Eusselle.

Talisic
Wills and Succession 7-9pm M/T
Atty. Tangarorang

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922
Facts:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance
to the requirements under the law. According to the court, the second will executed by
the deceased is not cloth with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient
revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the
destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.
(Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by
alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will
expressly revoking the former. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately
returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in
the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician
about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.
Issue:

Whether

or

not

there

was

valid

revocation

of

the

will

RULING: Yes.
His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw
or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own
statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was
subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed
destroyed with animo revocandi, hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and
testament of testator.

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939.
The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918.
He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner
Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for
the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on
ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. As a result, the petitioner
filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors
alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended
that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.
The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason
that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling
the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be
probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine
applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In both cases the subsequent will did not conform to all the formalities for a
sufficient revocation. In the case of Diaz vs De leon, though the court said that the
subsequent will did not conform to a sufficient revocation, it was imminent in the facts
that the testator intended to revoke his first will, in fact the two essential consideration to
somehow consider a sufficient revocation as enunciated by the court is present in the
case which is the concurrence of destruction and of animus revocandi or the intent to
revoke by one of the means provided by law on revocation. Under Article 830 there are
three ways of revoking a will, one is by implication of law, two is by execution of a codicil
or another will and three by some overt acts. In the case of Diaz it was clearly shown in
facts that indeed the testator intended to revoke the will when he actually instructed to
tear the will by some other person in his presence. Thus, making the first will as
considered revoked.
However, in the case of Molo vs Molo, the court ruled differently, the subsequent
will was probated and thereafter set aside for some reason or defects, in this case the
court ruled that there was No valid revocation as the testator did not show deliberate
intent to revoke the will. Court in this case adhere to the principle of dependent relative
revocation wherein the a void subsequent will does not revoke a valid previous will.
Thus, the first will remained valid as the subsequent had not cause the first will to be
revoked.