1. ANTONIO V.

REYES
GR NO. 155800; March 10, 2006
FACTS:
On March 8, 1993, herein petitioner Leonilo Antonio filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent Marie Ivonne Reyes be declared null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity as provided in Art. 36 of the Family Code. He asserted
that respondents incapacity is manifested by her persistent lying, fabrication of
stories and invention of personalities which he claims to have subsisted at the time
their marriage was celebrated up to the present.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the said marriage is null and void based on Art. 36 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage null and void on the
grounds that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of the marriage.
Court of Appeals reversed RTCs decision notwithstanding the ruling of the
Catholic tribunals annulling said marriage by reason of lack of due discretion.
SUPREME COURT:
Yes, the Court declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, reinstating the RTCs ruling.
Article 36 of the Family Code states that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The definition of psychological incapacity as the inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage was affirmed in the Republic v. Court of Appeals case, better
known as the Molina case. The Court based its decision on the case at bar based on
the guidelines laid down in the case as shown in the following: 1) the petitioner, by
his own testimony, expert witnesses and certificate was able to sufficiently prove
the wifes incapacity; 2) the root cause of the respondents psychological incapacity
has been medically and clinically identified and sufficient proven by two expert
witnesses; 3) respondents psychological incapacity was established to have existed
at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage, 4) the gravity of
respondents psychological incapacity rendered her unable to adhere to reality as
well as to any legal and emotional commitments is therefore sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage; 5) respondent is evidently
unable to comply with the essential marital obligations particularly that of Article 68
which enjoins spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support; 6) said marriage was already annulled by the
Catholic church, which though not controlling and binding should be given great
respect by the courts; and, 7) expert witnesses remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or not. Whether or not the respondents
psychological incapacity was incurable was rendered less than required in the case
of Santos v. Court of Appeals as said case did not clearly mandate the incurability of

the psychological incapacity to be established in the action for the declaration of

nullity.
Though the decisions of above cases, Molina and Santos were promulgated
only after the case at bar, the Court ruled on utterly practical considerations. It was
therefore concluded that the petitioner was able to establish his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
2. REPUBLIC V. HAMANO
G.R. NO. 149498; May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero, respondent and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, started a
common-law relationship in Japan in October 1986. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month and thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. Lolita gave birth to their child on November of the same year. They
were eventually married on January 14, 1988 at the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. A month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and stopped sending
money to Lolita after two months. She wrote to him several times but he never
responded. She also learned that he visited the Philippines but did not bother to see
Lolita and her child.
Respondent filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage to her
husband on the ground of psychological incapacity. The summons remained
unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. The summon and
the petition were also published in a newspaper of general circulation but Toshio still
failed to file a responsive pleading after 60 days from publication. Petitioner filed a
motion to present her evidence ex parte and was granted so.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void on the ground
that the respondent spouse Toshio failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
therein petitioner and father to his daughter. Such behavior could be traced to
respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC against the instant
appeal of the Office of the Solicitor General based on the lone assignment of error
that the respondent was able to prove Toshios psychological incapacity based on
the guideline laid down in the Molina case.
SUPREME COURT:
No, the marriage should not be declared null and void in the absence of a
clear showing that Toshio was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
The 1987 Constitution provides for the protection and the strengthening of
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of

psychological incapacity as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code. In the
interpretation and application of such article, the Molina guidelines were laid down
by the Court.
Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family,
however, the totality of evidence failed to prove that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Though he was irresponsible, it
was never alleged nor proven to be caused by some psychological disorder. The
guidelines in the Molina case were thus not satisfied and Toshio cannot be presumed
to be psychologically incapacitated as this cannot be proved by the mere failure of a
person to meet his marital duties. It is essential that such person is incapable of
doing do due to some psychological, not physical illness.
The Supreme Court thus reversed the order of the Court of Appeals.
3. TE V. TE
G.R. NO. 161793; February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Yu-Te, eloped to Cebu
three months after their first meeting upon the latters suggestion as they were
then sharing a similar angst towards their families. After only a month, they
depleted their sustenance and eventually returned home.
Edward was then forced to live with Rowena in her uncles house with threats
that she would commit suicide if he did not. They were thus married on April 23,
1996. Edward was treated like a prisoner in the said house and Rowenas uncle
showed Edward his guns and warned not to leave Rowena.
At one time Edward suggested to Rowena that they should live in his
parents house, but the latter refused and suggested instead for him to get his
inheritance so they could live on their own. Edward eventually was able to escape
from the house.
In June 1996, Edward and Rowena parted ways, the former saying that he
was disinherited. In January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latters psychological incapacity.
Both were found by the clinical psychologist who examined the petitioner, to
be psychologically incapacitated, Edward, being afflicted with a dependent
personality disorder while Rowena with a narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void based on Article 36 of
the Family Code.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of the parties null and void on
the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

The Court of Appeals, upon the Solicitor Generals notice of appeal, reversed
and set aside the trial courts ruling due to the failure of the petitioner to prove the
psychological incapacity of the respondent.
SUPREME COURT:
Yes, the marriage was declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in ruling on this case sought to examine Article 36 by tracing its
origin and the development of jurisprudence interpreting it. It was found that the
Code Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
emphasized that each case must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts as no case is on all
fours with another case in the field of psychological incapacity.
By the very nature of Article 36, the courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion of the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties. The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and indepth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
The Court basing on the decisive psychological evaluation that the parties
were afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, guided by
the trial courts first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, ruled to declare the
marriage null and void.
4. REPUBLIC V. SAN JOSE
G.R. NO. 168328; February 28, 2007
FACTS:
Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San Jose were married on
June 12, 1988 and begot two children. For nine years, the couple stayed with
Manolitos parents. Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As
for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and later filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court.
Dr. Tayag, clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health,
declared that from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on
Laila, she found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not said marriage should be declared null and void based on
psychological incapacity as provided in Article 36.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court denied Lailas petition citing the cases Molina and
Santos that the meaning of psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such incapacity
must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between Manolito and Laila void ab initio.
SUPREME COURT:
No, the Supreme Court ruled reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstating the decision of the trial court.
The Court relied on the case of Ferraris v. Ferraris to expound the meaning of
psychological incapacity which refers to a serious psychological illness affecting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond on is about to assume. It is the intendment of the law to
confine such to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to marriage. It is for this reason that the Court heavily relies on psychological
experts for the understanding of the human personality. However, in as much as the
clinical psychologists conclusion was based merely on information provided by the
petitioner, it was ruled by the Court to be mere hearsay. There is of course no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to
arrive at such declaration. If it can be proven by independent means that one is
psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be
credited.
Manolitos alleged incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a
drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. This condition or
attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition. In both Molina and Ferraris
cases, such condition was said to a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
5. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA
G.R. NO. 108763; February 13, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Roridel Molina and respondent Reynaldo Molina got married on
April 14, 1985 and had a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and as a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers on whom he squandered his money. Reynaldo
depended on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife

with regards to their finances resulting to frequent quarrels. He was relieved of his
job in Manila which left Roridel as the sole breadwinner of the family. This led to an
intense quarrel and estranged the two. When Roridel eventually quit her job in
Manila, Reynaldo left them.
On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage presenting evidence which includes her own testimony and other
witnesses her friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist, as well as documents.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared void ab initio based on
psychological incapacity as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void and the Court of
Appeals affirmed such decision.
SUPREME COURT:
No, the marriage was declared by the Supreme Court to be subsist and valid.
According to Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine such meaning to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. It was further rules that
it must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.
However the present case appears to show a mere difficulty if not an outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was thus reversed and set aside. The
said case further resulted to the formulation of the Molina guidelines as a basis for
qualifying psychological incapacity.
6. ENRICO V. HEIRS OF SPS. MEDINACELI
G.R. NO. 173614; September 28, 2007
FACTS:
Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Medinaceli were married on June 14, 1962
and begot seven children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004. Eulogio subsequently
married herein petitioner Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio
died on February 10, 2005.
On March 17, 2005 respondent heirs, filed with the Regional Trial Court an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and Lolita on the ground that
they did not a have the requisite marriage license and was not exempt from
securing such as provided by Article 34 of the Family Code as Eulogio marriage with
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter death in the previous year. Respondents
also pointed out the lack of a marriage ceremony.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent heirs have personality to file a petition to declare the
marriage of Eulogio and Lolita null and void.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and eventually reinstated it
in keeping with the decision of the Court on Ninal v. Badayog.
SUPREME COURT:
No, the respondent heirs do not have personality to assail the validity of the
marriage of Eulogio and Lolita.
While it is true that the Ninal case in no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage,
the Court cannot apply this on marriages solemnized within the effectivity of the
Family Code. The marriage in the present case was solemnized in 2004 and is within
the scope of application of the Family Code as provided in The Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Section 1 stating that, this rule shall govern
petitions for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. Such categorical
language leaves no room for doubt.
Under the same rule, that of Section 2, a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. When
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Such a petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses of the estate. Respondents thus, have
no cause of action before the court a quo. They may only challenge the validity of
such marriage in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate.
7. REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO
G.R. NO. 94053; March 17, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Nolasco, married British national Janet Monica Parker on
January 15, 1982 and had a child. While Nolasco was on another employment
contract as seaman, sometime January 1983, he received letter saying that Janet
gave birth to their son and left just fifteen days after. Nolasco later came home in
November 1983. Subsequently, on August 5, 1988, he filed before the Regional Trial
Court a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife or in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the herein respondent has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court granted Nolascos petition and declared Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead, without prejudice to her
reappearance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision holding that the
respondent has sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.
SUPREME COURT:
No, the respondent was not able to establish a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
Article 41 of the Family Code, in the declaration of presumptive death, has
four requisites which includes: a) that the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code; b) that the present spouse wishes to marry; c) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and, d) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is
dead, as required in the case of United States v. Biasbas. In performing a diligent
search, respondent failed to seek the help of the local authorities or of the British
Embassy; relied on his limited search for Janet whenever he docked in England and
was delayed in coming home to find his wife, having received the letter informing
him of her leave on January 1983 and he arriving on November of the same year.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, the Court stressed that marriage is a
relationship for life and the parties cannot ternminate it at any shorter period by
virtue of any contract they make The Court noted that respondent even tried to
have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding as
seemingly a scheme to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. In In Re
Szatraw, the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
Furthermore, marriage as defined in Article 1 of the family code is a special
contract of permanent union which the State needs to protect.
It is in light of these sentiments and above evidence that the Court nullified
the Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial courts decision declaring Janet
presumptively dead.
8.REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 159614; December 9, 2005
FACTS:
Barely a month into their marriage, Rosalia Julaton (Lia) left their marital
abode on February 6, 1995 after a light chastisement by her husband, herein
respondent, Alan Alegro (Alan) for having come home late and for always being out
of their house. Since then, Lea did not return to their house anymore. On February
14, 1995, Alan went to Leas parents house, but he was told that she was not there.
He learned from his father in-law that Lea had been to their house but left without
notice. He tried to look for her from her friend Janet, but she was in Manila. He also
sought the help of Barayngay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate
his wife. He eventually decided to work as a taxi driver so he could look for Lea on
his free time, but to no avail.

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police
station and to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not private respondent was able to establish a well-founded belief of his
wifes death.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition of presumptive death without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
SUPREME COURT:
No, private respondent was no able to establish a well-founded belief that his
wife was dead.
The spouse present bears the burden to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead. Although the law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief,
such belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Testimonial evidence may suffice, but the respondent failed to present a
witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat and further failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his
petition in the trial court. He reported such incident to the local police and to the
NBI only after the Solicitor General filed its motion to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court ruled that the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts decision is reversed and set aside.
9. VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 132955; October 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage with private respondent, Lilia Canalita-Villanueva before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila alleging that threats of violence and duress forced
him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant
prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and he
later learned that private respondents child during delivery on August 29, 1988.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed petitioners petition for the annulment of
his marriage with private respondent and ordered him to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court with modification as to damages.

SUPREME COURT:
No, marriage in question may not be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts but deleted the award
of moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis.
The decision is based on the following findings: 1) that steps to annul the
marriage were initiated only after four years and eight months; 2) that said
annulment corroborates Lilias allegation that it was made solely on the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about
an acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then pending against
Orlando; 3) that his claim of being forced and threatened to marry Lilia was not
reasonable in light of the fact that he was employed as a security guard, who can be
assumed to know the rudiments of self-defense or the proper way to keep himself in
harms way, at the very least; and 4) that other evidence show otherwise that he
did not cohabit with private respondent and that the child was of another man.
ALMELOR V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. NO. 179620; August 26, 2008
FACTS:
Manuel, petitioner and Leonida, respondent, both medical practitioners were
married on January 29, 1989 and begot three children. After 11 years of marriage,
Leonida filed a petition to annul their marriage before the Regional Trial Court on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. The trial court ruled not on the alleged ground of Article 36 of the
Family Code, but on the basis of Article 45 ratiocinating that homosexuality on
Manuels part as claimed by Lilia is generally incompatible with hetero sexual
marriage.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not homosexuality per se is a proper ground to annul said
marriage.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for annulment and ordered the
dissolution of the regime of community property between the parties and the
provision of monthly financial support to all the children. The Court of Appeals
affirmed above decision in toto.
SUPREME COURT:
No, said marriage may not be annulled on the basis of homosexuality per se.
The Court held that the trial court should have dismissed the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage as it was anchored on the ground of psychological
incapacity as provided in Article 36. But because the supporting grounds relied upon
by Leonidas cannot legally make a case on such basis as would be qualified under
the guidelines laid down in the Molina case, the trial court erroneously sought
support from the provisions of Article 45 citing that Manuels homosexual
tendencies rendered him incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations.
Evidently though, there was no sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this
to Leonida at the time of their marriage. Moreover, even in assuming that Manuel is

a homosexual, this cannot be made a ground to annul his marriage because it is the
concealment of homosexuality and not homosexuality per se that renders ones
consent to the marriage vitiated by fraud. Consent is an essential element requisite
of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be given freely by both parties. An allegation
of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code
has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances consisting fraud and
homosexuality per se is not among the cited, but its concealment. It is instead only
a ground for legal separation as it is alleged to be incompatible to a healthy
heterosexual life.
Furthermore, mindful of the constitutional policy of protecting and
strengthening family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family, the Court must resolve doubt in favor of the validity of
marriage.
10. MAQUILAN V. MAQUILAN
G.R. NO. 155409; June 8, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Dita Maquilan was convicted for the crime of adultery and later
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial
Court. During the pre-trial of the said case, the petitioner and private respondent
entered into a compromise agreement in partial settlement of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The said Compromise Agreement was later given judicial
imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying the repudiation of
the Compromise Agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses
pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the petitioner. It
later denied the motion for reconsideration of the assailed order of February 7,
2002.
The Court of Appeals on August 30, 2002 dismissed the petition for lack of
merit holding that adultery does not ipso facto disqualify respondent from sharing in
the conjugal property.
SUPREME COURT:
The provisions cited by the petitioner are not applicable to the case, namely:
Article 43 on the termination of subsequent marriage because of the reappearance
of an absent spouse; Article 63 which applies to the effects of legal separation, the
present case being that of a declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity; and Article 2035 as it does not deal with the validity of a marriage or
legal separation. Article 143 should instead be applied which provides that the
separation of property may be effected voluntary or for sufficient cause, subject to

judicial approval, notwithstanding the pendency of the declaration of the nullity of

marriage.
Moreover, the validity Compromised Agreement may not be assailed on the
ground that provincial prosecutor or solicitor was absent during the proceedings as
the settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their
marriage, nor did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties as
would have been required under Article 48 of the Family Code to ensure the interest
of the State.
Furthermore, Article 333 provides prision correctional in its medium and
maximum periods as the penalty for a conviction of adultery and therefore does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction but instead is only limited to the
accessory penalties prescribed in Article 43. Private respondent is therefore not
precluded from exercising her right over the conjugal property and should not be
prevented to dispose of such property.
Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and
judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement and
may not use such as a reason to repudiate said agreement. It is well settled that the
negligence of counsel bind the client and such may only be recognized by the Court
in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law or the outright deprivation of ones property through technicality.
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
Petition was therefore denied. The decision pf the Court of Appeals was
affirmed with modification that the subject Compromise Agreement is valid without
prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in
the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
11. VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. NO. 122749; July 31, 1996
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez, petitioner and Consuelo Gomez, private respondent were
married on January 5, 1971 and had 5 children. Upon petition of Antonio, their
marriage was declared null and void on grounds of mutual psychological incapacity
on July 29, 1994 with orders to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code within 30 days from the notice
of this decision.
On May 05, 1995, the trial court made the clarification that disposition of the
family dwelling should be made pursuant to Article 147. Petitioner contended that
Article 50, 51, 52 of the Family Code is controlling.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court is justified in ruling that disposition of family dwelling
should be governed by the provision of Article 147.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:

The trial court declared the said marriage null and void and ordered for the
liquidation of property, in particular, the disposition of the family dwelling to be
governed by Article 147.
SUPREME COURT:
Yes, the trial court has correctly applied the law in the disposition of the
family dwelling.
Article 147 provides such particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."
It is therefore correct to say that petitioner and private respondent own the
family home and all their property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them , the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Article 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to Article 102 and 129, should aptly prevail, as Article 102 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains while the latter, to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.
12. ONG V. ONG
G.R. NO. 153206; October 23, 2006
FACTS:
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Article
55 par. 1 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City alleging
that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive behavior which started after their third year of being married. Prior
to proceedings, Lucita left the marital abode on December 14, 1995 after an intense
quarrel.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court is justified in granting the respondent her petition for
legal separation.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision decreeing legal separation. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
SUPREME COURT:
Yes, the trial courts decision decreeing legal separation is upheld and denied
petitioners petition.
The Court adopted the facts as determined in the lower courts as it is wellsettled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review. The
Court therefore held that the denials and attempts to downplay the alleged
incidents of abuse and physical violence bear less weight than the detailed accounts

given by Lucita. Moreover, the contention that the witnesses Lucita presented are
not credible because of their relationship with her was not given much merit
because relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a witness relationship to one of
the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.
Abandonment, as that which refers to Lucitas leaving the conjugal abode on
December 14, 1995 after an intense quarrel cannot be entertained to bar her action
for legal separation as contemplated in Article 56 (4) of the Family Code as
abandonment as defined in the Code refers to that without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
The Court thus denied the petition and upheld the decision of the lower
courts.
13. ALMELOR V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. NO. 179620; August 26, 2008

FACTS:
Manuel, petitioner and Leonida, respondent, both medical
practitioners were married on January 29, 1989 and begot three children.
After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition to annul their marriage
before the Regional Trial Court on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The trial
court ruled not on the alleged ground of Article 36 of the Family Code, but
on the basis of Article 45 ratiocinating that homosexuality on Manuels part
as claimed by Lilia is generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not homosexuality per se is a proper ground to annul said
marriage.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for annulment and
ordered the dissolution of the regime of community property between the
parties and the provision of monthly financial support to all the children. The
Court of Appeals affirmed above decision in toto.
SUPREME COURT:
No, said marriage may not be annulled on the basis of homosexuality
per se.
The Court held that the trial court should have dismissed the petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage as it was anchored on the ground of
psychological incapacity as provided in Article 36. But because the
supporting grounds relied upon by Leonidas cannot legally make a case on
such basis as would be qualified under the guidelines laid down in the
Molina case, the trial court erroneously sought support from the provisions

of Article 45 citing that Manuels homosexual tendencies rendered him

incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations.
Evidently though, there was no sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. Moreover, even in
assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, this cannot be made a ground to
annul his marriage because it is the concealment of homosexuality and not
homosexuality per se that renders ones consent to the marriage vitiated by
fraud. Consent is an essential element requisite of a valid marriage. To be
valid, it must be given freely by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code
has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances consisting fraud and
homosexuality per se is not among the cited, but its concealment. It is
instead only a ground for legal separation as it is alleged to be incompatible
to a healthy heterosexual life.
Furthermore, mindful of the constitutional policy of protecting and
strengthening family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family, the Court must resolve doubt in favor of the
validity of marriage.
14. GANDIONCO V. PENARANDA

G.R. NO. 79284; November 27, 1987

FACTS:
On May 29, 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner,
filed with Regional Trial Court against petitioner for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. Respondent also filed a case of concubinage at the Municipal Trial
Court on October 13, 1968. On November 14, 1986, application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent lite, pending a decision in the action
for legal separation.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not civil action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendent lite, should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
petitioner by private respondent.
HELD:
LOWER COURT:
The trial court, on December 10, 1986 ordered for the payment of
support pendent lite and on August 5, 1987 denied the petitioners motion
to suspend hearings in the action for legal separation.
SUPREME COURT:
Yes, the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto,
such as, application for support pendent lite, may progress notwithstanding
the pendency of the criminal case for concubinage.
The governing rule is now Section 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to civil actions to enforce criminal liability arising
from the offense as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
111, which is civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged. Section 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged.
Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to Civil action arising
from the offense.
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and
their relations to each other. Moreover, a decree of legal separation on the
ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary and that support pendent lite, as a remedy, may be
availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of
the judge.