Psychological Incapacity Digests 2

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 1
SANTOS V CA 240 SCRA 20 JANUARY 4,

1995
FACTS: Leouel Santos (petitioner) and Julia
Rosario Bedia were married on September
20, 1986 in Iloilo City
May 18, 1988 Julia left for the US as
a nurse. She did not disclose where
she lived; petitioner tried to locate
her in the US but was unsuccessful.
He then filed with RTC a complaint
for nullity of marriage
May 31, 1991 Julia opposed
complaint and alleged that the
petitioner was the one who had been
irresponsible and incompetent
No collusion proven by the provincial
prosecutor
November 6, 1991 court dismissed
the case for lack of merit. Petitioner
appealed on the basis that Julias
failure to return and lack of
communication
proves
she
is
psychologically incapacitated
ISSUE: Whether Julias behavior (failure to
return home and lack of intention of
communicating with Leouel) constitutes as
psychological incapacity
HELD:
Psychological
incapacity
is
characterized by: 1. Gravity; 2. Juridical
antedence and; 3. Incurability.
The
incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
Psychological incapacity does not cover all
psychoses (extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, etc) Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law
on
marriage.
Thus
correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family
Code,
include
their
mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at
the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party
being
of
unsound
mind
or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF
MERIT
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA Julia appears to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with at least one essential marital
obligation i.e. that of living and cohabiting
with her husband. While it is true that
vagueness of psychological incapacity may
allow easy escape for couples out of their
marriage, there are enough safeguards in
this contingency, i.e. intervention of the
State through public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion.
The fact that Julia did not attempt to
communicate with Santos for some time
and did not even divulge her address is a
clear indication of psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital

obligations although these indications were
manifest AFTER the celebration of the
marriage.
The court is limiting the
interpretation of Art. 36 too much. VOTE TO
NULLIFY MARRIAGE
CHI MING TSOI V CA G.R. NO. 119190
JANUARY 16, 1997
FACTS:
Petition for annulment on the
ground of psychological incapacity
May 22, 1988 Chi Ming Tsoi married
Gina
Lao
Tsoi
(respondent).
Petitioner refuses to copulate with
respondent.
Gina claims that
petitioner is impotent, a closet
homosexual and marriage should be
annulled
due
to
psychological
incapacity
According to the petitioner, he loves
his wife very much and does not
want the marriage to be annulled.
Upon
physical
examination,
petitioners penis has a soft erection
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners refusal
to copulate
constitutes psychological
incapacity
HELD:
One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
REPUBLIC V OLAVIANO MOLINA G.R.

NO. 108763 FEBRUARY 13, 1997
FACTS: petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the
May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which

declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Family Code.
April 14, 1985 Roridel Olaviano and
Reynaldo Molina were married and
after a year, had a son. Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility:
dependent
on
parents,
squandered
money,
quarrelsome
1987 Separated after Roridel
became the breadwinner; Reynaldo
abandoned them after a few weeks
August
28,
1989
Reynaldo
admitted they can longer live as
husband and wife due to:
1.
Roridels
strange
behavior
on
maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; 2.
Roridels refusal to perform her
marital duties and; 3. Roridels
failure to run the household and run
their finances
Olavianos
allegations
were
corroborated by her friends, Ruth
Salas (social worker) and Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison
(psychiatrist);
submitted documents confirming
such while Reynaldo did not present
any evidence during pre-trial
May 14, 1991 Family court declared
marriage null and void. CA affirmed
the same
ISSUE: Whether opposing and conflicting
personalities is equivalent to psychological
incapacity;
Guidelines
of
proving
HELD:
In Santos v CA, psychological
incapacity refers to not just mental or
physical
incapacity
but
should
be
characterized by: a. gravity; b. juridical
antecedence; c. incurability. In the present
case, there is no clear indication that the
psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity but more of a difficulty or
neglect in performing marital obligations. It
is not enough to prove that the parties

failed to meet their responsibilities but they
must show that they are incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological illness
Guidelines for Psychological Incapacity:
1. Burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage
2. Root cause of psychological
incapacity must be: a. medically
or clinically identified; b. alleged
in the complaint; c. sufficiently
proven by experts and; d. clearly
explained in the decision
3. Psychological incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time
(during) celebration of marriage
need not be perceivable at such
time but must be existing at the time
thereof or prior to it
4. Incurability clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marital obligations, not necessarily
those related to marriage.
5. Gravity must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party
to
assume
essential
marital
obligations. Mild character biological
peculiarities, e.g. mood changes,
occasional
emotional
outbursts
cannot be accepted as such. There is
a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person that effectively
incapacitates
the
person
from
fulfilling his/her essential marital
obligations
6. The essential marital obligations
must be those mentioned in Art
68-71 of the Family Code as well
as Art 220, 221, And 225 relating
to parents and children
7. Interpretations given by the
court should be given respect
8. Participation of the State Fiscal
or Solicitor General must appear as
counsel for the State
PETITION IS GRANTED. MARRIAGE IS VALID
AND SUBSISTING
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA Maintained position in Santos v
CA. Each case must be judged based on its
own facts. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the actual milieu and CA must
avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trail court.
J. ROMERO Psychological incapacity
should not be the result of mental illness.
For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties (imbecility), there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus
rendering the marriage voidable under Art
45 of Family Code. Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage
MARCOS V MARCOS 343 SCRA 755
OCTOBER 19, 2000
FACTS:
Psychological incapacity, as a
ground for declaring nullity of marriage,
may be established by the totality of
evidence presented.
There is no
requirement that the respondent should be
examined a physician or psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration
September 6, 1982 Brenda Marcos
(petitioner)
and
WilsonMarcos
(respondent) married before Pasig
MTC and May 8, 1983 married again
before
Rev.
Eduardo
Ealeazar
(command chaplain); had 5 children
Husband has no work, often quarrel
and beat her and the children. He
would even force her to have sex
with him. In 1992, they were living
separately
October 17, 1994 petitioner left
with
her
children
because
respondent
turned
violent;
underwent
medical
exam
contusions due to physical violence

August 1995 petitioner went back
to get missing child but was chased
by respondent with samurai
Social worker Sonia Millans study
indicated
that
their
children
described their father as cruel and

physically abusive
Dr Natividad Dayan (psychologist)
evaluated
the
appellee
while
appellant did not
RTC
found
respondent
to
be
psychologically incapacitated but CA
reversed
the
decision
because
psychological incapacity has not
been established sufficiently by the
evidences presented
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidences
presented in the said case are substantive
and sufficient in ruling nullity of marriage;
Whether the testimony of expert witness is
required
HELD: Although the respondent failed to
provide material support to the family,
became abusive and abandoned them, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his defects were already present at
the time of the marriage or that it is
incurable. His alleged psychological illness
was only traced to the time he lost his job
and not at the inception of the marriage.
Art 36 of Family Code is not to be confused
with divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at
the
time
the
causes
manifest
themselves.
It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a part at the
time of the marriage and is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond provided in Art 68 to 71,
220, 221 and 225 of Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with

legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. At
best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation,
not for declaring a marriage void. Because
Article 36 has been abused as a convenient
divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation

in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.
PETITION
DENIED.
EDWARD
KENNETH
NGO
TE
VS
ROWENA YU-TE
579 SCRA 193 Civil Law Family Code
Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Molina
Case Merely a Guideline
Every
case
involving
psychological
incapacity must be resolved on a case-tocase basis
Note: This case relaxed the application of
the Molina Guidelines
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-Chinese gathering
at a school campus. They did not have
interest with each other at first but they
developed a certain degree of closeness
due to the fact that they share the same
angst with their families. In 1996, while still
in college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth
that they should elope. Kenneth initially
refused on the ground that he was still
young and jobless. But due to Rowenas
persistence Kenneth complied bringing with
him P80K. The money soon after
disappeared and they found themselves
forced to return to their respective home.
Subsequently, Rowenas uncle brought the
two before a court and had had them be
married. After marriage, Kenneth and
Rowena stayed with her uncles house
where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad
to come home otherwise he will be
disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was
able to escape and he was hidden from
Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted
Rowena urging her to live with his parents
instead. Rowena however suggested that
he should get his inheritance instead so
that they could live together separately or
just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited.
Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is
better if they live separate lives from then
on. Four years later, Kenneth filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Rowena.
Rowena did not file an answer. The City
Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted
that he cannot determine if there is
collusion
between
the
two
parties.
Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion
of an expert was sought wherein the
psychologist subsequently ruled that both
parties are psychologically incapacitated.
The said relationship between Kenneth and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the
wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up
was caused by both parties unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. Kenneth
was still in the state of finding his fate and
fighting boredom, while Rowena was still
egocentrically involved with herself. The
trial court ruled that the marriage is void
upon
the
findings
of
the
expert
psychologist. The Solicitor General (OSG)
appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the
psychological incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable (Molina case). The
clinical psychologist did not personally
examine Rowena, and relied only on the
information provided by Kenneth. Further,
the psychological incapacity was not shown
to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. All these were
requirements set forth in the Molina case to
be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of
the psychologist should be admitted in lieu
of the guidelines established in the
landmark case of Molina.
HELD: Yes, such is possible. The Supreme
Court ruled that admittedly, the SC may
have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid
rules
in
ascertaining
Psychological
Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so
that the subsequent cases after Molina
were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set
therein. And that there is not much regard
for the laws clear intention that each case
is to be treated differently, as courts
should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals. The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC
merely reemphasized that there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36
such as in the case at bar. The principle
that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own

facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of
Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to
both parties psychological disorder as
evidenced by the finding of the expert
psychologist. Both parties being afflicted
with
grave,
severe
and
incurable
psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others. He is too
dependent on others. Rowena cannot
perform the essential marital obligations as
well
due
to
her
intolerance
and
impulsiveness.
RODOLFO ASPILLAGA VS AURORA
ASPILLAGA
604 SCRA 444 Civil Law Family Code
Article 36; Psychological Incapacity
Gravity, Juridical Antecedence, Incurability
In 1977, Rodolfo Aspillaga and Aurora Apon
met each other in college. They became
sweethearts after 5 months of courtship. In
1982, they got married. In 1983, they again
married each other as a sign of affirmation
of their love to each other.
But in 1991, when Aurora returned from
Japan, she discovered that Rodolfo was
living with her cousin. From that point, their
marital relations soured. In 1992, Rodolfo
left Aurora to live with her cousin.
In 1995, Aurora filed a petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated.
Dr. Eduardo Maaba evaluated Rodolfo and
Aurora. After evaluation, he concluded that
both are psychologically incapacitated. He
explained that due to Auroras dark and
traumatic childhood past, she has the
tendency for self dramatization and
attention getting behavior. Lapses in
judgment
and
shallow
heterosexual
relationship
was
projected.
Sign
of
immaturity and desire to regress to a lower

level of development were likewise
projected. Self-esteem was also low. Deepseated sense of dejection, loneliness and
emptiness hamper her objectivity.
On the part of Rodolfo, the doctor found
that: he is an intelligent adult male, who is
egoistic and harbors an inner sense of
inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in
losing agility. He, however, projects himself
as dominant person, to cover his deepseated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends
to be suspicious and blames others for his
mistakes.
He
claims
for
adulation,
reassurance and attention from other
people. These can be traced from an
unhealthy familial relationship during the
early maturational development specifically
in the form of a domineering and protective
maternal image.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
psychologically incapacitated.
both
are
HELD: No. Dr. Maaba only found that

Rodolfo and Aurora are suffering from
psychological disorders but not the kind
contemplated
under
the
law
on
psychological incapacity which renders
them incapable to perform essential marital
obligations.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In this case, the foregoing were not met. Dr.
Maaba failed to reveal that these
personality
traits
or
psychological
conditions were grave or serious enough to
bring about an incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Mere difficulty is not synonymous to
incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence
to prove that each partys condition is so
grave or is of such nature as to render said
party incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. There is
likewise no evidence that the claimed
incapacity is incurable and permanent.
Note also that they actually had a good
marriage at first and their quarrel only
began when Rodolfo cheated on her with
her cousin, hence, the allege psychological
incapacity was not proven to have existed
at the time of their marriage.
ROWENA
PADILLA-RUMBAUA
EDWARD RUMBAUA
G.R No. 166738 August 14, 2009
v.
FACTS:
On February 23, 1993, Rowena Padilla and
Edward Rumbaua were married in City of
Manila. However, they never lived together
in one habitat because their marriage was
a secret to Edward's family. In 1995,
Edward's mother died and he blamed
Rowena being responsible for her death
associating it to the discovering of their
"secret marriage."
Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage
due to psychological incapacity in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Court
nullified the marriage in its decision on April
19, 2002.
The Republic of the Philippines appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals due to
prematurity, as it was rend despite the
absence of required certifications from the
Solicitor General. On June 25, 2004, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity
thus denied the nullification of the parties'
marriage.
Rowena, not happy with the decision of the
Court of Appeals, filed a petition to the
Supreme Court praying for the Court of
Appeals decision be set aside and regional
Trials Court's decision be reinstated. The
Supreme Court on August 14, 2009, deny
the petition for lack of merit, thus affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 25, 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the psychologist was able
to prove that the respondent is indeed
psychologically incapacitated according to
Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
HELD:
No, the psychologist did not have enough
proof because in her psychiatric report, she
did not mention the cause of the
respondents
so-called
"narcissistic
personality disorder", she failed to explain
to the court an insight into the respondent's
development years. Furthermore, she did
not explain why she came to the conclusion
that the respondent's incapacity is "deep

seated and incurable", when Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines states
that evidence presented must show that
the incapacitated party was mentally or
physically ill so that he or she could not
have known the marital obligations
assumed in marriage.
SALITA V MAGTOLIS 233 SCRA 100
JUNE 13, 1994
FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa (32) and Joselita Salita (22)
were married on January 25, 1986.
Separated in 1988 and Erwin sued for
annulment on the basis of psychological
incapacity
January 7, 1992 petitioner filed annulment
on the grounds that Erwin is psychologically
incapacitated; also moved for bill of
particulars
ISSUE:
Whether bill of particulars
submitted by Erwin is of sufficient
definiteness to enable petitioner to properly
prepare her responsive pleading
HELD:
YES.
SC held that the bill of
particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to
state a cause of action. Private respondent
already alleged that petitioner is unable to
understand and accept the demands made
by his profession (upon his time and
efforts). To demand more detail would be
asking for information on evidentiary facts.
SC sees no need to define or limit the scope
of Art. 36 of the Family Code since the
actual issue is with the sufficiency of the
bill of particulars. AFFIRMED CA DECISION.
TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
FACTS:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria
L. Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
branch 149 of Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason. In her
complaint Maria alleged that she and Emilio
were married on June 3, 1972 and as a
result begot two children and at the time of
the marriage Emilio Tuason was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligation which

became manifest afterward and resulted in
violent fights between them. Maria also
alleged that Emilio is a drug user and a
womanizer that in 1984 he left the conjugal
home and cohabitated with three women in
succession. After he left the conjugal
dwelling he gave minimal support to the
family and even refused to pay for the
tuition of his children compelling Maria to
accept donations and dole-outs from her
family and friends. Emilio likewise become
spendthrift and abused his administration
of the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE/S:
1.) whether or not Marias claim that Emilio
was already psychologically incapacitated
at the time of the marriage and becomes
manifest only after their marriage is a valid
ground for the nullity of their marriage.
2.) whether or not Emilio Tuasons claim
that he was deprived of due process is
correct.
HELD:
1.) Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present
witnesses or evidences that would prove
his innocence that led to the courts
decision to declare their marriage void
under Article 36 of the Family Code based
on the evidences presented by Maria
Tuason.
2.) No because his failure to inform or to
notify the court about his confinement and
medical treatment therefrom is negligence
which is not excusable that led the court to
deny his petition.
REPUBLIC V QUINTERO-HAMANO G.R.
NO 149498 MAY 20, 2004
FACTS: Petition for review of the decision
dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and
void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. QuinteroHamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
January 14, 1988 Lolita Quintero
and
Japanese
national
Toshio
Hamano were married in Bacoor
Cavite. Respondent did not know
that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated. After the marriage,

Toshio left for Japan but never
returned.
No financial support
received from him
Summons were served by publication
but the respondent failed to answer
November 20, 1996 prosecutor
reported that no collusion exists.
During trial petitioner testified how
Toshio abandoned his family and
offered documentary evidence to
support her claims
August 28, 1997 RTC declared
marriage null and void on the
grounds that Toshio failed to perform
his essential marital obligations
ISSUE:
Whether Toshios abandonment
constitutes as psychological incapacity
(mixed marriage)
HELD: The totality of evidence presented
are insufficient to prove that Toshio was
psychologically
incapacitated
following
Santos and Mo.ina guidelines
Mere
abandonment is not tantamount to
psychological
incapacity.
No
other
evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although as a general rule, there
is no need for medical exam, it would have
helped the petitioner to prove her case had
she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness.
In proving psychological incapacity, there is
no distinction between a Filipino spouse
and a foreign spouse.
Guidelines set
cannot be bended on the account of
nationality.
The
norms
used
for
determining
psychological
incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
PETITION GRANTED, RTC
DECISION REVERSED.
FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY

17, 2006
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma.
Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for

review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error.
February 20, 2001 Pasig RTC denied

the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by the petitioner on the
grounds that epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity and evidence on
record was insufficient to prove infidelity.
Motion for reconsideration was denied on
April 20, 2001
CA affirmed in toto the judgment of

RTC; it held that the evidence on record did
not convincingly establish that respondent
was suffering from psychological incapacity
or that his "defects" were incurable and
already present at the inception of the
marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to
establish the substance of respondent's
psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion
that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal
or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred affirming RTC
decision in denying petition for annulment
on the account of insufficient evidence
HELD: It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when
the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties to the case,
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion;
or
when
there
is
a
misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.
There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning

and significance to the marriage.
Respondent's alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack
of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes manifest themselves. Neither it is to
be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.
PETITION DENIED WITH
FINALITY
ANTONIO V REYES G.R. NO. 155800

MARCH 10, 2005
FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001
and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals
had reversed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void
Decembher 6, 1990 petitioner and
respondent were married in Pasig
and had a child who died 5 months
after birth
March 8, 1993 petitioner filed for
declaration of nullity based on Art.
36, alleging that respondent is
psychologically
incapacitated
to
comply
with
essential
marital
obligations, incapacity existed at the
time of the marriage and exists up to
the present
Petitioner alleged that respondent is
a pathological liar who lied about
everything
Petitioner
presented
Dr
Dante
Abcede (psychiatrist) and Dr Arnulfo
Lopez (clinical psychologist); based
on their tests, respondents constant
lying was pathological or abnormal.
This
undermined
the
basic
relationship of the marriage.
Respondent denied all allegations;
presented Dr Antonio Efren Reyes
(psychiatrist) who tested respondent
and found her to be psychologically
capacitated to perform marital duties
Dr. Lopez asseverated that there
were
flaws
in
the
evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and
interpreted
respondents
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he
made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable
because a good liar can fake the
results of such test
Church annulled marriage due to
lack of discretion on both parties but
CA
reversed
decision
on
the
insufficiency of evidence provided
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by

petitioner
are
sufficient
to
prove
psychological incapacity of respondent
HELD:
In understanding Art 36,
the
preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts
and
researchers
in
psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law."
Each case must be judged not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own
facts. Petitioner was able to sufficiently
prove the psychological incapacity of his
spouse (witnesses, experts, etc). The root
cause
of
respondents
psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial courts decision. The
initiatory
complaint
alleged
that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially
telling
lies,
fabricating
ridiculous stories, etc.
Respondents psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the
time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. She fabricated friends and made
up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she
kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out
the truth after their marriage. Also, The
gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability
to
assume
the
essential
obligations of marriage.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it
failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However,
although Dr Abcede did not comment on
the incurability of respondents illness, the
SC ruled that each case is to be tried based
on the merits of the facts presented and
not just juridical precedence.
PETITION
GRANTED, MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID
HERNANDEZ V COURT OF APPEALS 320

SCRA 76 DECEMBER 8, 1999
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the CA dated January 30,
1996 affirming RTC decision dated April 10,
1993 which dismissed the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner
Lucita Estrella (petitioner) and Mario
Hernandez were married on January
1, 1981 in Silang, Cavite with three
children
July 10, 1992 petitioner filed before
Tagaytay
RTC
a
petition
for
annulment on the grounds of
psychological incapacity; from the
time of the marriage up to present,

cohabited with another woman,
immature and irresponsible, had
STD, alcoholic
October 8, 1992 Mario did not
answer
Lucitas
allegations.
Assistant provincial prosecutor found
no evidence of collusion
April 10, 1993 RTC dismissed
petition for annulment. January 30,
1996, CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE: Whether alcoholism constitutes as

psychological incapacity; Whether CA erred
in holding that the petitioner failed to show
that
Marios
psychological
incapacity
existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage
HELD:
Respondents alleged habitual
alcoholism,
sexual
infidelity
and
abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable
to perform essential marital obligations.
As in Republic v CA, expert testimony
should be presented to establish the
precise cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity in order to show
that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage rests on the petitioner.
CA DECISION AFFIRMED
REPUBLIC V DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FEBRUARY 9, 2001
FACTS:
For review on certiorari is the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No.
380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda
Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
September 7, 1975 Erlinda Matias
herein respondent (16 yrs old)
married Avelino Parangan Dagdag
(20) at INC Cuyapo Nueva Ecija. With
two children.
After marriage,
habitual disappearance of Avelino,

alcoholic, forced her to have sex with
him, physically abusive
1993 Avelino abandoned his family.
Respondent found that he was
imprisoned and he escaped from jail
on October 22, 1985
July 3, 1990 Erlinda filed with
Olongapo RTC declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of
psychological
incapacity.
Since
Avelino was at large, summons were
served by publication. During trial,
she presented her sister-in-law as a
witness
Investigating
officer
found
no
collusion between said parties
December 17, 1990 RTC declared
marriage null and void
August 21, 1991 motion for
reconsideration
from
OSG
that
alcoholism, physical violence and
abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity.
April 22, 1983 CA affirmed RTC
decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC and CA
correctly declared the marriage as null and
void under Art. 36 on the ground that the
husband
suffers
from
psychological
incapacity as he is emotionally immature
and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic and
fugitive from justice
HELD: Respondent failed to comply with
guideline #2 of Molina case which requires
that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by
experts. No psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of the husband. The allegation
that he is a fugitive was also not sufficiently
proven. The Investigating prosecutor also
was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since RTC rendered
decision prematurely.
PESCA V PESCA 356 SCRA 588 APRIL
17, 2001
FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision
of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27
May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130,
which has declared the marriage between

petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent.
March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca

(petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (respondent)
were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a
seaman, he did not often stay with
petitioner.
In 1988 respondent showed signs

of immaturity, cruelty, was a habitual
drinker
November 19, 1992 petitioner left

with her children due to his cruel behavior
but returned and gave Zosimo a second
chance.
March 22, 1994 respondent

assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly
to leave Zosimo. Petitioner filed for
annulment,
invoking
psychological
incapacity as grounds
April 25, 1994 summons were

served on respondent but he failed to file
an answer within reglamentary period.
August
3, 1994 prosecutor
submitted report that no collusion exists
between both parties
January 11, 1995 respondent filed

an answer denying psychological incapacity
November 15, 1995 RTC granted

nullity of marriage but CA reversed the
decision on the basis that petitioner has not
sufficiently established the grounds for
psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability
ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pescas actions
constitute psychological incapacity
HELD:
DENIED.
Petitioner failed to
establish proof that respondent showed
signs of mental incapacity that would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenant provided in Art. 68 of the
Family Code.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in
Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the law shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim that the interpretation

placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ,"
borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
novel provision in our statute books, and,
until the relatively recent enactment of the
Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos
when, for the first time, the Court has given
life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines
to assist the courts and the parties in trying
cases for annulment of marriages grounded
on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed,
both in her allegations in the complaint and
in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage.
Emotional
immaturity
and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
CHOA
V
CHOA
392
SCRA
641
NOVEMBER 26, 2002
FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision and
the May 22, 2000 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100
March 15, 1981 Petitioner Leni

Choa married respondent Alfonso
Choa and had 2 children
October 27, 1993 respondent filed
before RTC complaint for annulment
based on psychological incapacity of
petitioner
February 20, 1998 respondent filed
a formal offer of exhibit; petitioner
did not object but instead, filed a
motion to dismiss (demurrer to
evidence) on May 11, 1998
December 2, 1998 RTC denied
petitioners demurrer of evidence;
filed motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Elevated to CA through
a petition for certiorari
CA held that demurrer was not the
correct procedure; proper remedy
was for the defense to present
evidence and appeal there from.
Petitioner also failed to show that the
issues in the court had been resolved
arbitrarily without basis
ISSUES: Is certiorari available to correct an

order denying a demurrer to evidence? In
its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse
of discretion by violating or ignoring the
applicable law and jurisprudence?
HELD: In general, interlocutory orders are
neither appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings.
However, this rule is not
absolute. In Tadeo v. People,21 this Court
declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in
due time was indeed the proper remedy,
provided there was no grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction or
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. In
fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court
expressly recognize this exception and
allow certiorari when the lower court acts
with grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of an interlocutory order.
The evidence against respondent (herein
petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support
any finding of psychological incapacity that
would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties
marriage.
The
documents
presented by respondent during the trial do
not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the
height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn
her
as
psychologically
incapacitated
to
fulfill
her
marital
obligations, simply because she filed cases

against him. Sorely lacking in respondents
evidence is proof that the psychological
incapacity was grave enough to bring about
the disability of a party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In Molina,
we affirmed that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to
identify and prove the root cause of the
alleged
psychological
incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that
the incapacity, if true, was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Neither
did he testify that it was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
SIAYNGCO V SIAYNGCO 441 SCRA 422
OCTOBER 27, 2004
FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January
2001, which dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
August 11, 1973 Juanita Carating

(petitioner) married Manuel Siayngco
(respondent) civil rites and church on June
27, 1973. Adopted baby boy
September 25, 1997 respondent

filed for declaration of nullity based on Art
36; petitioner was over domineering,
selfish, volatile, nagger and trivial. No
respect for his position as judge. This is
rooted in her deep-seated resentment from
lack of love and appreciation from her
parents
According to petitioner, respondent

is lying because he wants to be with his
paramour
Respondent presented Dr Valentina

Garcia (psychiatrist); from her psychiatric
evaluation,
both
had
narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their
other
maladaptive
traits),
failed
to
adequately empathize (or to be responsive
and sensitive) to each others needs and

feelings
Based on the psychiatric report of Dr

Eduardo
Maaba,
petitioner
is
psychologically capacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations
January 31, 2001 RTC denied

petition for nullity based on insufficient
evidence
July 1, 2003 CA reversed RTC

decision based on psychiatric report of Dr
Garcia that both are psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming
Tsoi v CA
ISSUE:
Whether
root
cause
of
psychological incapacity was identified
based on Molina guideline #2
HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as
well as from the testimonies of the parties
and their witnesses is that the only
essential
marital
obligation
which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if
any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that respondent Manuels
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state
and not merely due to his ardent wish to
have a child of his own flesh and blood.
Respondent failed to prove that his wifes
behavior
and
actions
are
grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her
from
complying
with
the
essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there
any showing that these "defects" were
already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. In fact,
Dr. Maaba, whose
expertise
as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with
the basic and essential obligations of
marriage. Dr. Garcias report does not even
mention that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated.
PETITION GRANTED. CA
DECISION WAS REVERSED
LIM V CA 214 SCRA 237 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992

FACTS: Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality the patient-doctor relationship
November 25, 1987 Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment
based on Art 36, alleging that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering from schizophrenia
before, during and after marriage and until the present
January 11, 989 Sim announced he will present Dr Lydia Acampado (psychiatrist) as a
witness on January 25, 1989
Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her with schizophrenia. Subpoena was issued on January 12, 1989
January 24, 1989 petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and suspend
proceedings. Overruled
Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would
not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor.
March 3, 1989 petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition but was
denied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that petitioner failed to establish the
confidential nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado
ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying schizophrenia
in case where petitioner is her client
HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must
concur:
1. Privilege claimed is in a civil case
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine
3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity
These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking
doctor-patient confidentiality:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed
2. Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the parties
3. The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must greater than the benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation
Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is
nothing specific or concrete offered to show that the information obtained from Dr Acampado
would blacken the petitioners reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her
proceedings that her counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege.
KROHN V CA 233 SCRA 146 JUNE 14, 1994
FACTS: A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The
witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not
the physician who prepared the report. Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient
confidentiality, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the psychiatric
evaluation report.
June 14, 1964 Edgar Krohn Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in San Marcelino
Manila. In 1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease marital strain;
1973 both separated
1975 Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report signed by
Dr Cornelio Banaag and Baltazar Reyes.
November 2, 1978 Edgar obtained a decree from family court nullifying his marriage
with Paz. On June 10, 1979, decree was confirmed and pronounced final
July 30, 1982 Pasig CFI granted voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership
October 23, 1990 Edgar filed petition for annulment, citing the confidential psychiatric
evaluation report
May 8, 1991 Edgar testified on the contents of the psych report but was objected due
to patient-doctor confidentiality. Petitioner asserted that there is no factual or legal
basis for Edgars claims since reports were fabricated.
June 4, 1991 RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence
Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 ROC<, prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a
professional capacity, more so a third person testifying on privileged matters between a
physician and patient or from submitting any medical report prepared by a physician
which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with
the patient
May 29, 1991 Edgar opposed Paz motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psych report as evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar Krohn constitutes
as evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of psychological incapacity
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband
who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly,
this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Such
testimony then is considered nothing but hearsay. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
MALCAMPOS-SIN V SIN 355 SCRA 285 MARCH 26, 2001
FACTS: Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity
June 4, 1987 Florence Malcampo (petitioner) and Philipp Sin (respondent), a
Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish, Manila
September 20, 1994 Florence filed with Pasig RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage
June 16, 1995 RTC dismissed Florences petition
December 19, 1995 Florence filed a notice of appeal to CA

April 30, 1998 CA dismissed Florences petition and affirmed RTC decision
June 23, 1998 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with CA but was denied on
January 19, 1999
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration in
declaring the nullity of her marriage with the respondent
HELD: The SC reversed the decision and remanded it to the RTC for proper re-trial, providing
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family CodE (based on
Molina case):
1. The burden of proving the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage (semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio). This is rooted in the fact that both the Constitution and
the Law cherish the validity of the marriage and the unity of the family.
2. The root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified;
b. alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently proven by experts and; d. clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
3. The incapacity was be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and is still existing
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts."
There is no state participation in the instant case other than the manifestation filed with the
RTC on November 16, 1994. The state did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at
any stage of the proceedings.
BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as the 7 August
1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for
violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
March 29, 1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against Diana Barcelona
(petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a motion to withdraw petition which the RTC
granted on June 7, 1995
July 21, 1995 Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on
two grounds: no cause of action and violates SC administrative circular 04-94 on forum
shopping
Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner (against
deferring resolution) was the complainants failure to state a cause of action but
according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to have violated the complainants right
so there is cause of action.
RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It
held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration 11 was denied in the March 22, 1999
Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, 13
docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological incapacity in
annulling said marriage
HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties
in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt.
The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any
finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or
juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Dr. Antonio
M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so
long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination. PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED
DEDEL V CA G.R. NO. 151867 JANUARY 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David Dedel married Sharon Corpuz on September 28, 1966 (civil rites) and
church wedding on May 20, 1967. they had four children
Petitioner claims that during the marriage Sharon turned out to be irresponsible and
immature wife and mother; had several affairs with other men.
Sharon was treated by clinical psychiatrist Dr. Lourdes Lapuz but affairs continued. She
even married the Jordanian national and had 2 children and left with him.
April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition for annulment on the grounds of psychological
incapacity. Summons were severed but no response from respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan who conducted a psychological evaluation of

petitioner who found him to be conscientious, hardworking, perfectionist
Dayan noted that Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality disorder evidenced
by her promiscuity and lack of remorse; these are indications amounting to
RTC rendered said marriage null and void
ISSUE: Whether anti-social personality disorder constitutes as psychological incapacity

HELD: Respondents sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which makes the respondent completely unable to perform her essential marital
obligations.
At best, the circumstances described are grounds for legal separation under Art 55 of Family
Code. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void. PETITION DENIED
REPUBLIC V IYOY 470 SCRA SEPTEMBER 21, 2005
FACTS: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L.
Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
December 16, 1961 Crasus and Fely married in Cebu City; both had 5 children. After
the marriage, Fely was hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant
1984 Fely went to the US; after a year, Crasus received divorce papers from Fely and
eventually found out that Fely married an American. Respondent filed complaint after
13 years of marriage
Fely denied claims that it was respondent who was a drunkard, lazy etc.
No deposition submitted from Philippine Consul in US to RTC; RTC declared marriage
void ab initio on October 30, 1998
State intervened but CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE: Whether abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity
HELD: Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.
Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married
is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now,
do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING
YU V YU 484 SCRA 485 MARCH 10, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA on January 11,
2002 alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld
from him the custody of their minor child
March 3, 2002 respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
dissolution of ACP before Pasig RTC
March 21, 2002 while habeas corpus was pending, CA awarded petitioner of full
custody over their child with full visitation rights to respondent
Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate court a Joint Motion
to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which was, by Resolution of April 24, 2002, approved.
On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for the Modification of
her visiting rights under the Interim Visitation Agreement. To the Motion, petitioner filed an
Opposition with Motion to Cite Respondent for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended,
constituted forum shopping.
By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and her counsel to make
the necessary amendment in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspect is concerned, under pain of contempt.
In compliance with the appellate courts Resolution of July 5, 2002, respondent filed a Motion
to Admit Amended Petition before the Pasig RTC. She, however, later filed in December 2002 a
Motion to Dismiss her petition, without prejudice, on the ground that since she started
residing and conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on resources
and her very busy schedule rendered her unable to devote the necessary time and attention
to the petition. The Pasig RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly dismissed the
petition without prejudice, by Order of March 28, 2003.
On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC
Case No. 6190, with prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the
final resolution by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by Resolution of July 3,
2003, for having become moot and academic, "the restraint on the liberty of the person
alleged to be in restraint [having been] lifted."
MALLION V ALACANTARA G.R. NO. 141528 OCTOBER 31, 2006
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a
question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of lack of marriage license?
October 24, 1995 Oscar Mallion filed a petition before RTC seeking declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara under Art. 36 of Family Code
November 11, 1997 RTC denied petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to
provide sufficient evidence to warrant the relief he is seeking.
June 11, 1998 Appeal filed with CA was dismissed for failure to pay docket and other
lawful fees with reglamentary period
July 12, 1999 petitioner filed another petition seeking nullity of marriage, alleging that
marriage was void ab initio due to absence of marriage license. Respondent filed a
motion to dimiss on August 13, 1999, on the grounds of res judicata and forum
shopping
October 8, 1999 RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss
According to Mallion, relief prayed for is the same but the cause of action is different;
res judicata1 does not apply
ISSUE: should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential
requisite prescribed by article 4 of the family code be raised in the same proceeding where
the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys psychological incapacity under
article 36 of the family code
HELD: The SC held that in civil case no. Sp 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is
now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner
raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that
parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat
their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first
and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. All
three requisites are present in the instant case. If same facts or evidence would sustain both
petitions, the two actions are considered the same and a judgment in the first case is a bar to
the subsequent action.
Petitioner has the same cause of actionnullity of said marriagethe grounds or basis are
just different. Petition denied due to lack of merit
CATALAN V CA 514 SCRA 607 514 SCRA 607 FEBRUARY 6, 2007
FACTS: This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between
respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as
well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
June 4, 1950 petitioner Felicitas Amor married Orlando Catalan in Pangasinan and
migrated to the US soon after (became US citizens). April 1988, both divorced
June 16, 1988 Orlando married Merope but since the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage, petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando and
Merope with damages
1 A matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law
legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to
appeal
Respondents (Orlando and Merope) filed motion to dismiss due to lack of action as
petitioner was not a real party-in-interest but was denied
October 10, 2000 marriage between Orlando and Merope was declared void ab initio
by RTC
CA reversed RTC decision and declared marriage was still subsisting
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the required standing in court to question the nullity of the
marriage between Orlando and Merope
HELD: Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando
were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988.
However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the
complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to
prove their naturalization and divorce. It was not sufficiently established that Felicitas and
Orlando were already US citizens at the time they secured divorce decree in April 1988.
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the
issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree
obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage
even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to
declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent
Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest"
can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be based on a
cause of action.28 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
REPUBLIC V TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 FEBRUARY 6, 2007
FACTS: Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (19 yrs 4 mos) and Manolito San Jose (20 yrs 10
mos) were married on June 12, 988 and had 3 children
9 years couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito was jobless, gambler and
addict.
August 20, 1998 Laila left Manilito and moved back to her parents house
March 9, 1999 Laila filed for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing Art 36
Laila presented Dr Nedy Tayag (clinical psychologist) and declared that from the psych
tests and interviews on Laila that Manolito (whom she did not personally examine) was
psychologically incapacitated. His anti-social personality disorder appears to be grave
and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the individual
until the later stage of life.
ISSUE:
Whether Manolitos behavior characterized as anti-social personality disorder
constitutes psychological incapacity
HELD: Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the
Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his
relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding
or conclusion was based is inadequate. If being jobless (since the commencement of the
marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as
being mentally or physically ill what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal
manners of a married man?
Dr. Tayag had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been
relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable. Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even show that the
alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the
marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder nor identify its root cause.
The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must
be fully explained (Santos case)
ZAMORA V CA G.R. 141917 FEBRUARY 7, 2007
FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set
aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 5, 1999 and
January 24, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525, entitled "Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado
Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
June 4, 1070 Petitioner Bernardino Zamora married Norma Mercado in City; did not
have any child. In 1972, Norma went to the US to work as a nurse; left in 1974 again.
In 1989, she was already a US citizen
Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Norma was horrified
at the mere idea of having children and also abandoned him when she left for the US
Norma denied that she refused to have a child, alleging that petitioner was unfaithful
and had two affairs with different women and had children with them.
June 22, 1995 RTC denied Bernardinos petition citing that there is no evidence of
psychological incapacity on Norma (no gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability)
August 5, 1999 CA affirmed RTC decision citing Molina and Santos guidelines
ISSUE: Whether or not refusal to have children and abandonment constitutes psychological
incapacity; Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still
desirable, if evidence in this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private
respondent
HELD: Molina and Santos cases did not mention the necessity of the presentation of expert
opinion. What is important, as in Marcos v Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the condition of psychological incapacity.
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
states:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in
totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party
concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed. DENIED.
REPUBLIC V CABANTUG-BAGUIO G.R. NO. 171042 JUNE 30, 2008
FACTS: Petition for review on the declaration of the nullity of marriage between Lynette
Cabantug-Baguio and Martini Dico Baguio
August 12, 1997 Lynette and Martini were married after being pen pals since 1995
Initially, the couple stayed with Lynettes parents. Martini only stayed with his wife
during weekends, and on weekdays he was at his parents house. Lynette soon
discovered that Martini was a mamas boy
Upon the insistence of Martinis mother, his allotment was divided equally between her
and Lynette
January 1999 No information about Martini. Lynette also stopped receiving her share
of the allotment and upon inquiry with Martinis employer, she found out that he was in
Alabang, Muntinlupa
October 12, 2000 Lynette filed a complaint for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage on the basis of Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital duties and obligations as stated in Art. 68-70 of the Family Code
Summons were served upon Martini to which he did not file any response. No collusion
was also established.
October 14, 1999 Lynette learned that Martini declared in his employment records
that he was SINGLE and named his mother as principal allotee
Respondent presented the letter of clinical psychologist who evaluated the behavior of
Martini. Based on the report, Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependency
patterns and self-centered motives. The situation is serious, grave, existing already
during the adolescent period and incurable. As such, Martini is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and family
January 2, 2002 Cebu City RTC declared that marriage void since Martini was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential martial obligations of
marriage and that same incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinis being a mamas boy constitutes as a psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code
HELD: Art. 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond at the
time the causes manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. [T]he root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
For psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio it must be characterized by:
1. Gravity must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage
2. Juridical antecedence it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
3. Incurability must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proving the nullity of
marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage, and against the dissolution and nullity (semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio)
As seen in this case, Lynette failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Martinis
psychological incapacity. While the court sympathizes with her predication, its first and
foremost duty is to apply the law.
LIGERALDE V PATALINGHUG G.R. NO. 168796 APRIL 15, 2010
FACTS: Petition to review RTC decision on November 30, 2004 concerning the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Silvino Ligeralde (petitioner) and May Ascension A. Patlinghug
(respondent)
October 3, 1984 Silvino and May got married and had four children. Respondent
displayed signs of immaturity, negligence, infidelity and irresponsibility soon after
Silvino was reluctant to leave his wife because of his love for her. He gave her another
chance after finding out she was sleeping with another man but after a few months,
May was back to her old ways and it seemed impossible for her to change
Prior to filing the complaint against Patalinghug, Ligeralde consulted Dr Tina NicdaoBasilio (psychologist). Based on the psychological evaluation, May was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential martial obligations; that the incapacity started
when she was young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was
serious and incurable
October 22, 1999 RTC decalared the marriage of Ligeralde and Patalinghug based on
the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Basilio
CA reversed the RTC decision on the grounds that respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify
and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
ISSUE: Whether Patalinhugs behavior constitutes psychological incapacity pursuant to Art 36
of the Family Code
HELD: Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage; shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. 7 The Court likewise laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals. 8 Relevant to this petition are the following:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Patalinghugs
condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological
incapacity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully established by the evidences
presented

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CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 1

SANTOS V CA 240 SCRA 20 JANUARY 4,

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 2

to comply with her essential marital

REPUBLIC V OLAVIANO MOLINA G.R.

Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 3

is not enough to prove that the parties

contusions due to physical violence

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 4

described their father as cruel and

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with

procedural requirements for its invocation

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 5

or generalizations but according to its own

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 6

immaturity and desire to regress to a lower

HELD: No. Dr. Maaba only found that

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 7

that the respondent's incapacity is "deep

with his essential marital obligation which

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 8

incapacitated. After the marriage,

FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY

dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for

February 20, 2001 Pasig RTC denied

CA affirmed in toto the judgment of

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 9

insensitivity or inability to give meaning

ANTONIO V REYES G.R. NO. 155800

ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 10

HERNANDEZ V COURT OF APPEALS 320

time of the marriage up to present,

ISSUE: Whether alcoholism constitutes as

REPUBLIC V DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 11

habitual disappearance of Avelino,

which has declared the marriage between

March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca

In 1988 respondent showed signs

November 19, 1992 petitioner left

March 22, 1994 respondent

April 25, 1994 summons were

January 11, 1995 respondent filed

November 15, 1995 RTC granted

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 12

settled legal maxim that the interpretation

March 15, 1981 Petitioner Leni

ISSUES: Is certiorari available to correct an

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 13

obligations, simply because she filed cases

August 11, 1973 Juanita Carating

September 25, 1997 respondent

According to petitioner, respondent

Respondent presented Dr Valentina

and sensitive) to each others needs and

Based on the psychiatric report of Dr

January 31, 2001 RTC denied

July 1, 2003 CA reversed RTC

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 14

LIM V CA 214 SCRA 237 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 15

CASE DIGESTS FOR ART 36 FAMILY CODE 16