposedtothesubsetofstopsleadingtoarrest

becausemostBPDstopreportsdonotdescribethefactsestablishingreasonablesuspicionfora
stop. 42Bylimitingourreviewtostopsthatresultedinarrest,wefocusedoncaseswhereofficers
presumablyhadstrongerindiciaofcriminalitytojustifyastopcomparedtostopsinwhichthe
investigationprovedfruitless.Itistroublingthatthisreviewnonethelessfoundrepeated

constitutionalviolationsduringstopsandsearchesbyBPDofficers.

a. BPD Stops Pedestrians Without Reasonable Suspicion

OurinvestigationrevealsawidespreadpatternofBPDofficersstoppinganddetaining
peopleonBaltimorestreetswithoutreasonablesuspicionthattheyareinvolvedincriminalactivity.
ThisconductviolatestheFourthAmendment,whichallowspoliceofficerstobrieflydetainan
individualforinvestigationwheretheofficerspossessreasonablesuspicionthatthepersonis
involvedincriminalactivity,Terry v. Ohio,392U.S.1,21(1968).Tosatisfythisstandard,officers
mustbeabletopointtospecificandarticulablefactssupportinganinferenceofcriminalactivity;
aninchoateandunparticularizedsuspicionorhunchisinsufficient.

Id.at27.

Terrysparticularityrequirementisnotsatisfiedwhereanofficerdeemsapersontobeacting
suspiciouslybutfailstoexplainthespecificbasisofthatsuspicion.Thepolicemustdomorethan

simplylabelabehaviorassuspicioustomakeitso;rather,thepolicemustalsobeableto...

articulatewhyaparticularbehaviorissuspiciousUnited States v. Massenburg,654F.3d480,491(4th
Cir.2011)(citationsandinternalquotationmarksomitted).Standingalone,anindividuals

unexplainedpresenceinahighcrimeareaisnotsufficienttoestablishreasonablesuspicion.

Illinois
42Asexplainedfurtherbelow,thefailuretocapturethefactssupportingreasonablesuspiciononstopformsalso

precludesBPDsupervisorsfromsubstantivelyreviewingthebasisforstopsandcorrectingofficerbehavior,where
necessary.

27

v. Wardlow,528U.S.119,124(2000)(citationomitted);United

States v. Slocumb,804F.3d677,68283
(4thCir.2015)(findingthatofficerslackedreasonablesuspiciontostopamanwhowaspresentina
highcrimearealateatnight,actingnervously,andconductinghimselfinawaythatseemed

inconsistentwithhisstatedreasonsforbeingatthelocation).Norisanindividualsdecisionto
moveawayfrompoliceinanormal,unhurriedmanner.

United States v. Sprinkle,106F.3d613,

61718(4thCir.1997)(officerslackedreasonablesuspiciontostopindividualwhocoveredhisface
withhishandtoconcealhisidentityanddroveawayfrompoliceatnormalspeed);cf.United

States v.
Bumpers,705F.3d168,17576(4thCir.2013)(findingreasonablesuspicionwhereanapparent
trespasserinhighcrimeareadodge[d]thepolicebywalkingawayatafastpace).

Notwithstandingtheserequirements,officersmayalwaysapproachindividualstomakesocial
contactandaskthemtoanswerquestionsvoluntarily.Thecasesdiscussedinthissectioninvolve

situationsinwhichBPDofficersdescriptionsofanencounterindicatethatthepersonstoppedwas
notfreetoleaveandreasonablesuspicionwasthereforerequired.

BPDofficersroutinelyviolatethesestandardsbydetainingandquestioningindividualswho

aresitting,standing,orwalkinginpublicareas,evenwhereofficershavenobasistosuspectthemof
wrongdoing.ThelackofsufficientjustificationformanyofBPDspedestrianstopsisunderscored

bytheextremelylowrateatwhichstopsuncoverevidenceofcriminalactivity.Inasampleofover

7,200pedestrianstopsreviewedbytheJusticeDepartment,only271or3.7percentresultedin

officersissuingacriminalcitationorarrest.Expressedadifferentway,BPDofficersdidnotfind

andchargecriminalactivityin26outofevery27pedestrianstops.Suchlowhitratesareastrong

indicationthatofficersmakestopsbasedonathresholdofsuspicionthatfallsbelowconstitutional

requirements.See Floyd v. City of New York,959F.Supp.2d540,575(S.D.N.Y.2013)(findingthata

hitrateof12percentinpedestrianstopsindicatedthatthestopswerenotsupportedbyreasonable
suspicion).

Despitethelowrateofstopsuncoveringevidenceofcrimes,BPDsupervisorsoftendirect

officerstomakefrequentstopsasacrimesuppressiontechnique.Manyoftheunlawfulstopswe
identifiedappearmotivatedatleastinpartbyofficersdesiretocheckwhetherthestopped
individualshaveoutstandingwarrantsthatwouldallowofficerstomakeanarrestorsearch
individualsinhopesoffindingillegalfirearmsornarcotics.Cf. Utah v. Strieff,579U.S.__,slipop.at
8(June20,2016)(holdingthatsearchincidenttoarrestwasvalidbasedonthediscoveryofanarrest
warrant,evenwhentheinitialstopwasunconstitutional,becausethestopwasanisolatedinstance
ofnegligenceandtherewasnoindicationthatthisunlawfulstopwaspartofanysystemicor

recurrentpolicemisconduct);see
also 579U.S.__,slipop.at1011(Sotomayor,J.,dissenting)

(warningthatpolicemaymakeunlawfulstopsinhopesofuncoveringoutstandingwarrants,

43
subjectingindividualstohumiliationsandindignity). Indeed,whereindividualslack
identificationallowingofficerstocheckforwarrants,officerssometimesdetainandtransportthem
tobookingfacilitiestochecktheiridentificationviafingerprintinganunconstitutionaldetention
evenwhereofficershavereasonablesuspiciontomaketheinitialinvestigativestop.See, e.g.,United
States v. Zavala,541F.3d562,57980(5thCir.2008)(90-minutedetentioninwhichsubjectwas
handcuffed,placedinapolicecar,andtransportedtodifferentlocationmorphedfromaTerry

detentionintoadefactoarrest).

43Consistentwiththisconcern,BPDofficersindicatedthattheyconductedawarrantcheckin73percentofall

pedestrianstopstheJusticeDepartmentanalyzedincludingmanystopsthatlackedreasonablesuspicion.

28


Officersownreportsdescribethisfaciallyunconstitutionalconduct.Forexample,an
officerintheNortheastDistrictnotedinanincidentreportthatheobserveda22-year-oldAfrican
Americanmalewalkingthroughanareaknowntohaveahighrateofcrimeand[drug]activity.

Afterwatchingthesubjectturnintoanalley,theofficerdespitepossessingnospecificinformation
indicatingthatthemanwasinvolvedincriminalactivitystoppedandquestionedhim.The

officersreportdoesnotidentifyanyevidenceofwrongdoinguncoveredduringtheTerry

stop.
Nonetheless,thereportexplainsthattheofficertransportedthemantoBPDsNortheastDistrict
headquarterstoproperlyidentif[y]himbecausethesubjectwasreluctanttogiveanyinformation

abouthimselforhisactions.Afterthiscustodialdetentionlikewiseuncoverednoevidenceof
wrongdoing,thesubjectwasfinallyreleased.Thisstoplackedreasonablesuspicionattheoutset,far

exceededthetemporallimitsevenforvalidTerry

stops,see
infraat39,andviolatesBPDspolicy

requiringofficerstocontactsupervisorswhenaTerry

stoplastsformorethan20minutes.Buta
BPDsupervisornonethelesssignedoffontheincidentreportdescribingthisunlawfulstopand

detention.

Insomecases,unconstitutionalstopsresultfromsupervisoryofficersexplicitinstructions.

Duringaride-alongwithJusticeDepartmentofficials,aBPDsergeantinstructedapatrolofficerto
stopagroupofyoungAfrican-Americanmalesonastreetcorner,questionthem,andorderthemto

disperse.Whenthepatrolofficerprotestedthathehadnovalidreasontostopthegroup,the
sergeantrepliedThenmakesomethingup.Thisincidentisfarfromanomalous.AdifferentBPD
sergeantpostedonFacebookthatwhenhesupervisesofficersintheNortheastDistrict,he
encouragesthemtoclearcorners,atermmanyofficersunderstandtomeanstoppingpedestrians
whoarestandingoncitysidewalkstoquestionandthendispersethembythreateningarrestfor
minoroffenseslikeloiteringandtrespassing.Thesergeantwrote,IusedtosayatrollcallinNE

whenIrantheshift:Donottreatcriminalslikecitizens.Citizenswantthatcornercleared.
Indeed,countlessinterviewswithcommunitymembersandofficersdescribecornerclearing

scenarios,inwhichBPDofficersstop,question,disperse,orarrestindividualsinpublicareasbased
onminimalornosuspicionofhighlydiscretionaryoffenses.

Suchunlawfulstopserodepublicconfidenceinlawenforcementandescalatestreet

encounters,sometimesresultinginofficersdeployingunnecessaryforceorcommittingadditional
constitutionalviolations.Forexample,onacoldJanuaryeveningin2013,anofficerapproached

andquestionedanAfrican-Americanmancrossingthestreetinahighcrimeareawhilewearinga

hoodedsweatshirt.Theofficerlackedanyspecificreasontobelievethemanwasengagedin

criminalactivity,but,accordingtotheincidentreportpreparedbythesupervisoryofficeronthe
scene,theofficerthoughtitcouldbepossiblethattheindividualcouldbeoutseekingavictimof
opportunity. 44Thisunsupportedspeculationfurnishesnobasistoconductastop.Nonetheless,
multipleofficersquestionedthemanandseizedakitchenknifethatthemanacknowledgedcarrying.

44Tojustifythestop,officersalsonotedthatthemanputhishandsinthepocketsofhissweatshirtastheyapproached.

However,giventhattheencounteroccurredonacoldJanuaryeveningandofficersobservedthemanshivering,

placinghandsinsideasweatshirtaddsminimally,ifatall,toanyobjectivesuspiciontheofficerspossessed.See United
States v. Burton,228F.3d524,529(4thCir.2000)(holdingthatwheresuspectrefusedtospeakwithpoliceorremovehis

handfromhispocket,somethingmoreisrequiredtoestablishreasonablesuspicionthatcriminalactivityisafoot);
United States v. Patterson,340F.3d368,37072(6thCir.2003)(holdingthatofficerslackedreasonablesuspicionwhere

suspectplacedhandsinhispocketsandwalkedawayfrompolice);United

States v. Davis,94F.3d1465,1468649(10th
Cir.1996)(holdingthatofficerslackedreasonablesuspiciontostopaknowngangmemberwhoignoredofficersorders

totakehishandsoutofhispockets).

29

Whenthemanaskedtheofficerstoreturnhisknife,theofficersorderedthemantositdownand

thenforcedhimtothegroundwhenthemanpersistedtoaskforhisknife.Themanyelledyou
cantarrestmeandresistedhisdetention.Althoughtherewasnobasistodetaintheman,two
officersattemptedtohandcuffandshacklehim,whileoneofficerstruckhimintheface,ribs,and
backwithfists.Themancontinuedtoresistbeingshackledasadditionalofficersarrived,oneof
whomtasedthemantwicetopreventhimfromescap[ing]thescene.Afterofficershandcuffed
theman,theytransportedhimtoUnionMemorialHospitalformedicalcare.Themanwasnot
chargedwithanyoffense.

Thesergeantwhorespondedtothesceneconfirmedthattheinvolved
officerstasedthemantwiceandhithiminthefacewiththeirfists,yetthesergeantsreportofthe

incidentconcludedthattheofficersshowedgreatrestraintandprofessionalism.

Insum,wefindthatBPDofficersfrequentlystoppedestriansonBaltimorestreetswithout
reasonablesuspicionthattheyareengagedincriminalactivity.Thispatternisevidencedbythe

extremelylowrateatwhichBPDsinvestigativestopsyieldevidenceofcriminalityandofficersown
descriptionsoftheirconduct.ThefrequencyoftheseunlawfulstopssubjectscertainBaltimore
communitiestorepeatedconstitutionalharms.

b. BPD Searches Individuals During Stops Without Legal Justification

Duringpedestrianandvehiclestops,BPDofficersregularlyescalateencountersby

conductingunlawfulsearches.Thispracticeincludestwotypesofconduct:(1)officersconducting
weaponspatdownsorfriskswheretheylackreasonablesuspicionthatasubjectisarmedand
dangerous;and(2)pre-arreststripsearchesinpublicareas.Bothtypesofconductresultfrom
systemicdeficienciesinpolicy,training,andoversight.

i. Unconstitutional Frisks

BPDofficerscommonlyfriskpeopleduringstopswithoutreasonablesuspicionthatthe
subjectofthefriskisarmedanddangerous.Thispracticecontravenestheprinciplethatbeforean
officerplacesahandonthepersonofacitizeninsearchofanything,hemusthaveconstitutionally
adequate,reasonablegroundsfordoingso.United States v. Powell,666F.3d180,185(4thCir.2011)
(citationandinternalquotationmarksomitted).Beforefriskingapersonstoppedonthestreetorin
avehicle,officersmusthavereasonablesuspicionbasedonspecific,particularizedinformation
thatapersonisarmedanddangerous.See, e.g.,Arizona v. Johnson,555U.S.323,32627(2009).This
requirementisdistinctfromthejustificationneededtomaketheunderlyingstop.See Powell,666
F.3dat186n.5(notingthatthejustificationformakingastopdiffersfrom...whetheralawfully

detainedpersonmaybearmedanddangerousandthussubjecttoaTerry

frisk).Theassessmentof
reasonablesuspiciontofriskisbasedonthetotalityofthecircumstances;itisinsufficient,standing

alone,thatasubjecthasapriorrecordofarrestsforviolentcharges,id.

at18486,wasstoppedina
highcrimearea,Maryland

v. Buie,494U.S.325,335(1990),orwasstoppedlateatnight,Papachristou

v.
City of Jacksonville,405U.S.156,163(1972).Wherereasonablesuspiciontoconductafriskexists,
officersmustlimitthescopeofthesearchtoapatdownoftheouterlayersofthesuspects

clothing.United States v. Holmes,376F.3d270,275(4thCir.2004).Onceanofficerestablishesthat

apersonisnotarmed,thatofficerexceedsthepermissiblescopeofaTerryfriskifhecontinuesto
searchthesuspect.United States v. Swann,149F.3d271,27475(4thCir.1998);Minnesota

v.
Dickerson,508U.S.366,378(1993)(anofficerexceedsthescopeofapermissiblefriskby
30

squeezing,slidingandotherwisemanipulatingthecontentsofdefendantspocketafter

determiningthatthepocketdidnotcontainaweapon)(citationandinternalquotationmarks

omitted).

Yetformanyyears,suspicionlessfriskshavebeenacommonfeatureofBPDsstreet
enforcementefforts.OfficersandcommunitymemberstoldJusticeDepartmentinvestigatorsthat
frisksoftenmadeundertheguiseofofficersafetybutwithoutidentifyinganyspecificbasisfor

believingthatapersonisarmedareacommonfeatureofBPDsstops.Officersowndescriptions

offrisksintheirincidentreportssupportthisconclusion.Forexample,onaspringeveningin2010
officersrespondedtoacallcomplainingthatdrugsaleswereoccurringataparticularlocation.
OfficersarrivedatthesceneandobservedseveralAfrican-Americanindividualsstandingand
sittingatthelocation.Absentinformationthattheseindividualswerearmedorotherwise

dangerous,theofficersnonethelessapproachedandimmediatelyfriskedthem.Officersdisclosed
thefriskinanincidentreport,explainingthattheyperformedthefriskforofficersafety.
Althoughtheofficersprovidednoinformationthatsuggestedtheindividualswerearmedor

dangerous,BPDsupervisorssignedoffonthereport.Ourreviewofincidentreportsandinterviews
withseveralhundredcommunitymembersindicatethattheunconstitutionalfriskpracticeis

widespread.Wewereunabletopreciselyquantifythescopeoftheseunconstitutionalfrisks,
however,becauseBPDdoesnotreliablyrecordwhenofficersconductafrisk.

BPDsmisapplicationoftheTerry

friskstandardsubjectsBaltimoreresidentstoembarrassing
invasionsofprivacyandneedlesslyescalatesencounterswithlawenforcement.Inonetypicalcase,a
BPDofficerunlawfullyfriskedanAfrican-Americanmanafteratrafficstopfordrivingwith
headlightsoff.Becausethedriverlookednervousastheofficerapproached,theofficerordered

thedriverandhispassengertoexitthevehicleandstandonthesideoftheroad.Theofficerthen
friskedthepassenger,whichincludedapublicpatdownofthepassengersgroin.Theofficer
identifiednobasisforfriskingthepassengerotherthanthedrivers

nervousappearancefarshort
oftherequiredshowingofparticularizedfactspointingtothepresenceofaweapon.See Powell,666
F.3dat183,185,187(noreasonablesuspiciontofriskmanduringavehiclestopforaburnedout

lightevenwhereofficershadinformationthatthemanhadpriorarrestsforarmedrobbery).In

anotherincident,anofficerapproachedanAfrican-Americanmanwalkingonasidewalkin

November2010inanareatheofficerstatedwasknownforviolentcrimeandnarcotics

distribution.Whentheofficerattemptedtointerviewhimabouthisactivities,themanfled.
Accordingtothereporttheofficerfiledthedayoftheincident,hechasedthemananddeployedhis

taserbecausethemanrefusedtocomplywithmyorderstostop.Thetaserprongshitthemanon

thebackbutfailedtostophim.Asthechasecontinued,theofficerreloadedhistasercartridgeand
againfiredprobesintothefleeingmansback.Aftercatchingupwiththeman,theofficerusedhis
taseryetagainthistimeindrivestunmodedetainedthemanforinvestigation,andconducteda

45
weaponsfrisk.Thereportprovidesnoreasontobelievethemanwasarmed. Thefriskand
investigationfoundnoweaponorotherevidenceofwrongdoing.Themanafterbeingtased
multipletimes,takentotheground,andfriskedwasreleasedwithoutcharges.

45Morethanamonthlater,theofficerfiledasupplementalreportclaimingthathedecidedtofrisk[theman]basedon

mysuspicionthathewasarmed,citingthemanspresenceinahighcrimearea,hislooseclothing,thefactthathe

lookedbackoverhisshoulder,andthatthemanranpastadumpsterwherehecouldhavetheoreticallydiscardeda
weaponornarcotics.

31


EvenwhereBPDofficersproperlyinitiateafriskbasedonreasonablesuspicionthata
personisarmedordangerous,wefoundinstancesinwhichthescopeofthosefrisksexceededthe
briefpatdownoftheouterlayersofthesuspectsclothingthatTerry

prescribes.See, e.g.,Holmes,
376F.3dat275.While[a]nofficerisnotjustifiedinconductingageneralexploratorysearchfor

evidenceundertheguiseofastop-and-frisk,United

States v. Brown,188F.3d860,866(7thCir.1999)
(citingDickerson,508U.S.at378),BPDofficerscommonlyfriskindividualsinawaythatseems

intendedtofindsmallpackagesofnarcoticsratherthanweapons.IncasesreviewedbytheJustice

Department,officersreachedinsideofsubjectsclothing,askedsubjectstoremovearticlesof
clothing,andsqueezedpocketstodetectsmallbagsthatmaycontainillegaldrugs.

ii. BPD Conducts Unconstitutional Strip Searches

InadditiontoimpermissibleTerry

frisks,ourinvestigationfoundmanyinstancesinwhich
BPDofficersstrip-searchedindividualswithoutjustificationofteninpublicareassubjecting

themtohumiliationandviolatingtheConstitution.Stripsearchesarefairlyunderstoodas
degradingand,undertheFourthAmendment,arereasonableonlyinnarrowcircumstances.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding,557U.S.364,375(2009).Stripsearchesareneverpermissible

aspartofapre-arrestweaponsfrisk.See Holmes,376F.3dat275(weaponsfrisksmustbelimitedto

theouterlayersofasuspectsclothing).Followingalawfularrest,thereasonablenessofastrip

searchturnsonthescopeoftheparticularintrusion,themannerinwhichitisconducted,the

justificationforinitiatingit,andtheplaceinwhichitisconducted.Bell v. Wolfish,441U.S.520,559
(1979).Absentspecificfactsindicatingthatanarresteeisconcealingaweaponorcontraband,
officersmaynotstripsearchapersonincidenttoarrestforanoffensethatisnotcommonly
associatedbyitsverynaturewiththepossessionofweaponsorcontraband.

Logan v. Shealy,660
F.2d1007,1013(4thCir.1981).Moreover,courtshaverepeatedlyemphasizedthenecessityof

conductingastripsearchinprivate.Amaechi v. West,237F.3d356,364(4thCir.2001)(finding

stripsearchunreasonablewhereitwasconductedinpublicview).

BPDpolicylikewiserecognizes
thatstripsearchesshouldbeconductedonlyunderverylimitedandcontrolledcircumstancesand

thatstripsearching...[]suspectsinpublicvieworonapublicthoroughfareisforbidden.

Nevertheless,ourinvestigationfoundthatBPDofficersfrequentlyignorethese
requirementsandstrip-searchindividualspriortoarrest,inpublicview,orboth.Numerous
BaltimoreresidentsinterviewedbytheJusticeDepartmentrecountedstoriesofBPDofficers
jumpingoutofpolicevehiclesandstrip-searchingindividualsonpublicstreets.BPDhaslong
beenonnoticeofsuchallegations:inthelastfiveyearsBPDhasfacedmultiplelawsuitsandmore
than60complaintsallegingunlawfulstripsearches.Inoneoftheseincidentsmemorializedina

complaintthattheDepartmentsustainedofficersinBPDsEasternDistrictpubliclystrip-searched

awomanfollowingaroutinetrafficstopforamissingheadlight.Officersorderedthewomanto

exithervehicle,removeherclothes,andstandonthesidewalktobesearched.Thewomanasked
themaleofficerinchargeIreallygottatakeallmyclothesoff?Themaleofficerrepliedyeah

andorderedafemaleofficertostripsearchthewoman.Thefemaleofficerthenputonpurplelatex

gloves,pulledupthewomansshirtandsearchedaroundherbra.Findingnoweaponsor
contrabandaroundthewomanschest,theofficerthenpulleddownthewomansunderwearand

searchedheranalcavity.

Thissearchagainfoundnoevidenceofwrongdoingandtheofficers
releasedthewomanwithoutcharges.Indeed,thewomanreceivedonlyarepairorderforher

headlight.Thesearchoccurredinfullviewofthestreet,althoughthesupervisingmaleofficer
32

claimedheturnedawayanddidnotwatchthewomandisrobe.

Afterthewomanfileda

complaint,BPDinvestigatorscorroboratedthewomansstorywithtestimonyfromseveral

witnessesandbyrecoveringthefemaleofficerslatexglovesfromthesearchlocation.Officers
conductedthishighlyinvasivesearchdespitelackinganyindicationthatthewomanhadcommitted
acriminaloffenseorpossessedconcealedcontraband.Themaleofficerwhoorderedthesearch
receivedonlyasimplereprimandandaninstructionthathecouldnotserveasanofficerincharge
untilhewasproperlytrained.

AnAfrican-AmericanteenagerrecountedasimilarstorytoJusticeDepartmentinvestigators

thatinvolvedtwopublicstripsearchesinthewinterof2016bythesameofficer.Accordingtothe
teenager,hewasstoppedinJanuary2016whilewalkingonastreetnearhishomebytwoofficers
whowerelookingfortheteenagersolderbrother,whomtheofficerssuspectedofdealingnarcotics.

Oneoftheofficerspushedtheteenagerupagainstawallandfriskedhim.Thissearchdidnotyield

contraband.Theofficerthenstrippedofftheteenagersjacketandsweatshirtandfriskedhimagain
infrontofhisteenagegirlfriend.Whenthissearchlikewisefoundnocontraband,theofficer

orderedtheteenagertogiveyourgirlyourphone,I'mcheckingyourightnow.Theofficerthen

pulleddowntheteenagerspantsandboxershortsandstrip-searchedhiminfullviewofthestreet
andhisgirlfriend.Theofficersreportoftheincidentdisputesthisaccount,claimingthattheydid
notconductastripsearchandinsteadrecoverednarcoticsfromtheteenagerduringaconsensualpat
down.Nonarcoticswereeverproducedtotheteenagerspublicdefender,however,andtheStates

AttorneysOfficedismissedthedrugchargesforlackofevidence.Theteenagerfiledalengthy
complaintwithBPDdescribingtheincidentandidentifyingmultiplewitnesses.Theteenager
recountedtousthat,shortlyafterfilingthecomplaint,thesameofficerapproachedhimneara
McDonaldsrestaurantinhisneighborhood,pushedtheteenageragainstawall,pulleddownhis
pants,andgrabbedhisgenitals.Theofficerfilednochargesagainsttheteenagerinthesecond
incident,whichtheteenagerbelieveswasdoneinretaliationforfilingacomplaintaboutthefirst
stripsearch.

OthercomplaintsdescribesimilarincidentsinwhichBPDofficersconductpublicstrip
searchesofindividualswhohavenotbeenarrested.Forexample,inSeptember2014,amanfileda

complaintstatingthatanofficerintheCentralDistrictsearchedhimseveraldaysinarow,including

undoinghispantsandsearchinghishindquartersonapublicstreet.Whenthestripsearchdid
notfindcontraband,theofficertoldthemantoleavetheareaandwarnedthattheofficerwould

searchhimagaineverytimehereturned.ThemanthenfiledacomplaintwithInternalAffairsand

identifiedtheofficerwhoconductedthestripsearchbyname.WhenInternalAffairsinvestigators

pressedthemantoprovideadetaileddescriptionoftheofficer,themanrecalledthattheofficer
hadredpatcheswithsergeantstripesonhisuniform.Theinvestigatorrecognizedthisdescription
aspatcheswornbytheofficerinchargeofashiftandconfirmedthattheofficernamedbytheman

wasworkingasanofficerinchargeintheCentralDistrictonthedatesthemanallegedhewasstrip

searched.InternalAffairsnonethelessdeemedthecomplaintnotsustainedwithoutfurther

explanation.

DeficientoversightandaccountabilityhashelpedperpetuateBPDsuseofunlawfulstrip

searches.AlthoughtheDepartmentspolicylimitsstripsearchestospecific,narrowcircumstances
followinganarrest,BPDsupervisorshavefailedtoensurethatofficerscomplywiththispolicyand

internalaffairsofficialshavenotadequatelyinvestigatedfrequentcomplaintsthatofficersviolateit.

33

BPDdoesnotseparatelycategorizeortrackcomplaintsallegingunlawfulstripsearches.Butour

manualreviewofBPDsInternalAffairsdatabaserevealedmorethan60suchcomplaintsinthelast
sixyearsonlyoneofwhichwassustained.Inresponsetodozensofotherstripsearchcomplaints,
IAhasdeemedthemadministrativelyclosed,classifiedthemsolelyforadministrativetracking,
orfoundthemnotsustainedafterminimal,ifany,investigation.Forexample,in2015anAfrican

Americanmanfiledacomplaintstatingthathewasstrip-searchedbyanofficerwhomBPD

eventuallyfiredin2016afternumerousallegationsofmisconduct.Themanstatedthattheofficer
orderedhimoutofhisvehicleduringatrafficstopandsearchedthevehiclewithoutthemans

consent.Whenthestopofthevehicledidnotuncovercontraband,theofficerpulleddownthe
manspantsandunderwear,exposinghisgenitalsonthesideofapublicstreet,andthenstrip
searchedhim.Theofficerseizedmarijuanaandcashduringthestripsearchandallegedlytoldthe
manthattheofficerwouldreturnhismoneyanddrugsifthemanprovidedinformationaboutmore
seriouscrimes.Thecomplaintstatedthatwhenthemandidnotprovidethisinformation,the

officerarrestedhimandturnedoveronlypartoftheconfiscatedmoney,keepingmorethan$500.
Despitetheseriouschargesinthiscomplaintandtheofficerslengthyrecordofallegedmisconduct,
IAdeemeditadministrativelyclosedwithoutinterviewingthecomplainant.

Thistypeof
inadequateoversighthasallowedBPDsunlawfulstripsearchpracticetocontinue.

3. BPD Makes Unconstitutional Arrests

OurinvestigationlikewisefoundreasonablecausetobelievethatBPDsapproachtostreetlevelcrimesuppressionhascontributedtoofficersmakingthousandsofunlawfularrestsoverthe

pastfiveyears.Thispatternhasthreemaincomponents:(1)warrantlessarrestsmadewithout
probablecauseinviolationoftheFourthAmendment;(2)arrestsforminoroffenses,suchasfailure

toobeyandtrespassing,incircumstancesthatviolatetheDueProcessClausesrequirementto
providefairnoticeofprohibitedconduct;and(3)investigativedetentionsthatexceedthelimitsof

Terryandconstitutearrests.

a. BPD Arrests Individuals Without Probable Cause

TheFourthAmendmentrequiresthatarrestsbesupportedbyprobablecause.

See, e.g,
Dunaway v. New York,442U.S.200,20713(1979);U.S.C
ONST.A
M.IV.Probablecauserequiresa

probabilityorsubstantialchanceofcriminalactivityandisevaluatedbyexaminingthetotalityof
thecircumstances.Illinois v. Gates,462U.S.213,243n.13(1983).Itrequire[s]...thekindoffair

probabilityonwhichreasonableandprudentpeople,notlegaltechnicians,act.Florida v. Harris,133
S.Ct.1050,1055(2013)(internalquotationsomitted).Policemaysatisfytheprobablecause

requirementbyobtainingawarrantpriortoarrestordeterminingthatprobablecauseexistsinthe

field.Gerstein v. Pugh,420U.S.103,11314(1975).Ourinvestigationdeterminedthat,whenBPD
officersmakearrestsinthefieldwithoutawarrant,theyoftendosowithoutprobablecause.

DatamaintainedbytheStateofMarylandshowsthat,fromNovember2010July2015,
BPDmadethousandsofarreststhatreviewingofficialsdeclinedtocharge.

TheStatesdatarecords
informationabouteachpersonarrested,thearrestingagency,allchargeslevied,andwhether

reviewingofficialsfoundthatthechargeswereadequatelysupported.Thisdatacapturesseveral

stagesofreviewofofficersjustificationforeacharrest.WhenaBPDofficermakesawarrantless
arrestandbringsthearresteetoCentralBooking,asupervisoratbookingdetermineswhetherto

34

committhearresteeintojail;releasethearresteeonbond,ontheirownrecognizance,orwitha

citation;ortonullifythearrestandreleasethearresteewithoutcharge.Forallcasesexceptwherean
arresteeisreleasedwithoutcharge,arepresentativefromtheStatesAttorneysOfficethenconducts

aninitialreviewofthechargingdocumentstoensurethattheyreciteprobablecause.

Thisreview
usuallyoccursthesamedayasthearrestandlooksonlyattheofficersstatedjustificationforthe
arrest,notevidencefromanyothersource.Insomecases,theStatesAttorneysreviewfindsthat
anarrestlacksprobablecauseorotherwiseshouldnotresultinfiledcharges.

Analysisofthisdatarevealsthat,fromNovember2010July2015,supervisorsatCentral
Bookingreleased6,736arresteeswithoutcharge.ProsecutorsfromtheStatesAttorneysOffice

declinedtochargeanadditional3,427cases,explicitlyfindingthat1,983oftheunderlyingarrests

lackedprobablecause.Insum,BPDofficersmade10,163arreststhatauthoritiesimmediately
determineddidnotmeritprosecutionanaverageofroughly200arrestspermonth.

BPDspatternofmakingarrestswithoutprobablecauseismostpronouncedwithnonfelonyoffensesthatstemfromstreetencountersbetweenofficersandresidents.Forexample,

duringthelastfiveyearsprosecutorsandbookingsupervisorsrejected1,350disorderlyconduct
charges20percentofthetotal.Arrestsforotherhighlydiscretionary,non-violentoffenseswere

nullifiedatevenhigherrates.Officialsrejected24percentofdisturbingthepeacecharges,23

percentoffailuretoobeycharges,and24percentofhinderingcharges.Officialslikewiserejected

156trespassingcharges,comprisingroughly5percentofthetotal.Andthesenumbersalmost
certainlyunderstatetheextentofBPDsproblematicarrests,astheyreflectonlycasesdismissed

duringpreliminaryreviewbasedonfacialdeficienciesinofficersreports,notarrestslatershownto

beinvalidduringpretrialhearingsorattrial.

Indeed,ourreviewofarandomsampleof150incidentreportsdescribingtheprobable

causeforthesediscretionaryarrestsfoundthatofficersfrequentlyrecitefaciallyinadequate

justifications.Inparticular,thesereportsrevealthatofficersoftenarrestindividualsfor

trespassingwherethepersonarrestedwasstandingonapublicstreetthatborderedproperty
ownedbytheCityoraprivateparty.Suchconductisnotcriminal.[I]ndividualsinthiscountry

havesignificantlibertyinterestsinstandingonsidewalksandinotherpublicplaces.

City of Chicago
v. Morales,527U.S.41,54n.19(1999)(quotingBrieffortheUnitedStatesasAmicusCuriae23).

Severalexampleshighlightthispattern.InJune2011,anofficerdispatchedinresponseto
suspecteddrugsalesobservedanAfrican-Americanmalefittingthebasicdescriptionofoneofthe

suspects.Theofficerwroteinhisreportthatthesuspectwasstandingonapublicstreetinfront
ofpropertyownedbythemayorandcitycouncilofBaltimoreCity.Whentheofficer

approached,themanbecamenervousandcouldnotprovideavalidexplanationforbeingatthis
location.Lackinganyfurtherevidencesuggestingthatthemanwasinvolvedinnarcoticssalesor

othercriminalactivity,theofficernonethelesstransportedthemantotheWesternDistrict
headquartersfordebriefingandthentoCentralBooking,wherethemanwaschargedwith

trespassing.Themanwasnotchargedwithanyotheroffense,andtheofficersaccountofthe
encounterfurnishesnobasisforthetrespassingarrest.Rather,itshowsthatthemanwasmerely
standinglawfullyonapublicstreet.InJanuary2010,officerssimilarlyapproachedamanwhowas

standinginfrontof1524MountMorCtlookingaroundandwhowalkedawaywhenhesaw
officers.Officersstoppedthemanandarrestedhimwhenhecouldnotprovideavalidexplanation

35

forbeing in front of1524MountMorCt,apartoftheGilmoreHomespublichousingcomplex.In

anothercase,anofficerarrestedanAfrican-Americanmanobservedstandinginfrontof578

OrchardSt.Theofficersreportexplainedthatwhenheapproached,themanbegantowalkeast
boundonOrchardStattemptingtoeludetheofficer.Theofficerstoppedthemanandaskedhim
whywashestanding

in front of578OrchardStandifheknewtheresidentwhoresidedthere.

Whenthemanrepliedthathedidnotknowtheresident,theofficerarrestedhimfortrespassing.
Theofficersaccountsoftheseandmanysimilarincidentsdescribefaciallyunlawfularrestsfor
conductthatisnotcriminal.

b. BPD Arrests People Lawfully Present on Baltimore Streets in Violation

of Due Process

BPDsapplicationofcityordinancesbanningloitering,trespassing,andfailingtoobeyan
officersorderviolatestheFourteenthAmendment.Citingtheseprovisions,BPDfrequentlyarrests

peoplewhoarelawfullypresentonpublicsidewalkswithoutprovidingtheconstitutionallyrequired

noticethattheyareengaginginprohibitedconduct.

Thesearrestsareunconstitutionalunderthe
void-for-vaguenessdoctrinewheretheyaremadeincircumstancesthatfailtoprovidethekindof

noticethatwillenableordinarypeopletounderstandwhatconductitprohibits.

Morales,527U.S.at
56(invalidatingcityordinancethatdefinedloiteringastoremaininoneplacewithnoapparent

purpose.).Whereconductlikeloiteringisgenerallylawful,policemaymakearrestsonlywhere

46
thearresteesviolatedtheordinanceknowingly.

See id.at5758.

Moreover,absentclearstandardsandanintentelement,adispersalorderitselfisan
unjustifiedimpairmentoflibertyandcannotformthebasisofanarrestforfailuretoobey.

Id. at
58.TheCourtofSpecialAppealsofMarylandhascriticizedBPDsapplicationoftheBaltimores

anti-loiteringordinanceforpreciselythesereasons.See Williams v. Maryland,780A.2d1210(Md.Ct.

App.2001).TheWilliams

courtreversedadefendantsnarcoticsconvictionafterfindingthatthe
defendantsunderlyingarrestforloiteringviolateddueprocess.Thecourtnotedthat,although
BPDofficersclaimedthemanwaspartofagroupthatwasimpedingpedestriantrafficona
sidewalk,therewasnoevidenceevenremotelysupportinganinferenceofscienterorthatthe

defendanthadnoticethatsuchconductwasillegal.

Id.at1217.Moreover,thecourtheldthatsuch

noticemustincludeaspecificdescriptionoftheprohibitedconduct;officerscouldnotprovide
sufficientnoticeby[t]ellingsomeonemerelythatheisloiteringandthatifhedoesnotmoveon
hewillbearrested.

Id.at1218.

ThesamevaguenessproblemexistsinBPDsenforcementoftrespassingstatutesagainst
individualswhoarestandingonsidewalksadjacenttopublichousingorprivateestablishments.
Indeed,afederaldistrictcourtinMarylandhasexpressedconcernaboutthetypeofhighly
discretionarytrespassingarreststhatBPDutilizes.See

Diggs v. Housing Authority,67F.Supp.2d522,

53235(D.Md.1999).There,thecourtenjoinedenforcementoftheCityofFrederickstrespassing

ordinanceandnotedthatapolicyofissuingcitationstopersonswithnoapparentlegitimate

reasonforbeingonHousingAuthoritypropertymayraiseseriousdueprocessconcernsinlightof
theSupremeCourtsrecentdecisioninChicago v. Morales.Diggs,67F.Supp.at534n.19.

46WedonotaddresswhetherBaltimoreCityordinancescriminalizingloitering,failingtoobey,andtrespassingare

faciallyunconstitutional.

36


BPDsarrestsofloiterersfortrespassingandfailingtoobeyorderstodispersefrequently

fallshortofthesedueprocessstandards.BPDoftenarrestspeoplestandingonstreetsorsidewalks

fortrespassingwhentheycannotprovideareasonfortheirpresencethatofficersdeem

acceptable.OurreviewfoundnumerouscasesinwhichBPDofficersarrestedindividualson
sidewalksnearpublichousingcomplexesorprivatebusinessessimplybecauseofficersdetermined

thatthearresteeshadnolegitimatepurposeornobusinessintheareapreciselythetypeof

vague,subjectivetrespassingstandardinvalidatedinMorales.

See527U.S.at56(finding
unconstitutionallyvagueastatutethatpermittedarrestofloitererswholackanapparent

purpose);see
alsoDiggs,67F.Supp.2dat534n.19(questioningarrestspremisedonhavingno

apparentlegitimatereasonforbeingonHousingAuthorityproperty).

Forexample,inApril2010,BPDofficersapproachedfiveAfricanAmericanssittingona

brickwallinfrontofaprivatebusiness.Officerswroteintheirreportthattheyapproachedthe

grouptoascertaintheirpurposeforsittingonthewallinfrontofthislocation.Whenthe

individualsrespondedthattheywerejustchillin,officersarrestedthemfortrespassingbecause

themencouldnotgiveavalidpurposeforbeingon[theproperty].Officersprovidednowarning

beforearrestingthemenanddidnotchargethemwithanyotheroffense.Laterthesamemonth,a
differentBPDofficerapproachedtwomalessittingonthestepsof110NorthFremontAve,a
streetthatbordersapublichousingcomplex.Whenthemenattemptedtogetupandwalkaway,
theofficerstoppedthemandaskedwhattheyweredoingontheproperty. 47Themenresponded
thattheywerejusttalking.Theofficerthenwithoutanywarningarrestedthemenfor
trespassingbecauseneitherwasabletoprovideanylegitimateexplanationforbeingonthe

HousingAuthorityproperty.InSeptember2011,aBPDofficersimilarlyarrestedamanloitering

directlybesidethe2501E.PrestonStreetGreaterMissionaryBaptistChurch.Theofficermade

thearrestafteraskingthemanwhyhewasintheareaandlearningthatthemanhadnobusiness

neartheareaofthe[churchs]steps.Eachofthesearrestsviolatesconstitutionaldueprocess

requirementsbecausethearrestedindividualslackednoticethattheirapparentlyinnocentbehavior

wasunlawful.

WefoundevidencethatBPDsupervisorshaveexplicitlycondonedtrespassingarreststhat
donotmeetconstitutionalstandards,andevidencesuggestingthattrespassingenforcementis

focusedonpublichousingdevelopments.AshiftcommanderforoneofBPDsdistrictsemaileda
templatefordescribingtrespassingarreststoasergeantandapatrolofficer.Thetemplateprovides
ablueprintforarrestinganindividualstandingonornearapublichousingdevelopmentwhocannot
giveavalidreasonforbeingthereafaciallyunconstitutionaldetention.Equallytroublingisthe
factthatthetemplatecontainsblankstobefilledinfordetailsofthearrest,includingthearrestdata

andlocationandthesuspectsnameandaddress,butdoesnotincludeaprompttofillintheraceor
genderofthearrestee.Rather,thewordsblackmaleareautomaticallyincludedinthedescription
ofthearrest.Thesupervisorstemplatethuspresumesthatindividualsarrestedfortrespassingwill
beAfricanAmerican.

47Officerslackedreasonablesuspiciontomaketheinitialstop,asthemenwereobservedonlysittingonstepsandthen

walkingdownapublicsidewalk.

37

BPDlikewisemakesconstitutionallydeficientarrestsofpeoplewhofailtoobeyofficers
unlawfulorderstodisperse.BPDpolicyrequiresthat,priortomakingsuchanarrest,officerswarn
peopleallegedlyloiteringthattheirspecificconductisillegal.Yetourreviewfoundthatofficers

frequentlydonotprovidethiswarningorindicateonlythatapersonmustdispersebecauseheor
sheisloiteringaninstructionthatisunconstitutionallyvague.See Williams,780A.2dat1218
(dueprocessrequiresmorethantellingsomeonemerelythatheisloiteringandthatifhedoesnot

moveonhewillbearrested.).Instead,wefoundnumerousfailuretoobeyarrestsmadewithout

therequiredwarningandpremisedonanofficerssubjectivedissatisfactionwithapersonsstated

reasonforstandingorsittingonapublicsidewalk.

InOctober2011,forexample,anofficerapproachedagroupofAfrican-Americanmen

standingonasidewalkwithin100feetofAmkoliquorstore.Allbuttwoofthemenleftwhen
theofficerapproached.Theofficerstoppedthetworemainingmenandwarnedthemthatthey
wereloiteringbyblockingpedestriantrafficandthattheyweretrespassingnearaliquorstore.

Theofficerthentoldthementoleavethearea,tostoploitering...andtostoptrespassingnear
theliquorstore.Whenoneofthemenreplied,Imnotleaving,Imgoingtostayandfinish

talkingtomybrother,theofficerarrestedhimforfailingtoobey.Theorderthemanfailedto

obeyageneralinstructionnottoloiterortrespassnearaliquorstorefallsfarshortofthe
noticerequiredtosupportanarrest.Similarly,inJuly2011officersapproachedthreemalesstanding
onthesidewalkinfrontofCrazyJohnsrestaurantonEastBaltimoreStreetbecausetheywere

purportedlyobstructingpedestriantrafficinapublicwalkway.Afterseveralwarnings,theofficer
orderedthementoleavetheareaandinformedthemthattheywouldbearrestediftheyreturned.

Thethreementhenwalkedawayandcrossedthestreet,wheretheyresumedhang[ing]out.When

theofficerfollowedthementotheirnewlocation,themenwalkedfartherdownBaltimoreStreet,
tauntedtheofficer,andthenranaway.Fortyminuteslater,theofficersawthemenwalkingdown

anadjacentstreetwhileattemptingtocomebackonthe400blockofBaltimoreStreetand
arrestedthemforfailuretoobeytheordernottoreturn.Thisarrestispremisedonan
unconstitutionallyvagueordernottoreturntoapublicstreetforanindeterminatetimeperiod.

38


TheseandsimilararrestsidentifiedbyourinvestigationreflectBPDofficersexercising
nearlyunfettereddiscretiontocriminalizetheactofstandingonpublicsidewalks.Absentclear

warningaboutthespecifictypesofconductthatwillresultinsucharrests,thispracticefailsto
providenoticerequiredbytheDueProcessClauseandrisksarbitraryanddiscriminatory

48
enforcement.SeeKolender v. Lawson,461U.S.352,357(1983). Accordingly,thesearrestsare
unconstitutional.

c. BPD Unlawfully Detains Individuals for Investigation, Effectively

Arresting Them Without Probable Cause

OurinvestigationfurtherrevealedthatBPDofficersunlawfullydetainpersonsforextended

periodsoftimesometimesforatleastseveralhourswithoutprobablecause.Thesedetentions
constitutearrestsandviolatetheFourthAmendment.BPDdoesnotprocessthesedetentionsas
arrests;insteadofficersusethemto:(1)detainandquestionpeoplesuspectedofcrimesinhopesof
uncoveringevidencesupportinganarrest;and(2)facilitatecustodialinterrogationsofwitnessesor
otherpeoplewithknowledgeofsuspectedcrimes.Neitherpurposevitiatestherequirementthat
officersmusthaveprobablecausetoexceedtheconstitutionallimitsoninvestigativedetentions.

[D]etentionforcustodialinterrogationregardlessofitslabelintrudessoseverelyon
interestsprotectedbytheFourthAmendmentasnecessarilytotriggerthetraditionalsafeguards
againstillegalarrest.Dunaway,442U.S.at216;see also Brown v. Illinois,422U.S.590,605(1975)
(detentioninapolicestationwithoutprobablecauseforinvestigationorforquestioningviolates

theFourthAmendment).TheFourthAmendmentlikewiseprohibitsofficersextendingdetentions

forthepurposeofgatheringadditionalevidencetojustifythearrest.County ofRiverside v.
McLaughlin,500U.S.44,56(1991);see also Brown,422U.S.at605(stationhousedetentionand

questioninginthehopethatsomethingmightturnuprequiresprobablecause).WhileTerry

allowsofficerstodetainindividualsforbriefinvestigationwhereofficershavereasonablesuspicion

thatcriminalactivityisafoot,Terry stopsmaynotresembleatraditionalarrest.Hiibel v. Sixth

Judicial District Court,542U.S.177,186(2004).Courtshaveresistedputtingpreciselimitsonthe
permissibledurationofTerry

stops,buthavefound90-minutedetentionsunconstitutional.See
United States v. Place,462U.S.696,70910(1983);accordUnited States v. Watson,703F.3d684(4thCir.

2012)(investigativedetentionforthreehourswithoutprobablecauseconstitutedanunlawful
custodialarrestundertheFourthAmendment);Zavala,541F.3dat57980(90-minutedetentionin

whichsubjectwastransportedtodifferentlocationconstitutedadefactoarrest);United

States v.
Chamberlin,644F.2d1262,126667(9thCir.1980)(placingasuspectinthebackofapolicecarfor

twentyminuteswhiletheofficerpursuedanothersuspectexceededthelimitsofaTerry

stop).

WhileBPDdoesnotformallydocumentinvestigativedetentions,wefoundtroubling
indicationsthatBPDofficersusesuchdetentionsasaregularpartofinvestigatingpeoplesuspected

ofcriminalactivity.LocalprosecutorsdescribedthispracticetoJusticeDepartmentofficialsas
BPDofficersmakingarrestswithoutprobablecauseonthestreet,thenhourslaterdecidingtoun

arrestwhendetentionandquestioningfailedtouncoveradditionalevidence.OurreviewofBPD

documentsconfirmedthatBPDusestheseunlawfuldetentions.

48Indeed,assetforthinSectionII(B),infra,thesepracticeshaveresultedinhighlydiscriminatoryoutcomes.

39


Forexample,inOctober2010,anofficerrespondedtoacallforsuspectedburglarythat

indicatedseveralAfrican-Americanmenwereusingagreentrucktocarryawayafurnace.The
officerarrivedonthesceneandapproachedthreeAfrican-Americanmenwhowerestandingaround
agreentruckwithafurnaceintheback.Inresponsetotheofficersquestions,oneofthemen

statedthathewashelpingtheothermenmovethefurnace,whichhadbeenfoundinanearbyalley.
Theofficerdetainedthemenwhileheconductedacanvassofthearea,whichdidnotfindany

propertyfromwhichthefurnacecouldhavebeenremoved.Despitefailingtoidentifyevidence
suggestingthemenwereinvolvedinaburglary,theofficernonethelessplacedallthreemenin

custodyandtransportedthemtotheWesternDistrictheadquartersforfurtherinvestigation.
Whilethemenwereheldatthestation,theofficerreviewedaCitiWatchcamerathatconfirmedtheir

explanationthattheymovedthefurnacefromanalley.Afterdetainingthemenfor1hourand40
minutes,theofficerreleasedthem.BPDrecordscontainnoindicationthatthemenconsentedto
theirdetention,muchlesstobeingdetainedfornearlytwohours.Inothercases,BPDofficershave
likewisestoppedindividualsbasedonreasonablesuspicion,transportedthemtoprecinctsfor
fingerprintingandfurtherinvestigation,thenultimatelyreleasedthemmorethananhourlaterwhen

theinvestigationfailedtouncoverprobablecausetomakeanarrest.See supra,at29.
These
custodialdetentionsviolatetheFourthAmendment,whichforbidsextendingTerry

stopsforthe
purposeofgatheringadditionalevidencetojustify[an]arrest.Riverside,500U.S.at56;see also
Brown,422U.S.at6025(stationhousedetentionandquestioninginthehopethatsomethingmight

turnuprequiresprobablecause).

4. BPDs Unconstitutional Stops, Searches, and Arrests Result from a Longstanding

Practice of Overly Aggressive Street Enforcement with Deficient Oversight and
Policy Guidance

BPDs patternofmakingunconstitutionalstops,searches,andarrestsarisesfromits

longstandingrelianceonzerotolerancestreetenforcement,whichencouragesofficerstomake

largenumbersofstops,searches,andarrestsforminor,highlydiscretionaryoffenses.This

approachtostreet-levelenforcementmagnifiestheimportanceofprovidingofficerswithrobust
policiesandtrainingandoverseeingofficeractivitywithcomprehensiveaccountabilitysystems.Yet

BPDfailedtocollectreliabledata,conductedminimaloversightofenforcementactivities,and
forcedofficerstorelyonpoliciesthatprovideinsufficientguidanceor,inseveralimportantareas,
faciallymisstateconstitutionalrequirements.Takentogether,thesedeficienciescontributeto
widespreadconstitutionalviolations.
a. Baltimore Leadership Prioritized Zero Tolerance Crime Suppression
Tactics for Many Years
Startinginthelate1990s,BaltimoreCityandBPDleadershipexpresslyadoptedapolicing
modelthatembracedtheprinciplesofzerotolerancestreetenforcement.AccordingtoCityand

BPDleaderspastandpresent,aswellasmediareports,BaltimoreCitybaseditsapproachinparton
tacticsdevelopedbytheNewYorkPoliceDepartmentandbroughtinconsultantsfromNYPDs

49
programtooverseeitsimplementationinBaltimore.

AsweheardfromBPDofficersandleaders,

49See,

e.g.,GerardShields,OMalley

is wooing zero-tolerance gurus,BALTIMORESUN,Oct.2,1999,

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-10-02/news/9910020227_1_jack-maple-violent-crime-police-commissioner(last
accessedAug.5,2016).

40

aswellasnumerouscommunitymembers,thestrategyinvolvedBPDofficersmakingwidespread
useofpedestrianstopsandsearchesinapurportedefforttoseizegunsandnarcoticsanddeter
crime.BPDsupervisorsencouragedofficerstoissuecitationsandmakearrestsforlow-level

qualityoflifeoffenses,includingloitering,trespassing,disorderlyconduct,failuretoobey,and

disturbingthepeace.Aspartofthisstrategy,BPDleadershippressuredofficerstoincreasethe

numberofarrestsandtoclearcorners,whetherornottheofficersobservedcriminalactivity.The
resultwasamassiveincreaseinthequantityofarrestsbutacorrespondingdeclineinquality.Of
50
the100,000arresteesthatBPDprocessedthroughCentralBookingin2004,

morethanoneinfive
51
werereleasedwithoutcharge.

Althoughourinvestigationdidnotanalyzedataonthenumberof
stopsandsearchesthattookplaceduringthesametimeperiod,itisdoubtlessthattheyfarexceeded

thenumberofarrests.

Fromthebeginning,somecommunitymembersandpolicymakersquestionedthevalueof
thepolicy,arguingthatitcouldleadtoharassmentofresidentswithoutanappreciablereductionin

crime.ZerotoleranceenforcementmadepoliceinteractionadailyfactoflifeforsomeBaltimore
residentsandprovokedwidespreadcommunitydisillusionmentwithBPD,aswellascallsfrom

activists,formerpoliceofficers,andstateofficialstoadoptnewpractices.Thestrategyalsocreated

disillusionwithintheDepartment.Accordingtothepoliceunionpresidentatthetime,some
officersreferredtothestop-and-friskprogramasaVCRdetail,standingforviolationofcivil

rights. 52

InJune2006,theACLUofMarylandandtheNAACPfiledalawsuitallegingthatBPDwas

illegallyarrestingthousandsofresidentseveryyear.ThecomplaintassertedthatBPDhadnot
properlytrainedofficersonthelegalstandardnecessarytomakeanarrest,andhadplacedpressure

onsupervisorstobolsternumbers,leadingtocitizensbeingimproperlydetainedwithoutprobable

cause.Shortlyafterthesuitwasfiled,BPDbegantotakestepstodecreaseitsrelianceonzero
tolerancepolicing.Inthelate2000s,underBaltimorePoliceCommissionerFrederickH.Bealefeld

III,thenumberofarrests,andarresteesreleasedwithoutcharge,begantodecrease. 53In2010,BPD
andtheCityenteredintoasettlementtoresolvetheACLUlawsuit,withBPDagreeingtoadopt

policiesrejectingitsformerzerotolerancestrategyandmakechangestoexistingpoliciesand

procedures.ThesettlementestablishedanIndependentAuditortoevaluateBPDsprogresstoward

adoptingstopandarrestpracticesconsistentwiththeConstitution.In2015,BPDpublisheda
numberofamendedpolicies,includingoneaddressingthecorelegalelementsofqualityoflife

offenses,inwhichitcautionedthatverbalwarnings,counseling,andcitationsarepreferableto
arrest.Thepolicystatesthatarrestshouldonlytakeplacewherethequalityoflifeviolationwas

committedintheofficerspresence,andtheofficerhasanobjectivelyreasonablebeliefthatarrestis

necessaryunderthefactsandcircumstancesortootherwiseprotecttheofficerandcitizensof
Baltimore.

50Atthetime,BaltimoreCityhadapopulationofapproximately650,000residents.

51JUSTICEPOLICYINSTITUTE,B
ALTIMOREBEHINDBARS10(2010).

52GusG.Sentementes,Police step up frisking tactic,BALTIMORESUN,Nov.13,2005,

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-11-13/news/0511130098_1_frisking-deter-crime-police-officers(lastaccessed
Aug.5,2016).
53JUSTICEPOLICYINSTITUTE,B
ALTIMOREBEHINDBARS10(2010).

41

CurrentBaltimorePoliceCommissionerKevinDavisandformerCommissionerAnthony
BattshaveacknowledgedthatBPDszerotolerancestrategydamagedcommunityrelationshipsand

createdobstaclestoeffectivepolicing.Bothcommissionershavepubliclysupportedamoreholistic
policingmodelfocusedonrebuildingandleveragingcommunitytrust.Nevertheless,thepractices
ofofficersonthestreethavecontinuedtoreflectmanyoftheproblematicaspectsoftheprevious
strategy,resultinginapatternofunconstitutionalconduct.Theseproblematicpracticesarereflected
inourfindings.BPDsfailuretoengageinmeaningfulchangewasalsonotedinthereportsofthe

IndependentAuditorestablishedbytheACLUlawsuitsettlementagreement.Attheendofthe
four-yearmonitoringperiod,theAuditordeterminedthatBPDhadnotreachedfullcomplianceon
morethanhalfoftheconditionsoftheagreement.Failuretoconsistentlyandadequatelyreport
arrestsandengageinmeaningfuloversightofstreet-levelenforcementwas,andremains,arecurring

problem.AlloftheAuditorsreportingindicatedthatarrestreportsforqualityoflifeoffensesdid

notmeettherequirementsofBPDdepartmentalpolicies.Thefinalreportfrom2014notedthat

therewasnosystematicimprovementinreportingfortheseoffensesduringthemonitoringperiod.

Oneofthereasonsthattheintendedmoveawayfromzerotolerancepolicinghasnot

sufficientlycurbedBPDspracticeofunconstitutionalstreet-levelenforcementisapersistent

perceptionamongofficersthattheirperformancecontinuestobemeasuredbytherawnumbersof
stopsandarreststheymake,particularlyforgunanddrugoffenses.Manyofficersbelievethatthe

pathtopromotionsandfavorabletreatment,aswellasthebestwaytoavoiddiscipline,istoincrease

theirnumberofstopsandmakearrestsfortheseoffenses.Byfrequentlystoppingandsearching
peopletheybelievemightpossesscontraband,withorwithoutrequisitereasonablesuspicion,

officersaimtoimprovetheirstatisticaloutput,whichwillinturnreflectfavorablyintheir
performancereviews.DuringshiftsobservedbyJusticeDepartmentinvestigators,patrolofficers

activelysoughtoutcornerstoclearandindicatedthattheybelievedtheywereobligatedtomove
groupsofpeoplestandingonsidewalks,whetherornottheindividualsinthegroupsappearedtobe

engagedincriminalconduct.Severalofficersdemonstratedamistakenunderstandingofthelaw,

expressingthatagroupstandinginfrontofabusinessoravacantlotwasnecessarilyloiteringor
trespassingontheproperty.

TheseviewsarereinforcedbyBPDsmid-levelsupervisors,manyofwhomservedinthe
Departmentduringtheheightofthezerotolerancestrategyandcontinuetoembraceitsprinciples.

Someofficersweinterviewedexpressedfrustrationwithsupervisorypressuretoprioritizedrugand

gunarrestsovercommunitypolicingandlonger,moreintensiveinvestigations.Oneofficer
acknowledgedthefutilityofbreakingupacrowdofloiterersbecausethecrowdwouldsimply

relocatetoadifferentstoreorcorner.Yetsupervisorsstillencourageofficerstoclearcornersand
engageinblanketenforcementoflow-leveloffenses,asdemonstratedbytheincidentdiscussedin

SectionII.A.,supra,inwhichtheofficerssupervisorencouragedhimtomakesomethingupin

ordertodisperseresidentswhoweregatheredpeaceablyonastreetcorner.Otherofficerstoldus
thattheyweredeniedtheopportunitytoworkovertimebecausesupervisorsbelievedtheydidnot

makeenoughstopsandarrests.

Thispressurefromsupervisorsnotonlycontributestoconstitutionalviolations,butcanalso
resultinpoortacticaldecision-makingthatimperilsthelivesofofficersandinnocentcivilians.In
oneincidentwereviewed,anofficerobservedagatheringofpeopletalking,eating,andwaitingfor

foodoutsidealate-nightrestaurantafterbarshadclosed.Noneofthepeopleappearedtobe
42

committinganycrimes.Butratherthanmonitoringthegrouporcallingforbackupincaseof
trouble,theofficerdecidedtoattempttodispersethegatheringalone.Theofficerreportedthathe
decidedtodothisbecausehebelievedhissupervisorwouldnotbehappyifhesawtheareahadnot
beencleared.Asaresultofhisdecisiontoclearthecorner,theofficerendedupinaphysical

altercationwithamanwhorefusedtoleave.Aloneandsurroundedbyanunfriendlycrowd,the

officerfiredhisserviceweaponatamanhefearedwasabouttokickhim.Thebulletstrucktwo
people,atleastoneofwhomwasnotinvolvedintheincident.Despitetheofficersserioustactical
mistakes,reviewingsupervisorsdidnotreportanyerrorsandconcludedthattheofficerhadacted

appropriately.

b. Deficient Policies, Training, and Oversight

BPDexacerbatestheriskthatitsaggressivestreetenforcementtacticswillleadto
constitutionalviolationsbyfailingtouseeffectivepolicies,training,oversight,andaccountability
systems.WhilethesedeficienciesarediscussedingreaterdepthinSectionIII,infra

at128-54,

severalfailingsareparticularlyrelevanttoBPDspatternorpracticeofmakingunlawfulstops,
searches,andarrests.

i. BPD Policies and Training Materials Do Not Equip Officers to Police

Effectively and Constitutionally
ImportantBPDpoliciesandtrainingmaterialseithermisstatethelaworaretoovagueto
providemeaningfulguidancetoofficersaboutoperativeconstitutionalstandards.Asaresult,
officerscommittedtoconstitutionalpolicingareoftennotequippedtoprovideit.

Forexample,BPDsnewlyadoptedordertitledQualityofLifeOffensesCoreLegal
ElementsfromApril2015doesnotaccuratelyexplainthelegalrequirementsformakingloitering

arrests.Theorderincludesasectiondiscussingspecialconsiderationsforaviolationofthe
BaltimoreCityCodeprohibitingloitering,butfailstomentiontherequirementthatofficersmaynot
arrestindividualsforloiteringuntiltheyhavebeentoldwhatspecificconductisprohibited,warned

thataviolationoflawisoccurring,andstillrefusetodesist.Asdiscussedabove,BPDsstopspolicy

likewisemisstatedtheapplicablelegalstandarduntil2015bynotrequiringofficerstohavesuspicion
thatapersonisarmedanddangerouspriortoconductingaweaponsfrisk.Otherpoliciesare
insufficientlyspecifictoprovideeffectiveguidancetoofficers.Forexample,GeneralOrder4-94,
StripSearchesandBodyCavitySearches,requiresofficerstoobtainawarrantinordertoconduct

abodycavitysearchunlessexigentcircumstancesexisttojustifyawarrantlesssearch.However,
thepolicyprovidesofficerswithnoguidanceaboutwhatwouldconstitutesufficientexigent

circumstancestojustifyanimmediate,warrantlessbodycavitysearch. 54
54Otherpoliciesrelatedtosearchesandseizures,thoughnotdirectlyrelatedtoourfindings,aresimilarlytroubling.For

example,BPDGeneralOrderJ-7(January5,2004),SearchandSeizureWarrantsstatesthatImmediateentrymaybe

initiatedifsounds,conversationsorotheractivitycomingfromwithinthepremisesleadsyoutobelievethatactivityis
occurringwhichmayindicateapotentialthreatofphysicalharmtopoliceofficers/occupants,evidenceisbeing

destroyed,orasuspectisescaping.However,thisdoesnotaccordwithconstitutionalrequirements.Priortoforcibly
enteringaresidence,policeofficersmustknockonthedoorandannouncetheiridentityandpurpose.Bellotte

v.
Edwards,629F.3d415,419(4thCir.2011)(quotingRichards

v. Wisconsin,520U.S.385,387(1997)).Whileitistruethat
exigentcircumstancesmaysometimesjustifyano-knockentry,policemusthaveareasonablesuspicionthat
knockingandannouncingtheirpresence,undertheparticularcircumstances,wouldbedangerousorfutile,orthatit

43

Severalkeytrainingmaterialslikewisefailtoprovideofficerswithanunderstandingof

relevantconstitutionalrequirements.Forexample,alessonplanfroma2009stopandfrisktraining
indicatesthatInvestigativecontactsofcitizensbymembersofthisagencywillbeconductedwith

articulablereason.TheconfusingreferencetoarticulablereasonmisstatestheTerry

standard
requiringreasonablesuspicionbasedonspecificandarticulablefacts.Thelessonplanlaterinstructs

thatthemembermustbeabletoarticulatereasonablesuspicionorbeliefacrimehasbeenorwill
becommittedtoperformastop&frisk.Thissimilarlymisstatestherelevantlaw,asitindicates
thatthesamestandardofsuspicionisrequiredforbothaninvestigatorystopandasubsequent
friskcontrarytotherequirementthatanofficerpossessseparatereasonablesuspicionthatan
individualisarmedanddangerouspriortoinitiatingafrisk.Throughoutthetraining,andonthe

reportingform,stopandfriskareconsistentlymentionedtogether,suggestingtoofficersthatfrisks

areamatterofcourseduringanystop.Thetraininglikewisedoesnotmentionthatweaponsfrisks
mustbelimitedtoapatdownofapersonsouterclothing.

BPDleadershiprecognizedthedeficienciesinitsstopandfriskguidanceandupdatedthe
Departmentspolicyonfieldinterviews,investigativestops,weaponspat-downsandsearchesin
2015toreflectamoreaccuratestatementofthelaw.Thenewpolicyalsorequiresthatcommanding

officersprovidetrainingsandconductauditstoensuremembersengageappropriatelyandwithin

policy,andfulfillreportingrequirements.However,trainingshaveyettobeadministeredtothe

majorityoffieldofficers,andsupervisorshavenotconsistentlyauditedreportsorheldofficers

accountableforfailingtocomplywiththeupdatedpolicy.

ii. BPD Lacks Effective Oversight and Accountability of Stops, Searches,

and Arrests

BPDfailstouseeffectivemeasurestoreviewstops,searches,andarreststoidentifyand

correctconstitutionalviolationsorprovidecounselingandsupporttoitsofficers.BPDconducts
minimalsubstantivereviewofthejustificationforparticularstops,searches,andarrests,anddoes
notsufficientlycollectandanalyzedatatoidentifyproblematicpatternsintheseactivities.
Consequently,BPDreliesalmostexclusivelyonitscomplaintsystemtoidentifyconstitutional
violations.Thesepracticesarenotsufficienttoensureconstitutionalpolicing.

Substantive review of stops, searches, and arrests: BPDsupervisorsconductminimal

substantivereviewofofficersjustificationsforstops,searches,andarrests.AlthoughBPDpolicy

wouldinhibittheeffectiveinvestigationofthecrimeby,forexample,allowingthedestructionofevidence.Bellotte,629

F.3dat420(citationomitted).

Genericthreatsanddangersraisedatthemostgenerallevelarenotparticularized

enoughtoestablishexigentcircumstances.Id.at424n.2.Entrywithoutknockingbasedonmerespeculationislikewise

notreasonableundertheFourthAmendment.Id.at423.TheBPDpolicyalsopermitsimmediateentry,eveninthe

absenceofexigentcircumstances,wheretherehasbeennoresponsewithin20secondsofknockingonthedoor.Thisis

notinaccordwithapplicablelaw.Although1520secondsmaybeasufficientamountoftimetowaitifofficershave

reasontobelievethedelaygivesrisetoexigentcircumstances,inacasewithnoreasontosuspectanimmediateriskof

frustrationorfutilityinwaitingatall,thereasonablewaittimemaywellbelongerwhenpolicemakeaforcedentry,since
theyoughttobemorecertaintheoccupanthashadtimetoanswerthedoor.

United States v. Banks,540U.S.31,41

(2003);see
alsoHudson v. Michigan,547U.S.586,590(2006)(Ourreasonablewaittimestandardisnecessarilyvague.)
(internalquotationmarksandcitationsomitted).

44

instructsofficerstodocumentallstops,frisks,andsearchesonastopform,itlacksaneffective
meanstoidentifyandaddressunconstitutionalbehavior.Formostoftheperiodcoveredbyour
review,BPDofficersrecordedstopsonaStopandFriskformthattypicallydidnotrecordan

officersreasonsformakingastoporinitiatingafrisk.Asaresult,BPDofficersdidnotdocument
thefactsjustifyingastoporsearchexceptincasesthatresultedinanarrestoruseofforce,for
whichofficerswererequiredtocompleteanincidentreportoruseofforcereport.Thisinformation

deficitprecludedsupervisoryreviewforthelargemajorityofstopsthatdonotleadtoarrestsor

citationsstopsforwhichsuchreviewisimperative.BPDattemptedtoaddressthisdatacollection
issuethroughapolicychangein2015,whenitbeganrequiringofficerstodocumentthebasisfor

TerrystopsandfrisksonaForm309andinstructingsupervisorstoreviewthesejustifications.

Butthisprocesshasnotgeneratedrobustreview.Whilesupervisorsusuallyreviewstopreports,
theyalmostuniversallysignoffonthebasesforstopsandsearchesevenwhereofficersdescribe

faciallyunlawfulactivity.Indeed,BPDsupervisorstoldustheyviewtheirroleasmerely

documentingofficeractivity,notreviewingitforcompliancewithpolicyandlaw.Moreover,our

ride-alongsandofficerinterviewsrevealedthatmanyofficerswhomakeTerry

stopsthatdonotlead
toarrestreportthattheyconductedonlyavoluntaryfieldinterviewornostopatalltoavoid

thenewdocumentationrequirements.AndBPDhasnotauditeditsfieldreportsorCADdatato
rootoutthispractice.

WefoundsimilardeficienciesthroughoutBPDsreviewofofficersjustificationsforarrests.

Aswithstopsandfrisks,BPDfrontlinesupervisorsconsistentlysignoffonincidentreports

describingthebasisforwarrantlessarrests,evenwherethereportsdescribeegregiousconstitutional
violations.Indeed,ourreviewdidnotidentifyasinglearrestquestionedbyafrontlinesupervisor.

Andaswithstops,BPDsupervisorstoldusthattheyseetheirroleasdocumentingofficeractivity,
notreviewingtoensureitconformstoconstitutionalstandards.

Data collection and pattern analysis: BPDlikewisefailstocollectandanalyzedatato

identifypatternsinofficersstops,searches,andarrests.Despitealongrecordofpublicoutcryand
numerouscomplaintsregardingillegalstops,searches,andarrestsforlowleveloffenses,BPDhas
neverconsistentlycollectedandanalyzeddataregardingthenumber,type,andnatureofits
investigatorystops.BPDenterscertaininformationfromstopformsintoanelectronicdatabase,

butthelimitedtypesofdataandinconsistentdataentrypracticesprecludeanalysis.Indeed,BPD
doesnotconductanystatisticalanalysisofitsstopsorsearchesusingthesedata,norarethedata

enteredintoBPDsearlyinterventionsystemtohelpidentifyofficerswhoseactivitiesmaywarrant
furtherscrutiny.ThislackofmeaningfuldataanalysishindersBPDsabilitytomanageitsofficers
effectively.

TheinabilitytoanalyzedatakeepsBPDfromidentifyingimportanttrends,curbingunlawful
practices,andassistingofficersorunitsthatmaybenefitfromadditionaltrainingorsupport.For
example,BPDsdatasystemscannotidentifywhetherspecificofficersorunitsbeara
disproportionateshareofresponsibilityforillegalstopsandsearches.Duringthecourseofour

investigation,wereceivedalargenumberofanecdotesspecificallyidentifyingplainclothesofficers

enforcingviolentcrimeandviceoffenses(thenamesandorganizationoftheunitshavechanged

multipletimesovertheyearscoveredbytheinvestigation)asparticularlyaggressiveandunrestrained

intheirpracticeofstoppingindividualswithoutcauseandperformingpublic,humiliatingsearches.
Adisproportionateshareofcomplaintslikewiseaccuseplainclothesofficersofmisconduct.Yet

45

muchofBPDsstopdatadoesnotevenidentifytheunitoftheofficersinvolvedinthestop,making

unit-levelanalysisimpossible.Indeed,BPDsdataonroughlyhalfofthe300,000stopsrecorded
from20102014containnoinformationabouttheunitsoftheofficerswhomadethestop.

BPDsimilarlyfailstotrackdataonarrestsmadebyofficers.AlthoughBPDenters
informationonarrestsinabasicdatabase,theDepartmentconductsnoanalysistoidentifytrendsin
thetype,frequency,orqualityofarrestsmadebyparticularofficersorunits.Forexample,one
measurethatcouldbeusedtoassesswhetherindividualofficersorunitsareengagedinapatternof
illegalarrestswouldbetomonitorarrestoutcomestodetermineifprosecutorsfiledordismissed

chargesincasesstemmingfromarrestsbycertainofficers,units,orsupervisors.Doingsowould
identifyofficerswhomakearreststhatcannotbeprosecutedduetolackofprobablecause,failureto
collectevidenceinaconstitutionalmanner,orotherimproprieties.Trackingarrestoutcomesisan
importanttoolforimposingaccountabilityaswellasidentifyingofficerswhowouldbenefitfrom
additionaltraining,guidance,orotherearlyintervention.YetBPDdoesnottakeanystepstotrack
oridentifyofficersorunitswhomakearreststhatcannotbeprosecuted,ortoidentifysupervisors
whosignoffonsucharrests.

EvenwhereprosecutorshaveprovidedBPDwithspecificinformationonproblematic
officerswhoroutinelymakeimproperarrests,searches,orseizures,theDepartmenthasfailedto

meaningfullyinvestigatetheinformationortakeappropriateaction.Forseveralyears,theStates
AttorneysOfficemaintainedaDoNotCalllistofofficersthatprosecutorsshouldnotsubpoena

totestifybecauseprosecutorsdeterminedthattheofficersdidnottestifycrediblyabouttheir

enforcementactions.AlthoughtheStatesAttorneysOfficeregularlysharedthislistwithBPD,the
Departmentrarelyusedtheinformationtoidentifyofficerswhomayneedsupportordiscipline.As
aresult,problematicofficersremainonthestreet,detaining,searching,andarrestingpeopleeven
thoughtheStatesAttorneysOfficehasdeterminedthatitcannotprosecuteacrimebasedonthe

officerstestimony.TheStatesAttorneysOfficenolongermaintainsawrittenDoNotCalllist,

butprosecutorsinformallymaintainaregistryofproblematicBPDofficerswhocannotbeusedto
supportcriminalprosecutions.Inrecentyears,theStatesAttorneysOfficehascontactedBPD
leadershiponseveraloccasionstoidentifyofficersthatprosecutorsdeterminedcannolongertestify
crediblyduetomisconduct.Inmostofthesecases,BPDleadershiptooknoactionagainstthe
identifiedproblemofficers.

46

B. BPD DISCRIMINATES AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS IN ITS ENFORCEMENT

ACTIVITIES

WefindreasonablecausetobelievethatBPDengagesinapatternorpracticeof

discriminatorypolicingagainstAfricanAmericans.StatisticalevidenceshowsthattheDepartment
intrudesdisproportionatelyuponthelivesofAfricanAmericansateverystageofitsenforcement

activities.BPDofficersdisproportionatelystopAfricanAmericans;searchthemmorefrequently
duringthesestops;andarrestthematratesthatsignificantlyexceedrelevantbenchmarksfor
criminalactivity.AfricanAmericansarelikewisesubjectedmoreoftentofalsearrests.Indeed,for

eachmisdemeanorstreetoffensethatweexamined,localprosecutorsandbookingofficials
dismissedahigherproportionofAfrican-Americanarrestsuponinitialreviewcomparedtoarrests

ofpeoplefromotherracialbackgrounds.BPDofficersalsodisproportionatelyuseforceincluding
constitutionallyexcessiveforceagainstAfrican-Americansubjects.Nearly90percentofthe

excessiveforceincidentsidentifiedbytheJusticeDepartmentreviewinvolveforceusedagainst

AfricanAmericans.

Intheearly2000s,BPDbeganazerotoleranceenforcementstrategythatencouraged

officerstomakefrequentstops,searches,andarrestsformisdemeanoroffenses.

Thisstrategy

overwhelminglyimpactedtheCitysAfrican-AmericanresidentsandpredominantlyAfrican

Americanneighborhoods.BPDhashadnoticeofconcernsaboutitspolicingofAfrican-American
communitiesformanyyears,yetithasfailedtotakeadequatestepstoensurethatitsenforcement

activitiesarenon-discriminatory.TheDepartmentdidnotimplementaFairandImpartial
Policingpolicyuntil2015andconductedvirtuallynoanalysisofitsowndatatoassesstheimpact

ofitsenforcementactivitiesonAfrican-Americancommunities.BPDlikewisehasfailedto

effectivelyinvestigatecomplaintsallegingracialbiasoftenmisclassifyingcomplaintstopreclude
anymeaningfulinvestigation.Insomecases,BPDsupervisorshaveorderedtheirsubordinatesto

targetAfricanAmericansspecificallyforheightenedenforcement.Wealsofoundnumerous

examplesofBPDofficersusingracialslursormakingotherstatementsthatexhibitbiasagainst

AfricanAmericanswithoutbeingheldaccountablebytheDepartment.Theseracialdisparitiesand

indicationsofintentionaldiscriminationerodecommunitytrustthatisacriticalcomponentof

effectivelawenforcement.Weheardrepeatedlyfromcommunitymemberswhobelievedtheywere
treateddisrespectfullyorsingledoutforenforcementbecauseoftheirrace.BPDleadership
acknowledgesthatitslegacyofzerotoleranceenforcementincertainneighborhoodshasdamaged
communitypartnershipsandhastakenstepstobeginimprovingtheDepartmentsrelationshipwith
African-Americancommunities.Whileweapplaudthesesteps,significantworkremains.

Inadditiontoharmingitsrelationshipwiththebroadercommunity,BPDsraciallydisparate

enforcementviolatestheSafeStreetsActandTitleVIoftheCivilRightsActof1964.

These
statutesprohibitlawenforcementpracticesthatdisparatelyimpactAfricanAmericansunlessthe

practicesarenecessarytoachievenon-discriminatoryobjectives.Cf.

Gallagher v. Magner,619F.3d
823,837(8thCir.2010)(intherelatedcontextofFairHousingActlitigation,anofficialactionthat
causesraciallydisparateimpactmaybejustifiedonlybyshowingthattheactionhasamanifest
relationshiptolegitimate,non-discriminatoryobjectives);Albemarle

Paper Co. v. Moody,422U.S.405,

425(1975)(findingintheTitleVIIemploymentdiscriminationcontextthatanemployermayrebut

primafacieshowingofdisproportionateimpactbyprovingthattherequirementcausingdisparate
47

impacthasamanifestrelationshiptotheemploymentinquestion).TitleVIprovidesthatno
personshallbeexcludedfromparticipatingin,bedeniedthebenefitsof,orbesubjectedto
discriminationunderanyprogramoractivityreceiving[f]ederalfinancialassistancebasedonrace.

42U.S.C.2000d.TheTitleVIimplementingregulationsbanrecipientsoffederalfundsfrom

usingcriteriaormethodsofadministrationthathaveanunnecessarydisparateimpactbasedon
race.28C.F.R.42.104(b)(2).TheSafeStreetsActlikewiseproscribeslawenforcementpractices

thatcausedisparateimpactbasedonraceexceptwheresuchimpactisnecessarytoachieve
nondiscriminatoryobjectives.See28C.F.R.42.203.

1. BPDs Enforcement Activities Disproportionately Impact African Americans

ThereisoverwhelmingstatisticalevidenceofracialdisparitiesinBPDsstops,searches,and

arrests.ThisevidencedemonstratesadiscriminatoryimpactonAfricanAmericansunderTitleVI

andtheSafeStreetsAct.SeeChavez v. Illinois State Police,251F.3d612,637(7thCir.2001)(The

SupremeCourthaslongnotedtheimportanceofstatisticalanalysisincasesinwhichtheexistence

ofdiscriminationisadisputedissue.)(internalcitationomitted);Bradley

v. United States,299F.3d
197,206n.11(3dCir.2002)(Inprofilingcases...statisticalevidenceofdiscriminationmaybethe

onlymeansofprovingadiscriminatoryeffect);Floyd

v. City of New York,959F.Supp.2d540,661

62(S.D.N.Y.2013)(statisticalevidenceofracialandethnicdisparitiesinpolicestopandfrisk

practices,includingpost-stopoutcomes,provedadverseimpactundertheEqualProtectionClause);

Melendres v. Arpaio,No.CV-97092513,2013WL2297173(D.Ariz.May24,2013)(statistical
evidenceprovedthatcertainpatroloperationsatasheriffsofficedisparatelyimpactedLatinos);

Maryland NAACP v. Maryland State Police,454F.Supp.2d339,349(D.Md.2006)(disparitiesin

stopsandsearchesofAfricanAmericansconstitutedpowerfulcircumstantialevidenceofracial
profiling).Here,statisticalevidencehighlightsracialdisparitiesatalllevelsofBPDsstreet

enforcement,fromtheinitialdecisiontostoppedestriansorvehiclestoconductingsearchesand

makingarrests.Wealsofoundtroublingtrendsinthesampleofuseofforcereportswereviewed,
suggestingthatforcemaybeuseddisproportionatelyagainstAfricanAmericans.

a. Racial Disparities in Stops and Searches

BPDofficerssubjectAfricanAmericanstoadisproportionatenumberofpedestrianand

vehiclestopsonBaltimorestreetsandsearchAfricanAmericansdisproportionatelyduringthese
stops.

i. Stops

BPDdisproportionatelystopsAfricanAmericansstanding,walking,ordrivingonBaltimore
streets.TheDepartmentsdataonallpedestrianstopsfromJanuary2010toJune2015showsthat

AfricanAmericansaccountfor84percentofstops 55despitecomprisingonly63percentofthe
Cityspopulation.Expresseddifferently,BPDofficersmade520stopsforevery1,000black

residentsinBaltimore,butonly180stopsforevery1,000Caucasianresidents.

55Stopsforwhichofficersdidnotrecordthesubjectsraceareexcludedfromthisanalysis.

48

Figure 1 BPD Pedestrian Stops Per 1,000 Residents, 2010-2015

ThehighrateofstoppingAfricanAmericanspersistsacrosstheCity,evenindistrictswhere

AfricanAmericansmakeupasmallshareofthepopulation.Indeed,theproportionofAfrican
AmericanstopsexceedstheshareofAfrican-AmericanpopulationineachofBPDsninepolice

districts,despitesignificantvariationinthedistrictsracial,socioeconomic,andgeographic
composition. 56Forexample,AfricanAmericansaccountedfor:83percentofstopsintheCentral
District(comparedto57percentofthepopulation),whichcontainstheCitysdowntownbusiness

area;over93percentofstopsintheEasternDistrict(comparedto90percentofthepopulation),

whichincludespredominantlylow-income,urbanneighborhoods;and83percentofstopsinthe
NorthernDistrict(comparedto41percentofthepopulation),whichincludesmanyaffluent,

suburbanneighborhoods.EvenintheSoutheastDistrictwithanAfrican-Americanpopulationof

only23percenttwooutofthreeBPDstopsinvolvedAfrican-Americansubjects.Figure2
illustratesthispattern.

56TheproportionofAfricanAmericanpedestrianstopsandpopulationwasvirtuallyidenticalintheWesternDistrict,

wherebothfiguresareapproximately96percent.

49

Figure 2 Pedestrian Stops Compared to Population, by BPD District, 2010-2015

Closeranalysishighlightstheimpactoftheseracialdisparities.

IndividualAfricanAmericans
arefarmorelikelytobesubjectedtomultiplestopswithinrelativelyshortperiodsoftime.African
Americansaccountedfor95percentofthe410individualsstoppedatleasttentimesbyBPD

officersfrom20102015.Duringthisperiod,BPDstopped34AfricanAmericansatleast20times

andsevenotherAfricanAmericansatleast30

times. 57Nopersonofanyotherracewasstopped
morethan12times.OneAfrican-Americanmaninhismid-fiftieswasstopped30timesinlessthan

fouryears.Theonlyreasonsprovidedforthesestopswereofficerssuspicionthatthemanwas

loiteringortrespassing,oraspartofaCDSinvestigation.Onatleast15occasions,officers
detainedthemanwhiletheycheckedtoseeifhehadoutstandingwarrants.Despitetheserepeated

intrusions,noneofthe30stopsresultedinacitationorcriminalcharge.

Themaponthefollowing
pageshowstheconcentrationofstopsinAfrican-Americanneighborhoods.

57AsexplainedinSectionII.A.1,thereisstrongevidencethatBPDunder-reportsitspedestrianstops.Thus,thetrue

numberofAfricanAmericanswhohittheseorhigherstopthresholdsmaybesignificantlylarger.

50

ortcd SIO s, 20 10-20 15, with l'c rccnta c B lac k 1'0

..............,.

. _.

urn

u.s. c.-n .... 0:... ,2010

- --=':!:""---

51

BPDlikewisestopsAfrican-Americandriversatdisproportionaterates.From20102015,
AfricanAmericansmadeup82percentofpeoplestoppedbyBPDofficersfortrafficviolations,

comparedtoonly60percentoftheCitysdrivingagepopulation.Aswithpedestrianstops,BPD

stoppedahigherrateofAfricanAmericandriversineachoftheCitysdistricts,despitelarge
differencesinthosedistrictsdemographicprofilesandtrafficpatterns.Forexample,African
Americansaccountedfor80percentofvehiclestopsintheNorthernDistrictdespitemakingup

only41percentofthedistrictspopulation,andmadeup56percentofstopsintheSoutheast
Districtcomparedtoonly23percentofthepopulationlivingthere.

Whiletherearelimitationsonusingpopulationdatatobenchmarkvehiclestopsbecausethe

proportionofdriversonroadwaysdoesnotnecessarilymatchthepopulationlivinginaparticular
area,therearestrongindicationsthatBPDshighrateofstoppingAfrican-Americandriversis

discriminatory.Indeed,theproportionofAfrican-AmericandriversonBaltimoreroadwaysis
almostcertainlylessthantheir60percentshareoftheCitysdrivingagepopulation.Baltimores
trafficpatternsareinfluencedbycommutersandvisitorsfromsurroundingareaswithsignificantly
smallerAfrican-AmericanpopulationsthantheCitys.BPDsdataconfirmsthat25percentofthe

DepartmentstrafficstopsinvolvedriverswholiveoutsidetheCity,overwhelminglyintownsand

suburbswithintheBaltimoremetropolitanarea.ThepresenceoftheseindividualsonBaltimore
roadslowerstheproportionofAfrican-Americandrivers,asAfricanAmericansaccountforonly
27.6percentofthedrivingagepopulationintheBaltimoremetropolitanarea.Moreover,basic

populationdataislikelytooverstatetheportionofAfrican-AmericandriversonBaltimoreroadways

58
becauseAfricanAmericansarelesslikelythanotherCityresidentstohaveaccesstovehicles.

Nationally,19percentofAfricanAmericansliveinhouseholdsthatdonothaveaccessto

automobiles,comparedto4.6percentofCaucasians,adisparitythatfollowsdirectlyfromsharp

racialdifferencesinhouseholdincomeandpoverty.Berube,Deakin,&Raphael,S

OCIOECONOMIC
DIFFERENCESINHOUSEHOLDAUTOMOBILEOWNERSHIPRATES203(2008).Thistrendis
pronouncedinBaltimore,whereover100,000AfricanAmericansliveinpoverty,constitutingan

outsizedshareoftheCityslow-incomeresidents. 59Consequently,AfricanAmericansalmost
certainlycompriselessthan60percentofBaltimoredrivers,butaccountfor82percentofBPDs
trafficstops.

ii. Searches

WealsofoundevidenceofbiasinBPDssearchesduringpedestrianandvehiclestops,

althoughouranalysisislimitedbysignificantshortcomingsinBPDsdatacollection.Wefirst
examinedspreadsheetsprovidedbyBPDthatpurportedlyreflecttheDepartmentsdataonall
vehicleandpedestrianstopsfrom20102015,includingwhetherofficersconductedasearchduring

eachstop.Althoughthesespreadsheetstypicallyrecordtheraceofthepersonstoppedandthe
districtinwhichthestopoccurred,theydonotappeartoreflectcompleteinformationabout
searches.BPDsdatarecordthatofficersconductedsearchesinonly1.3percentofpedestrianstops
58AccordingtotheU.S.CensusBureausAmericanCommunitySurvey20102013,30percentofBaltimoreresidentsdo

nothaveaccesstoautomobiles.

59AfricanAmericansaccountformorethan76percentofBaltimoreanslivingbelowthepovertylinedespitemakingup

only63percentoftheCityspopulation.U.S.CensusBureau,AmericanCommunitySurvey2014One-YearEstimate.

52

and0.5percentofvehiclestopsratesthatareimplausiblylow.InterviewswithBPDpersonnel

responsibleforenteringdatafromofficersstopreportsintothespreadsheetsconfirmedthat

informationonsearchesisfrequentlynotcaptured.

Otherrelevantdatasuchasthereasonforthe
stop,officersunitassignments,etc.alsoappeartoberecordedinconsistently.Inanattemptto
addressthisunder-reportingandfacilitatemorecomprehensiveanalysisofsearches,expertsretained
bytheJusticeDepartmentdrewasampleofnearly14,000hardcopyBPDstopreports,manually
codedthem,andcreatedanewdatabasecontainingalloftheinformationrecordedonthereports.

Withinthissample,officersconductedsearchesin13percentofpedestrianstopsand8.2percentof

vehiclestopsfarhigherratesthanreflectedinthedataBPDcapturedinitsdataentry.

ThedatabasewecreatedfromhardcopystopreportsrevealsthatBPDofficerssearch

AfricanAmericansatdisproportionaterates.Duringpedestrianstops,officerssearched13percent
ofAfricanAmericanscomparedtoonly9.5percentofotherpeoplemakingAfricanAmericans37
percentmorelikelytobesearchedwhenstoppedthanotherresidents.Similarly,officerswere23

percentmorelikelytosearchAfricanAmericansduringvehiclestops.Thesedifferencesare
significantbeyondconventionallevelsofstatisticalsignificance. 60JusticeDepartmentexpertsfound
thatracialdisparitiesinsearchratespersistedafterusingregressiontechniquestocontrolfor
relevantvariables,includingtheareainwhichastopoccurredandtheassignmentandexperience
leveloftheofficersinvolved.

TheseracialdisparitiessuggestthatBPDssearchpracticesdiscriminateagainstAfrican
Americans.Searchratedifferencesdonotaloneestablishdisproportionateimpactbasedonrace,
however,becauseitispossiblethatdifferentialsearchratesaredrivenbyrace-neutralexplanations.
Forthatreason,thebestmeasureofracialpatternsinsearchesisacomparisonoftheratesatwhich

officersfindcontrabandduringsearches,orhitrates.See, e.g.,JohnKnowles,NicolaPersico&

PetraTodd,Racial

Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,109J

OURNALOFPOLITICAL
ECONOMY203(2001).Alowerhitrateforsearchesofaparticulardemographicgroupisevidence

thatofficersapplyalowerthresholdofsuspicionwhendecidingtosearchmembersofthatgroup
comparedtoothers.

TotheextentthatBPDcollectshitratedata,itsuggeststhatofficerssearchdecisionsare

biasedagainstAfricanAmericans.Indeed,BPDsdataonallstopsfrom20102015showsthat
searchesofAfricanAmericanshavesignificantlylowerhitratesthanothersearches.Duringvehicle
stops,BPDofficersreportedfindingsometypeofcontrabandlessthanhalfasoftenwhensearching

AfricanAmericansinonly3.9percentofsearchesofAfricanAmericans,comparedto8.5percent
ofothersearches.Searchhitratesduringpedestrianstopsalsoexhibitedlargedisparities,with

officersfindingcontrabandinonly2.6percentofAfricanAmericansearchescomparedto3.9
percentforothersearchesa50percentdifference. 61Theseresultsarestatisticallysignificant.
60Inthefieldsofstatisticsandcriminology,resultsaregenerallyconsideredstatisticallysignificantiftheywouldoccurby

chancenomorethan5timesoutof100.

61Thisanalysisisbasedonall3,863searchesthatBPDrecordedforpedestrianstopsand1,495searchesrecordedfor
vehiclestopsfrom20102015.Asdiscussedabove,thesedatalikelyfailtocaptureasignificantnumberofsearchesthat
BPDofficersactuallyconductedduringthisperiod.Thehit
ratesfromthesesearchesarenonethelessindicativeofbias,
however,becausethereisnoreasontobelievethattherearesystematicdifferencesinhowBPDrecordssearch

outcomesbasedontheraceofthepersonsearched.Inotherwords,BPDofficerssometimesfailtorecordtheir

searchesatall.Butwhensearchesarerecorded,thereisnoindicationthatofficerschangehowtheyrecordthefruitsof

thesearchbasedontheraceofthepersonsearched.Nordoesitappearthatofficersdisproportionatelyrecordsearches

53


Figure 3 Search Hit Rates, 2010-2015

Inshort,BPDspedestrianandvehiclestopsdisproportionatelyimpactAfricanAmericans.

ThelargeracialdisparitiesinstopspersistthroughouttheCity,subjectingAfricanAmericansto

heightenedintrusionfromthepoliceintheirlives.OfficersalsosearchAfricanAmericansathigher
ratesduringthesestops,eventhoughsearchesofAfricanAmericansarelesslikelytofind
contrabandthansearchesofpeoplefromotherracialbackgrounds.Thesedifferentialsearchrates

arenotjustifiedbycharacteristicsofthepeoplesearched.

OuranalysisofracialpatternsinBPDssearcheswaschallengingbecauseofthe
Departmentsdeficientdatacollection.BPDsfailuretorecordconsistentsearchinformationnot
onlyinhibitsouranalysishere,itlimitstheDepartmentsabilitytorootoutdiscriminatoryconduct
byitsofficers.Movingforward,BPDmustreformitsdatacollectionandanalysissystemstoensure

thatrobustsearchdataistrackedandanalyzedtopreventandcorrectdiscriminatorypractices.

incertainpartsoftheCity.Tothecontrary,theproportionofsearchesrecordedineachdistrictroughlytracksthe

numberofstopsinthosedistricts.Insum,BPDsdatashowingthatsearchesofAfricanAmericansarelesslikelytofind
contrabandthanothersearchesisreliableevidenceofdisproportionateimpact.

54

b. Racial Disparities in Arrests

TheracialdisparitiesinBPDsstopsandsearchesarefurtherreflectedinBPDsarrest
practices.FromNovember2010July2015,BPDchargedAfricanAmericanswith280,850criminal

offenses,constitutingover86percentofallchargesfiledforwhichtheraceoftheoffenderis
known. 62Expressedadifferentway,AfricanAmericansinBaltimorewerechargedwithoneoffense

forevery1.4residents,whileindividualsofotherraceswerechargedwithonlyoneoffenseper5.1

residents.ThisdiscriminatorypatternisparticularlyapparentintwocategoriesofBPDs
enforcement:(1)warrantlessarrestsfordiscretionarymisdemeanoroffensessuchasdisorderly
conductandfailingtoobeyanofficersorder;and(2)arrestsfordrugpossession.Inbothcases,

officersarrestAfricanAmericansatratesfarhigherthanrelevantbenchmarks.

i. Racial Disparities in Misdemeanor Street Arrests

BPDswarrantlessarrestsfordiscretionarymisdemeanoroffensesexhibitsubstantialracial

disparities.OuranalysisofthesearrestsisbasedondatatheStateofMarylandtracksforallcriminal

chargesmadebylawenforcementofficers.Foreachchargedoffense,thisdatacapturestheagency

makingthearrest,theraceandgenderofthepersonarrested,andthearrestsdisposition.As

explainedinSectionII.A,supra,thedispositiondatarecordswhethereacharresteewascommitted

intojail,issuedacriminalorcivilcitation,releasedwithoutcharges,orreleasedbecauseofmistaken

identity.Forarreststhatdonotresultinimmediaterelease,thedataalsorecordwhetherreviewing

officialsattheStatesAttorneysOfficefoundthatthearrestlackedprobablecauseorotherwise

declinedtochargetheoffense.AnalysisofthisdatarevealsthatAfricanAmericansaccountforthe
overwhelmingmajorityofBPDsdiscretionarymisdemeanorarrests,andthatreviewingofficialsare
morelikelytodismisschargesagainstAfricanAmericansindicatingthatofficersapplyalower
standardwhenmakingthem.

Asaninitialmatter,BPDofficersarrestAfricanAmericansforseveralcommon
misdemeanoroffensesathighrates.Althoughtheymakeuponly63percentofBaltimores

population,AfricanAmericansaccountedfor:87percentofthe3,400chargesforresistingarrest;
89percentof1,350chargesformakingafalsestatementtoanofficer;84percentofthe4,000

chargesforfailingtoobeyanorder;86percentofthemorethan1,000chargesforhinderingor
obstruction;83percentoftheroughly6,500arrestsfordisorderlyconduct;and88percentofthe
nearly3,500arrestsfortrespassingonpostedproperty.Figure4highlightsthemagnitudeofthese

disparitiesbyexpressingthenumberofarrestsfortheseoffensesper1,000Baltimoreresidents.

62AfterremovingduplicatesfromdataprovidedbytheStateofMaryland,wefoundthatBPDfiled331,764criminal

chargesduringthisperiod.Ofthesecharges,5,641wereexcludedfromanalysisbecausethearresteesracewasnot

recorded.

55

Figure 4 Misdemeanor Charges Per 1,000 Residents, 2010-2015

Thesedisparitiesareevenmorepronouncedwhereofficersarrestindividualssolelyfora

misdemeanorstreetoffense,unconnectedtoamoreseriouscharge.Insuchcases,African
Americanscomprise91percentoftrespassingcharges;91percentoffailuretoobeycharges;88

percentofhinderingcharges;and84percentofdisorderlyconductcharges.

BPDalsocharged79
peoplesolelywithresistingarrest,despitenotarrestingthemforanyothercrime.African
Americansaccountedfor90percentofthesecharges.

Inadditiontothesecommonmisdemeanoroffenses,BPDenforcesotherminorcharges
almostexclusivelyagainstAfricanAmericans.Forexample,BPDcharged657peoplewith

gamingorplayingcardsordice,ofwhom652over99percentwereAfricanAmericans.

Althoughwearenotawareofanydatatrackingthepreciserateatwhichpeopleofdifferentraces

playcardsordice,itisextremelyunlikelythatAfricanAmericanscomprise99percentofthose

doingso.Notably,insomecases,BPDhasexpendedsignificantresourcestoenforcetheseminor
offensesagainstAfricanAmericans.Forexample,BPDhasusedahelicopterunitknownas
Foxtrot,whichtypicallycoordinatesofficersresponsetoshootingsandotherseriouscrimes,to
enforcemisdemeanorgamblingoffensesagainstAfricanAmericans.Inearly2016,aFoxtrotunit
alertedpatrolofficersthatagroupofyoungAfrican-Americanmenwereplayingdiceonastreet
corner.Officersonthegroundrespondedtothisintelligencebyconfrontingthegroupand
arrestingoneofthemen,whowaschargedsolelywithplayingdice.

ThedifferentialratesatwhichBPDsupervisorsreleasewithoutchargesorlocalprosecutors

declinetochargeBPDsmisdemeanorarrestsunderscoretheirdiscriminatorynature.Toarrestfora
misdemeanoroffense,BPDofficersmusthaveprobablecausethatanoffenseoccurred.As
56

explainedabove,insomecasesreviewingofficialsatbookingortheStatesAttorneysOffice

disagreewithofficersprobablecausedeterminationsanddeclinetochargearrestees.Ifofficers
applyaconsistent,unbiasedstandardwhenmakingarrests,therateofsuchdeclinationsshouldbe

roughlyequivalentacrossracialgroupsforarrestsonanyparticularoffense.

However,ouroutcome

analysisshowslargeracialdisparities:misdemeanorarrestsofAfricanAmericansaredismissedor

declinedatsignificantlyhigherratesthanotherarrests.

Duringtheirinitialreviewofarrestdocuments,bookingofficersandprosecutorsdismissed

chargesagainstAfricanAmericansatsignificantlyhigherratesthanarrestsofotherpeople.This

disparityexistsforeverycommonmisdemeanoroffenseweexamined,asevidentinFigure5below.

OfficialsdismissedchargesagainstAfricanAmericansfortrespassingatarate52percenthigher
thantherateatwhichtheydismissedothertrespassingarrests;dismissedAfricanAmericanresisting
arrestchargesata57percenthigherrate;failuretoobeychargesata33percenthigherrate;false

statementchargesata231percenthigherrate;disorderlyconductchargesata17percenthigher
rate;anddisturbingthepeacechargesata370percenthigherrate.Thesedisparitiesarestatistically
significant.Notably,theracialdisparitiesinoutcomesforthesehighlydiscretionary,non-violent
offensesarenotpresentforlessdiscretionaryfelonyoffenses.Wefoundthatreviewingofficials
initialreviewresultedindismissalofchargesforfirstdegreeassault,burglary,androbberyatnearly

identicalratesacrossracialgroups.Theimplicationofthesefindingsisthattherearenounderlying
conditionsthatcauseofficialstodismissAfrican-Americanchargesathigherrates.Instead,thelarge

racialdifferencesintheproportionofdismissedchargesformisdemeanorstreetoffenses
demonstratethat,whereofficershavewiderdiscretiontomakearrests,theyexerciseitina
discriminatorymanner.

57

Figure 5 Percent of Charges Dismissed Upon Initial Review, 2010-2015

Insum,BPDdisproportionatelyarrestsAfricanAmericansforcommonmisdemeanorstreet
offenses.TheproportionofAfricanAmericansarrestedfortheseoffensesisfarhigherthantheir

shareofBaltimorespopulation,andreviewingofficialsdeterminedthatarrestsofAfrican

Americansfortheseoffensesaresignificantlymorelikelytolackprobablecauseorotherwisenot
meritprosecution.Takentogether,thesefactsdemonstratethatBPDarrestsAfricanAmericansfor

misdemeanoroffensesbasedonlowerevidentiarythresholdsthanituseswhenarrestingpeople
fromotherracialbackgrounds.

ii. Disproportionate Arrests for Drug Possession

TherearelargeracialdisparitiesinBPDsenforcementoflawscriminalizingpossessionof
controlledsubstances.Weanalyzeddrugpossessionchargesforseveralreasons:suchchargesmake
upmorethanonethirdofallBPDarrests;stakeholdersandcommunitymembersweinterviewed

frequentlyexpressedtheirbeliefthatBPDfocusesonAfricanAmericansforheighteneddrug
enforcement;anddataonthedrugarrestscanbecomparedtorelevantbenchmarksondrugusage
toassesswhetherBPDenforcesdruglawsdisproportionately.Forthisanalysis,wecompared
BPDsdrugarreststo:(1)surveydataondrugusage;and(2)theratesofdrugarrestsinjurisdictions

similartoBaltimore.WefindthatBPDarrestsfarmoreAfricanAmericansfordrugoffensesthan

wouldbeexpectedbasedondrugusageandpopulationdata,andthatthisdisparityisnot
attributabletoanylegitimatelawenforcementobjective.

Indeed,BPDsrateofAfrican-American
drugarrestsissignificantlyhigherthantherateofsucharrestsbylawenforcementagenciesincities
withsimilardemographicprofilesandsocioeconomicchallenges.TheseanalysesrevealthatBPDs

58

drugenforcementdisproportionatelyimpactsAfricanAmericans.

BPD arrests African Americans for drug possession offenses at rates far
exceeding their drug usage: ToassesstheracialimpactofBPDsdrugarrests,wefirst
aggregatedalldrugpossessionoffenses 63forwhichBPDmadeatleast3,000chargesfrom

November2010June2015.BPDchargedapproximately100,000peoplefordrug
possessionundertheseoffenses.Eighty-ninepercentofthosechargedwereAfrican

American. 64BPDmade254drugarrestsforevery1,000African-AmericanBaltimore

65
residentswhilemakingonly52drugarrestsper1,000residentsofotherraces.

African
Americanswerethusfivetimesmorelikelythanotherstobearrestedfordrugoffenses.

Figure 6 Drug Possession Charges Per 1,000 Residents, 2010-2015

TheracialdisparitiesinBPDsenforcementarefarhigherthananydemographicdifferences
intheratesatwhichindividualsusedrugs.Whiletheobservedprevalenceofillicitdrugusevaries

somewhatbydatasource,mostcomprehensivesurveysindicatethatAfricanAmericansusedrugsat

ratesthat,atmost,onlymodestlyexceedotherpopulationgroups.TheCenterforDiseaseControls
(CDC)NationalSurveyonDrugUseandHealthfoundthat,in2013,8.7percentofAfrican

Americansoverage12haduseddrugswithinthepastmonth,comparedto7.7percentof

Caucasians.The2012surveyreportedsimilarfigures,with9.1percentofAfricanAmericansand7.4

63Somecriminologistsbelievethat,whencomparingdrugarreststosurveydataondrugusage,themostaccurate

comparisonincludespolicearrestsfordrugpossessionanddrugdistributionbecauselawenforcementofficersmay
chargeindividualspossessingcontrolledsubstanceswithintenttodistributethem.Accordingly,wealsocompared
BPDsrateofchargingindividualsforalldrugpossessionand distribution offensestodataondrugusage.This
comparisonyieldednearlyidenticalresults.AfricanAmericansaccountfor90percentofpossessionanddistribution
offenseschargedbyBPD,comparedto88.5percentofpossessionchargesalone.
64Weexcludedasmallnumberofchargesforwhichtheraceofthearresteewasnotrecorded.

65ThesefiguresincludeonlydrugoffensesforwhichBPDmadeatleast3,000chargesfrom20102015.Thetotal

numberofalldrugarrestsishigher,asindicatedintheanalysisofBureauofJusticeStatisticsdatadiscussedbelow.

59

percentofCaucasiansreportingdruguse. 66Inotherwords,theCDCsurveyfoundthatAfrican
Americanswerebetween1.1and1.2timesmorelikelytousedrugsthanCaucasians,yetBPDarrests

AfricanAmericansfordrugpossession5timesasoftenasothers. 67

BPDsdisparaterateofarrestingAfricanAmericansfordrugcrimescannotbeexplainedby
differencesindrugusagewithinBaltimoreascomparedtothenationasawhole.Tothecontrary,

druguseinBaltimoreappearsbroadlysimilartonationalaverages.Forexample,datamaintainedby
theSubstanceAbuseandMentalHealthServicesAdministration(SAMHSA)showsthattherateof

marijuanausefrom20102012averaged8.2percentinBaltimore,comparedtoanationalaverageof
7.0percent.Fordrugsotherthanmarijuana,SAMHSAsurveysshowthatusageinBaltimore
averaged3.3percentduringthisperiod,comparedtoanationalaverageof3.4percent.

BPD arrests African Americans for drug possession offenses at higher rates
than similar cities: AsecondmeasureofBPDsdisproportionatedrugenforcementisthe
agencyshighrateofarrestingAfricanAmericansfordrugpossessionoffensescomparedto
lawenforcementagenciesincitieswithcomparabledemographicprofiles,crimerates,and

economicprofiles.Expertcriminologistsretainedforourinvestigationidentifiedfivecities
mostcomparabletoBaltimoreforpurposesofthisanalysis:Atlanta,Cleveland,Detroit,

Memphis,andMilwaukee.Thesecitiesreportedoveralldrugusageratesinlinewith
Baltimores8.2percent,including:9.0percentinMilwaukee;13.6percentinDetroit;and6.5

68
percentinAtlanta. Thecomparisoncitieslikewisereportedusageratessimilarto
Baltimores3.3percentfordrugsotherthanmarijuana.Clevelandreported3.5percentnon69
marijuanausage,Atlanta3.1percent,andDetroit3.7percent.

Despitesthesesimilaritiesin
ratesofdruguse,however,wefoundthatBPDmakesfarmoredrugarrests

thanagenciesin
Baltimorespeercities.

Tomakethiscomparison,wecollecteddatafromtheBureauofJusticeStatistics(BJS)on

drugarrestsinBaltimoreandthefivecomparisoncities.ThemostrecentperiodforwhichBJSdata
isavailableis20102012.

Weusedthe20102012BJSdataforallcitiesincludingBaltimoreto
standardizehowarrestsarecategorizedandreported. 70Wethencontrolledforpopulation
differencesamongthesecitiesbymeasuringarrestratesbasedonthenumberofdrugarrestsper
1,000residentsineachracialcategory.TheresultsshowthatBPDsrateofarrestingAfrican
Americansfordrugcrimesdramaticallyexceedstherateofsucharrestsbyagenciesinthe
comparisoncities.Indeed,foreachofthethreeyearsweexamined,Baltimoredrugarrestsof

66SeeNationalSurveyonDrugUseandHeath,C

ENTERFORDISEASECONTROL(Aug.4,2016),

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data.
67Ninety-ninepercentofBPDsarresteesfordrugpossessionwereeitherAfricanAmericanorCaucasian.

68National Survey on Drug Use and Health Table 5,SUBSTANCEABUSEANDMENTALHEALTHSERVICESADMINISTRATION

(August4,2016),
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHsubstateChangeTabs2012/NSDUHsubstateChangeTabs2012
.htm.
69Id.
70TheBJSdataondrugarrestsinBaltimorediffersslightlyfromthedataBPDprovidedtousduringtheinvestigation,

butthesmalldifferencesdonotimpactouranalysis.Indeed,forallthreeyearsweexamined,theBPDdatashowthat
theagencyarrestedanevenlargernumberofAfricanAmericansthanthedatareportedtoBJS.Theanalysispresented

herethusmayslightlyunderstatethemagnitudeofBPDsdisparatedrugarrestsofAfricanAmericanswhencompared

toagenciesinothercities.

60

AfricanAmericanswerebetween200

and 500 percent higherthanthecomparisoncities. 71

Figure 7 Drug Possession Arrests Per 1,000 African-American Residents, 2010-2012

c. Use of Force

Theconsequenceofthelargeracialdisparitiesinstops,searches,andarrestsmayalso

manifestitselfinwhatmaybedisproportionateuseofforceagainstAfricanAmericansbyBPD.We

foundthatAfricanAmericansaccountedforroughly88percentofthesubjectsofnon-deadlyforce
usedbyBPDofficersinarandomsampleofover800caseswereviewed.Thistrendisconsistent
acrossdifferenttypesofnon-deadlyforce,includingtasers,themostcommonweaponusedbyBPD
officers.Whilethesepatternsmeritattention,wedrawnofirmconclusionsabouttheirrelative
impactonAfricanAmericansbecausewedidnotcomparetheratesofforcetoanybenchmarkof
encountersinwhichforceiswarranted.Nevertheless,thisrateofforceissignificantlyhigherthan

theproportionofAfricanAmericansinBaltimorespopulation,heighteningourconcerns.

*
*
*

Insum,wefindlargeracialdisparitiesinBPDspedestrianstops,vehiclestops,searches,and
arrests.WefurtheridentifiedtroublingindicationsthatBPDofficersdisproportionatelyuseforce

duringencounterswithAfricanAmericansonBaltimorestreets.Asexplainedfurtherbelow,BPDs
disparatestops,searches,andarrestsofAfricanAmericansarenotpartofacalibrated,

71BPDalsoarrestsnon-AfricanAmericansfordrugpossessionoffensesatsomewhathigherratesthanthenational
averageandthecomparisoncities.Asexplainedabove,however,theproportion

ofBPDdrugarrestsofAfrican
Americansisfarhigherthanwouldbeexpectedbasedondrugusagedataandpopulationstatistics.Thecomparisonto
lawenforcementagenciesinsimilarcitiesdemonstratesthatthesedisparitiesarenotdrivenbylegitimateresponsesto

socioeconomicconditions.Rather,BPDsdiscriminatorydrugenforcementrendersitasignificantoutlier.

61

proportionatestrategyforrespondingtocriminalactivity.Thesedisparitiesestablish
disproportionateimpactundertheConstitutionandthenondiscriminationprovisionsofTitleVI

andtheSafeStreetsAct.TitleVIandtheSafeStreetsActprohibitlawenforcementagenciesthat

receivefederalfinancialassistancefromengaginginpracticesthathaveanunnecessarydisparate

impactbasedonrace.BecauseBPDsdisparatestops,searches,andarrestarenotdoneinamanner
necessarytoachieveBPDslegitimatepublicsafetygoals,theyviolateTitleVIandtheSafeStreets

Act.

2. Racial Disparities in BPDs Enforcement, Along with Evidence Suggesting

Intentional Discrimination Against African Americans, Exacerbates Community
Distrust

ThepolicingpracticesthatcausetheracialdisparitiesinBPDsstops,searches,andarrests,
alongwithevidencesuggestingintentionaldiscriminationagainstAfricanAmericans,underminethe

communitytrustthatiscentraltoeffectivepolicing.Indeed,weheardfrommanycommunity
memberswhowerereluctanttoengagewithBPDofficersbecauseoftheirbeliefthatthe

DepartmenttreatsAfricanAmericansunfairly.See alsoJackGlaser,Suspect

Race: Causes and

Consequence of Racial Profiling96126(2015)(racialprofilinghasahighriskofunderminingefforts
tocontrolcrimeandpromotepublicsafety).

TheseconcernswereacknowledgedbyBPD

leadershipandofficers,whoexplainedthatthelackoftrustparticularlyinmanyofBaltimores

African-Americancommunitiesinhibitedofficerseffortstobuildrelationshipsthatareakey
componentofeffectivepolicing.

Startingintheearly2000s,BPDimplementedazerotolerancepolicingstrategy.This

strategyencouragedofficerstotakediscretionaryenforcementactions,includingstops,searches,and
arrestsformisdemeanoroffenseslikeloiteringanddisorderlyconduct.Asdescribedabove,this
enforcementstrategyfocusedonAfricanAmericansandpredominantlyAfricanAmerican
neighborhoodsfordiscretionaryenforcementactions,anditledtoofficersfrequentlystopping,
searching,andarrestingindividualswithouttherequiredconstitutionaljustification.Wealsofound
evidenceofofficersusingracialslursormakingotherstatementsexhibitingbiaswhiletaking

enforcementactionsagainstAfricanAmericans.

TheDepartmenthashadnoticeofconcernsabouttheimpactofitszerotolerancestrategy
onAfricanAmericansandpredominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoodsformanyyears,butfor
manyyearsitfailedtotakeadequatestepstoensurethatitspolicingeffortsarenon-discriminatory.

BPDdidnotinstituteaFairandImpartialPolicingpolicyuntil2015,leavingofficerswithout
criticalguidanceonhowtolawfullyperformtheirduties.WelikewisefoundnoevidencethatBPD
hasperformedanyanalysistodetermineifitsenforcementstrategiesandactivitiesdisparatelyimpact
AfricanAmericans,eventhoughithascollectedthebasicdatatoperformsuchassessmentsfor

years.Indeed,everyanalysisweincludeinthisreportisbasedonBPDsowndata,butBPDnever

developedsystemstoconductthisanalysis.WealsofoundthatBPDrepeatedlyfailstoinvestigate

complaintsofracialbias.IntheapproximatelysixyearsofcomplaintdatawereceivedfromBPD,

wefoundonlyonecomplaintthatBPDclassifiedasaracialslur.Thisisimplausible.Bymanually
reviewingandperformingtextsearchesonBPDscomplaintdata,wefound60morecomplaints

thatallegedthatBPDofficersusedjustoneracialslurn****rbutallthesecomplaintswere
misclassifiedasalesseroffense.
62

Recently,CityandBPDleadershaveacknowledgedthatthezerotolerancepolicingstrategy

hasharmedtheCityspredominantlyAfrican-Americancommunities.See supraat17-18.During
ourinvestigation,oneofBPDstopofficialstoldusthatstopandfriskkilledthehopesanddreams
ofentirecommunities.TheCitysandBPDsrecognitionthatitszerotolerancepolicingstrategy
hashadasignificant,unwarrantedimpactonBaltimoresAfrican-Americancommunitieshasledto

recentchangesintheDepartment,includingimplementingtheFairandImpartialPolicingpolicy
in2015,andeffortstoimproveitscollectionofdataonitsenforcementactivities.Wecommendthe
CityandBPDfortheseefforts.

Still,manyBPDsupervisorscontinuetoreinforcezerotoleranceenforcement.Officers

patrollingpredominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoodsroutinelyreceiveorderstoclear

cornersbystoppingorarrestingAfrican-Americanyouthstandingonsidewalks.Thispracticehas
continueddespiteconcernsraisedbyofficersthemselves,whohavetoldBPDleadershipthatthese
actionslacklegaljustification,aretime-consuming,andcounterproductive.Insomecases,
supervisorshaveissuedexplicitlydiscriminatoryorders,suchasdirectingashifttoarrestallthe

blackhoodiesinaneighborhood.Andwhenofficershaveexpressedconcernsaboutsuch
directives,theDepartmenthasfailedtotakecorrectiveaction.Torestorethecommunitys
confidenceinBPDandensurethatitspolicingservicesarebeingprovidedequitably,BPDmust
continuetoimproveitspolicies,training,datacollectionandanalysis,andaccountabilitysystems.

Theassessmentofdiscriminatoryintentfocusesoncircumstantialanddirectevidenceof
intentasmaybeavailable.See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,429U.S.252,266
(1977).Theimpactoftheofficialaction...mayprovideanimportantstartingpointforassessing
discriminatoryintent.Id.;see also Williams v. Hansen,326F.3d569,585(4thCir.2003).Inadditionto
evidenceofdisparateimpact,otherfactorsinclude:directstatementsthatexhibitbias;anagencys
departuresfromitsownproceduresandacceptedpracticesinthefield;andtherelevanthistorical

context.Arlington Heights,429U.S.at26668;Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County,48F.3d810,819(4th

Cir.1995).

a. BPDs Enforcement Activities Disproportionately Impact African

Americans

ThemagnitudeoftheracialdifferencesinBPDsstops,searches,andarrestsareevidence

thatBPDsdisproportionateenforcementmayconstituteintentionaldiscrimination.Wefound
consistentracialdisparitiesinBPDsstops,searches,andarreststhatarenotattributableto
populationpatterns,crimerates,orotherrace-neutralfactors.

BPDstopsAfricanAmericansdisproportionatelyineachofitsninepolicedistricts,despite
significantvariationinthedistrictsdemographiccharacteristicsandcrimerates.Moreover,
BPDhasusedpedestrianstopsasaregularpartofitsdiscretionaryenforcement

documentingover300,000stopsinfiveyearsdespitetheirdemonstratedineffectiveness
forferretingoutcrime.Only3.7percentofpedestrianstopsuncoveredevidenceofcriminal
activityandtherateofcriminalactivityfoundduringstopsofAfricanAmericanswas
lowerthanstopsofothers.Supraat28.

63

RacialdisparitiesinBPDssearchratespersistedaftercontrollingfortheareainwhicha
searchoccurredandnumerousotherfactors,includingtheunitassignmentandexperience

leveloftheofficersinvolved.AndsearchesofAfricanAmericanswerelesslikelytofind

contrabandcomparedtosearchesofpeoplefromotherracialbackgrounds,indicatingthat
officersapplyalowerthresholdofsuspicionwhendecidingtosearchAfricanAmericans.
Supraat53.

ThereisalsosubstantialevidencethatthelargeracialdisparitiesinBPDsenforcementof

drugpossessionstatutesarenotexplainedbyratesofdrugusage.Whilesurveydataondrug
usageshowsthatAfricanAmericansusebannedsubstancesatratessimilartoorslightly
higherthanotherpopulationgroups,BPDarrestedAfricanAmericansfordrugpossession
offensesatfivetimestherateatwhichitarrestedothers.BPDalsoarrestedAfrican

Americansfordrugpossessionoffensesseveraltimesmoreoftenthanlawenforcement
agenciesincitieswithsimilarcrimeratesanddemographicandeconomiccharacteristics.
SupraatSectionII.B.1

TheconsistentracialdisparitiesinoutcomesfromBPDsmisdemeanorarrestsalsodonot

appeartobeattributabletonon-racialfactors.Foreverymisdemeanoroffensewe

examined,supervisorsatCentralBookingandprosecutorsdismissedasignificantlylarger

shareofchargesbroughtagainstAfricanAmericansthanothers.Thisconsistentpattern
suggeststhat,forthesehighlydiscretionaryoffenses,BPDisdisproportionatelylikelyto
arrestAfricanAmericansbasedoninsufficientevidence.See supraatSectionII.B.1.

Together,thesefindingsprovidesubstantialevidencethatBPDsdisparatestops,searches,and
misdemeanorarrestsofAfricanAmericansarenotpartofacalibrated,proportionatestrategyfor

respondingtocriminalactivity.

Inaddition,BPDsdisproportionateenforcementagainstAfricanAmericansissuggestiveof

intentionaldiscriminationbecausetheracialdisparitiesaregreatestforenforcementactivitiesthat

involvehigherdegreesofofficerdiscretion.Inthefiveyearsofarrestdatawereviewed,African

Americansaccountedforalargershareofchargesforhighlydiscretionarymisdemeanoroffenses
thanforotheroffenses,including:91percentofthosechargedsolelywithtrespassing,91percentof
chargesforfailingtoobeyanofficersorders,88percentofthosearrestedsolelyforimpedingand

84percentofpeoplechargedwithdisorderlyconduct.Asnotedabove,bookingsupervisorsand
prosecutorsdismissedasignificantlyhigherportionofchargesmadeagainstAfricanAmericansfor
eachofthesecharges.Thispatternindicatesthat,whereBPDofficershavemorediscretiontomake
arrests,theyexercisethatdiscretiontoarrestAfricanAmericansdisproportionately.Moreover,the
racialdisparitiesindismissalratesexistonlyforhighlydiscretionarymisdemeanorarrests,notfelony

arrests.Thatis,bookingofficialsandprosecutorsdismissedchargesatnearlyidenticalratesacross

racialgroupsforfelonychargeslikefirstdegreeassault,burglary,androbberyforwhichthereislittle

officerdiscretionaboutwhethertoarrestsuspects.Foreverydiscretionarymisdemeanoroffense
thatweexamined,however,officialsdismissedchargesagainstAfricanAmericansatsignificantly

higherratesindicatingthatofficersapplyalowerstandardwhenarrestingAfricanAmericansfor

theseoffenses.

64

b. BPDs Zero Tolerance Strategy Focused on African-American

Neighborhoods

Inadditiontothisstatisticalevidenceofdisparateimpact,wealsohaveevidencethatracial

disparitiesoccurred,atleastinpart,becauseofBPDsrelianceonzerotoleranceenforcement

tacticsinpredominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoods.BPDemployedthesetacticswithout
adequateoversight,training,oranalysis,despitefrequentcommunityconcernsabouttheirimpact.
Wealsofoundevidenceofdirectordersthatencouragediscriminatorytreatment.

ZerotolerancetacticsinAfrican-Americanneighborhoodsprioritizedofficersmakinglarge

numbersofstopsandarrestsforminoroffenses,despiteknowingthepotentialimpactofthese
practices.Forexample,intheapproximatelyfiveandhalfyearsofdataweexamined,BPDrecorded

nearly55,000pedestrianstopsinitssmallestpolicedistricttheWesternDistrict,withapopulation

ofalittlemorethan37,000peoplethatis97percentAfricanAmericanwhilemakingonly21,000

stopsinthepredominantlywhiteNorthernDistrict,withapopulationofapproximately91,000. 72
Expresseddifferently,BPDmade146stopsforevery100residentsinthepredominantlyAfrican
AmericanWesternDistrictwhilemakingonly22.5stopsper100residentsinthepredominantly
whiteNorthernDistrictamorethan6to1disparity.WefoundthatdisparitiesinBPDsstopsof

AfricanAmericanspersistacrossallofBPDsninepolicedistricts.

Weheardconcernsfromnumerousofficersthatzerotolerancetacticshaveresultedin

unconstitutionalstopsandarrests,andthattheyarecounterproductive.TheFraternalOrderof

Polices2012Blueprint for Improved Policingnotedhowzerotolerancetacticsarecounterproductive:

ComstatnumbersdriveeverythinginBPD,whichhasledtomisplaced
priorities...Asaresult,officersintheBPDfeelpressuretoachievenumbersfor

perceptionssake,and[t]hefocusonassigningblameforless-than-satisfactory
numbersduringComstat,ratherthanproblem-solving,iscompletelyunproductive

andweakensthecollectivemoraleoftheBPD.

TheBlueprint

concludedthatBPDmustdiscontinuethepracticeofrewardingstatisticallydriven
arrests.

Nevertheless,manyBPDsupervisorscontinuetoencouragepatrolofficerstousezero
tolerancetactics.Basedonourobservationsduringnumerousride-alongsandconversationswith
BPDofficers,instructionstoclearcornersremainaregularfeatureofpatrollingcertain
predominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoods.Theseactivitiesfrequentlylackanylegalbasis.
Oneofficerinformedusthatshestopsanddispersesyouthstandingonsidewalksbecauseitlooks
bad.Thesameofficer,whilerespondingtoacallaboutagangfight,stoppedtoengageanAfrican

Americanmanandhisfour-year-oldsonwhoweresittingonafencebyaplaygroundwherethe
youngboyhadbeenplaying.Theofficertoldthemthattheycouldntjuststandaroundand
neededtomove.Asecondofficer,afterexplainingtohissupervisorthathehadnolegalbasisto
clearacorner,wastoldtomakesomethingup.BPDhascontinuedthispracticedespiteitsimpact

onAfrican-Americanresidentsanditslackofeffectivenessforfightingcrime.Indeed,wefound

72ThesestopsalsofelldisproportionatelyonAfricanAmericans.Despitemakinguponly41percentoftheNorthern

Districtspopulation,AfricanAmericansaccountedfor83percentofstopsinthedistrict.

65

thatBPDspedestrianstopsandsearchesconductedduringthesestopsuncovercriminalactivity

atextremelylowrates.See supraatSectionII.A.2.Andtherateoffindingcriminalactivitywhen

stoppingandsearchingAfricanAmericansislowerstill.Id.

Insomecases,BPDsupervisorshaveinstructedtheirsubordinatestospecificallytarget

AfricanAmericansforenforcement.Asergeanttoldusthatin2011herlieutenantacommander

inchargeofsettingenforcementprioritiesforanentirepolicedistrictduringtheshiftorderedthe
sergeanttoinstructofficersunderhercommandtolockupalltheblackhoodiesinherdistrict.
Whenthesergeantobjectedandrefusedtofollowthisorder,shereceivedanunsatisfactory
performanceevaluationandwastransferredtoadifferentunit.Thesergeantfiledasuccessful
complaintaboutherperformanceevaluationwithBPDsEqualOpportunityandDiversitySection,
butBPDnevertookactionagainstthelieutenantforgivingtheordertotargetblackhoodiesfor
enforcement.Similarly,asdescribedabove,in2012aBPDlieutenantprovidedofficersunderhis

commandwithatemplatefortrespassingarreststhatsuggestedofficerswouldarrestexclusively
African-Americanmenforthatoffense.Asinthefirstexample,thisdirectiveisespecially

concerningbecauseitcamefromashiftcommander.See supraat63.Thesestatementstargeting

AfricanAmericansforenforcementreinforcethestatisticaldisparitiesinenforcementoutcomesthat
wemeasured.TheenforcementactivitiesorderedbytheBPDcommandersarrestingAfrican

Americansfortrespassingandfindinganypossiblebasistoarrestblackhoodiesareconsistent

withtheracialdisparitieswefoundinBPDsdiscretionarystops,searches,andmisdemeanorarrests.

c. Statements Exhibiting Bias Against African Americans

WealsofoundnumerousexamplesofBPDofficersusingracialslursorotherstatements
thatexhibitbias.Officersuseofraciallanguagewasarecurrentthemeduringthehundredsof

interviewsweconductedwithmembersoftheBaltimorecommunity.Thefrequencyofthis

conductisdifficulttoquantify,however,becauseBPDerectsmanyformalobstaclestofiling
complaints,communitymembersoftendonotfilecomplaintsbecausetheybelievedoingsowould
befruitless,andBPDfailstoproperlydocumentandclassifyallegationsthataremade.See

infra at
139.Evenwhenindividualssuccessfullymakeacomplaintallegingracialbias,BPDsupervisors

almostuniversallymisclassifythecomplaintasminormisconductsuchasdiscourtesythatdoes
notreflectitsracialelements.

Indeed,BPDsinternalaffairsrecordscontainonlyonecomplaintthatofficerscategorized
asaracialslurallegationinthesixyearsofdataweexamined.Ourinterviewswithhundredsof

Baltimoreresidents,alongwithothercomplaintswehavereceivedfromtheBaltimorecommunity,
demonstratesthatthisnumberisimplausiblylow.Becauseofthis,wemanuallyreviewedthe
narrativedescriptionsofasubsetofthecomplaintsthatwerenotclassifiedasallegingracialbias,

andweidentifiedmorethanonehundredexamplesofofficersallegedlyusingracialepithets,slurs,

andmakingthreatswheninteractingwithAfricanAmericansinthatsubset.Indeed,wefound60

separateallegationsbetween2010and2016thatofficersusedthewordn****rthatwerenot
classifiedascomplaintsalleginguseofracialslursorotherracialbias. 73Asexplainedfurtherbelow,
73Useofracialepithetsundoubtedlydemonstrateracialanimus.Jones

v. Robinson Prop. Group,427F.3d987,993(5th

Cir.2005).Manycourtshaverecognizedthatparticularslursareextremelyprobativeofracialanimus.See

Spriggs v.
Diamond Auto Glass,242F.3d179,185(4thCir.2001)(Farmorethanamereoffensiveutterance,thewordn****ris
pureanathematoAfrican-Americans.);Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Assn,989F.2d858,861(5thCir.1993)(theterm

66

BPDmisclassifiesandfailstoinvestigatecomplaintsofracialslursandracialbias,allowingaculture

ofbiasagainstAfricanAmericanstopersist.Severalexampleshighlightthetypesofstatementswe
foundthatexhibitbiastowardsAfricanAmericans:

TheCitypaid$95,000in2012tosettlealawsuitbroughtbyan87-year-oldAfricanAmericangrandmotherwhoallegedthatshewasshovedagainstawallaftersherefusedto
allowanofficertoenterherbasementtoconductawarrantlesssearch.Aftershovingthe
womantothefloor,theofficerallegedlystoodoverherandsaid,Bitch,youaintnobetter

thananyoftheotheroldblackbitchesIhavelockedup.

In2014,amiddle-agedAfrican-AmericanmanallegedthatasergeantinSoutheastBaltimore

stoppedhimnearPattersonParkandstrip-searchedhiminpublic.Whenthemanprotested

andsaidhewouldcontactalawyer,thesergeantallegedlytoldhim,Getyourn****rassout

ofhere.BPDfoundthecomplaintnotsustainedwithoutinterviewinganyofthe

involvedparties.

OneBaltimorefirefighterandanemergencymedicaltechniciantoldusthat,priortoamarch
ledbyaprominentAfrican-Americanpastorin2015,aBPDofficertoldthefirefighters
theyregoingmarchingandtheresgoingtobeaproblem.Whatyallshoulddoisturn

themhosesonthem.

In2013awhitemaleBPDofficermadearacially-chargedthreattoanAfrican-American
teenagerwhilebookingtheyouthintoBaltimoresjuvenilefacilityonafailuretoappear
charge.TheincidentstemmedfromanargumentaboutGeorgeZimmerman,whohadbeen
acquittedofmurderingTrayvonMartinfourdaysearlier.Inresponsetotheteenager
referringtotheofficerspresentasZimmermans,awhiteofficerthreatenedthejuvenileby

referringtotheoutfitMartinworeatthetimehewaskilled:Putahoodieonandcometo
myneighborhood,youwillsee.Theofficeralsothreatenedtheyouthbystating,Ifyou
cometomyneighborhoodIllthrowyouinthewaterandfeedyoutothecrabs.Iwillthen
letthecrabsgetfatoffyouandthensellthemtoyourfamily.WhenBPDinvestigatedthe
incident,theofficeradmittedtotalkingaboutthecrabsandthrowinghimintheriver,but

claimedtointernalaffairsinvestigatorsthathecouldnotrecallwhetherhemadethe

remarkaboutthehoodie.BPDsustainedacomplaintagainsttheofficerformisconduct
andmakinganinappropriatecomment,buttheinvestigativefilecontainsnorecordof

discipline.TheofficerremainsemployedatBPD.

InacomplaintfromAugust2011,anAfrican-Americanmanallegedthatduringavehicle
stop,anofficerwarnedasecondofficertobecarefulbecausetheoccupantsofthecar
mightdovoodooonyouanapparentreferencetotheirheritageandaccents.Asecond

officermademonkeynoisesthroughouttheencounter.BPDclosedthecomplaintwithout
makinganinvestigativefinding.

n****risauniversallyrecognizedopprobrium,stigmatizingAfrican-Americansbecauseoftheirrace.);Boyer-Liberto

v.
Fontainebleau Corp.,786F.3d264,280(4thCir.2015)(useoftheslurporchmonkeyisaboutasodiousastheuseofthe
wordn****r).

67

AnAfrican-Americanmantoldusthat,whileoutwalkinginApril2015,officersstopped
him,accusedhimoflooting,andcalledhimalowlifen****r.

Theuseofracialslursandotherraciallychargedstatementsdescribedabove,aswellas

othersweuncoveredduringourinvestigation,typicallyoccurredwhileofficerswereconducting
stopsorsearchesofAfricanAmericans.Thisisconsistentwiththeareasinwhichwefoundlarge
statisticaldisparitiesinBPDsenforcement.

d. BPD Misclassifies Complaints of Racial Bias and Fails to Investigate

Racial Bias Allegations

BPDfailstorecordcomplaintsofracialbiasoraffirmativelymisclassifiescomplaintsto

74
masktheirracialcomponents.BPDalsofailstoinvestigateallegationsofbiasedenforcement.

By
notusingitsownprocedurestodeterandcorrectbiasedconduct,BPDexacerbatesrelationships
withBaltimoresAfrican-Americancommunities.NumerousindividualstoldusthatBPDeither
refusedtoacceptcomplaintsevenforegregious,racially-motivatedmisconductordidnottake

theircomplaintsseriously.ManycommunitymembersthusfeelthatBPDisbiasedagainstAfrican

Americansanddoesnotrespondtheirconcerns.

i. BPDs defective procedures for recording and classifying complaints

of racial bias

BPDsinternalaffairsdatabasereflectsonlyfivecomplaintsfrom20102016thatBPD
supervisorsclassifiedasalleginguseofaracialslurorotherracialbias. 75Theabsenceofsuch
recordsstemsfromatleasttwoproceduraldeficiencies.Asdiscussedabove,BPDerectssignificant

obstaclestofilingcomplaints.Andevenwhencommunitymemberssucceedinfilingacomplaintof

racialbiasaccordingtoBPDsrequirements,supervisoryofficersalmostuniversallymisclassifythose
complaintstomasktheirracialelements.Asaresult,BPDdoesnotinvestigatethefrequent

allegationsofrace-relatedmisconductmadeagainstitsofficersandhasnomechanismtotracksuch
allegationstocorrectdiscriminatorypolicingwhereitoccurs.

Mostnotably,BPDsupervisorsaffirmativelymisclassifycomplaintsofracialbias,precluding

theDepartmentfrominvestigatingortrackingbiasallegations.AcommanderatBPDsInternal

InvestigationDivisiontoldusBPDrequiresallcomplaintsclaimingofficersusedaracialepithetto

becategorizedasracialslurcomplaints,andBPDsdisciplinarymatrixmakesclearthatconduct

relatingtoapersonsraceisaseriousoffensethatmayresultintermination.Yetinnearlyevery

caseinwhichanofficerallegedlyusedaracialslur,BPDofficialscategorizedtheallegationmerelyas

discourtesyorusinginappropriatelanguage.Forthecomplaintsinwhichourmanualreview
foundthatBPDrecordedallegationsthatofficersusedthewordn****r,supervisorsfailedtoclassify
thecomplaintasaracialslurorotherallegationofracialbias98percentofthetime.

74PriortoenactingitsFairandImpartialPolicingpolicyin2015,BPDonlyhadageneralprohibitionagainst

discrimination,whichdidnotprovidesufficientguidancetoofficersonhowtoconducttheirpolicingactivitiesinanon

discriminatorymanner,althoughitdidprovideabasisforBPDtodisciplineofficers.
75WereferinthissectiononlytocomplaintsallegingbiasbyBPDofficerstowardsmembersoftheAfricanAmerican
communityinBaltimore.

68


BPDsimilarlymisclassifiednearlyallofthecomplaintsweidentifiedthatallegedothertypes

ofracialdiscriminationinBPDsenforcement.Outofthedozensofcomplaintsthatourmanual
reviewfoundtoallegeracialprofilingorracialdiscrimination,BPDsupervisorsclassifiedonly
fourasalleginganytypeofracialbias.Andeventhosecomplaintstriggerednomeaningfulreview.
BPDreferredtwoofthecomplaintstocommandinvestigationunitstaskedwithaddressingonly
minorallegations,andclosedathirdcomplaintsevenminutesafteropeninganinternalaffairs

investigation.AlthoughwefoundthatBPDroutinelymisclassifiesothercomplaintsdueto
systemicdeficienciesinitspractices,see
infraat138,wedidnotfindanythingapproachingthelevel

ofsystematicmisclassificationofcomplaintswefoundrelatingtoallegedracialdiscrimination,such
asthe98percentmisclassificationofuseofthewordn****r.Moreover,thecomplaintsthatare
misclassifiedallegeracialdiscriminationontheirface,suchastheuseofaracialepithet.Failingto
recognizethepotentialforracialdiscriminationintheuseofaracialepithetisdifficulttoattributeto

alackoftraining,policyguidance,orothersystemicdeficiency.Thissystematicmisclassificationof
complaints,particularlywhentheclassificationisnotdifficult,indicatesthatthemisclassificationis
becauseoftheracialnatureofthecomplaint.

BPDspracticeofobscuringracialelementsofmisconductimpedesanysignificant
disciplinaryaction,evenincaseswhereanofficeradmittedtousingaracialepithet.Several

exampleshighlightthispractice.Inacasefrom2010,anofficeradmittedthathesaidyouknow,
youreactinglikearealn****rrightnowduringanencounterwithayoungAfrican-Americanmale

hehadstoppedforloitering.Theofficerspartner,whowasAfricanAmerican,filedthe
complaintafterwitnessingtheincident.Thecomplaintwasinitiallycategorizedasaracialslur

complaint.Beforeissuinganinvestigativefindingsustainingtheallegation,however,theleadBPD
investigatorchangedthecategorizationinBPDsinternalaffairsdatabasefromracialslurto

inappropriatecomments,profanity,orgesturestoadepartmentalmember.Thischangein
classification,shortlybeforetheallegationwassustained,indicatesanintenttodisguiseandexcuse
theracialmotivationfortheenforcementaction.Theincidentresultedinminimaldisciplineagainst
theoffendingofficer. 76Otheraspectsoftheinvestigationareequallytroubling.Thedetectivewho

downgradedthecomplaintalsoexpandedhisreviewoftheincidenttoinvestigatetheofficerwho
reportedtheracialslurforneglectofduty,ostensiblybasedontheofficersfailuretoprovidethe

African-Americanmanwithacitizencontactreceipt.Weareconcernedthattheexpanded

investigationmayhavebeendoneinretaliationforreportingafellowofficersracialbias.Despite

thecomplaintsclearmisclassificationinviolationofDepartmentpolicy,BPDsupervisorssignedoff
throughoutthechainofcommand.

Inanotherincidentfrom2010,anAfrican-Americanmanstatedthathewitnessedofficers

useexcessiveforceduringanarrestandpunchafourteen-year-oldboywhoattemptedtofilmthe
arrestonhiscellphone.TheAfrican-Americanmanrecountedthattheofficersusedtheword

n****rfrequentlyandaskedhimifhetake[s]ituptheassbyAllah.Whenthemanwenttothe
districtheadquarterstoreportthemisconduct,hewasmetbythesameofficerswhotoldhim,what
77
bringsyourblackassbackhere?andyoucantakeyourblackassdowntoKirkAvenue

before
76Theofficerwasnotfiredorsuspended.Instead,hereceivedaletterofreprimand,wasrequiredtoattendsensitivity

training,andforfeitedthirtydaysofhisleave.
77KirkAvenuereferstothelocationofBPDsInternalInvestigationDivision,orIID.UnderBPDpolicy,members

ofthepublicshouldbeabletofileexternalcomplaintsofofficermisconductbothatdistrictheadquarters,andalsoat

theIID.

69

thebusleavesbecauseyouknowhowyoublackpeoplelikethebus.Despitetheseriousnessofthe
allegationsandthefactthatthecomplaintidentifiedtwowitnesses,BPDneverinvestigatedthe
incidentsallegedracialmotivation.Instead,detectivescategorizedtheallegationsasmisconduct,
78
excessiveforce,andunwarrantedaction,andadministrativelyclosed

thecasewithout
conductingasingleinterview.

ii. BPD fails to investigate racial bias allegations

BPDfurtherimpedesaccountabilityfordiscriminatorypolicingbydepartingfromits

proceduresforinvestigatingbiasedconduct.BPDsupervisorsrepeatedlyfailtoseekevidencethat
couldcorroboratebiasallegationsandresultinofficerdiscipline.Forexample,a2011complaint

describedanincidentinwhichtwowhiteofficerstoldanAfrican-Americanmanwhohaddoubleparkedhiscarandwasblockingthestreettomovethiscar,n****r!Themanwasdoubleparked
inordertoassisthisauntintoherhomeinNortheastBaltimoreandwasnotchargedwithany
offense.Themanscomplainttheone
complaintBPDcorrectlycategorizedasaracialslurinthe

79
morethansixyearsofdataweexaminedwasassignedtobeinvestigatedatthecommandlevel

andadministrativelyclosedsixmonthslater.ThefileBPDprovidedhasnorecordofthe
investigationoranyattempttoidentifytheofficersinvolved.

BPDconductedasimilarlyinadequateinvestigationina2010casethatalsoallegedrace
motivatedmisconduct.There,anAfrican-Americanmanallegedthatwhilebeingheldinacellat

theSouthwestDistrict,severalofficerscalledhimamonkeyandan****rwhilebeatinghim.

Theinvestigativefile,whichconsistedsolelyofafewsummaryparagraphsabouttheincident,

revealedthattheinvestigatingofficeradministrativelyclosedthecasewithoutevenreadingarelated

incidentreportbecauseitwaslockedinthereportboxatthetimeofmyinvestigation.

Inanotherexample,BPDfailedtoadequatelyinvestigateacomplaintthatanofficercalled
anAfrican-Americanwomanablackb***h.BPDneverinterviewedtheofficeraccusedofusing

theoffensiveterm.Instead,hewasaskedonlytocompleteawrittenquestionnairethatomittedthe

racialcomponentofthewomansallegation.Thequestionnaireaskedwhethertheofficeratany
timecall[ed]orrefer[red]to[thewoman]asabitch?BPDfoundtheallegationnotsustainedbased
ontheofficerswrittendenial.Theomissionoftheracialcomponentofthewomansallegation

indicatesthatBPDinvestigatorsintendedtoconcealtheracialnatureoftheinteractionandavoid
determiningwhethertheheighteneddisciplinerequiredforusingaracialslurshouldbeimposed.

e. Baltimores History of Residential Segregation

BPDszerotolerancepolicingstrategyhasfocusedonpredominantlyAfrican-American

neighborhoodsthathavebeensegregatedforgenerationsduetogovernmentpoliciesthat
systematicallypreventedAfricanAmericansfromacquiringwealth,andobstructedtheirabilityto

moveintoneighborhoodswithbetterjobsorschools.
78AsdiscussedfurtherinSectionIII.C.1,infra,internalinvestigationsshouldbeissuedoneoffourpossiblefindings:

sustained,notsustained,unfoundedorexonerated.WefoundthatBPDfrequentlydisposedofcaseswithminimalor
noinvestigationbylabelingthemasadministrativelyclosed.
79AsdescribedfurtherinSectionIII.C,infra,underBPDpolicy,minormisconductcanbeinvestigatedandhandledat

thecommandlevelbycommandinvestigationsunits.

70


Startingintheearly20thCentury,theCitysponsoredresidentialsegregationprogramsthat

forcedthelargenumberofAfricanAmericanswhosettledinBaltimoreduringtheGreat

Migrationtoliveineconomicallydepressedneighborhoods.

Baltimorewastheninthmost
80
segregatedcityinthecountrywhentheGreatMigrationendedin1970,

andthemostrecentU.S.
81
CensusBureaudatashowsthattheCityremainsextremelysegregated. InitslawsuitagainstWells
Fargofordiscriminatorylendingpractices,theCityofBaltimoreitselfacknowledgedthatits

minoritycommunitieshavebeenvictimizedbytraditionalredliningpractices,andthatthecity
itselfremainshighlysegregated:

[E]venthoughBaltimoreis64%African-Americanand32%white,many

neighborhoodshaveamuchhigherconcentrationofoneracialgrouportheother.
Forexample,theAfrican-Americanpopulationexceeds90%inEastBaltimore,

Pimlico/Arlington/Hilltop,Dorchester/Ashburton,SouthernParkHeights,Greater
Rosemont,Sandtown-Winchester/HarlemPark,andGreaterGovans.

Itexceeds
75%inWaverlyandBelairEdison.

Atthesametime,thewhitepopulationof
GreaterRolandPark/Poplar,Medfield/Hampden/Woodberry,andSouthBaltimore
exceeds80%,andthewhitepopulationofCross-Country/Cheswolde,Mt.
Washington/Coldspring,andNorthBaltimore/Guilford/Homelandexceeds70%.

City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo,No.1:08-cv-00062-JFM(D.Md.Oct.21,2010).

Cityleadershipencouragedandsupportedthissegregationbypassingthecountrysfirst
block-by-blocksegregationordinance,whichmadeitacrimeforAfricanAmericanstomoveto
majoritywhiteblocks,andviceversa.Atthetimeoftheordinancesenactmentin1910,theNew

York TimesdescribeditasthemostpronouncedJimCrowmeasureonrecordandnotedthat
[n]othinglikeitcanbefoundinanystatutebookorordinancerecordofthiscountry. 82The
SupremeCourtlaterstruckdownasimilarordinanceinBuchanan v. Warley,245U.S.60(1917),but
theeffectinBaltimorewasminimal.Whitepropertyowners,withsupportfromCityleadership,
continuedtoenforcetheruleinformallybyrequiringhomeownersincertainwhiteneighborhoods,
liketheaffluentRolandParkareainNorthBaltimore,tosigncovenantsbarringAfricanAfricans
fromowningorrentingtheirproperty.ThemayordirectedCitybuildingandhousinginspectorsto
instituteapracticeofcitingforcodeviolationsanyonewhorentedorsoldpropertytoAfricanAmericansinthoseneighborhoods.SeeAnteroPietila,NOTINMYNEIGHBORHOOD35,5354

(2010).

80SeeDouglasS.MasseyandNancyA.Denton,Hypersegregation

in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation

Along Five Dimensions,26Demography3,1989.TheGreatMigrationreferstoamassrelocationofAfricanAmericans
between1910and1970whensixmillionAfricanAmericansmigratedfromruralSouthernstatestosettleacrossthe
country.WhentheGreatMigrationendedaround1970,nearlyhalfofallblackAmericanswerelivingoutsidetheSouth,

comparedtotenpercentwhentheMigrationbegan.

Baltimoreisaffectedbyhyper-segregation,atermsociologists
usetorefertothenearlycompletedivisionofracesfollowingtheGreatMigration.SeeIsabelWilkerson,T
HEWARMTH
OFOTHERSUNS810,398(2010).
81Accordingtothe2010census,thedissimilarityindexforBaltimoreis71.8,whichindicatesthepercentageofAfrican

Americansthatwouldneedtomovetolesssegregatedareasforthepopulationtobedistributedequallywithwhites.
82Baltimore Tries Drastic Plan of Race Segregation,N.Y.Times,Dec.25,1910,at34,43,

http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1910/12/25/105900067.html?pageNumber=34.

71

ThefederalgovernmentalsocontributedtoBaltimoressegregationbyinstitutingpolicies
thatfurtherisolatedAfricanAmericans.DuringtheGreatDepression,thegovernmentsHome
OwnersLoanCorporation(HOLC)createdmapsof239cities,includingBaltimore,torate
residentialareasformarketvalueandrisk.BaltimoresneighborhoodswithlargeAfrican-American
populationswerecoloredredonthemaptosignifyHOLCsconclusionthattheseneighborhoods
werehazardous,leadingtothetermred-lining.SeeHOLC1937map(followingpage). 83After
theGreatDepression,theFederalHousingAdministration(FHA)carriedonHOLCslegacywell

intothe1960s.TheFHApromotedhome-ownershipinwhitesuburbanneighborhoods,and
toleratedfurtherred-liningbyprivatebanksandinsurancecompanies.Id.at6174.

Thelegacyofthisgovernment-sanctioneddiscriminationcontinuestoimpacttheAfricanAmericancommunityinBaltimoretoday.

TheCityremainshighlysegregated,andAfricanAmericanresidentslivedisproportionatelyinneighborhoodswithsocialandeconomicchallenges.
Morethan100,000African-Americansresidentsliveinpoverty,constitutingmorethanthreefourthsofBaltimoreanswhodoso.

BPDleadershipisacutelyawareofthechallengesposedbythisbackdrop.

Former
CommissionerBattsexplainedthatwhenhewasappointedtoleadBPDin2012itwaslikegoing

backalittlebitintime.Itsaboutblackandwhiteracismin[Baltimore].Itsallthethingsyoudealt
withinthe1960s. 84CommissionerDavishasalsorecognizedthechallengesofficersfacein

addressingracismandpoverty,amongothersocialproblems:

whencopshearthattheyhavethe
burdentoaddressracismandpovertyandeducationandhomelessness...Ithinkcopsmisinterpret

85
thatmessagewith,howdoyouexpectmetodothat? Recently,BPDhastakenseveral
commendablestepstowardsaddressingtheseconcerns,includingissuingaFairandImpartial
Policingpolicyandlaunchinganeducationalprogramforofficersthataddressessomeoftheracial

dynamicsintheCityshistory.

Nevertheless,manychallengesremain.BPDneedstoensurethatitemployslaw
enforcementstrategiesthatdonotdiscriminateagainstAfricanAmericansandpredominantly

African-Americanneighborhoods.Workingtogetherwiththecommunitywillpromoteproactive,
constitutional,andeffectivepolicing.

*
*
*

Insum,BPDsstops,searches,andarrestsdisproportionatelyimpactAfricanAmericansand

predominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoodsandcannotbeexplainedbypopulationpatterns,
crimerates,orotherrace-neutralfactors.ThisdisparateimpactviolatesTitleVIandtheSafeStreets

83HOLCdevisedasystemofratingneighborhoodsbasedontheirperceivedsuitabilitytoreceivehomemortgageloans,

rangingfromtheostensiblymostsuitableAareastotheleastsuitableDareas.HOLCclassifiedtheAareas,
coloredgreenonthemap,asmostindemandforhomemortgageloans.TheBareas,coloredblueonthemap,
wereratedasstilldesirable.Theyellow-codedCareaswereratedasdefinitelydeclining.

TheredDareaswere
ratedastoohazardousforgenerallendingpractices.BaltimoreresidentslivingintheDareasweregenerallyunableto

obtainmortgages.

SeeNot in My Neighborhood,at67-70.
84Q&A C-SPAN: Anthony Batts(C-SPANtelevisionbroadcastJan.20,2015),https://www.c-span.org/video/?323886
1/qa-anthony-batts.
85http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-davis-challenges-20150711-story.html.

72

Act.WealsofoundevidencesuggestingintentionaldiscriminationagainstAfricanAmericans.This

racialdiscriminationunderminescommunitytrustinBPD.

Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC) 1937 Map

Legend

D o,-

c=J

"

73

C. BPD USES UNREASONABLE FORCE

BasedonourreviewofnearlyathousandofBPDsowninvestigativefilesofitsofficers

86
usesofforce,wefindreasonablecausetobelievethatBPDofficersuseunreasonableforce

in
violationoftheFourthAmendment,andfailtomakereasonablemodificationsnecessarytoavoid
discriminationinviolationofTitleIIoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct,contributingtothe

patternorpracticeofconductthatviolatestheconstitutionandfederallaw.BPDsunreasonable
forceisnotlimitedtoofficersuseofanyspecificweapon;wefounditthroughouttheuseofforce
fileswereviewed.
TheFourthAmendmentguaranteestherightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,

houses,papers,andeffects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.

U.S.C
ONST.amend.IV.
Thisprotectionfromunreasonableseizuresprohibitsanofficerfromusingexcessiveforcewhen
makingaseizure.Determiningwhethertheforceusedtoeffectaparticularseizureisreasonable

undertheFourthAmendmentrequiresacarefulbalancingofthenatureandqualityoftheintrusion
ontheindividualsFourthAmendmentinterestsagainstthecountervailinggovernmentalinterestsat

stake.Graham v. Conner,490U.S.386,396(1989)(internalquotationmarksomitted).The

determinationmustbemadewhileviewingtheincidentfromtheperspectiveofareasonable
officeronthescene,ratherthanwiththe20/20visionofhindsight.

Id.at396,399.

Todeterminewhetherforceusedbyalawenforcementofficerisreasonable,welookto(1)
theseverityofthecrimeatissue;(2)theextenttowhichthesuspectposesanimmediatethreat

tothesafetyoftheofficersorothers;and(3)whether[thesuspect]isactivelyresistingarrestor

attemptingtoevadearrestbyflight.

Estate of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst,810F.3d892,899(4th

Cir.2016)(alterationinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Toproperlyconsiderthe
reasonablenessoftheforceemployedwemustviewitinfullcontext,withaneyetowardthe

proportionalityoftheforceinlightofallthecircumstances.Id.at899(internalquotationmarks

omitted).[O]fficersusingunnecessary,gratuitous,anddisproportionateforcetoseizeasecured,
unarmedcitizen,donotactinanobjectivelyreasonablemanner....Meyers v. Baltimore County,713
F.3d723,734(4thCir.2013)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

OurevaluationofBPDsuseofforcewasinformedbymanysources,including:

(1)interviewswithhundredsofindividualswhohavehadencounterswithofficersorwitnessed

thoseencounters;(2)interviewsoftheDepartmentsofficers,supervisors,andcommandstaff;

(3)anextensivereviewofnearlyonethousandoftheDepartmentsreportsandinvestigationsof

officersusesofforce;(4)theDepartmentspoliciesandtrainingmaterials;and(5)analysisbyour

expertpoliceconsultants.
Thenearlyonethousandforcecaseswereviewedincludedarandomlyselected,statistically
significantsamplefromalluseofforceincidentsbyBPDofficersoccurringbetweenJanuary1,
2010,andJune19,2015.Thesampleof814caseswasidentifiedbyourstatisticalexpertsfromthe
universeofall2,818incidentsofforce,includingbothdeadlyforceandless-lethalforce,identified

86Throughoutthisletter,weusethetermsunreasonableandexcessiveinterchangeably;bothtermsrefertoforce

thatexceedsconstitutionallimits,orinotherwords,isdisproportionalinlightoftheseverityofthecrimesuspected,

threatposedtoofficersorothers,andlevelofresistance.Whenusingthetermunnecessary,wemeanthatforcewas

usedwhentheincidentcouldhavebeenresolvedwithoutresortingtoanyforceatall.

74

byBPD.Thesamplesizeaccountedforanumberoffactors,includingthetypeofweaponusedby

officersandwhethertheforcewasusedagainstpeoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis.

Becauseoftheircriticalnature,wealsoattemptedtoreviewallusesofdeadlyforcebyBPD
occurringfromJanuary1,2010,throughthedurationofourinvestigation,andwereviewedwhat

wasprovidedtousthroughMay1,2016.However,thoughweidentifiedforBPDonmultiple

occasionsadditionaldeadlyforcecasesthatwehadnotreceived,BPDwasneverabletofindand

producecasefilesforalldeadlyforceinvestigationsfromthistimeperiod.TheDepartment
informedusthatitisunabletolocatethefilesfortwentyfirearmsdischargesfromthetimeperiod

thatwerequested.Becauseofthislackofdocumentation,wewereunabletoconclusivelydetermine
thenumberofdeadlyforceincidentsthatoccurredduringthetimeperiodwereviewed.Thisfailure

isquiteconcerning.TheDepartmentsinabilitytomaintainthefilesforofficersfirearmsdischarges

reflectsaseriousdeficiencyintheoversightofofficersusesofdeadlyforce.Foranumberofother

shootingcases,BPDprovideduswithsupplementalinformationnearlyayearafterweinitially

requestedthecompletefiles.Intheend,wewereabletoreviewoveronehundredinvestigationsof
BPDsusesofdeadlyforce.Wecarefullyreviewedeachoftheforcefileswewereprovided,both

deadlyforceandless-lethalforce,todeterminewhethereachuseofforcewasjustifiedunder

applicablelegalstandards.Ourreviewofindividualuseofforcereportsandinvestigationsinformed
ourdeterminationofwhetherapatternorpracticeofexcessiveforceexistswithinBPD.
Wenotethat,inanumberofcasesofbothdeadlyandless-lethalforcethereportsand

reviewsofforceprovidedtoolittleinformationaboutthecircumstancessurroundingtheuseof
forcetoallowourteamandexpertstodeterminewhethertheforcewasreasonable.Thisis
troublingbecause,despitethelackofadequateinformationtodeterminewhethertheseusesofforce

werereasonable,BPDsupervisorsstillapprovedallbutahandfuloftheseusesofforce.This

systematicfailuretoprovideadequateoversightofuseofforcerequirescorrection.Evengiventhe
significantnumberofcasesinwhichwewereunabletomakeadecision,however,wewere
neverthelessabletomakedeterminationsinasufficientnumberofcasestoconcludethatthereisa

patternorpracticeofexcessiveforceatBPD.
WhilereviewingBPDsforceinvestigations,wenotedanumberoftrends.First,ina
significantnumberofcases,officersuseaggressivetacticsthatescalateencountersandstiflepublic

cooperation,leadingtotheuseofphysicalforcewhenitisnotnecessarytoresolveanincident.
Officersapproachincidentsinvolvingmerequalityoflifeviolationsinaconfrontationalmannerand

failtousebasicconflictresolutionskills,creatingconflictwhereitdidnotexistbefore.BPDtrains
officerstobeaggressive,inculcatinganadversarialmindsetinitsrecruitsandteachingthemto,for

example,pointaweaponatunarmedandinnocentcivilianstocontrolascene.Tacticssuchasthese

unnecessarilyescalateencounters,increasetensionsandleadtounnecessaryforce.

Second,officersuseexcessiveforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorin

crisis.WhenfamiliesinBaltimoreconfrontafamilymemberexperiencingamentalhealthissue,
theyoftencall911torequestanofficertosafelyescorttheirfamilymembertoahospitalfora
mentalhealthevaluationand,ifnecessary,commitment.

Intoomanyofthesecalls,officersarriveat
thehomesoffamilies,knowingtheyarebeingcalledtoassistwithamentalhealthincident,without

aplantoaccountforthementalhealthissue.Becauseoftheirlackofplanningandpropertactics,
theyendupinviolentconfrontationswithindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisisand

useforce,sometimesdeadly,againstthesevulnerableindividuals.
75

Third,officersuseunreasonableforceagainstjuveniles.Itisapparentthatofficershavenot
receivedguidancenorhavebeentrainedonwell-establishedbestpracticesforpoliceinteractions

withjuvenilesthataccountfortheirdevelopmentalstageandpreventtheunnecessary
criminalizationofoverwhelminglyminorityyouth.Thelackofpolicyandtrainingforthese

interactionsresultsinexcessiveforcebeingusedagainstyouths.
Finally,officersuseunreasonableforceagainstpeoplewhopresentlittleornothreattothem
orothers.Onesuchgroupincludesindividualswhoarealreadyrestrainedandunderofficers
control.Anothergroupisindividualswhoarefleeingawayfromofficers.OfficersinBaltimore
engageinahighnumberoffootpursuits,atacticwithanumberofattendantrisks,including

endangeringofficersandcommunitymembers.Duetotherisksinherentinfootpursuits,agencies
mustexercisecarefuloversightoverfootpursuitsandprovideproperguidanceandtrainingon
whenitisappropriatetoengageinfootpursuitsandhowtodososafely.BPDfailstodoso.In

somecases,thepeoplewhoofficerspursuehavenotcommittedseriouscrimesandpresentno

threattoofficersorcommunitymembers,butthesepursuitsendwithBPDofficersusingsignificant

force.Additionally,insomecaseswhenindividualsfleeinvehicles,officersuseunreasonableforce

afteranypotentialthreattothemhassubsided.
TheDepartmentsfailuretoprovideofficerswiththenecessaryguidance,skills,and
oversighttoresolveincidentsinawaythatkeepsthemandcommunitymemberssafeunderlies
officersconstitutionalviolations.TheDepartmentfailstoprovideproperpolicyguidanceonhow
andwhenitisappropriatetouseforce.Italsofailstoproperlytrainofficersonhowto

operationalizeitspoliciesand,insomecases,hasimproperlytraineditsofficersbyteachingincorrect

legalstandardsorimpropertacticsthatleadtoofficersunreasonableforce.Finally,theDepartment
failstoexerciseproperoversighttoaddresspotentiallyunreasonableforceandremedybadtactics

whentheyoccur.Thesefailureshaveledtothesystemicuseofunreasonableforcethatwe

observedinourinvestigation.
1. BPDs Overly Aggressive Tactics Unnecessarily Escalate Encounters and Result in
Excessive Force

BPDofficersaggressivetacticsintheirencounterswithciviliansunnecessarilyescalate
situationsandcontributetoofficerssystemicuseofunreasonableforce.Officersuseaggressive
tacticsinencountersthatbeginconsensuallyorincaseswhereofficersstopindividualsforlow-level

andhighlydiscretionaryviolationssuchasloitering,aswellasviolationsthatofficerschargebased
onciviliansconductduringtheencounter,suchasfailuretoobey,resistanceordisorderly

conduct,asdiscussedsupraatSectionII(A).Intheseencounters,officersissuecommandswithout

explanationratherthancommunicatingrespectfully,explainingthepurposefortheirapproachand

providingsubjectsanopportunitytovoicetheirconcerns. 87Whensubjectsdonotimmediately
complywithofficerscommands,ratherthanattempttoproblem-solveoruseconflict-resolution

skills,officersresorttooquicklytophysicalforceevenifindividualsdonotpresentathreattothem
orothers.Evenwhereforceisjustified,officersfrequentlyuseahighlevelofforcewhenonlyalow
87Citizenswhodonotunderstandwhytheyarebeingstoppedandfeeltheyarebeingtreatedunfairlyand

disrespectfullyarelesslikelytocomplywithofficersorders.

SeeTomR.Tyler,Procedural

Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective

Rule of Law,30Crime&Justice283,35051(2003)(Whenpeoplejudgethatlegalauthoritiesandinstitutionsare
makingtheirdecisionsfairly,theyviewthoseauthoritiesasmorelegitimateandmorewillinglydefertoandcooperate
withtheminpersonalencountersandintheireverydaylaw-relatedbehaviors.).

76

levelofforceisobjectivelyreasonable.Officersusethesetacticsagainstindividualswithmental

healthdisabilitiesorincrisis,whohavecommittednocrime,andalsoonjuveniles.Theforceused

byofficersinthesesituationsisoftenunnecessaryanddisproportionaltothesuspectedviolation,

threat,andresistanceposedbyciviliansunderGraham.

See Armstrong,810F.3dat900(internal
quotationmarksomitted)(Theproblemsposedby,andthusthetacticstobeemployedagainst,an

unarmed,emotionallydistraughtindividualwhoiscreatingadisturbanceorresistingarrestare
ordinarilydifferentfromthoseinvolvedinlawenforcementeffortstosubdueanarmedand

dangerouscriminalwhohasrecentlycommittedaseriousoffense.).

Cf.Waterman

v. Batton,393
F.3d471,477(4thCir.2005)([T]hereasonablenessoftheofficersactionsincreatingthe
dangeroussituationisnotrelevanttotheFourthAmendmentanalysis.).

Inadditionto
contributingtoofficersunconstitutionalconduct,thesetacticsgreatlyundermineBPDseffortsto
repairitsdamagedrelationshipwithsomesegmentsofBaltimorescommunity.
Forexample,ina2014incident,anofficerinformedayoungman,Matthew, 88thathecould
notsmokeinsideapublicmarketandaskedhimtoleave.

Matthewleftandtheofficerfollowedhim

outside.Onceoutside,theofficeraskedhimforidentificationtoissueacivilcitation.

Accordingto
theDepartmentsuseofforcereport,theMatthewbecameagitatedandstartedtoarguewiththe

officer,attractingacrowd.Theyoungmanrefusedtoprovideidentificationandmovedbackward.
Theofficergrabbedtheyoungmanbyhisjacket,atwhichpointhepulledawayandfled.Two
officerspursuedMatthewforblocksandwhentheyeventuallycaughtupwithhim,usedarrestand

controltechniquestotacklehimandstophimfromfurtherfleeing.Whiletryingtocontrolhim
onthegroundandplacehiminhandcuffs,hesustainedabrasionstotheleftandrightsideofhis
faceandacuttohisupperlip,requiringtwostitches.

TheofficerarrestedMatthewforbeing

disorderly,butaccordingtothearrestdatabasethatBPDprovided,theStatesAttorneysOffice
declinedtoformallychargetheyoungman.

Theofficerrepeatedlyescalatedthisencounter,usingunnecessarilyaggressivetacticsagainst
ayoungmanwhohadnotcommittedacrime,resultinginthemanbeingsubjectedtoexcessive
force.Thedecisiontograbthemanbyhisjacket,afterhehadobeyedtheofficerswarningby

leavingthemarket,escalatedtheencounterandledtothemanresistingtheofficersforcebypulling
away.Theofficersdecisiontothenpursuetheyoungman,foramerecivilcitation,alsoescalated

theencounter.Otherthancallingoffthepursuit(whichwouldhavebeenappropriate),asdiscussed
inmoredetailinfra

atpage91,themostlikelywaytoendthepursuitwasbyusingforce.Tackling,
andusingcontrolandarresttechniquesresultingintwostitchesandabrasionstohisface,was

disproportionateinlightofthecivilviolationtheyoungmanhadcommitted,andwhereheposed

nothreattoofficersoranyoneelse.See Graham,490U.S.at396.

Inanotherexample,ina2010incident,amajorwhowaspatrollinginuniforminan

unmarkedpolicevehicleobservedseveralpeopleonthestepsofanapartmentbuilding.Heasked
thegroupifeveryonelivedthere.Oneofthegroup,ayoung56,147-poundAfrican-American

man,Daniel,askedthemajorwhattheproblemwas.Themajortoldthesuspecttherewasno

problemandhecangobacktohissteps.ThemajorreportedthatDanielwalkedinfrontof[the

majors]vehicleactingina[sic]agitatedstatewearingandadjustingsometypeofathleticglovesand

takinghisshoesoff.AnolderAfrican-Americanmanwasinstructing[theyoungman]tostop
88WeusepseudonymsforindividualswhowerethesubjectofforcewithBPDofficerstoprotectagainstdisclosing

personally-identifyinginformation.WealsodonotidentifyBPDpersonnelbyname,asthepurposeoftheseillustrations

isnottoassessindividualliabilitybuttosupportandillustratethefindingsofapatternorpractice.

77

actinglikethis.Danielbeganyellingatthisoldermaleinathreateningmannerandchallenging

89
him.Themajorcalledforbackup,withdrewhistaser,

andorderedDanieltositonthecurb.

Alieutenantarrivedasbackup.Themajorreportedlytoldthelieutenantthattheyoungmanwas

warnedtodesistbuttonoavailandisreadytofight...heneedstobearrestedbeforehehurts

someone.Theinvestigatingsergeantreportedthatthesubjectmovedtoonesideofthestreetand

satonthecurb.ThemajorinformedthelieutenantthatDanielwastheaggressorandhecontinued

tobeathreat.ThereisnoindicationinthereportthatDanielstoodupfromhisseatedpositionon

thecurb.Nevertheless,thelieutenantimmediatelypushed[Daniel]tothegroundwith[a]leftfoot

kicktothechest.Danielhadcommittednocrime,wasseatedonacurbandobeyingofficers

commandsatthetimethelieutenantunnecessarilyandunreasonablykickedhiminthechest.This
incident,involvingalieutenantandamajor,wasinvestigatedbyalower-rankedsergeant,

underminingthecredibilityoftheinvestigation.Themajor,whowasinvolvedintheincident,

ultimatelyapprovedthesergeantsinvestigation,thoughthemajorlackedtheindependenceto

objectivelydeterminewhethertheforceusedwasappropriate.

Officersalsouseheavy-handedtacticswhencivilianssimplyrefusetoobeytheircommands

andescalateencountersbyresortingtoforcetooquickly,includingagainstindividualswhoarenot
90
beingarrestedforanycrime,withmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis.

Wedeterminedthat
approximately20percentofuseofforcefilesBPDprovidedinvolvedindividualswithmentalhealth

disabilitiesorincrisis.Inoneofmanysuchincidentswereviewed,in2013,threeofficersandone

sergeantrespondedtoacalltotransportanindividualtoahospitalforamentalhealthevaluation.

Accordingtotheirreport,theofficersarrivedatthebackofahouseandfoundawoman,Ashley,
thesubjectofthepetition,sittingonthegroundwithaclenchedhand.Ashleyreportedlyhada

smallbuildandwasyellingdontshootme.Oneofficeraskedhertoemptyherhandsandshe
refused,stating,youhavetoshootmefirstIamnotgivingitup[sic].

Thereisnoindicationthat
theofficersattemptedtoverballypersuadeAshleyinanywaytoopenherhandsorcalmherdown.

Rather,theofficersphysicallyattemptedtoforceherhandsopen.Ashleyresistedtheofficers

physicalattemptsandbegantokick[]andswing[]atthem.Accordingtothereport,oneofficer

usedataserindrive-stunmodetotrytocalm[her]down.Becausedrive-stunninganindividual

causesgreatpain,itdidnotcalmher.Thetechniquealsocarriesaheightenedriskofseriousharm
orinjurywhenusedonindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis.

See PoliceExec.
ResearchForum&Cmty.OrientedPolicingServs.,2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines14(2001)
(hereinafterPERF&COPS,2011

Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines).Ashleycontinuedtoresist.

Inresponse,theofficerdrive-stunnedhertwomoretimes,withsimilarresults.Theofficerswere
89Ataser,oranElectronicControlWeapon(ECW)isaweaponthatcanbeusedeitherinprobemodeorin

stunmode.Inprobemode,twoprobesarefiredfromadistance,attachedtothinelectricalwires,tolodgeintheskin

ofthesubject.The[t]aserthendeliversafixedfive-secondcycleofelectricitydesignedtocauseelectro-muscular
disruption,effectivelyfreezingthesubjectsmusclesandtherebytemporarilydisablinghim.Instunmode,theprobe
cartridgeisremovedandthe[t]aserselectrodesareapplieddirectlytothesubject.The[t]aseroperatorcanthendelivera

painfulelectricshock,thedurationofwhichiscompletelywithin[theoperators]control.Instunmode,the[t]aserdoes

notcausemusculardisruptionorincapacitation,butratherfunctionsonlyasapaincompliancetool.

Meyers,713F.3d

at728n.3(alterationsinoriginal)(quotingMeyers,814F.Supp.2d552,555n.3(D.Md.2011)).
90Acrisisincidentisoneinwhichsomeoneexperiencesordisplaysintensefeelingsofpersonaldistress(e.g.,anxiety,

depression,anger,fear,panic,hopelessness);athoughtdisorder(e.g.,visualorauditoryhallucinations,delusions,sensory
impairment,orcognitiveimpairment);obviouschangesinfunctioning(e.g.,neglectofpersonalhygiene);orcatastrophic

lifeevents(e.g.,disruptionsinpersonalrelationships,supportsystemsorlivingarrangements,lossofautonomyor

parentalrights,victimization,ornaturaldisasters).Thiscouldbearesultofmentalillness(includingsubstanceuse
disorders),anintellectualdisability,apersonalcrisis,ortheeffectsofdrugsoralcohol.

78

eventuallyabletophysicallypryopenAshleyshands,whichheldtwovials,thecontentsofwhich

emptiedontotheground.Ashleywastransportedtothehospitalforapsychiatricevaluation.Use

ofthetaserindrive-stunmodethreetimesagainstawomanexperiencingcrisis,whowasunarmed,

posednoseriousthreattotheofficersorothers,andwasnotbeingarrestedforanycrime,was
unnecessaryandunreasonable.Problematically,itappearstheonlyinvestigationofthisincidentwas

conductedbythesergeantwhowasatthescene.Asergeantwhoparticipatedintheincidentlacks

thenecessaryobjectivityandindependencetofairlyassesswhetherofficersonthesceneacted

appropriately.Havinganinvolvedsergeantinvestigatetheforceunderminestheintegrityofthe
investigation.
Aggressiveandviolentpoliceinteractions,suchasthosedescribedabove,haveleftsome

BaltimoreresidentswiththebeliefthatencounterswithBPDofficerswillresultintheirbeing

subjectedtounnecessaryforce.Communitymemberstoldusininterviewsthatevenwhenthey
believetheyhavedonenothingwrong,theyfleefrominteractionswithofficers,believingthatitis

bettertorunatthesightofanofficerratherthantaketheriskthataninteractionwiththeofficer
91
willresultinunnecessaryandexcessiveforcebeingusedagainstthem.

Indeed,officers
unnecessaryandunreasonableforceduringarrestsforhighlydiscretionarychargessuchas
loitering,disorderlyconduct,resistingorfailuretoobeyanofficerscommands,confirm

thesecommunitymembersfears.
Thefaultforofficerssystemicuseoftheseheavy-handedtacticslieswithBPDasanagency.

ThroughtrainingusedformanyyearssomeofwhichisstillongoingBPDteachesofficerstouse

aggressivetactics.Wereviewedanumberoftrainingmaterials,suchasBPDsAcademy-Level

trainingonUseofForce,DefensiveTactics,andBPDsin-servicetrainingonCharacteristicsofan

ArmedPerson.WealsoobservedinpersonBPDstrainingonfootpatrolsandinteractionswith

92
peoplewithmentalillness.

ThroughitsDefensiveTacticstraining,forexample,BPDinstructs

officerstopointtheirfirearmatindividualswhentheyneedtocontrolascene.Inthecaseswe
reviewed,andinmediareports,wesawthistroublingtacticinoperation.BPDgroupsthistacticon

parwithcommandpresence,verbalcommands,andusingafirmgrip.Pointingagunatan
individualforgeneralcontrolisaninappropriateuseofafirearmandisathreatofdeadlyforce

wheretheunderlyingoffense,ifany,doesnotjustifydeadlyforcebeingused.See Holland v.
Harrington,268F.3d1179,1192(10thCir.2001)(explainingthatanofficerspointingofafirearm

involvestheimmediatethreatofdeadlyforceandthusshouldbepredicatedonatleasta

perceivedriskofinjuryordangertotheofficersorothers,baseduponwhattheofficersknowat
thattime).Pointingfirearmsdirectlyatindividualsisalsodangerousbecauseitcanleadto

accidentaldischarges;limitofficersabilitytouseother,moreappropriateforcewhenonehandis
occupiedwithholdingafirearm;andleadtounnecessaryuseofdeadlyforce.Duringourreview,we
sawinstancesinwhichofficersdrewandpointedtheirfirearmsatindividualswhentheuseofdeadly
forcedidnotappeartobejustified,includinganincidentthatresultedinanaccidentaldischargethat

fortunatelydidnotstrikeanyone.Inpartthroughaggressivetacticssuchasthese,BPDstrainings

fuelanusvs.themmentalitywesawsomeofficersdisplaytowardscommunitymembers,
alienatingthecivilianstheyaremeanttoserve.
91WhileflightinahighcrimeareamaygiveofficersreasonablesuspiciontoconductaTerry

stopunderIllinois

v. Wardlow,
528U.S.119,12425(2000),flightalonedoesnotprovideajustificationtousetheamountofforceweobservedin
manycases.
92ThroughoutthisReport,thetermmentalillnessincludessubstanceusedisorders.

79

Moreover,theDepartmenthasfailedtoequipofficerswithsufficientde-escalationskillsand

tactics.TheDepartmenthadnocomprehensivetrainingonde-escalationtechniquesuntil2015,
whenitaddedde-escalationtrainingtotheAcademysUseofForcecurriculumfornewrecruits.
WecommendtheDepartmentforitseffortsanddesiretoimplementde-escalationtraining.

Nevertheless,workremainstoensurethatthesede-escalationskillsaresufficientlyemphasized
withintheAcademysUseofForcecurriculum.EvenwiththenewAcademytraining,theseskills

mustbeconstantlyrefreshedthroughin-servicetrainingforexperiencedofficersaftertheyleavethe
Academy.BPDdoesnotsufficientlyprioritizetheseskillsinthein-servicetrainingcoursesitoffers.

TheothertrendsweidentifiedbelowthroughBPDsownforceinvestigationsusingforce

againstvulnerablegroupsandindividualswhoarenotathreatalsoreflectofficersaggressive

tacticsthatresultinunreasonableforce.
2. BPD Uses Unreasonable Force Against Individuals with a Mental Health Disability
and Those in Crisis and Fails to Make Reasonable Modifications When Interacting
with Individuals with Mental Health Disabilities

BPDofficersroutinelyuseunreasonableforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealth

93
disabilitiesorthoseexperiencingacrisis

inviolationoftheFourthAmendment.Additionally,by
routinelyusingunreasonableforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilities,BPDofficers
repeatedlyfailtomakereasonablemodificationsnecessarytoavoiddiscriminationinviolationof
TitleIIoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesActof1990(ADA),42U.S.C.1213112134.

Since
2004,BPDhasprovidedsomespecializedtrainingtoitsnewofficersonhowtointeractwith
individualswithdisabilitiesandthoseincrisis.Butthistraininghasnotbeenprovidedtoallofficers.
Moreover,theDepartmentdoesnothaveaprotocolrequiringthatapersonwiththistrainingbe
dispatchedtoacrisiscall.TheresultisthatBPDofficersfrequentlyfailtode-escalateencounters

withunarmedindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesandthoseincrisis.

Indeed,theirtactics
oftenescalatetheseencounters.Insteadofrequestinganofficertrainedinhandlingcrisiseventsor
amobilecrisisteammadeupoftrainedmentalhealthprofessionals,officershandcuffanddetain

peoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesandthoseincrisisandresorttooquicklytoforcewithout
understandingoraccountingforthepersonsdisabilityorcrisis.

Forexample,BPDofficersoftenarecalledtothescenetoescortindividualslikelytohave
disabilitiestoahospitalforamentalhealthevaluation(referredtoasanemergencypetitionunder
Marylandlaw),andpossiblecivilcommitment.Frequently,theseindividualshavecommittedno

crimeandpresentnosignificantthreattoofficersorothermembersofthepublic.

Wherea
seizuressolejustificationispreventingharmtothesubjectoftheseizure,thegovernmenthaslittle

interestinusingforcetoeffectthatseizure.Rather,usingforcelikelytoharmthesubjectis

manifestlycontrarytothegovernment'sinterestininitiatingthatseizure.Armstrong,810F.3dat

901.Inthecourseofengagingwiththeseindividuals,usuallytotransportthemformedical
treatment,BPDofficersresorttousingunreasonableforceifindividualsfailtocomplywiththeir

commands.

UndertheFourthAmendment,officerswhoencounteranunarmedandminimally
threateningindividualwhoisexhibit[ing]conspicuoussignsthathe[i]smentallyunstablemust
93Foradefinitionofcrisis,see
note90,supra.

80

de-escalatethesituationandadjusttheapplicationofforcedownward.Id.at900.Similarly,the
ADA,whichappliestoBPDsservices,programs,andactivities,includingon-the-streetencounters,

arrests,andtransportationtoahospitalformentalhealthevaluation,see 42U.S.C.12132;28
C.F.R.35.130(a),requiresBPDtomakereasonablemodificationsinpolicies,practices,or

procedureswhenthemodificationsarenecessarytoavoiddiscriminationonthebasisofdisability.
See also28C.F.R.35.130(b)(7);Title II Technical Assistance Manual II-3.6100,at14. 94BPDs
obligationsapplywhenofficersrespondtoascenewheretheyknoworreasonablyshouldknowthat
anindividualhasamentalhealthdisability. 95Forexample,BPDhasknowledgeofanindividuals
disabilitywhenBPDiscalledforanemergencypetition,whenamothercalls911andsaysherson
hasschizophreniaandisnoteating,orwhenapersonisexhibitingapparentsignsofmentalillness.

TrainingBPDofficersonhowtointeractwithindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesisa
reasonablemodificationtopolicies,practices,andprocedurestoaffordpeoplewithmentalhealth
disabilitiestheequalopportunityforapoliceinterventionthatisfreefromunreasonableforce.See
Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,54F.Supp.3d409,424(D.Md.2014)(holdingthatthefailureto

provideappropriatetrainingforofficerstointeractwithindividualswithdevelopmentaldisabilities,

whichresultedinthedeathofa26-year-oldmanwithDownSyndromeafterofficersattemptedto
forcehimtoleaveamovietheater,properlystatedaclaimunderTitleIIoftheADA).Among

otherthings,suchtrainingshouldresultinofficersemployingappropriatede-escalationtechniques

orinvolvingmentalhealthprofessionalsorspeciallytrainedcrisisinterventionofficers.

Ratherthanemployingsuchde-escalationtactics,wefoundthatBPDofficersoftenresort
tooquicklytousingforceagainstindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis.Wefound

thatonmanyoccasions,theofficersunreasonableuseofforceinvolveduseoftasersindrive-stun

mode.AstheFourthCircuithasrecognized,[d]eployingataserisaserioususeofforce.The
weaponisdesignedtocause...excruciatingpainandapplicationcanburnasubjectsflesh.

Armstrong,810F.3dat902(internalquotationmarksandcitationsomitted).Thecourtnotedthat

usingdrivestunmodetoachievepaincompliancemayhavelimitedeffectivenessand,whenused

repeatedly,mayevenexacerbatethesituation.Id. at902(quotingPERF&COPS,2011 Electronic

Control Weapon Guidelines,at14);see also Armstrong,810F.3dat897n.3(internalquotationmarksand
citationsomitted)(Tasersgenerallyhavetwomodes.Indartmode,atasershootsprobesintoa
subjectandoverridesthecentralnervoussystem.Drivestunmode,ontheotherhand,doesnot
causeanoverrideofthevictim'scentralnervoussystem;thatmodeisusedasapaincompliancetool
94TheADAsobligationtomakereasonablemodificationsinpolicies,practices,orproceduresisnotlimitless.

A
modificationisnotrequiredifitwouldfundamentallyalterthenatureoftheservice,program,oractivity.28C.F.R.
35.130(b)(7).TherequestedmodificationsherewouldnotfundamentallyalterBPDsprograms.Asdiscussedin

furtherdetailinSectionII(C)(5),infra,BPDalreadyofferssomepolicingservicesspecificallytailoredtowardindividuals

incrisis,althoughsignificantworkremainstofullydevelopthisprogram.Additionally,therequestedmodificationsare
consistentwithBPDsobligationsundertheConstitution.BPDwouldnothavetomaketherequestedmodificationsif

thepersonrequiringthemodificationposesadirectthreattothesafetyofanofficerorothers.

See 28C.F.R.35.139.

Adirectthreatisasignificantrisktothehealthorsafetyofothersthatcannotbeeliminatedbyamodificationof

policies,practices,orprocedures,orbytheprovisionofauxiliaryaidsorservices.

28C.F.R.35.104.Inmanyofthe
incidentswereviewedinvolvingindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis,however,thepersonagainstwhom

forceisuseddoesnotmeetthedefinitionofdirectthreatasthattermisusedintheADA.
95GuidanceonADARegulationonNondiscriminationontheBasisofDisabilityinStateandLocalGovernment

Services,28C.F.R.pt.35,app.B,at686(2015)(Lawenforcementagenciesandofficersarerequiredtomake

appropriateeffortstodeterminewhetherperceivedstrangeordisruptivebehavior...istheresultofadisability),

available athttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title28-vol1/pdf/CFR-2015-title28-vol1-part35-appB.pdf.

81

withlimitedthreatreduction.).EvenTaserInternational,thecompanythatmanufacturestasers,

hascautionedagainstusingthedrivestunmodeonemotionallydisturbedpersonsorotherswho

maynotrespondtopainduetoamind-bodydisconnect.Id.at903.

Nonetheless,BPDofficershaverepeatedlyuseddrive-stunswhilerespondingtopeoplewith
mentalhealthdisabilitiesandthoseincrisis,causingunnecessarypainandsufferingwithoutany
noticeablebenefit.Infact,theseuseshaveoften,ifanything,exacerbatedthesituation.Ina2011

incidentwereviewed,severalofficersrespondedtoacallaboutadomesticdisturbance,atwhich

pointtheywereflaggeddownbyMichael,standingoutsidewithoutshoesinJanuaryweather,
smellingofalcohol.Hiswife,presentonthescene,informedofficersthatshehadnotbeen

assaulted,butthatherhusbandwasintoxicatedandthatshewaspackingthingstoleaveforthe
night.Michaelyelledprofanitiesandstatedthathewantedtodie.Insteadofusingde-escalation

techniques,callingforhelpfromanofficertrainedincrisisinterventiontechniquesoramental

healthprofessional,orworkingtoconnectMichaelwithappropriatetreatmentservices,theofficers

attemptedtophysicallyforceMichaelintohandcuffs,andwhenheresisted,drive-stunnedhimwith

aTaserfivetosixtimes.Oneofficerspecificallynotedinhisreportthat[t]heTaserseemedto
haveaminimalaffect[sic]upon[Michael]possiblyduetohislevelofalcoholicintoxicationand
mentallydisturbedstate.Afterhandcuffinghim,theofficerstookMichaeltothehospitalfor

stabilization.Hewasneverchargedwithacrime.

Theforceusedbytheofficerswasunreasonable
becausehehadnotcommittedacrimeanddidnotappeartoposeathreattoofficersorhiswife.

It
wasalsoineffectiveinrenderingMichaelcompliant,andcausedunneededsufferingwithoutany

appreciablebenefit.

Inanother2011incident,nineofficersrespondedtoacallforserviceregardingaman,

Christopher,standinginthestreetwithnoclothingon.Inthiscase,thereisnodocumented
attempttohaveaspecially-trainedofficeratthescene.WhentheofficersencounteredChristopher,

theyreportedthathewasspeakingreligiousversesandarguingwithhimself.

Theybelievedhehada
mentalillnessanddecidedtotransporthimtoahospitaltobeevaluated.Thereisnoindicationin

thereportsthattheofficerssoughttohaveChristophergowiththemvoluntarily,andinsteadthey

soughttoplacehiminhandcuffs,eventhoughhewasnotunderarrest.Inordertohandcuffhim,

oneofficerheldhisleftarm,asecondofficerheldhisrightarm,andathirdofficerattemptedto
applythehandcuffs.Christopherreportedlybecameaggressiveandviolent,attemptingtograb

andbiteofficers.TheofficersandChristopherfellontotheground.

Fromtheofficersreports,it
appearsthatsixadditionalofficerswereonthesceneandavailabletoassistinbringingChristopher

undercontrol,butthereisnoindicationthattheyattemptedanycontroltechniquesonChristopher.

Thereisalsonoindicationthatde-escalationtechniquesorotherreasonablemodificationswere
used,suchasattemptstoverballycalmChristopher,createdistanceorslowdowntheincident.

Instead,thetransportvandriverexitedhisvanandpromptlydrive-stunnedChristopher.
Usingataserindrive-stunmodeistobeavoidedunlessitisnecessarytocreat[e]asafedistance

betweentheofficerandsubject.PERF&COPS,2011ElectronicControlWeaponGuidelines,at
14.BPDhadnopolicyortrainingsolimitingtheuseofdrive-stuns,evenagainstindividualswith

mentalillnessorincrisis,atthistime.Thus,thevandrivercontinuedtodrive-stunChristopher,an

82

96
individualincrisis,afewmoretimesinhischestandbackarea

untilChristopherbecame

compliant.Asaresultoftheencounter,Christopherandtwoofficersreceivedminorinjuries,and

Christopherwastransportedtotheemergencyroomfortreatment.Beforetheofficersattemptsto

handcuffhim,hehadnotcommittedanyviolentoffense,andpresentednoimmediatephysical

dangertotheofficersorthepublicatlarge.Christopherwasneverarrestedorchargedwithacrime.

In2016,BPDissuednewguidancelimitingofficersusesoftasers,apositivestepforward.

Additionalworkremains,however,toensurethatofficersabidebythenewguidance.

Inmanyincidentsinvolvingindividualsincrisis,theuseofforcewasprecipitatedbyofficers
perceivedneedtobringtheindividualintoimmediatecustodyatallcosts,includinghandcuffing

themandplacingthemintoapolicevehiclefortransportinordertoprovidenecessarymental

healthtreatment.Duringthisdetentionprocess,anumberofusesofunreasonableforceagainst

individualswithmentalillnessandcrisishaveoccurredwhentheyhadcommittednocrimeatall

instead,BPDsinteractionwiththeindividualwasprecipitatedbycallsforhelpfromalovedone,

friendorconcernedcitizen.Thatapersonhascommittednocrimeweighsheavilyagainsta

findingthattheuseofforcebylawenforcementwasreasonable.

Bailey v. Kennedy,349F.3d731,744
(4thCir.2003)(findingthatblowsandkicksagainstamanresistingarrestforanunwarranted

emergencymedicalevaluationwereunreasonable).Inmanyincidents,however,officershavefailed
todistinguishbetweenpeopleincrisiswhoarebeingescortedtothehospitalfortreatment,and
peoplewhohavecommittedcrimesandarebeingplacedunderarrest.FromourreviewofBPDs
forcereports,itappearsthatofficersmakelittle,ifany,efforttode-escalateorengagepeaceably

withthepersonincrisis,resortingtotheuseofforceasafirstoptioninordertotransportthe

individualfortreatment.Iftheydonotsubmittohandcuffingorrespondimmediatelytoofficers
commands,theyareoftensubjectedtousesofforceinordertophysicallyrestrainthem,ratherthan
neutralizeathreat.Theonlydifferenceisthatthefinaldestinationwillbeanemergencyroom,

ratherthanjail.

Inonesuchincident,in2010,severalofficersrespondedtoacallfromthefatherofaman,
James,inmentalhealthcrisis.ThefatherinformedtheofficersthatJameswasthesubjectofan

emergencypetition,hadahistoryofmentalillnessandhospitalization,andwasunarmed.

The
petitionitselfindicatedthatJameswasnottakinghismedication,wearingawintercoatinhot

weather,andyellingatpeopleonthestreetandhisfather.WhentheycouldnotconvinceJamesto

openthedoor,officersattemptedtoprythedooropenwithacrowbar,thensprayedtwoburstsof
maceinanattempttoforcehimoutoftheapartment.Onceinside,alieutenantdeployedhistaser

inprobemode,strikingJames,whenheresistedbeinghandcuffed.DespitethefactthatJameshad

committednocrimeandthereisnoindicationintheforcereportthathewasathreathimselforthe
officersotherthanresistinghandcuffing,theofficersresortedtoahigh-levelofforcetodetainthe
man.See Armstrong,810F.3dat900(internalquotationmarksomitted)(Theproblemsposedby,

andthusthetacticstobeemployedagainst,anunarmed,emotionallydistraughtindividualwhois
creatingadisturbanceorresistingarrestareordinarilydifferentfromthoseinvolvedinlaw
enforcementeffortstosubdueanarmedanddangerouscriminalwhohasrecentlycommitteda

seriousoffense.).Usingeffectivede-escalationtechniquesandcallingforassistancefromamental

96InanOctober2009TrainingBulletin,TaserInternationalrecommendedthatitsTasers,theleadingbrandofECWs,

notbeusedonindividualschests,toavoidcontroversyaboutwhethersuchshotsaffectthehumanheart.

SeeTASER
Intl,Training Bulletin 15.0 Medical Research Update & Revised Warnings(Oct.15,2009).

83

healthproviderorcrisisinterventiontrainedofficerwouldhavelikelypreventedtheuseofforce

againstJames.

Inanotherincident,twoofficersencounteredapossiblementalpatientinsideavacant
dwelling.Theman,David,wasyellingincoherentlyandwouldnotcomeoutofthebuilding

whenordered.Theofficersentered,andwhenDavidbecamelouderandplacedhishandsinhis

pockets,oneofficerpointedataserathimasathreat,purportedlytoprotecthimselfandto
persuadeDavidtocomplywiththeordertoexitthebuilding.

Davidtoldthepoliceofficersthat

tasersdidnotworkonhim.Inresponse,theofficerdeployedonecycleofhistaserinprobemode,
strikingthemantoeliminatetheneedforafight.Withoutwaitingtoassesswhetheradditional

forcewasnecessary,theofficerusedasecondcycle.

Davidwashandcuffedandtransportedtothe

hospital.Theonlyjustificationofferedbytheofficerforthesecondtasercyclewasthatitwas

necessarytogainhisfullcompliance.Formanypeoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisis,

theappearanceofofficerspointingweaponsmayconveytheimpressionthattheyarebeing

threatenedorarrested,ratherthanprovidedtreatmentthatisintendedtohelpthem.Theuseofa

taseragainstDavidinthiscontextwasunnecessaryandunreasonablewhereithadthesolepurpose

ofbringinghimintothephysicalcustodyoftheofficersfortreatment,andDavidpresentedno

immediatethreattohimselforothers.Usingeffectivede-escalationtechniquesandcallingfor
assistancefromamentalhealthproviderorofficertrainedincrisisinterventiontechniqueswould
havelikelypreventedtheuseofforceagainstalloftheseindividuals.

Tragically,someencounterswithpeoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisishave
resultedinusesofdeadlyforcethatmayhavebeenavoidedhadofficersusedtacticstoaccountfor

thementalstateoftheindividualsinvolved.Forexample,ina2012incident,asingleofficerwasthe
firsttoarriveonthesceneinresponsetoacallbyaman,Zachary,whoinformedthedispatcherthat

hehadaweaponandwasabouttodosomethingcrazy.Aftertheofficerwasdispatched,

anotherofficerandsergeantstatedovertheairthattheywouldrespondasbackup.Theofficerdid
notwaitforbackuptoarrive,however,orrequestthepresenceofaspeciallytrainedcrisis
interventionofficer,despitethefactthathehadpriorinformationthatZacharyhadaweaponand

wasincrisis.TheofficeralsomadenoattempttocontactZacharyinsidethehousebefore

approachingthedoor,orconsiderless-lethaloptionsforintervention.Instead,theofficerwentup
tothedoor,alone,andwithhisgunalreadydrawn.WhenZacharyopenedthedoorwithalit

cigaretteinonehand,andaknifeintheother,theofficerreportedlyorderedthemanthreetimesto

droptheknife,andwhenhedidnotcomply,theofficerfired,killinghim.Afterradioingdispatchto
informthathehadarrivedonthescene,lessthantwominutespassedbeforeheannouncedthat
Zacharyhadbeenshottwotothreetimes.Althoughthereisinsufficientinformationtomakea

determinationabouttheshootingitself,thisincidentshowshowdifferenttacticscouldhave

changedtheoutcome.

Officersuseofarresttechniques,includingforce,handcuffingandprisonertransportvans

todetainpeoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorincrisisforemergencypetitionswhentheypresent
noimmediatethreattoofficersorthepublic,maycausepeopletoperceivethattheyarebeing
attackedorarrested,ratherthantransportedfortreatment.Thisperceptionmayescalatethe
encounter,resultinginadditionalforce.

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Insomecases,officersresorttoarrestingindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorin

crisisinsituationswheretreatmentinsteadofjailwouldmoreeffectivelyservethegoalsof

publicsafetyandwelfareandcouldpreventtheneedforunnecessaryforce.Forexample,inone
case,officersrespondedtoamentalcaseandfoundaman,Robert,speakingtohismother,who
explainedthathersonhadamentalillnessandthatshewasafraidofhim.TheofficerstoldRobert
toleaveandputashirton,whichhedid,andthenreturned.

OfficersthentoldRoberthehadto

leave,orwouldbearrested.Whenherefused,officershandcuffedhimandsathiminachairwhile
waitingforatransportvantoarrive.ThisdecisiontoarrestandhandcuffRobert,apersonincrisis,

ledtounreasonableforce.Whilewaiting,Robertrepeatedlystoodupinwhattheofficerbelieved

wasanattempttoflee,andwaskickinghislegstocreatespacearoundhimself.

Afterbeing
toldseveraltimestostopstandingandstopkicking,andthathewouldbestruckinthelegwitha

batonifhedidnotcomply,Robertrefusedtocomply.Heattemptedtostandagain,inwhatofficers

reportedlybelievedwasanotherattempttoflee.Oneofficerstruckhimintherightshinwithhis
baton.ThisforceusedagainstRobert,whilehewashandcuffed,wasunreasonablebecausehehad

notactedviolently,didnotpresentanyevidentthreattotheofficersorhismother,andtheofficers
hadbeeninformedthathehadamentalillness.ThisforcecouldhavebeenavoidedbyusingdeescalationtechniquesbeforehandcuffingRobertorbycallingamobilecrisisteamforassistance.In

thisincident,aswithalloftheaboveincidentsinvolvingindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesor
incrisis,officersdidnotseemtounderstandthatindividualsmentalillnessorintoxicationmight

diminishtheirabilitytocomplywithorders.Moreover,theofficersinthisincidentbelieved
contrarytotheDepartmentspolicythattheycouldnotemergencypetitionRobertbecausehehad

notdisplayedanysignsofmentalillnessintheirpresence,despitehismotherscallforassistance

basedonthatmentalconditionandherexplanationofhishistoryofhospitalization.Instead,the
officersarrestedhimandchargedhimwithdisorderlyconduct,trespassing,resistingarrest,and
failuretoobey.Allchargesagainsthimweresubsequentlydismissed.

BPDroutinelyusesunreasonableforceagainstpeoplewithmentalillnessorincrisis,even
whentheyhavenotcommittedanycrimesandwhentheofficersknoworshouldknowthatthe
individualhasamentalhealthdisability.Asaresult,individualsareexposedtoseriousharmthat
exacerbatestheirdisabilityandthecrisisthatprecipitatedtherequestforBPDassistance.This
unreasonableuseofforceagainstindividualsincrisisviolatestheFourthAmendment.AndBPD
furtherviolatesTitleIIoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesActbyfailingtomakereasonable

modificationstoitspolicies,practicesandprocedures,suchastraininginde-escalation,effectively
usingspecializedcrisisinterventiontrainedofficers,andinvolvingmentalhealthprofessionalsas

necessarytoavoiddiscriminationagainstindividualswithdisabilities.

3. BPD Uses Unreasonable Force Against Juveniles And Ignores Widely Accepted
Strategies For Police Interactions With Youth

BPDofficersfrequentlyuseunreasonableforceagainstjuvenileswithoutimplementing

widelyacceptedtechniquesandtacticsforengagingwithyouth.Courtshaverecognizedthatan

individualsagecanbeafactorinwhethertheforceusedagainstthemwasreasonable.

See Graham,
490U.S.at396(thetestofreasonableness...requirescarefulattentiontothefactsand
circumstancesofeachparticularcase....);Doe

ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dept of Educ.,334F.3d906,
90910(9thCir.2003)(notingPlaintiffwaseightyearsoldinanalysisunderGraham

ofwhether
forcewasreasonable);Ikerd

v. Blair,101F.3d430(5thCir.1996)(findingareasonablejurycould
85

concludeadeputyusedexcessiveforcewheretheappellantsproducedevidencethatDeputy

Varnado,a300poundman,violentlyjerkedLaura,aten-year-oldchild,outofherlivingroomchair

anddraggedherintoanotherroom).WefoundthatBPDofficersengageinunnecessaryand
excessiveforcewithyouthandfailtoadjusttheirtacticstoaccountfortheageanddevelopmental
statusoftheyouththeyencounter.
Forexample,ina2011incident,anofficernoticeda52,85poundfemaleyouthstanding

withamaleinaknownareaforhighdrugtrafficking.

Theofficerinchargewhoinvestigatedthe

forcereportedthattheinvolvedofficerwasfamiliarwiththefemalejuvenileandherpasthistory
forsellingCDS.Theinvolvedofficersincidentreportdoesnotmentionanyhistoryofselling

drugsbutstatesthatshesuspected[thefemalewas]amissingjuvenile.

Regardlessofthebasisfor
stoppingtheyouth,theofficergotoutofherpatrolvehicletoidentifythefemale.

Whenshedid
so,theyouthandthemalebegantowalkawayveryquickly.Theofficercommandedthe

individualstostopbuttheydidnotcomply.Theofficeragaincommandedthetwotostop.

Whentheycontinuedtonotcomplywithhercommand,theofficerdischargedhertaserinprobe

modeattheyoung85-poundfemale,whichgaveanelectricshock.

Theyouthstoppedand
supportedherselfon[a]fence,andtheofficerdiscontinuedtheelectricdischarge[].Whenthe
officerdischargedhertaser,shedidnothaveprobablecauseforanarrest.Thereisalsono

indicationinBPDsownreportsthattheyouthwasthreateningtheofficerorothers;rather,shewas
simplywalkingaway.Evenassumingthatthereisreasonablesuspicionforastop,refusingtoobey

anofficerscommandtostop,whentheofficerhasnoprobablecausetoarrestandthereisno

threattothepublicorofficer,doesnotjustifytheuseofataser.Theofficersuseofataserwas

97
unnecessaryandexcessive. Thechainofcommandfailedtoidentifyanyissueswiththeofficers

useofforce.
Inanotherincident,in2010,twoofficersapproachedagroupofindividualswhowere

standingonasidewalkinaresidentialneighborhoodandverballywarnedthissmallcrowdto
disperse.Ajuvenile,Brian,andhissisterwalkedontothestepsoftheirhome,remainingoutside.

WhenoneoftheofficersapproachedBrianssistertowarnheraboutloitering,sheinformedthe

officers,yellingandcursing,thatshelivedinthehouse.Theofficersdidnotappeartodisputeher

claimthatshelivedinthehouse.Theirreportsdonotshowthatanyeffortwasmadetoconfirm

whetheritwasherhome.Nevertheless,theofficerscontinuedtowarnhertoleaveandcease

causingadisturbance.Theyeventuallyattemptedtoarrestherfornon-compliance.Oneofthe

officerswalkedupthestepsofthesiblingsstooptoattempttomakethearrest.

Brianattemptedto

blocktheofficer,andtheofficerbegantostrugglewiththejuvenile.Accordingtocivilianwitness

statementsthataresummarizedintheDepartmentsreports,theofficerpunchedBrianintheface.

Theofficeralsousedoleoresincapsicum,orOCspray,againstbothsiblingsandarrestedthemfor

loitering,resistingarrestandassaultonapoliceofficer.Alloftheofficersusesofforceagainstthe

siblings,whowerestandingonorinfrontoftheirownproperty,wereunreasonable.These
individualswereplacedintothecriminaljusticesystemforstandingontheirownsteps.
AllegationsofBPDsunreasonableuseofforceagainstjuvenilesarenotnew.

BPDhasa
historyofproblematicencounterswithyouththatpre-datetheperiodofourreview.Forexample,
in2007,officersarrestedaseven-yearoldchildforsittingonadirtbikeduringaninitiativeto

97Behindwheretheyouthandhermalecompanionwerestopped,officersfoundbagsofagreenleafsubstance

suspectedtobe[m]arijuana.Additionalbagsofthegreenleafsubstancefelloutofthemanspants.

Theyouthwas
arrestedforacontrolledsubstanceviolationandtakentoajuveniledetentioncenter.

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confiscatedirtbikes.Allegedly,althoughthedirtbikewasturnedoff,itwasnotsecurelylockedor

otherwiseimmobilizedinviolationofBaltimoreCityCode.AccordingtoCourtdocumentsfiled
bythefamilysattorney,officersattemptedtoconfiscatethebikeandmaliciouslyandunreasonably
grabbed[thechild]byhisshirtcollaranddragged[him]offthebike.Accordingtothesame

documents,thechildsmotherinformedofficersthatsheintendedtofileacomplaint,andthe
officers,inturn,arrestedthechild.Thefamilyallegedhewashandcuffedtoabenchatthedistrict

stationforhours,anddetainedandquestionedwithouthisparentsconsent.Hewaseventually
releasedandneverformallycharged.Thisincidentgarneredwidespreadmediaattentionin
BaltimoreandinvokedacommunityoutcryaboutBPDsaggressivetactics,particularlyagainsta
seven-yearoldchild.Despitetheoutcryandwidespreadattention,BPDfailedtocreatepolicy
guidanceorcomprehensivetrainingforofficersinteractionswithyouth.
Inaddition,threeofficerswerecriminallychargedthisyearforassaultingayouthwhohad
beenincrisisandwasrestrainedina2015incident.Accordingtoacomplaintfiledaboutthe
incident,whenthechildwasadmittedtothehospitalforevaluationofamentalhealthcondition,

independentwitnessesonthesceneindicatedthathehadnoinjuries.Inhishospitalroom,hewas
handcuffedwithbothhandsbehindhisbackbutwasbeingunrulyyellingandkickinghislegs.

Oneoftheofficersreportedlyorderedhospitalstafftoleavetheroomandreportedlyslappedor

punchedtheyouthinthefacerepeatedly.Thenursesobservedtheofficersbeingverballyabusiveto

thechildandobservedinjuriestohisfacewhentheyreturnedtotheyouthsroom.

Researchhasestablishedthatadolescentdevelopmentaffectsthemannerinwhichjuveniles
comprehend,communicate,andbehave.Theseuniquerealitiesofadolescentdevelopmentwarrant

specificpoliciesandtacticsforofficersinteractionswithjuveniles.TheInternationalAssociationof

ChiefsofPolice(IACP)hasrecognizedthisneedandcreatedguidanceforofficersinteractionswith

youth. 98Specificstrategiesforofficersinclude[a]pproach[ing]youthwithacalmdemeanor,

conveyingthatyouaretheretohelpthembecause[a]ggressionmaycausetheyouthtoshutdown
andmakethesituationworse. 99BPDofficersarenotprovidedguidanceonthecausesandunique
qualitiesofyouthbehaviorandcommunicationortrainedontheskillsandtacticsnecessaryfor
interactingwithyouth.Officersusethesameoverlyaggressivetacticstheyusewithadults,

unnecessarilyescalatingencounterswithyouth.AsthePresidentsTaskForceon21stCentury
Policingnotes,[u]seofphysicalcontrolequipmentandtechniquesagainstvulnerable
populationsincludingchildren...canunderminepublictrustandshouldbeusedasalast
resort. 100
Wereviewednumerousothercasesthatalsoraisedconcernsaboutofficersinteractionswith
juveniles.ThesecasesdemonstratethatBPDfailstoadjustitstactics,evenwhendealingwith

youth.TheyalsoshowthatBPDneedstoprovidedetailedandcomprehensivepolicyguidanceand

trainingforinteractionsinvolvingjuveniles,andtoholdofficersaccountableiftheyfailtoabideby

theirtrainingandguidelines.

98IntlAssn.ofChiefsofPolice,The

Effects of Adolescent Development on Policing2(2015),availableat

http://www.iacp.org/teenbrain).
99Id.at4.
100FinalReportofthePresidentsTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing15(May2015).

87

4. BPD Uses Unreasonable Force Against People Who Are Not a Threat to Officers or
the Public
a. BPD Uses Unreasonable Force Against People who Are Already
Restrained

BPDusesunreasonableforceagainstpeoplewhoarealreadyrestrainedandposelittleorno

threattotheofficerorthepublic.Insomeinstances,theseindividualsmaycontinuetoverbally

resistornotsubmittoofficersdemands,butthistypeofpassiveresistanceornon-compliancedoes
notjustifyusingforce.Thispracticecontraveneswell-settledlaw.
InMeyers,theFourthCircuitdeterminedthatanofficersuseofforcewasexcessiveand

unreasonablewheretheofficerrepeatedlyadministeredelectricalshocksfromataseronan

individualwhowasnolongerarmed,wasnolongeractivelyresistingarrestandwasphysically

restrainedbyseveralotherofficers.713F.3dat734.Wealsohavestatedinforthrighttermsthat
officersusingunnecessary,gratuitous,anddisproportionateforcetoseizeasecured,unarmed
citizendonotactinanobjectivelyreasonablemanner.

Id.(quotingBailey

v. Kennedy,349F.3d731,
74445(4thCir.2003));see also Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.,380F.3d893,902(6thCir.2004)

(citingcases)(Wehaveconsistentlyheldthatvarioustypesofforceappliedafterthesubduingofa
suspectareunreasonableandaviolationofaclearlyestablishedright.).

TheCourtinMeyersalso
indicatedthatanyunnecessary,gratuitous,anddisproportionalforceagainstunarmedand
securedindividualswasobjectivelyunreasonableregardlessofthetypeofweaponused,whether
arisingfromagun,abaton,ataser,orotherweapon.713F.3dat73435(quotingJones

v. Buchanan,
325F.3d520,532(4thCir.2003)(fists))(citingPark

v. Shiflett,250F.3d843,85253(4thCir.2001)
(pepperspray)).
InBaltimore,BPDofficersuseexcessiveforceagainstrestrainedindividuals,oftenwhen
thoseindividualsareawaitingtransporttoCentralBookingafterbeingarrestedforcommittinglowlevelstreetoffenses.Forexample,ina2011incident,threeBPDofficersrespondedtoan

anonymoustipaboutpersonsusingillegaldrugsinsideapick-uptruck.Arrivingonscene,the
officerslocatedillegaldrugsanddrugparaphernaliainthetruckscab.Thethreeoccupantstwo

womenandonemanwereremovedfromthevehicleandarrestedforcontrolledsubstance

violations.Whilewaitingforaprisonertransportvehicle,oneofthewomen,Sarah,began

movingaroundinaperceivedattempttowanderawayorescape.

Sarahattemptedtogetupon

sixoccasionsandeachattempttorisewasmetwithaverbalwarningtostopandanadmonition
thatthenexttimeshetriedtoescapetheofficerwoulduseforcetoagainsther.Sarahagaintried

tostandupandtheofficer,alreadyholdinghispolicebatoninhishand,struckSarahinthelegand

thenmanagedtomaintainphysicalcontroloverher.Thisbatonstrikeappearstobeusedas
punishmentforfailingtofollowtheofficerscommandsratherthannecessaryandreasonableforce

tocontrolSarah,whowasnotactivelyaggressiveandwasbeingdetainedforaminordrugoffense.

Sarahlatertoldtheinvestigatingsupervisorthatshewasnotattemptingtoescape;rathershewas

tryingtostandupbecauseherkneeswereinpainfromkneelingonthehardpavementforsucha
longtime.Inthissituation,otherlessforcefultechniquesshouldhavebeenemployedforinstance
anescortposition,jointmanipulation,orutilizinglegrestraintsifescapewastrulyaconcern.

Moreover,BPDspecificallytrainsitsofficersthatimpactweaponsshouldnotbeusedwhen

individualsarenon-compliantorpassivelyresisting.Rather,strikinganindividualwithanimpact

88

weaponshouldonlybeusedtostopanattackerwhoisactivelyattemptingtoinflictinjury.

Nevertheless,thisstrikeagainstarestrainedindividualwassummarilyapprovedbythechainof
command.
Ina2014incidentthatwereviewed,aCitiWatchoperatorwhowasmonitoringsecurity

camerasplacedthroughoutBaltimorenotifiedBPDpatrolofficersthatheobservedanunknown

male,lateridentifiedasBrandon,conductahand-to-handexchangeofsuspectednarcotics.An

officerandatraineerespondedtothesceneandenteredalocalstoretointerviewBrandon.After

producingidentification,theofficerssmelledanodorofmarijuanaemanatingfromBrandon,whom

theythenpatteddownforweapons,butfoundnone.Astheywereexitingthestore,BPDofficers

noticedabaggiecontainingawhitepowderysubstanceonthefloorneartheentrancewhere

Brandonhadbeenstanding.Accordingtotheirforcereports,havingseennooneelseenterorleave

thestore,theofficersdeterminedthatthebaggiebelongedtoBrandon,handcuffedhimandtook

himoutsidetowaitforatransportwagon.
WhenaBPDsergeantarrivedonscene,Brandonwassittingonthegroundinhandcuffs.

ThesergeantbeganspeakingtoBrandonandreportedlyobservedanothersmallbaggiecontaininga

whitepowderysubstanceandaclearsandwichbaggiecontaininggreenplantmaterialunder

Brandonstongue.Accordingtothesergeant,heaskedBrandontospitoutthebaggies,but

Brandonclenchedhismouthandattemptedtodestroythenarcotics/evidencebyswallowing

them.ThesergeantplacedhishandonBrandonscheeksand,mosttroublingly,onhisthroatand

thenappliedpressurenottorestricthisbreathing,butjusttokeephimfromswallowingthe

illegalnarcotics/evidencewhichcouldhavealsoput[Brandons]lifeatrisk.

WhenBrandon

refusedtospitoutthesuspectednarcotics,thesergeantorderedthepoliceofficertraineeonthe

scenetotaseBrandon,eventhoughhewasrestrained.Thetraineedrive-stunnedBrandononhis

legs.WhenBrandondidnotspitoutthebaggies,thesergeantorderedthetraineetodrive-stun

Brandonthreeadditionaltimes.

Brandonspatoutseveralsmallbaggiesandwastransportedto

thedistrictforprocessing.
TheuseofforceonBrandonsneckahandcuffeddetaineewhodidnotposeathreatto

officersafety,andwhowasbeingarrestedforwhattheofficersdescribedintheirownreportasa
streetleveldrugtransactionwasexcessiveandunreasonable.Althoughsomeforcetoprevent
thedestructionofevidenceortoprotectBrandonmaybereasonable,thesergeantsapplicationof

pressuretoBrandonsthroatwasauseoflethalforcethatwasnotjustifiedbythepossible
destructionofevidenceoreventhepotentialthreattoBrandonofswallowingthenarcotics.If

Brandonhadactuallyswallowedthebaggies,officersshouldhavetransportedhimtoahospitalfor

treatmentbytrainedmedicalprofessionals.TheofficersuseofhistaseronBrandonwasalsohighly

questionable,ifnotexcessive.
Ina2010incident,twoBPDofficersandalieutenantarresteda56,160-poundmanfor

litteringafterobservinghimthrowacigarwrapperonthegroundandthenemptythetobacco

contentsfromthecigar.Theofficershandcuffedandsat19-yearoldWilliamonacurb,and

conductedasearchincidenttoarrest.TheyremovedWilliamsshoesandrecoveredablueZiploc

bagcontainingwhattheysuspectedwasmarijuana.

Accordingtotheforcereports,Williambegan

toyellprofanitiesandaccusetheofficersofplantingthedrugs.OneofficerplacedWilliamagainsta

wallwhiletheywaitedforatransportvehicle.

Williamcontinuedtoyell,thenpushedoffthewall

andbegantorun.Afteronlyafewsteps,anofficerpushedWilliamtotheground.Accordingto

theforcereport,Williamcontinuedtoflailandtrytostriketheofficersbyheadbutting,kicking,

89

shoulderingandspitting.TheofficersattemptedtogaincontrolofWilliam,butwereunable.

A
crowdformedaroundtheofficersandWilliam.AlthoughWilliamwasinhandcuffsandthree

officerswerepresenttocontroltherestrainedman,theofficersresortedtotasingthemanindrivestunmodeapproximatelysixtimes.Thelieutenantandoneoftheofficersalsoreportedlykicked
Williamseveraltimeseitherinanefforttogethimtothegroundortokeephimontheground;the

reportsareunclear.Whenthedrive-stunswerereportedlyineffective,andWilliamreportedly

pushedawaythetaserandcontinuedtofight,thelieutenantorderedtheofficerstomoveawayand

deployedtwoburstsofpeppersprayinWilliamsface.TheofficerswerethenabletoholdWilliam

onthegroundandplacehiminatransportvehicle.TheinabilityofthreeofficerstocontrolWilliam

isconcerningandreflectsinsufficienttrainingonarrestandcontroltechniques.

Whilewetakeno
positiononthereasonablenessofmuchoftheforceusedinthisincident,theuseofthetaserona

handcuffedindividualapproximatelysixtimeswasunreasonable.

Theuseoftaseronarestrained
individualisrarelyreasonable,andtasingthepersonindrive-stunmodesixtimesisunreasonable
andexcessiveinalmostanycase.Adrive-stunistobeusedonlytocreatedistance.

William
sufferedabrasionsonhisknees,arm,backandasmallfractureofleftshoulder.

Hewascharged
onlywithlitteringanddisorderlyconduct.

BPDofficersalsouseexcessiveforceagainstrestraineddetaineeswhorefusetoexitBPD
transportvehicles,insomecaseswhenbeingtransportedtothehospitalforanemergencypetition
evaluation.Ina2010casewereviewed,aBPDtransportofficerrespondedtoacallaboutaperson

withpossiblementalillnessinawheelchairwhowasallegedlyexposinghimselftotakehimtoa
hospitalforanevaluation.Althoughtheincidentreportisvague,difficulttoread,andlacksany

follow-upinvestigation,itappearsthattheofficerapproachedtheman,Timothy,whowas

agitatedanddisorderly,andaskedforidentification.Timothyproducedhisidentificationand

thenjumpedoutofthewheelchairandkickedthepatrolcar.Whentheofficerattemptedtotake
Timothyintocustody,Timothybegankicking,andtheofficertasedhimandtookhimintocustody.

Timothywastransportedtoanareahospitalforanemergencypetitionevaluation.Uponarrivingat

thehospital,TimothyrefusedtocomeoutofthetransportvehicleandkickedattheBPDtransport

officer.ThetransportofficergaveTimothyseveralcommandstostopkickingorhewouldbetased.

Asecondofficerstoodoutsidewitnessingtheevents,butthereisnoindicationthathemadeany
efforttointervene.AfterthetransportofficergaveTimothyathirdcommandtostopkicking,the

transportofficerdeployedhistaserindrive-stunmode.

Thereasonablenessofthefirsttaserincidentcannotbedeterminedbecausetherewere

conflictingaccountsofwhatoccurred,therewasnosupervisoryinvestigation,andtheincident
reportscontainlittledetail.However,tasingTimothythesecondtimewhilehewasrestrainedinthe

backofatransportvehiclewasunreasonable.InOrem

v. Rephann,523F.3d442(4thCir.2008),
abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy,559U.S.34,39(2010),theCourtofAppealsaddressed

whethertheuseofataseragainstanarresteewhowasbeingtransportedtojailinapoliceofficers
carconstitutedexcessiveforce.Becausethesubjectwasalreadyincustody,thecourtanalyzedthe

excessiveforceclaimundertheFourteenthAmendmentsstandardofwhethertheofficerinflicted
unnecessaryandwantonpainandsuffering.Orem,523F.3dat446;but
see Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135S.Ct.2466(2015)(holdingthatexcessiveforceclaimsbroughtbypretrialdetaineesneedonly
meettheGraham

standardofobjectiveunreasonableness).Indoingso,thecourtheldthattheuse
ofataseronadetaineewhowasalreadyinhandcuffsandrestrainedinthebackofapolicecarwas

clearlyunlawful,despitethefactthatthedetaineewasextremelyunrulyanduncooperative.Orem,
523F.3dat44647;Cf. Wernert v. Green,419F.Appx337,34243(4thCir.2011).Here,Timothy

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wastransportedtoanareahospitalbecauseBPDofficersdeterminedthatheneededanemergency

psychologicalevaluation.Timothywasincrisisandkickedatthetransportofficer,buthewas

restrainedandwasnotcurrentlyadangertohimselforathreattotheofficers.Therewasnourgent
needtoremoveTimothyfromthetransportvehicle.

Insteadofhavingpatienceandattemptingto
de-escalatethesituationoraskingforassistancefromtheotherofficeronsceneorqualified
medicalpersonnelinthehospitalthetransportofficerresortedtoahighlevelofforcetogain

compliancefromapersonincrisiswhomaynothaveunderstoodhiscommands.Theuseofthe
taserinthisinstance,andinothersimilarBPDforcefileswereviewed,waspunitiveratherthan

necessaryandreasonable.
Nevertheless,indeterminingthattheofficersactionsconformedtoDepartmental
Guidelines,thesupervisorjustifyingthisuseofforcewrote:TheX26Taserfillstheactionvoid

withaforcelessthaneitherespantoon 101ordeadlyforcetoelicitcompliancefromindividualswho
areabouttobearrested.Itallowsmemberstousearelativemildforceandprovidesasaferoption
thansufferingorinflictingseriousinjury.Thesupervisorsdeterminationthatdrive-stunninga
restrained,mentallyillpersonismildandjustifiedbecauseitpreventssufferingorseriousinjury
illustratesalackofappreciationfortheseriousnessoftheforceusedandthepossibilityofharmthat
couldresult.See Bryan v. MacPherson,630F.3d805,825(9thCir.2010)(Thephysiologicaleffects,

thehighlevelsofpain,andforeseeableriskofphysicalinjuryleadustoconcludethattheX26and

similar[tasers]areagreaterintrusionthanothernon-lethalmethodsofforcewehaveconfronted.).

ItalsodemonstratesanignoranceofapplicableFourthCircuitlawthatprohibitstheuseofataserin
thesecircumstances.Orem,523F.3dat44647.

Inastrikinglysimilar2014incident,aBPDofficerrespondedtoadomesticviolencecall,
tookthesubjectintocustody,andtransportedhimtothedistrictstation.Whenofficersordered
Erictoexitthetransportwagon,herefusedandstatedIwantthepolicetoshootme.Ihave

nothingtolivefor.TheofficerswarnedEricseveraltimesthathewouldbetased,butwhenhe

refusedtocomplywiththeircommands,thesergeantonthesceneorderedoneoftheofficersto
taseEric.

ThetaserprobesstruckEricinthearmandbuttocks.Subsequently,theofficers

transportedErictothehospitalforanemergencypetition.Thisuseofforceonapassivelynon

complaintpersonincrisiswasunreasonable.Theofficersresortedtoforcesimplytogain

compliancefromEric,notbecausetheyneededtogaincontroloverhim.Indoingso,BPDofficers

disregardedanindividualsconstitutionalrightsinfavorofexpediency.Thesergeantwhoordered
theofficertotaseEricandalsoinvestigatedtheuseofforce,despitetheconflictofinterest

justifiedthetaserdeploymentbycitingwhatappearstobeaversionoftheDepartmentsTraining
GuidelinestitledElectronicShockDevices,thathadbeenreplacedin2010,fouryearsbeforethe

incidenttookplace.
b. BPD Uses Unreasonable Force Against Persons who Are Fleeing from
Them and Present Little or No Threat of Harm
AsignificantnumberofincidentswereviewedinvolvedBPDofficersusingforceagainst

individualswhowerefleeingfromofficersandpresentedlittleornothreatofharmtothemor
others.Manyoftheseincidentsinvolvedofficerswhochasedciviliansonfoot,oftenwithout
suspicionthattheyhadcommittedanyseriouscrimes.Suchfootpursuitsincreasethelikelihood

thatofficerswilluseforceinordertostopanindividualthatisnotreasonableinlightofthethreat
101AnespantoonisonetypeofbatonusedbyBPDofficers.

91

posedorcrimecommittedbytheperson.Footpursuitsofindividualsforlow-leveloffensesarealso
anunsafetacticthatunnecessarilyendangersofficersandcommunitymembers.
Similarly,wefoundanumberofcasesinwhichofficersshotatvehiclesthatwerefleeingor
movingawayfromthem,afteranythreatofharmtothemorothershadsubsided.Suchshootings
areunreasonable.
i.

In Foot Pursuits, BPD Uses Excessive Force Against Individuals Who

Are Fleeing From Them and Tactics That Endanger Themselves and
Community Members

BPDofficersusedexcessiveforceagainstindividualsduringfootpursuits.Whenofficers
encountercivilianswhofleefromthem,officersnearlyalwaysgivechase,withoutweighingthe
severityofanysuspectedcrime,whetherthepersonposesathreat,andanyalternative,safermeans

toaffectastoporseizure.Onceengagedinafootpursuit,BPDofficersthenoftenusedforceto

endthepursuitregardlessofwhethertheyhadonlyreasonablesuspiciontoconductastop,or

probablecausetomakeanarrest.See Cortez v. McCauley,478F.3d1108,1126(10thCir.2007)

([P]olicehavehistoricallybeenabletousemoreforceinmakinganarrestthanineffectingan

investigativedetention.);see also Rabin v. Flynn,725F.3d628,63233(7thCir.2013)(Whenan

officersuseofforceduringsuchaTerry

stopbecomessodisproportionatetothepurposeofsucha
stopinlightofthesurroundingcircumstancesandthepurposemayincludeensuringthesafetyof
theofficersorothersthentheencounterbecomesaformalarrest(whichmustthenbejustifiedby
probablecause.))(citationsomitted).Often,theforceofficersusedtoendthepursuitwas
disproportionaltothesuspectedcrimeandthethreatposedbythecivilian.

See Armstrong,810F.3d
at899(internalquotationmarksomitted)(Toproperlyconsiderthereasonablenessoftheforce

employedwemustviewitinfullcontext,withaneyetowardtheproportionalityoftheforceinlight
ofallthecircumstances.).Basedontheforcereportswereviewed,thefrequencywithwhich

officersengagedinfootpursuits,withoutconsideringtheseriousnessofthesuspectedcrime,any

alternativemeanstostoptheindividual,andriskstothemselves,thesuspect,andothersis

concerning.
Footpursuitsaregenerallyahigh-risktacticandhavecivilrightsimplications.See generally
IACP,Protecting

Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement,p.133.In
particular,attheendofafootpursuit,whenofficersseizeanindividual,theymayexperiencean

adrenalinerush;actionstakenundersuchcircumstancesmayimpedeanofficersabilitytoexercise

properjudgmentandappropriaterestraint.Forthisreason,policedepartmentsshould,and

generallydo,givecarefulconsiderationtofootpursuitsinpolicyandtraining.

BPDhasnotengagedinthecarefulconsiderationthatfootpursuitsrequireasapolicyand
trainingmatter.BPDhasnopolicyonfootpursuitstoguide,andholdaccountable,itsofficers

conduct.Aninternalreportin2013recommendedthattheDepartmentissueapolicyonthese
pursuits,anditsinternaldocumentsindicatethatithasintendedtodraftapolicytoguideofficers

conductinpursuitsforanumberofyears.However,todate,BPDhasnotissuedanypolicyonthis

issue.BPDstrainingonfootpursuitsforbothnewandexperiencedofficersalsoisdeficient.Only

in2015didBPDcreateaspecifictrainingonfootpursuitsforitsrecruitsintheAcademy.

Previously,itstrainingonthistacticwasspreadthroughoutseveraldifferentcourses,leavingitto
officerstotiethelessonstogether.Additionally,theskillsthatofficerslearnintheAcademymust

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berefreshedfrequentlythroughoutanofficerscareerthroughin-servicetraining.Forexperienced
officers,BPDprovidedin-servicetrainingonfootpursuitsforthefirsttimein2015.

BPDofficersresorttoexcessiveforcetoendfootpursuits,orafterapursuithasoccurred.

Forexample,inthe2010incidentdiscussedsupraonpage31,anofficerreportedlyinanarea

knownforviolentcrimeandnarcoticsdistributionrecognizedanAfrican-Americanmanwhohad

previouslyfledwhentheofficerhadattemptedtoconductafieldinterviewandagainfledatthe

sightoftheofficer.Theofficerreportedlypursuedthemanbecausehebelievedhewasinvolvedin
criminalactivitythoughhedidnotidentifyanyspecificcrimehesuspected.

Healsoreportedly
believedhemaybearmedwithaconcealedweaponbecauseofhisactions,looseclothingand

thesurroundings.Suchgenericandvaguedescriptionsareinsufficienttojustifyusingseriousforce
againstaperson.Smith v. Ball State Univ.,295F.3d763,771(7thCir.2002)(applyingGraham

and
findingforceusedinaTerrystopreasonablebecauseitwasmeasured,brief,andappropriateto

accomplishthepurposesoftheinvestigativestop.).Here,theofficerpursuedthemanonfootfor

eightblocks.Duringthepursuit,theofficerdeployedhistaserinprobemodetwotimesonthe

man,andthenfinallyusedadrive-stuntostoptheindividual. 102Theofficerthenfriskedtheman
andfoundhewasnotcarryinganyfirearms.Tostrikethemanwithtwodeploymentsofataserin

probemodeandoneindrive-stunwasexcessiveinthesecircumstances.Alieutenantwhoarrived
onthesceneinterviewedthemanandaskedwhyhehadrunfromtheofficer.

Themaninformed
thelieutenantthathewasscared.Officersreleasedthemanwithoutcharginghimwithanycrime.
Separatefromtheriskofexcessiveforce,BPDofficersalsouseunsafetacticswhenthey

engageinfootpursuits,needlesslyendangeringthemselvesandcommunitymembers.Therisksof

engaginginafootpursuitmayoutweighthebenefitsinanumberofcases.Particularlywhen

officersareactingalone,pursuitsarenotadvised.Indeed,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsof

Police(IACP)hasalsocautionedthat[n]ormally,conductingafootpursuitaloneisfartoo

dangerousanundertakingtobepermissible.103InourreviewsofBPDsfiles,officersengagein

solofootpursuitsfrequently,evenwhen,insomecases,theybelievethepersontheyarepursuingto

bearmed.Engaginginasolopursuitofanarmedpersonisdangeroustotheofficer,andmaymake

itmorelikelythatshotsmaybefired,increasingthedangertocommunitymembers.BPDofficers

repeatedlyfailtoconsidertheriskfactorsinherentinfootpursuits.Theytoofrequentlyemploy
tacticsthatareunsafeforofficers,theindividualstheypursue,andthecommunity.
Whenofficersdecidetopursueasuspect,eventhoughtheymustdecidequicklywhetherto
pursue,theyshouldassesstheseriousnessofthesuspectedviolationatissue,thedangerousnessof
thepursuitunderthecircumstances,whetherthepersontheyintendtopursueposesanimmediate
andseriousthreatorcouldbeapprehendedlaterorthroughothermeans.Theneedforthesuspects
immediateapprehensionmustbeweighedagainsttheriskstoofficersandthepubliccausedby
engaginginafootpursuit.Ifofficersknowtheidentityofthesuspect,hisorherimmediate

apprehensionislikelyunnecessarywithoutexigentcircumstances.However,ifcircumstances
requirethatthesuspectbeimmediatelyapprehended,officersshouldcontainthesuspectand

establishaperimeterratherthanengaginginafootpursuit,particularlyifofficersbelievethesuspect
maybearmed.Officersmaythenconductasweepinacoordinatedmannerwithinthecontained

areatolocatethesuspect,withtheassistanceofsurveillanceifthisisavailable.Thisrecognizesthat
102Strikingastationaryindividualwithataserinprobemode,ifatadistance,canbedifficult;strikingamovingperson

whileanofficerisalsorunninghasalowlikelihoodofbeingeffective.

103IntlAssnofChiefsofPolice,Foot

PursuitsConcepts & Issues Paper2(Feb.2003).

93

thesafetyoftheofficersandcommunitymembersisparamountwhenalternativetacticsare
availabletoresolvetheincident.Containingasuspectandestablishingaperimeteralsoslowsthe

incidentdown,decreasingtheneedforrusheddecisionsorjudgmentsmadeinadrenaline-filled
circumstances,anddecreasestheneedtouseforcetoapprehendasuspect.
Officersshouldbeencouragedandincentivizedtochoosesafeandprofessionalcoursesof
conduct.Indeed,theIACPrecommendsthat[b]ecauseoftheinherentanddemonstrateddangers
involvedinfootpursuits,itshouldbeamatterofagencypolicythatofficersshouldnotbecriticized
orsanctionedformakingarationalandprofessionallyinformeddecisionnottoengageinorto

terminateafootpursuit.BPD,tothecontrary,indirectlyencouragesfootpursuitsbyplacinga
heavyemphasisonofficersarrestnumbers.AsdiscussedaboveinSectionII(A)(1)some

supervisorsstillassessofficers,atleastinpart,bythenumberofarreststheymake,regardlessofthe

severityoftheunderlyingcrime.Thisincentivizesofficerstopursueindividualsforevenminor

infractionstoincreasethenumberofarreststheymake.Additionally,pressurefrompastCity
officialstolowertherateofviolentcrimealsohasencouragedofficerstopursueandseize

individualswhomaybearmed,inanattempttoseizeandremovetheirgunsfromthestreet.Thisis
ahigh-riskstrategythat,ifengagedin,musthavestrictcontrolsandoversighttoensurethatofficers
actionsareconstitutionalandthatofficersandthepublicarenotexposedtounnecessaryrisk.Our
investigationfindsthatsuchcontrolsandoversightarenotpresent,andthatofficersdonotappear
tobeengaginginpursuitsofindividualswhotheysuspectarearmedinamannerthatkeepsthem

andotherssafe.
Forexample,ina2014incident,auniformedofficerpatrollinginanareaallegedlyknown
fordrugtraffickingandviolenceturnedonhislightsandsirenstorespondtoacallforservice
regardingasilentalarmatanearbyblock.Ashedidso,henoticedAndrew,anunknownblack

maleobserve[his]markeduniformpresenceandfleeonfoot.TheofficernotedthatAndrewwas

holdinghisleftsidewhichtheofficerbelievedtobeacharacteristicofanarmedperson.The

officerabandonedthecallforservicethathehadbeenrespondingtoandinsteadpursuedAndrew,
anunknownindividual,alone,onfoot.

Andrewenteredaresidentialhomefromthebackporchand

lockedthedoorbehindhim.Theofficer,[b]elievingthathemightbearmed,andfearingthatthe
househeenteredmightnothavebeenhis,andalsofearingthatanyevidenceor

contraband/weaponshemayhaveonhimwouldbedestroyed/concealed,forcedentryintothe

104
house,damagingthedoorintheprocess. IfAndrewhad
beenarmed,theofficerschoiceof
tacticsforcingentrywithoutbackupcouldhaveresultedintheofficerbeingshot.Andrewranto

thefrontdoorwheretheofficercaughtuptohimandattemptedtomakeanarresttheofficerdid

notspecifythecrimeforwhichhewasattemptingtomakethearrest.

Whilethetwowere
struggl[ing]atthefrontdoor,apitbullchargedatthemfrominsidethehouse.

Theofficer
withdrewhisserviceweaponfearingthathewouldhavetoshootthedog.Eventually,toavoid
thedog,theofficerletAndrewrunoutthefrontdoorandcontinuedtopursueonfoot.Theofficer

thendecidedtotaseAndrewbecausehebelievedAndrewwasinvolvedinillegalactivity,

suspectedhehadenteredanunknownhouse,mightbearmed,andhadalreadyresistedall
104Itisnotclearthattheofficerhadcausetoenterthehomewithoutawarrant.See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,547U.S.
398,403(2006)(internalquotationmarksomitted)(ItisabasicprincipleofFourthAmendmentlawthatsearchesand
seizuresinsideahomewithoutawarrantarepresumptivelyunreasonable.).

Whileofficersinhotpursuitofafleeing

suspectaregrantedanexigencyexceptiontothegeneralprincipleprohibitingasearchofahomewithoutawarrant,itis
notclearthatthisqualifiesasahotpursuitwheretheofficerhadinsufficientbasistobelievethemanhadcommitteda
specificcrime,orthatanyotherexigencyexistedherepermittingtheofficertoenterthehome.See id.

94

attemptstoapprehendhim.TheofficertasedAndrewtwotimes,asthefirstdeploymentwasnot

effective.Aftertakinghimintocustody,theofficerdiscoveredthatAndrewwasnotarmed,hadno

contraband,andwaseventuallydetermined,atalater,unknowntime,tohaveanopenwarrant.

The
reasonfortheofficersforcelistedinhisuseofforcereportwasthatthesuspectrefusedto
comply.
Thisofficerrepeatedlyusedunsafetacticsthatendangeredhimself,theindividualhe
pursued,andahomeowner,anddamagedahomeownersproperty.Hechosetoengageinafoot
pursuitinanallegedlyviolentarea,alone,whilebelievingthepersonhewaspursuingtobearmed.

Thereisnoindicationinthereportthathecalledforbackuporconsidereddiscontinuingthepursuit
atanytime.Heforcedentryintoanunknownhome,wherethepersonhewaspursuingwasinside
andatatacticaladvantagetotheofficer.IfAndrewhadactuallybeenarmed,astheofficer

suspectedhewas,theofficercouldhavebeenshot.Theofficerdamagedahomebybreakingthe
door,potentiallyincreasingthedangertothehomeownerhewastryingtoprotect,andpointinghis
firearmatthehomeownersdogwhilestrugglingwithaman,creatingariskofharmtothe
homeownersproperty.TheofficersuseofforceagainstAndrewwashighlyquestionable,ifnot

clearlyunreasonable,particularlygiventheofficersowntrainingonthelikelihoodthattheindividual
wasarmed.
Liketheofficersintheaboveaccounts,officersfrequentlycitefactorslearnedinBPDs
trainingonCharacteristicsofanArmedPersonsuchasgrabbingoneswaistbandorwearing
looseclothing.Officersappeartousethesefactorstojustifytheforcetheyuseduringorfollowing

pursuits,assertingthattheybelieveindividualswhoexhibitanyoneofthesefactorstobearmed.
BPDprovidestheirtrainingonCharacteristicsofanArmedPersontoteachofficerstoidentify

whenapersonmaybearmed,whichmayprovidereasonablesuspicionforastop.BPDtraining

instructorswarnstudentsthattheremaybefalsepositives,andinformedusthattheyinstruct

studentsthateighty

percentofindividualswhoshowcharacteristicsofanarmedpersonsuchas

wearinglooseorbaggyclothing,orgrabbingtheirwaistbandswhilerunningwillnot bearmed. 105

Despitepurportedlybeingtrainedonfalsepositives,BPDofficersneverthelessfrequentlyengagein
footpursuitsanduseforceonindividualsbasedsolelyonfactorssuchaswearinglooseclothing.

Wefoundthatthisresults,attimes,intheuseofexcessiveforce.
Someoftheincidentswereviewedinvolvedofficersshootingatindividualswhowere

fleeingfromthemandwhoofficerssuspectedwerearmed.InanumberofcasesinvolvingBPD

officersusesofdeadlyforce,itwasnotclearthattheindividualsofficersshotathadactually
threatenedtheofficerorotherswithseriousordeadlyharm.Withoutanimmediatethreat,simply
beinginpossessionofafirearmdoesnotjustifyusingdeadlyforce.Tennessee v. Garner,471U.S.1,
11(1985);Cooper v. Sheehan,735F.3d153,159(4thCir.2013)([T]hemerepossessionofafirearm
byasuspectisnotenoughtopermittheuseofdeadlyforce.Thus,anofficerdoesnotpossessthe
unfetteredauthoritytoshootamemberofthepublicsimplybecausethatpersoniscarryinga
weapon.Instead,deadlyforcemayonlybeusedbyapoliceofficerwhen,basedonareasonable

assessment,theofficeroranotherpersonisthreatenedwiththeweapon.).

105Itishighlyunlikelythatonlyeightypercentofindividualswhoarewearinglooseorbaggyclothingareunarmed.

Nevertheless,thistraininggaveofficersclearnoticethatevenapersonwhoisdisplayingsomeofthecharacteristicsof
anarmedpersonismostlikelytobeunarmed.BPDofficersalsoappeartoberelyingtooheavilyononlyasingle
characteristicofanarmedperson,ratherthanasetofcharacteristicsthat,whencombined,togetherindicatethata
personisarmed.

95

However,becausetheinvestigationsoftheseincidentsweresoincomplete,asfurther
explainedbelowinsectionII(C)(5),itisdifficulttodeterminebasedontheinformationprovidedin

BPDsinvestigativefileswhetherofficersfacedanyimmediatethreatbeforefiring.Forexample,in
a2013case,fourofficerstravelingintwounmarkedvehiclespursuedasuspectaftertheyheard

gunshots.Thesuspectallegedlyraisedafirearmwhilerunning,thenranthroughtheyardofa

residence,thoughtheofficersstatementsregardingthesuspectsactionsareinconsistent.The
officersparkedtheirvehiclesandgavechaseonfoot.Atsomepointduringthefootpursuit,the

suspectmayhavetossedhisgun(onewitnessingofficerstatedinhisinterviewthatthesuspect

tossedhisgunwhenhejumpedonabushbeforetheofficerheardthenextgunshot)whichstruck

thesuspect.Whenaskedwhetherthepotentialguntossoccurredbeforeorafterhewasshot,he
statedhehadnotseentheactualguntoss.Anotherofficerfoundagunnearabushseveralfeet
fromwherethesuspectlayafterbeingshot.Theinterviewersdidnotthoroughlyexaminewhether
thepotentialguntossoccurredbeforeoraftertheofficershotatthesuspect.

Thefourofficers
involvedinthiscasewereinterviewedforonly5,8,8,and14,minutes.Duringthesecursory

interviews,theinterviewersmadenoeffortstoprobethebasisfortheofficersinitialstatementthat
thesuspecthadtossedhisgun,anddidnotquestiontheotherofficersaboutwhetherandwhenthe

potentialguntossoccurred.
Officersshouldhavepolicyguidanceandtrainingonwhenandhowtosafelyengageinfoot

pursuits,giventhefrequencywithwhichofficersconducttheminBaltimore,andtherisksinvolved

forbothofficersandthepublic.ItiscriticalthatBPDprovideofficerswithpolicyguidanceonhow
toassesswhethercircumstanceswarrantengaginginafootpursuit,andsufficienttrainingonhowto

conductthesepursuitssafely,withoutneedlesslyendangeringthemselves,suspects,andthepublic.
ii.

BPDs Discharges of Firearms at Moving Vehicles Are Highly

Dangerous, Ineffective, and May Be Constitutionally Impermissible

BPDofficersshotatmovingvehiclesineightcasesduringthetimeperiodwereviewed.

Shootingatavehiclethatisfleeingawayfromofficersisunreasonableexceptinrarecircumstances.

SeeWaterman v. Batton,393F.3dat482([O]nceWatermansvehiclepassedtheofficers,thethreatto
theirsafetywaseliminatedandthuscouldnotjustifythesubsequentshots.);cf.
Plumhoff v. Rickard,
134S.Ct.2012,2021(2014)(findingofficersuseofdeadlyforceagainstfleeingsuspectreasonable

wheresuspectengagedinoutrageouslyrecklessdriving,leadingofficersonachasethatexceeded

100milesperhourandpassingmorethantwodozenvehicles,severalofwhichwereforcedtoalter
course).Insomeofthesecases,althoughthefactualdescriptionswereincomplete,itappeared
officersmayhavefiredshotsatindividualsinmovingvehiclesasthevehiclewasfleeingawayfrom

them.Atthatpoint,thevehicleitselfnolongerposedaseriousthreattotheofficers,andifitposed
athreattoothers,shootingatitlikelyincreasedthethreat,ratherthaneliminatingit.See

Police
Exec.ResearchForum,Guiding

Principles on Use of Force44(Mar.2016)(Shootingatvehiclesmustbe

prohibited....unlesssomeoneinthevehicleisusingorthreateningdeadlyforcebymeansother
thanthevehicleitself.);IACPNatlLawEnforcementPol.Ctr.,Use

of Force Concepts & Issues Paper5

(Rev.Feb.2006).Theinvestigationsoftheseincidentsoftenleftcriticalquestionsunanswered,
however,makingitdifficulttodeterminewhethertheofficersfacedanimmediatethreatofserious
harmbeforedischargingtheirweapons.Nevertheless,supervisorsandinvestigatorsgenerally

approvedofficersdecisionstofireshotsatmovingvehicles.

Additionally,shootingatamovingvehicleisahighlydangeroustacticandanineffectiveway

tostopthevehicle.Usingfirearmsagainstamovingvehicleoftencreatesgreaterrisksthanit

96

eliminates.Ifadriverisshotwhileavehicleisinmotion,thevehicleitselfmaybecomeoutof

controlandadanger,toofficersandinnocentbystandersinitspath,ratherthancomingtoastop.
Further,amovingvehicleisadifficulttargettoshootwithaccuracy;shotsfiredmaymissthe

intendedtargetandhitbystandersorpassengersinthevehicle.Thus,shootingatamovingvehicle
shouldbepermissibleinonlyextremecircumstances.Since2006,theIACPsmodelpolicyonUse
ofForcehasaccountedfortheserisks,requiring:

Firearmsshallnotbedischargedatamovingvehicleunlessapersoninthevehicleis

immediatelythreateningtheofficeroranotherpersonwithdeadlyforcebymeans
otherthanthevehicle.Themovingvehicleitselfshallnotpresumptivelyconstitutea
threatthatjustifiesanofficersuseofdeadlyforce.Anofficerthreatenedbyan

oncomingvehicleshallmoveoutofitspathinsteadofdischargingafirearmatitor
anyofitsoccupants.
TwoillustrativeincidentsidentifysomeofourconcernswithBPDsuseoffirearmson
fleeingvehicles,althoughwemakenofindingonwhethertheforceusedineitheroftheseincidents
wasunreasonable.Inone2013incident,aninvestigationintoapossibledrugtransactionendedwith

anofficerfiringsevenshotsatthefront,sideandrearofavehicleasitdroveaway.

Oneofthree
officersonthesceneobservedwhathesuspectedwasadrugtransactioninprogressinacarparked
nearagaspumpandsignaledtotheothertwoofficerstoinvestigate.Oneofficerapproachedtothe
driverssidedoorofthevehicleandtheothertothepassengerside.

Theofficeratthedriversside,
reportedlyfearingthedriverwasreachingforaweapon,openedthedriverssidedoorandreached
insidewhilethecarwasstillrunning;hedoesnotappeartohaveorderedthedrivertoturnthe

engineoff.Ratherthanreachingforaweapon,thedriverhadputthecarintodrive.

Withthe
officerstorsoinsidethevehicle,thedriverhitthegasandthecarspedforward.Theofficer,
becomingcaughthalfwayintothecar,wasdraggedbythecar.

Hereachedforhisweaponandfired
oneshottowardthedriverofthecar,missingboththedriverandtheofficerstandingontheother

sideofthevehicle.Theofficersgunshotreportedlycausedthedrivertojerkthecar,dislodgingthe

officerfromthecar.Thevehicleturnedtoexittheparkinglot,drivingtowardsthethirdofficer

whohadobservedtheincident.AccordingtoBPDsdocuments,thethirdofficersteppedoutof
thewayoftheoncomingvehicleandthenfiredsevenrounds,twoofwhichhitthefrontwindshield,

andfiveofwhichhittherightsidepassengerwindows,andrearpassengerdoor,shatteringtherear

windshieldandhittingtherearroofofthecar.Theofficeradmittedduringabrief,15minute

interviewBPDinvestigatorsconducted258daysaftertheincidentthatheshotatthevehicleasit

wasfleeingawayfromhim.Itappearedheshotatthevehicle,whichhadfledthewrongwaydown
aone-waystreet,todisableit,thoughBPDofficersconductinghisinterviewdidnotclarifythis

point.BPDdeterminedallforceinthisincidenttobereasonable.
Inanotherincidentfrom2013,twoofficerswereonfoot,directingtrafficnearacrowded
nightclub.Aciviliancartravelingthewrongdirectionstruckthetwoofficersfrombehind,knocking

themtothepavement.Thecarthenstartedtoleavethescene.Oneofthetwoofficersfiredeight
shotsatthevehicleasitwasfleeingawayfromhim.Inthiscase,investigatorsdeterminedthe

dischargestobeinappropriate.Inourreview,weobservedadditionalincidentsoffirearms
dischargesatmovingvehicleswhich,eveniftheywerenotunreasonable,endangeredmembersof

thepublic.
Thedisparatetreatmentoftheofficersinthesetwoincidentsmayhaveresultedfromthe
lackofclearpolicyguidanceonwhenofficersmightbejustifiedinshootingatmovingvehicles.The
97

Departments2001UseofDeadlyForceGuidelinesinstructofficersthattheymaynotshootat
vehiclesmovingawayfromthemunlessthevehicleturnsaroundandattemptstoinjurethemor

someoneelseandadequatecoverisnotavailable.However,Guidelinesfunctiondifferentlyfrom
policiestheyarenotbindingonofficers.Theprohibitiononshootingatvehiclesmovingaway
fromofficerswasnotmadeclearinpolicyuntilMay2016.TheDepartmentnowprohibitsshooting

atmovingvehiclesunlessconfrontedwithadeadlythreat,otherthanthevehicleitself.Thisnew
policyprohibitingshootingatmovingvehicles,regardlessofwhethertheyarefleeing,isapositive
stepforward.
5. BPDs Deficient Policies, Training, Crisis Intervention Program, and Lack of
Oversight Underlie The Pattern Or Practice Of Excessive Force and Violations of the
Americans With Disabilities Act
BPDsdeficientpolicies,training,crisisinterventionprogram,andfailuresinoversightover
forceincidentsunderliethepatternorpracticeofunconstitutionalforceweobserved.Itisthe
Departmentsresponsibilitytoarticulatepoliciesthatprovidesufficientguidance,bothinqualityand

content,toofficersonwhenandhowitisappropriateandlawfultouseforceagainstmembersof

thepublic.BPDspoliciesfailtoprovidethisguidance.ItisalsotheDepartmentsresponsibilityto
trainofficerstoensuretheyunderstandhowtheDepartmentspoliciesaretobeoperationalized,
andtoprovideofficerswithskillstheyneedtosafelyandconstitutionallyresolvethebroad
spectrumofincidentstheyencounteronthestreetwhileminimizingtheneedtoresorttoforce.

TheDepartmenthasfailedtoprovidesuchtraining.TheDepartmentislikewisechargedwith
investigatingincidentsofforcetoensuretheycomplywithitspoliciesandthelaw,andwherethey

donot,remedyingofficersconductthroughretraininganddiscipline,asappropriate.The

Departmenthasfailedtoexerciseproperoversightoverincidentsofforceandaddressdeficiencies
whentheyoccurred,allowingofficerstocontinueusingunreasonableforceandunsafetactics.In
addition,BPDfailstoadequatelyprepareofficersfortheirinteractionswithindividualswith

disabilitiesorincrisis,andtopartnereffectivelywithothersocialserviceprovidersinthese
incidents.Thus,theresponsibilityforthepatternorpracticeofunconstitutionalforceweobserved
lieswiththeDepartmentasanagency.

a. BPDs Deficient Policies Have Contributed To and Permitted BPDs

Pattern or Practice of Excessive Force
DeficienciesinBPDspoliciesregardingtheuse,reporting,andinvestigationofforcehave
contributedtoofficerssystemicuseofexcessiveforce.Overall,BPDspoliciesregardingwhenand
howtouseforce:(1)aremissingcriticalelements;(2)arescatteredacrossmultipledocuments,
makingitdifficultforofficerstosynthesizetheirguidance;(3)includedelementsthatwerenot

enforced;and(4)aresometimesinaccessibletosomeofficers.Thesepoliciesfailtoprovideofficers

withclearandconsistentguidancethatofficersneedtosafelyandconstitutionallyconducttheirlaw

enforcementactivities.BPDissuedrevisionstoitspoliciesgoverningofficersusesofforceonJuly

1,2016.ThepoliciesappeartohaveimprovedinsomerespectsandtheDepartmentistobe
commendedforitsinitiativeandefforts.However,therecentupdatesmayrequireadditional

amendmentstocorrectthepatternsorpracticesofunconstitutionalforceourinvestigation
uncovered.
BPDspoliciesonuseofforce,andonuseofspecificweaponswere,untilveryrecently,

missingcriticalelements.BPDimplementeditsfirstpolicygoverningofficersuseofbatonsin
98

2016.TheDepartmentsfirstpolicygoverningtheuseofoleoresincapsicum,orOCspraywas

implementedin2015.Despitethepreviouslackofpolicyguidanceontheuseoftheseweapons,the
Departmenthadissuedtheseweaponstoitsofficersfordecades.Itisafundamentalresponsibility
oftheDepartmenttoprovidecontrollingguidancetoofficersregardingwhentheyarepermittedto

usetheweaponstheDepartmenthassuppliedthem.Previously,officersuseoftheseweaponswas

governedonlybyTrainingGuidelines,butthesetrainingguidelinesdidnotestablishclear

standardsforofficerconduct.
WhiletheDepartmentimplementedapolicyonElectronicallyConductedWeapons,or

tasers,in2007,thispolicyfailedtoprovideofficerswithnecessaryguidanceonwhenitwouldbe

appropriatetouseataser.TrainingGuidelinesregardingtasers,whichwereissuedin2010,similarly

failedtoprovideanyrestrictionsonofficersuseoftheseweapons.Instead,boththepolicyand
Guidelinessimplyprovidedofficerswithdescriptionsofthevariousmodesthattheweaponmaybe
usedin,withoutprovidingproperlimitationsonthoseuses.Neitherthepolicynorthetraining
guidelineswereupdatedwhentheDepartmentofJusticesOfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicing

Services,inconjunctionwiththePoliceExecutiveResearchForum,releasedECWGuidelinesin

March2011,whichrecommendedrestrictionssuchasnotusingatasermorethanthreetimesona

particularindividual.

Importantly,untilits2016policyupdate,BPDdidnotrequireanumberoftypesofforceby

BPDofficerstobereported.Thisincludedtakedowns,punches,controlholdsandpaincompliance

techniques,unlessasubjectcomplainedofpain,orinjuryresulted.

OurreviewofBPDsreports

suggeststhat,inpractice,forceinvolvinganofficershandswasgenerallyonlyreportedifthesubject

sustainedinjuriesrequiringmedicalattention.

OurreviewofBPDsforcecases,interviewswith
communitymembersinBaltimore,aswellasinterviewswithofficers,demonstratedthata

significantvolumeofforcebyBPDofficersinvolvesofficersusingtheirhandsagainstindividualsin
closeencounterstypesofforcethatBPDdidnotrequireofficerstoreportuntilveryrecently.

Forcethatisnotdocumentedcannotbemanagedormonitored.Inourinterviewswithcommunity
members,manymembersofthepublicdescribedexperiencesinwhichofficersusedforcesuchas

takedownsandcontroltechniqueswithoutsufficientjustification.Theseincidentshaveledtothe
deepfrustrationthatsomemembersofthepublicfeeltowardsBPD.

UntilJuly2016,BPDpoliciesonforcefailedtoencourageanyde-escalationstrategies.Itis
criticalthatofficersbeprovidedguidancenotonlyonwhenandhowforcemaybeused,butalso

thattheybeencouragedtousetacticsthatminimizetheneedforforce.Usingforceagainst
membersofthepublicisnotonlyanintrusiontothesubjectofforce,italsocreatesrisksfor

officersentangledintheseencountersbyheighteningtensionsandcreatingsituationsinwhich
officersmayalso,inturn,beinjured.BPDsnewpolicieshavetakensomestepstoincorporatedeescalationprinciples,butsignificantworkremainstoensurethatde-escalationstrategiesare

understoodandutilizedthroughouttheDepartment.Additionally,althoughBPDimplementeda

policygoverningcontactswithyouthinJune2015,thepolicyfailstoprovideanyguidanceonthe

uniquequalitiesofyouthbehavioranddevelopmentorprescribespecifictechniquesforofficers
approachandinteractionswithyouth.
Second,inadditiontomissingcriticalelements,BPDsguidanceonwhenandhowtouse
force,aswellastoreport,investigate,andreviewusesofforceisscatteredthroughoutmany

policies,trainingguidelines,andtheirvariousupdates.Forexample,therulesgoverningofficers
usesoftheirserviceweaponsarecontainedinatleastfourseparatepoliciesandaTraining

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Guidelineontheuseofdeadlyforce,ratherthanasingle,cohesivepolicy.Additionally,whenthe

Departmentupdatesapolicy,eachupdateiswritteninanewandseparatedocument.Onepolicy

canhavemanyupdates,andthusofficersareexpectedtokeeptrackofmanydifferentdocuments

simplytounderstandasinglepolicy.Tounderstandalloftheapplicablepoliciesgoverningforce,
officersmustbeawareofandsynthesizedozensofdocuments.Thereisnocohesive,
comprehensiveguidanceforofficersthatisdigestibleandworkable.Havingthiscriticalguidance
scatteredthroughoutdozensofdisparatedocumentsmakesitdifficulttounderstandand
operationalizewhatguidancetheDepartmentdoesprovideitsofficersaboutuseofforce.

In
interviews,officersexpressedconcernthatpoliciesweresimplyimplementedanddistributed

withoutsufficientguidanceregardingthemeaningofprovisions.Anumberofofficerswespoke
withexpressedconfusionaboutthecontentsofrecentlyupdatedpolicies,includingthe
Departmentsnewuseofforcepolicy.
Third,untilrecently,officershadinsufficientaccesstoDepartmentalpolicies.Officers

receivedapolicymanualintheAcademyuponjoiningtheDepartment,butlaterupdatestopolicies

werenotdistributedinamannerthatensuredofficersreceivedandreviewedtheupdatedpolicy.
Officersreceivepolicyupdatesthroughtheiremail,whichmanyofficersdonotfrequentlycheckor

haveaccesstobecauseDepartmentcomputersintheprecinctsareold,outdated,andfrequently
breakdown.Officerswerenotrequiredtosignoffonwhethertheyhadreceivedpolicyupdatesand

theDepartmenthadnotrackingmechanismsinplacetoensurethatallofficershadreceived,much
lessunderstood,policyupdates.Toitscredit,theDepartmenthasrealizedthatthisisasignificant
problem,andhaspurchasedanewsoftwareapplicationtotrackthedistributionofnewandupdated

policiesandproficiencytestingofofficersontheneworupdatedpolicies,butthatapplicationhad
notyetbeenrolledoutbyJune2016.

Finally,theDepartmentdoesnotuniformlyandconsistentlyenforceitspolicies.For
example,a1999policyonreviewingandinvestigatingfirearmdischargesthatwasineffectuntil

2012includedarequirementthateachdischargebereviewedbyanadhocboardconsistingofa

numberofchiefsandotherpersonnelappointedbytheCommissioner.Toourknowledge,based
onthedocumentswereviewed,suchareviewboardwasneverconstitutedunderthispolicyduring
theperiodofourreview.Instead,underformerCommissionerBatts,anewpolicyregardingaUse

ofForceReviewBoardwasimplementedin2014,underwhichanumberofreviewswere
conducted.AswedescribeinmoredetailinSectionIII(A)below,theDepartmentsfailureto

consistentlyenforceitspolicieshascontributedtothepatternorpracticeofexcessiveforcethatwe
found.
Thesedeficienciesinpolicyguidance,organization,distribution,andenforcementcontribute

tothepatternorpracticeofunconstitutionalforceweobserved.

b. BPDs Training On Force Is Severely Lacking, Leading To Officers

Systemic Constitutional Violations
BPDofficersaretrainedintheAcademywhentheyinitiallyjointheDepartment,andthen
throughmandatoryannualin-servicetraining.TrainingatbothlevelsattheAcademyandthrough

in-serviceislacking.AsdescribedinmoredetailinSectionIII(A)(1)below,BPDstraining

generallyfailstoprovideofficerswithsufficientinstructiononhowtooperationalizepolicies.It
lackstheintegrated,scenario-basedtrainingthatequipsofficerswiththetacticalskillsnecessaryto
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conductlawenforcementactivitiesinasafeandconstitutionalmanner,includingstrategiesthat

decreasetheneedforforce.
BPDsDefensiveTacticstrainingteachesofficersanerroneouslegalstandardforexcessive
force.Itseparatesexcessiveforceinto(1)perceivedexcessiveforce;(2)intentionalexcessive
force;and(3)unintentionalexcessiveforce.Thisseparationbetweenperceived,intentional

andunintentionalexcessiveforcehasnoplaceunderwell-establishedFourthAmendment

standardsgoverningexcessiveforce.AnofficerssubjectiveintentisirrelevantforFourth
Amendmentpurposes.

Graham,490U.S.386,397(1989)(thereasonablenessinquiryinan
excessiveforcecaseisanobjectiveone:thequestioniswhethertheofficersactionsareobjectively
reasonableinlightofthefactsandcircumstancesconfrontingthem,withoutregardtotheir
underlyingintentormotivation)(internalquotationsandcitationsomitted).Indeed,theSupreme
Courtexplicitlyrejectedthenotionthatexcessiveforcerequiredintentormalicedecadesago,
declaringthat[a]nofficersevilintentionswillnotmakeaFourthAmendmentviolationoutofan

objectivelyreasonableuseofforce;norwillanofficersgoodintentionsmakeanobjectively
unreasonableuseofforceconstitutional.Id.AccordingtoBPDsDefensiveTacticstraining,the

appropriateconsequenceforunintentionalexcessiveforce,acategoryofforcethatdoesnot
existinthelegallandscape,isremedialtrainingnootherconsequenceisidentified.Thistraining
isadisservicetoofficers,becauseitisinconsistentwithhowcourtswillconsidertheiruseofforce.

Thecategoryofperceivedexcessiveforceisalsoproblematicbecauseitappearstodiscreditthe

complainantwhetherthecomplainantisanotherofficeroracommunitymember.

BPDstrainingonCharacteristicsofanArmedPersonalsoappearstobeineffective.

Whileinstructorsteachstudentsthateightypercentofindividualswhoshowcharacteristicsofan
armedpersonsuchaswearinglooseorbaggyclothing,orgrabbingtheirwaistbandswhile

runningwillnot bearmed,thisissueoffalsepositivesdoesnotappeartobetaughtinaneffective

manner.Noscenariosinvolvingfalsepositivesareemployedinthetrainingthatwouldallow
officerstointernalizeandretainthislesson.Additionally,itiscriticaltolearnhowtosafelyand

constitutionallyapproachandinvestigateanindividualwhomaybearmed.

Inatrainingonthe
samesubject,sponsoredbytheDepartmentofJusticeandtheIACPandheldatBPDstraining

centerforlawenforcementagenciesthroughouttheregion,theinstructorspentasignificantamount

oftimerefreshingstudentsknowledgeofFourthAmendmentlawandprinciples.Inthattraining,
theinstructorrepeatedlyreinforcedthroughoutthecoursethatapersonwhodisplaysoneofthese

characteristicsisnotnecessarilyarmed;eachcharacteristicshouldbeonefactorinanofficers

analysis.ItdoesnotappearthatBPDsowntrainingonCharacteristicsofanArmedPerson
providesofficerswithsuchcriticalguidance.
Additionally,untilrecently,BPDhadnocomprehensivetrainingonde-escalationstrategies
toguideofficersonhowtoresolveincidentswithoutresortingtoforce.Itcreatedashortcourseon
de-escalationin2015,apositivestepforward.However,giventhenoveltyofde-escalationtactics
withinBPDscurriculum,itisimportantthatleadershipwithintheDepartmentmakeclearto

officersthatthisskill-setiscriticaltokeepingofficers,aswellascommunitymembers,safe.The

Departmentmustensurethatde-escalationissufficientlyemphasizedandintegratedintoallofits
coursesinvolvingforcesuchthatofficersunderstanditisacriticaltoolforresolvingincidents.
Similarly,officershavebeenprovidedwithlittletonotrainingontacticsandtechniquesfor
interactingwithyouth,includingonhowtoengagewithjuvenilewitnessesorvictims.

Becausetheir

developmentalstateaffectsthemannerinwhichadolescentscomprehend,communicate,and

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behave,BPDofficersmustbetrainedontheseuniquerealitiesandequippedwithskillsand
techniquestoaccountforthemwheninteractingwithyouth.

TheDepartmentprovidedabrieftraining,runningfromMaythroughJuneof2016for

officersonitsnewuseofforcepolicyand26otherpoliciestheDepartmentreviewedandupdated.

Wewereabletoattendoneofthefirstsessionsofthetrainingandhearfromconsultantsabouta

latersession.Ourobservationsbasedonthefirstsessionweattendedgaveusseriousinitial

concernsabouttheadequacyofthetraining,butitappearsthetrainingsubstantiallyimprovedwith

time.WeapplaudtheDepartmentsdesiretoissuenewguidanceandtrainingtoitsofficers,butwe
havesomeconcernsabouttheadequacyofthetrainingbeingprovided,giventheambitiousscope
ofwhattheDepartmentintendstocover.Itiscleartous,however,thattheDepartmentis
committedtoimprovingtheguidanceitprovidestoofficersonuseofforce,andwelookforwardto
workingwiththeDepartmenttomakesureitissuccessfulinitsefforts.
c. BPDs Lack of Oversight Of Officers Uses of Force Has Contributed
to the Pattern of Excessive Force
Asawhole,BPDfailstoexerciseoversightofitsofficersusesofforce.Ofthe2,818force

incidentsthatBPDrecordedinthenearlysix-yearperiodwereviewed,BPDinvestigatedonlyten
incidentsforexcessiveforcebasedonconcernsidentifiedthroughitsinternalreview.Oftheseten
incidents,itfoundonlyoneuseofforcetobeexcessive.Duringthesameperiod,twenty-five
officersweresuedfourormoretimesincasesallegingviolationsrelatingtouseofforce,stops,
searches,arrests,ordiscriminatorypolicing.ThefewincidentsthattheDepartmentinternallynoted
asproblematicarealsostrikingconsideringthemanyincidentswedeterminedtobe
unconstitutional.
Likethatofmanydepartments,BPDpolicysetsoutdifferentinvestigativerequirementsfor

differentlevelsofforcethatofficersuse.BPDofficersuseofforceisinvestigatedthroughoneof

tworoutes.First,formostincidentsofforceotherthanshootings,officersnotifytheirsupervising

sergeantafterusingforce.

Thesergeanttravelstothesitewhereforcewasused,andconductsan

investigationatthescene.Thechainofcommandthenreviewsthesergeantsinvestigationand
eitherreturnsitforfurtherinvestigationormakesadecisiononwhethertheofficersforcewas

reasonable.Theprocessfortheseinvestigationsisoutlinedinapolicythathasbeeninplacesince

2003;itremainedinplaceuntilJuly2016.UntilNovember2014,allusesofforceotherthan

shootingsweretobeinvestigatedinthismannerbyanofficerschainofcommand.Foreaseof
reference,werefertotheseaschainofcommandinvestigations.
Inthesechainofcommandinvestigations,ifBPDinvestigatorsorreviewersbelievedthata
useofforcemayhavebeenunreasonableoroutofpolicy,inordertoinvestigatethatconcern,a
supervisorinthechainofcommandwouldhavetofileaninternalcomplaintofexcessiveforcewith

InternalAffairs.InternalAffairswouldthenalsoseparatelyinvestigatethecomplaintthroughits

processes.Wefoundthat,inpractice,internalcomplaintswereexceedinglyrarethedatawe
reviewedindicatedonlytensuchcomplaintshadbeenmadeduringtheperiodofourreview.
Indeed,onesergeantwespokewithabouthisforceinvestigationsofofficersunderhiscommand

indicatedthathewouldnotfeelcomfortablefilingacomplaintwithInternalAffairsifhesuspected

anofficerunderhissupervisionhadusedunnecessaryorunreasonableforce.Instead,hewouldcall
hischainofcommandandinformthemofthesituation,leavingittothemtomakethedecisionof
whethertofileacomplaintabouttheofficerforInternalAffairstoinvestigate.

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Thesecondroutethatanadministrativeinvestigationofforcemaytakeisreservedfor
officersuseofdeadlyforce.Theprocessforinvestigatingthesedeadlyforcecaseschangeda

numberoftimesduringtheperiodofforceincidentswereviewed.Fromthebeginningofour

periodofreview,in2010untilearly2014,thissecondroutewasreservedforofficer-involved

shootings,whichwereinvestigatedbyofficersinBPDsHomicideUnit.InJanuary2014,BPD
institutedaspecializedForceInvestigationTeam(FIT)toinvestigateshootingsandotherusesof

forcethathavethepotentialtocauseseriousphysicalinjuryordeath.TheFITfunctionedonly
untilJuly31,2015,whenitwasreplacedasaninterimmeasurebytheHomicideunitin2015,and

thenbyaSpecialInvestigationResponseTeam(SIRT)inSeptemberof2015.TheSIRThasthe
samejurisdictionastheformerFITandcurrentlyinvestigatesshootingsaswellasotherserioususe
offorcecases.Foreaseofreference,werefertotheseasdeadlyforceinvestigations.

BasedonourreviewofBPDsforceinvestigationsandourinterviewswithBPDofficersand

sergeants,itappearsthatthechainofcommandfailstothoroughlyandobjectivelyevaluateofficers
usesofforce.BPDsinvestigativefilesofforceincidentsaremissingcriticalelementsnecessaryto

allowthechainofcommandtounderstandandadjudicatetheforceincidents.

Thisisperhaps
unsurprising,because,untilthisyear,BPDprovidednotrainingwhatsoeverforsergeantsonhowto

investigatetheirofficersusesofforce,orforlieutenants,captainsormajors,regardingtheir

responsibilitiesandobligationsinreviewingforceinvestigations.Similarly,BPDalsofailsto
thoroughlyandobjectivelyinvestigateofficersusesofdeadlyforce.

BPDsdeadlyforce
investigationslikewiselackcriticalinformationnecessarytoevaluatetheforceusedandreflectbias
onthepartofinvestigators.Theseinvestigationsarealsosubjecttounreasonabledelays,tothe
detrimentofbothofficersandthecommunity.
i.

BPDs Investigations of Less-Lethal Force Cases are Missing Critical

Elements that are Necessary to Evaluate the Propriety of the Force
Used

InBPDschainofcommandinvestigations,criticalinformationthatisnecessaryto
investigateforceincidentsisroutinelymissing.

Investigatorsroutinelyfailtointerviewanycivilian

witnesses,witnessingofficers,theinvolvedofficer,andthepersonagainstwhomforcewasused.In

manycases,therearenowitnessescivilianorofficerinterviewedeventhoughwitnesseswere

presentonthescene.Forexample,inone2014narcoticsarrestatapublichousingcomplexduring

whichataserwasdeployed,therewerereportedly20to30civilianwitnessesgatheredatthesiteof

thearrest,andtheofficerfeltitnecessarytocallinadditionalunitsforbackuptodealwiththe
crowd.However,theforcereportdidnotincludeasinglecivilianwitnessstatement.Althoughthe

reportstatesthat[t]herewerenocivilianwitness[es]whowishedtoprovideastatement,thereis

noindicationoftheeffortstheofficersmadeinattemptingtoobtainstatementsfromwitnesses.
Fromourinterviews,itappearsthatsomepeoplemayrefusetospeakwithofficersbecause

ofthedistrusttheyhaveofthepolice.WhileBPDspolicyonuseofforcereportingrequiresthat

notationsofaneighborhoodcanvassforwitnessesmustbeincluded,manyotherreportswe

revieweddidnotincludesuchanotation.Evenintheinstanceswhereitappearedaninvestigator
spokewithacivilianwhohadwitnessedtheincident,investigatorsdidnotrecordthecivilians

statementorprovidetheciviliansaccountintheirownwords.Instead,theinvestigatorsummarized

theciviliansstatementfortheinvestigativefile.Iftheinvestigatormissesrelevantinformation,or

misunderstandsaciviliansstatementinanyway,oriftheinvestigatorbiasestheciviliansstatement

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inanywaywhetherintentionallyornotthiscannotberemediedbythechainofcommands

review.
Wealsofoundthat,incaseswhereaciviliansaccountappearedtobeinconsistentwith
informationprovidedbyanofficer,investigatorsappearedtosummarilydismissthecivilians
accountorcreditofficersaccountsovercivilianswithoutsufficientinvestigation.Forexample,ina

2014incident,asergeantrespondedasback-uptoassisttwoplainclothesofficerswithanarrestfor
CDSpossession.Heobservedthemengagedinanongoingstruggleinthestreetwhenhearrived

onthescene.Eventhoughthesergeantwasonthesceneinasupervisoryrolewhentheuseof

forcewastakingplace,healsoinvestigatedtheofficersforce.Whenattemptingtolocatewitnesses,

hereportedseveralcitizensintheblockstated,Theydidnthavetobeathimlikethat,Another
caseofpolicebrutality,Theypickedthatmanupanddumpedhimonhishead,andSomebody
hasitonvideo.Itwillbeonyoutubetomorrow,thoughhewasunabletogaincontactinformation

forthepersonwithvideo.Shortlyaftertheincident,awomanformallycomplainedtothe

Departmentabouttheincident,andthesamesergeantrespondedtoaddresshercomplaint.Despite
thesestatementsfromwitnesses,thesergeantdismissedthefivecomplaintsoftheforceusedand

determined[b]asedonthefactsofthisincident,witnessinterviews,andreviewsofCCTVfootage
thattheofficershadusedappropriateforce. 106Inadditiontoourconcernsabouthowthedifferent
witnessandofficeraccountswerereconciledinthisinvestigation,thisisoneofanumberofcases
wesawwheresergeantswhowereinvolvedinanincidentwhereforcewasusedinvestigatedthat

incident.Thesergeantssupervisionoftheuseofforceunderminestheintegrityofhisinvestigation

oftheforceaswellastheindividualscomplaintsoftheincidenthelackedtheindependenceand

objectivitytoinvestigateeithertheforceorthecomplaints.
Officersstatements,whentheywereprovided,wereonlyinwrittenform,oftenlacked

detailsoftheforceusedandwhyitwasnecessary,andusedvagueandboilerplatelanguage,
preventingreviewersfromunderstandingthenatureofthethreatthatofficersfacedandthenature

oftheforcethatofficersused.Often,theonlydocumentedbasisforusingforcewasthatthe

subjectswereresisting,withnodetailaboutwhichactionstakenbythesuspectwhileheorshe

resistednecessitatedforcebytheofficer.Descriptionsoftheforceitselfwerelikewiseoften

vague.Insomecaseswhereataserwasused,officersreportedtheyusedthetaseronanindividual

afeworseveraltimesoruntilheorshecompliedorbecamesubdued,ratherthan
specifyingthenumberoftimesthattheydeployedtheirtaser.

Thespecificnumberoftimesthata
taserisdeployediscriticaltoassessingthereasonablenessofitsuseunderthecircumstancesand

mustbereported.Similarly,inalmostallinstancesinwhichofficersemployedatakedown
technique,theofficersdidnotspecifythetypeoftechniqueused,suchasastraightarmbar,joint
manipulation,orpressurepoints.Withoutknowingthespecificactionsthatofficerstook,itis

difficulttoevaluatewhethertheyactedreasonablyunderthecircumstances.Forexample,duringa

2010incident,threeplainclothesofficersapproachedtwomen,whotheybelievedwereinvolvedin

distributingnarcotics,toarrestthem.Reportedly,astheofficersapproached,oneofthetwomen

punchedoneoftheofficersandran.Twooftheofficersgavechase.Whentheycaughtupwiththe
individual,theinvolvedofficersreportedthattheindividualbegantoviolentlyresistandduring
thestruggle,wasreportedlytackledtothegroundseveraltimes,duringthecourseofwhichthe
suspectstruckhisheadagainstafence.Accordingtotheinvestigatingsergeantsreport,the
106ThesergeantrequestedvideofromCitiwatch,butthevideowasonpanmodeduringtheentireincident.He

reportedthatthepartswhichcapturetheincidentaregrainy,butgavenoindicationthatunnecessaryforcewasused.

Thevideowasnotproducedtouswiththeinvestigativefile.

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suspectsufferedheadinjuriesinthisaltercationrequiring37staples.Itisdifficulttoassesswhether
theofficersforceherewasreasonablewithoutmoreinformationabouthowthesuspectresistedthe
officersandwhattechniquestheofficersusedonthesuspectthatcausedaheadinjuryrequiring37

staples.Thesuspectinthiscasewasnotinterviewed,deprivingBPDofcriticalinformationto
assesstheincident.Intheirreviewofthisincident,thechainofcommandapprovedtheforce
withoutaskingforanyadditionalinformation,despitethevaguenessoftheofficersaccounts.This
wasthecaseinmanyoftheincidentswereviewed.
Officerswrittenstatements,whenanywereprovided,werealsooftennearlyidentical
faciallylackinginindependence.Theofficersaccountsappearedtohavebeencopiedafterthey

agreeduponasingleaccountoftheincident.Indeed,becauseofthis,officersaccountssometimes

referredtothemselvesinthethirdpersonbecausetheaccounthadbeenelectronicallycopiedinto

theforcereport.Wealsofoundthatthelanguageinvestigatorsusedintheirreportsindicatedalack

ofobjectivity,suchasadescriptionthatofficerswereforcedtouseataser,baton,OCspray,or

otherweapon.Thislanguagedoesmorethansimplystatethefacts,andindicatesbiasinfavorof

theinvolvedofficers.
Wealsofoundthatinconsistenciesbetweenofficersstatementswerenotroutinely
reconciledoraddressed.Inoneincident,inwhichasergeantpointedoutinconsistenciesbetween
officersaccounts,itappearsthechainofcommandtookissuewiththesergeantsinvestigationand

reportthathighlightedtheinconsistencies.

Ina2011incident,aninvestigatingsergeant,tohis

credit,explicitlyreportedthattwoofficersversionsofeventsdiffer[ed]regardingwhethera

juvenilewassprayedwithOCspraybeforeorafterhewashandcuffedasignificantfactthatcould

affectthereasonablenessoftheforceused,andwhetherithadbeeninoroutofpolicy.See Tracy v.
Freshwater,623F.3d90,9899(2dCir.2010)(jurycouldfindofficersapplicationofpeppersprayto

beunreasonablewhereplaintiffclaimedhewashandcuffedandnotresisting);Henderson

v. Munn,439
F.3d497,50203(8thCir.2006)(officernotentitledtoqualifiedimmunityatsummaryjudgment
wherejurycouldfindthathehadappliedpepperspraytonon-resistingplaintiff'sfacewhileplaintiff
waslyingonhisstomachandhandcuffedwithhishandsbehindhisback);Vinyard

v. Wilson,311
F.3d1340,134749(11thCir.2002)(officernotentitledtosummaryjudgmentwherehehadpulled
overandappliedpepperspraywhilearresteewasyellingandarresteehadbeenarrestedforminor

offenses,washandcuffedandsecuredinbackseatofpolicecar,posednothreattotheofficeror
herself,andtherewasapartitionseparatingherfromtheofficer). Accordingtothesergeants
report,whenherealizedthattheofficersreportsvariedonthispoint,hecalledthembothintohis

officetoquestionthem,aboutwhathadhappened.Thewitnessingofficerstatedthathis
administrativereportwascorrectandsubmittedit.TheofficerwhousedOCspraywith-drewhis
administrativereport,statinghewasgettingworriedabouthowthisinvestigationwasprogressing

andstatedthathewantedtotalktotheFOPpriortosubmittinghisadministrativereport.The
sergeantreportedthesefactsthattheofficersreportedinconsistentlyaboutwhetherforcewas

usedonahandcuffedperson,andthattheinvolvedofficerwithdrewhisreporttohischainof
command.Hesubmittedhisinvestigationforapproval.Alieutenantcolonelresponded,NOT

APPROVED;RETURNEDFORCORRECTIONS,andstated,YOUNEEDTOSEEME
IMMEDIATELYREGARDINGTHISSUMMARY!Thereisnodocumentationofthe
conversationbetweenthesergeantandthelieutenantcolonel.

Inthefinalreportproducedtous,
thesecondpageofthewitnessingofficersreportismissing;thedocumentspecificallynotesthatit

istwopageslong,yetonlythefirstpageisprovided.Thefirstpageofthewitnessingofficersreport
simplystatesthefactsaboutthebeginningoftheincidentandprovidesnoinformationaboutthe
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forcethatwasusedandwhetheritwasusedafterthejuvenilewashandcuffed.

Ultimately,itappears

thesergeantidentifiedaninconsistencyinthiscase,andthechainofcommandnotonlyrefusedto
addressit,butmayhaveattemptedtocoverupthereportthatidentifiedpotentiallyproblematic

officerconduct.
Witnessesaccounts,bothofficersandcivilians,areimportantnotonlyfordetermining
whetheranofficersuseofforcewaswithinpolicy,butalsoinassessingwhethertheofficerstactics

wereappropriate,andwhetherthereareanyissuesonwhichtheofficerwouldbenefitfrom

additionaltraining,mentoring,orguidance.Thelackofspecificsinthesestatementsprevents
supervisorsfromimprovingofficersperformanceandpreventingfuturemisconduct.

Onesergeant
informedusduringaninterviewthatjudginganofficerstacticsissimplynotpartofauseofforce
investigation;hedidnotdeemittobehisjobtosecond-guessanofficerstactics.Thisisafailure

insupervisionitisasergeantsjobtomentorofficersinareaswheretheymaybenefitfrom
additionalguidance.Thesergeantsstatementherereflectsalackofunderstandingoftheroleofa
supervisor,andindicatesaDepartmentalfailuretotrainsergeantsonhowtobeeffective

supervisors.
Ourinvestigationalsofoundthatcriticalevidencewasoftenmissingfromthechainof

commandforceinvestigations.Wedidnotseeasinglechainofcommandinvestigationinwhich
photographsofthesubjectsinjurieswereprovided.ThesephotographsaretakenbyCrimeLab

technicians,but,asamatterofprotocol,theyarenotkeptwiththeinvestigativefile.Amongthe

overeighthundredchainofcommandinvestigativefileswereviewed,wedidnotseeanyindication

thatalieutenantormajorhadrequestedtoseephotographsofthesubjectsinjuriesinanycase.
Similarly,taserdownloadsverifyingthenumberoftimesthatofficersdeployedtheirtaserswerenot

includedininvestigativefiles,therebypreventingthechainofcommandfromconfirmingthe

accuracyofofficersreports.Thesedeficienciesinchainofcommandinvestigationsprevent
supervisorsfrombeingabletoexerciserealoversightoverofficersusesofforce.Withoutdetailsof

incidentsprovidedbycivilianwitnesses,involvedandwitnessingofficers,andevidencesuchastaser

downloadsorphotographsofinjuries,officersuseofforcecannotbecriticallyexamined.

Finally,wefoundevidencethatseriousincidentsinvolvinguseofforcebyofficerswent

entirelyunreported.Indeed,becauseitwasnotrequiredtobereportedbypolicy,muchoftheforce
usedbyofficerswiththeirhandswasnotreported,evenwhenitandnottheforcereportedwas
thesourceofinjuriestoofficers.Inthe2011incidentinvolvingajuvenileaboveatpage105,for

example,thesergeantreportedthattheofficersfoughtwiththejuvenile.Theinvolvedofficerwas

transportedtoahospitalandtreatedforabrasionsandbruisestohisknee.Hiskneeinjurieswere
severeenoughthathewasunabletoworkforanumberofdays.

However,theuseofforcereport
wascreatedtoreportontheofficersuseofOCspray.

Aninjuryreportallegesthejuvenilekicked
theofficerinthekneebuttheuseofforcereportdoesnotprovideanyspecificinformationabout
thefightbetweentheofficersandthejuvenilethatcausedtheofficersinjury,otherthanthatthe
youthwasmakingthreateningstatements,andkickingandbeingcombativewhileofficerswere

attemptingtohandcuffhim.Itdoesnotincludeanydetailsabouttheofficersuseoftheirhands

duringthefight.Thesefailuresinexercisingoversightofofficersuseofforceareattributablein

parttoBPDspriordeficientpolicyonreportinguseofforce.Thepolicyonreportinguseofforce,

throughmultipleprovisions,allowedinvestigatorsandreviewerstoignoreallegationsofexcessive
force.Itstatedthat[w]henallegationsofexcessiveforcearise[],investigatingsergeantswereto

informthecomplainantsofthethereportingrequirementsforcomplaintsofexcessiveforceand
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providethecomplainantswiththetelephonenumberandaddressoftheInternalAffairsDivision.

Thepolicydidnotrequireaninvestigatingsergeanttoaddressthecomplainthim

orher-selfinany

wayortoensurethatInternalAffairswasnotifiedofthecomplaint.Thesepolicyfailuresallowed
significantforce,andallegationsofexcessiveforce,togoentirelyuninvestigated.

ii.

BPDs Deadly Force Investigations Lack Critical Analysis and

Information that is Necessary to Evaluate the Threat Faced and Force
Used

Likeitschainofcommandinvestigations,BPDsinvestigationsofofficersuseofdeadly

force,includingofficer-involvedshootings,lackcriticalinformationneededtoevaluatethepropriety

oftheforce,reflectabiasinfavorofinvolvedofficers,andincludeunreasonabledelays.Thisis

concerning,as[t]heintrusivenessofaseizurebymeansofdeadlyforceisunmatched.The
suspectsfundamentalinterestinhisownlifeneednotbeelaboratedupon.Theuseofdeadlyforce
alsofrustratestheinterestoftheindividual,andofsociety,injudicialdeterminationofguiltand

punishment.Garner,471U.S.at9.
Officersusesofdeadlyforcemustbecriticallyexaminedto

ensurethattheyconformwiththeDepartmentspoliciesandlaw.Evenwhentheuseofdeadly

forceisjustified,muchcanbelearnedbycriticallyexaminingincidentstoimprovetacticsandlessen

theneedtousesuchforce.

Inourinvestigation,werequestedinvestigativefilesforalldeadlyforceincidents,including

allofficer-involvedshootings,betweenJanuary1,2010andMay1,2016.Troublingly,BPD

informedusthattheycouldnotlocatetheinvestigativefilesfortwentyofficer-involvedshootings
thatoccurredinthattimeframe,andcouldprovidenoexplanationfortheirabsence.Theseincluded
lethalshootingsofmembersofthepublic,includingonelethalshooting,aswellasfirearms

dischargesagainstanimalsandunintentionaldischarges.Failingtomaintainfilesofsuchhighrisk

incidentsisaseriousomission,inhibitingeffectiveoversightanderodingpublicconfidencethat
BPDtakesseriouslyitsresponsibilitytooverseeitsownuseofforce.

OurreviewofBPDdeadlyforceinvestigationsrevealedmanyofthesameproblemsthat
werepresentinthechainofcommandinvestigations.Transcriptsofinterviewswereroutinely
excluded,anditappearsthattheywerenotcreatedinmanycases.

Inconsistenciesbetweenwitness

accounts,officerstatements,andphysicalevidencewerefrequentlynotinvestigated.Moreover,

documentsandevidencethatonewouldexpecttoseeinanadministrativeinvestigationofan
officer-involvedshooting,suchascrimescenelogs,photographsofthesubjectorthescene,and

crimelabreports,werefrequentlymissingfromtheinvestigativefileswereviewed.

Asinthechain
ofcommandinvestigations,wesawevidencethatinvolvedofficersconferredwithotherinvolved
andwitnessingofficersabouttheincidentbeforespeakingwithinvestigators.Investigatorsalso

failedtoquestionofficersabouttheirconductbeforetheshooting,toascertainevenifthe
shootingwaslawfulwhattactical,trainingorotherissuescouldbeidentified.
WealsofoundthatsignificantdelaysinBPDsdeadlyforceinvestigationsdiminishedthe

integrityoftheinvestigations.Asamatterofpractice,BPDinvestigatorsdonotinterviewofficers
whodischargetheirweaponsuntilaftertheStatesAttorneysOfficeissuesaletterdecliningto

prosecutetheofficerforanypotentialcriminalact.
Often,theStatesAttorneysOfficetakesmany
months,andinanumberofcases,overayear,todeterminewhethertoprosecute,and,ifnot,to

issueadeclinationletter.Inoneextremecase,forashootingthatoccurredonAugust29,2010,the
StatesAttorneysOfficedidnotissueadeclinationletteruntilOctober16,2012,overtwoyears
107

later.Manylawenforcementagenciesconductparalleladministrativeinvestigationsofofficerinvolvedshootings,understandingthatprecautionscanbetakentoensurethattheofficers
statementsaresegregatedanddonottaintanypotentialcriminalinvestigation.BPDdoesnot
conductsuchparallelinvestigations.
WealsofoundsignificantdifferencesbetweenBPDspracticeswheninterviewingwitnesses

anditspracticeswheninterviewingofficersthatsuggestabiasinfavoroftheofficer.Forexample,
wheninterviewsoftheofficersfinallydidoccur,theywereconclusoryandsuperficial,oftenlasting

nolongerthantenorfifteenminutes,withsomeendingafterfiveminutes.Officersweregenerally

notaskedanycriticalquestionsaboutthethreattheyfacedortheirdecision-makingprocessleading

uptotheirdeadlyforce.Forexample,inalethal2013shooting,theInternalAffairsdetectives
interviewoftheshootingofficerlastedonlyfiveminutes,whichincludedformquestionsaboutthe
natureoftheinterviewwhichwerenotparticulartothefactsofthatcase.Theactualsubstantive
interviewoftheofficerlastedthreeminutes.BPDsinterviewsofcivilianwitnesses,ontheother

hand,oftenlasthours,andtheinvestigatorsaskspecific,probingquestions,demonstratingtheir
abilitytobethoroughandexacting.WealsofoundthatBPDhasapracticeofconductingpre
interviewswithofficersbeforeturningontherecordingdevice;attimes,investigatorsstatedthat

theyhaddoneapre-interviewontherecord.Forexample,inanother2013officer-involved

shooting,aninvestigatorfromInternalAffairsstated,Sir,pleasejustaswedidbeforewewenton

thetape,justtelluswhathappen[sic].Theofficerthenprovidedacannedandprepared

presentationaboutashooting,summarizingtheincident,frombeginningtoend.Theentire
interview,ontape,lastsonlyeightminutes.Pre-interviewsimpedetheintegrityoftheinvestigation.
Becauseofthis,pre-interviewsininvestigationsofofficer-involvedshootingshavebeendiscouraged

sincetheatleasttheearly1990s.

See, e.g.,JAMESG.K
OLTS&S
TAFF,T
HELOSANGELESCOUNTY
SHERIFFSDEPARTMENT140(1992),availableathttp://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/

PN-CA-0001-0023.pdf.

TheseinvestigativedeficienciespreventBPDfrombeingabletoevaluatewhetherofficers

whouseddeadlyforcefacedanimmediatethreatofseriousharm,andwhethertheirforcewas
justified.Moreover,byfailingtocriticallyevaluateofficerstacticsanddecision-makingpriorto

theiruseofdeadlyforce,includingopportunitiestode-escalate,theDepartmentfailstohelpofficers
improvetheirskillsandpotentiallydecreasetheneedtoresorttodeadlyforce.Toeffectively

overseeitsuseofforce,BPDmusttakestepstoremedythesedeficiencies.

d. BPD Has Inadequate Policies, Programs, and Training to Guide

Officer Interactions with Individuals with Disabilities or in Crisis, and
Fails to Coordinate Adequately with Other Social Services Providers
BPDsinadequatepolicies,training,andprogramsregardingofficerinteractionswith
individualswithadisabilityorincrisisalsocontributetothesystemicuseofexcessiveforcein
violationoftheFourthAmendmentandthefailuretoprovidereasonablemodificationsnecessaryto

avoiddiscriminationinviolationoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct.Thevastmajorityof

individualswithmentalhealthdisabilities,includingsubstanceusedisorders,orintellectualor

developmentaldisabilities(I/DD)inBaltimoreareworking,learning,andlivinginthecommunity

andwilllivetheirliveswithoutanyinvolvementwithBPD.Someindividualswithdisabilities,

however,whoarenotabletoaccesssufficienthome
andcommunity-basedservicestomeettheir
needsmaybeunabletoavoidcrisis,maintainhousingandemploymentor,foryouth,toengagewith
school,leadingsometocomeintocontactwithlawenforcement.Accordingtoa2009Baltimore

108

CityCommunityHealthSurvey,23percentofresidentsreportedhavingunmetmentalhealth

107
needs. Theratewasnotablyhigherforblackresidents(33.4percent)andforallindividualswith
lessthanabachelorsdegreeineducation(28.6percent). 108Thisdisparitywasreflectedagainina
2011MarylandBehavioralRiskFactorSurveillanceSystemstudy,whichfoundthat19.5percentof

blackresidentsand15.1percentofwhiteresidentsreportedthattheirmentalhealthwasnotgood

109
foreightormoreoutofthepast30days.

Lawenforcementofficersareoftenthefirstresponders
whenpeoplewithmentalhealthdisabilitiesareexperiencingacrisis,andthesameistruein

Baltimore. 110ItisthereforeincumbentuponBPDtoprovideclearguidancetoitsofficersonhow
tointeractwithindividualsincrisis,butthatguidanceislacking.

i. BPDs Crisis Intervention Practices Are Inadequate

BPDscrisisinterventionpoliciesandproceduresareinadequatetosafelyandlawfullyserve

individualsincrisis.Baseduponourinvestigation,includingourreviewofuseofforcefiles,reports,
andtrainingmaterials,aswellasinterviewswithBPDemployees,communitymembers,andservice

providers,itisclearthatBPDofficersarenotpreparedtoeffectivelyandsafelyrespondto

individualsexperiencingcrisis.Consequently,BPDofficersfrequentlyresorttounreasonableforce

againstindividualsincrisisandfailtomakereasonablemodificationsnecessarytoavoid

discriminatingagainstpeoplewithdisabilities.

BPDitselfrecognizedthechallengesthatpoliceofficersfacewhenrespondingtoindividuals

incrisis.Buttheprogramitlaunchedin2004,calledBehavioralEmergencyServicesTeam(BEST)

hasproventobeineffective. 111First,since2009,BESTtraininghasbeenofferedonlytonew

recruitsinthetrainingacademy.CrisiscallsareamongBPDsmostchallengingcallsforservice,and

officersearlyintheircareersaretypicallynotwellpreparedtohandlethesecomplexincidentswhile

alsoadjustingtotheirmanynewdutiesasapoliceofficer.Aneffectivecrisisinterventionresponse

programwouldprovideatleastabasiclevelofcrisisinterventiontrainingtoallofficers,including
newofficersintheacademy,butitwouldalsoensurethatatleastsomeofitsmoreexperienced

officershadreceivedahighlevelofcrisisinterventiontraining.Theseexperienced,highly-trained
officersaretheoneswellpositionedtohandlethecomplexsituationsthatinteractionswith

individualsincrisispresent.BecauseBPDonlyofferscrisisinterventiontrainingtonewrecruits,
manyofficersarenottrainedtoidentifywhetheranindividualisincrisisorengaginginbehavior

relatedtoadisability,tointeracteffectivelywithpeoplewithdisabilities,tode-escalateacrisis,and

toconnecttheindividualwithlocalresourcestoprovidetreatmentorsupport.

BPDshould
regularlyprovidein-servicetrainingtorefreshthelessonsrecruitslearnedintheacademyoncethey

haveexperienceinpatrol.OurinvestigationrevealedthatinsufficientlytrainedBPDofficershave

107SeeBALTIMORECITYHEALTHDEPT,H
EALTHYBALTIMORE2015,at11(2015),

http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/HealthyBaltimore2015_Final_Web.pdf.

108Id.

109SeeBALTIMORECITYHEALTHDEPT,H
EALTHYBALTIMORE2015:I
NTERIMSTATUSREPORT28(2013)availableat

http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/HB2015InterimUpdateOct2015Optimized_2.pdf.
ATLALL.ONMENTALILLNESS,https://www.nami.org/Gete.g.,LawEnforcementandMentalHealth,N
Involved/Law-Enforcement-and-Mental-Health(lastvisitedMay25,2016)(Withourfailingmentalhealthsystemso

inadequate,lawenforcementagencieshaveincreasinglybecomede factofirstresponderstopeopleexperiencingmental
healthcrisis.).
111TheBESTprogramhastrainedover800officerssinceitsinception.Duringthefirstfiveyearsoftheproject,it

trainedanaverageof70officerseachyear.Since2009,thetrainingnumbersaverage136officersperyear.
110See,

109

escalatedinteractionsthatdidnotinitiallyinvolvecriminalbehavior,resultinginthearrestof,oruse
offorceagainst,individualsincrisis,orwithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorI/DD,orunnecessary

hospitalizationofthepersonwithmentalhealthdisabilitiesorI/DD. 112WhenBPDofficershave
discretionaboutwhethertomakeanarrest,agencypoliciesandproceduresshoulddirectthemto
considerwhetheritwouldbeappropriatetodeclinetoarrestorissueacitation,andinsteadconnect

individualstocommunity-basedserviceswithoutfurthercriminaljusticeinvolvement.

Second,dispatchersdonotreceivetrainingonBPDsBESTprogramandBPDhasno
mechanismsinplacetoensurethatBEST-trainedofficersaredispatchedtocrisis-relatedcallsfor
service.NordoestheDepartmentcollectdataonwhetherandhowoftenBEST-trainedofficers

respondtocallsinvolvingindividualsincrisis.Moreover,otherofficersandcommunitymembers
donotknowtorequestaBEST-trainedofficerwhenacrisisdoesoccur.Duringaninterviewon

crisisintervention,forexample,onedistrictcommanderbluntlystatedWedontdothathere.

Similarly,manyBaltimoreCitymentalhealthserviceprovidersindicatedtheywereunawareofthe

programorhadonlyalimitedfamiliaritywiththeconceptofBESTtraining,andanevensmaller

numberstatedthattheyrequestBEST-trainedofficerstorespondtoindividualsincrisis.

Third,BPDpolicydoesnotrequirethataBEST-trainedofficerbedispatchedtocalls

involvingindividualsincrisis.Infact,theonlyBPDpolicywefoundthatspecificallyaddresses

individualsincrisisisanorderdescribingtheprocessforexecutingapetitionforanemergency
evaluation.AnduntilBPDamendedthepolicyinJuly2015,itfailedtoprovideanyguidanceto

officersonhowtoidentifyandinteractwithanindividualincrisisormentionutilizingBESTtrainedofficers.Indeed,thispolicyisbothunderdevelopedandunnecessarilyrestrictive.Thepolicy

suggeststhatde-escalationtechniquesandBEST-trainedofficersareonlyneededinsituationswhere
someoneisgoingtobetakentothehospitalforanemergencypetitionevaluation.Itis
unsurprising,therefore,thatmanyBPDofficersseedetentionforanemergencypetition,arrest,or

inactionastheironlyoptionswhenrespondingtoacrisissituation.

OfficersinthefieldalsostatedthatitisnotacommonpracticetoseekoutBEST-trained
officersforassistancewithcrisiscalls.Similarly,duringourreviewofforcereports,therewasno
indicationthatBPDofficersrelyonBEST-trainedofficerstohelpthemrespondtocrisiscalls,even
whentheyrequestbackupforacallinvolvinganindividualincrisis.Wereviewedoneforcefile

whereBPDofficers,respondingtoacallforanassaultwherepeopleexperiencinghomelessness
wereknowntostay,encounteredanindividualclearlyincrisis,naked,hidinginthewoods,bleeding

andyelling.InsteadofrequestingtheassistanceofaBEST-trainedofficer,BPDofficersasked
dispatchtorequestthatanofficerarmedwithataserrespondtothescene.Whenonearrived,the
officersyelledatthemantowalkoutofthewoods,andthathewouldbetasedifhedidnotcomply.
Theofficersreportindicatedthatthemanhadhisarmstuckedupunderhisarmpitsand
positionedhimselfintoafightingstance[.]Allegedlybelievingthatthemanmightcharge,the
112UnderTitleIIoftheADAsintegrationmandate,publicentitiesmustadministerservices,programs,andactivities

inthemostintegratedsettingappropriatetotheneedsofqualifiedindividualswithdisabilities.28C.F.R.35.130(d).

TheSupremeCourtinOlmstead v. L.C.,527U.S.581(1999),furtherheldthatTitleIIprohibitstheunjustified

institutionalizationofindividualswithdisabilities.TheCourtheldthatpublicentitiesarerequiredtoprovide
community-basedservicestopersonswithdisabilitieswhen(a)suchservicesareappropriate;(b)theaffectedindividuals

donotopposecommunity-basedtreatment;and(c)community-basedservicescanbereasonablyaccommodated,taking

intoaccounttheresourcesavailabletotheentityandtheneedsofotherswhoarereceivingdisabilityservicesfromthe

entity.Id.at607.

110

officertasedhim,strikinghiminthegroinandcausinghimtofalltotheground.Whenthey
approachedhim,hestartedkickinghislegsandgrabbingatthetrees.Theofficersrespondedby
cyclingthetaserfiveadditionaltimes.NoneofthefourofficerspresentonthescenewereBESTtrained.

Noteveryencounterwithanindividualincrisiswillorshouldresultinarrestoran
emergencypetitionevaluation.Employingsoundcrisisde-escalationtechniquescouldprevent
unnecessaryandunreasonableforcewithindividualsincrisisandalsopreventneedlessincarceration

andhospitalization.

ii. BPD Does Not Partner Effectively with Community Service Providers

OurinvestigationfoundthatthereareexistingservicesinthecommunitythatBPDfailsto
utilizesufficiently,manyofwhichmaypreventanindividualfromexperiencingacrisisormay

preventrecurringinstancesofcrisis.TheCityofBaltimoreprovidesarangeofservicesforpeople
withdisabilitiestowhichthepoliceshouldbeconnectingindividuals,includingcommunitymental

healthclinicswhereindividualscanreceivementalhealthandsubstanceuseassessments,individual
andgrouptherapy,andmedicationmanagement;AssertiveCommunityTreatmentteams,whichare

mobileteamsofpsychiatrists,socialworkers,nursesandmentalhealthprofessionalswhoprovide

mentalhealthtreatmentandsupportservices;andthearrayofcrisisservices,suchascommunity

basedpsychiatriccrisisinterventionandaddictionstreatmentservices.Theseincludeatelephone
crisishotline,mobilecrisisteams(mentalhealthprofessionalsincludingpsychiatrists,socialworkers,
andnurseswhocanbedispatchedtoanyBaltimoreCitylocationtoprovideimmediateassessment,

intervention,andtreatment),medicaldetoxificationforindividualsaddictedtosubstances,andinhouseandcommunitycasemanagement.

Althoughthereappearstobeasufficientarrayofservicestomeettheneedsofmany
individualswithdisabilities,theredoesnotappeartobesufficientcapacityinmanyofthoseservices
tomeettheneed.GapsinBaltimoreCityscommunitymentalhealthservicesystemincreasethe

communitysrelianceonthepoliceasmentalhealthfirstresponders.

Ifapersonwithmentalhealth

disabilitiesisnotadequatelyconnectedtoservicesorisnotgettinghermentalhealthneedsmetby

thementalhealthsystem,shemayendupincrisis,andBPDwilllikelybecalledtointervene.BPD,

alone,cannotsolvetheproblemofinsufficientmentalhealthservicesorcapacityalthoughBPDs

collaborationwiththementalhealthservicesystemcouldresultingreaterrelianceonthemental

healthsystemtoservepeopleincrisis,ratherthanlawenforcement.WhatBPDcancontrol,

however,ishoweffectivelyitusestheresourcesthatexistinthecommunity.

BPDsBESTprogramdoesnotpartnereffectivelywiththebehavioralhealthcommunity,

consumersoftheseservices,andtheirfamilies.Untilrelativelyrecently,BPDsapproachtocrisis

interventionhasbeenlimitedtoitsacademytrainingprogram.Beginningin2014,theBEST
coordinatorformedtheCollaborativePlanningandImplementationCommittee(CPIC)withthe

purposeofbringingtogetherabodyofstakeholdersfromthebehavioralhealthcommunitytoactas
anadvisoryboardforfurtherdevelopingBPDsBESTprogram.CPICisasubstantialundertaking,
andweareencouragedthatBPDistakingthisimportantsteptowardgreatercollaborationbetween

BPDandBaltimoresbehavioralhealthcommunity,and,ultimately,towardprovidingeffectivecrisis

interventionservicestothepeopleofBaltimore.Progresshasbeenslow,however,andduringour
111

sitevisits,itwasapparentthatBPDofficershadnotbeentrainedondiversiontocommunity-based
treatmentasanalternativetojailorshort-termacutehospitalization,demonstratingthatadditional
workremainsforCPIC.BPDshouldcontinuetofindwaystobuildandstrengthenrelationships
withlocalprovidersthatserveindividualswithdisabilitiesorincrisis.

Finally,BPDshouldbettertrackwhenitconnectspeopletoserviceproviders.Itisdifficult
tofullyassessBPDseffortstoconnectindividualswithdisabilitiestoservicesbecauseBPDdoes

notaggregatedataonmentalhealthcallsanddoesnottrackconnectiontoservices.

iii. To Remedy the ADA Violations, BPD Should Strengthen its Crisis
Intervention Policies, Training, Community Partnership, and Data
Collection Practices

InordertopreventfurtherADAviolations,BPDshouldstrengthenitscrisisintervention

policies,training,communitypartnership,anddatacollectionpractices.BPDmustdevelopand

implementpoliciesandproceduresforallofficersonrespondingtoindividualswithmentalhealth

disabilitiestoensurethatofficersmakereasonablemodificationsnecessarytoavoiddiscrimination.

BPDmustdevelopandimplementeffectivetrainingforallofficersanddispatchersthatfocuseson
identifyingindividualswithmentalhealthdisabilitiesandeffectivelyrespondingtoindividualswith

mentalhealthdisabilities,includingmakingreasonablemodificationsanddiversiontotreatment

services.Tobetterensurethesuccessandefficacyoftheseefforts,BPDshouldwork

collaborativelywiththementalhealthcommunity,includingmentalhealthagencies,providers,

advocates,andconsumersandtheirfamilies,todevelopthepolicies,procedures,andtrainings.
BPDmustensureappropriateofficeraccountabilityforprotectingthecivilrightsofpeoplewith
disabilities.BPDshouldcollect,aggregate,andanalyzeinformationonofficerinteractionswith

individualswithmentalhealthdisabilities.

BPDshouldusethedataandinformationtomake
furtherimprovementstopolicy,procedures,training,andaccountabilitymeasuresasnecessaryto

avoiddiscrimination.

6. BPDs Transport Practices Create a Significant Risk of Harm

OurinvestigationrevealedsignificantdeficienciesinBPDstransportpracticesthatplace

detaineeswhoarebeingtransportedatsignificantriskofharm.Alackofvideomonitoringanddata

collectionsurroundingBPDstransportpracticespreventedusfromreachingaconclusive

determinationregardingapracticeofroughridesorconstitutionalviolationsintransportation.

Nonetheless,wefoundevidencethatBPDofficersroutinelyfailtosafelysecurearresteesin
transportvanswithseatbelts.Inmultipleinstancesinthepast,thisfailurehasresultedinserious
injuriesand,insomecircumstances,death.Thisriskofharmshouldberemedied.
a. BPD Has a History of Not Securing Arrestees
BPDreliesonspeciallyoutfittedvanstotransportdetaineesfromthelocationofarrestor
113
crisistothedistrictstation,CentralBooking,ortheemergencyroom.

BPDsuseofthesevans
has,attimes,beenthesubjectofconsiderablecontroversyandhasledtosomereforms,butthese
havenotbeenconsistentlycarriedthroughinpractice.Forexample,in1997,BPDarrestedJeffrey

113MostBPDcruisersdonothavepartitions,orcages,andarethereforeunsuitablefortransportingpeoplewhohave

beenarrested.

112

Alstonforspeeding.Accordingtotestimonyatalatertrial,hewasplacedintoachokeholdbyBPD
officersduringthearrestandthrownunsecuredintoatransportvan.Asaresultofthetreatment
andtransport,Alstonwasleftquadriplegic.

AciviljuryfoundinfavorofMr.Alston,andtheCity

ultimatelysettledwithhimfor$6million.Followingthisincident,BPDissuedaGeneralOrder
requiringofficerstoensureeveryindividualplacedinavanissecuredwithseatorrestraintbelts.
ThePoliceCommissionerreaffirmedthisrequirementin1999,issuingamemorandumstatingthatit
istheresponsibilityoftheofficerto[e]nsurethatprisonerstransportedinprisonertransportation
vehiclesaresecuredwithaseatbelt.

Despiteitslongstandingpolicythatofficersmustsecuredetainees,BPDhasreceived
repeatedindicationsthatofficersroutinelyfailtocomplywithseatbeltpolicies,sometimeswith
tragicresults:
In2005,DondiJohnson,Sr.wasarrestedforurinatingonapublicstreetandtransported

inavanbyaBPDofficer.Duringasubsequenttrial,officersadmittedthatneitherthe

driverofthevannorthearrestingofficerssecuredMr.Johnsoninthebackofthevan.

Whiletransportinghim,thedrivingofficertestifiedthatsheheardseveralbangsfrom
thebackofthevan,andthatshereachedthedistrictstationinhalfthetimeitwould

havetakenifshehaddrivenatthespeedlimit.Whenthevanwasopened,Mr.Johnson

wasfoundface-downonthefloorandinpain.HospitalrecordsrevealedthatMr.

Johnsondescribedbeinghurtwhilefallingafterthevantookasharpturn,andanexpert
witnesstestifiedthatthenatureoftheinjurywassuchthatthevanmusthavebeen

driveninanaggressivemanner.Mr.Johnsondiedshortlyafterwarddueto
complicationsfromparalysis.AjuryfoundinfavorofMr.Johnsonsfamily,awarding

$7.4millionindamages.
In2013,ChristineAbbottsuedBPDofficers,allegingthatsheandherboyfriendwere

subjectedtoaroughrideinadditiontootherconstitutionalviolations.Thesuitstated
thatofficersthrewherintothebackofthepolicevan,failedtosecureher,anddrove

erratically.Ms.Abbottclaimedshewasviolentlythrownaroundtheinteriorofthevan
duringtherideandsustainedinjuries.Inadeposition,thetransportingofficer
acknowledgedthatMs.Abbottwasnotsecuredduringtheride.TheCitysettledthe
casewithMs.Abbottfor$95,000.

b. BPD Continues to Place Detainees At Risk During Transport

OurinvestigationfoundthatBPDcontinuestoplacedetaineesatsignificantriskduring

transport.FollowingeachoftheJohnsonandAbbottlawsuits,BPDundertookinspectionsofits
transportvanstodetermineifofficerswereproperlysecuringarrestees.Anauditconductedby
BPDfromApril12,2012,throughMay14,2012,inspected18vehicles,twofromeachBPDdistrict.

Theauditfoundthatnone

ofthe34arresteesinthosevehiclesweresecuredwithseatbelts.
BPDconductedsimilarauditsofninevehiclesinApril2014andSeptember2014,and

anothershortlyafterthedeathofFreddieGrayinApril2015.Witheachaudit,BPDinspectedone

transportvehiclefromeachofthedistricts,onetime.TheApril2014auditfoundthatoneoutof11

arresteeswasnotsecuredbyaseatbelt.TheSeptember2014auditfoundthatallofthe15arrestees

intheinspectedvehiclesweresecured.

TheApril2015auditfoundthat13outof14detaineeswere

secured.Whilethisrepresentsasignificantimprovementfrom2012,theauditswerelimitedin
113

scopeandsamplesize,andasdescribedbelow,arecontradictedbythestatementsofofficersabout

BPDsactualpractices.Accordingtothedocumentsproducedtousinourinvestigation,BPDhas
notconductedanyfurtherinspectionsofthetransportationprocess,norhasitgatheredanydatato
ensurethatdetaineesareconsistentlysecuredinvans.
GiventhelimitationsoftheBPDaudits,weattempted,throughseveralmethods,toobtain

informationfromBPDaboutinjuriesthatoccurduringtransport.

BPDneithercollectsdataabout
injuriesthatdetaineesincurduringtransportnortracksdataonthesourceofinjuriesreportedby

detaineesaftertheyareacceptedatCentralBookingortheemergencyroom.

Thus,weattemptedto
obtaininjurydatadirectlyfromCentralBookingandtomatchittoinjurydataavailableinBPDs

incidentandforcereports.Thesedatawereinsufficientforustoreliablymatchandanalyzethem.
WealsoattemptedtoobtainvideosBPDmaintainedofdetaineesduringtransport.BPD
transportvansoriginallycontainedcamerastoshowdriversthedetaineesintherearofthevan.
Manyofthesecamerasceasedtofunctionshortlyafterthevanswereputinuse,however,andhave

notbeenrepaired.Becauseofthesefailures,wewereunabletoobtainvideoofdetaineesand

conductanevaluationoftheirtreatmentduringtransport.Withoutfunctioningvideo,data

collectiononinjuries,ormorefrequentinspections,wecouldnotconfirmthatdetaineesarestill

routinelybeingtransportedwhileunsecured.
GivensuchdifficultiesinobtainingdataaboutBPDtransportpractices,weconductedan
anonymouspollofrecentarresteesduringbailreviewhearingsthroughoutthemonthofMarch
2016,withassistancefromlawyersattheMarylandOfficeofthePublicDefender.Sixtyofthe298
polledarresteesreportedthattheyhadbeenunsecuredforatleastaportionoftheridetoCentral

Bookingmorethan20percentofthearresteespolled.Severaloftherespondentsindicatedthat
theyhittheirhead,neck,orbackduringtheride,and/orreportedminorinjury.Whilethissurvey

waslimitedinscope,itwaslargerthananyoftheauditsconductedbyBPD.And,despiteits

limitations,theresultssuggestthatBPDcontinuestofailtosecurearresteesduringtransport,
placingthematsignificantriskofharm.

Wealsoobtainedsignificantanecdotalevidencefromofficersthatdetaineeswereoften
unsecuredwhilebeingtransportedbyBPDofficers,particularlybeforeFreddieGraystransportlast

year.OneofficerwhospoketousdescribedthetransportationprocessbeforeFreddieGraysdeath

asloadandgo,oftenwithlittleregardforseatbelts.Otherofficersrepeatedlytoldusthatthey

knewoforhadheardaboutroughridesthathadtakenplaceinthepast,althoughtheydeclinedto
giveusspecifics.
c. BPD Transport Equipment Continues to Place Detainees At Risk
OurevaluationofBPDtransportvansheightensourconcernregardingtransportation
practices.ManyvansusedbyBPDremainunsuitableforsafetransportationbecauseofalackof
functioningseatbeltsandvideoobservationequipment,althoughBPDhasmadeanumberof
changesoverthelastfewmonthstoaddressthisproblem.Untilrecently,allvansfeaturedarear

compartmentsplitdownthemiddlebyadividingwall,creatingtwoparallelsectionstoenclose
detainees,withthreeseatsfacinginwardineachsection.Whileeachseatfeaturesaseatbelt,thiswas
notalwaysthecase:forsometime,manyvanshadnoseatbelts.Moreover,thoughvansarenow

equippedwithseatbelts,weobservedonourride-alongsthatsomearebroken.Thespaceinside
eachofthetransportvansislimited,makingitpossiblefordetaineesbeingtransported,ifnot
114

properlysecured,tostriketheirheadonthedividerorwallsrelativelyeasily;andthereisvirtuallyno

paddingtoprotectthepersonfrominjury.Thephysicallayoutofthevanalsocreatessignificant

concernsforofficersafety.Inordertobeltinmultipleindividuals,theofficerhastoclimbintothe
van,exposinghisweaponsandequipmenttothoseseatedinthefirsttwoseats.Onceinsidethe
compartment,theofficerrunsthedangerofbeingharmedbyanindividualinthevanoreven
lockinghimselfinside.Officersreportedtousthatsuchlock-insoccurwithsomefrequency.

BPDiscurrentlyretrofittingoldervanswithapartition,orcage,thathasadifferent

format.Thenewcagefeaturesanopencompartmentaccessedfromthereardoorsofthevan,with
seatingforfourpeople;twooneachsideofthevan,facinginward.Thereisaseparate,smaller
compartment,accessedfromthesideofthevan,withseatingfortwopeoplesittingsidebyside,
facingthedoor.Eachseatisequippedwithaseatbeltandastrapforthedetaineetogripfor
stabilitywhileseatedwithhandscuffedbehindhisorherback.

Thenewervansalsohavevideo

camerasintherearcompartmentsthatcanbeviewedbythedriverandhavethecapabilitytorecord.
However,significantchallengesremain,evenwiththenewsystem.Officersreportedthat
thevideorecordingfunctionhasyettobeenabled.Thereisnoclearlineofsightfromthedriverto
therearcompartmentsandsoundsaremuffledbythebarrier.Accordingly,ifanypersonintherear
compartmentishurtorotherwiserequiresassistance,thedrivermayremainunawareofthepersons
condition.ThisiscontrarytoarecommendationbytheInternationalAssociationofChiefsof
Policethatofficersshouldmaintainvisualcontactwithpeopletheytransportatalltimes,through

eithervideoordirectobservation. 114Similartotheoldervans,theinteriorsaresmallandlack
padding,soanybodyridingintheback,ifunsecured,couldbeinjuredifthemannerofdriving
causedthemtohitthewalls,seatsorfloor.Evenwhenfunctioning,theseatbeltsarepositionedin
suchawaythatapersonwithhandscuffedbehindhisbackcanunbucklehimselfbyturninghis

body.Thisraisesadditionalconcernsforpeopleincrisis,aswellasforofficersafetywith

uncooperativedetainees.
BPDhasalsomadeothereffortstoimprovetheirtransportationpracticesandprocedures.

Afterthe2012audit,officerswerebriefedontherequirementtoseatbeltarrestees.Following
FreddieGraysdeathandthe2015audit,BPDsentofficerswhooperatethetransportvehiclesto
academytraining,andconductedabrieftrainingduringroll-callatthebeginningofshifts.

The
trainingandcertificationprogramisshort,however,consistingofonlyfourhoursofinstruction.

Andwhileitpurportstocoverawiderangeoftopics,fromproperhandcuffingandsearch

techniquestoidentificationofmentalhealthandmedicalissues,thetrainingdoesnotcoverdriving
techniques.BPDhasalsoindicatedthatnewpatrolcarscomingintothedepartmentalfleetwillbe

equippedwithprotectivepartitionsallowingforthetransportofdetainees,butitisnotclearwhen

BPDwillhaveasufficientnumberofequippedcarstoeliminatetheneedfortransportvans.

Thus,despitesuchimprovements,BPDstillhasagreatdealofworktodo.Most
fundamentally,BPDmustimproveitsoversightandmonitoringofitstransportationpracticesto
ensurethatitsownpoliciesarefollowed,andthatarresteesareconsistentlytransportedinamanner
thatissafeandsecure.

114IACPLawEnforcementPolicyCenter,TransportationofPrisonersConceptandIssuesPaper,originallypublished

August1990,revisedOctober1996,March2005,andSeptember2015.

115

D. BPD UNLAWFULLY RESTRICTS PROTECTED SPEECH

ThepeopleofBaltimorehaveaconstitutionalrighttoobserveandverballycriticizethe

police.SincethedaytheinkdriedontheBillofRights,therightofanAmericancitizentocriticize
publicofficialsandpoliciesisthecentralmeaningoftheFirstAmendment.McCurdy v. Montgomery
County,240F.3d512,520(6thCir.2001)(internalquotationmarksandcitationsomitted).We
foundthatBPDofficersroutinelyinfringeupontheFirstAmendmentrightsofthepeopleof

BaltimoreCity,typicallyinoneofthreeways.First,wefoundthatBPDunlawfullystopsandarrests
individualsforspeechtheyperceivetobedisrespectfulorinsolent.Second,wefoundthatofficers
retaliateagainstindividualsforprotectedspeechthroughtheuseofexcessiveforce.

Third,wehave

concernsthatBPDimproperlyinterfereswithindividualswhorecordpoliceactivity.
1. BPD Unlawfully Detains and Arrests Members of the Public for Protected Speech
BPDdetainsandarrestsindividualsforspeechperceivedtoberude,critical,ordisrespectful.

Thesearrestsdescribedbytheofficersintheirownwordsinincidentandarrestreportsviolate
theFirstAmendment.Forexample,anofficerindowntownBaltimorein2011felt...thatitwas
reasonabletoorderayoungAfrican-Americanmantoleavetheareabecausehehadnorespect

forlawenforcementandwasmakingidlethreatstowardsauniformedofficer.Astheyoung
manwalkedawayaccompaniedbyafriend,thetwomadeadditionalcommentsmockingtheofficers

andtheBPD;15minuteslater,theofficeragainspottedthetwomeninthesameareaandplaced

bothunderarrestforfailuretoobey.Thefreedomofindividualsverballytoopposeorchallenge
policeactionwithouttherebyriskingarrestisoneoftheprinciplecharacteristicsbywhichwe
distinguishafreenationfromapolicestate.City of Houston v. Hill,482U.S.451,46263(1987)
(strikingdownmunicipalordinancethatmadeitillegaltoopposeorinterruptapolicemanas

115
constitutionallyoverbroadundertheFirstAmendment). Byorderingtheyoungmentoleave,and
thenarrestingthemfortheircomments,theofficerviolatedtheirFirstAmendmentrightto
peacefullyandverballycriticizeoropposelawenforcementofficerswithoutactivelyinterferingwith

theofficerslawfulperformanceoftheirduties.

Inanotherincidentfrom2011,BPDofficersarrestedamanfordisorderlyconductafterhe
refusedtoleaveapublicareafollowinganorderissuedwithoutjustcause,andyelledfuckyou
repeatedlyattheofficer.

Thisarrestwasalsounlawful,asindividualsmaynotbepunishedforusing
vulgaroroffensivelanguageunlesstheyusefightingwords,thatis,wordsthatbytheirvery
utteranceinflictinjuryortendtoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeace.Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,315U.S.568,572(1942).Useofprofanityaloneisnotsufficienttorisetothelevelof
inflictinginjuryorincitingabreachofpeace.SeeHess v. Indiana,414U.S.105,10708(1973)
(findingthatprofanewordswerenotfightingwordsbecausetheywerenotapersonalinsult);Lewis

v. City of New Orleans,415U.S.130,13234(1974)(invalidatingNewOrleansordinancethatmadeit

unlawfultocurseatapoliceofficeronduty);Buffkins

v. City of Omaha,922F.2d465,46768,472
(8thCir.1990)(arrestwasunlawfulasuseofthewordassholetowardsofficersdidnotconstitute

fightingwords).Fromourreviewoftheirreports,someBPDofficersappeartobelievethatuseof

vulgarorprofanelanguageprovidesprobablecausetoarrestorgroundsfororderingapersonto

leavealocation.
115AsdiscussedinSectionsupra

at36-39,thisorderandarrestalsolikelyviolatetheFourteenthAmendmentsDue

Processclause.

116

Indeed,inanothercase,anofficerpatrollingtheinnerharborontheFourthofJuly

complainedthataman,Nicholas,bumpedhisshoulderwhilewalkingpast.AsNicholas

continuedwalking,theofficersaid,Hey,youranrightintome,towhichNicholasrepliedfuck

youandcontinuedwalking.Althoughnocrimehadbeencommitted,theofficerpursuedNicholas
anddemandedhisidentification.Nicholascontinuedtowalkawayfromtheofficer,whoattempted

tograbhisarm.Nicholassworeattheofficeragainandcontinuedtopullaway,atwhichpointthe

officerinformedhimhewasunderarrest.Accordingtotheofficersreport,afterattemptingto

placethemanunderarrest,theincidentendedinaphysicalaltercationbetweenofficers,Nicholas,

andhisbrother,withthebrothereventuallybeingtased.ThoughNicholasmaderepeatedattempts

towalkawaypeacefully,theofficerpursuedhimandescalatedtheencounter.Accordingtothe

officersreport,hebelievedthatNicholassattitudeandactionsindicatedhewaspurposelylooking

foraconfrontationwithlawenforcement[.]However,Nicholasmadenoobviousthreatsor

aggressivemovementstowardtheofficer.Hisuseofprofanitydidnotrisetotheleveloffighting
wordsandwasprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.Theofficerspursuit,detention,andeventual
arrestwasanunlawfulexerciseofgovernmentpowertoexactpersonalvengeanceforaperceived
slight.

BPDofficersalsoviolatetheFirstAmendmentbyarrestingindividualswhoquestionthe
lawfulnessoftheiractions.Inonereporteduseofforce,anofficerdescribedthearrestofaman
whoapproachedhimduringatrafficstoptoaskwhytheofficerhadstoppedhisfriend.The

profferedjustificationforthearrestwasthatthemanrefusedtoleavetheareawhenorderedtodo

sobytheofficer.Nothingintheofficersreportindicatesthatthemanphysicallyinterferedwiththe
officersdutyorwasotherwisecommittingacrime.Hewasarrestedmerelybecausehecontinuedto
standneartheofficer.Arrestsforfailingtoleaveacrimescenearealsounlawful.Themanhada

righttovoicehisobjectiontowhatheobviouslyfeltwasahighlyquestionabledetentionbya
policeofficer.Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio,414U.S.14,16(1973);see also Wilson v. Kittoe,337
F.3d392,402(4thCir.2003)(officerslackedprobablecausetoarrestanattorneywhodidnotobey

officersorderstoleavethesceneofthearrestofanotherperson,andthatthesubsequentarrestof

theattorneyunlawfullyinfringeduponhisFirstAmendmentrights).Themansustainedaninjuryto
hisheadwhilestrugglingduringthecourseofbeingtakenintocustodyfollowingtheunlawfularrest.

Despiteaclearlackofprobablecause,supervisoryreviewfoundthattheofficerhadactedproperly
andwithinpolicy.
Inasimilarincidentfrom2014,BPDofficersarrestedamanfordisorderlyconductbecause
hewasshoutingattheofficers.Themanbelievedtheyhadassaultedhisnephewandstolenfrom
himwhiledetaininghimonsuspicionofgambling.Whenheapproachedtheofficers,demanding

toknowwhichofthemhadpunchedhisnephew,acrowdgathered,andhewasplacedunderarrest.

Themanwaswithinhisrightstoquestiontheofficersactions,andthearrestunlawfullysuppressed

hisspeech.Officersarrestedhimforobjectingtotheiractionsandformakingvocalinquiriesinto

theirconduct. 116Inmakingthesearrests,BPDofficersviolatedtheseindividualsrighttoquestion

andcriticizepoliceactions.

See Norwell,414U.S.at16(speechprotestingofficersactionsis
protectedevenifloudandboisterousorannoyingtoofficers).

116Althoughoneofficerlatertoldasupervisorthatthemanhadadoptedafightingstancebeforethedecisionto

arrest,thiswasnotcorroboratedbyotherofficersorcivilianwitnessesonthescene,whoreportedthatthemanmerely
refusedtoleaveandmaderepeateddemandstoknowwhohadassaultedhisnephew.

117

[A]clearandpresentdangerofcrowdviolencemaybeaconsiderationindetermining

whetheraFirstAmendmentviolationoccurred.Smith v. McCluskey,126Fed.Appx.89,94(4thCir.
2005)(percuriam)(unpublished)(internalquotationsomitted).

Butthepresenceofotherpeople

aloneisinsufficienttorenderotherwiseprotectedspeechgroundsforarrest,unlesssuchspeechis

directedtoincitingorproducingimminentlawlessactionandislikelytoinciteorproducesuch
action.Brandenburg v. Ohio,395U.S.444,447(1969).

See also State of Texas v. Johnson,491U.S.397,

40910(1989)(rejectingtheargumentthatthepotentialforbreachofpeacesatisfiesthe

Brandenburgstandard);Patterson

v. United States,999F.Supp.2d300,316(D.D.C.2013)([C]ursingat

anofficerinthepresenceofacrowd,withoutsomeindicationofalikelyviolentreactionfromthat

crowd,doesnotgiverisetoprobablecausetobelievethatthespeakerisengagedindisorderly
conduct.);Dormu

v. District of Columbia,795F.Supp.2d7,21(D.D.C.2011)([D]isorderlyconduct

doesnotoccurmerelybecauseacrowdgatherstowatchacitizen-policeencounter.).Andunlike

theplaintiffinSmith v. McCluskey,theindividualsintheabovedescribedincidentshadnotbeen
placedundervalidarrestatthetimetheirspeechwassuppressed.Neitherthemansdemandto
knowwhichofficerhadstruckhisnephew,northewomansshoutsorprofanitywereevidently

directedtoproduceimminentlawlessactiononthepartofthecrowd.Accordingly,their
suppressionbyarrestwasunlawful.

TheseandotherarrestsforprotectedspeechdemonstratethatBPDofficersmayconsider

speechcriticalordisrespectfuloftheiractivitiestobeassaultiveordisruptive,andtherefore
sufficienttojustifysuppressionthroughtheunlawfuluseofpolicepowerstodetainandarrest.
2. BPD Retaliates by Using Force Against Individuals Who Engage in Protected
Speech
BPDusesunreasonableforcetoretaliateagainstindividualswhoengageinprotectedspeech

117
criticaloflawenforcement,inviolationofboththeFirstandFourthAmendments.

City of
Houston,482U.S.at461;Hartman v. Moore,547U.S.250,256(2006)(thelawissettledthatasa

generalmattertheFirstAmendmentprohibitsgovernmentofficialsfromsubjectinganindividualto

retaliatoryactions...forspeakingout.).WereviewedanumberoftroublingincidentswhereBPD
officersappearedtouseforceagainstindividualssimplybecausetheydidnotlikewhatthose
individualssaid.Inonecasefrom2011,officerstackledandusedatasertodrive-stunayoungblack

manwhowas,intheirview,loiteringnearamarketduringbusinesshoursindowntown
Baltimore.Whentoldtomove,theyoungmanrefusedandsworeattheofficers,whothentackled
him.Nothingindicatedthemanwasarmed,violent,orpresentedadangertotheofficersorothers.
Supervisorswhoinvestigatedandapprovedtheincidentfailedtorecognizethattheforceappeared
toberetaliatory,eventhoughtheman,wheninterviewed,toldthemhebelievedhewastackled
becausehecursedattheofficers.

Furthermore,wehavereviewedmanyincidentsinwhichBPDofficersbelievetheyare
justifiedinusingforceorarrestingaperson,basedsolelyonprofaneorinsultingwords.We

reviewedanincident,forexample,inwhichanofficertasedayoungmanwho,accordingtothe

officersreport,hadremovedhisshirtandwasyellingatclubpatronsandstaff.Theofficerjustified

117RetaliatoryforcealsoviolatestheFourteenthAmendmentwhenusedagainstindividualswhohavebeenarrestedare

beingheldaspretrialdetainees,forexampleduringprisonertransport.

See Orem v. Rephann,523F.3d442,446(4thCir.

2008),abrogatedonothergroundsbyWilkins

v. Gaddy,559U.S.34,39(2010).

118

usingthetaseronthebasisthatthemanapproachedtheofficerinanaggressivemannerwhile

swearing.Althoughthereportisnotaltogetherclearonwhattheofficermeantbyaggressive,the

reportdoesmakeclearthatthemansmouthhiswordsconstitutedtheweaponormeansof

attack:

Indeed,thisreportappearstoindicatetheofficerfelthewasjustifiedintasinganindividualahigh

levelofforceforthisreason.Moreover,thereportnotedthattheindividualstrademarkwas

[e]xplicitwordthisplace.Ifthiswasinfacttheofficersjustificationfortasingthisindividual,itis
grosslyinsufficient,anditwouldviolateboththeFirstandFourthAmendments.Althoughwe
makenofindingaboutthisspecificincidentbecauseofthevaguenessofwordaggressiveinthe

report,itisnotablethattheofficersdirectsupervisorsignedoffonthereport,andareviewofthe

useofforcefoundittobejustifiedwithoutneedofclarification.
WereviewedanumberofsubstantiallysimilarincidentswhereBPDofficersonlyresortedto

forceafteranindividualsworeatthem.Theseusesofforceinretaliationforprotectedspeech
violatetheFirstandFourthAmendments,andtheyunderminepublicconfidenceintheBPD.

3. Concerns that BPD Interferes with the Right to Record Public Police Activity
WealsohaveseriousconcernsthatBPDofficersinterferewithindividualswhoattemptto
lawfullyrecordpoliceactivity,althoughwedonotmakeafindingofconstitutionalviolationsinthis
areabecausewedidnotfindasufficientnumberofincidentstowarrantsuchafindingatthistime.
WeneverthelessreceivedandreviewedanumberofallegationsthatBPDofficersseize,view,and

destroyvideoandaudiorecordingsthatconstituteprivatepropertywithoutjustcausetodoso.

In
2012,weprovidedguidancetoBPDontheFirst,Fourth,andFourteenthAmendment

considerationsrelatedtotherecordingofpublicpoliceactivityinaStatementofInterestfiledin

Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dept.,No.1:11-cv-02888-BEL(D.Md.Jan.12,2012),2012WL

9512053.
ThatcasewasbroughtbytheACLUofMarylandonbehalfofamanwhosecellularphone

wasseizedbyBPDofficersduringanincidentatthePimlicoRaceCoursein2011.TheCitysettled
thecasein2014for$250,000.TheplaintiffallegedthatBPDofficersseized,searched,anddeleted

thecontentsofhisphoneafterheusedittorecordofficersusingforceduringanarrestofhis

acquaintance.WhenBPDreturnedthephonetohim,allofthevideosonthedeviceweredeleted,

includinganumberofpersonalvideosofhisyoungson.Afterthemanfiledsuit,BPDmovedfor
partialsummaryjudgment,andtheDepartmentofJusticeopposedthatmotioninourStatementof

Interest.Shortlythereafter,onMay14,2012,inadvanceofthepartiessettlementconference,we

sentalettertobothparties.Inourletter,wedescribedinmoredetailhowtheseconstitutional

interestsplayoutinpractice,andwegavetechnicalassistanceontheirimplicationsforpolicyand

119

training.Thepartiessettled,and,aspartofthesettlement,BPDagreedtoimplementanewpolicy

andtrainingprogramconcerningtherighttoaudiotape,videotape,andphotographBPDmembers
duringthepublicexerciseoftheirduties.Thenewpolicywaspublishedin2014.Nonetheless,in
thetimeperiodsinceSharp,wehavereceivednumerousallegationsthatBPDofficerscontinueto

interferewiththeindividualrighttorecordpoliceactivity,inviolationoftheFirstAmendmentand
theirownpolicy.
Oneexampleoftheallegationswereceivedstemsfromanincidentin2015.

Accordingto
thecomplainant,ayoungmanwaschargedwiththreeoffensesafterfilmingBPDofficersarresting

hisfriendfortrespassingoutsideanightclubinBaltimoreCity.Thefriendwasengagedinan
argumentwithsecurityofficersatabarcomplexaboutrefundinghisadmissionfee.WhenBPD

Officersinformedhimthathewastrespassingandbeganhandcuffinghim,hiscompanion,allegedly
standingapproximately20feetaway,begantofilmtheincidentusinghisphone.Twootherofficers
onthesceneturnedandconfrontedhim,grabbinghisphoneandplacinghiminhandcuffs.While
theallegedtrespasserwasreleasedwithonlyaticket,themanfilmingwasarrestedandchargedwith

threeoffenses:failuretoobey,trespassing,andassault(forwhatappearstobealater-discovered

allegedassaultagainstthenightclubsbouncer).Duringthearrestprocess,themanwatchedasan

officeropenlywentthroughhisphone.WhenBPDreleasedthemanafterhespenttwonightsin

jail,hediscoveredthatthevideooftheincidenthadbeendeleted.Ultimately,astatecourtentereda

judgmentofacquittalfortheassaultandfailuretoobeycharges,andthemanwasacquittedofthe

trespassingchargeattrial.Accordingtotheman,thesolejustificationforhisarrestwashisattempt

torecordtheofficersinteractionwithhisfriend.Wealsonotethat,totheextentthattheofficers
thoughtthatthemanrecordingtheiractivitieswassomehowinterferingintheirenforcementefforts,
theofficersdonotappeartohavemadeanyefforttoinstructthemanwhowasrecordingthemto

movetoaless-intrusiveplacewherehecouldcontinuerecording.
InadditiontotheseapparentFirstAmendmentviolations,BPDofficersalsoappeartohave

violatedtheFourthandFourteenthAmendmentsbysearchingthephonefollowingthearrest,
apparentlywithoutawarrant,andbydeletingthevideo.Whenindividualsrecordpoliceofficersin

thepublicexerciseoftheirduties,theyhaveaFourteenthAmendmentpropertyrighttomaintain

thepossessionoftheirbelongings,includingrecordingsandrecordingdevices.See,e.g.,Helton v.
Hunt,330F.3d242,24749(4thCir.2003)(strikingdownstatuteallowingpolicetoseizeand

destroyvideogamingmachineswithoutdueprocess).BPDspolicyaccordinglyprohibits

employeesfromerasing,deleting,orinstructingotherstoeraseordeleteanyrecordingsfroma

recordingdevice.Bygoingthroughthemansphoneanddeletingthevideo,BPDdestroyed

valuableevidenceanddisregardedtheownerspropertyrightsandtheDepartmentsownpolicy.

FirstAmendmentviolationsacutelyaffectacommunitystrustinthelegitimacyoflaw

enforcementoperations.BPDssensitivitytocriticismandrecordingoftheiractivityisultimately

bothasymptomandacauseofmutualmistrustwiththecommunity.Thereisemergingevidence
thatvideorecordingcanbeavaluabletooltoreduceuseofforceincidentsandcomplaints,and
118
protecttherightsofbothcommunitymembersandofficers.

Tocreateanatmosphereofmutual
respectandaccountability,officerswillneedtodemonstratetheabilitytoworkwithintheconfines
oftheFirstAmendment.
118See,

e.g.,IACP.The Impact of Video Evidence on Modern Policing: Research and Best Practices from the IACP Study on In-Car
Cameras,availableat:http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/WhatsNew/IACP%20InCar%20Camera%20Report%202004.pdf(lastaccessedJune10,2016).

120

*
*

Insum,BPDtakeslawenforcementactioninretaliationforindividualsengagingin

protectedspeechoractivityinviolationoftheFirstAmendment.

121

E. BPDS HANDLING OF SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS RAISES SERIOUS

CONCERNS OF GENDER-BIASED POLICING
OurinvestigationalsoraisedseriousconcernsabouthowBPDrespondstoandinvestigates
reportsofsexualassault.

1. Evidence of Gender Bias in BPDs Response to Sexual Assault

a. Treatment of Victims of Sexual Assault

Byitsverynature,sexualassaultisacrimeaboutwhichitcanbedifficulttoascertainthe

facts:forexample,sexualassaultoftenoccursinaprivatesetting,withnowitnessesotherthanthe

119
peopleinvolvedasthevictim

andsuspect,andvictimsofsexualassaultareoftenreluctantto
reporttheassault,particularlytolawenforcement.Forthatreason,victimadvocateswhoactas

confidantesandguidesforvictimsastheynavigatethecriminaljusticesystem,andwhoserole
affordsthemauniqueperspectivefromwhichtoidentifypatternsintheirclientsexperiencesplay
acriticalroleinprovidinginformationaboutsexualassaultstoBPD.

Theinformationprovidedtousbyvictimadvocates,and,insomecases,byvictimsofsexual
assaultthemselves,togetherwithourreviewofBPDssexualassaultcasefilesandrelated
documents,raiseseriousconcernsaboutgenderbiasinBPDstreatmentofvictimsofsexualassault.
Forinstance,officersanddetectivesinBPDsSexOffenseUnitoftenquestionvictimsinamanner
thatputstheblameforthesexualassaultonthevictimsshouldersforexample,withquestions
suggestingthevictimsshouldfeelpersonallyresponsibleforthepotentialconsequencesofa
criminalreportonasuspectorforhavingengagedinbehaviorthatinvitedtheassault.Intheir
interviewsofwomenreportingsexualassault,forexample,BPDdetectivesaskquestionssuchas
Whyareyoumessingthatguyslifeup?BPDofficersanddetectivesalsoaskedquestions

suggestingthattheydiscreditthereportsofvictimswhodelayedinreportingtheassaulttothe

police.Thistypeofquestioningisinappropriateinadetectiveinterviewofapotentialvictimof

sexualassaultandsuggestsgenderbiasbythedetectives.

WewerealsotroubledbystatementsofBPDdetectivessuggestinganundueskepticismof

reportsofsexualassault.OnevictimadvocatetoldusaboutadetectiveintheBPDSexOffense

Unitmakingcommentsataparty,inthecompanyofBPDofficersandvictimadvocates,that,in
homicide,therearerealvictims;allourcasesarebullshit.Whenanotherpersonsuggestedthe
detectivesoftenthestatement,thedetectiveadded,Ok,90percent.Wealsoreviewede-mail

correspondencebetweenaBPDofficerandaprosecutorinwhichtheyopenlyexpressedtheir
contemptforanddisbeliefofawomanwhohadreportedasexualassault:theprosecutorwrotethat

thiscaseiscrazy...Iamnotexcitedaboutchargingit.Thisvictimseemslikeaconnivinglittle

whore.(pardonmylanguage).;theBPDofficerreplied,Lmao!Ifeelthesame.

119Throughoutthisfindingsletter,wehaveusedthetermsvictimandvictimofsexualassaulttorefertopeople

havingexperiencedsexualassaultbecauseitisthetermgenerallyusedincriminallegaldefinitionsofsexualassaultand

inthecriminaljusticesystem.Weappreciate,however,thatmanypreferthetermssurvivororvictim/survivor,and

encouragerespectforthosepreferences.

122

Inaddition,wefoundindicationsthatBPDdisregardsreportsofsexualassaultbypeople

involvedinthesextradeaparticularlytroublingtrendgiventhevulnerabilityofthoseindividuals

torape. 120Accordingtoonecasereport,thesuspecthadapproachedthevictimwithagun,the

victimhadcalledthepolicerightaway,andthesuspectsinterviewwasalmostentirelyconsistent
withthevictimsaccountoftheassaultallevidencethatcouldhavesupportedaninvestigationand
prosecution.Nonetheless,theBPDdetectivemadenoattempttocorroboratethevictimsaccount

oftheassaultwithwitnessinterviewsorotherevidenceandtoldthesuspectthathewouldnotbe

chargedwithanythingotherthanpossessionofagun.

b. BPDs Treatment of Transgender Individuals

WereceivedallegationsofBPDofficersmistreatmentoftransgenderindividualsandhave
concernsthatBPDsinteractionswithtransgenderindividualsreflectunderlyingunlawfulgender
bias.WeheardallegationsthatBPDofficersmakedisparagingandinappropriatecommentsto
transgenderindividuals,andthatBPDofficersrefusetoacknowledgetransgenderwomenas

women.Onetransgenderwoman,forexample,describedanincidentafteratrafficstopin
December2015inwhichshewasaskedbytheofficerwhethersheidentifiedasmaleorfemale,and

toldtheofficerthatsheidentifiedasfemale.Despiteherresponse,thearrestingofficerthensaidto
anotherofficeratthescene,Well,areyougoingtotransporthim?Wealsoheardfromthe

transgendercommunitythattheirinteractionswithBPDaredegradinganddehumanizingandthat,
asaresult,transgenderindividualsareafraidtoreportcrimetolawenforcement.Thesame
transgenderwomandescribedabove,forexample,allegedthatwhenshearrivedatintake,thefemale

supervisorwhowascalledtosearchhersaid,Iamnothereforthisshit.Iamnotsearchingthat.

Whenshethentriedtoaskthesupervisortoshowhersomerespect,thesupervisorsaid,LikeI
said,Idontknowyou.Idontknowifyoureaboyoragirl.AndIreallydontcare,Iamnot
searchingyou.ThisisnottheonlyexampleweheardaboutBPDofficersconducting
inappropriatesearchesoftransgenderindividuals.WeheardseveralreportsthatindicatethatBPD
officerslackguidanceontheappropriateprocessforconductingsearchesoftransgenderindividuals,
includingensuringthatsearchesareconductedbyapersonoftheappropriategender.

BPDstreatmentofwomenvictimsofsexualassaultandoftransgenderindividualsshould

notreflectgender-basedstereotypesandassumptionsthatmaycompromisetheeffectivenessand

impartialityofBPDsresponsetoreportsofsexualassaultanddiscouragewomenandtransgender
individualsfromengagingwiththecriminaljusticesystem.

2. BPD Fails to Adequately Investigate Reports of Sexual Assault

BPDseriouslyandsystematicallyunder-investigatesreportsofsexualassault,andthesexual

assaultinvestigationsitdoesconductaremarkedbypracticesthatsignificantlycompromisethe

effectivenessandimpartialityofitsresponsetosexualassault.ThesearenotnewissuesforBPD.
BPDshandlingofsexualassaultwassubjecttowidespreadpublicscrutinyin2010,spurredby
mediareportsofBPDsmisclassificationofrapecases,failuretoidentifyandinvestigatereportsof
sexualassault,andsubstantialbacklogofrapekits.Victimadvocates,forexample,criticizedthe
120See,

e.g.,MicheleR.Deckeretal.,Violence Against Women in Sex Work and HIV Risk Implications Differ Qualitatively by
EALTH876(2013),availableat

Perpetrator,13BMCP
UB.H
http://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-13-876.

123

mannerinwhichBPDtreatedvictimsofsexualassaultincludinginterrogatingrapevictims,

questioningwomenintheemergencyroom,threateningtohookupwomenreportingsexualassault
toliedetectors,andnotinformingvictimsaboutthestatusoftheircases.Moreover,victim
advocatesreportedthatBPDsSexOffenseUnitwasonlyminimallyinvestigatingreportsofsexual

assault;forexample,theywerenotmakingeffortstoidentifywitnessesorsubmittingrapekitsfor

testing.

DespitesomeattemptsatreformbyBPDandBaltimoreCityleaders,mostofthese
problemseitherremainorhavereturned.BPDsresponsetoreportsofsexualassaultis,overall,

grosslyinadequate:forexample,BPDallowsmorethanhalfofitsrapecasestolingerinanopen
status,oftenforyearsatatime,withlittletonofollow-upinvestigation,whilefewerthanoneinfour
ofitsrapeinvestigationsareclosedduetothearrestofasuspect,arateroughlyhalfofthenational
average;BPDdetectivesrequesttestingofrapekitsinfewerthanoneinfiveofBPDsadultsexual

assaultcases,leavingtheserapekitstosituntestedinBPDsevidencecollectionunit;andBPD

detectivesrarely,ifever,seektoidentifyorinterviewsuspectsandwitnesses,evenincaseswhere

theyareclearlyidentifiedbythewomanreportingtheassault.Inaddition,BPDinvestigative

policiesandpracticessignificantlyunderminethequality,effectiveness,andfairnessofBPDs

responsetoreportsofsexualassault,makingitmoredifficulttouncoverthetruthwhensexual

assaultallegationsaremade.
a. Failure to Develop and Resolve Preliminary Investigations

InthemajorityofBPDssexualassaultcases,BPDfailstopursueinvestigationsbeyondthe

immediate,preliminaryresponsetoareportofsexualassault.AccordingtoBPDsowndata,for

example,between53and58percentofitssexoffensecaseswereinanopenstatuseachyear

between2013and2015.InourownreviewofasampleofBPDssexualassaultcasesbetween2010

and2015,wefoundthatmorethanhalfofthesecasesweredescribedbyBPDasbeinginanopen
statusandthatonlyapreliminaryinvestigationhadbeendoneinasubstantialproportionofthose
opencases.Onesexualassaultcase,forexample,wasidentifiedbyBPDasopen,despitethe

factthattherehadbeennoactivityonthecasesinceFebruary2013.Inthiscase,therehadbeenno
requestforalabtestkit,nofollow-upwiththesuspectslawyertointerviewthesuspectortest
DNA,andnoindicationofcommunicationwiththevictimoverthepastthreeyears.Indeed,it
appearedfromthefilethatcommunicationwiththevictim,andBPDsinvestigationofthecase,had
slowedandultimatelystoppedafterthesuspecthiredadefenseattorney.

b. Failure to Identify and Collect Evidence to Corroborate Victims

Complaints

Similarly,BPDmakeslittle,ifany,efforttocorroboratevictimsaccountsoftheirassaults,
eitherbyidentifyingandinterviewingwitnesses,gatheringothertypesofevidence,oridentifyingand

interrogatingsuspects.BPDroutinelyfailstocontactwitnessestosexualassaultsinthefirst
instanceand,wheretheirinitialattemptstocontactwitnessesfail,BPDalmostnevermakeasecond

attempttocontactthosewitnesses.Evenwhenavictimdescribeshavingreportedtheassaultto

othersintheimmediateaftermathofthecrime,BPDmakesnoefforttoidentifyandinterviewthese

outcrywitnessesinotherwords,thepeoplewhofirstheardtheallegationofsexualassault.In
onecase,forexample,thevictimhadimmediatelytoldherfatherandotherwitnessesaboutthe
assault;however,BPDmadenoattempttocontactanyoftheseoutcrywitnessestocorroboratethe
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victimsstory.Similarly,BPDpersistentlyfailstomakeanyeffortstocontacteyewitnessestosexual

assaults.Inonecase,forexample,thevictimandthesuspecthadbeenintwodifferentbars

togetherbeforetheassault.Thevictimbelievedthatthesuspecthaddruggedher,andshehad
injuriesalloverherbody.Aftertheassault,thevictimhadrunoutofabarandimmediately
reportedthecrime.Giventhesefacts,itisreasonabletoexpectthattherewouldhavebeen

numerouspeoplewhowouldhaveseenthevictimandthesuspecttogetheratoraroundthetimeof
theassaultandwhocouldhavecorroborateddetailsofthevictimsaccount.

ButBPDmadeno

attempttocontactthebartendersofthebarsortoidentifyanyothereyewitnesses.

Inadditiontofailingtoseekoutcorroboratingwitnesstestimony,BPDpersistentlyfailsto

seekothertypesofevidencethatcouldcorroborateavictimsaccountoftheassault.Inthecasejust

described,forexample,inadditiontoneglectingtoidentifyandinterviewwitnesses,BPDmadeno

attempttoreviewsurveillancecamerarecordingsfromthetwobarsvisitedbythevictimandthe
suspect,noefforttohavethevictimtestedfordrugs,andnoattempttogatherphysicalevidence
fromthescene.

BPDpersistentlyneglectstorequestlabtestingofrapekitsandotherforensicevidence.

Rapekitsareonlytestedifadetectivemakesarequestandalltoooften,detectivesdonotrequest

thatrapekitsbetested.Between2010andSeptember2014,forexample,rapekitsweretestedin
only15percentofBPDscasesinvolvingsexualassaultsofadultvictims.Similarly,betweenJanuary
andSeptember2015,BPDdetectivesrequestedtestingofrapekitsinonly16percentofBPDs
casesinvolvingsexualassaultsofadultvictims.InthefewcaseswhereBPDisrequestingrapekit

tests,wefoundthattherearelongdelaysinmakingthoserequests.Inonecase,forexample,BPD

requestedalabtestninemonthsafterreceivingareportofthesexualassault;ittookanotherfive

monthsforBPDtogettheresultsofthelabtest.

Similarly,BPDdetectivesconsistentlyneglecttogatherDNAevidenceandtorequestlab

testsforDNAevidencefromswabsorclothing.Inonecase,forexample,ataxidriverdrovean

intoxicatedwomantohishomeinsteadoftotheaddressgiventohimbyabartender;thewoman
reportedthatthetaxidriverhadthenrapedherathishome.BPDsubsequentlyinterviewedthetaxi
driver,andheadmittedtohavingtakenthewomantohishome.Arapekitwassubmittedand
testedpositiveforsemen.However,BPDmadenoattempttogetaDNAsamplefromthetaxi

driver.

BPDalsomakesminimaltonoefforttolocate,identify,interrogate,orinvestigatesuspects.
Wefoundthistobetrueevenincaseswherethesuspectshadbeenidentifiedorwereeasily

identifiableonthebasisofthevictimstestimony.Forexample,inonecase,involvinganattempted

sexualassaultofawomanbythedriverofanunauthorizedtaxi,thedetectivewasabletoidentify

thesuspectbasedonthewomansdetaileddescriptionofthesuspectscar.Thedetectivemadeno
attempttocontactthesuspect,however,andtheinvestigationprogressednofurther.Because
sexualassaultisacrimethatfrequentlyoccursinprivatesettings,itiscriticalthatlawenforcement
makeeffortstogather,preserve,andanalyzeevidence,especiallycorroborativeevidence,asquickly

aspossible.BPDspersistentfailuretoseekoutanddevelopsuchcorroborativeevidence,including
suspectinterrogations,constitutesasignificantanddamagingomissionfromtheirinvestigationsof
sexualassault.

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BPDfailstoidentifyandfollowuponindicationsofserialsuspectsinitssexualassault

cases.Serialsuspectsarebelievedtoberesponsibleforasubstantialproportionofsexualassaults
oneoft-citedstudyconcluded,forexample,thattwointhreerapistswhohadneverbeenprosecuted
fortheircrimeswererepeatrapists 121andthustheremaybeenormouspublicsafetyconsequences

whenlawenforcementfailstoidentifyandholdaccountableserialrapists.Weweretroubledtofind

evidenceofsuchfailuresinBPDsinvestigationsofsexualassault.Forexample,wereviewed

numerouscasesofforciblerapesofwomenbystrangersthatpresentedcircumstancessuggesting
theremightbeserialrapistsinvolved;however,BPDdetectivesdidnottakethestepsnecessaryto

makethatdetermination,suchassearchingforcasespresentingsimilarfactualscenariosor

identifyingothervictimsinBaltimoreorneighboringjurisdictions.

c. Missing or Inadequate Documentation of Investigation

BPDssexualassaultcasefiles,asageneralmatter,aremissingcriticalinformationandlack

sufficientdocumentationoftheinvestigationtoallowdetectives,theirsupervisors,andprosecutors
toeffectivelyevaluatethequalityofinvestigationandtoassessandrespondtothereportedcrimes.

Forinstance,wefoundthatBPDssexualassaultcasefilesfrequentlylackvideorecordingsof

victims,witnesses,andsuspects,evenwherethenotesinthecasefileindicatethatthoseinterviews

hadtakenplaceandbeenrecorded.BPDssexualassaultcasefilesgenerallylacknotesfromofficers

anddetectives.Wherecasefilesdoincludesuchnotes,thenotesprovideinsufficientinformation

aboutofficersanddetectivesimpressionsandobservations,orabouttheirreasonsformaking
investigativedecisions,topresentacomprehensive,factualpictureofthereportedassault.Indeed,

acrosstheboard,wefoundthatwelearnedfarmoreaboutvictimsimpressionsandrecollectionsof
theirassaultsfromtheforensicmedicalexamreportsthanfromBPDsownreports.

d. Failure to Collect and Review Data About, and to Appropriately Report

and Classify, Reports of Sexual Assault

TheinformationprovidedtousbyBPDinresponsetoourrequestsfordataregardingthe

departmentscasesofsexualassaultsuggeststousthatBPDcontinuestohaveproblemswith
improperlyidentifying,reporting,andclassifyingreportsofsexualassault,aswellaswithcollecting,

reviewing,andanalyzingdataaboutsexualassaultsreportedtoBPD.BPDhaspreviouslybeen

subjecttopublicscrutinyforitsmisclassificationofcasesofsexualassaultandforitsfailuresto

appropriatelyidentifyorreportcasesofsexualassault.InJune2010,theBaltimore

Sunreportedthat
BPDpatrolanddetectiveshadclassifiedmorethan30percentoftheirrapecasesasunfounded
aclassificationthatisappropriateonlyforareportofrapethatisfound,afteraninvestigation,tobe

eitherfalseorbaseless;BPDsunfoundedrateforrapecasesatthattimewasfivetimesthe

nationalaverage. 122AsubsequentreviewofunfoundedcasesconductedbytheBaltimoreCity

SexualAssaultResponseTeam(SART)auditunitfoundthat,ofthecasesreviewedbytheSART
auditunit,morethanhalfofthesexualassaultcasesclassifiedasunfoundedbyBPDdetectives

121DavidLisak&PaulM.Miller,Repeat

Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists,17VIOLENCEANDVICTIMS

7384,78,80(2002).
122See, e.g.,JustinFenton,City

Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern,BALTIMORESUN(June27,2010),

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-06-27/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519_1_rosalyn-branson-police-detectivepolice-figures.

126

hadbeenmisclassified. 123AccordingtodatafromBPD,theproportionofrapecasesclassifiedas

unfoundedbyBPDhasdroppeddramaticallysince2010;BPDsdatareflectedarateof9.6
percentofrapecasesclassifiedasunfoundedbetweenJanuary2010andMarch2016.Weare

concerned,however,thatthesestatisticsmaskacontinuingproblemwithBPDsunderstandingand

applicationoftheappropriatedefinitionsandusesoftheclassificationcategories,aswellaswithits
practicesforidentifyingandreportingsexualassaults.In2015,forexample,BPDdescribed

approximately56percentofitsrapecasesasopen.

Meanwhile,only17percentofBPDsrape

casesin2015wereclosedbyarrestaratelessthanhalfthenationalaveragefortheproportionof

rapecasesclosedbyarrest.Alsoin2015,accordingtobothdataandanecdotalevidencefromthe

BaltimoreCitySART,onlyahandfulofBPDscaseswereclosedasunfounded;SARTdata

indicatedarateof6.6percentofrapecasesclassifiedasunfoundedbyBPDbetweenJanuaryand

September2015,andBPDpresentedonlyahandfulofcasesclassifiedasunfoundedtotheSART
auditcommitteefortheirreview.Takenintheaggregate,thisdatasuggeststhatBPDiskeepingthe
majorityofitsrapecasesinanopenstatus,thusdrasticallyreducingtherateofitsrapecases
closedasunfoundedandcreatingtheillusionofhavingmademeaningfulreformstoits
proceduresforidentifyingandclassifyingsexualassaults.

Inaddition,weweretroubledbythefactthatBPDwasunabletoprovideuswithresponses

toourrequestsforbasicdataaboutthevictimandsuspectpopulation,theincidenceandnatureof

casesofsexualassaultreportedtoandhandledbythedepartment,andtheincidenceofcasesof
sexualassaultinvolvingBPDofficers.Theinabilitytocollectandproducesuchdatasuggeststous
thatBPD,atpresent,lacksthecapacitytoeffectivelyassesstheeffectivenessitsownresponseto

sexualassault,toidentifytrendsintheincidenceofsexualassault,bothintheBaltimorecommunity

andwithinitsowndepartment,andtomakedecisionsabouthowtoadjustorimproveitsresponse

tosexualassault.ParticularlyinlightofthepublicattentiontotheseriousflawsinBPDs
identification,reporting,andclassificationofcasesofsexualassault,BPDsfailuretoremedyits
proceduresforcollectingandreviewingdataaboutsexualassaultrepresentsasignificantweaknessin

thedepartmentshandlingofsexualassault.

e. Lack of Supervisory Review

AlthoughasupervisoryreviewformisincludedasamatterofcourseinBPDssexualassault
casefiles,thesesupervisoryreviewformsarealmostalwaysleftblank.Intherarecircumstances
wherethesupervisoryreviewformsarefilledout,theyincludelittleinformationandappearto
reflectalimitedreviewofwhatstepshavebeentakenintheinvestigation,andnotanexaminationof

thequalityoftheinvestigationorthereasoningfortheoutcomeoftheinvestigation.Similarly,
althoughaStatesAttorneyContactLogformisincludedasamatterofcourseinBPDssexual
assaultcasefiles,thisformisrarelycompletedand,whenitisfilledout,containsverylittle

information.Theextremelylimitednatureoftheinformationprovidedbythesupervisoryreview
formandStatesAttorneyContactLogformraisesconcernsforusabouttheinadequatesupervision

andreview,bothwithinandexternaltothepolicedepartment,ofBPDssexualassault

investigations.

123Md.Coal.AgainstSexualAssault,Baltimore

City Sexual Assault Response Team Annual Report10(Oct.5,2011),

http://www.mcasa.org/_mcasaWeb/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/BaltimoreCityAnnualReport_print.pdf.

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III. SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES IN BPDS PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE

TO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS, ERODE COMMUNITY
TRUST, AND INHIBIT EFFECTIVE POLICING
Theconstitutionalviolationsdescribedinourfindingsresultinpartfromcriticaldeficiencies
inBPDssystemstotrain,equip,supervise,andholdofficersaccountable,andtobuildrelationships

withthebroaderBaltimorecommunity.First,BPDfailstoadequatelysuperviseitsofficers.

This
lackofsupervisionmanifestsitselfinmultipleways,includingafailuretoguideofficeractivity

througheffectivepoliciesandtraining;afailuretocollectandanalyzereliabledatatosupervise

officerenforcementactivities;andthelackofameaningfulearlyinterventionsystem(EIS)to
identifyofficerswhomaybenefitfromadditionaltrainingorotherguidancetoensurethattheydo

notcommitconstitutionalviolations.Second,BPDlacksmeaningfulaccountabilitysystemstodeter
misconduct.BPDdoesnotconsistentlyclassify,investigate,adjudicate,anddocumentcomplaints

ofmisconductaccordingtoitsownpoliciesandacceptedlawenforcementstandards.Indeed,we

foundthatBPDpersonnelsometimesdiscouragecomplaintsfrombeingfiledandfrequently
conductlittleornoinvestigationevenofseriousmisconductallegations.Asaresult,aculture
resistanttoaccountabilitypersiststhroughoutmuchofBPD,andmanyofficersarereluctantto

reportmisconductforfearthatdoingsoisfruitlessandmayprovokeretaliation.

Third,BPDfailsto

haveproperagreementsinplacetocoordinateitsactivitieswithotheragenciesthatareoperating

withinitsjurisdiction.Fourth,BPDfailstoadequatelysupportitsofficersthrougheffective
strategiesforrecruitment,retention,andstaffingpatterns,anddoesnotprovidethemwith

appropriatetechnologyandequipment.

Fifth,BPDdoesnotengageeffectivelywiththecommunity

itpolices.BPDsfailuretouseacceptedcommunitypolicingstrategiesandtransparency

mechanismserodesthecommunitytrustthatiscentraltoproductivelawenforcement.

Thesesystemicdeficienciesimpairofficersafetyandeffectivenessandleaddirectlyto
violationsoftheConstitutionandfederallaw.

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A. BPD FAILS TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE ITS OFFICERS ENFORCEMENT

ACTIVITIES
1. BPD Does Not Provide Adequate Policy Guidance and Training to its Officers
BPDsinadequatepoliciesandtrainingcontributetotheDepartmentspatternorpracticeof
constitutionalviolations.Clear,comprehensive,andlegallyaccuratepoliciesandtrainingare
essentialtotheproperfunctioningofapolicedepartment.Theyprovidecrucialguidancefor
officersregardingwhatpracticalstepstotaketoremainincompliancewithdepartmentalrulesand

legalrequirements,allowsupervisorstoproperlymonitorandinstructofficers,andprovide
consistentguidelinesforofficerdiscipline.Here,wefindthatcertainBPDpoliciesandtrainingsdo
notfulfillthesefunctions.BPDofficersthuslacksufficientguidancetoensurethattheir

enforcementactivitiesareeffective,safe,andconsistentwiththeconstitutionalrightsofthepeople

theyserve.WhileBPDhasmadeadmirableeffortstoupdateitspoliciesin2015and2016,some

outdatedandcontradictorypoliciesremainineffect,diminishingtheimpactofthenewpoliciesand
procedures.
a. Deficient Policies
Aswedescribedaboveinourfindings,criticaldeficienciesinBPDspoliciescontributeto
officersviolatingtheconstitutionalrightsofBaltimoreresidents.Forexample,officersfrequentuse
oftaserstoapplyconstitutionallyexcessiveforceisconnectedtotheDepartmentsfailuretohave
anypolicygoverningtheuseofelectroniccontrolweaponsuntil2015.BPDsimilarlylackedany
policyonbatonusealsoafrequentsourceofconstitutionalviolationsuntil2016.The

Departmentlikewiselackedafairandimpartialpolicingpolicyuntil2015,despitelongstanding

noticeofconcernsaboutitspolicingoftheCitysAfrican-Americanpopulation.Andpolicy

deficienciesalsocontributetoofficersfrequentillegalstops,searches,andarrestsbymisstatingthe
lawonthejustificationrequiredtostoporfriskindividualssuspectedofcriminalactivity.Indeed,
severalBPDpoliciesdonotadequatelycapturethecurrentstateofthelaw,andothersprovide

insufficientguidancetoofficerstoallowthemtoaligntheirconductwithconstitutional
requirements.

Beyondthesespecificpolicydeficiencies,however,wefoundsystemicproblemswithBPDs

methodofdrafting,distributing,andimplementingpoliciesthathasmadeitdifficultforofficersto

understandproperproceduresandadapttochangingrules.BPDfailstofollowwidelyaccepted
principlesindeveloping,distributing,andimplementingnewpolicies.TheInternationalAssociation
ofChiefsofPolice,forexample,hasdevelopedasetofbestpracticesforeffectivedevelopmentof
operationalpolicyandprocedures.Amongotherrecommendations,theseprinciplesindicatethat

staffshouldbeinvolvedinthedevelopmentofthemanualandkeptinformedofanychanges.Chief

W.DwayneOrrick,Best Practices Guide: Developing a Police Department Policy-Procedure Manual,

InternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice,http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BP
PolicyProcedures.pdf(lastvisitedJune17,2016).Empiricalresearchhasalsosuggestedthatofficers

aremorelikelytosupportandcomplywithpolicieswhentheyhavebeenprovidedopportunitiesto

giveinput,andsupervisorsclearlyexplaindecisionsthattheyhavemade.NicoleE.Haaset.al.,
Explaining officer compliance: The importance of procedural justice and trust inside a police organization,15
Criminology&Crim.Just.4,16(Sept.2015).

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BPDdoesnotfollowtheseacceptedmethodsofpolicydevelopment.Instead,the
Departmenthashistoricallydevelopedandpublishedpoliciesandamendmentsinamannerthat
officersfindtobeconfusingandopaque.Asmanyofficerstoldus,thenumberingsystemaloneisa

sourceofconfusion.Generally,BPDpolicieshavebeenorganizedwithtitlesthatincludedletters

andnumbers.Duringoneperiod,however,theletter-and-numbersystemwasreplacedwitha

systemthatincludednumbersalone.Thenewsystemonlyappliedtonewlyimplementedpolicies,
however,andthemajorityofpolicieswerestillclassifiedbyletter-and-number.Policiesfrom
differenterasarewrittenindifferentformats,andoftenmodifiedbyannexes,memoranda,
amendments,andrescissions,insteadofreplacingtheoldpolicycompletely,makingitdifficultfor

officerstobeconfidentthattheyhadthecurrent,completepolicy.

Whilethepolicymanualhasa

tableofcontents,thereisnoindex,andnewadditionsandrevisionscanquicklymakeoldermanuals

difficulttonavigate.Infact,duringourinvestigation,BPDwasunabletolocateoneofitsown
amendmentstodisclosetous.Inshort,BPDpoliciesdonotprovideofficerswithclearguidance
thatcanberapidlydigestedandputintopracticeinthefield.Althoughinearly2016BPDmade
effortstoprovideclearerandmoreeffectiveguidancetoitsofficersbydistributingabinderof

updated,corepoliciesthateachofficercanuseinthefield,significantworkremainstoensurethat
allofBPDspoliciesareclear,internallyconsistent,andreadilyavailabletoofficers.

BPDlikewisefailstoprovideofficerstheopportunitytoprovideinputonthepolicyasitis
developed.Wespokewithmanyofficers,includingsupervisorsandothersinpositionsofauthority,
whowerefrustratedbythelackofinputtheywereabletohaveonpolicydevelopment,including

thepoliciesdevelopedin2016.Withnearly3,000swornofficersandanother1,000personnel,BPD

willlikelyreceiveconflictinginputinadditiontothehelpfulideasgeneratedifitseeksinputfrom
officers.Withoutseekingthisinput,however,BPDfailstolearncriticallessonsfromthefield,and,

asimportantly,itrisksalienatingitsofficersandunderminingadherencetothepoliciesitdevelops.
Indeed,duringourinterviewsandride-alongs,wefoundthatlargenumbersofofficersexpresseda
lackofconfidenceinthepolicyguidanceBPDprovides.

Toensurethatitspoliciesprovideofficerswithsufficientguidancetopolicewithinthe

boundsoftheConstitution,BPDmustupdateitspoliciestomakethemreflectcurrentlegal
requirementsanddevelopasystemtodistributeandmaintainpoliciesandproceduresinawaythat
promotesofficerconfidenceandallowsofficerstousethepolicieseffectively.
b. Deficient Training
Compoundingtheproblemswithpolicydevelopment,BPDreliesondeficienttrainingona
broadarrayofsubstantivepolicingfunctions.Thiscontributestothepatternorpracticeof

violationsoftheConstitutionandfederallawthatweobserved.Officershavenotbeenproperly
trainedonnumerousimportanttopics,fromtheuseofforceandde-escalationtostops,searches,

andarrests,tohowtosuperviseandinvestigatemisconduct.Absenteffectivetrainingonhowto

properlyconducttheseactions,itisnotsurprisingthatBPDofficersfrequentlyviolatefederallaw

wheninteractingwiththecommunity.Ourobservationsoftrainingprograms,reviewofinternal

documents,andconversationswithBPDpersonnelrevealedthattrainingdeficiencieswithinthe
DepartmentarisefromfoundationalissuesinBPDsoverallapproachtotraining.TheDepartment
hasfailedtoestablisharobusttrainingprogramandlacksthebasicorganizationalcapacities,
infrastructure,andsupportrequiredtoeffectivelytrainpoliceofficerstorespondtosituationsthat
ariseinlawenforcementencounters.

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i. Training Has Not Been a Top Priority Within BPD
Ourinvestigationrevealedthatoneofthefundamentalcausesofthebreakdownintraining
istheDepartmentsindifferentattitudetowardsitstrainingprogram.NumerousmembersofBPD,

fromlineofficerstocommandstafftotrainingpersonnel,conveyedtousthattrainingisnota

prioritywithintheDepartment.Indeed,BPDsformerdirectoroftheTrainingAcademyreleaseda
needsassessmentin2015thathighlightedaninternalcultureofplacingtrainingsecond,
expectationsforrushedtraining,andoutsidepressuretocondensetrainingprogramsasthreats
tothecurrentprogram.SeeBaltimore Police Department Training Academy Needs Assessment(July2015),
at5.Unfortunately,afterthetrainingdirectorsenttheneedsassessmenttoBPDleadership,hedid

notreceivearesponseformonths.Healsoorganizedthreedifferentmeetingswithpatrol
commanderstobeginmakingchangesbasedontheneedsassessment,butnocommandersattended
themeetings.

Wefoundthatthislackofemphasisontraininghasapervasiveinfluenceonthe
Department.AsignificantnumberofofficerswespokewithhadnotrainingbeyondMarylands
basicrequirements.Officerswhohadfurtheredtheirtrainingdidsobecauseoftheirownpersonal
interestorambition,oftenusingprivatefundsandovercomingobstaclesposedbysupervisorsor
workschedules.Ratherthanencouragingadditionaltraining,supervisorsviewtrainingasa

peripheralactivitythatisconsistentlysupersededbytheneedtokeepofficersonthestreet.
Strikingly,trainingpersonnelarealsosubjecttobeingpulledfromtheirtrainingdutiestoothertasks:
basictrainingisfrequentlypostponedorshiftedduetoovertimedetailsfortrainingpersonnel,
leadingtotheextensionoftimebasicrecruitsspendattheAcademy.See id.

TrainingiscrucialforeffectiveandlawfulpolicinginBaltimore.Indeed,keepingofficerson
thestreetwithoutproperorup-to-datetrainingisadisservicenotonlytocommunitymembers,but

toofficersbecauseoftheimpactonofficersafety.

ii. BPD Lacks Basic Infrastructure to Train its Officers

ThefailuretoinvestintraininginfrastructureunderscoresBPDsfailuretoprioritizethis
criticalcomponentofeffectivepolicing.BPDlacksadequatestafftotrainitsofficersefficiently;its

trainingfacilitiesareoutdated,ill-repaired,andoftenunabletoaccommodatemoderntraining

methods;andBPDlacksmechanismstotrackofficerattendanceandperformancetoensurethat

officersreceiveandunderstandthetrainingtheyneedtoengageinsafe,effective,constitutional

policing.

Thetrainingacademyisnotablyunder-resourced.Theprogramlostabouttwo-thirdsofits
staffoverthepastthreeyears:trainingstafffellfromapproximately60in2013to20currently.

Duringthecourseofourinvestigation,thirtyclasseshadnoprimaryinstructor.Multipletraining
units,includingtheonesresponsibleforsupervisortrainingfornewsergeantsandlieutenants,were

entirelyvacantwithnopersonnelstaffingthem.Wealsofoundthatstudent-to-instructorratios

duringtrainingclasseswereoftenextremelyhigh,underminingeffectivecommunicationofthe
material.TheFraternalOrderofPolicehasalsohighlightedthisconcern,notingthatclasssizesfor

newrecruittraininghaveaveraged3550officers.

See FOP Blueprint for Improved Policing(July11,

131

2012),at7.MinimalstaffingalsoposesdifficultiesforBPDinstructorstoattendoutsidecoursesto
developtheirtrainingskills.

BPDtrainingfacilitiesareinasimilarlytroublingstate.Duringthecourseofour
investigation,wewereinformedthatBPDhasonly17computersavailabletotrainitsnearly4,000

personnel.Thebuildingsthemselvesareindisrepair:watercannotbeconsumedfromthefaucets,

andthebuildingsoftenlackworkableairconditioningandheating.

AccordingtotheAcademys
recentneedsassessment:

Thedecrepitstateoftheacademyitselfgivestheimpressionofalackadaisicaland

uncommittedattitudetowardsthenecessitiesoftrainingthemodernpoliceofficer.
Recruits,swornpersonnel,visitinglaw-enforcementexperts,andciviliansgetthe
impressionthattheyarepartytoafly-by-night,poverty-strickendepartmentwhen
theyfindthemselvesinacrumbling,draftybuilding.

See Baltimore Police Department Training Academy Needs Assessment(July2015),at12.Theneeds

assessmentadditionallydescribesalonglistofbasicequipmentandstructuresmissingfromtraining

facilities,fromprotectiveheadgeartomatsfordefensiveexercises.Ourobservationsconfirmed

manyoftheseshortcomings.

EquallyproblematicisBPDsinabilitytoevaluateandtrackofficertraining,thusfailingto
properlyenforcetrainingrequirements.Accordingtointernaldocumentsproducedtousduringthe
investigation,practicaltrainingexercisesdonothaveacomprehensiveevaluationtoolthatmeasures

theskillandcomprehensionlevelsofstudents;instructorsareunabletoproperlyassessrecruits
proficiencywithdefensivetacticsortheirabilitytodeterminewhensituationsrequireforce;andthe
currentcurriculumlackspre-andpost-testingproceduresforevaluatinghowtrainingchanged

recruitscomprehensionofrelevantinformation.Noristhereamechanismtotrackthefollow-up
remedialtrainingrequiredafteradisciplinaryincident.Numerouspersonnelconveyedthattheydo
nothaveaworkabletrackingsystemfordeterminingwhenofficersrequiretrainingorhavefailedto
attendaclass.Rather,thecurrentsystemreliesonasingleofficerupdatinganExcelspreadsheet

withtheactivitiesofthousandsofofficersandformulatingatrainingschedule.Likelyduetothis

deficienttrackingsystem,membersofthetrainingstaffnotedthattheyoftenfindthatofficersare

missingsignificantamountsofrequiredtraining.

iii. Despite Efforts to Improve Training, Much Work Remains to Fix the
Program

IndividualsthroughouttheDepartmenthavehighlightedthattheDepartmentneedsto
significantlyimproveitstrainingprogram.Forexample,in2012,theFraternalOrderofPolices
Blueprint for Improved Policing in Baltimoreincludesanentiresectionfocusedontrainingissuesand
recommendations.See
FOP Blueprint for Improved Policing(July11,2012),at68.Morerecently,BPDs
July2015TrainingAcademyNeedsAssessmentprovidesaprogramanalysis,describingmajorissues
inpersonnel,curriculum,equipmentandstructures,andbudgeting.ItalsonotesthattheAcademy
hasbeenworkingtoaddresssomeoftheseissues.Thisincludestopic-areatrainingson,for
example,theuseofforce,de-escalation,andunderstandingyouth.

TheAcademyhasalsobegunto
createtrainingvideosandprovidingroll-calltrainingsoncurrentlaw,twoimportantstepsforward.
132

Whilethisisencouraging,thesenewinitiativeswillnotbesuccessfulwithoutaconsiderablechange

intheoverallapproachtotheDepartmentstraining.Muchworkremains,andthisworkwillrequire
dedicationfromallmembersoftheDepartmenttoprovideBPDstrainingprogramswiththe
necessaryresourcesandtocreateanatmospherethatactivelyencouragestrainingandpreparation.

ThreeparticulartypesoftrainingwillneedsignificantworkiftheDepartmentwantsto
effectivelyimplementreforms.First,theDepartmentlackssufficientscenario-basedtrainingforits

officers.Thisrealworldtrainingiscriticalforbuildingofficersskills.TheFOPhasalsonoted

thisdeficit:accordingtotheFOP,simulationtrainingonreal-lifescenariosshouldbeanareaof

focusforBPD,andofficershavefrequentlynotedthatsimulationtrainingiscrucialbecauseit

teachesofficershowtoreactinsituationsthatregularlyarise.See FOP Blueprint for Improved Policing

(July11,2012)at7.Suchtraining,especiallywithinadefensivetacticsorcrisisintervention

curriculum,helpsstudentsdeterminethemostappropriateactionsduringlawenforcementactivities,
suchasthelevelofforcetobeusedinanencounter.Fortunately,leadersintheDepartmenthave
alsorecognizedthisneed,butmuchworkremainstoaddressit.

Second,BPDsFieldTrainingOfficer,orFTO,programneedssignificantimprovement.An
effectiveFTOprogramisacriticaltoolfortheDepartmenttoreinforcethetrainingandvalues

communicatedtoanewofficerduringtheacademy.Likewise,apoorFTOprogramcanundermine
theinvestmenttheDepartmenthasmadeinarecruitbeforethattraininghasbecomeingrained.
Generallyspeaking,BPDdoesnotcurrentlyattractandretaintherightofficersfortheFTO

positions,andthosewhodobecomeFTOsreceiveonlyoneweekoftraining.

Thereisadearthof
qualifiedFTOsthroughouttheDepartment;somedistrictslackFTOsentirely.Theimportanceand
benefitofastrongFTOprogramhavelongbeenrecognized.

See, e.g.,MichaelS.McCampbell,Field
Training for Police Officers: The State of the Art (1987)(discussingresearchshowingthatFTOprograms
canhelpreducecivilliabilitycomplaintsandincreaseapoliceagencyseffectivenessinthe

community).Toachievethereformsrequired,BPDneedstoinvestinthisprogramtoensurethat
thenewofficersitaddstotheDepartmenthaveasolidfoundationtoengageineffectiveand

constitutionalpolicing.

Finally,supervisorandleadershiptrainingisacriticalneedwithintheDepartment.Across
alllevelsofBPD,wefoundthattrainingforthesepositionswasdeficient.Ourinterviewsrevealed
thatmanyDepartmentcommandersdonothavetheopportunitytoreceivecommanddevelopment
training,andtheFOPnotedasimilarlackoftraining.See FOP Blueprint for Improved Policing(July11,
2012)at6.TheBlueprintdescribesmanagementtrainingoverallasveryinsular,because

departmentmanagersgenerallystayinBaltimore.Id.InanagencyofBPDssize,command-level
andsupervisorytrainingiscriticaltoensuringthatthevaluesoftheagencyarereinforcedbyits

leadersonaconsistent,day-to-daybasis.Tocreatethetypeofculturaltransformationrequiredto
addresstheconstitutionalviolationswefound,strong,capableleadershipisrequired.Effective
leadership,combinedwithproceduraljusticeinternaltotheagency,resultsinofficerswhoaremore
likelytobehaveaccordingtoagencystandardswheninteractingwithmembersofthecommunity.

st
See, e.g. The Final Report of the Presidents Task Force on 21 Century Policing (May2015)at54.

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2. BPD Does Not Adequately Supervise Officers or Collect and Analyze Data on their
Activities

SeriousdeficienciesinBPDssupervisionofitsenforcementactivities,includingthrough
datacollectionandanalysis,contributetotheDepartmentsfailuretoidentifyandcorrect
unconstitutionalpolicing.

a. BPD Does Not Effectively Use Data to Oversee Officer Activity

BPDfailstocollectandrecordimportantdataonabroadrangeofpoliceactivities,andthat,
whenitdoescollectdata,BPDdoesnotusethedatatomanageandsuperviseofficeractivity.As

discussedinSectionII.A4,supra,BPDsowninternalauditsandotherindicationsdemonstratethat

officersfailtorecordanyinformationonalargeportionofthestopsandsearchesconductedon
Baltimorestreets,contrarytoBPDsownpoliciesandprocedures.Whenofficersdorecordthe
existenceofastop,theydonotconsistentlyrecordimportantinformationconnectedtoit.We
foundthatofficerslikewiseoftenfailtoreportusingforceagainstindividuals.Andaswithstops
andsearches,evenwhereforceisreported,officersdonotconsistentlydocumentimportant

supportinginformation,suchasstatementsfromwitnessesandotherofficersonthescene.These

omissionsviolateBPDsownpolicyrequirements.Thepoliciesandproceduresarealsounderinclusive,however,anddonotrequireinformationtobegatheredthatisessentialtosupervise
officeractivityeffectively.

Evenwheredataiscollected,BPDfailstostoreitinsystemsthatarecapableofeffective

trackingandanalysis.ChiefamongthedataanalysischallengesisBPDsfailuretouseintegrated

systemstomaintaininformation.InformationtechnologyofficerswiththeDepartmentinformedus
thatBPDuses232separatedatabasestostoreinformation,mostofwhichcannotlinktoeachother.

Moreover,mostfilesdonotcontainuniqueidentifiersthatallowsupervisorstoidentifyandreview
informationaboutasingleincidentthatmaybestoredinseparatedatabases.Forexample,BPD
usesdifferentprogramsordatabasestorecordstops,arrests,andincidentreports.Thedifferent

informationcapturedontheseactivitiesissiloed:BPDssystemsdonotallowasupervisorreviewing

therecordofanarrestoruseofforcethatstemmedfromapedestrianstoptoaccessthestoprecord

thatismaintainedseparately.BPDsfailuretorespondtoitspatternofconductingunlawfularrests

illustratestheconsequencesofsegregatingrelateddatainunconnectedsystems.Asexplainedabove,
MarylandmaintainsdataonallarrestsbyBPDofficersforwhichbookingofficersfindnoprobable
causeorotherwiseresultinprosecutorsdecliningtobringcharges.Manyoftheseproblematic
arrestsstemfromstops,searches,orotherincidentsdescribedinvariousBPDreports.Yetthe

Departmentlacksanymechanismtoconnectproblematicarreststoinformationaboutthe

enforcementactionsthatprecipitatedthembecausethatinformationismaintainedinseparate

programsordatabases.BPDsupervisorsthuslackcriticalinformationtocorrectthese
constitutionalviolations.

Moreover,BPDconductsminimalpatternanalysisofofficeractivities.TheDepartment
doesnotgenerateanyreportsorotherwisetrackpatternsinofficersstops,searches,arrests,usesof

force,orcommunityinteractions.Forexample,supervisorsdonothaveaccesstoinformation
abouthowfrequentlyofficerssearchsuspectsduringstops,theproportionofstopsandsearches
thatfindweaponsorcontraband,howoftenstopsorarrestsleadtoofficersusingforce,orhow
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oftenarrestsleadtochargesbeingdismissed.BecausetheDepartmentdoesnottrackthese

activities,itlacksinformationtoassesstheeffectivenessofitspolicingstrategiesandresource

utilization.

BPDsinadequatedatacollectionandanalysisreflectsbroaderdeficienciesrelatingtoofficer

supervisionthatallowconstitutionalviolationstogouncorrected.Asexplainedthroughoutour
findingsonstops,searches,arrests,andusesofforce,supervisorsconductminimalsubstantive
reviewofofficersjustificationsfortheseactivities.Anumberofsupervisorsinformedusthatthey
viewtheirroleasdocumentingactivityratherthanassessingwhethertheactivityconformedto
policy,orthattheybelieveinternalaffairsnotdirectsupervisionistheappropriatevehiclefor

assessingwhetheranenforcementactionmeetspolicyorconstitutionalrequirements.Indeed,our
reviewdidnotidentifyasinglestop,search,orarrestthatafrontlinesupervisorfoundtoviolate

constitutionalstandardseventhoughnumerousincidentreportsfortheseactivitiesdescribe
faciallyunlawfulpoliceaction.Supervisoryreviewofofficersuseofforceissimilarlylimited.As
explainedfurtherinSectionII.C.5,supra,theDepartmentsustainedonlyoneexcessiveforce

complaintthatcamefrominternalchannelsbetween2010and2015,despitetheover2,800usesof
forcethatBPDrecordedduringthattimeperiod.Thesefailuresarecompoundedbythedata
collectionandanalysisdeficiencieshighlightedabove.Supervisorslackimportantinformationabout
theactivitiesandeffectivenessofofficersundertheircommand.

BPDsfailuretoimplementsystemstocollectandanalyzedataunderminesnotonlyBPDs
abilitytosuperviseitsownactivities,butalsotheabilityofCityleadershipandthecommunityto

reviewtheactivitiesoftheirownpoliceforce.ThelackofdataanddataanalysisrendersBPD

opaquetoanyexternalentity,makingitdifficulttoascertainwhetherBPDispolicinginamanner

thataccordswiththeprioritiesofCityleadershiporthecommunitiesBPDserves.BPDmust
institutemoreeffectivedatamanagement,sothatitcanbeaccountabletoitscommunityand
leadership.

b. BPD Does Not Use an Adequate Early Intervention System

RelatedtoBPDsfailuretosuperviseitsofficersandcollectdataontheiractivities,the
Departmentlacksanadequateearlyinterventionsystem,orEIS,toidentifyofficersbasedon

patternsintheirenforcementactivities,complaints,andothercriteria.Aneffectiveearly
interventionsystemallowssergeants,lieutenants,andcommanderstoproactivelysupervisethe
officersundertheircommandandtocontinuallyassessofficersriskofengaginginproblematic
behavior.EISisaforward-lookingtoolthathelpssupervisorsinterruptnegativepatternsbefore
theymanifestasmisconductorunconstitutionalactivity.Likewise,earlyinterventionsystemshelp

supervisorsrecognizepositivepatternsthatshouldbeencouraged.BPDsEISdoesnotachieve
thesegoals.

DespiteBPDslongstandingnoticeofconcernsaboutitspolicingactivitiesandproblems
withitsinternalaccountabilitysystems,theDepartmenthasfailedtoimplementanadequateEISor

othersystemfortrackingorauditinginformationaboutofficerconduct.Rather,BPDhasanearly

interventionsysteminnameonly;indeed,BPDcommandersadmittedtousthattheDepartments

earlyinterventionsystemiseffectivelynonfunctional.Thesystemhasseveralkeydeficiencies.First,
BPDsetsthresholdsofactivitythattriggeralertstosupervisorsaboutpotentiallyproblematic
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conductthataretoohigh.Becauseofthesehighthresholds,BPDsupervisorsoftenarenotmade
awareoftroublingbehavioralpatternsuntilafterofficerscommitegregiousmisconduct.Second,
evenwherealertsaretriggered,wefoundthatBPDsupervisorsdonotconsistentlytakeappropriate

actiontocounseltheofficer,consideradditionaltraining,orotherwiseinterveneinawaythatwill
correctthebehaviorbeforeanadverseeventoccurs.Third,criticalinformationisomittedor
expungedfromtheEISthatcouldhelpaddressofficertrainingorsupportneedsorhelpprevent
futuremisconduct.Forexample,BPDexpungesdisciplineimposedfromcommand
investigationsmorethanhalfofallinternalinvestigationshandledbytheDepartmentwithin

oneyearwhereanofficervoluntarilyacceptsthecommandpunishment.

Thisexpungementis
problematicforofficerdiscipline,whichisnotthefunctionofEIS,butitalsoinhibitsafunctional
EISbecausethiscriticalinformationisomitted.Together,thesedeficienciesimpedeBPDsability
toidentifyandinterruptpatternsofbehaviorthatmaycompromisesafetyorleadtofuture
misconduct.Moreover,undertheStateLawEnforcementOfficerBillofRights,allcomplaintsthat
donotresultinasustainedfindingareeligibletobeexpungedwithinthreeyearsandthusnolonger
capturedintheDepartmentsEISsystem.

ItisclearthattheDepartmenthasbeenunabletointerruptseriouspatternsofmisconduct.

Ourinvestigationfoundthatnumerousofficershadrecurringpatternsofmisconductthatwerenot
adequatelyaddressed.Similarly,wenotethat,inthepastfiveyears,25BPDofficerswereseparately
suedfourormoretimesforFourthAmendmentviolations.BPDhaslikewisefailedtoidentify

officersinneedofsupportthroughitsEIS.Forexample,oneoftheofficer-involvedshootingfiles
wereviewedrevealedthattheinvolvedofficerwhounloadedhisentiremagazineatacardriving

towardhimhadbeenpreviouslyinvolvedintwootherofficer-involvedshootingsinthepastfive
years,inadditiontoalonghistoryofcomplaintsforharassmentandexcessiveforce.When

interviewedaboutthemostrecentshooting,theofficertolddetectivesthathebelievedhestillhad
post-traumaticstressrelatedtotheothershootings.EvenunderBPDshighEISthresholds,the

officersconducthadtriggeredalerts.Butbasedontherecordswereviewed,theDepartmentfailed
torespondtothosealertsinawaythatcouldhaveuncoveredtheofficersconditionorotherwise
allowedforanintervention.Theofficerwascriminallychargedintheshooting.BPDslackofan
effectiveEISexposesofficers,theDepartment,andthepublictoriskthatshouldbeavoided.

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B. BPD FAILS TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT ITS OFFICERS

BPDfailstosupportitsofficersthrougheffectivestrategiesforrecruitment,retention,and
staffingpatterns,anddoesnotprovidethemwithappropriatetechnologyandequipment.The
Departmentmustaddressanumberofinternalchallengesnamely,currentandprojected

manpowershortages,andoutdatedtechnology,facilities,equipmentandinsufficientresourcesin

ordertoensurethatofficersareadequatelysupported.BPDdistrictsareshort-staffed,anissuethat

isfurthercomplicatedbychallengestheDepartmentisfacinginretainingexperiencedofficers,and
inrecruitingqualifiedcadets.Additionally,theDepartmentstechnology,equipment,andfacilities
areoutdated,creatinginefficienciesforofficersandtheDepartment,andnegativelyimpactingthe
Departmentsrelationshipwiththecommunity.TheDepartmentalsolackscriticalresourcesto
supportofficers,suchaspsychologicalcounselingforofficersfollowingatraumaticincident.

First,BPDdoesnothaveaDepartment-wideplantoaddressstaffingshortagesinpatrol;

instead,eachdistrictdealswithitsownshortagesindependently.Districtsaddresstheirstaffing

shortagesbydrafting,orrequiring,officerstoworkadditionalhoursaftertheirregularten-hour
shift.Officersaredraftedtoworkuptoanadditionaltenhoursaftertheirregularshift,making
for,potentially,atwenty-hourday.Onlyonedistrictindicatedthattheyattempttodraftofficers
whoarenotworkingthefollowingdayafterbeingdrafted.Eachdistricthascrafteditsownprocess

ofdrafting,andtherearevariationsineachdistrictsprocedures.

TheDepartmenthas,however,
indicateditisintheprocessofcreatingapolicytomoreconsistentlyaddressstaffingshortages.

The
Departmentdoesnotrecord,track,orassesswhichofficersaredrafted,howfrequentlytheyare
drafted,orforhowmanyhourstheyaredraftedperdayoroveranyperiodoftime.Officerswe
spokewithconsistentlyinformedusoftheseriousnegativeimpactthatdraftinghasontheirmorale.

Additionally,thepotentialnegativeimpactthatdraftinghasonofficersdecision-makingskillsafter
workingforuptotwentyhoursisequallytroubling.Itwouldbedifficultevenforofficerswhoare
well-trainedandguidedbyproperpolicieswhichBPDofficersarenotafterworkingfourteento


twentyhours,toexerciserestraintandgoodjudgmentintheirinteractionswiththepublic.Itis
difficulttoexpectill-trainedofficerswhoareprovidedlittletonoguidancetodosoinsuch
circumstances.

ItappearsBPDsstaffingshortagewillnotberesolvedintheshortterm.Weheardfrom

officers,supervisors,andcommandstaffthatmanyofficersjoinBPDtogainexperienceinahigh

activityenvironment,andafterthreetofiveyears,leavetheDepartmentforless-demandingand

higher-paidpositionswithneighboringagencies.See FOP Blueprint for Improved Policing(July11,2012)

at4,13.ThisisasignificantdrainontheDepartmentsresources,astheseexperiencedofficers,if
theyremained,wouldbethefutureleadersoftheDepartment,andcriticaltothesuccessofthe

Departmentslawenforcementefforts.TheDepartmentalsoappearstobeconfrontingchallenges
inrecruitingqualifiedofficersithasonlymetafractionofitsgoalsforthe2016Academyclass.

AtleastoneoftheDepartmentsbackgroundcheckprocessesitspsychologicaltestinghasbeen

investigatedforallegedlyrushingthoseevaluations,sometimesconductingpsychologicalevaluations
foraspiringofficersinaslittleasfifteenminutes. 124TheDepartmentmustensurethatinitsefforts
torecruitasufficientquantityofofficers,itdoesnotsacrificethequalityofofficersthatthe
BaltimorecommunityandcurrentemployeesoftheDepartmentdeserve.

124KevinRector,Provider

of mental health evaluations for Baltimore police under investigation,TheBaltimoreSun,Aug.5,2015

(9:23PM),http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-md-police-psych-evals-20150805-story.html.

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Second,officersarealsochallengedbyBPDsoutdatedtechnology,equipment,andfacilities.

TheDepartmentishamperedbysignificanttechnologicalinfrastructuregapsandhistoricallyhas
underestimatedtheinfrastructurerequiredtoimplementtechnology.Whileweapplaudthe

Departmentsadvances,suchasitscommitmenttoequippingallofficerswithbody-worncameras,

BPDmustalsoensurethatitupdatesitstechnologicalinfrastructuretosupportsuchinitiatives,as

necessary.Likewise,officerssufferfrombeingsuppliedwithoutdated,broken,orinsomecases,no
equipment.AsoneofficernotedtotheFraternalOrderofPoliceinafocusgroup,HowamI

supposedtopullsomeoneoverforhavingataillightoutwhenmycarhastwo?

See also FOP

Blueprint for Improved Policing(July11,2012)at10.Officershavenocomputersintheircars,forcing

themtoreturntothedistrictstationtotypereports,andeventhosecomputersareoftennot

working.AlthoughtheDepartmentusesthePocketCopapplicationondepartmentallyissuedcell
phones,wefoundthatmanyofficersdidnothaveaccesstoitforvariousreasons,andthatitcould
notbeusedformanyreports.Thisabsenceoftechnologyforfield-basedreportingcreatesan
additionaldrainontheDepartmentsalreadylimitedresources.Takingofficersoffthestreettotype

reportsatthedistricttakesawayfromtimethatcouldbespentonlawenforcementorcommunity
buildingactivities.Italsocreatesinefficienciesforofficerswhooftenmustwritereportsonpaperin
thefieldwhiletheirmemoriesofincidentsarefresh,andthentypethesameinformationinto

computerdatabasesafterarrivingatthedistrictstationattheendoftheirshift.

TheseequipmentissuesnotonlycreateinefficienciesforofficersanddraintheDepartments
resources,theyalsonegativelyimpactofficermorale.Thedilapidatedstateofsomeofthe

Departmentsdistrictstationsalsolowersofficermorale,andaffectscommunityrelationships.

The
Departmentalsolackscriticalsupportservicesforofficers,suchasadequatepsychological
counselingorpeersupportprogramfollowingashootingorothertraumaticevent.Despiteits
budgetaryissues,theCityofBaltimorewillneedtomakeaninvestmentinitspublicsafetyfacilities

andresourcestoensurethatofficershavethetoolsnecessarytoproperlyservetheresidentsand
businessesoftheCity.

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C. BPD FAILS TO HOLD OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR MISCONDUCT

BPDreliesondeficientaccountabilitysystemsthatfailtocurbunconstitutionalpolicing.
Foryears,theDepartmentsprocessofinvestigatingandadjudicatingcomplaintshasbeenplagued
bysystemicfailures,including:discouragingindividualsfromfilingcomplaints;poorinvestigative
techniques;unnecessarydelays;minimalreviewandsupervision;andapersistentfailuretodiscipline

officersformisconduct,evenincasesofrepeatedoregregiousviolations.BPDlikewisefailsto
provideinformationaboutofficermisconductinatransparentmannerorreceiveinputonthe
accountabilityprocessfromthecommunityitserves.Asaresult,aculturalresistanceto
accountabilityhasdevelopedandbeenreinforcedwithintheDepartment.Thisculturefurther
underminesaccountabilitybydiscouragingofficersfromreportingmisconductanddiscouraging
supervisorsfromsustainingallegationsofit.BPDspersistentfailuretoholdofficersaccountable

formisconductcontributestoanerosionofthecommunitytrustthatiscentraltoeffectivelaw
enforcement.

CentraltoBPDsaccountabilitysystemsistheInternalInvestigationDivision,orIID.IID
investigatesandresolvescomplaintsofofficermisconduct,bothcomplaintsreceivedinternallyfrom
otherofficersorBPDemployees,andthosereceivedfrommembersofthecommunity.Withinthe

IID,Ethicsdetectivesinvestigatecomplaintsthatofficersengagedinpotentiallycriminalactivity,

orotherallegationsthat,thoughnotcriminal,implicateanofficersintegrityortruthfulness.

Generalinternalaffairsdetectivesinvestigateallotherallegationsofseriousofficermisconduct,

includingmostinstancesofexcessiveforce.OutsideoftheIID,eachoftheninepatroldistricts,
alongwitheachSpecializedUnitwithinBPDsOperationsBureau,housedaCommand
InvestigationsUnit,orCIU,untilJanuaryof2016,whentheDepartmentcentralizedallCommand

InvestigationUnitsattheIID.Beforecentralization,eachCIUoperatedindependentlyoftheother

CIUsandoftheIID.TheCIUsinvestigateminorviolationsofBPDpolicy,andBPDhas
authorizeddistrictandunitcommanderstoimposeminordisciplineintheeventanaccusedofficer

agreestothediscipline.

WhenIIDsustainstheallegationsinaninvestigation, 125oranofficerrefusestoaccept

disciplineatthecommandlevel,thecaseissenttotheOfficeofAdministrativeHearingsto

coordinatethedraftingofadministrativechargesand,ifnecessary,toarrangedisciplinary

proceedings.UndertheStatesLawEnforcementOfficersBillofRights(LEOBR),officersare

thenentitledtoanadversarialhearing,ortrialboard,beforetheDepartmentcandisciplinethem.At
BPD,trialboardsconvenedtoadjudicatecertainminorviolationsofBPDscommanddiscipline
policytypicallyconsistofoneperson,drawnfromapoolofBPDcommanders.

Trialboards
convenedtoadjudicatemajordisciplinearecomposedoftwocommandersandoneBPDmember
ofthesamerankastheaccusedofficer.Ifthetrialboardfindstheofficerisnotguiltyofviolating

BPDpolicy,thatfindingterminatesthecaseandtheDepartmentcannotdisciplinetheofficer.But
ifthetrialboardfindstheofficerisguilty,ithearsapresentationofmitigatingevidence,andthen

recommendsdiscipline.Ultimately,thecommissionerdeterminestheappropriatediscipline,but

125WhenBPDcompletesaninternalinvestigation,therearefourpossibleoutcomes.TheDepartmentcansustainan
allegation,whichmeansinvestigatorsfound,byapreponderanceofevidence,thatapolicyviolationoccurred.
Allegationscanbefoundnotsustained,whichmeansthatinvestigatorswereunabletotelleitherway.Allegationscan
beunfounded,meaningtheinvestigatordeterminedthattheviolationdidnot
occur.Orallegationsmaybeexonerated,
meaningthattheactionallegeddidoccur,butthatitdidnotviolateDepartmentpolicy.

139

mayonlydosoifthetrialboardfirstfindstheofficerguilty.Thecommissionermaydepartfrom
theBoardsrecommendationandimposelessormorediscipline.Butifthecommissionerimposes
greaterdiscipline,theofficerisentitledtoanotheropportunitytobeheard.Theofficermaythen
appealanydisciplineimposedbytheDepartmenttothestatecourtsinMaryland.

Wefounddeficienciesthroughouttheseaccountabilitysystemsthatundermineadherenceto
BPDspoliciesandproceduresandcontributetotheviolationsoffederallawthatwefound.

1. BPD Lacks Adequate Systems to Investigate Complaints and Impose Discipline

BPDssystemsforholdingofficersaccountableareplaguedbyseveraldeficiencies.We

foundthatBPDdiscouragesmembersofthepublicfromfilingcomplaints;improperlyclassifies
complaintstomaskmisconduct;delaysinvestigationsofcomplaintsunnecessarily;usespoor
investigativetechniquestogatherevidenceaboutmisconduct;failstoconsistentlydocumentthe
resultsofitsinvestigations;anddoesnotreceiveinputfromthecommunityorshareinformation
aboutitsinvestigativeprocesses.Asaresult,theDepartmentisrarelyabletoimposedisciplinefor

misconduct,andmanyofficersbelievethatdisciplinarydeterminationsarenotmadefairlyor
consistently.
a. BPD Discourages Members of the Public from Filing Complaints
BPDdiscouragesmembersofthepublicfromfilingcomplaintsagainstofficersthroughthe

proceduralrequirementsBPDhasimposedonfilingcomplaints,andBPDofficersandsupervisors
haveactivelydiscouragedcommunitymembersfromfilingcomplaints.Thesepracticespose

significantbarrierstomembersoftheBaltimorecommunitywhotrytoalerttheDepartmentto
misconductbyitsofficers.

Asaninitialmatter,BPDplacesunnecessaryconditionsonthefilingofcomplaints.While
theDepartmentostensiblyacceptscomplaintsmadeinperson,bytelephone,oroveremail,it

requirescomplaintsallegingmanycommontypesofmisconductincludingexcessiveforce,abusive

language,harassment,falsearrestandimprisonmenttobesigned,notarized,andfiledinpersonat
oneofjustafewlocationsthroughouttheCity. 126Additionally,complaintsallegingexcessiveforce
mustbeswornunderpenaltyofperjury.AlthoughIIDcommandersweinterviewedinformedus
that,despitetheserequirements,theDepartmentinvestigatesallcomplaintseveniftheyarenot

notarizedorsubmittedinperson,ourreviewofBPDsfilesindicatedthat,inpractice,BPDdoesnot
investigateunlesstheserequirementsaremet.Forexample,in2013anindividualcalledBPDs
internalaffairstocomplainaboutanofficerwhograbbedhimbytheneckandcalledhimapunk

assfaggot.Althoughtheindividualgaveastatementdescribingtheincidentoverthephone,BPD

supervisorsclosedthecasebecausethecomplainantdidnotshowupinpersonatBPDsInternal

InvestigationDivisiontofilloutaCRBformandtohavehisstatementnotarized.Indeed,the
BPDinvestigatorclaimedthatthemanfailedtocooperatebynotsubmittinganotarizedform.
Theserequirementsallbutensurethatnumerousanonymouscomplaints,orthosereceivedoverthe

phone,byemail,orinpersonatanyofBPDsninepolicedistricts,willgounexamined.

Inaddition,wefoundexamplesofBPDofficersexpresslydiscouragingciviliansfromfiling

126Ifthecomplaintismadebyajuvenile,thejuvenilemustbeaccompaniedbyanadult.

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complaints,sometimesmockingorhumiliatingthemintheprocess.Somecivilianswishingtoalert
BPDtoofficermisconducthadtoendureverbalabuseandcontactBPDmultipletimesbefore

investigatorswouldmoveforwardwithanyinvestigation.Asdescribedsupraat69-70,forexample,

BPDofficersridiculedanAfrican-Americanmanattemptingtofileacomplaintthatofficersused

excessiveforceandracialslursduringanarrest:whenthemanarrivedatthedistrictheadquartersto

makethecomplaint,officerstoldhim,youcantakeyourblackassdowntoKirkAvenuebeforethe

busleavesbecauseyouknowhowyoublackpeoplelikethebus.KirkAvenueisthelocationof

BPDsInternalInvestigationDivision.Inanotherincident,awomanallegedthataBPDsupervisor

flatlyrefusedtoacceptacomplaintthatofficersusedexcessiveforcewhenarrestingherson.

Accordingtothewoman,thesupervisorrefusedtoacceptthecomplaint,tellingthewomanshe

couldnotgoagainstherofficers.

Toensurethatitlearnsaboutpotentialconstitutionalviolationsandothermisconductbyits

officers,andtorebuilditsrelationshipwithmanyofthecommunitiesitserves,BPDmustreformits

complaintintakeproceduresandmakethemaccessibletothepublic.

b. Supervisors Misclassify Complaints and Administratively Close

Them Without Investigation

Afterintakeofacomplaint,BPDinvestigatorsfrequentlymisclassifythosecomplaintsor

administrativelyclosethemwithlittleattempttocontactthecomplainant.

First,BPDinvestigatorsofteninappropriatelycategorizecomplaintsasminorallegations
thatmayberesolvedatthecommandlevelwithoutIIDinvolvement.Appropriatelycategorizinga

complaintiscriticalbecauseitaffectswhichinternalaffairscomponentwillinvestigate,thelevelof
investigationundertaken,andthepossibledisciplineimposed.BPDspolicyoncommanddiscipline

listscategoriesofcaseswhichmaybehandledbythedistrict,butthisfailstoprovideguidancefor

officersanddetectivesaboutwhencasesshouldbereferredtoIID,orwhoisresponsiblefor

makingthatdecision.Instead,weweretoldthatBPDofficersandIIDinvestigatorscategorize

complaintsbasedoncommonsense.Moreover,wefoundthatBPDdoesnotuseitsinternal

affairsdatabasetoconsistentlyreviewhowcomplaintsarecategorized,andthatisitsonly

mechanismfordoingso.Thisprocessvestsconsiderablediscretioninsupervisors,andwefound
thatsupervisorsfrequentlyusethisdiscretiontoclassifyallegationsofmisconductthatresultin
minimalinvestigation.Indeed,wefoundthattheDepartmentresolvedthemajorityofthe
approximately38,000allegations 127madeagainstBPDofficersfrom2010through2015atthe
commandlevelwithoutreferraltoIID,resultinginsignificantlylessinvestigation.Moreover,of
these38,000allegations,9,694allegationswerecategorizedassupervisorcomplaints,which,
accordingtoBPDcommanders,requirenoinvestigationatall.Accordingly,allegationshandledas

supervisorcomplaintsvirtuallyneverresultindiscipline.WefoundthatBPDadministratively

closed67percentofsupervisorcomplaintsandsustainedjust0.27percentofthem,or1outof
every370allegations.

Manycomplaintsthatweresenttocommandinvestigationsorclassifiedassupervisor
complaintsallegedseriousmisconduct,includingallegationsthatofficerscommittedcriminal
assault,theft,anddomesticviolence.In2014,forexample,althoughacomplaintonintakeallegeda

127Asinglecomplaintmaycontainmultipleallegations.

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sexualassault,thecasewasassignedtoacommandinvestigationsunitandcategorizedas

misconduct/impropersearchanddiscourtesy.In2011,asergeantlikewisemisclassifieda
complaintallegingthatthatBPDofficershadbeenharassinganAfrican-Americanwomansnephew
overthepastmonthbyrepeatedlystoppinghimneartheirhomeinWestBaltimore.Thoughthe
womanwishedtomakeacomplaintofharassment,thesergeantcategorizedthecomplaintasa

supervisorcomplaintandclosedthecasewithoutconductinganyinterviewsoftheinvolved

officersorthewomansnephew.Thisistroubling,particularlygivenourfindingsthatBPDofficers
engageinunlawfulstopsanddiscriminatorypolicing.

Second,evenwherecomplaintsarenominallyaccepted,BPDsupervisorsoften

administrativelyclosethemwithminimalinvestigation.Indeed,BPDsupervisorsadministratively

closed33percentofallallegationsreceivedfrom2010through2015ensuringthattheallegations

wouldresultinnofurtherinvestigationorofficerdiscipline.Administrativeclosuresfrequently

occuraftersupervisorsmakeonlyminimaleffortstocontactthecomplainant.Someofthefileswe
reviewedcontainednoindicationthatinvestigatorsattemptedtocontactcomplainantsatall.Many

otherfilesshowedthatinvestigationslanguishedformonthsbeforeinvestigatorsmadeanyeffortto
reachout,orthatinvestigatorsclosedcasesaftercomplainantsfailedtorespondtoasingleletter,
answeraphonecall,orappearforascheduledinterview.Byadministrativelyclosingcomplaints,

BPDinvestigatorsevadeBPDpolicythatrequiresallcomplaintstobelabeledassustained,not
sustained,exoneratedorunfounded.SomeBPDofficersweinterviewedbelieveditwasappropriate
toadministrativelycloseacomplaintwhenthecomplainantwithdrewhisorhercomplaint,orcould

otherwisenotbereached.Othersbelievedcomplaintsthatfailedtoallegearealviolationof
BPDpolicyshouldbeadministrativelyclosed.Theseadministrativeclosures,combinedwithBPDs
failuretoensurethatcomplaintsareappropriatelyclassified,undermineBPDssystemof
accountabilityandcontributestotheperceptionsharedbyofficersandcommunitymembersalike
thatdisciplineisinconsistentandarbitrary.

c. BPD Fails to Investigate Complaints in a Timely Manner or with

Effective Techniques

Wheninvestigationsofcomplaintsdoproceed,theyarehamperedfromthestartbypoor

investigativetechniquesandunreasonabledelays.ThesefailureslimittheDepartmentsabilityto
disciplineitsofficersbypreventinginvestigatorsfromgatheringevidenceofmisconductand

subjectingevidencetoattackduringadministrativeproceedings.

i. Delays Impede Investigations

BPDsmisconductinvestigationsarefrequentlyplaguedbydelaysthatcompromisethe
evidence-gatheringprocessandunderminecommunityconfidence.Asaninitialmatter,evenwhen
BPDnominallyacceptsanexternalcomplaintandassignsthecasetoaninvestigator,the

Departmentspracticeinmostcasesistonotinvestigatethatcomplaintuntiltheindividualappears

inpersonatBPDsInternalInvestigationDivisionduringbusinesshoursandparticipatesina

formal,tapedinterview.Bythatpoint,keyevidencethatcouldcorroborateclaimsmaybelostor
destroyed.Wefoundinstancesinwhichinvestigatorswaitedmonthsbeforecanvassing
neighborhoodsinwhichallegedmisconductoccurs.Aftersuchdelays,physicalevidenceisoften
142

destroyed,witnessescannotbelocated,andwitnessmemorieshavefaded.Otherimportant

evidence,suchassurveillancevideo,mayalsobeunavailable.

Thesedelaysnotonlyimpedeeffectiveinvestigations,theycommunicatetothecommunity
thatBPDdoesnottakecomplaintsseriouslyeventhoseallegingegregiousofficerbehavior.For

example,amanallegedin2013thattwoplainclothesofficerspunchedhimintheface,placedhimin

achokehold,andspitinhisfaceduringanarrest.Theman,whosearrestprosecutorsdeclinedto

pursue,participatedinaformalinterviewatIIDduringwhichheprovidedtheinvestigatorwiththe
nameofawitnesstotheincident,andthewitnessswife,whocouldhelpinvestigatorslocatehim.

Theinvestigatormadenoefforttofollowupwiththecivilianwitnessuntileightmonthsafterthe
incidentoccurred.Atthattime,theinvestigatorwenttothecarwashwherethewitnessswifehad
beenworkingatthetimeoftheincidentandwastoldbytheownerthatshewasnolongeremployed

there.Theinvestigatorthenrecommendedtoclosethecomplaintasnotsustainedbecause

[w]ithouttestimonyfromindependentwitnesses,alongwiththeofficersdenial,thereexists

insufficientevidencetoproveordisprovetheallegations.BPDsinvestigationofasecond2013
complaintallegingseriousmisconductsufferedevenlongerdelays.Thecomplainantallegedhewas

hospitalizedaftertwoofficersslammedhimtothegroundandunlawfullyarrestedhimfor
hinderingandfailingtoobeyduetohisrefusaltoleavetheareawhileofficersquestionedhis

brother-in-law.Thecomplaintwasnotinvestigatedforthirteenmonthswhiletwocommand
investigationunitssentthecomplaintbackandforth.Afterthecasewasrediscoveredafteranaudit
ofIAPro,itlingeredforanotherfourmonthsbeforeasupervisorfinallyassignedthecasetoanIID
detective.BPDultimatelyfoundthecomplaintnotsustainedforlackofcooperationwhen
witnessesfailedtoshowupforinterviewsseventeen

monthsafterthecomplaintwasfiled.According

totheinvestigativefile,theDepartmentneverinterviewedtheaccusedofficers.

Inanotheregregiousexample,aninvestigatormademinimaldelayedattemptstolookintoa
womanscomplaintthattwoBPDofficersfondledherwhenconductingasearchandcalledhera

junkie,whorebitch.Theinvestigatorassignedtothecasemadenoattempttocontactthewoman

untilfourmonthsaftershemadetheseseriousallegations.Andatthatpoint,theinvestigatormerely

sentthewomanacertifiedletterseekinginformation.Twomonthslater,aftertheletterhadcome

backunclaimed,theinvestigatorwenttotheresidentialaddressthewomanhadoriginallyprovided,
onlytodiscovershehadbeenevictedmonthsbefore.Moreover,thedelaysprecludedinvestigators
fromidentifyingrelevantvideoevidence.TheincidentoccurredinapubliclocationtheLexington

Marketthatwaslikelycapturedonvideosurveillance.Yetthedetectivemadenoattempttogather

thefootageuntiltenmonthsaftertheincident.Bythattime,anyvideohadbeendeleted.
Investigatorsalsowaitedtenmonthstoreachouttoawitness,eventhoughthecomplainanthad
providedthewitnessscontactinformationatthetimeshefiledthecomplaint.Ultimately,the

investigatorlearnedthatthecomplainanthadpassedawayseveralmonthsbeforehefirstcontacted
thewitness.BPDthenfoundthecomplaintnotsustained.

Intheseandmanysimilarcaseswereviewed,unnecessarydelaysprecludedBPD
investigatorsfromgatheringimportantevidenceaboutallegationsofseriousmisconduct.Going

forward,collectingandassessingsuchevidenceinatimelymannerwillbeacriticalpieceofthe

accountabilitysystemthatBPDmustbuildtoidentifyofficersconstitutionalviolationsandimpose
appropriatediscipline.

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ii. BPD Uses Ineffective Methods to Investigate Misconduct Allegations

Inadditiontofrequentdelaysthatlimittheinformationavailableaboutmisconduct
allegations,poorinvestigativetechniquesfurthercompromiseBPDsinvestigations.Weidentified

severalkeyfailuresthatrecurthroughouttheDepartmentsinvestigativefiles,includingthefailureto
adequatelyconsiderinconsistenciesininvestigations,aswellasinappropriateinterviewingmethods

andnoticeofallegations.

First,investigatorsfailtoadequatelyconsiderevidenceandstatementsfromwitnessesor

otherofficersthatcontradictexplanationsprovidedbyofficersaccusedofmisconduct.Indeed,
BPDappearstoapplyastandardthatfavorsofficerswhenevaluatingstatementsmadeby
complainantsandinvolvedofficers.WhileBPDsInternalAffairsManualencouragesinvestigators
tobewaryofacomplainantsinconsistentstatements,theDepartmentpermitsofficerstosubmit

addendumsthatclarifytheiroriginalstatements.Andwheninconsistenciesariseeitherfromsuch

addendaorotherevidenceinvestigatorsgenerallydiscreditordiscountentirelyevidence

contradictingtheaccusedofficersaccount.Wefoundinvestigationsinwhichthistookplaceeven
wheretheaccusedofficersaccountiscontradictedbyphysicalevidence,includingphotographicor
videoevidence.

Second,BPDinvestigatorscompromiseofficerinterviewsbyfailingtoprobebeyondreports

theaccusedofficeralreadyprovided,andperformingunrecordedpre-interviewswithaccused
officers.AswedescribedinSectionII.C.5,supra

at107,regardingforceinvestigations,thesepre

interviewscompromisetheintegrityofaninvestigation.Similarly,wealsofoundnumerous
instancesinwhichofficersreviewedtheirstatementoradministrativereportrelatedtotheincident
beforetheinterview,andtheinterviewthenconsistedmerelyoftheaccusedofficerorallyreciting

128
hisadministrativereport. IIDinvestigatorsdidnotprobebeyondthisoralrecitation.

These
interviewtechniquesinhibitthefunctionofIIDinvestigatorstoobtainreliableinformationfrom
officersaccusedofmisconduct.

Third,BPDriskscompromisinginvestigationsbyprovidingaccusedofficerswithadetailed

noticedescribingtheallegedmisconduct,oftenrightafteracomplainthasbeenfiledandbeforeany
investigationoccurs.WhileLEOBRprovidesthatofficersmustreceivebasicnoticeofallegations

andfivedaystoobtaincounselpriortoquestioning,BPDfrequentlynotifiesofficersalmost

129
immediatelyaftertheDepartmentreceivesacomplaint.

Thisnoticeoftentakesplacebeforea
detectiveundertakesanyinvestigationorevenattemptstocontactthecomplainanttosetupan
128BPDofficerscollectivebargainingagreementprovidestheopportunitytoreviewstatementsandreportspriorto

beinginterviewed.
129Untilearly2016,LEOBRentitledofficerstoatendaynoticeperiodtoobtaincounselpriortobeingquestioned.

We
notethatthesewaitingperiodsprescribedbyLEOBRmay,inmanyinstances,impedeeffectiveinvestigations,andthata

similarwaitingperiodisnotaffordedtomembersofthepublicwhomayhavebeeninvolvedinanincidentorwere

witnessestotheincident.Insomeinstances,wesawevidencethatBPDrequiredwitnessestobeinterviewed

immediately,evenwhilethewitnesssfriendorfamilymemberwasbeingtakentothehospitalasaresultoftheincident.

Thebestpracticeistointerviewtheofficerassoonaspossible.

Additionally,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsof

Policeopposesanyspecialand/oradditionalprotectionforlawenforcementofficers.Officersrightsshouldbeno
greaterthanthoseofotherprivateandpublicsectoremployees.L
EGISLATIVEAGENDAFORTHE114THCONGRESS,
INTERNATIONALASSOCIATIONOFCHIEFSOFPOLICE20,
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/IACP114thLegislativeAgenda.pdf.

144

interview.Moreover,thenoticespecificallyarticulatestheallegationsagainsttheofficer

sometimesincludingthedateandtimeoftheincidentinquestion.Providingsuchdetailednoticeat
theoutsetofaninvestigation,whichisnotrequiredbyLEOBR,maycompromisecertain
investigativestepsandopensthepossibilitythatacomplainantmayberetaliatedagainstor
intimidatedpriortospeakingwithinvestigators.Indeed,theDepartmentsowninternalaffairsaudit
identifiedthesesamepotentialproblemsin2014.TheDepartmentnonethelesscontinuestouseits

earlynotificationpractice.

iii. BPD Fails to Adequately Supervise Investigations

ThedeficienciesinBPDsinvestigativetechniquespersistinpartbecauseofineffective
supervisionandtraining.Indeed,wefoundthatmostinvestigatorsreceivenoformalinvestigative
training.Lackoftrainingcoupledwithminimalsupervisionresultsinsomeinvestigatorscontinuing

torelyonpoorinvestigativetechniques.Forexample,oneCIUdetectivewhowasresponsiblefor

allcommandinvestigationsforanentiredistricttoldusthathispracticewastoallowaccused
officerstobeinterviewedbyquestionnairewhichofficerscouldcompleteoff-sitewiththe

assistanceoftheirattorneysratherthansubmittoin-personinterviews.AlthoughBPDformally
discontinuedtheuseofwrittenquestionnairesyearsago,thepracticepersistsbecauseofinadequate

trainingandoversight.Indeed,thispracticehascontinuedevenafteritwascriticizedbythe
Departmentsowninternalaffairsaudit.

Moreover,BPDsupervisorsfailtoidentifydeficienciesorquestionablefindingsin

investigations.Wefoundthatcommandersconsistentlyapproveinvestigativefindings,evenwhere

investigativefilesaredeficientorincomplete.Inourreview,wefoundthatfilesfrequentlyomitted
basicinformation,suchastheoutcomeoftheinvestigationoranydisciplineimposed.Wealso

foundkeypiecesofevidencereferredtointheinvestigatorsnarrativeincludingwitness

statements,photographs,andvideofootagewereleftoutofthecasefileitself.Nevertheless,

acrossallthecasefileswereviewed,wesawvirtuallynoevidencethatsupervisorssentcasesback

forfurtherinvestigationorclarification.Nordosupervisorsmeaningfullyreviewinvestigators
determinationsaboutwhethertosustaincomplaints.Indeed,CIUinvestigatorstoldustheywere
notrequiredtohavesupervisorsreviewandsignoffoninvestigationsthatresultedinfindingsof

notsustained,althoughsupervisorsmustapproveaninvestigationthatresultsinafindingof

sustained.

Additionally,BPDsinternalaffairsfilesanddatabaseindicatethatBPDdoesnotadequately
superviseinvestigatorstoensurethattheymeetinvestigativedeadlines,especiallyinthecommand

investigationsunits.UnderLEOBR,inordertodisciplineanofficerformisconduct,the
Departmentmustcompletetheinternalinvestigationandbringadministrativechargeswithinone
year.Wereviewedcomplaintswhereinvestigatorsrecommendedclosingcasesbecausethe
investigationshadextendedpasttheone-yeardeadline.Indeed,BPDsinternalaffairsdatabaseitself
includespossiblefindingsthatindicatecaseswereclosedduetoexpiration.

Finally,BPDhasnottakensufficientstepstoensurethatinvestigatorsdonothaveaconflict

ofinterest.Wefoundinstancesinwhichconflictsofinterestcouldhavecompromisedaninternal
investigation.Forexample,oneinternalaffairsdetectiveweinterviewedtoldusthathehadbeen

detailedtoserveunderthesupervisionofanofficerhewasinvestigatingatthattime,andthatthe

145

commanderknewoftheinvestigation.Thisistroubling,anditcommunicatestoofficers,
investigators,andthecommunitythatinternalinvestigationsarenotapriorityoftheDepartment.

BPDsfailuretoensurethatinvestigationsarethoroughlyandfairlyinvestigatedlimitsits
abilitytoholdofficersaccountableformisconduct.Withoutadequateevidence,thechancesof
sustainingallegationsofofficermisconductarediminished.Andevenwhereallegationsof

misconductaresustained,theDepartmentsabilitytomarshaladequateevidenceattrialboard

proceedingsiscompromised.Consequently,officersfrequentlydonotfaceinternaldisciplineeven
whereevidenceofmisconductexists.

d. BPD Fails to Sustain Complaints and Apply Discipline Consistently

DeficienciesinBPDscomplaintintakeandinvestigationcontributetoBPDsextremelylow
rateofsustainingallegationsofofficermisconduct,whichinturnleadstoalackofdisciplineand

accountabilityintheDepartment.Disciplineforallegationsofseriousmisconductisrare.Ofthe
1,382allegationsofexcessiveforcethatBPDtrackedfrom2010through2015,only31allegations,
or2.2percentweresustained.Theseallegationsaroseoutoffourteenseparateincidents.Inlightof
thesignificantevidenceofexcessiveforcewefoundinourinvestigation,thelowrateofsustaining
excessiveforcecomplaintsistroubling.Similarly,BPDcompletedinvestigationsinto1,359
allegationsofdiscourtesyfrom2010through2015,andsustainedjust2.6percentofthose

allegations,arisingoutofjustfifteenincidents.Thislownumberofsustainedoutcomesisalso
concerning,consideringthenumberofcommunitymemberswespoketowhodescribedBPD

officersbehavinginarudeorabusivemannerduringencounterswithcommunitymembers.

Whencomplaintsofmisconductaresustained,however,thetrialboardprocessthatfollows
inorderfordisciplinetobeimposedalsohasseveralproblemsthatimpedeaccountability.First,the
processisbesetbydelay.TheDepartmentreportedtous,forexample,thatsometrialboards
conductedin2015weretoresolvecasesBPDbeganinvestigatingin2011.Delaysofthismagnitude
sendamessagetoofficersthatmisconductistolerated,frustratingofficersandsupervisorswhoare

tryingtofollowandimplementDepartmentpoliciesandprocedures.Theyalsosignaltothepublic,
andinparticulartothecomplainant,thatofficerswhocommitmisconductareunlikelytobeheld

accountable.

Second,officersfacingthetrialboardhavesubstantialpowersgrantedtothembyLEOBR
andBPDscollectivebargainingagreementstoshapethemembershipofthetrialboardthatwill
heartheircase,underminingaccountability.TrialboardsconvenedbyBPDtoadjudicateallegations

ofmisconductaretypicallycomposedofthreeofficersselectedfromapooldeterminedbythe
commissioner.UnderLEOBR,eachboardmustincludeoneofficerwhoisthesamerankasthe
lawenforcementofficeragainstwhomthecomplaintisfiled. 130Theaccusedofficerhastheright

torejectassignedBoardmembersatotalofthreetimesthroughtheuseofperemptorystrikes.The
officercanexercisethesestrikesuptoandincludingthedayofthehearingitself,potentially
dismissingallmembersoftheboard.Weheardfromnumeroussources,includingmanywithin
BPDandCityleadership,thatthisuseofperemptorystrikespermitsofficerstoassembleatrial

boardsympathetictotheirinterests,particularlybecausethepoolofeligiblecommandstaffinthe

Departmentislimited,andbecausethecommandstaffmembersarealsopartofthesameunion.
130Md.CodeAnn.,Pub.Safety

3107.

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TheMarylandlegislatureamendedLEOBRinearly2016toauthorizejurisdictionswithinthestate

toallowuptotwovotingornonvotingcivilianstoserveontrialboardsifauthorizedbylocallawor

ifnegotiatedthroughcollectivebargainingwiththepoliceunion.

Todate,BPDdoesnotallow
civilianstoserveonthetrialboard.

AlthoughBPDproducedaverylimitedamountofinformationabouttrialboard
proceedings,wesawindicationsthattheconstructionofthetrialboardsunderminesconfidencein

theequityoftheprocess.Werequestedinformationonalltrialboardsconductedbetween2010and

2015,andBPDproducedonlytwelvetranscriptsoftrialboardproceedings,andnosummariesand
nowrittenfindingsforthe139trialboardstheDepartmentreportedtookplacebetween2010and

2015,despiteourrequestthattheDepartmentproducealldocumentationconcerningtrialboard

cases.Inaddition,BPDsattorneystoldustheDepartmentwillonlycreateatranscriptofatrial

boardthatresultsinaguiltyfindingiftheofficerchallengesthedisciplineimposedincourt.This
lackofinformationisconsistentwithBPDsownassessment:accordingtoaninternalaudit,BPD
hashistoricallyfailedtofullytrackinformationrelatedtodiscipliningofficers.Suchminimal
documentationofthetrialboardprocesspreventstheDepartmentfromfullyevaluatingthe

proceedingsoridentifyingpatternsordeficienciesthatmaycontributetotheDepartmentsfailureto

disciplineanofficer.

Thislackofconsistencyandfairnessinimposingdisciplinehasaprofoundeffectonofficer
morale,anditalsoaffectshowofficersinteractwiththepublic.Throughoutourinterviewsand

ride-alongswithofficers,weheardofficersexpressthatdisciplineisonlyimposedifanincident
makesitintothepressorifyouwereonthewrongsideofasupervisor,notbecauseofthe

magnitudeofthemisconduct.Similarly,someofficersfeltthatcommandstaffcreatesan
appearanceofaddressingproblemsafterahigh-profileincidentbyrushingtoissuenewpolicies,
withoutanyofficerinput,andofteninconflictwithexistingpolicies.ByBPDrushingtoissuethese

newpolicies,officersfeltthattheywerenotprovidedwithadequatetrainingtofollowthenewrules,
exposingthemtoriskevenastheDepartmentappearedtoaddresstheproblemandrespondtoCity

politics.Thislackofinternalproceduraljusticeofficerssensethattheyarebeingtreatedfairlyby
theirDepartmentdiminishesofficermoraleanddiminishesofficersadherencetoDepartmental

rules.This,inturn,canmakeofficerslesslikelytotreatmembersofthepublicfairlyandin
accordancewithBPDpoliciesandprocedures,potentiallycontributingtoviolationsoffederallaw
wefoundinourinvestigation.See, e.g., NicoleE.Haaset.al.,Explaining officer compliance: The
importance of procedural justice and trust inside a police organization,Criminology&CriminalJustice,p.14
(January2015)(findingthattheperceptionofproceduraljusticeandtrustisassociatedwithhigher

levelsofendorsementofrulesandregulationsontheuseofforce).
e. BPD Lacks Effective Civilian or Community Oversight

BPDsaccountabilitysystemisshieldedalmostentirelyfrompublicview,andthecivilian
oversightmechanismsthatarecurrentlyinplaceareinadequateandineffective.Theseflawsdamage

theDepartmentslegitimacyinthecommunity.

CommunitymembersareunabletoobtaininformationaboutBPDscomplaintand
disciplinesystemsatalmosteverystepintheprocess.Complainantsfacemanyhurdlesinfiling
complaints,butoncetheyarefiled,itisdifficultforcomplainantstoobtaininformationabouthow
thecomplaintsareprogressingorwhetherandwhentheywillbeactedupon.

Indeed,evenwhen
147

disciplineisimposed,noticeofthisactionisonlygiventoasmallgroupwithintheDepartment,not

tothecomplainantortothepublicexceptinunusualcircumstanceswheretheDepartment

determinesthatabroaderannouncementofthedisciplineisinthepublicinterest.Trialboard
proceedingshavebeenclosedtothepublichistorically.Althoughtheywereopenedtothepublicin

early2016,itistooearlytodeterminewhateffectthishasonthecommunitysabilitytoaffectthe

accountabilityprocess.TheMarylandPublicInformationAct,orMPIA,furtherlimitsBPDs

transparencytothepublic.TheMPIAprohibitsdisclosureofdocumentsthatconstitutepersonnel
records.SeeMd.CodeAnn.10616.Thestatutedoesnotdefinethescopeofthisprohibition,
butMarylandappellatecourtshaveheldthatitappliestoallmaterialsrelatedtohiring,promotions,
anddiscipline,aswellasanymatterinvolvinganemployee'sstatus.

See, e.g.,Montgomery County v.

Shropshire,23A.3d205,215(Md.Ct.App.2011).Weheardfromnumeroussourcesthatthis
provisionhasrepeatedlyblockedattemptstoaccessinformationabouttheresolutionofcomplaints

andotherissuesofpublicconcernrelatedtoBPDspolicingactivities.

Inaddition,BaltimoresCivilianReviewBoard,orCRB,hasproventobeineffectiveat

changingthisdynamic,inlargepartbecauseithasneverbeenprovidedwithadequateauthorityor
resourcestoperformitsintendedfunction.Establishedin2000,theBoardwasmeanttobea
crucialcheckonpolicemisconductbyprovidinganalternativeinvestigativeandreviewprocess.
TheBoardismadeupofcivilianrepresentativesfromeachoftheCitysninepolicedistrictsselected

bytheMayorandapprovedbytheCityCounsel,alongwithmemberswithoutvotingpowerfrom

localadvocacyorganizationsandthelocalchapteroftheFraternalOrderofPolice.TheBoardmay
acceptcomplaintsthatallegeexcessiveforce,abusivelanguage,harassment,falsearrest,andfalse

imprisonmentdirectlyfromthecommunity.BPDisalsorequiredbypolicytoforwardall
complaintscontainingthesecategoriesofallegationstotheBoard.TheBoardmayreviewBPDs

investigations,oritmayconductanindependentinvestigationandmakerecommendationsdirectly
tothecommissionerthatthecomplaintbesustained,notsustained,unfounded,orexonerated.

It
canalsorequestthatBPDundertakeadditionalinvestigation.

TheBoardhasfacedseveralimpedimentstoservingasameaningfulcommunitybackstop

foraccountability.First,theBoardreliesuponBPDtoforwardcomplaintsthatfallwithinits

authority,exceptwhenacomplaintisfileddirectlywiththeBoard,andBPDoftenfailstoforward

complaintsinatimelymanner.Indeed,CRBstaffmemberstoldusofcasesBPDforwardedtothe

BoardonlyafterBPDhadalreadycloseditsinvestigation,despiteBPDsobligationtosharethe

complaintwiththeBoardwithin48hoursofreceipt.TheBoardhasnoauthoritytoauditBPDto
determineifithasreceivedallthecomplaintsthatshouldhavebeenforwardedtoit.Second,the
Boardhasinsufficientresourcesandauthoritytoconductitsowninvestigations.During2010to
2015,theBoardonlyhadasingleinvestigatortoinvestigateallthecomplaintsthatfellwithinits

authority.TheBoardalsocannotcompelofficerstoparticipateininvestigations;indeed,LEOBR
providesthatswornlawenforcementofficerscanonlybeinterrogatedbyotherswornlaw
enforcementofficers.Finally,whentheBoardmakesrecommendationstothecommissionerabout
investigativefindings,orrecommendsthattheIIDconductadditionalinvestigation,theBoardhas
nowayofknowingifBPDactsonitsrecommendations,muchlessrequiringthatBPDdoso.

The
lackofresourcesandauthoritythattheCitycurrentlyinvestsintheBoardrenderitineffective,
heighteningcommunityperceptionsthatBPDisresistanttoaccountability.

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WenotethatweareencouragedthattheCivilianReviewBoardwasrecentlyabletohire

severalnewstaffmembers,andisnowcoordinatinganewmediationinitiativeforpoliceand
communitymembers.Althoughthesearestepsintherightdirection,theBoardwillstillbeunable
tofulfillitsmissionifitisnotgrantedmoreauthorityandsupportedwithadequateresourcesto

performitsduties.

2. BPDs Internal Culture is Resistant to Effective Discipline

ThelongstandingdeficienciesinBPDssystemsforinvestigatingcomplaintshascontributed

toaculturalresistancetoaccountabilitythatpersistsintheDepartment.Theculturaloppositionto
meaningfulaccountabilitywithintheDepartmentisreflectedbythelackofdisciplineforserious

misconductandwidespreadviolationsofminorpolicyprovisions;thefailuretotakeactionagainst
officerswithaknownreputationforrepeatedlyviolatingDepartmentpolicyandconstitutional

requirements;andthereluctanceofofficerstoreportobservedmisconductforfearthatdoingso
willsubjectthemtoretaliation.

a. BPD Has Allowed Violations of Policy To Go Unaddressed Even

When They Are Widespread Or Involve Serious Misconduct

Inpartbecauseoftheabovefailuresininvestigatingcomplaintsagainstofficers,BPDallows
policyviolationstogounaddressed,evenwhentheyoccurinlargenumberorinvolveserious

misconduct.Forexample,themostcommonallegationsofpolicyviolationthatfallunder
commandinvestigationslevelisthatofficersfailtoappearincourt.TheDepartmentsinternal
affairsdatabaseindicatesthat6,571allegationsweremadethatofficersfailedtoappearincourt

betweenJanuary1,2010,andMarch28,2016.For1,698oftheseallegations,theDepartmentdid

notrecordanydispositionatall,althoughacompleteddatehasbeenenteredforallbutahandful
oftheseincidents,indicatingthattheinvestigationhasconcluded.Additionally,theDepartment
administrativelyclosed1,142ofthecases.

Thus,nearlyhalfofthesepolicyviolations43

percentresultedinnoactionbeingtakenagainsttheofficerforfailingtoappearincourt.Without
thearrestingorwitnessingofficerstestimony,manyofthesecaseslackadequateevidenceto
proceed,andaredismissed.

Moreover,wefoundevidencethatsomeBPDofficersengageincriminalbehaviorthatBPD

doesnotsufficientlyaddress.Weheardcomplaintsfromthecommunitythatsomeofficerstarget
membersofavulnerablepopulationpeopleinvolvedinthesextradetocoercesexualfavors

fromtheminexchangeforavoidingarrest,orforcashornarcotics.Thisconductisnotonly
criminal,itisanabuseofpower.Unfortunately,wenotonlyfoundevidenceofthisconductin

BPDsinternalaffairsfiles,itappearedthattheDepartmentfailedtoadequatelyinvestigate

allegationsofsuchconduct,allowingittorecur.

Forexample,BPDinvestigatorsbecameawareofoneofficersallegedmisconductinMarch
of2012whentheyconductedaprostitutioninitiativeforthepurposesofgatheringintelligence

andobtainingconfidentialinformantsrelatingtopolicecorruption.Oneofthewomen

interviewedinformedBPDinvestigatorsthatshemetwithacertainofficerandengagedinsexual

activitiesintheofficerspatrolcaronceeveryotherweekinexchangeforU.S.Currencyor

immunityfromarrest.TheDepartmentadministrativelyclosedthecaseninemonthslater,

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without,itappears,referringthematterforcriminalprosecutionorinterviewingtheaccusedofficer,

oranyotherpotentialwitnesses.

Tenmonthsafterclosingthefirstinvestigation,theChiefofBPDsOfficeofProfessional

ResponsibilityreceivedananonymousCrimeStopperstipthatthesameofficerwashavingsexin
hispatrolvehiclewithadifferentpersoninvolvedinthesextrade.

TheDepartmentinitiatedanew
investigation,andassignedthecasetoadifferentdetective.Onedayafteropeningtheinvestigation,

anassistantstatesattorneydirectedthedetectivetosubpoenathewomansphonerecordsforasix

month-period.Thedetectivewaitedmorethanamonthtodoso,andthendidnotreviewthose
recordsforanothersixmonths,untilMayof2014.Therecordsconfirmedthattheofficerandthe

womanexchanged237textmessagesandfivephonecallsinthesix-monthperiodforwhichrecords
weresubpoenaed.Approximatelyfourmonthslater,theStatesAttorneysOfficedeclinedto
prosecutetheofficer,thoughBPDsadministrativeinvestigationremainedopen.

FourmonthsaftertheStatesAttorneysOfficedeclinedtoprosecute,inFebruaryof2015,
BPDreceivedathird,newtipthatthesameofficerwasengaginginsexualactivitieswiththesame

womaninvolvedinthesextradewhowasmentionedintheCrimeStopperstip.Thenewtip

camefromaneighboringPoliceDepartment,whichinterviewedthewomanandsubpoenaedher

phonerecordsinthecourseofaninvestigation.ThoughBPDsadministrativeinvestigationintothe
CrimeStopperstipremainedopen,BPDopenedathird,separateinvestigationintothenewtip,
assigninganew,thirddetectivetoinvestigatethesameofficersconduct.Thecasewasassigned
lowpriority.ThethirdBPDdetectiveattemptedtointerviewthewomanbutpostponedthe

interviewbecauseshewasinillhealth.Twodayslater,thewomanpassedaway.Theinvestigators
finallyreviewedtheofficersphonerecords,whichindicatedthattheofficerhadexchangedtext
messagessomesexuallyexplicitwithseveralotherwomenwhosenumberswerelinkedtoonline
profilesforsextradeservices.Finally,monthslater,Departmentinvestigatorsinterviewedthe

officertwotimesinconnectionwiththetwoopeninvestigations.Theallegationsresultingfromthe
CrimeStopperstipandthethirdinvestigationwereeventuallysustainedinthefallof2015,based

largelyontheevidenceprovidedbytheneighboringPoliceDepartment.Theofficerwasallowedto

resignfromBPD.ItisunclearfromBPDsfileswhetheranystateauthoritieswerenotifiedofthe

officerssexualmisconduct.

Thiswasnottheonlycaseinwhichallegationsweremadethatofficerscoercedsexin

exchangeforimmunityfromarrest.Wefoundothercomplaintsofthisnaturewerealsonot
properlyinvestigated.Failingtoproperlyinvestigateallegationsthatofficerswereengagedinsexual
misconductistroublinginlightoftheconcernsofgenderbiasdiscussedsupraat122-27.

Failingto
properlyinvestigateandaddressrepeatedpolicyviolationsandseriousmisconductalsodoesa
disservicetocommunitymembersandthevastmajorityoflaw-abidingBPDofficerswhoare
unfairlytaintedbythemisconductofafew.Byfailingtotimelyaddressrepeatedpolicyviolations
andmisconducttheDepartmentdoesharmtoitsinternalcredibilityandexternallegitimacy.

b. BPD Has Failed To Take Action Against Offenders Known to Engage

in Repeated Misconduct
OurinvestigationalsofoundsubstantialevidencethatBPDfailstotakedisciplinaryaction
againstofficersBPDknowshaveengagedinseriousorrepeatedmisconduct.Oneexampleofthis
150

problemistheso-calledDoNotCalllist.BPDhashadnotice,includingfromtheStates
AttorneysOffice,thatparticularofficersmaybeengaginginbehaviorthatis,ataminimum,

unethicalandimpactstheircredibilityandintegrity.

Throughatleast2011,theStatesAttorneys
OfficemaintainedaformalDoNotCalllistofofficersprosecutorswouldnotcalltotestify

becausetheybelievedtheirtestimonywouldbeunderminedbyissuesofcredibilityorintegrity.The
sizeofthislistvariedovertime,andincludedasmanyasadozenofficers.BPDwasawareofthe
listtheStatesAttorneysofficeregularlydiscussedtheofficersonthelistwiththeChiefofBPDs
OfficeofProfessionalResponsibilitybutfailedtotakeactionontheinformation.Instead,the
officerslistedremainedonthestreets,makingarreststhatcouldnotbecrediblyprosecuted.Atone
point,weweretold,anentiresquadsmemberswereonthelist,leadingtoanumberofcasesbeing

dismissed.AlthoughtheformalDoNotCalllisthasbeendiscontinued,theStatesAttorneys

OfficecontinuestodiscussproblemofficerswithBPD.

BPDsabilitytotakedisciplinaryactionagainstofficersontheDoNotCalllistisexpressly

circumscribedbyLEOBRandBPDscontractwiththepoliceunion.Specifically,BPDcannottake
punitiveactionagainsttheofficerbasedsolelyonthefactthat[the]officerisincludedonthelist,

includingdemotion,dismissal,suspensionwithoutpay,orreductioninpay. 131Becauseofthis
prohibition,BPDhasnottakenanyactionagainstofficersthattheStatesAttorneysOfficehas

notifiedBPDcannotbecalledtotestify,andtheseofficersremainonduty.Particularlygiventhe

evidenceofnumerousunlawfulstops,searches,andarreststhatwefound,thefactthatofficers
whosearrestsarenotabletobeprosecutedremainonthestreetistroubling.

WhileLEOBRmay
preventtheDepartmentfromtakingdisciplinaryactionagainstofficerssolelyforappearingonthe
list,itdoesnotpreventtheDepartmentfromtakingotheraction,includinginitiatingitsown
investigationofofficersconducttoindependentlydeterminewhetherdiscipline,training,

reassignment,orotheractionisappropriate.

WealsofoundevidencethatBPDfailstotakeactionagainstofficerswithalonghistoryof
misconductthatiswellknowntotheDepartment.Ourinvestigationfound,forexample,thatone

officercurrentlyemployedbyBPDhasreceivedapproximately125complaintsfromcomplainants
withintheDepartmentandfromthecommunitysince2010,andmanyofthesecomplaintsallege

seriousmisconduct.Indeed,complaintsfromdifferentindividualsallegedremarkablysimilar
factsspecifically,thattheofficersubjectscivilianstounwarrantedstripandcavitysearchesin

public.ButtheDepartmenthassustainedonlyonecomplaintagainsttheofficerforminor

misconductfornotfilingapropervehicleinventoryreport,resultinginthelossofacameravalued

at$1,200.Theofficerwasverballycounseledontheproperprocedureforfillingoutinventory
reports.Althoughwewereunabletoconclusivelydeterminewhetherothercomplaintsshouldhave
beensustainedbasedontheinformationBPDprovided,suchalargenumberofcomplaints,
includingunrelatedcomplaintsallegingsimilarbehavior,istroubling.

Wehaveseriousconcernsthat
BPDisnotadequatelyaddressingrepeatedmisconductbyitsofficers.

c. BPD Officers are Reluctant to Report Misconduct

BPDssystemicaccountabilityfailureshavealsocontributedtoacultureinwhichsome

officersarereluctanttoraiseconcernstosupervisorsaboutproblematicpolicingpracticesoridentify
misconductbytheirfellowofficers.SeveralofficerstoldJusticeDepartmentinvestigatorsthatthey
131Md.CodeAnn.,Pub.Safety

3106.1.

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believetheirfellowofficershaveretaliatedagainstthemforreportingmisconductorobjectingto

improperenforcementactivities.Otherofficersexpressedfearsthattheywouldfacesuch
retaliation,andthatBPDsupervisorswouldnotaddressanyretaliationthatoccurs.Ourreviewof
BPDsinternalaffairsfilesunderscorestheseconcerns.

SeveralexampleshighlightBPDsresistancetointernalaccountability.In2014,aBPD

lieutenantplacedseveralsignsnexttothedeskofanAfrican-Americansergeantwithareputation

forspeakingoutaboutallegedmisconductintheDepartment.Amongthesignswerewarningsto
stayinyourlane,worryaboutyourself,mindyourownbusiness!!anddontspread

rumors!!!Afterthesergeantfiledacomplaintaboutthesigns,thelieutenantadmittedtocreating

themandplacingthemnexttothesergeantsdesk.YetBPDtooknomeaningfulcorrectiveaction.
Thoughthecomplaintwassustained,thelieutenantreceivednosuspension,fine,orlossofbenefits.
Instead,hewasgivenonlyverbalcounselinginstructinghimthatsuchbehaviorisunprofessional
andinappropriate.Thisminimalresponsetoadmittedallegationsthatasupervisorwarnedhis
subordinatetomindyourownbusinessratherthanreportmisconductunderlinesBPDsfailureto
createacultureofaccountability.

Inawidely-publicizedincident, 132aformerBPDdetectiveintheViolentCrimeImpact

Division(VCID)facedretaliationafterreportingtwoofficers,includinghissergeant,foralleged
excessiveforceinthefallof2011.Accordingtothedetective,theVCIDunitarrestedamanfor

drugpossessionafterachasethatendedwiththemanbreakingintothehomeofanofficers
girlfriendtohide.Accordingtotheofficersreportsoftheincident,afterthemansarrestthe

sergeantbroughthimbackinsidethehometoapologizetothewomanlivingthere.Whenthe

manemergedfromthehome,hisshirtwasrippedopen,hewasbleeding,andhehadsuffereda

brokenankleandotherinjuries.Thesergeantclaimedthatthearrestedmaninjuredhimselfby

attemptingtohead-buttthesergeantandfallingtotheground.Concernedthatthesergeantandoffdutyofficerhadbeatenthemaninsidethehome,thedetectiveaskedadifferentBPDsergeant

whethertoreporttheincidenttointernalaffairs.Accordingtothedetective,thesergeant

discouragedhimfromreportingtheincident,statingIfyourearat,yourcareerhereisdone.

The
detectivereportedtheincidenttoprosecutorsintheStatesAttorneysOffice,whoindictedboth
officersoncriminalchargesstemmingfromtheincident.Afterthedetectivetestifiedagainstthe
officersattrial,ajuryconvictedthesergeantofmisconductandtheoff-dutyofficerofassaultand
obstructionofjustice.

Thedetectivefacedsignificantretaliationforexposingthismisconduct.Thedetective
recountedthat,afterreportingtheincidenttoprosecutors,fellowofficersfrequentlycalledhima
rat.Asergeantleftpicturesofcheeseonthedetectivesdesk.Thedetectivealsotoldusthata
lieutenantdeniedhistransferrequesttoaviolentrepeatoffendersquadbecausethedetective
snitched.Thelieutenantallegedlysaidthatthedetectivewasnottherightfitfortheunit
becausetheyhavetodothingsinthegrayarea.

Andontwooccasions,nooneinthedetectives
132SeeJustinFenton,Whistle-blower

officer files lawsuit against Batts, BPD,TheBaltimoreSun(Dec.23,2014,6:55PM),

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-crystal-whistleblower-ratgate-lawsuit20141223-story.html;AlbertSamaha,Breaking
Baltimores Blue Wall of Silence,Buzzfeed(May14,2015,9:09PM),

https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/breaking-baltimores-blue-wall-of-silence?;LukeBroadwater,Baltimore to pay
$42K to whistle-blower former officer who found rat on car,TheBaltimoreSun(June1,2016,7:14PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-crystal-settlement-20160601-story.html.

152

unitrespondedtohiscallsforbackup.Theretaliationintensifiedastheofficerstrialsapproached.

InNovember2012,thedetectivefoundadeadratonhiscarwithitsheadseveredunderhiswiper

blades.Shortlythereafter,aBPDsergeantallegedlytoldthedetectiveyoubetterpraytoGod

yourenotthestarwitnessagainsttheofficers.Thedetectivereportedthedeadratincidentto
internalaffairs,butstatedthatinvestigatorsdidnotcontacthimuntilMay2014,aftertheincident

receivedsubstantialmediacoverage.ThedetectiveultimatelyresignedfromtheDepartmentin

September2014andnowworksatadifferentlawenforcementagency.TheDepartmentsettleda

lawsuitbroughtbytheformerdetectiveinthespringof2016.

Theallegedretaliationagainstthedetectivereceivedsignificantpublicityandhashada
chillingeffectonotherofficersintheDepartmentwhowitnessmisconduct.Inonecase,anofficer
inaspecializeddrugunitobservedoneofhisfellowofficersplantdrugsonasuspectafterafoot

chase.TheofficerdecidednottoreportthemisconductbecausehedidnotwantBPDofficersto
domethewaytheytreatedthedetective.

Officersalsotoldusthattheyhavefacedretaliationforraisingconcernsaboutthe
constitutionalityofcertainBPDenforcementpractices.In2015,asergeantbannedapatrolofficer

fromworkingovertimefor30daysaftertheofficerobjectedtothesergeantsfrequentrequeststo

clearcorners,whichtheofficerbelievedrequiredhertoviolateconstitutionalstandardsbymaking

stopswithoutreasonablesuspicion.Whentheofficerraisedherconcernswiththemajorincharge
ofthedistrict,heallegedlydefendedthepunishmentbystatingthattheofficerhadntmadestats
forsixdays.Atthetimesupervisorsbannedherfromworkingovertime,theofficerwasasingle

parentwhowasknowntoworkovertimefrequentlytosupportherfamily.Inasimilarincident,

detailedinSectionII.B.2,supra,asergeantreportedthatshewastransferredandgivenapoor

performancereviewafterobjectingtoalieutenantsinstructiontotargetblackhoodiesfor

enforcement.

Inshort,resistancetointernalaccountabilitypersistswithinBPD.TheDepartmenthas

failedtotakeadequatestepstoensurethatofficersfeelcomfortablereportingmisconductandmake

clearthatitwillnottolerateretaliationagainstofficerswhodoso.

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D. BPD DOES NOT COORDINATE WITH OTHER AGENCIES APPROPRIATELY

BPDalsofailstoappropriatelycoordinateitseffortswithotherlawenforcementagencies
thatithasgrantedauthoritytoexerciseconcurrentjurisdiction,creatinggapsinthereportingof
stops,searches,andinthereportingandinvestigationoftheuseofforce.Thesegapsimpede

BPDsabilitytoensurethatitisappropriatelysupervisingitsownenforcementactivitiesandthose

ofagenciesexercisingconcurrentjurisdiction.
TheDepartmenthasenteredintoanumberofagreementswithlawenforcementagenciesin
andaroundBaltimoreCity,includingtheBaltimoreSchoolPoliceForce,andpoliceforcesserving

theUniversityofBaltimoreandMorganStateUniversity.Forexample,BPDhasenteredintoan

agreementwiththeBaltimoreCityPublicSchoolSystem,whichoperatestheBaltimoreSchool

Police.Thisagreementconsiderablyexpandstheschoolpoliceforcesjurisdiction,whichotherwise

wouldbelimitedtoschoolproperty.Md.CodeAnn.,Educ.4318(c)and(d)(1)(2015)(limiting

BSPsjurisdiction,inmostcircumstances,topropertyoperatedorcontrolledbytheschool
system).UndertheschoolpoliceforcesagreementwiththeDepartment,however,theBaltimore
SchoolPolicearegivenconcurrentjurisdiction:schoolpolicemayactwithlawfulauthority

includingwiththepowerofarrestthroughouttheCityofBaltimore.Accordingtotheagreement,

schoolpolicemayexercisefullpolicepoweranywherewithinthejurisdictionoftheCityof

Baltimoreandassistininvestigationsandfollow-upincriminalcases.Schoolpolicemustnotify

BPDwhenitsofficersactoutsideofschoolpropertyandwithintheterritorialjurisdictionofBPD.

Ifschoolpoliceofficersmakeanarrestwhileexercisingconcurrentjurisdiction,theymustwritean

officialpolicereport,andtheymustalsouseBPDfieldreportsoridenticalformsforincidents
occurringinareasofconcurrentjurisdictions.
Earlyinourinvestigation,welearnedthattheCityhasessentiallyusedtheBaltimoreSchool
PoliceasanauxiliaryforcetoBPD.Duringourride-alongswithBPDofficers,wefrequently

observedschoolpoliceofficerspatrollingneighborhoodsandrespondingtocallsalongwithBPD
officers.Thiswasparticularlytrueindistrictsthatwereunderstaffed.ThefilesBPDproducedtous
confirmedthatschoolpoliceareoftenpresentwithBPDofficersduringenforcementactivities.

Schoolpolicewerepresent,forexample,atthesceneofseveralincidentsinwhichBPDofficers

usedforce,andschoolpoliceofficerswerealsomentionedinourreviewofBPDsinternalaffairs
files.
WehaveseveralconcernswiththeCitysuseoftheschoolpoliceasanauxiliaryforceto

BPD.First,basedonourreviewoftheagreementbetweenBPDandtheBaltimoreCityPublic

SchoolSystem,theagreementdoesnotclearlydelineatewhichagencyisinchargeofanincident

whenofficersfrombothagenciesrespond,asweobservednumeroustimesduringourride-alongs.
Itisunclearwhetherthisresponsibilityfallstotheseniorofficeronthescene,regardlessofthat
officersagency,ortoBPDofficersbecauseBPDistheagencygrantingconcurrentjurisdictionto

theschoolpolice(regardlessofrank),orifthedecisionisbasedonotherfactors.

Whenofficers
werequestionedaboutitduringourride-alongs,theywerealsounclearaboutwhowouldbein

controlinthosecircumstances.Thiscreatesconsiderablerisksforboththeofficersandmembersof
thepublic,becauselinesofauthorityarenotclearifacrisisofsomekindarises.

Second,theagreementislikewisesilentonwhichagencyspoliciescontroldecisionsmade

duringandafteranincident,suchasanincidentinvolvingtheuseofforce.Whenuseofforce
154

policiesforeachagencysetdifferentstandardsforwhenforcemaybeused,BPDriskshavinga
schoolpoliceofficer,actingundertheconcurrentjurisdictiongrantedbyBPD,useforcein

circumstancesthatBPDwoulddeemoutofpolicy.Similarly,aftertheuseofforceoccurs,the

agreementdoesnotmakeclearwhichagencyorbothwouldinvestigatetheuseofforceifit

involvedofficersfrombothagencies,orhowthatinvestigationwouldbeconducted.Thisfailure
couldleadtogapsinaccountabilityforbothagencies.
Third,theagreementdoesnotsetforthaprocessforhowcomplaintsaboutallegedofficer
misconductwillbehandled,evenifthosecomplaintsariseoutofincidentswhereofficersfromboth
agenciesarepresent.WhenwequestionedcommandersinBPDsInternalInvestigationDivision
aboutthis,theyinformedusthattheDepartmentspracticewastorefercomplaintsreceivedabout
schoolpoliceofficerstotheschoolpoliceforceitself.Wefoundincidents,however,whereit
appearsBPDofficersrefusedtotakecomplaintsaboutschoolpoliceanddidnotreferthemto

otheragencieswithoutmakinganyefforttoascertainwhethertheschoolpolicewereactingwith

authoritygrantedtothembyBPD,orpursuanttothedirectionofBPDcommanders.Thisfailure
similarlyunderminesaccountabilityandcommunityconfidenceinbothBPDandtheschoolpolice.

Finally,althoughtheagreementrequiresschoolpoliceofficerstofilearrestandfieldreports,

weareconcernedthatthedatafromthesereports,aswellasfromotherreportsonactivitiessuchas
stopsandsearchesthatdonotappeartoberequiredbytheagreement,arenotbeingproperly
collectedandanalyzed.ThisimpactstheabilityofBPDandtheschoolpolicetoeffectivelysupervise

officeractivities.ParticularlywhereBPDisusingtheschoolpoliceasanauxiliaryforcetoaidin

patrolandotheractivitieswhenBPDisitselfshort-staffed,thefailuretocoordinateeffortstocollect

andanalyzethisdatacanleadtoaskewedviewofBPDsenforcementactivities.Asmentioned
previously,reliableandaccuratedataaboutBPDsenforcementeffortsiscriticaltoeffective

supervisionandpreventionofunlawfulstops,searches,arrests,anduseofforce.
BPDshouldtakeimmediatestepstostrengthenitsagreementswithagenciestowhichithas
grantedconcurrentjurisdictiontoremedythesedeficiencies.

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E. BPD FAILS TO ENGAGE IN EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY POLICING

Fromparticipationingrassrootsorganizationmeetingstopolicedepartmentinterviews,our
investigationrevealedasignificantdividebetweenthepoliceandmembersoftheBaltimore

community.BothcommunitymembersandpoliceofficersexpressedthattheDepartmenthas
overlyfocusedonnarcoticsenforcement,gunrecovery,andclearingcorners,evenwhensuch

strategiesareineffectiveataddressingthecommunitysdesiretocombatdrugcrimesandother

enforcementpriorities.ManyofficersopenlyadmittedthatcommunityrelationsareBPDsweakest
attribute.Somesupervisorsnotedthatitissadtoseehowmanyofthecitysresidents,especially

thoseinlow-income,predominantlyAfrican-Americanneighborhoods,hatethepolice.Thisdivide
isasignificantimpedimenttoconstitutionalandeffectivepolicingintheCityofBaltimore.

CentraltothisdivideistheperceptionthattherearetwoBaltimoresreceivingdissimilar
policingservices.Oneisaffluentandpredominatelywhite,whiletheotherisimpoverishedand

largelyblack.Thenotionthatresidentsinmoreaffluentneighborhoodsreceivebetterpolicing
servicesthanresidentsinpoorneighborhoodswasevidentinmanyofourconversationswith

communitymembers.Thedisparitiesdescribedtousgobeyondaggressivebehaviorand
misconduct;someresidentsspokeaboutapolicenon-responsetopoor,minorityareasaswellasa
lackofthoroughinvestigationintocrimescommittedinthesecommunities.

Manypointtothe
policeresponsefollowingtheunrestinApril2015asanexample.

WeheardfromanAfricanAmericanresidentwhotoldusthatduringtheunrestinBaltimoretherichwhitepeoples
neighborhoodswereprotectedbutstoresintheblackneighborhoodswereleftunguarded.In
anotheraccount,residentsinaminorityneighborhoodatthecenteroftheunrestdescribedtheir
frustrationuponhearingthatBoltonHill,anaffluent,majority-whitearea,wasgrantedanincreasein

officerdeploymentwhiletheirrequestforfootpatrolfollowingadramaticspikeindrugtrafficking
wasdeniedduetoalackofresources.

Oneresidentcommented,Thecitywasprettymuchsaying

Sandtowndoesntmatter;theblackneighborhoodcanburn.Theywereprotectingthewhitepeople,
thericherpeople. See, e.g.,Over-Policed, Yet Underserved: The Peoples Findings Regarding Police Misconduct
in West Baltimore,WestBaltimoreCommissiononPoliceMisconductandtheNoBoundaries

Coalition(March8,2016)at11.

Ourinvestigationfoundthat,throughalllevelsoftheBaltimorePoliceDepartment,from
membersofcommandstaffdowntoofficersonthestreet,theDepartmenthasnotimplemented
fundamentalprinciplesofcommunitypolicing.Communitypolicinginvolvesbuildingpartnerships
betweenlawenforcementandthepeopleandorganizationswithinitsjurisdiction;engagingin

problem-solvingtogetherwiththecommunity;andmanagingthepoliceagencytosupportthis
communitypartnershipandcommunityproblem-solving.See, e.g.,Community Policing Defined116
(U.S.DeptofJustice,OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices,2014).Communitypolicing
isinherentlyproactive;itinvolvesidentifyingleaderswithinacommunitythatcanaidthepolicein
preventingandinvestigatingcrime,particularlyamongthosegroupsthataremostalienatedfromthe
police,andcreatingrelationshipswiththoseleadersthatallowthepoliceandthecommunityto

worktogethertomakethecommunitysafe.Thisstrategyenableslawenforcementagenciesandthe

individualsandorganizationstheyservetodevelopsolutionstoproblemsandincreasetrustinthe
police.See, e.g.,Effective Policing and Crime Prevention: A Problem Oriented Guide for Mayors, City Managers,
and County Executives162(U.S.DeptofJustice,OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices,
2009);The Collaboration Toolkit for Law Enforcement: Effective Strategies to Partner with the Community192
156

(U.S.DeptofJustice,OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices,2011).Tobeeffective,it
mustincludeallranks,sectors,andunitsofapolicedepartment.See, e.g.,Community Policing
Explained: A Guide for Local Government154(U.S.DeptofJustice,OfficeofCommunityOriented
PolicingServices,2003).ThisapproachiscurrentlynotbeingimplementedbytheBaltimorePolice
Department,althoughleadershipintheDepartmenthasmadeeffortstochangethisoverthelast
fewyears.Toremedytheconstitutionalviolationswefoundinourinvestigation,acomprehensive
communitypolicingstrategymustbeacentralcomponentofpolicereforminBaltimore.

1. The Relationship Between the Police and the Community in Baltimore Is Broken

TherelationshipbetweentheBaltimorePoliceDepartmentandmanyofthecommunitiesit

servesisbroken.Duringourinvestigation,weparticipatedinorobserveddozensofcommunity

meetings,reviewedthousandsofdocuments,includinglettersandcomplaintsfromBaltimore
residents,andinterviewedhundredsofadditionalBaltimoreresidents.Manyresidentsthroughout
theCityofBaltimore,andparticularlyinimpoverished,primarilyminority,neighborhoods,
describedbeingbelittled,disbelieved,anddisrespectedbyofficers,spurringsomegroupstosubmit

detailedaccounts,documentation,andevenformalreportstousabouttheirexperienceswiththe
Department.See, e.g.,Over-Policed, Yet Underserved: The Peoples Findings Regarding Police Misconduct in
West Baltimore,WestBaltimoreCommissiononPoliceMisconductandtheNoBoundariesCoalition
(March8,2016).Theseaccountsincludedreportsofverbalabuseduringroutineinteractionsand
ofteninvolvedcursingorthreats.Inoneaccount,duringatrafficstop,aresidentpolitelyaskedan
officerwhyhehadbeenpulledover.Theofficersimplytoldhimtogetoutofthecarand,when
askedagain,begancursingattheresident,eventhreateningtotowhisfuckingcar.

Inanother
account,awomanaskedpoliceofficersthereasonforconductingasearchofherhome.

Shewas
toldtoshutthefuckupbitchandsitthefuckdownbecausetheywerethefuckinglaw.

Strikingly,thevastmajorityoftheindividualswespokewithdonotwantthepolicetobeless

involvedintheircommunities;theywantpoliceengagement,andtheywantthisengagementtobe
respectfulandcollaborative,sotheycanfeelsafeintheirowncommunities.

OurinteractionswithBPDofficersandreviewoftheDepartmentsdocumentsconfirmed
manyoftheaccountsweheardfrommembersofthepublic.OurreviewoftheDepartmentsown

incidentreports,forexample,revealednumerousinstancesinwhichofficersspokeinan
unnecessarilyrudeoraggressivemannerwheninteractingwithsuspects,witnesses,andthegeneral

public.And,asdescribedpreviouslysupra,theseaggressiveinteractionsfrequentlyescalated

situationsand,attimes,ledtotheunnecessaryuseofforce.InterviewswithBPDofficers
throughoutthechainofcommandalsorevealedthatofficersopenlyharborantagonisticfeelings

towardscommunitymembers.Wefoundaprevalentus-versus-themmentalitythatis
incompatiblewithcommunitypolicingprinciples.Whenaskedaboutcommunity-orientedproblem

solving,forexample,onesupervisorresponded,Idontpandertothepublic.

Anothersupervisor
conveyedtousthatheapproachespolicinginBaltimorelikeitisawarzone.

Apatrolofficer,when
describinghisapproachtopolicing,voicedsimilarviews,commenting,Youvegottobethe
baddestmotherfuckeroutthere,whichoftenrequiresthatoneowntheblock.Officersseemed
toviewthemselvesascontrollingthecityratherthanasa
partofthecity.Manyothers,including
highrankingofficersintheDepartment,viewthemselvesasenforcingthewillofthesilent
majority.

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ManyBPDdiscretionaryenforcementactionsincreasedistrustandsignificantlydecreasethe
likelihoodthatindividualswillcooperatewiththepolicetosolveorpreventothercrimes,as

describedinnumerousincidentsandstatisticsthroughoutthisletter.Inonereport,anofficer
describedtellingtwoindividuals,amotherandherson,whowerestandingintheblocktoleave.

Theyrefused,notingthatwerestandingoutsideoftheirownhome,buteventuallymovedtothe
stepsoftheirfrontstoop.

Ultimately,theson,ajuvenilewithnopriorcriminalrecord,wasarrested
forloiteringoutsidehisownhome.Supervisorsraisednoissueswithrespecttotheincident.

Similarly,groupsofpeopleareoftendispersedunlesstheyhaveaclearreasonforgatheringinthat

location.Inoneinternalreport,asupervisordescribestheactionsofanofficer,stating,Officer
approachedthegrouptoascertainthereasonforthecrowdandiftherewasnolegalreasonthey
weregoingtodispersethecrowd.TheinteractionconcludedwithanofficerusingOCsprayon

theentiregroupofpeople.Theseenforcementactivitiesforbehaviorthatis,atmost,aminor
offenseifevenunlawful,alienatecommunitymembersanddecreasetheirwillingnesstoworkwith
police.

Indeed,ourreviewofdocumentsandourconversationswithBaltimoreresidentsconfirm
thatdistrustiscausingindividualstobereluctanttocooperatewithpolice.Itwasnotuncommonto
seemarkedonincidentreportsthatwitnesseswerehostileandunwillingtosharebasicinformation

withpoliceofficers.Andinmanyinstances,BPDimposedunnecessarynegativeconsequencesfor

optionalinteractions.Forexample,acasemanagerrequestedthatthepolicereachouttoajuvenile

whowasfriendswithvictimsofahomicidecasebecauseshewasconcernedforhissafetyand
wantedtocheckifhedesiredtoberelocated.DetectivesintheHomicideUnitarrivedathishouse,
andthejuvenileinvitedtheminsidehishometospeakaboutthemurderofhisfriend.

Duringthe
courseoftheconversation,thedetectivesdecidedthattheywantedaformalstatementfromthe
juvenile.However,aftertelephoninghisgrandmother,whoadvisedhimnottospeakto
investigators,herefused.Thedetectivesinsistedthathecomedowntown,whichcausedthejuvenile

toallegedlyscreamandballhisfists.Ultimately,officersplacedhiminhandcuffsandtransported

himdowntown.Wealsoreadnumerousincidentreportswherethepersonwhooriginallycalledthe

policeorwasinneedofassistancerefusedtocooperateafterbecomingupsetwiththemannerin

whichthepoliceresponded.

2. BPD Has Failed to Implement Community Policing Principles

Ourinvestigationrevealedthatoneofthefundamentalcausesofthebreakdowninthe

relationshipbetweentheDepartmentandthecommunityitservesisthat,throughoutmuchofthe

Department,communitypolicingprinciplesarenotbeingimplemented.Duringourinterviewswith

commandstaff,districtcommanders,andothersupervisors,weobservedthat,inthevastmajority
oftheseinterviews,thepersonwasunabletoaccuratelydescribewhatcommunitypolicingisorhow
BPDimplementscommunitypolicingefforts.Somedistrictcommandershadnotevenconsidered
enlistingthecommunitytohelpcombatcrimeproblems.Mostcouldnotidentifycommunity
organizationswillingtodoviolencepreventionworkorotherpartnersforcommunitypolicingon

anongoingbasis.AndnoneoftheBPDmajorswetalkedwithhadrelationshipswithcommunity

groupswhowereabletoputpressureonviolentmembersofthecommunitytostoptheviolence.
Thesecoalitionscanbeaneffectivetoolinnotonlystoppingtheviolencebutalsobuilding

importantcommunityrelationships.Notably,whenadistrictcommanderormemberofcommand
staffdidhaveastrongergraspofcommunitypolicingprinciples,theirdescriptionofthespecific
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actionsBPDistakingoftendifferedwidelyfromthatsharedwithusbyotherDepartmentleaders.

TheDepartmentlacksacommonvisionforhowitisengagingandworkingwithitscommunity.

TheDepartmentleadershipslackofvisionforcommunitypolicinghasrepercussionsfor

theofficerstheysupervise.Mostoftheofficersweencounteredduringourinvestigationcare

deeplyaboutdoingagoodjob,buttheirapproachesarenarrowlyaimedatenforcement,withan

almostexclusivefocusonoffenders,andlackcommunity-orientedproblem-solving.Manyofficers

describedlittleinteractionwiththecommunitiestheypatrol,notingthatthoseonpatrolsimply
handlecallsforservice.Supervisorsconfirmedthisnotion.

Onenoted,Officersbasicallyjust
handlecallsforservice.Anotherdescribedpatrolofficersbystatingthattheygofromcalltocall,
sotheyhavenotimeforcommunityinteraction...theyrecontrolledmostlybytheradio.

Many
policepersonnelopenlyadmittedthatofficersdonotregularlyattendcommunitymeetingsthat

streetcopsfocusonenforcementwithlittleoutreachtoorinvestmentincommunityneeds.

Communitypolicingeffortsareadhocandofficer
ormajor-specific.Thoseofficerswesaw

interactingwiththecommunityinapositivemannerdidsoduetotheirowninterest,notingthat

suchactionswerenotmandatedbycommandstaff.Atthecommandlevel,onedistrictcommander
describedprioritizingsectorofficersandsergeantshavingasmanydesignedintentionalmoments

aspossiblewiththecommunityandtrackingofficersfootpatroltimetoencouragesuch

interactions.Thesamedistricthasbeeninvolvedinnumerousoutreachefforts,includinglistening
campaigns,CocoawithaCop,ashoegiveaway,andcommunitywalks.However,thisdistrict

commanderseffortsagainappeartobeanexceptiontoBPDsoverallpolicingstrategy.The
commanderconfirmedthis,tellingus,IknowitneedstohappensoIdontwaitforsomeoneto
tellmetodoit.Furthermore,althoughthisdistrictcommanderandsomeothersfocuson
communitypolicing,manypatrolofficersarereceivingconflictingmessages.

Forexample,one
officertoldus,Commanderssaytheywantcommunitypolicing,butthentheycomebackaround
andaskHowmanyarrestsyoumade?

Asthisquestionsuggests,fromcommandstafftoofficers,

theDepartmentstrugglestoembracetruecommunitypolicingandfailstounderstandhow
communitypolicingstrategiescanmakeitbetterandmoreeffectiveatreducingcrimeandsocial
disorder.

3. BPD Recognizes that It Must Improve Its Relationship with the Communities It
Serves, But Much Work Remains

Overthepastfewyears,leaderswithintheCityandwithinBaltimorePoliceDepartment

haverecognizedthattheDepartmentneedstodosignificantworktoimproveitsrelationshipwith

thecommunitiesitservesthroughoutBaltimore,particularlythoseinimpoverishedandminority
neighborhoods.Duringourinvestigationandbeforeit,theDepartmentbegantomakechangesto
thewayitpolicestobetterembracecommunitypolicingprinciplesandmoreeffectiveserveits
community.Unfortunately,communitypolicingisstillnotaphilosophythatpermeatesallaspects
ofBPDsactivities;rather,itcurrentlyisasingleprogramthatisnotintegratedwithBPDsotherlaw
enforcementfunctions.Indeed,mostofficersthinkofcommunitypolicingasdistinctfromtheir
regularpolicingduties.

Currently,theDepartmentscommunitypolicingeffortsareundertakenexclusivelybythe
CommunityCollaborationDivision(CCD),exceptfortheadhoceffortsofcertainofficersand

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commandersdescribedabove.CCDisledbyaLieutenantColonel,anditsphilosophyisbasedon

fourpillars:community-orientedpolicing,faith-basedinvolvement,youthengagement,andre-entry

programs.Structurally,CCDaimstohaveonesergeantandfourofficersperdistrictwitheach
officerresponsibleforapillarandthesergeantsresponsibleforsupervision.Theseofficersare
notunderdistrictcommand;instead,theyworkoutoftheirownunitdowntown.

Whileitistooearlytoconclusivelyevaluatetheseefforts,weareconcernedthatthesenew
initiativeswillnotbesuccessfulwithoutsubstantialchangesintheDepartmentsapproach.First,
theDepartmentscommunitypolicingplaniscurrentlytoolimitedinscope,anddoesnotembrace

allaspectsoftheworkoftheDepartment.Ascurrentlyunderstoodbymanymembersofthe
Department,communitypolicingistheresponsibilityoftheCCD,nottheDepartmentasawhole.

Tobeeffective,however,communitycollaborationandengagementhastobepracticedbyevery

memberoftheorganization,especiallybytheuniformedpatrolofficerswhoareassignedto
neighborhoods.Atpresent,patrolofficerslargelyviewthepolicingstrategyassomeoneelsesjob.
Thislimitedversionofcommunitypolicingwillnotbeeffective,particularlygiventherelatively

smallnumberofindividualsdedicatedtoundertaketheseefforts.

Second,andrelatedly,theDepartmentscommunitypolicingeffortsarenotwell-integrated

withtheworkofthedistricts.Weexpressnoviewonwhethercommunitypolicingeffortsneedto

beledoutofthedistrictsorcentralized,astheycurrentlyareinBaltimoreintheCCD.Regardless

ofwheretheseeffortsareled,however,theymustbecloselycoordinatedandintegratedwithpatrol
andspecializedunits,andthatintegrationisnotyetoccurring.Thisproblemisexacerbatedbythe
distinctnatureofeachdistrictinBaltimore.AccordingtosomepeoplethroughouttheDepartment,
districtsworkasiftheyareaseparatekingdom,withdistinctlydifferentpracticesandapproaches.

Thisisconsistentwithourobservations.Evidenceofthedifficultiesthisposesisalreadyapparent.

Insomedistricts,thedistrictcommanderswereappreciativeofthehelpandsupporttheyreceived

fromtheCCD;othercommanders,however,wereconcernedthattheywerenotawarewhenthe

unitwasactuallyworkingintheirarea.Afewalsovoicedfrustrationthattheylackcontrolof

communityengagementintheirdistrict,giventheirexperienceinthearea.Onecommandernoted
thatitcanbedifficulttoengageandbuildrelationshipswithsomecommunitygroups,mostnotably

thefaith-basedcontacts,sincethisresponsibilityfallsundertheCCD.Itsharderfordistrict
commanderstohaveaccesstothesefolks,notedone.Themajordescribedhowthedistrict
developeditsowninitiativestofacilitatecommunitypolicingandengagementbecauseofthe

difficultiesincoordinatingwiththeCCD.

Third,theDepartmentisnotbuildingeffectivepartnershipswithexistingcommunitygroups

dedicatedtoservingtheircommunities,andinsteadistryingtoestablishnewprogramsthatareled

bytheDepartment.Duringthecourseofourinvestigation,weobservedasurprisinglackofBPD

representationatcommunitymeetingsofgrass-rootsorganizationsthroughouttheCity.Atthe
majorityofcommunitymeetingsweattended,wefoundthatmembersoftheBPDeventhe

CCDwerenotpresent.Often,thecommunityandreligiousleadershostingthemeetingtoldus
thattheyhadpersonallyreachedouttothepolicedepartmenttoinviteofficerstothemeeting,but
receivednoresponse.Accordingtosomeparticipants,policeofficialsusedtoattendtheirmeetings
buthavenotdonesosincetheunrestfollowingthedeathofFreddieGray.

Bynotparticipatingin
thesemeetings,theDepartmentismissingvaluableopportunities.

Attendingthesemeetingswould
allowofficerstobuildpartnerships,gaininformation,andsolveproblemsthatwouldfacilitate

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effectivepolicing.Notably,duringourinterviewswiththem,CCDleadershipdidnotspeaktothe
importanceofpartneringwithgrass-rootorganizationsthatarenottraditionalsupportersofthe
police.Instead,theapproachtopolice-communityrelationsisprimarilyfocusedonestablishing

programstosupportCCDsfourpillars,whicharepolice-ledratherthanpartneringwithotherswho
havealreadyestablishedthemselvesinthecommunity.Itisperhapsunsurprisingthatcommunity
activistshavedescribedtheDepartmentseffortstoimprovepolice-communityrelationsas
troublingthatthepoliceareseekingacommunityrubberstamptonormalizeproblematic
policingpracticesratherthanworkingwiththecommunitytofindanapproachtopolicingthatcan

gainbuy-in. 133

Fourth,theDepartmentisnotconsistentlyenforcingitsownrequirementsforofficer
communityengagement.Forexample,theDepartmentrecentlyimplementeda30-minutefoot
patrolrequirement,butthisobligationisnotuniformlyenforcedbycommandstaff.Althoughwe
engagedinnumerousride-alongswithpatrolofficers,onlyahandfuloftheofficerscompletedtheir
footpatrol.Additionalinterviewsconfirmedthatthisrequirementisnotreadilyenforcedacross
BPD.Itis,therefore,unsurprisingthatsomeofficersfailtointegratecommunitypolicingefforts
intotheirtimeonpatrol.Therearefewincentivesandlittleencouragementtodoso.

Finally,BPDspoliciesandtrainingdonotconsistentlyembracecommunitypolicing

principles.BPDscommunitypolicingstrategyinvolvesfewtrainingmodulesoncommunity
policingandcommunication.Weattendedoneofthesein-servicetrainings,whichfocusedon
communitypolicingandfootpatrol.

Thesegmentonofficersroleaswarriorsversusguardians
focusedprimarilyonthebenefitsofbeingawarrior.Indeed,itseemedthatprinciplesofcommunity
policingandtheroleofapoliceofficerasaguardianisnotyetwellunderstoodbytheinstructors,

whoemphasizedthedrawbacksofthisapproach,makingitunlikelythatofficerswillunderstand
howtoembracesuchprinciplesintheirinteractions.BettertrainingisneedediftheDepartment
wantstoteachofficerseffectivecommunitypolicingpractices,andthistrainingneedstobe
providedandtailoredtopersonnelthroughoutalllevelsoftheDepartment.

*
*
*

Communitypolicingandengagementprovideapromisingrouteforensuringofficersactin

accordwiththeConstitutionandforrepairingBPDsrelationshipwiththecommunity.

Aproactive
communitypolicingstrategyhasthepotentialtoovercomedivisivedynamicsthatdisconnect
residentsandpoliceforces,dynamicsrangingfromadearthofpositiveinteractionstoracial
stereotypingandracialviolence.

See, e.g.,JackGlaser,Suspect Race: Causes and Consequence of Racial

Profiling 20711(2015)(discussingresearchshowingthatcommunitypolicingandsimilarapproaches

canhelpreduceracialbiasandstereotypesandimprovecommunityrelations);L.SongRichardson
&PhillipAtibaGoff,Interrogating Racial Violence,12OhioSt.J.ofCrim.L.115,14347(2014)
(describinghowfullyimplementedandinclusivecommunitypolicingcanhelpavoidracial
stereotypingandviolence);Strengthening

the Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Communities of

Color: Developing an Agenda for Action120(U.S.DeptofJustice,OfficeofCommunityOriented
PolicingServices,2014).Thus,astheDepartmentstrivestocorrecttheproblemsourinvestigation

133MaggieYbarra,A

conversation with Police Commissioner Kevin Davis,CityPaper,April27,2016,

http://www.citypaper.com/news/features/bcp-042716-feature-commissioner-davis-interview-20160427-story.html.

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identifiedandtoengendertrustwithinBaltimoresdiversecommunities,acommunitypolicing
strategyshouldbeacentralcomponentofitsapproachmovingforward.

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CONCLUSION

Fortheforegoingreasons,theDepartmentofJusticeconcludesthatthereisreasonable

causetobelievethatBPDengagesinapatternorpracticeofconductthatviolatestheConstitution
orfederallaw.Thepatternorpracticeincludes:(1)makingunconstitutionalstops,searches,and

arrests;(2)usingenforcementstrategiesthatproducesevereandunjustifieddisparitiesintheratesof

stops,searchesandarrestsofAfricanAmericans;(3)usingexcessiveforce;and(4)retaliatingagainst

peopleengaginginconstitutionally-protectedexpression.Wealsoidentifiedconcernsregarding

BPDstransportofindividualsandinvestigationofsexualassaults.BPDsfailingsresultfrom

deficientpolicies,training,oversight,andaccountability,andpolicingstrategiesthatdonotengage

effectivelywiththecommunitytheDepartmentserves.

Weareheartenedtofindbothwidespread
recognitionofthesechallengesandstronginterestinreform.Welookforwardtoworkingwiththe
Department,Cityleadership,andBaltimoresdiversecommunitiestocreatelastingreformsthat
rebuildtrustinBPDandensurethatitprovideseffective,constitutionalpoliceservicestothepeople

ofBaltimore.

163