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RELIGION
Law of Crimes
Submitted by:
BHARAT RAVIKUMAR
935
BA.LLB. (Hons.)
3rd Semester
Contents
Page
No.
Introduction
Crime
Criminal Law
Offences against Religion
Introduction
Defilement of place of worship
or objects of veneration (S.
295, 297, IPC);
Outraging or wounding
religious feelings of any class
(S. 295A and 298, IPC)
Disturbing a religious assembly
(S. 296, IPC)
Offences against Religion in
News
Recent Cases
Conclusion
Bibliography
3-6
7
8-10
11-14
15-16
17-20
21-32
33-34
35
Page | 1
INTRODUCTION
CRIME
WHAT IS A CRIME? We must answer this question at the outset. In order to answer this
question we must know first, what is law because the two questions are closely inter-related?
Traditionally, we know a law to be a command enjoining a course of conduct. The command
may be of a sovereign or of political superiors to the political inferiors; or it may be the
command of a legally constituted body or a legislation emanating from a duly constituted
legislature to all the members of the society. A crime may, therefore, be an act of
disobedience to such a law forbidding or commanding it. But then disobedience of all laws
may not be a crime, for instance, disobedience of civil laws or laws of inheritance or
contracts. Therefore, a crime would mean something more than a mere disobedience to a law,
"it means an act which is both forbidden by law and revolting to the moral sentiments of the
society." Thus robbery or murder would be a crime, because they are revolting to the moral
sentiments of the society, but a disobedience of the revenue laws or the laws of contract
would not constitute a crime. The content of crime changes from time to time in the same
country and from country to country at the same time because it is conditioned by the moral
value approved of by a particular society in a particular age in a particular country. A crime of
yesterday may become a virtue tomorrow and so also a virtue of yesterday may become a
crime tomorrow.
WHAT IS THE TEST of criminality or criminal liability? The true test of criminal
liability has had a gradual development. In the very beginning only the most serious crimes
were recognised and were singled out for punishment. The list of crimes at that time was
short. In the next stage we find that the machinery for administration of justice was refined
and developed, and procedural laws for the trial of criminal cases were also reformed. In this
process of development we find that certain fundamental principles were evolved. The first
was that nobody should be held liable unless he had the evil intent to commit it, and the
second was that the accused was to be presumed to be innocent unless he was proved to be
guilty. The former principle assumed a Latin garb and became known as actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea, and was first cited as a principle by Lord Kenyon C.J. in Fowler v.
Pedger thus: "It is a principle of natural justice and of our law that actus non facit reum, nisi
Page | 2
mens sit rea." This principle has even in modern times been accepted to be a leading doctrine
of criminal law, for Lord Goddard C.J. observed in a case in 1949: "actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea is a cardinal doctrine of the Criminal Law." This maxim which has been accepted
not only by the courts of England but also our own courts recognise that there are two
necessary elements in a crime, namely, first, a physical element, and, secondly, a mental
element. The former is known technically as actus Reus and the latter as mens rea. These are
the tests of criminality known to our law and to the laws of England.
Now, come to the ELEMENTS. The two elements of crime are mens rea and actus
Reus. Apart from these two elements that go to make up a crime, there are two more
indispensable elements, namely, first, a human being under a legal obligation to act in a
particular way and a fit subject for the infliction of appropriate punishment, and secondly,
an injury to another human being or to the society at large. Thus the four elements that go
to constitute a crime are as follows: first, a human being under a legal obligation to act in a
particular way and a fit subject for the infliction of appropriate punishment: secondly, an evil
intent or mens rea on the part of such human being; thirdly, actus reus, i.e., act committed or
omitted in furtherance of such an intent; and fourthly, an injury to another human being or to
society at large by such an act.
CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law is the body of law that relates to crime. It regulates social conduct and
proscribes threatening, harming, or otherwise endangering the health, safety, and moral
welfare of people. It includes the punishment of people who violate these laws. Criminal law
differs from civil law, whose emphasis is more on dispute resolution and victim
compensation than on punishment.
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES? Criminal law is distinctive for the uniquely serious
potential consequences or sanctions for failure to abide by its rules. Every crime is composed
of criminal elements. Capital punishment may be imposed in some jurisdictions for the most
serious crimes. Physical or corporal punishment may be imposed such as whipping or caning,
although these punishments are prohibited in much of the world. Individuals may be
incarcerated in prison or jail in a variety of conditions depending on the jurisdiction.
Confinement may be solitary. Length of incarceration may vary from a day to life.
Government supervision may be imposed, including house arrest, and convicts may be
Page | 3
involving technology unheard of during Macaulay's time fit easily within the Code mainly
because of the broadness of the Code's drafting.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian Penal Code in chapter XV, deals with offences relating to religion. This chapter
has been framed on the principle that every man should have the full freedom to follow his or
her own religion and that no man should be allowed to insult the religion of another, or
religious feelings of any class of persons also enshrined under Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian
Constitution.
India has no religion of its own; there is no state religion, unlike Islamic countries,
such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and most of Middle East countries where
Islam is the state religion. However, this freedom is not absolute. It is a limited one, subject to
public order, morality, decency and health.
Chapter XV is a small chapter consisting of five sectionsss 295, 295A, 296, 297
and 298 which can be grouped into the following three divisions:
I.
II.
III.
S. 295. Injury or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any
class. Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held
sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class
of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such
destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
The object of this section is to punish those persons who intentionally wound the
religious feelings of others by injuring or defiling a place of worship. This section is intended
to prevent wanton insult to the religious notions of a class of persons. 2 This section has been
intended to respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious persuasions
or creeds. Courts have got to be every circumspect in such matters and to pay due regard to
the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of persons with different beliefs,
irrespective of the consideration whether or not they share those beliefs, or whether they are
rational or otherwise, in the opinion of the Court. 3 This section does not penalise any and
every act of insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of
citizens, which are not perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging
the religious feelings of that class do not come within the scope of the sections. It only
punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate
and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.
2 Gopinath v. Ramchandra, (1958) cut 485.
3 Veerabhadran Chettiar v. Ramaswami Naicker, AIR 1958 SC 1032: 1958 Cr L J 1565 (1568).
Page | 6
S. 297. Trespassing on burial places, etc. Whoever, with the intention of wounding
the feelings of any person, or of insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge
that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is
likely to be insulted thereby, commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any place of
sculpture, or any place set apart from the performance of funeral rites or as a depository for
the remains of the dead, or offers any indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance to
any persons assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or
with both.
This section deals more especially with trespasses on places of sepulchre and places
set apart for the performance of funeral rites and as depositories for the remains of the dead.
It extends the principle laid down in S. 295 to places which are treated as sacred. The essence
of the section is an intention, or knowledge of likelihood, to wound feelings or insult religion
and when with that intention or knowledge trespass on a place of sepulchre, indignity to a
corpse, or disturbance to persons assembled for funeral ceremonies is committed, the offence
is complete.9
The section contemplates disturbance of persons engaged in performing funeral
ceremonies. But a Moharram procession is not a funeral ceremony within the meaning of this
section.10
The essence of the offence is mens rea in addition to an act of destruction, damage of
defilement of place or worship. The Law Commission, while commenting on the propriety of
enacting the sections, have rightly said:
We have prescribed a punishment of great severity. The proposed punishment is rigorous
imprisonment for a term which might extend to seven years for the intentional destroying or
defiling of places of worship, or of objects held sacred by any class of persons. No offence in
the whole of the Penal Code is so likely to lead to tumult, to sanguinary outrage and even to
armed insurrection.11
In the case of Katwaru v. State,12 when the prosecution case is that accused wounded the
feelings of any person by ploughing a graveyard there must be evidence to bring home
charge under Section 297, IPC that the place is set apart as a depository of or the remains of
the dead. Proof of two or three burials is not enough.
In Surdarshan Kumar and Others v. Gangacharan Dubey,13 the accused police officials had
shot dead a criminal in encounter and after post mortem took the body to deceaseds father
who refused to take the body but in the meantime a large crowd had gathered to see the dead
body and in other to avoid law and order problem and ensure public at large about the death
of dangerous criminal his body was roped to tower for few minutes. It was held that police
officials were not guilty u/s. 297 ass they had not intended to show any indignity to the dead
body.
14 The section was first inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment Act) 1927 (25 of 1927) and
amended by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1961.
15 Shiv Ram Dass v. King Emperor, AIR 1927 All 649.
Page | 10
3 years.16 It is not necessary to prove that the accused bore ill-will or enmity against specific
persons.17
Offence relating to religion is based on malice and basic requirement of the offence is
deliberate and malicious act and person alleging the malicious and deliberate act on part of
another has to prove it. In The Trustee of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v. Govt. of NCT of
Delhi,18 the notification of Govt. of Delhi forfeiting the material containing in the banner,
titled as Ram Katha in Jain tradition and Budh tradition, was challenged on the ground that
notification did not mention the particular material found objectionable. The notification also
did not mention the name of religion or community which was likely to be incensed. It was
held that notification was liable to be nullified as there was complete non-application of the
mind.
In the impugned case of Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh19 the constitutional
validity of S. 295A IPC was challenged on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right
of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution.
While holding the constitutionality of S. 295A, IPC, the Supreme Court held that the section
is enacted in the interest of public order, and it only penalises the aggravated form of insult to
religion, when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of a class of citizens. Right to freedom of religion is subject to public order,
morality or health. Restrictions on right to freedom may be imposed in interest of public
order. Section 295A, has been included in Chapter XV of the IPC, which deals with offences
relating to religion.
In Chandanmal v. State of W.B.20 the Calcutta High Court in a writ petition under Art.
226 of the Indian Constitution has refused to issue a writ for forfeiting copies of Koran under
Section 295A or 153 IPC. No action can be taken against Koran either under S 295A or 153
16 State of Punjab v.Nand Singh, 1979 Cr L R (P & H) 6.
17 Khalil Ahamad,AIR 1960 All 715 SB.
18 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del). In this case reference to Section 153A was also made.
19 AIR 1957 SC 620.
20 1986 Crl. L.J. 183.
Page | 11
banning or forfeiture of Koran cannot be ordered. It would violate the Preamble and Art.
25 of Constitution. The Koran being a sacred Book and an object held sacred by a class of
persons within the meaning of Section 295 of Penal Code, against such book no action can
be taken under S. 295A of Penal Code. Consequently, banning or forfeiture of Koran cannot
be ordered under S. 95 of CrPC. Any other interpretation would lead to absurdity. If any
offence, within the S. 295, IPC is committed, in respect of Koran then it is punishable.
Section 295A, IPC does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult
the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are not perpetrated with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to
religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of that class do not come within the scope of the section. It
only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. It cannot
be said that Koran offers any insult to any other religion. It does not reflect any deliberate or
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of non-Muslims. Isolated passages
picked out from here and there and read out of context cannot change the position.
S. 298. Uttering, words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings
of any person. Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings
of any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any
gesture in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.
The authors of the Code observe: In framing this clause we had two objects in view: we
wish to allow all fair latitude to religious discussion, and at the same time to prevent the
professors of any religion from offering, under the pretext of such discussion, intentional
insults to what is held sacred by others. We do not conceive that any person can be justified in
wounding with deliberate intention the religious feelings of his neighbours by words, gestures
or exhibitions. A warm expression dropped in the heat of controversy, or an argument urged
by a person, not for a purpose of vindicating his own will not fall under the definition
contained in this clause.
Page | 12
It was held in the case of Narasimha v. Shree Krishna21 that the interpolation of a
forbidden chant in an authorised ritual is an offence under this section. In Rahman,22
exhibiting cows flesh by carrying it in an uncovered state round a village with the deliberate
intention of wounding the religious feelings of Hindus was held to be an offence under
Section 298.
In the case of Amjad Seikh v. Emperor23, on the occasion of Bakr-i-Id, the accused
killed a cow at dawn in a semi private place and killing was seen by some Hindus walking
along the village pathway fifty feet away, it was held that no offence under this section was
committed. However, in Kitab Ali v. Santi Ranjan,24 it was held that the sacrifice of cow on
the Bakr-i-Id day is not an obligatory religious act for a Muslim and the prosecution of Art.
25 of the Constitution cannot be claimed for such an act.
Of the offences under the above two Sections 295A and 298, the former is more
serious, for the words used are outraging which is undoubtedly a stronger expression than
wounding used in Section 298.
The intention to outrage must not only be deliberate but also malicious under Section 295A
whereas in Section 298, it need only be deliberate. Again in Section 295, the offensive words
or representations must be directed to a class of persons and not merely against an individual
as in Section 298.
It is no defence to a prosecution under S. 298 that religious feelings were deliberately
shocked or wounded by the accused in order to draw attention to some matter in need of
reform. Under S. 295A however the prosecution must prove that the insult was for the sake of
insulting and with an intention which springs from malice and malice alone. To a charge
under this section, therefore, it would be a good defence to say I had no malicious intention
towards a class, but I did intend to wound and shock the feelings of an individual, so that
attention might, however rudely, be called to a reform which I had in view.25
But in Jangu v. Ahmadullah,30 it was held that any person, Mahomedan or not, who
goes into a mosque not bona fide for a religious purpose, mala fide, for the purpose of
disturbing others engaged in their devotions, will render himself criminally liable.
Persons of every sect are entitled to take out religious processions with music through
public streets provided that they do not interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by the
public or contravene any traffic regulation or lawful directions issued by the Magistrates. A
religious procession does not change its character merely because the music is temporarily
stopped in front of a mosque. Interference with such a procession by the accused bring them
under the mischief of Section 296 read with Section 341, IPC has decided in Mohamudkhan
v. Emperor.31
In the case of Masit v. Emperor32, certain Lodhas were carrying Flags through public
streets in a procession to a temple with the sanction of public authorities in the performance
of religious ceremony and the persons carrying them constituted an assembly lawfully
engaged in religious ceremony. An attack on such a procession is an offence under Section
296.
The question whether intentional playing of music by a religious procession in front
of a mosque where prayers are being offered constitutes an offence under Section 296, IPC is
not free from difficulty. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It also
depends on the interpretation of Article 25 of Indian Constitution.
The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 296 is the doing of an act by
which a disturbance is caused. It was held in Mohammed Husain v. Emperor,33 that mere
spreading of false rumours even if proved and even if it results in serious consequences,
cannot amount to causing a disturbance.
In March 2007, a newspaper editor BV Seetharam was arrested under the Sections
153A, 153B, and 295 of the IPC for allegedly promoting religious hatred. He had
written articles criticizing the public nudity of the Digambara Jain monks.38
In May 2007, a Buddhist group in Maharashtra's Amaravati district said their
religious sentiments were hurt, and filed a complaint against Rakhi Sawant, an
actress, because she posed in a bathtub against a statue of Lord Buddha.39
In September or October 2007, the police in Pune arrested four Bangalore-based
software-engineers for posting on the Internet an obscene profile of Chhatrapati
Shivaji, a sixteenth-century Maratha warrior king, clad in female underwear.40,41
In 2007, the authorities charged ninety-one-year-old Maqbool Fida Husain with
hurting religious sentiments by painting Mother India as a naked woman.42
Jokes on Sardars: In March 2007, around 25 Sikh youths from Sikh Media and
Culture Watch (SMCW) demanded arrest of Ranjit Parande, a Matunga-based book
seller, for stocking the Santa and Banta Joke Book, a collection of Sardarji jokes.
Based on a complaint filed by a Sikh businessman, the Mumbai Police arrested
Parande under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, for "hurting religious
sentiments."43
In February 2009, the police filed a complaint against Ravindra Kumar and Anand
Sinha, the editor and the publisher respectively of the Kolkata-based English
daily The Statesman. The police charged Kumar and Sinha under section 295A
because they had reprinted an article from The Independent by its columnist Johann
38 Freedom of expression under attack by Parvathi Menon, The Hindu, March 8, 2007.
39 "Rakhi in legal trouble over bathtub scene", www.nerve.in, 1 May 2007.
40 Mishra, Gaurav (28 February 2009), "Shiv Sena's Orkut Campaign: The Limits to Freedom of
Expression in an Intolerant India", Gauravonomics Blog.
41 "Pune cops book Orkut user", The Times of India, 2 September 2007.
42 Reuters (7 May 2007), "M F Husain loses home over nude 'Mother India'", Expressindia.com.
43 "Sikhs ask cops to ban 'Sardar' jokes on Net", The Times of India, Mumbai, March 27, 2007.
Page | 18
Hari Titled "Why should I respect oppressive religions?" The article stated Hari's
belief that the right to criticise any religion was being eroded around the world.
Muslim protestors in Kolkata reacted to Hari's belief by violent demonstrations at the
offices of The Statesman.44
In November 2012, Maharashtra Police arrested Shaheen Dhada (21) for questioning
the total shutdown in the city for Bal Thackerays funeral in a Facebook post, and also
her friend Renu Srinivasan (20) for liking her post. Although no religious issue was
involved, the two were charged under Section 295A for hurting religious sentiments,
apart from Section 66 (a) of the Information Technology Act 200045. The exact
comment posted by Shaheen Dhada was:46
Reacting to this incident, Member of Parliament Rajeev Chandrasekhar said, This
incident shows the misuse of the IT Act rules as put together by Minister Kapil Sibal.
I am mystified by our governments approach both to the internet and to the millions
of Indians using it. It does not adhere to the values of our republic and democracy.
This matter needs to be addressed urgently.
Independent Member of Parliament Rajeev Chandrasekhar has battled tirelessly
against growing internet censorship in India, using his position in the upper house of
parliament to challenge legislation that chokes digital freedom. Mr Chandrasekhar has
filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in Supreme Court Challenging the IT Rules.
With all respect, every day, thousands of people die, but still the world moves on. Just due
to one politician died a natural death, everyone just goes bonkers. They should know, we
are resilient by force, not by choice. When was the last time, did anyone showed some
respect or even a two-minute silence for Shaheed Bhagat Singh, Azad, Sukhdev or any of
the people because of whom we are free-living Indians? Respect is earned, given, and
definitely not forced. Today, Mumbai shuts down due to fear, not due to respect.
44 Taylor, Jerome (12 February 2009), "Editor arrested for 'outraging Muslims'", The Independent.
45 "In Palghar, cops book 21-year-old for FB post", Mumbai Mirror, 19 November 2012.
46 "'Mumbai shuts down due to fear, not respect'", The Hindu, 19-11-2012.
Page | 19
The two women were later granted bail on a surety of 15,000.47 Their arrest was
strongly criticized by a number of the citizens, including the Press Council of
India chairman Markandey Katju.48,49 An internal inquiry by the Maharashtra Police
deemed the arrests wrongful and indicted four police officers linked to the arrest.50
In November 2012, a complaint was filed seeking penal action against BJP president
Nitin Gadkari for "hurting" religious sentiments of lakhs of followers of Swami
Vivekananda by comparing him with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim.51
TDP corporator T Raja Singh filed a complaint against Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen
(MIM) legislator Akbaruddin Owaisi in the Nampally court for his disparaging
remarks against Hindus in a hate speech on December 24, 2013, the main content of
which was that Muslims would need just 15 minutes without the police to show 100
crore Hindus who is more powerful. Akbaruddin, who is the younger brother of MIM
MP Asaduddin Owaisi, said Hindus have so many gods and goddesses, and every
eight days, there are new gods coming up. "We knew about Lakshmi, but who is
Bhagyalakshmi, we are not aware," Akbar said referring to the Bhagyalakshmi temple
abutting the historic Charminar.52
47 "Two women arrested for Anti-Shiv Sena comments on Facebook, government orders enquiry",
The Economic Times (Mumbai), 19 November 2012.
48 "Katju blasts arrest of women who commented on FB", The Hindu, 19-11-2012.
49 "Netizens flay Mumbai girls arrest over Facebook post", The Hindu Business Line, 19-11-2012.
50 "FB arrests illegal, four officers indicted", Mumbai Mirror, 24-11-2012.
51 Case against Nitin Gadkari for comparing Swami Vivekananda with Dawood
Ibrahim, NDTV, November 06, 2012.
52 Akbaruddin in trouble for hate speech, Times Of India, Hyderabad, Dec 29,
2012.
Page | 20
RECENT CASES
2013:
On 18th February, 2013:
further sentencing them to undergo simple imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
Rs.10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 3(i)of the SC / ST (PA) Act and in
default of payment of fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months each.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused persons beyond
reasonable doubt and proved the fact that on 26.2.2004, at 11.00a.m. The accused
persons with common intention removed the photographs of Bhagwan Buddha and of
Dr.Ambedkar and torn and burnt the flags?
2. By doing so the appellants insulted the feelings of the community and they did not
stop at that, but abused them and thereby committed the offence punishable under
Section 295 read with 34 IPC and Section 3(1) (x) of the Act?
the land did not belong to the complainants and hence to contend that the appellants had
trespassed on to the land and defied the portraits of lord Buddha and Dr. Ambedkar apart
from burning the flags and using foul language against the caste of the complainants and
belittling them, is not established. In any event, the court has found as a fact that neither the
flags were burnt nor the portraits destroyed. They were found intact. And further, the
appellants having used foul language against the complainants was also established on the
basis of the testimony of the complainants. This, the learned Counsel would submit, is an
unfair finding, especially, since the portraits of Lord Buddha or Dr. Ambedkar and the flags
were representing a political party and Buddhism. There was no indication that they were
representative of any Scheduled Caste, in order that the defying of the portraits or flags
amounted to showing disrespect to a scheduled caste. There is no evidence as to the
appellants having used such language generally against all of them or only against some of
them. It was also contended that this is also in the backdrop of the present appellants
themselves having filed a complaint, but the same has been negated on the ground that the
complaint filed by the complainants in the present case was earlier in point of time and that
the complaint lodged by the present appellants was an after-thought and was a counter-blast
to the complaint that was already filed. The court, therefore, was not justified in holding that
the offences stood established.
Judgement:
The complainants, who were seeking to lay claim over portions of land, is an admitted fact.
The same sought to be occupied by them by planting flags of a political party or the portraits
of Dr. Ambedkar and Buddha, did not by itself demonstrate that the portraits or flags were
representative of the Scheduled Caste community. The allegation that foul language was used
against the complainants is a self-serving allegation. There were no independent eye
witnesses. The signatories to the complaint were acting as a group and apparently, the
intention was to implicate the appellants. There was rivalry between two groups and the
allegation that such foul language was used in the forest land would hardly make it an offence
committed in public, as is a necessary ingredient for committing an offence under the
provisions of the POA Act. Therefore, it can hardly be said that the prosecution had
established its case beyond all reasonable doubt for the court to have convicted and punished
the accused. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The judgment of the court was set aside.
The appellants were acquitted.
Page | 23
17 January, 2013
2012:
17 December, 2012
2011:
26 August, 2011
police chief to investigate the incident of blasphemy by the SPC with reference to the
derogatory remarks towards Maharishi Valmiki in the program in question. The Respondent
then immediately called for the recording which was telecast on 6th October 2009. There was
a conversation between the two actors in which the following dialogue in Hindi is spoken:"Alekh says-: kya main aapse kuch pooch sakta hoon mamaji?
Mama-: "haan bilkull" . . .
Alekh-: wo main valmiki ki kahani padh raha tha..mamaji kya sachme wo ek chor se saadhu
baba ban gaye..koi aadmi itna badal sakta hai kya?
Mama smiles as he explains-: valmiki ji ke paas himmat thi... aatmvishvaas tha beta... jiske
man me aastha aur pakka vishvaas ho use koi nahi rok sakta...
Here Alekh listening to all of this very carefully and registering in his mind as if he also upto
something like that.....He nods his head and says-: "achha!" samajh gaya...(he looks at
Sadhana and says) theek hai ab main Sadhna ko phone deta hoon."
Judgement:
The Court observed that When the above scene is viewed in the context of the theme of the
serial and the entire episode, it is difficult to appreciate the conclusion drawn by the
Respondent that it contains any derogatory remarks against Maharishi Valmiki or maligns an
individual or the words used are contemptuous of religious groups or promote communal
attitudes and "are likely to encourage violence". In any event, it is not proper to take one
word out of context to determine if it is derogatory or defamatory. It has to be viewed in the
context and setting of the episode in which the dialogue occurs. The exchange underscores
and extols the virtues of the poet sage who is acknowledged as the author of the Ramayana. It
could hardly be said to malign or slander an individual or a group much less encourage or
incite violence, or contain anything threatening to the maintenance of law and order. For the
aforementioned reasons, the Court finds the impugned warning dated 3rd/4th March 2010
issued by I & B Ministry to the Petitioner to be unsustainable in law. It was, thus, set aside.
The writ petition was allowed.
Page | 26
12 April, 2011
2010:
6 April, 2010
found. The counsel appearing for the accused were contacted and the accused were directed
to appear before the Investigating Officer at 10 a.m. on 26-3-2010. But the accused did not
appear as directed.
Accordingly, their bail order was set aside and the Court cancelled the bail granted to the
accused under Sec. 439 (2) Cr.P.C. And their petition against this order in the Honble
Supreme Court was also dismissed.
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2009:
19 August, 2009
Judgement:
Here, in the instant case, the allegation is that the petitioners declared to the public that they
will be showing hand of the Goddess 'Chinna Mastika'. This application even if is accepted to
be true, one would wonder as to how the said act has wounded the religious feelings of the
Hindus and, therefore, allegation never attracts offence under section 298 of the Indian Penal
Code and hence, that part of the order where the court refused to discharge the petitioner from
offence under section 298 of the Indian Penal Code was hereby set aside.
However, in the facts and circumstances, there has been prima facie material for framing
charge under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code as it is the case of the prosecution that the
petitioners with the intention to have more offering by the gathering made it declared to the
general public that the 'Goddess Chinna Mastika' would be showing her hand and by that act,
the petitioners appear to have dishonestly induced general public to deliver the property by
way of offering cheated to the general public and thereby the trial court has rightly come to
the conclusion that there appears to be ample material for framing charge against the
petitioners under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
2005:
59 W.P. (Cr.) No.232 of 2008.
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22 September, 2005
inherent in the religious belief opposed to the true religion preached by Islam, a
religion of humanity and mankind.
The intention of the author, who herself profess the same religion, has to be gathered from the
context of the book itself which is argued to be an eye-opener pointing out her fingers to the
inconsistency in the Holy Scriptures, relying on history and other authentic biographies of the
Holy Prophet and the Holy Koran and other Holy Scriptures. It is also to be noted that the
passage was written in the context of the position of women in Bangladesh being appraised in
the light of adoption of the State religion at the cost of secularism and democracy with
different standard for women and men. That the author is a feminist attempting to emancipate
the feminine of her own country and to secure for them a respectable position in the society
in Bangladesh and eager to the restoration of democracy and secularism opposed to the
religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh so as to enable her to come back to her own
motherland, the urge whereof is apparent in volumes from her writings. Her entire effort in
the book is directed towards the situation in Bangladesh alone. The book was published by a
publisher in West Bengal/India in Bengali language which was proscribed by the Government
of West Bengal under Section 95 of the Cr. PC read with Section 295A of the IPC.
The petitioner filed the petition under Section 96 of the Cr. PC registered to challenge the
said notification regarding forfeiture of the book in question as under the provision of law,
Section 96 was the enabling section for any aggrieved party, having any interest in the book
in question to challenge a notice of forfeiture made under Section 95 of the Cr. PC.
Judgement:
The author did not pen down the book which is written in the circumstances and the
background of the country of her origin - with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging
the religious feelings of any class of Citizen of India and thus, the book cannot be brought
under the ambit of Section 295A. Therefore, in the instant case Section 295A is wholly
inapplicable. In addition it reiterated that the theme of the book is not any religion nor the
role of its Prophet, rather the writer laments and condemns the hapless condition of women in
a male dominated patriarchal society in the country of her origin which is theocratic.
Also, there were no reports of any communal trouble, tension or disharmony of any nature
among various communities in India after the publication of the book in November, 2003.
Subsequently, it had gone in for a reprint in the same month. This goes to show that the
citizens of this country and especially the followers of Islam whose sentiments, it is alleged
the book had hurt, are responsible and mature enough to examine the book in the right
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Page | 33
CONCLUSION
Hinduism, Indias dominant religion, does not have the concept of blasphemy. The Indian
Penal Code does punish hate speech (insults or attempts to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of any citizen with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage their
religious feelings). These laws are applied to all religions including Hinduism, Sikhism,
Christianity and Islam.
When drops of water began to fall from the feet of a crucifix in 2012, believers thought that it
had holy powers. Sanal Edamaruku, president of the Indian Rationalist Association,
suggested that the source of the water to be leaking toilet drainage. Its a case of miraclemongering, Edamaruku told AFP from his home in New Delhi. Any kind of miraclemongering is ultimately to get money and power. Accusing him of spreading anti-Catholic
venom during televised debates on the crucifix, outraged religious groups in Mumbai have
filed police complaints that could see Edamaruku jailed for up to three years under Indias
blasphemy law. Now Edamaruku welcomes the moves against him as an opportunity, not a
thing to be afraid of, he said, and is challenging Indias blasphemy law.
The legislation bans deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of
any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs, a rule Edamaruku believes runs
counter to freedom of expression.
The films of Deepa Mehta61
Indian-born film-maker, Deepa Mehta, now living in Canada, is best known for her
trilogy Fire, Earth and Water. Fire shows two young women trapped in loveless marriages
who turn to each other for solace and become lovers. The film was initially passed by the
Indian censors, but screenings brought violent protests. Hindu extremists in particular, caused
the film to be withdrawn. Deepa Mehta and her supporters demonstrated for freedom of
expression. One Hindu critic objected to the main characters being given Hindu names, and
said he would withdraw his objection if they had Muslim names. When Mehta was about to
start filming Water, the third film in the trilogy, she learned that 2,000 protesters had stormed
the studio, destroying and burning the main film set and throwing the remnants into the
Ganges. Cinemas were also burnt down by Hindu protesters. Water was eventually filmed in
61 http://kayehargreaves1.wordpress.com/legal-issues/do-we-really-havefreedom-of-expression/722-2.
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Sri Lanka. Deepat Mehtas most recent film, an adaptation of Salman Rushdies Midnights
Children, (a Booker Prize-winning novel about British colonial India and Partition), will be
released this year. It was filmed in Sri Lanka, in the utmost secrecy and under false names, in
an effort to keep the fundamentalists at bay. Hes got the Muslims, says Mehta, wryly
assessing the field of people who might want to stop this film. And Ive got the Hindus. 62
Two weeks into the shoot, Mehtas husband and producer, David Hamilton, received notice
from the government saying permission to film had been withdrawn after displeasure was
expressed by Iran. Mehta made a personal appeal to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, and the
filming continued. The BBC tried to make Midnights Children into a five-part miniseries in
1997, but the government withdrew permission for that production after Muslim protests.
62 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/movies/deepa-mehta-filmsrushdies-midnights-children/article2021293.
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Bibliography
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