Rev-Envi-compilation Wala Pa Ang Reports

[ENVI MIDTERM COMPILATION (BASED ON
SYLLABUS)] July 13, 2016

I.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Preamble to conserve and develop
our patrimony
B. Art. II Declaration of Principles and State
Policies
(i)
Sec. 15 Right to Health
The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among
them.
(ii)
Sec. 16 Right to Balanced and
Healthful Ecology
The State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
OPPOSA vs. FACTORAN (1993)

This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent
the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape
of Mother Earth."
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies, among many

other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
COURT OF APPEALS (1994)
AUTHORITY
vs.
The clash between the responsibility of the City

Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of
garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the
residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan
City where these tons of garbage are dumped
everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the
protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
ISSUE: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the
authority to entertain the complaint against the
dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of
Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite?
ANSWER: YES.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard
that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting
and accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others,
to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order
by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under

the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of
its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws.
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION vs. ALCALA (1997)
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber
Corporation seeks the nullification of the order dated
February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7,
1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as of no
force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106,
with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
hectares of forest land in the municipalities of
Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora
and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.
C. Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony

(i)
Sec. 1 Efficient Use of Natural
Resources
The goals of the national economy are
a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people;
and an expanding productivity as the
key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The
State
shall
promote
industrialization and full employment
based
on
sound
agricultural
development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural
resources, and which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign
competition
and
trade
practices.
THERE SHOULD BE A NEW POLICY. It is finally

contended that any policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection justifying the decision of
the executive department not to reinstate petitioners
license must be formally enunciated and cannot merely
be implied from the Presidents instruction to his
subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy
cannot be applied to existing licenses such as
petitioners.
ANSWER:
UNTENBABLE.
The
Presidents
order
reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal
Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the license of FLDC)
was prompted by concerns expressed by the then
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that
said reinstatement [of FLDCs license] may negate our
efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our
forest resources. There was really no new policy but, a
mere reiteration of a policy of conservation and
protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, Sec. 16 of
the Constitution which commands the State to protect
and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. There is therefore no merit in
petitioners contention that no new policy can be
applied to existing licenses.
VIOLATION OF THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS.
Petitioner contends that the cancellation of its license
constitutes an impairment of the obligation of its
contract.
ANSWER: UNTENABLE. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
(ii)
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors

of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum
opportunity
to
develop.
Private
enterprises, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership.
Sec. 2 State Ownership of Natural
Resources
All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the
State.
With
the
exception
of
agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration,
development,
and
utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such
citizen. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twentyfive years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of

water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
RESIDENT MARINE
REYES (2015)
MAMMALS
vs.
SECRETARY
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging

the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded
to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service
contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the
Taon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys
and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was
brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the
Taon Strait by two individuals acting as legal
guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The
second petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
along with individual representatives from fishing
communities impacted by the oil exploration activities.
The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after
JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and
the government of the Philippines mutually terminated
the service contract and oil exploration activities
ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for
the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the
important procedural point of whether the case was
moot because the service contract had been
terminated. The Court declared that mootness is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Due to the alleged grave
constitutional violations and paramount public interest
in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions
complained of could be repeated, the Court found it
necessary to reach the merits of the case even though
the particular service contract had been terminated.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners,
the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1)
whether marine mammals, through their stewards,
have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether
the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution
or other domestic laws.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the
principle of standing beyond natural and juridical
persons, even though it recognized that the current
trend in Philippine jurisprudence moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court
access in environmental cases." Instead, the Court
explained, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized
Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the
contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional
requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires a service contract for oil
exploration and extraction to be signed by the

president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX
contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary,
and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court
held that it was unconstitutional.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract
violated the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally
prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected
areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
area, the exploration must be performed in accordance
with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The
Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys
before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity
was unlawful. Furthermore, the Taon Strait is a NIPAS
area, and exploration and utilization of energy
resources can only be authorized through a law passed
by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not
specifically authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the
Court declared that no energy exploration should be
permitted in that area.
OH CHO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1946)
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the
registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in
the name of the applicant. The opposition of the
Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of
title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien,
from acquiring lands of the public domain. The
applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of
the application for registration on January 17, 1940.
ACT NO. 496 OR CA No. 141, SHOULD BE APPLICABLE.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case,
then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land
Act (C.A. No. 141).
ANSWER: FAILED TO SHOW PROOF REQUIRED BY SAID
LAWS. The applicant failed to show that he has title to
the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his
predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the
laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant below to
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does
not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessors in
interest begun in 1880.

WHETHER ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
Next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48,
49, C.A. No. 141).
ANSWER: NO, PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST FAILED TO
REGISTER SAID LAND. It may be argued that under the
provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been
entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having
purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must
be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The
benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest should comply with
the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration
of the land of which they had been in possession at
least since July 26, 1894. The applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have
any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which
was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which,
tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS &
CARINO (2000)
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent,
AquilinoCario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, a petition for registration of
Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters,
more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land
surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala,
Cabuyao, Laguna.
Pertinent portions of the Report from the Land
investigator of the Bureau of Lands were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
That the land subject for registration thru

judicial confirmation of imperfect title is
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on
plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No.
3015, Cad. 455-0, CabuyaoCadastre; and that
the same is agricultural in nature and the
improvements found thereon are sugarcane,
bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and
one house of the tenant made of light
materials;
That the land subject for registration is outside
any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park
and watershed reservation and that same land
is free from claim and conflict;
That said land is neither inside the relocation
site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor
any pasture lease; it is not covered by any
4.
existing public land application and no patent

or title has been issued therefor
That the herein petitioner has been in
continuous, open and exclusive possession of
the land who acquired the same thru
inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa
Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial
partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant
requested that said instrument will be
presented on the hearing of this case; and that
said land is also declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of
the petitioner
Subsequently it was granted by the trial court.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals but the
Decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence,
the present petition.
ISSUE: According to the petitioner, the private
respondent has not overthrown the presumption that
the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines
RULING: THE CONTENTION IS TENABLE. Possession of
public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession
or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
the required period to constitute a grant from the
State. There is thus an imperative necessity of the
most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over
public agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition. The underlying principle is that all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the
public domain.
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the
government, the petitioner in land registration cases is
not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect
right or title sought to be confirmed.
In the case under consideration, private respondent
can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of
land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated
to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and
partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly
effected, the private respondent has possessed the
property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years
as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the
registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to
tack his possession to what he theorized upon as
possession of the same land by his parents. However,
other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent
has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate
his allegation that his late mother possessed the land
in question even prior to 1911.
REPUBLIC vs. DELA PAZ (2010)
Respondentsdela Paz applied for a registration of land
under PD 1529. Respondents alleged that they
acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural
land, by virtue of SalaysayngPagkakaloob dated June

18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimodela Paz
and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier
acquired the said property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a
"SinumpaangPahayagsaPaglilipatsaSarilingmgaPagaaringNamatay dated March 10, 1979.
In their application, respondents claimed that they are
co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents
further averred that by way of tacking of possession,
they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the same, in the concept of an owner
even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than
fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of
registration with the trial court. They maintained that
the subject property is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application for registration on the ground,
among others, that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not
subject to private appropriation.
ISSUE: Petitioner contends that the respondents failed
to produce evidence to prove that the subject lot is
within the alienable and disposable area of the public
domain. Respondents failed to establish that the
subject property is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. The subject property
remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
RULING: THE CONTENTION IS TENABLE. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public domain. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the
character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also

secure a certification from the Government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to
the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the
said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the
nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1988)
These cases arose from the application for registration
of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose
de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was
divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009.
According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose
de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
MamayaBalbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 69, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
BALBALIO AND ALBERTO: In support of the application,
both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription
Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she
was born in the land, which was possessed by her
parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he
received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by
Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas,
avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the
earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father.
Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his
tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from
that year to 1964.
BENGUET: Benguet opposed on the ground that the
June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest
of James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the
date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts,
and its payment of taxes on the land.

ATOK: For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 15 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds
on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2,
1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio.
These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been
in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work
on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon.
BUREAU OF FORESTRY DEVELOPMENT: The Bureau of
Forestry Development also interposed its objection,
arguing that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to
alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the
applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of
the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and
Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de
la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving
the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic
has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its
argument that neither the private respondents nor the
two mining companies have any valid claim to the land
because it is not alienable and registerable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot is alienable and
disposable
RULING: It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the
rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. By such act,
the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land,
against even the government, without need of any
further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they had the right
to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the
land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
The classification must be categorical; the land must
be
either
completely
mineral
or
completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed,
the land which was originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As
long as mining operations were being undertaken

thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those
who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land devoted
to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person
is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
Once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the
use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any
other purpose that will impede the mining operations
to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by
such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could
not have been transferred to the private respondents
by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use
be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution)
WATER RIGHTS
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant. (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution)
PROTECTION OF MARINE WEALTH
o
Art. I (Sec. 1) The National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial,

and aerial domain, including its and other

submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
UNCLOS
SMALL-SCALE
RESOURCES
UTILIZATION
OF
annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between

the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.
NATURAL
The State may directly undertake such activities, or

it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizen. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. (Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
TECHNICAL OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.
RAMOS (2004)
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April
9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March
30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering
close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On
August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which
was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 9640, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing
rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that
they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP
to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral
resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian
mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake
in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned
by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25,
1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals
which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR)
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the
2.
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is

unconstitutional for allowing fully foreignowned corporations to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
Whether or not the FTAA between the
government and WMCP is a service contract
that permits fully foreign owned companies to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
RULING:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained
the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section
also states that, the exploration and development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State
to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of
natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of
inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire
makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given
area. The concession amounts to complete control by
the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource,
for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the
phrase management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows
only technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities
by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such

provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts
that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law
is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service
contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA
7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership
over the nations mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare
title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally
ordained
60-40%
capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements
or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if
some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are
thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail
with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign
owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large
scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between the WMCP and the Philippine
government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign
owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and byproducts that may be produced from the contract
area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides
that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related
provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP
beneficial
ownership
over
natural
resources that properly belong to the State and
are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution.
They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law
seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
Consequently, the contract from which they spring

must be struck down.
(iii)
Sec. 3 Lands of the Public Domain

Classification
Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations
or associations may not hold such
lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, and not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than 12 hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirement or
conservation,
ecology,
and
development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(1984)
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor
General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution
of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private
respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as
Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, ObandoCadastre, under
Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan,
and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It
adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents
have converted it into a fishpond.
In their application for registration filed on May 10,
1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity)
claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of
the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918
and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not
within any forest zone or military reservation; and that
the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their
names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed
the application on the principal ground that the land
applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando,

Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927;
and that areas within the unclassified region are
denominated as forest lands and do not form part of
the disposable and alienable portion of the public
domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the
subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was
affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court,
which found that "through indubitable evidence
(Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona
fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to
the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled
to registration. It further opined that "since the subject
property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it
cannot be categorized as part of forest lands."
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Courts can reclassify the
subject public land; and (2) whether or not the
applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.
RULING: NO, IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE COURT.
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release
the subject property from the unclassified category,
which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative
of the Executive Department of the Government and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This
should be so under time-honored Constitutional
precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.
NO, THEY CANNOT AVAIL OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION;
LAND IS UNCLASSIFIED. Since the subject property is
still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may
have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. The conversion of subject property into a
fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of
properties around it, does not automatically render the
property as alienable and disposable. Applicants'
remedy lies in the release of the property from its
present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it
appearing that there are titled lands around the subject
property, petitioners-officials should give serious
consideration to the matter of classification of the land
in question.
registration in its name of said parcels of land under

the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under
Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-ininterest had allegedly been in possession thereof since
July 26, 1894.
After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial
fiscal, appearing for the Director of Lands, submitted
evidence supporting the opposition filed by the
Solicitor General to the effect that AIC had no
registerable title and that the highly mineralized
parcels of land applied for were within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve which had not yet been
released as alienable and disposable land pursuant to
the Public Land Law.
On July 22, 1966, the lower court favorably acted on
the application and ordered the registration of the
parcels of land under the Land Registration Act. It ruled
that although said land was within the forest zone, the
opposition of the Director of Lands was not well-taken
because the Bureau of Forestry, thru the District
Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to exclude the
same area from the forest reserve." It found that the
parcels of land had been acquired by purchase and
AIC's possession thereof, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-nine (49)
years.
The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
asserting that except for a 4-hectare area, the land
covered by PSU-217518, 217519 and 217520 fell within
the
Central
Cordillera
Forest
Reserve,
under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that
although it had been denuded, it was covered with
massive, corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to
yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a fifth of which
was suitable for the manufacture of high grade
portland cement type and that the limestone, being
250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of cement a
day for 1,000 years. He contended that, while the land
could be reclassified as mineral land under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the process of
exclusion from the Cordillera Forest Reserve had not
yet been undertaken pursuant to Sec. 1826 of Republic
Act No. 3092 and therefore it was still part of the forest
zone which was inalienable under the 1935
Constitution.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. JUDGE AQUINO (1990)
On December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land

Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and
118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of
land in the name of AIC.
Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for

brevity), a duly registered corporation established for
the purpose of setting up a cement factory, claims to
be the owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare
area indicated in survey plans PSU-217518, PSU217519 and PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of
P6,724.48. Thus, on September 23, 1965, it filed in the
then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for
Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or

on May 22, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, invoking Section 38 of
Act No. 496, filed in the Court of First Instance of Abra
a petition for review of the decrees of registration and
the lower court's decision of July 22, 1966. The Solicitor
General alleged that although the evidence presented
by AIC showed that it had purchased from individual

owners only a total area of 24 hectares, the application
included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and therefore AIC "employed actual fraud"
which misled the court "to error in finding the applicant
to have a registerable title over the parcels of land
subject of the application."
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration
of the parcels of land be granted, notwithstanding the
finding that they are within the forest zone.
RULING: NO, BECAUSE IT IS CLASSIFIED AS FOREST
LAND. Forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private properties. This
ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined
not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in
the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides
that:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber, . . . and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated."
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must
first be released from its classification as forest land
and reclassified as agricultural land in accordance with
the certification issued by the Director of Forestry as
provided for by Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code. This is because the classification
of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and not of
the courts. Moreover, a positive act of the government
is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
AYOG vs. JUDGE CUSI (1982)
This case is about the application of section 11, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private
corporation from purchasing public lands) to a 1953
sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a
sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and
to the 1964 decision of the trial court, ejecting some of
the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision
was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals.
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a
bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc. on
the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834
Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan,
Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of
about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of
the lot protested against the sale. The Director of
Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the
protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot
and remove their improvements. No appeal was made
from that decision.
The Director found that the protestants entered the
land only after it was awarded to the corporation and,
therefore, they could not be regarded as bona fide
occupants thereof. The Director characterized them as

squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious
persons. He issued a writ of execution but the
protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the
land.
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the
land, the corporation filed against them on February
27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil
Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accionpubliciana).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on August
14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was issued to the
corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.3
hectares. The patent was registered. Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the
patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June
29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources,
recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed
out that the purchaser corporation had complied with
the said requirements long before the effectivity of the
Constitution, that the land in question was free from
claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent
was in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in
Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the
prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution.
Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in
approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that
the applicant had acquired a nested right to its
issuance.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the
corporation filed a motion for execution. The
defendants, some of whom are now petitioners herein,
opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption
of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17,
1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally
impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They
invoked
the
constitutional
prohibition,
already
mentioned, that "no private corporation or association
may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Bian
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired
a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations
to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested
rights in constitutional law.
(iv)
Sec. 4 Specific Limits of Forest Lands

& National Parks

(v)
The Congress shall, as soon as

possible, determine by law the specific
limits of forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their boundaries
on the ground. Thereafter, such forest
lands and national parks shall be
conserved and may not be increased
nor diminished, except by law. The
Congress shall provide, for such
periods as it may determine, measures
to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and in watershed areas.
Sec. 5 Ancestral Lands of Indigenous
Cultural Communities
The State, subject to the provisions of
the
Constitution
and
national
development policies and programs,
shall protect the right of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social
and cultural well-being.
(ii)
(iii)
The Congress may provide for the
applicability
of
customary
laws
governing property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains.
(vi)
Sec. 6 Social Function of Property
The use of property bears a social
function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good.
Individuals
and
private
groups,
including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations,
shall have the right to own, establish
and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to
promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so
demands.
D. Art. XIII Social Justice and Human Rights
(i)
Sec. 4 Ecological Considerations in
Agrarian Reform
The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on
the right of the farmers and regular
farm workers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farm
workers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To the end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject
to
such
priorities
and
reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In
determining the retention limits the
State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further
provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.

Sec. 6 Principles of Agrarian Reform
or Stewardship
The State shall apply the principles of
agrarian
reform
or
stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition of utilization
of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain under lease
or concession suitable to agriculture,
subject to prior rights, homestead
rights of small settlers, and the rights
of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless
farmers and farm workers in its own
agricultural estates which shall be
undistributed to them in the manner
provided by law.
Sec, 7 Preferential Use of Communal
Marine and Fishing Resources
The State shall protect the rights of
subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential
use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both island and
offshore. It shall provide support to
such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services, the
State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve
such
resources.
The
protection shall extend to offshore
fishing
grounds
of
subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fish workers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
TANO vs. SOCRATES (1997)

On December 15, 1992, the SangguniangPanlungsodng
Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92
which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF"
On February 19, 1993, the SangguniangPanlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution
No. 33 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING
AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING
AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE
(MAMENG),
EPINE
PHELUS
FASCIATUS
(SUNO).
CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS(PANTHER OR SENORITA),
LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING,
TRIDACNA
GIGAS(TAKLOBO),
PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT

CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON
(TIGER
PRAWN-BREEDER
SIZE
OR
MOTHER),
EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER)
AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES)
FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM
PALAWAN WATERS"
The respondents implemented the said ordinances,
thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole
province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of
their only means of livelihood and the petitioners
Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other
marine merchants from performing their lawful
occupation and trade.
ISSUE: According to the petitioners, the Ordinances
deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII and Sec. 2 and 7 of
Art.XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of
Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering,
possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine
coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline
Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering
"into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion."
RULING: PETITION IS UNMERITORIOUS. Ordinance No.
15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up
to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the
Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is
effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these
Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise
of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection
and preservation of the environment and are thus
novel and of paramount importance. No further delay
then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues
raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances
enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this
presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with
the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain.
After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the
provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have
been violated, we find petitioners' contentions baseless
and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and

Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as
having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan is self-described as "a private
association
composed
of
Marine
Merchants;"
petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as
"merchants;" while the rest of the petitioners claim to
be "fishermen," without any qualification, however, as
to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a
definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal"
fishermen, they should be construed in their general
and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an
individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or
reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing
price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover
the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence
fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC
(R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman
as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or
fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced
by himself and his immediate family." It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding
that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's
marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is
that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
E. Art. X Local Government
(i)
Sec. 7 Local Governments Equitable
Share
in
the
Utilization
and
Development of National Wealth
Local Governments shall be entitled to
an equitable share in the proceeds of
the utilization and development of the
national wealth within their respective
areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
II.
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS

A. Human Relations (Art. 19, 20, 21)
ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in

the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 20. Every person who,

contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to

another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
ARTICLE 21. Any person who

willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
B. Nuisance (Art 694 and Art. 695)
ARTICLE 694. A nuisance is any act,

omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything
else which:
(1) Injures or endangers
the health or safety of
others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the
senses; or
(3) Shocks,
defies
or
disregards decency or
morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes
with the free passage
of any public highway
or street, or any body
of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the
use of property.
ARTICLE 695. Nuisance is either

public or private. A public nuisance
affects
a
community
or
neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one
that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS vs. LIM
(2014):
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of
Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was
enacted by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila in
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They
agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.
The SangguniangPanlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which

period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7
March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled that respondent
had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative
to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No.
8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron)
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the
oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask
for a reconsideration of the decision.
ISSUE: Whether
constitutional
or
not
Ordinance
No.
8027
is
RULING: Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for

their right to property. They allege that they stand to
lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However,
based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right
to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals' right to
property, the former should prevail.
Both
law
and
jurisprudence
support
the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair
to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders
who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and
control their own destiny and preserve their lives and
safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors'
warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to
provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation
of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The
enforcement of a decision, specially one with farreaching consequences, should always be within the
bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive
and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame
that complies with the letter and spirit of our
resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no
choice but to obey the law.
III.
GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY)
1151
(PHILIPPINE
REPUBLIC vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO (2002)

On August 11, 2000, respondent (City of Davao) filed
an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)
for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports
Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were the
required documents for its issuance, namely, a)

detailed location map of the project site; b) brief
project description; and c) a certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the project is not
located in an environmentally critical area (ECA).
The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding
that
the
proposed
project
was
within
an
environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant
to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise
known as the Environmental Impact Statement System,
in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151,
also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the
City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed
with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of NonCoverage, respondent filed a petition for mandamus
and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that
its proposed project was neither an environmentally
critical project nor within an environmentally critical
area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.
Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through
the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of
respondent upon submission of the required
documents.
ISSUES:
(1) Is an LGU like Davao exempt from the coverage
of PD 1586?
(2) Is the project entitled to a Certificate of NonCoverage (CNC)?
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the

country as environmentally critical. No person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such
government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or instrumentalities including the realignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
Section 1, Presidential Decree 1586.Policy. It is
hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and
maintain a rational and orderly balance between socioeconomic growth and environmental protection.
RULING:
(1) NO, IT IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586.
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government
Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the
people's right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant
to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot
claim exemption from the coverage of PD
1586. As a body politic endowed with
governmental functions, an LGU has the duty
to ensure the quality of the environment, which
is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no
person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. The Civil Code
defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the
local government units are juridical persons.
Undoubtedly therefore, local government units
are not excluded from the coverage of PD
1586.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, defines a local
government unit as a body politic and corporate
endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
conformity with law. As such, it performs dual
functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental
functions are those that concern the health, safety and
the advancement of the public good or welfare as
affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are
those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or
earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental
powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is
an agency of the national government. When engaged
in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.
Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the
duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a
balanced ecology.
Section 4, Presidential Decree 1586.Presidential
Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his
own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
(2) YES. The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does

not come close to any of the projects or areas
enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to
any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said
project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical
area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice
but to issue the Certificate of Non- Coverage. It
becomes its ministerial duty, the performance
of which can be compelled by writ of
mandamus, such as that issued by the trial
court in the case at bar.
NOTE:
Section 4 of PD 1151provides:

Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the
above enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well
as private corporations, firms and entities shall
prepare, file and include in every action, project or
undertaking which significantly affects the quality of
the environment a detailed statement on
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, project or undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot
be
avoided
should
the
proposal
be
implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the
resources of the environment are consistent
with the maintenance and enhancement of the
long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of
depletable or nonrenewable resources, a
finding must be made that such use and
commitment are warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by
a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or
special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall
comment on the draft environmental impact statement
made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the same.
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
I.
HEAVY INDUSTRIES
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
b. Iron and steel mills
c. Petroleum
and
petrochemical industries including
oil and gas
d. Smelting plants
II.
RESOURCE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
a. Major mining and quarrying
projects
b. Forestry Projects
i.
Logging
ii.
Major wood processing
projects
iii.
Introduction of fauna
(exotic-animals)
in
public/private forests
iv.
Forest occupancy
v.
Extraction of mangrove
products
c. Grazing
d. Fishery Projects
i. Dikes for/and fishpond
development
projects
III.
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossilfueled,
nuclear-fueled,
hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges
B. Environmentally Critical Areas

1. All areas declared by law as
national parks, watershed reserves,
wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic
potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat
for any endangered or threatened
species of indigenous Philippine
Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas
of
unique
historic,
archaeological,
or
scientific
interests;
5. Areas
which
are
traditionally
occupied by cultural communities
or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or
hard-hit by natural calamities
(geologic
hazards,
floods,
typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas
classified
as
prime
agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one
or any combination of the following
conditions:
a. Tapped
for
domestic
purposes
b. Within
the
controlled
and/or protected areas
declared by appropriate
authorities
c. Which support wildlife
and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by
one or any combination of the
following conditions:
a. With primary pristine and
dense young growth
b. Adjoining mouth of major
river systems
c. Near or adjacent to
traditional productive fry
or fishing grounds
d. Which act as natural
buffers
against
shore
erosion, strong winds and
storm floods
e. On which people are
dependent
for
their
livelihood.
12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or
any combinations of the following
conditions:
a. With 50% and above live
coralline cover
b. Spawning and nursery
grounds for fish
c. Which act as natural
breakwater of coastlines
Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other
projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the
President as environmentally critical shall be
considered as non-critical and shall not be required to
submit an environmental impact statement. The
National Environmental Protection Council, thru the
Ministry of Human Settlements may however require
non-critical projects and undertakings to provide
additional environmental safeguards as it may deem
necessary.
the water quality 'has deteriorated to a degree where

its state will adversely affect its best usage.' Section 17
and 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the
pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well, nigh impossible, to draw the line
between a specific and a general pollution incident.
PAJE vs. CASINO (2015)
SPECIAL
(2013)
PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE
ENVIRONMENTAL CODE)
1152
(PHILIPPINE
MMDA vs. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY

(2008)
The complaint by the residents alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards
set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the
Philippine
Environment
Code and that ALL
defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up
Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B,
waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.
ISSUES: Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD
1152
under the headings, Upgrading
of
Water
Quality
and
Clean-up
Operations, envisage
a
cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Sec. 17 of PD 1152 (Philippine Environmental
Code)
SECTION 17 UPGRADING OF WATER QUALITY.
Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage, the government agencies concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrady the
quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards.
SECTION 20 CLEAN-UP OPERATIONS. It shall be
the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove
and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own
expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concernec shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the
persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
RULING: Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs.
On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in
the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1586 (ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM)
PEOPLE
FOUNDATION
vs.
CANADA
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource

development and utilization project in Barangay Jimiliaan in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would
involve the tapping and purifying of water from the
Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water
to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.
The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt
from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1586.
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the
environmental impact of the project, respondent Nestor
M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his
findings in a letter dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area;
hence, Initial Environmental Examination is
required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive
therefore proof of social acceptability should be
established. Proper indorsement from the
Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB
should be secured.
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Candas
findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director
Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it
should also be issued a CNC because the project was
no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
that had recently been issued a CNC.
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an
Initial Environmental Examination document was
required for the project due to its significant impact in
the area. Consequently, he required the petitioner to
submit certain documents to enable the EMB to
determine whether the project was within an
environmental critical area.
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the
Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was not
located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope
because RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise

to render such finding, and thus had to forward the
petitioners request to the MGB Central Office.
CASE DIGESTS
Upon the MGBs advice, the petitioner sought and

obtained the required certification from PHIVOLCS, but
the certification did not state whether the project area
was within a critical slope. Instead, the certification
stated that the project site was approximately 18
kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.
SHELL vs. JALOS, et al
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD

Lipayons letter dated February 4, 2003 declared that
the project was within an environmentally critical area,
and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC.
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled
to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied
with the certification requirements; and that the EMB
had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area
ISSUE: Whether or not, after petitioner's due
compliance with the requirements mandated by
respondents for the issuance of the certificate of noncoverage applied for by the petitioner, it is now the
ripened duty of the respondents to issue the Certificate
of Non-Coverage
RULING: NO. The CNC is a certification issued by the
EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the
Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System)
and that the project proponent is not required to secure
an ECC.26 The EIS System was established by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section
4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy)
that required all entities to submit an EIS for projects
that would have a significant effect on the environment
There is no sufficient showing that the petitioner
satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit
the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no
certification to the effect that the project site was not
within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCSs
certification showed that the project site had
experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact
that sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas
frequently
visited
and/or
hard-hit
by
natural
calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish
that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied
for, warranting the denial of its application.
PROCLAMATION NO. 2146 (ENVIRONMENTALLY
CRITICAL PROJECTS)
[See Resident Mammals Case]
[See list of Environmentally Critical Projects in Republic
vs. City of Davao]
Pollution Case (Petroleum Pipelines

in the Malampaya Area), Jurisdiction
of PAB
FACTS:
-
Petitioner Shell and the Republic of the

Philippines
entered
into
a
SERVICE
CONTRACT 38 for the exploration and
extraction of petroleum in northwestern
Palawan.
Shell discovered natural gas in the CamagoMalampaya area and pursued its development
of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas
Project.
This entailed the construction and installation of
a pipeline from Shells production platform to its
gas processing plant in Batangas. It spanned
504 km and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
Respondents Jaloset. Al filed a complaint for
damages against Shell before the RTC
Respondents (Jaloset. Al)

-
[SUBSISTENCE FISHERMEN] They were all

subsistence fishermen from the coastal
barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose
livelihood was adversely affected by the
construction and operation of Shells natural gas
pipeline.
[FISH CATCH AND INCOME LOW] Their fish
catch became few after the construction of the
pipeline. As a result, their average net income
per month fell from a high of P4.8K to only P573.
[NEGATIVE EFFECT ON MARINE LIFE] The
pipeline greatly affected biogenically hardstructured communities such as coral reefs and
led to stress to the marine life in the Mindoro
Sea.
[LONGER
TIME
TO
CATCH;
FISH
POPULATION DROVE OUT BY OPERATION]
They now have to stay longer and farther out at
sea to catch fish, as the pipelines operation has
driven the fish population out of coastal waters.
Petitioner (Shell)

-
Moved for the dismissal of the complaint

[NO JURISDICTION] Alleged that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a
pollution case under RA 3931, as amended by
PD 984 or the Pollution Control Law. Under
these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution
cases and actions for related damages.
[DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY] It could not
be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
immunity without the states consent. Under
Service Contract 38, it served merely as an
agent of the Philippine Government in the
development of the Malampaya Gas Reserves.
[NO CAUSE OF ACTION] The complaint failed
to state a cause of action since it did not specify
any actionable wrong or particular act or
omission on Shells part that could have caused
the alleged injury to Jalos, et al.
[NOT A VALID CLASS SUIT] The complaint
failed to comply with requirements of a valid
class suit, verification and certification against
forum shopping, and the requisites for a suit
brought by pauper litigants.
RTC
-
Dismissed the complaint

The action was actually pollution-related,
although denominated as one for damages.
The complaint should thus be brought first
before the PAB, the government agency vested
with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases.
CA
-
Reversed RTCs ruling and upheld the

jurisdiction of the RTC over the action
[RTC HAS JURISDICTION] Shell was not being
sued for committing pollution, but for
constructing and operating a natural gas pipeline
that caused fish decline and considerable
reduction in the fishermens income.The claim
for damages was thus based on quasi-delict
over which the regular courts have jurisdiction.
[NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE]
Government was not even impleaded as party
defendant. The State should be deemed to have
given its consent to be sued when it entered into
the contract with Shell.
[THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION] The complaint
sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong. Jalos,
et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn

a living, which Shell had the correlative
obligation to respect. Failure to observe such
obligation resulted in a violation of the
fishermens rights and thus gave rise to a cause
of action for damages.
[VALID CLASS SUIT] Jalos, et al substantially
complied with the technical requirements for
filing the action.
ISSUES:
1. WON the complaint is a POLLUTION CASE
that falls within the primary jurisdiction of
the PAB
2. WON there is sufficient cause of action
against Shell
3. WON it is a case against the State and is
barred under the doctrine of State Immunity
RULING:
1. YES, IT IS A POLLUTION CASE AND PAB
HAS JURIDICTION, NOT THE RTC
Although the complaint does not use the word
pollution, it is unmistakable based on their allegation
that Shells pipeline produced some kind of poison or
emission that drove the fish away from the coastal
areas. It alleged that the pipeline greatly affected
biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral
reeds and led to stress to the marine life in the Mindoro
Sea. This constitutes pollution as defined by law.
SEC. 2(A), PD 984 POLLUTION: any alteration of the
physical, chemical and biological properties of any water,
as will or is likely to create or render such water harmful,
detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare
or which will adversely affect their utilization for
domestic,
commercial,
industrial,
agricultural,
recreational or other legitimate purposes.
It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life
claimed by Jalos, et al is caused by some kind of
pollution emanating from Shells natural gas pipeline.
The power and expertise needed to determine such
issue lies with the PAB.
By virtue of EO 192, PAB has the power to conduct
hearings, impose penalties for violation of PD 984, and
issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and
decisions.

2. ALL ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
ARE PRESENT
The complaint said that the natural gas pipelines
construction and operation greatly affected the marine
environment, drove away the fish, and resulted in
reduced income for Jalos, et al. Thus, the construction
and operation of the pipeline may, in itself, be a wrongful
act that could be the basis of Jalos, et als cause of
action.
3. NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE
Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It
is but a service contractor for the exploration and
development of one of the countrys natural gas
reserves.
In sum, while the complaint in this case sufficiently
alleges a cause of action, the same must be filed
withthe PAB, which is the government agency
tasked to adjudicate pollution-related cases. Shell is
not anagent of the State and may thus be sued
before that body for any damages caused by its
operations. Theparties may appeal the PABs
decision to the CA. But pending prior determination
by the PAB, courtscannot take cognizance of the
complaint.
MMDA vs. JANCOM

Waste-to-Energy Project (Incineration
Technology),
Clean
Air
Act
(Incineration as a mode of waste
disposal, if allowed)
FACTS:
-
President
Ramos
issued
Presidential
Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the
EXECOM to oversee the BOT implementation of
solid waste management projects, headed by
the Chairman of the MMDA and CORD-NCR.
It was to oversee and develop waste-to-energy
projects for the waste disposal sites in San
Mateo Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the
BOT scheme.
The terms of reference for the waste-to-energy
projects provided that its proponents should
have the capability to establish municipal solid
waste thermal plants using incineration

technology.
INCINERATION
TECHNOLOGY;
alleged
advantages of greatly reduced waste volume,
prolongation of the service life of the disposal
site, and generation of electricity.
After a series of meetings and consultations
between EXECOM and JANCOM, a draft BOT
contract was prepared and presented to the
Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste
Management.
The BOT contract for the waste-to-energy
project was signed between JANCOM and the
Philippine Government.
It was submitted for approval to President
Ramos but this was too close to the end of his
term which expired without him signing the
contract. However, he endorsed the contract to
incoming President Estrada.
With the change of administration, a lot of things
changed:
1. Composition of the EXECOM
2. Clean Air Act of 1999 was passed by
Congress
3. Due to the clamor of residents in the Rizal
Province, President Estrada ordered the
closure of the San Mateo Landfill
GMSWMC adopted a resolution not to pursue
the BOT contract with JANCOM (due to changes
in policy and economic environment). Other
alternative implementation arrangements for
solid waste management for Metro Manila would
be considered instead.
JANCOM appealed to President Estrada.
Despite the pendency of the appeal, MMDA
caused the publication in a newspaper of an
invitation to pre-qualify and to submit proposals
for solid waste management projects for Metro
Manila.
JANCOM filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari.
JANCOM
-
Declare the resolution of the GMMSWMC

disregarding the BOT Contract and the acts of
MMDA calling for bids as illegal, unconstitutional
and void
Prohibition to enjoin the GMMSWMC and MMDA
for implementing the assailed resolution and
disregarding the Award to, and the BOT contract

with, JANCOM, and from making another award
in its place.
parties, there was a concurrence of offer and

acceptance with respect to the material details of the
contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the
contract.
In favor of JANCOM
Declared the resolution of GMMSWMC and
MMDA bids as illegal and void
Respondents and their agents are hereby
prohibited and enjoined from implementing the
Resolution and disregarding petitioners BOT
Award Contract and from making another award
in its place
Admittedly,
when
petitioners
accepted
private
respondents bid proposal (offer), there was, in effect, a
meeting of the minds upon the object (waste
management project) and the cause (BOT scheme).
Hence, the perfection of the contract.
RTC
-
CA
-
Granted MMDAs prayer for a temporary

restraining order.
JANCOM moved for the execution of the RTC
decision, which was opposed by MMDA.
However, RTC granted the motion for execution
on the ground that its decision had become final
since MMDA had not appealed the same to the
CA.
ISSUES:
1. WON the decision in the RTC had become
final and executory;
2. WON MMDAs contention is correct in saying
that there is no valid and binding contract
between RP and respondents because:
a. The BOT does not bear the signature of
the President of the Philippines;
b. The conditions precedent specified in the
contract were not complied with;
c. There was no valid notice of award
3. WON
the
CLEAN
AIR
ACT
bans
INCINERATION
RULING:
1. RTCs decision had become final and
executor upon failure of MMDA to appeal the
said decision within the reglementary period
2. MMDAs contention holds no water
THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT
SIGNATURE OF THE PRES. NOT NEEDED; SIGNED

BY SENR
The Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
has such authority to sign the contract, pursuant to SEC.
1, EO No. 380, Series of 1989.
It provides that the Secretaries of all Departments and
Governing Boards of GOCC can enter into publicly
bidded contracts regardless of amount.
CLEAN AIR ACT DOES NOT PROHIBIT
INCINERATION AS A MODE OF WASTE DISPOSAL.
Sec. 20.Ban on Incineration. Incineration, hereby
defined as the burning of municipal, bio-chemical and
hazaradous wastes, which process, emits poisonous
and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited.
Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a
mode of waste disposal; rather only those burning
processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are
banned.
ROBINA vs. LAGUNA

LAKE
Wastewater Treatment Facility; EO
192 (Creation of PAB); Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
FACTS:
-
Under Article 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a

contract is perfected by mere consent.
In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the
contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the
Petitioner Universal Robina Corp. is engaged in

the manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in
BagongIlog, Pasig City
1990: LLDA, through its Pollution Control
Division, after conducting a laboratory analysis
on petitioners corn oil refinery plants

wastewater, found that it failed to comply with

government standards under DAOs Nos. 34 and
35, series of 1990
LLDA issued an Ex-Parte Order requiring the
petitioner to explain why no order should be
issued for cessation of its operation due to its
discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig
River and why it was operating without a
clearance/permit from the LLDA.
The LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint,
another analysis of petitioners wastewater,
which showed its continued failure to conform to
its effluent standard in terms of Total Suspended
Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Deman
(BOD), Color and Oil/Grease
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and
inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioners
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters
set by the aforementioned DAOs.
2003: Petitioner notified LLDS of its plan to
upgrade the wastewater treatment facility (WTF)
of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort to comply
with environmental laws, an upgrade that was
completed only in 2007.
On its request, a resampling of petitioners
wastewater was conducted which showed that
petitioners plant finally complied with
government standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of
penalties, by Manifestation and Motion, to which
it attached copies of its Daily Operation Reports
and Certifications to show that accrued daily
penalties should only cover a period of 560
days.
LLDA
-
The LLDA issued its Order to Pay: Respondent

is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater
computed in two periods (TOTAL: 1,247
DAYS):
1. March 14, 2000 the date of the initial
sampling until November 3, 2003 the
date it requested for a re-sampling
COVERING 932 DAYS
2. From March 15, 2006 the date when resampling was done until April 17, 2007
COVERING 448 DAYS
LLDA ordered the respondent to pay
PHP1,247,000
PETITIONER
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be

considered to pay only accumulated daily
penalties in the sum of PHP560,000 on the
following grounds:
1. LLDA erred in adopting a straight
computation of the periods of violation
based on the flawed assumption that
petitioner was operating on a daily basis
without excluding the period during which
LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation
work from December 1, 2000 to June 30,
2001 (Covering 212 days)
2. It also erred in disregarding the Daily
Operation Reports and Certifications which
petitioner submitted to attest to the actual
number of its operating days, i.e. 560 days
Affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found to be

amply supported by substantial evidence
Petition for Certiorari premature since the law
provides for an appeal from decisions or orders
of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or Office of
the President, remedy which should have first
been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention.
CA
ISSUES:
Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack
of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds
which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies
RULING:
THE PETITION FAILS.
EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board
under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over
the powers and functions of the National Pollution
Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator
for determining reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution.
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy
of appeal to the DENR Secretary.
PETITIONER ASSERTS THAT LLDA HAD NOT
CREDITED IT FOR UNDERTAKING REMEDIAL
MEASURES TO REHABILITATE ITS WASTEWATER

MANAGEMENT FACILITY; ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ASSAILED LLDA ORDERS AMOUNTED TO A GROSS
DISINCENTIVE TO ITS BUSINESS
Everyone must do their share to conserve the national

patrimonys meager resources for the benefit of not only
this generation, but of those to follow.
The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade
its WTF (2003-2007), a move arrived at only under
threat of continuing sanctions, militates against
genuine concern for the well-being of the countrys
waterways.
VELASCO vs. MERALCO
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Nuisance; MERALCO Substation
FACTS:
Appellant Velasco bought from the Peoples

Homesite and Housing Corporation 3 adjoining
lots in Diliman, Quezon City.
Subsequently, appellant sold 2 lots to
MERALCO, but retained the third lot, which was
farthest from the street-corner, whereon he built
his house.
In September 1953, Appellee MERALCO started
the construction of the sub-station in question
and finished it the following November, without
prior building permit or authority from the Public
Service Commission.
The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a
current suitable for distribution to the companys
consumers, not less than 8,500 residential
homes, over 300 commercial establishments
and about 30 industries.
It was constructed at a distance of 10-20 meters
from the appellants house.
The company built a stone and cement wall at
the sides along the streets but along the side
adjoining the appellants property, it put up a
sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink
wire fence.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly
emanates from the substation.
APPELLANT VELASCO
The sound constitutes an actionable nuisance

under Art. 694 of the Civil Code:NUISANCE is
any act, omission, establishment, business
condition of property or anything else which:
(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety or
others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
The subjection of the sound since 1954 had
disturbed the concentration and sleep of said
appellant, and impaired his health and lowered
the value of his property.
He sought a judicial decree for the abatement of
the nuisance and asked that he be declared
entitled to recover compensatory, moral and
other damages under Art. 2202 of the Civil Code
Dismissed the claim of the plaintiff

The sound of substation was unavoidable and
did not constitute nuisance
It could not have caused the diseases of anxiety
neurosis, pyelenophritis, ureteritis, lumbago and
anemia
The items of damage claim by plaintiff were not
adequate proved.
ISSUE:
WON this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance
RULING:
(Torterella vs. Traiser& Co., Inc.) A noise may
constitute an actionable nuisance, but it must be a noise
which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary
people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to
a particular person in a peculiar position or of specifically
sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance.
(Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson)
There can be no doubt but that commercial and
industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may
become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses
that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable.
TESTIMONIES Not reliable
QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENTS WERE RESORTED
TO; FINDINGS:

-
The sound emitted by the substation

transformers were much in higher level than the
ambient sound of the locality.
The noise continuously emitted, day and night,

constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the
appellant is entitled to relief.
Medical evidence proves that the basic root of the
appellants ailments was his inability to sleep due to the
incessant noise with consequent irritation, thus
weakening his constitution and making him easy prey to
pathogenic germs that could not otherwise affect a
person of normal health.

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[ENVI MIDTERM COMPILATION (BASED ON

SYLLABUS)] July 13, 2016

OPPOSA vs. FACTORAN (1993)

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THERE SHOULD BE A NEW POLICY. It is finally

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exploration and extraction to be signed by the

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That the land subject for registration thru

existing public land application and no patent

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legislative act or statute. The applicant may also

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annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between

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Sec. 3 Lands of the Public Domain

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

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registration in its name of said parcels of land under

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. JUDGE AQUINO (1990)

On December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land

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Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or

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occupants thereof. The Director characterized them as

Sec. 4 Specific Limits of Forest Lands

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The Congress shall, as soon as

provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.

TANO vs. SOCRATES (1997)

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Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and

CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in

ARTICLE 20. Every person who,

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ARTICLE 21. Any person who

ARTICLE 694. A nuisance is any act,

ARTICLE 695. Nuisance is either

for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which

RULING: Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for

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(2) YES. The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does

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the water quality 'has deteriorated to a degree where

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