Civilian Space Coop AFF

Plan Texts

Wolf Amendment
The United States federal government should substantially increase its space cooperation
with the Peoples Republic of China, including repealing the Wolf Amendment.

ISS
The United States federal government should invite the Peoples Republic of China to
participate as a partner on the International Space Station.

Space Race Adv

1AC
Current policy prevents the United States from cooperating with China in space that
risks accidental escalation from inevitable space accidents
Fernholz, Quartz state, business and society reporter, 2015
(Tim, NASA has no choice but to refuse Chinas request for help on a new space station, 10-13,
http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-request-for-help-on-a-new-space-station)
The Martian has been praised as the rare science fiction movie that takes pains with scientific accuracy, but one of the more prosaic events in the movie is actually
among the least likely. In

the film, Chinese and US space agencies work together to save the day. But in fact, that kind of international

Kumbaya moment is forbidden by US lawa restriction underscored today (Oct. 13) at the International Astronautical Congress (IAC). The
chief designer of Chinas space program, Zhou Jianping, said his country would solicit international partners for a space station it plans to launch in 2022, with
opportunities ranging from shared experiments and spacecraft visits by foreign crews to building permanent modules to attach to the main station. The European and
Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with China, but NASA will have to snub the project. The

ban on cooperation
between NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative lawmaker Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding
for work with China in protest of political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology; he retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And

NASA is not a fan of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the US, for its own good, ought to dump the fouryear-old ban. We will find ourselves on the outside looking in, because everybodywho has any hope of a human spaceflight programwill go to whoever will fly
their people, Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters. Currently, China operates a space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by
groups of Chinese astronauts. The US supports the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts alongside 15 other countries, including
Russia. Both

the US and Russia have committed to provide support to the station through 2024. The US has a long history
of space diplomacy with opponentsas with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing China as a peaceful
competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a
tough spot with space scientists from outside the agency, some of whom have protested the ban by boycotting scientific conferences. If the
desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions, theres also the increasing
concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of coordination between burgeoning space
programs will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in costly, inorbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could provide trust and lines of
communication for de-escalation as fears of space militarization increase. And its not like there isnt some cross-pollination already
SpaceNews notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.

This sends signal the US is pursuing space dominance which triggers security dilemmas for
other countries
Zhang, Lingnan political science professor,2011
(Baohui, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Asian Survey, 51.2, JSTOR)
In both cases, Chinese

security experts believe that the U.S. seeks absolute security in order to maximize protection
for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive
motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of
international relations, one countrys efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by
changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for absolute security evokes countermeasures from
other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since maintaining status quo
is the minimum goal of any great power.10 According to Robert Jervis, The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one
states security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of
international relations. In this context, Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect
the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.11
Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures. The first factor

that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for
space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama
administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best
possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent
national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, Americas domination of the
space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.12
The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to
unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve full spectrum dominance in
space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: Today, the U.S. is the preeminent
military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminenceproviding a solid foundation for our national security.14 General
Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: Space superiority is the future of
warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force

released a White Paper called The Nations Guardians: Americas 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar
statement: No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority; thus, the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance.
Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic
spectrum.16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries.

Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from
nuclear weapons and other threats, other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by
Joan Johnson-Freese, I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is
space dominance, and thats what the rest of the world wont accept.17 Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for
space dominance as damaging to Chinas national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning
the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for absolute security
jeopardizes other countries security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in
fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too
far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, In recent decades the U.S. has
been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.18 The study also points out that the U.S. is
the first country to develop a full set of doctrines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its
long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of
allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemys land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this

represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military
toward space war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has
initiated a new space war to maintain its status as the overlord of space . He claims that the ultimate goal of the
U.S. space program is to build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between
earth and moon under American jurisdiction. Under this empire, without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will
not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.20

Risk of miscalculation in space is high now because of how opaque space programs are.
Finch, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction principal director, 2015
(James, Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth, , JFQ 76, 1st Quarter, proquest)
As potentially dangerous as the

overlapping ADIZs are, they are far less destabilizing than actions in space could be during a
crisis. All contestants in the great game unfolding in Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications that
would follow engaging military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ. These understandings have been built over 100 years of air
travel and were underscored dramatically in the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. Such shared
understandings are largely nonexistent in space. Not only do nations have less experience operating in the domain, but the criticality of
space systems to broader operational objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis. Combined with
the lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space, this lack of common understanding may create a growing
risk of miscalculation in a terrestrial political crisis. If not explicitly addressed, this instability in space could even create a
chasm that undermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets of strategic or nuclear stability. While much has been written about how
nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space, in some ways, is more complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear
taboo exists against the use of nuclear weapons. Crossing that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications. Second, in the context
of nuclear weapons, theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory motives based on the type of weapon strategic or tacticaland based on the type
of targetcounterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form of an escalation ladder in Herman Kahns 1965 book, On
Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding escalation based on the target and the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a
byproduct of the lack of mutual understanding on the implications of the weapon and the value of the target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because they
describe the playing field on which a terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must account for these complexities. To
begin, there

is no taboo against many types of counterspace systems . Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use
of temporary and reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are documented instances of
electronic jamming happening all over the world today, and the number of actors who possess counterspace weapons such as communications
jammers is much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of some counterspace weapons, even nonstate actors have found utility in employing them. As
former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted, Irregular

warfare has come to space.8 Consequently, this type of weapon

appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less prone to miscalculation than kinetic weapons. At the
other end of the weapons spectrum are weapons that have permanent and irreversible effects. The extreme version of such a weapon would be a debrisgenerating kinetic kill device such as the kind that was tested by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These
weapons are particularly insidious because they generate large amounts of debris that indiscriminately threatens satellites and other
space systems for decades into the future. One additional dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis
stability relates to the survivability of a weapon. It is commonly accepted that space is an offense-dominant domain, which is to say that holding
space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them. This could lead to first-strike instability by
creating pressure for early action at the conventional level here on Earth before counterspace attacks could
undermine the capability for power projection. But the offense-dominant nature of the domain has implications for both peaceful satellites as well
as space-based weapons. This could also create first-strike instability regarding space-based weapons since the advantage
temporary and reversiblemay

would go to the belligerents who use their space weapon first. In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely destabilizing in ways that
their more survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to Kahns heuristic, however, is the situational context surrounding the employment of
counterspace systems. In the space context, strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the target, and also the terrestrial context. Todays electronic
jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes have sought to deny freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial
communications satellites. The same weapon typea

satellite communications jammerapplied against a satellite carrying strategic

nuclear command and control communications during a crisis could be perceived much differentl y. In such an instance,
decisionmakers might conclude that the other side is attempting to deprive them of nuclear command and
control as a prelude to escalation. Similarly, the application of permanent, irreversible force against a commercial or third party satellite would have a
much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying or otherwise rendering inoperable such assets could raise a partys stake in the

Many militaries use

commercial assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a show of force strike against a commercial satellite
could inadvertently engage an adversarys vital interests. Simply put, the weapon, target, and context all contribute to
the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack. Unlike in other domains, tremendous ambiguity exists regarding
the use of counterspace weapons. This means that all of these variables would be open to interpretation in crises, and it
should be remembered that an inherent characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time
is short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic, decisionmakers tend to lean toward
worst-case interpretations of an adversarys actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent miscalculation.
conflict, by threatening either its power projection capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike.

Space conflict goes nuclear flashpoints with China are inevitable outweighs probability
of ground-based conflicts
Billings, Scientific American editor, 2015
(Lee, War in Space May Be Closer than Ever, 8-10, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-maybe-closer-than-ever)
The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or
Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of Earth

orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd expect
militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isnt so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe
in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and
planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the
ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S.
superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a
conflict that could cripple [destroy] the entire planets space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a
conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling
point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last
months failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both
developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict, such as those that might erupt over Chinas military
activities in the South China Sea or Russias in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated the need to
interfere with, damage and destroy U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are
many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its
optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellites
components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In

response to these
billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and
offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through
diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European
Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including
Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading
possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least 5

to years of further debate within the UNs General Assembly. The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space, says Frank Rose, assistant
secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to
work with Russia and China to keep space secure. But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The
prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even
tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, spacebased surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or
launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested space mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could
seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administrations multibilliondollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air
Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit.
Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think
tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous
orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites

effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks.

But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth , both
superpowers backed down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this, Krepon says. We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be
worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too. Today,

the situation is much more

complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds
upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in
part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules and
they dont have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high
velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a
marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a kinetic method to destroy an adversarys satellite, it can easily create even
more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when
China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly
one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a
malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris
was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude. More

recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional
tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts
say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of
last year. Chinese officials insist the tests only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one

test in May 2013 sent a

missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous
satellites.

Causes nuclear war, collapses all vital systems crucial to human civilization
Lamrani, Stratfor security analyst, 2016
(Omar, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, 5-18, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248)
The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication,

future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar

energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number
of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world
economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of
nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening
salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled
exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover,

satellites in the event of attack theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet, however;

key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems, such as the large but critically
important nuclear-hardened command-and-control mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas
and considerable power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative ways to
perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer the most advanced alternative. But considering
the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best.
Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a

In the race between shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT
capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial
war.
contingency is being put in place.

Lifting restrictions on cooperation solves risk of escalating space race.

David, former National Commission on Space research director, 2015
(Leonard, US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?, 6-16, www.space.com/29671china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html)
"The

first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation
revoked," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other
spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight." Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet
Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar initiative bringing the United States and
China together in orbit would be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work together on Earth as well as in
space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens into orbit, the current state of the
Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted.
"China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S.
perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political, not technical." Complicated relationship The U.S. and China
have a complex relationship, said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not like the U.S.-Soviet Cold
War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told
Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish." Smith pointed out that, as far as space
cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the

Richard Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under thenPresident Jimmy Carter after the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration,
small programs again, mostly in the biomedical area were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight
the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership waited for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian
cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one
would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible," Smith added. The law
does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation, she said. "The door is not completely shut." A U.S.-China space race? " It is in the interest
of U.S. national security to engage China in space," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the
Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. "The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space
race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space
partnerships," Johnson-Freese said. Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part, has spurred
China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be the de facto international space station when
the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited." [China's Space Station Plans in Photos] Cooperation stonewalled Apollo-Soyuz demonstrated that space
can be a venue to build cooperation and trust during difficult political times, when they are most needed, and without dangerous technology
transferal, Johnson-Freese said. "However, that demonstration has gone unheeded regarding China," she noted. Johnson-Freese said the reasoning
given by those who have stonewalled cooperation in space with the Chinese "often has little to do with space or national security." Rather, "space
is merely a token for complaints about China in other areas, such as human rights," she said. Other countries are eager to work with China in
space, Johnson-Freese said, and "the U.S. merely appears petulant" in its refusal to engage in any meaningful way with
China in space.

Space War Likely/Space Dominance Bad

Space dominance creates self fulfilling prophecies that destroy assets.
Stalcup, CSIS Nuclear Scholars Initiative fellow, 2014
(Travis, U.S. in Space: Superiority, Not Dominance, 1-16, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/u-s-in-spacesuperiority-not-dominance/?allpages=yes)
Director Alfonso Cuarns latest film, Gravity is a sci-fi thriller about a lone astronaut fighting to live where life is impossible. Following a Russian missile strike
against an aging spy satellite that shreds the American space shuttle and its crew, protagonist and mission scientist Sandra Bullock struggles to evade a predictable but
lethal field of orbiting debris. Cuarns story dramatizes a stark future one in which nations vie to control the cosmos and in doing so make life on earth as we know
it considerably harder. Gravity makes an implicit argument about the folly of space dominance: operating in space is hard enough so why make it harder by testing and
using kinetic kill anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons? The Gravity of the Situation Freedom

of action in space is essential not only to the

American way of war but to the American way of life. Everything from theater missile defense to Facebook relies on satellites high above that
beam signals back and forth to Earth. Despite the importance of these assets, at no time since it first placed satellites into orbit in 1958 has the United States enjoyed
space dominance. The Soviets acquired ASAT capabilities early in the space race (albeit it by heavenly nuclear detonations) and even now, the U.S. is dependent on
Russia to ferry astronauts to and from the International Space Station. As an interest vital to U.S. national security, it is important to determine under what
conditions the United States can achieve or to many, maintain dominance in space. (For a hardnosed view of U.S. space policy, see the 2006 National Space
Policy, which calls for the denial of space to adversaries.) American space policy, sometimes out of the limelight, is growing even more important. Other nations are
growing their capabilities to access space including China, which is also intensifying its investment in anti-satellite weaponry. Americas strategic advantage is
eroding. Conditions for Space Dominance Given

this challenge from China and the proliferation of space programs around the
world, is space dominance even a feasible goal? For the U.S. (or any state) to dominate space, one or a combination of three conditions must
exist. The first condition requires the U.S. to develop offensive and defensive capabilities so insurmountable as to
dissuade competitors from attempting to access space. Unfortunately, history has shown that dissuasion only works against states disinclined or incapable of
competing in the first place. Great powers like the United States and China, which landed its first lunar rover on the surface of the moon last December, are inexorably
drawn into competition with one another. Beijings plans to complete its own space station by 2020 demonstrate that it is not dissuaded by enormous American
capability. The second condition is a change in priorities by a competitor away from space. Economic turmoil and consequent social
unrest could cause the Chinese Communist Party to turn inward, but there is no reason to believe that economic problems would result in a more restrained Chinese
foreign policy. It is equally likely that a strife-ridden China would deflect popular enmity toward a neighbor, pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy to boost
support for ruling elites priorities. The

third condition is an American willingness to deny competitors access to space by

attacking targets on the ground including anti-satellite weapons, satellites and their delivery vehicles, and launch pads.
The U.S. has demonstrated a willingness to take preventive action against second-order adversaries like Iraq, but the uncertainty of preventive strikes against China
would give American military planners pause. As former Secretary Robert Gates expressed in his memoir, war is tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Moreover, it is
highly questionable that the American people would support such a provocative and costly endeavor. American Policy Options Absent these conditions and given the
immense importance of space access, what are American policymakers to do? The United States may choose from one of three policy options: it can do nothing and
countenance the continued erosion of the American position; it can pursue space dominance despite its requirement of preventive war; or it can pursue a more modest
goal of space superiority, remaining, as scholars Gene Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese write, first among many. The Easy (and Costly) Option: Do Nothing
Were the U.S. to take no action at all, China would continue to access space and grow its capability, undermining American strategic advantage. Moreover, space
situational awareness would remain limited leaving U.S. satellites extremely vulnerable. Without improving the resilience of its satellites or demonstrating the ability
to hold adversary satellites at risk, the U.S. position would continue to diminish. This course is unacceptable because it leaves American satellites at risk without
stabilizing the relative decline of the United States strategic advantage. The Scary (and Costly) Option: Space Dominance If denying adversaries access to space is
truly essential to the American way of war and life, then Washington should pursue a strategy that establishes space dominance. By combining immense
offensive capabilities with a willingness to strangle the baby in the crib, the United States can temporarily achieve dominance in space. This strategy would require
offensive weapons in space to destroy deployed space-based assets as well as robust land-based anti-satellite weapons. Such a course of action is

counterproductive. If the United States were to engage in preventive action and initiate war over space, it
would invite the very anti-satellite attacks the United States wishes to avoid . (Even more pernicious is the cheapness of ASAT
missiles relative their very expensive targets.) To recover from such attacks, the United States would need to reinvigorate its
satellite manufacturing infrastructure and space technology sector to ensure it can easily replace disabled or
destroyed space assets, a costly venture. A policy of space hegemony would also require some sort of action against
friendly space-faring nations such as Japan and India as well as coalitions of states like the European Union. While
Europe and Japan already closely cooperate with the United States in space, it is unlikely that these allies would
willingly surrender their space programs or subordinate them to American control . Even if the United States chose
to eschew preventive action, the presence of offensive weapons would create dangerous spirals of hostility
fraught with inadvertent escalation. The pursuit of space dominance is thus far too costly and unsustainable,
requiring perpetual wars for perpetual dominance.

Space supremacy causes counterbalancing that risks escalation

Weeden, Secure World Foundation technical advisor, 2015
(Brian, The End of Sanctuary in Space, 1-7, https://warisboring.com/the-end-of-sanctuary-in-space2d58fba741a#.dqpke136m)
The inclusion of offensive space control capabilities in the Congressional language suggests that the United States
may be considering threats of force against adversary space systems as a way to deter attacks on U.S. space systems.

Although neither Russia nor China are as reliant on satellites as the United States, they still have space systems that
are important for their own national security. For example, a key element of Chinas anti-access/area denial strategy for a potential conflict in East
Asia includes using anti-ship ballistic missiles ASBMs to deter, or potentially attack, U.S. carrier battle groups. Chinese ISR satellites play a critical role in the kill
chain for its ASBMs by providing tracking and targeting information on U.S. naval forces. It

is likely that some in the U.S. believe that

developing offensive counterspace capabilities that could hold Chinese ISR satellites at risk, or destroy them during
an actual conflict, could provide a deterrent to Chinese aggression or a significant military advantage in a conflict.
Proponents of developing new U.S. offensive space control capabilities argue that the previous decades of strategic restraint by the United States have not been
matched by potential adversaries such as China, and thus continued restraint is pointless. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. began development of the ASM-135 ASAT
program in the late 1970s to address precisely the same concerns with Soviets using space-based surveillance to target U.S. naval forces. However, the program was
ended in the late 1980s, partly out of concerns that it could spark an arms race in space. Compared to the air, sea and land domains where the U.S. military has
continued to develop and field weapon systems that are much more advanced and capable than its adversaries, the public evidence suggests that the United States has
indeed been much more restrained in the space domain, if you dont count hit-to-kill missile defense as a latent ASAT capability. By contrast, the multiple ASAT tests
conducted by China since 2005 have led some in the U.S. military to conclude that continued restraint by the United States will not be similarly matched, and will
only serve to put it at a further disadvantage. If

the United States were to develop increased offensive counterspace capabilities,

there would be significant drawbacks. The biggest drawback is that it will not halt the proliferation of
counterspace capabilities and development programs in other countries, and may accelerate that proliferation
even more. Russia, China, and other countries already consider the U.S. missile defense program as evidence of a
stealth space weapons program and proof of why they should develop their own hit-to-kill ASAT and missile
defense capabilities. A new U.S. effort to develop offensive counterspace capabilities to defend U.S. satellites
is likely to only deepen these perceptions, potentially leading to an arms race instability scenario, and an allout competition in space that the U.S. tried to avoid in the 1970s. The end result would be increased threats to
everyones space systems and increased tensions that could lead to or escalate conflict. It is also hard to see how
active defenses or offensive counterspace capabilities would be a credible deterrent unless they are accompanied by
a dramatic shift in current U.S. space policy. The deterrent value of both offensive and defensive systems rests on
the adversarys belief that the systems will work. That implies that adversaries would need to be aware of the active defenses and offensive
counterspace systems, and that the systems would need to be tested to demonstrate their effectiveness. However, testing destructive systems
would seem to be contrary to what most countries, including the United States, would consider to be
responsible behavior in space. Testing such systems would establish a precedent that it would be okay for
other countries, such as Russia and China, to develop and test their own active defenses, which in turn would
likely lead to the development of more threats by all parties.

Recent dynamics prove space supremacy has a high chance of escalation.

Hitchens, CISSM senior research scholar, 2016
(Theresa, Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing, 6-17,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-time-for-astrategic-rebalancing)
During the Bush administration, the space-control and dominance rhetoric emanating from the US military created
external perceptions of aggressive US intentions in space. These perceptions were initially soothed by the Obama
administrations policies, rhetoric, and focus on multilateral diplomacy. Recent rhetoric, however, is once again
changing the US profile. For example, in statements as recently as 2014, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Frank Rose stated that the United States was amenable to space arms-control agreements if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of all
nations [emphasis added].17 By contrast, in his November 2015 remarks, Rose stated that the United States would consider arms-control measures if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies [emphasis added].18 This

distinction was
reminiscent of the us and them view of the world after 9/11, and of language in the Bush administration space
policy that focused almost exclusively on US rights in space. Since this phrase is an often-heard talking point of US
space policy, it is unlikely the recently selected wording was simply a misstep. Given the danger of space warfare
and its escalation potential, Bruce MacDonald pointed out how the hegemonic space strategy of the Bush
administration was misaligned, in a 2008 report for the Council on Foreign Relations. First, the 2002 US space doctrine included
language about the imperative of being able to deny the use of space assets by US adversarieslanguage that has
caused considerable angst among countries increasingly using space in many of the same ways as the United States.
The United States has ranged from hinting to overtly stating its desire to control space. Second, since the 2006 National Space Policy, space has been considered a
US vital interest that must be protected. MacDonald highlighted the incongruous nature of those two points: Identifying

ones own space

capabilities as a vital national interest while reserving the right to attack others in space (which would likely provoke
retaliatory attacks against our vital space assets), appears internally inconsistent, even contradictoryAttacking
others satellites would invite retaliation, putting at risk a vital national interest where the United States has much
more to lose than the attacker.19 Rational decision-making is goal directed, with internally consistent choices.
Therefore, if the United States wants to maintain access to its vital interests, avoiding an attack becomes just as

important as defending against and defeating an attack. Yet, since the 2013 Chinese launch, the United States is
once again considering systems to attack adversary counterspace capabilities, as well as offensive actions
against adversary satellitesincluding potential first-strike, preemptive optionswhich could lead to a
similar misalignment of goals with means. A closer look at the congested, contested, and competitive space environment (as characterized by
current US policy) is important to understand the backdrop within which threat assessments and strategies are being developed. While management of the
environment is both useful and necessary, control of

the environment is already out of the reach of any one country. Though a
politically potent objective, pursuing space control and domination is a futile, costly quest, and can be
counterproductive. In some cases, it already has been. The United States attempted to control satellite technology through the International Trafficking and
Arms Regulations (ITAR), until revisions were made in 2014. In a globalized market, the primary effect of those controls was to see satellite sales go to other
countries. Not

only is unilateral control of space technology and the space environment now impossible, but attempts at
control create the perception of denying other countries benefits from space that the United States enjoys . If
the United States is to be the leader of the family of spacefaring nations, it must be seen to hold the moral
high ground in terms of upholding the principle of access to space, as codified in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
and seeking to avert space warfare.

More ev
Hitchens, CISSM senior research scholar, 2016
(Theresa, Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Time for a Strategic Rebalancing, 6-17,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-time-for-astrategic-rebalancing)
Clearly, there are growing risks and threats to US satellites, civilian and military alike, and challenges to stated US
goals in space. The question for the new administration, however, is whether hegemonic means to address
those challengesincluding a national security space strategy focused on active defense and offensive
weapons (a decidedly grey distinction)are likely to achieve US goals. It is this papers assertion that they
are not. Instead, a rebalancing of means used to address US goals in space is now necessary, based on a comprehensive assessment of the strategic space
environment through the next ten to twenty years, toward ensuring that the ways and means being pursued to address those goals are in alignment. This assessment
must extend beyond the Pentagon as well, to include the rapidly expanding cast of governmental and nongovernmental space actors. In particular, industry

Such a rebalancing
would require a continued emphasis on strategic restraint in the very near term, as well as a continued focus on
diplomacy. The best-case scenario would be for the United States to convince others, particularly China and
Russia, to similarly take a step back and re-evaluate their own goalssomething that is only going to happen
through improved dialogue and/or signaling. However, this may not be feasible at the current moment, due to the lack of dialogue and the
high level of geostrategic tensions. Even without a reciprocal move on the part of the two near-peer competitors in space,
however, the United States will benefit internally by taking the time to seriously reassess its space security house,
potentially including consideration of the structures and organizational charts dictating who is in charge. While there
will undoubtedly be pressure from some quarters to move ahead swiftly with a more aggressive approach, no
country currently has the capability to directly threaten the ability of the United States to successfully utilize its
space assets in a conflict, thus allowing time for a strategic reassessment . Space assets are vital to US interests, too important to be
representatives should be brought into a process of dialogue with the national space security community to discuss priorities and concerns.

guided by a ready, shoot, aim approach based on fear, rather than on actual goals. Indeed, the point is to reassess whether US goals in space are feasible and
reasonable in a changing environment, and to develop a strategy that ensures the ways and means to achieve them. If the

current US goals (as discussed

below) remain relevant and viable, as the authors believe they do, then a national security space strategy must be
premised on preventionboth of space warfare in general, and of attacks on US space assetsrather than on the
concept that the best defense is a good offense.

Earth Monitoring Advantage

Internal Links 1AC

Expanded space cooperation enables more effective data sharing --- that produces better
models capable of anticipating solar flares and geomagnetic storms
Johnson-Freese, US Naval War College national security affairs professor, 2015
(Joan, Found in Space: Cooperation, 10-9, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-spacecooperation-a-welcome-dialogue-begins)
The increasing U.S. propensity, especially in conjunction with political campaigning, to equate diplomacy with appeasement and negotiation with weakness has not
served the U.S. well in other parts of the world, and wont with China either. The Obama Administration has apparently decided that with nothing to lose politically, it
intends to make strategic and sometimes bold foreign policy moves before leaving office, in spite of obstructionist roadblocks: normalizing relations with Cuba,
negotiating a nuclear treaty with Iran, and talking with the Chinese about space among them. It is ironic that talking has become a bold policy move. According to
the DOS media note on the meeting, [2] the broad intent of the meeting was greater transparency, initially including an exchange of information on each others space
policies. The importance of that simple objective cannot be overstated. The Chinese - Asian - cultural propensity

toward opaqueness has

resulted in the U.S. assessing all things space-related done by China from a worst-case scenario perspective. The
American cultural attribute of everybody - regardless of standing or knowledge having an opinion on every subject
can result in the Chinese believing that anything said in the New York Times or on Fox News is official U.S. policy.
Clarity can serve both parties well. Apparently also, according to the media note, space debris and satellite collision avoidance
were discussed, in acknowledgement that those issues cannot be handled solely on a national basis and are critical to
maintaining the sustainability of the space environment. Since the United States has more assets in space and is more dependent on those space
assets in both civil and military operations than any other country, it behooves the U.S. to pursue all potentially valuable avenues
available to protect the space environment. It is in U.S. interests. Given the increasing number of Chinese assets in space, sustainability of
the space environment is in Chinese interests as well. Countries cooperate where both have a vested interest. Other
topics that were discussed in conjunction with potential cooperation were civil Earth-observation activities, space sciences, space weather and the civil Global
Navigation Satellite System. Beyond

the general benefits that flow to the U.S. from cooperation including learning Chinese
standard operating procedures in decision making and operations, establishing an internal Chinese constituency to
argue against aggressive Chinese actions that threaten cooperative programs by creating a vested interest in
continuance, and getting a closer look at Chinese capabilities cooperation in each of these areas offers the U.S.
more in benefits than associated risks. Working together on civilian-Earth observation activities would likely involve
sharing data on complex Earth-system processes relevant to everyone on the planet . There are frequently data
gaps in the models designed to address these complex processes, gaps that can be closed by sharing data. Better
models would yield positive benefits to both countries in fields like disaster management, environmental
studies, coastal and marine planning, and sustainable land use. Everybody wins. Space-science cooperation has long
been discussed as potentially valuable and viable for two reasons. First, it can be an area of cooperation where technologytransfer concerns can be minimized. Although it would likely begin only with data exchanges, ideally data exchanges could lead to more
extensive projects so that Americans can learn more about Chinese decision making and foster positive
constituencies within China. Further, space scientists in both countries are notoriously like stepchildren when it comes to funding allocations.
Working cooperatively could enable scientists in both countries to do more with their limited funds . One area
of space science with practical application is space weather being able to anticipate solar flares and geomagnetic
storms that are potentially damaging to satellites in orbit and negatively affecting ground facilities and operations,
and thereby be able to protect against those effects. Space weather predictions are based on fundamental
scientific research on solar-terrestrial physics. Finally, discussions on civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) focus on navigation
satellite systems with global coverage, including the U.S. Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), the Russian GLONASS system, and the expanding Chinese BeiDou
system. It is in U.S. interests to assure that China integrates BeiDou with other systems rather than having BeiDou incompatible with other systems. If China were to
integrate only BeiDou into the myriad of commercial products that utilize GNSS and that China produces, thereby requiring a different receiver than currently used by
GPS, that would wield significant negative economic impacts on the U.S. Additionally, non-integration could also create a more chaotic environment for GNSS use.
Therefore, the

United States is not merely doing China a favor by participating in these talks or by considering
expanded areas of space cooperation, as is sometimes characterized. It is the United States acting in its own best interest. While ideally the U.S. could
tie space cooperation to other contentious issues between the U.S. and China cyber attacks, for example that is unlikely to happen. Expecting and waiting for that
unlikely link to be made allows critical space issues to go unaddressed.

US-China cooperation is necessary to fill gaps-reversing restrictions on coop is key

Freedman, Mashable's Science Editor, 2013
(Andrew, NOAA Criticized for Likely Satellite Gap and China Option, 9-23,
http://www.climatecentral.org/news/noaa-criticized-for-likely-satellite-gap-and-china-gap-16514)
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has not
developed sufficient contingency measures to ensure that weather forecasts remain as reliable as they are today,
With a likely gap in critical weather satellite coverage beginning in 2016,

Weather satellites provide invaluable data to

forecasters and climate scientists alike, with polar-orbiting satellites, for example, providing at least 80 percent of the information that gets fed every day into
sophisticated weather computer models. A gap in satellite coverage a looming possibility post years of mismanagement, budget
difficulties, and technical troubles could significantly reduce the governments ability to anticipate major storms and
protect life and property, which is the main mission of NOAAs National Weather Service. The precariousness of U.S. weather satellite
infrastructure was driven home earlier this year when a micrometeoroid struck a geostationary weather satellit e,
forcing NOAA to rely on a backup satellite. But in the near future, there may be long chunks of time when there are no backups
available. NOAA has been left scrambling to figure out how to compensate for what could be reams of lost data, a
gap in coverage that may occur as soon as 2016 and could last for longer than a year. In a controversial finding, a report commissioned by NOAA found
that the agency's best alternative would be to turn to China for help. The report said NOAAs silver bullet solution
would be for it to purchase data from Chinas polar-orbiting satellites to compensate for lost U.S. data. China plans to
according to three new federally commissioned reports and lawmakers at a House subcommittee hearing.

launch its next generation of polar-orbiting satellites later this year and in 2014, ahead of the U.S. new polar-orbiting satellites, and the capabilities of the Chinese satellites are expected to be
comparable to U.S. spacecraft, the study said. The European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts, which maintains one of the most accurate medium-range weather models in the world,

concerns
about national security have held back any use of Chinese weather satellite data . Washington has recently criticized Beijing for alleged
Chinese computer hacking of American companies, and Chinese space firms have long had ties to the countrys military. At a joint hearing on the
weather and satellite program, held on Sept. 19 by the House Science Subcommittees on Oversight and Environment, lawmakers from both parties sharply
criticized NOAA for considering buying data from the Chinese government. Instead, they urged NOAA to consider purchasing data from
already incorporates the Chinese data in experimental ways, and plans to use it operationally if there is a data gap from U.S. satellites, the study said. In the U.S., however,

commercial satellite providers that are developing fleets of small satellites that could be used for weather forecasting and environmental monitoring. I have grave concerns about incorporating
data into U.S. systems from a country well-known for its persistent and malicious cyber attacks against our nation, said Oversight Subcommittee chairman Paul Broun (R-Ga.). Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) said going with commercial vendors, rather than Chinese data, would make more sense. (There is) A pretty misplaced set of values here when we are more interested in
Chinese satellite data and we are hesitant to use commercial data from our own commercial companies, he said. Mary Kicza, who directs NOAAs satellite service, said the decision whether to

The biggest risk of a data gap concerns

polar-orbiting satellites, which continuously scan the planet from north to south. The satellites gather information on
winds and moisture in the upper atmosphere, which is then fed into computer models that meteorologists use for making weather
forecasts. The data from the polar-orbiting satellites is particularly useful for making medium-range predictions out to
about seven days in advance. The other weather satellites are known as geostationary satellites since they orbit above a fixed point along
the Earths equator, keeping continuous watch on a particular swath of the planet. Images from these satellites, which are known by the acronym
GOES, often appear on television weathercasts. The likelihood of a data gap is much higher with the polar-satellite program than it is
for the geostationary satellites, largely because of the limited design lifetime of current satellites and the launch schedule for the next generation of these spacecraft. Tests
that have deprived computer models of some polar satellite data have shown that the model projections would be
significantly less accurate, raising concerns about the reliability of U.S. weather forecasts when a data gap occurs. For example, experiments done using the forecast for
purchase Chinese satellite data would need to be a whole of government decision involving national security officials.

Hurricane Sandy showed that forecast models would have shown the storm curving out to sea and missing the U.S., rather than taking its devastating hook to the west, into the New Jersey coast.

A gap
(in satellite coverage) would be catastrophic for forecasting by the national weather service, Rep. Chris Stewart (R-Utah) said at the
That storm claimed 117 lives and caused at least $65 billion in damage. Accurate forecasts made several days in advance of the storms landfall were widely credited for saving lives.

hearing. Because of mismanagement, billions in cost overruns, and technical hurdles, there has been a significant delay in launching the next generation of polar-orbiting satellites, known as the
Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS. According to Kicza, NOAA anticipates that the first JPSS satellite from the $11.3 billion program will be ready for launch in March of 2017, at the earliest.
However, that timeline is already past the design lifetime of the youngest polar-orbiting satellite currently in orbit, known as the Suomi-NPP satellite, and if there are any slips to the launch date,
it would make a data gap both more likely to occur and longer than it otherwise would be. Kicza said faster development of the first JPSS satellite, combined with improved performance from the
newest polar-orbiting satellite, known as the Suomi-NPP satellite, along with additional funds from Congress have reduced the likelihood of a gap in polar-satellite coverage. However, David A.
Powner, the director of information technology management issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), testified that the likelihood of a data gap has not been reduced. Im not
aware of the gap situation improving, Powner said. The GAO released two reports on Sept. 19 pertaining to NOAAs two main weather and climate satellite fleets. Both found that

has not adequately planned for what to do in the event that it experiences a partial loss of its fleet .

NOAA

Solar Flares 1AC

Solar flares are inevitable --- better forecasting is crucial to effectively adapt power grids to
geomagnetic storms
Stone, staff writer at Gizmodo, 15
[Maddie, staff writer at Gizmodo, Published 10-30-15, The US is Finally Heeding Warnings About a Monster Solar
Storm, http://gizmodo.com/the-us-is-finally-heeding-warnings-about-a-monster-sola-1739620903, accessed 6-2816//DJ]
if a massive solar storm were to strike the
Earth, the effects could be catastrophic. Think worldwide power and telecommunications outages, lasting weeks to
months. Everything that relies on electricity, from our computers to our refrigerators to our water supply, could break down. Frankly, space weather consultant John Kappenman told
Space weather scientists at the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration and NASA have warned for years that

Gizmodo last month, this could be one of the most severe natural disasters that the country, and major portions of the world, could face. Apocalypse preppers have been stocking their EMP

These two documents outline goals and

strategies for improved space weather modeling, forecasting, and response coordination. Ultimately, they represent a
roadmap toward a future where the unfortunate arrival of a giant solar storm doesnt spell the end of modern society.
Whats Space Weather and Why Do We Care? Space weather is a fairly broad term encompassing a bunch of stuff the Sun hurls our
way, including high-energy x-rays, magnetized plasma, and charged particles. All of these can interact with Earths magnetic field, causing
bunkers for years, but yesterday, the White House released the very first National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan.

geomagnetic disturbances that light up the northern and southern skies with dazzling auroras. Most of the time, these cosmic light shows are beautiful and harmless. Sometimes, however, things

when the Sun releases a large burst of plasma known as a coronal mass ejection (CME). Large CMEs are unusual,
CMEs cause geomagnetic storms that generate
tremendous electric currents in the upper atmosphere. Some of this current makes its way into the ground, where its
channeled by any and all conductive materials, including certain rocks, pipes, and electric cables. Currents from large geomagnetic
storms can ultimately feed into our grids, melting transformers at the heart of power distribution centers. Because
our power supply has become more aggregated and interconnected over the last decades, the effects of an outage at one distribution center could spread
far and wide, impacting millions of people. In the case of electric power grids, both the manner in which systems are operated and the accumulated design decisions
can get nasty, especially

and its even more unusual for our planet to line up directly in their path. But when that happens,

engineered into present-day networks around the world have tended to significantly enhance geomagnetic storm impacts, writes Kappenman in a report on the dangers of space weather. To
illustrate his point, Kappenman cites a geomagnetic storm that occurred across Earths northern hemisphere in March of 1989: This [storm] started a chain of power system disturbance events
that only 92 seconds later resulted in a complete collapse to the entire power grid in Quebec. The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts to the Quebec power grid allowed no time to even
assess what was happening to the power system, let alone provide any meaningful human intervention. Over the course of the next 24 hours, additional large disturbances propagated across the
continent, the only difference being that they extended much further south and came, at times, arguably close to toppling power systems from the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions of the

geomagnetic storms of this magnitude are rare, but itd be unwise to assume we wont see another
in the years to come. In fact, a CME roughly four times larger than the one that caused the 1989 Quebec outages
narrowly missed us in 2012. If it had hit, we would still be picking up the pieces, physicist Daniel Baker of the University of Colorado told
U.S. to the Midwest. Again,

NASA two years later. A report by the National Academies estimated that the cost of such an event could exceed 2 trillion dollarsthe economic equivalent of 20 Hurricane Katrinas. The Road
Forward Clearly, its high time we to start thinking about how to prepare for the possibility of a monster solar storm. The National Space Weather Action Plan released yesterday describes how
the US government will coordinate efforts on space weather forecasting, infrastructure preparation and education. Here are some highlights. Establishing the Godzilla Storm: On the science

the largest solar storm recorded on Earth was

a series of powerful CMEs that ignited the northern lights as far south as Cuba, causing global telegraph outages.
The Carrington Event has always been our benchmark for really big storms, but in recent years, observations of Sun-like stars beyond our solar system have shown that superflares
1,000 times larger than the Carrington Eventcan and do occur. In 2012, a study published in Nature estimated that such a flare could
strike the Earth every 800 to 5,000 years. Thats a pretty wide margin of uncertainty for such a potentially devastating event. Clearly, we need to get a
better handle on the upper size limit of our own Suns eruptions and the actual risk superflares pose . Monitoring Vulnerability
front, a key component of the White Houses new plan is figuring out just how big these suckers can get. To this day,
the 1859 Carrington Event,

on the Ground: While we know that large pulses of electric current pose a danger to power grids, experts dont agree on just how vulnerable our infrastructure is. The White House Action Plan
calls for a nationwide assessment of vulnerability that includes factors like the age and design of grid infrastructure and the underlying geology. The DOE has also been tasked with developing a
grid monitoring system that would display the status of power generation, transmission, and distribution systems during geomagnetic storms. Real-time monitoring tools like this could be used

A big aspect of our vulnerability to space weather is

the fact that we have almost no lead-time before a large storm strikes. If a CME is heading straight for us, our first
notice comes from the space weather monitoring satellites situated at the L1 Lagrange point a million miles in front of Earth.
At best, these satellites give us about an hours notice. Theres a lot of room to improve our forecasting, and it
starts with a better understanding of when and how large solar flares and CMEs occur. The White House Action Plan calls for
more research on solar dynamics. Just as we can use weather models to predict the onset of tropical storms , with better solar
models we might be able to forecast days, or even weeks in advance, when the Suns gearing up to punt a a
giant blob of plasma our way. Cooperation: Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of a large geomagnetic storm is that its
effects could be felt globally. This makes space weather unique among all natural disasters humans face, and it
underscores the need for international coordination. To that end, the White House Action Plan outlines a number of goals and targets, including 1) an
international meeting on the social and economic impacts of a large solar event, 2) multi-national acknowledgement of space weather as a global challenge, 3) facilitating openaccess to space weather data across agencies and countries, 4) developing international standards for solar storm
measurements and scales, and 5) developing a set of mutual-aid arrangements to facilitate response efforts
by grid operators who need to make fast decisions about when to shut things off. Improved Forecasting:

worldwide. The last thing we want is for a bunch of power-hungry humans to panic. Were all in this together, and itd be nice if we didnt devolve into a society of cannibalistic road
warriors overnight.

The impact is extinction

IBT 2011
(International Business Times, Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust Across Planet Earth, Forcing
Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns, 9-13,
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/213249/20110914/solar-flare-could-unleash-nuclear-holocaust-across-planet-earthforcing-hundreds-of-nuclear-power-pl.htm)
What happens when there's no electricity? Imagine

a world without electricity. Even for just a week. Imagine New York City
with no electricity, or Los Angeles, or Sao Paulo. Within 72 hours, most cities around the world will devolve into
total chaos, complete with looting, violent crime, and runaway fires. But that's not even the bad news. Even if all the
major cities of the world burned to the ground for some other reason, humanity could still recover because it has the
farmlands: the soils, the seeds, and the potential to recover, right? And yet the real crisis here stems from the
realization that once there is no power grid, all the nuclear power plants of the world suddenly go into "emergency
mode" and are forced to rely on their on-site emergency power backups to circulate coolants and prevent nuclear meltdowns
from occurring. And yet, as we've already established, these facilities typically have only a few hours of battery power available, followed by
perhaps a few days worth of diesel fuel to run their generators (or propane, in some cases). Did I also mention that half the people who work at
nuclear power facilities have no idea what they're doing in the first place? Most of the veterans who really know the facilities inside and out have
been forced into retirement due to reaching their lifetime limits of on-the-job radiation exposure, so most of the workers at nuclear facilities right
now are newbies who really have no clue what they're doing. There are 440 nuclear power plants operating across 30
countries around the world today. There are an additional 250 so-called "research reactors" in existence, making a total of roughly 700
nuclear reactors to be dealt with (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/i...). Now imagine the scenario: You've got a massive solar
flare that knocks out the world power grid and destroys the majority of the power grid transformers, thrusting the world
into darkness. Cities collapse into chaos and rioting, martial law is quickly declared (but it hardly matters), and every nation in the world is on
full emergency. But that doesn't solve the really big problem, which is that you've got 700 nuclear reactors that can't feed power into
the grid (because all the transformers are blown up) and yet simultaneously have to be fed a steady stream of emergency fuels
to run the generators the keep the coolant pumps functioning. How long does the coolant need to circulate in these facilities to cool
the nuclear fuel? Months. This is also the lesson of Fukushima: You can't cool nuclear fuel in mere hours or days. It takes months to bring
these nuclear facilities to a state of cold shutdown. And that means in order to avoid a multitude of Fukushima-style meltdowns

from occurring around the world, you need to truck diesel fuel, generator parts and nuclear plant workers to every
nuclear facility on the planet, ON TIME, every time, without fail, for months on end . Now remember, this must be
done in the middle of the total chaos breakdown of modern civilization, where there is no power , where law
enforcement and emergency services are totally overrun, where people are starving because food deliveries have been disrupted, and when
looting and violent crime runs rampant in the streets of every major city in the world. Somehow, despite all this, you have to run these diesel fuel
caravans to the nuclear power plants and keep the pumps running. Except there's a problem in all this, even if you assume you can somehow work
a logistical miracle and actually deliver the diesel fuel to the backup generators on time (which you probably can't). The problem is this: Where
do you get diesel fuel? Why refineries will be shut down, too from petroleum refineries. Most people don't realize it, but petroleum refineries run
on electricity. Without the power grid, the refineries don't produce a drop of diesel. With no diesel, there are no generators keeping the coolant
running in the nuclear power facilities. But wait, you say: Maybe we could just acquire diesel from all the gas stations in the world. Pump it out
of the ground, load it into trucks and use that to power the generators, right? Except there are other problems here: How do you pump all that fuel
without electricity? How do you acquire all the tires and spare parts needed to keep trucks running if there's no electricity to keep the supply
businesses running? How do you maintain a truck delivery infrastructure when the electrical infrastructure is totally wiped out? Some countries
might be able to pull it off with some degree of success. With military escorts and the total government control over all fuel supplies, a few
nations will be able to keep a few nuclear power facilities from melting down. But here's the real issue: There are 700 nuclear power facilities in
the world, remember? Let's suppose that in the aftermath of a massive solar flare, the nations of the world are somehow able to control half of
those facilities and nurse them into cold shutdown status. That still leaves roughly 350 nuclear facilities at risk. Now let's suppose half of those
are somehow luckily offline and not even functioning when the solar flare hits, so they need no special attention. This is a very optimistic
assumption, but that still leaves 175 nuclear power plants where all attempts fail. Let's be outrageously optimistic and suppose that a third of
those somehow don't go into a total meltdown by some miracle of God, or some bizarre twist in the laws of physics. So we're still left with 115
nuclear power plants that "go Chernobyl." Fukushima was one power plant. Imagine the devastation of 100+ nuclear power
plants, all going into meltdown all at once across the planet. It's not the loss of electricity that's the real problem; it's the

global tidal wave of invisible radiation that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil, irradiates everything
that breathes and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we know it today . Because if you
have 100 simultaneous global nuclear meltdowns, the tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly impossible
for years. That means no food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means a near-total collapse of the
human population on our planet. How many people can survive an entire year with no food from the farms? Not one in a hundred
people. Even beyond that, how many people can essentially live underground and be safe enough from the radiation that they can have viable
children and repopulate the planet? It's a very, very small fraction of the total population.

Oceans 1AC
Effective satellite data models are key to ocean ecosystem adaptation
McCauley, UC Santa Barbara marine biology professor, 2016
(Douglas, How Satellites and Big Data Can Help to Save the Oceans, Yale Environment 360,
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/how_satellites_and_big_data_can_help_to_save_the_oceans/2982
Yet a key question remains: Will

the new availability of sophisticated, satellite-based technologies, coupled with the

democratization of online data about the health of our environment, help ensure that these positive advancements
live up to their potential to protect the oceans? The first encouraging policy development is the explosive movement
by countries around the world to set up massive marine protected areas of unprecedented size . The biggest of these newly
proposed mega-marine protected areas, the Pitcairn Islands Marine Reserve, is three-and-a-half times larger than the United Kingdom, and more than 100,000 times
larger than the historical median size for an ocean protected area. The 19 mega-marine protected areas created or announced in the last six years would comprise an
area larger than all the protected ocean areas created previously. Several huge marine reserves currently being considered would add an additional 775,000 square
miles of ocean protection. The

second key development is that the United Nations is now drawing up a treaty that would, for
the first time, manage biodiversity across the high seas the region outside the 200-mile exclusive economic zones of individual nations. The
forthcoming United Nations high seas treaty would be setting new rules for a swath of the ocean 22 times larger than the United States. These new
regulations are focused on preserving marine biodiversity, establishing international ocean reserves, evaluating
processes for sharing marine genetic resources, and effectively carrying out environmental impact assessments.
These bold new policies suggest that decision-makers are finally committed to taking the kind of aggressive actions
needed to stay a step ahead of industrialization in the oceans something we failed to do when industrialization occurred on land. This
issue extends well beyond industrial-scale fishing. Recent innovation and technological development have now made it possible to take the industries of farming,
mining, power generation, and even data center management underwater. The scope and significance of this mass acceleration of new uses of the ocean cannot be
overstated. In 2014, for example, the world began eating more fish from farms than from the wild a marine reprise of our historic shift on land from hunting wild
food to farming. Mining claims have already been staked to roughly 400,000 square miles of deep-sea ecosystems. The campaigns to vastly expand marine protected
areas and significantly improve international governance of the oceans are extremely exciting. But both of these important policy movements have an Achilles heel:
Laws only matter if you can ensure that people actually follow them. These new policies cover such vast areas that they render boat, plane, and other traditional forms
of ocean observation as obsolete as sextants. In the absence of systems to watch their boundaries, large marine protected areas will be nothing more than huge paper
parks. Likewise, our efforts to control the exploitation of high-seas biodiversity via the new U.N. treaty will only be effective if we arent blind to what is happening in

high-tech solutions
may also hold the key to ensuring that a marine industrial revolution advances responsibly and intelligently .
These advances, when put in the hands not just of governments but also of researchers, citizen-scientists and environmental
groups, promise a new era in which we can actively observe and responsibly plan out whats going on in the worlds
seas. A vital solution lies in the use of satellite-interfacing sensors and data processing tools that are beginning to allow us to watch how ships use the oceans as
this large and distant part of the ocean. But just as technological innovation is fueling a rapid acceleration of development in the ocean,

easily as we track Uber taxis cruising around a city. Like airplanes, more and more ships now carry sensors that publicly transmit their position so they dont crash into
each other.

We can make use of these same streams of safety data to detect where industrial fishing is concentrated, to
watch as seabed mining exploration begins, and to observe how cargo ships overlap with whale migration pathways.
Instead of the oceans being a black hole of data, our new challenge is figuring out ways to intelligently and efficiently sift through
the billions of data points now pouring in. Fortunately, smart new algorithms can help pick out specific kinds of vessel
behavior from this sea of big data. Ships leave unique behavioral fingerprints. For example, purse seine fishing boats make circles around fish schools
when setting their nets, while long-line fishing boats travel linearly up and back along the gear they set. In a recent report in the journal Science, colleagues at the nonprofit Global Fishing Watch and I monitored progress as the nation of Kiribati closed a section of its ocean the size of California to fishing. After six months of
observation, we happily saw that all vessels, save one, left to fish elsewhere. Our group also mapped out the activity of purse seine fishing boats on the high seas of
the Pacific generating the first publicly accessible view of where fishing activity occurs in the very region that the UN high seas convention may consider setting
up international protected areas. A key

question ahead is whether governments will realize the value of this new data and act
on calls from the scientific community to require that more vessels carry these observation sensors and use them
properly. We estimate that approximately 70 percent of all large fishing vessels worldwide are already equipped with these publicly accessible tracking systems.
Some captains, unfortunately, misuse the tool by turning it off after leaving port or failing to enter proper vessel identification information into the system. All such

noncompliance issues are readily detectable by big data processing. If political will can be mustered to close these
loopholes, these observation technologies could shed an immense amount of light on our now-dark oceans .
Orbiting in space alongside these ship-tracking satellites is another rapidly growing fleet of nanosatellites that
constantly take high-resolution pictures of the earth. This technology promises to be an important additional piece in the ocean-observation
puzzle. The goal of the groups tending to these flocks of tiny electronic eyes is to be able to take a high-resolution
snapshot of the entire earth, every day. These new imaging satellites may soon allow marine ecologists, ocean
conservation groups, and marine park managers to begin to search in near real-time for ships in protected areas , to
monitor weekly (even daily) losses of coastal mangrove forests, and to document abuses to coral reefs, such as dredging.
With foresight, the intelligence derived from the vessel tracking systems may eventually be interlinked with these imaging satellites to enable them to function like
space-based red light cameras that snap pictures of law breaking at sea as it happens.

Extinction- best science

Rogers et al., Oxford conservation biology professor, 2011
(Alex, Implementing the Global State of the Oceans Report, June,
http://www.stateoftheocean.org/pdfs/ipso_report_051208web.pdf)
Every stretch of sea and ocean on the planet serves as part of the wider, global ocean. This network of marine life is linked by the great ocean
conveyor, which comprises the currents that work together to form one of the key operating systems of our planet what
scientists describe as the earth System and which in turn works to keep the planet habitable. The ocean creates more than
half our oxygen; provides vital sources of protein, energy and minerals; drives weather systems and natural flows of energy
and nutrients around the world; moderates the climate; modulates the chemical composition of the atmosphere; and transports water
masses many times greater than all the rivers on land combined. Yet at the earth System level the ocean is poorly understood and rarely
considered. Without a better understanding we cannot understand the true value of ocean services to humankind nor the full consequences of
permitting widespread degradation to our oceans health. On the brink As with terrestrial ecosystems, humankind has been expending the natural
capitol of the ocean with little restraint. Although concealed beneath the waves, the evidence of wholesale degradation and destruction
of the marine realm is clear, made manifest by the collapse of entire fisheries and the growth of deoxygenated dead zones,
for example. The cumulative result of our actions is a serial decline in the oceans health and resilience; it is becoming
demonstrably less able to survive the pressures exerted upon it, and this will become even more evident as the added pressures of
climate change exacerbate the situation. Without significant changes in the policies that influence human interactions with the
marine environment, the current rate of ecosystem change and collapse will accelerate and direct consequences will be felt
by all societies. Without decisive and effective action, no region or country will be immune from the socioeconomic upheaval and
environmental catastrophe that will take place possibly with the span of the current generation and certainl by the end of the century. It is
likely to be a disaster that challenges human civilisation. A narrow window Humankind faces an immediate and
pressing choice between exerting ecological restraint and allowing global ecological catastrophe. The belief among
scientists is that the window of opportunity to take action is narrow. There is little time left in which we can still act to prevent
irreversible, catastrophic changes to marine ecosystems as we see them today. Failure to do so will cause such large-scale changes to
the ocean, and to the overall planetary system it supports, that we may soon find ourselves without the natural capital
and ecosystem services necessary to maintain sustainable economies and societies as we know them, even in affluent
countries. New scientific methods are emerging that enable us to understand the ocean in ways we have never done
before, from individual ecosystems to planet-wide functions and services. Critically, we can now undertake an entire
earth System assessment of the state of the ocean and the impact of individual activities or policy decisions upon it. We are able to
open up a new understanding of how humankind impacts on the ocean, how the stresses exerted upon it can be alleviated
to restore ocean health, and the consequences of a failure to do so.

Disease 1AC
Accurate earth monitoring is key to predict and prevent pandemics
Harmon, Scientific American contributing editor, 2009
(Katherine, Satellites Used to Predict Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 8-24,
www.scientificamerican.com/article/satellites-predict-infectious-disease/)
Satellites Used to Predict Infectious Disease Outbreaks From avian flu to cholera, infectious diseases may not be able to hide for long.
Some researchers have their sights trained on predicting their every move with detailed satellite data Rather than searching for weird weather or
enemy missiles, some satellites are helping researchers to trackand predictthe spread of deadly diseases. With the pandemic
spread of H1N1 swine flu and the continued advance of the H5N1 avian flu, scientists are anxious to better predict the spread of
infectious diseases and are looking for new tools wherever they might beeven if that's hundreds of miles in the sky. "Ideally we
could predict conditions that would result in some of these major outbreaks of cholera, malaria, even avian flu," says Tim Ford of the University
of New England in Biddeford, Maine. Ford and a group of experts have co-authored a perspective paper (pdf), due out next month in Emerging
Infectious Diseases, that proposes making use of environmental datatracked via satelliteto predict disease outbreaks. "As climate changes,
and even with many of our weather patterns, [it] directly affects the distribution of disease," Ford says. Hantavirus, the pulmonary
disease spread by rodents, for example, has been linked to changes in precipitation. With more rainfall, vegetation increases, which then fuels
rodent populations. And pinpointing an area as relevant conditions emergebefore an outbreak startsbuys precious
time to spread public health messages. Satellite imaging can also help warn of cholera outbreaks, which are predicted to
worsen with climate change. The satellites provide information about water surface temperatures, which are key to the spread
of this waterborne disease. One study found that giving people simple preventative instructions, such as filtering water through a
sari cloth, reduced cholera-related deaths by an estimated 50 percent in some areas. Remote data have already been used to
map the avian flu in Asia. Xiangming Xiao, associate director of the University of Oklahoma's Center for Spatial Analysis in Norman, has
been tracking likely outbreaks of this highly pathogenic flu by looking for key habitat and weather changes. The domestic duck
determined to be the main carrier of the diseaseis a common inhabitant of Southeast Asia's rice paddies, and the movement of migratory
birdsa secondary carriercould be predicted based on temperatures. So using both land-use and temperature information from
satellites, Xiao and his team could track the spread of the flu by estimating where the birds would be. If visual data from satellites is
combined with information from radar and LiDAR, (light detecting and ranging, which provides laser-measured data about 3-D contours), Xiao
explains, researchers can really hone prediction of some diseases down to a tree line. "You can look at the transition of pasture grassland to
forests," he says, habitats which determine the range of deer. "And this has very important implications for tick-borne diseases, like Lyme
disease." Much of the satellite work, however, still relies on clear skies. And all of it has been dependent on quality information
from willing providers, such as NASA and its Earth Observing System, the availability of which researchers hope will continue in the future.

Extinction
Keating, Foreign Policy web editor, 2009
(Joshua, The End of the World, 11-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the_end_of_the_world?
page=full)
How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more
off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly
3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today
spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola
virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a
global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact. How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved
since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and

as the worlds population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to
previously unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV.
Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

Ag 1AC
Earth monitoring is key to ag
GEOSYS 2016
(Agriculture technology company, Why Use Satellite Data?, www.geosys.com/experience/why-use-satellite-datafrom-geosys/)
The agricultural sector is facing numerous challenges over the next few decades: a growing population, a finite amount of
arable land, limited water and a changing climate. Meeting these challenges will require a new agricultural revolution, one based
on leading-edge technology that maximizes yield and minimizes risk. Archive and In-Season Imagery While no one can predict the future,
detailed knowledge of past seasons can help evaluate the most likely scenarios for each season depending on weather patterns. GEOSYS tools
layer two decades of archived imagery with current conditions to help assess yield trends and other outcomes. Measuring Plant Health There are
many factors affecting yield and many ways to measure them, but the best information comes from the plants themselves think of
them as tens of thousands of sensors per hectare. GEOSYS uses satellite imagery from several sources to give you an accurate and

unbiased view of crops potential by analyzing sun light reflectance. Higher potential crops absorb more of some light wavelengths and
reflect more light from other wavelengths. GEOSYS uses reflectance to calculate crops health indices like NDVI (normalized
differentiation vegetation Index), one of the many layers of data in our proprietary products and the custom solutions we create for our clients.
Weather data GEOSYS measures the status of the vegetative parts of the crop in the context of its environment, i.e., soil and climate. We add
specific weather indicators to support further refinement of yield trend analysis. For instance, crops are stressed by high temperatures at certain
growth stages, with an impact on the reproductive part of the plants but not on the vegetative parts. Thus it is vital to monitor weather
conditions in addition to the Crops development measurement. GEOSYS can integrate the best quality weather data from various
providers, including private weather stations.

Extinction
Lugar, Indiana senator, 2000
(Richard, http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/143/lugar.html)
In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the
long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy
in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment , but also world peace and

security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often
bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global
instability and the proliferation of [WMDs] weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to
grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond
current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of
living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world
population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the
West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears,

people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves.
The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe . Productivity revolution To meet
the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times
more food on the land we have. Thats a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of
corn per hectare typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes
per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, its been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved
machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 on our farm back then, my dad produced
2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results
again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that
money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way
we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The
United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may

play a decisive humanitarian role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

US-China Coop Key

US-Sino Cooperation K2 ending dangerously impaired satellites
Konkel, editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group, 2013
[Frank, September 5, 2013, Today's weather forecast, brought to you by China?, FCW,
https://fcw.com/articles/2013/09/05/noaa-satellite-gap-china-solution.aspx, accessed 6-28-2016, ZT]
Using data from Chinese satellites might be the closest thing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
has to a "silver bullet" fix for a potential gap in polar-orbiting weather satellite coverage that could dangerously
impair U.S. forecasts, a NOAA-commissioned study says. But involving China in a U.S. satellite program could run into both practical and
political difficulties, and a key appropriator said he has "very serious concerns" about any such plan. The NOAA study examined 44 potential
solutions to an expected gap that could occur as early as 2014 in weather satellite coverage between NOAA's existing polarorbiting satellites and its next-generation $13 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), which is not scheduled to launch its first satellite -JPSS-1 -- until 2017. The gap could have a significant effect on weather forecasts produced by U.S. and
European weather models, and has national security implications because the Defense Department, which has
its own aging polar-orbiting satellite program, currently relies partially on data from NOAA's polar-orbiting
satellites to position its spy satellites. FCW obtained a copy of the study, titled "JPSS Gap Mitigation Analysis of Alternatives," which was completed
by Colorado-based Riverside Technology and Virginia-based Integrity Applications in February but not released publicly. The firms produced a number of
recommendations for NOAA to consider as the agency charts a mitigation plan for its satellite program, which will be one of the talking points as officials from
NOAA and the Government Accountability Office testify before the House Science, Space and Technology Committee on Sept. 19. NOAA declined

to
comment on the specifics of the report. An agency official told FCW that "based on security concerns, NOAA believes that this would
be a 'whole of government' decision, possibly involving the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the
U.S. Congress. It would not be solely a NOAA decision." The Riverside study itself, however, clearly suggests that
using Chinese satellite data could be the best option. "The Riverside team views this idea as potentially the sole
silver bullet among the ideas, one that would require a partnership with the Chinese to allow the use of the Feng Yun
3 data," the study said. "The idea is most attractive because the satellites provide nominally the same information and
will reside in approximately the same orbit as will JPSS-1, and new satellites will be launched well before the projected gap in NOAA polar satellite coverage." Polarorbiting satellites orbit 500 miles above the Earth's surface and provide measurements such as a storm's direction, speed and intensity. U.S. and European weather
models rely on data from three such satellite programs to produce medium-range weather forecasts. Data is shared through the World Meteorological Organization.
Data from the afternoon orbit of NOAA's polar-orbiting satellites is pooled with data collected during the mid-morning orbit of the European Organization for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites' (EUMETSTAT's) Metop satellite and the morning orbit of a satellite operated by the Air Force's Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program. This

kind of data proved vital during the early forecast of Hurricane Sandy, which provided
ample warning for East Coast residents to evacuate before the storm veered toward land. According to the Riverside
study, the China Meteorological Administration operates two Feng Yun-3 series satellites -- FY-3A and FY-3B -- with sensors comparable to NOAA's existing polarorbiting satellites. In 2013 and 2014, the Chinese satellites FY-3C and FY-3D will become operational with sensors comparable in quality to NOAA's next-generation
JPSS. The study indicates the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), which provides forecast data to the European National Weather
Service, already receives and monitors data from the Chinese FY-3A and -3B satellites, having developed algorithms that can assimilate the data into research models .

The Chinese data is not as good as that from the afternoon orbit of NOAA's polar-orbiting satellites, but if NOAA's
satellites fail, the ECMWF indicated it would use data from the Chinese. "(The ECMWF) are not assimilating the FY-3 data in their
operational models now, but have stated they would use the data during an afternoon orbit data gap ," the study said. "While Chinese
polar satellite data have been available, the U.S. has not used the data for various reasons. However, these data have the potential to virtually mitigate in full any
degradation of NWS weather services caused by a gap in U.S. polar-orbiting satellites."

Yes Solar Flares

Solar flares are coming --- and they risk disaster
FHE, scientists and professionals, 14
[FHE, a group of scientist and other professionals, published 2014, Future Human Extinction: Natural Disasters
Asteroid impact The Future of Human Evolution, http://futurehumanevolution.com/future-human-extinctionrisks/future-human-extinction-natural-disasters, accessed 11-3-14//DJ]
Giant Solar Flares Solar flares- more properly known as coronal mass ejections- are enormous magnetic outbursts on the sun that
bombard Earth with a torrent of high-speed subatomic particles. Earths atmosphere and magnetic field negate the potentially
lethal effects of ordinary flares. But while looking through old astronomical records, Bradley Schaefer of Yale University found evidence that
some perfectly normal-looking, sunlike stars can brighten briefly by up to a factor of 20. Schaefer believes these stellar flickers are caused by
superflares, millions of times more powerful than their common cousins. Within a few hours, a superflare on the sun could fry
Earth and begin disintegrating the ozone layer (see #2). Future Human Extinction by Giant Solar Flare Although there is persuasive
evidence that our sun doesnt engage in such excess, scientists dont know why superflares happen at all, or whether our sun
could exhibit milder but still disruptive behavior. And while too much solar activity could be deadly, too little of it is problematic as
well. Sallie Baliunas at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics says many solar-type stars pass through extended quiescent periods,
during which they become nearly 1 percent dimmer. That might not sound like much, but a similar downturn in the sun could send us

into another ice age. Baliunas cites evidence that decreased solar activity contributed to 17 of the 19 major cold
episodes on Earth in the last 10,000 years. Reversal of Earths Magnetic Field Every few hundred thousand years Earths
magnetic field dwindles almost to nothing for perhaps a century, then gradually reappears with the north and south
poles flipped. The last such reversal was 780,000 years ago, so we may be overdue. Worse, the strength of our magnetic field has decreased
about 5 percent in the past century. Why worry in an age when GPS has made compasses obsolete? Well, the magnetic field deflects
particle storms and cosmic rays from the sun, as well as even more energetic subatomic particles from deep space.
Without magnetic protection, these particles would strike Earths atmosphere, eroding the already beleaguered ozone
layer (see #5). Also, many creatures navigate by magnetic reckoning. A magnetic reversal might cause serious ecological mischief. One big
caveat: There are no identifiable fossil effects from previous flips, says Sten Odenwald of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. This is
most curious. Still, a disaster that kills a quarter of the population, like the Black Plague in Europe, would hardly register as a blip in fossil
records

ISS Solvency

Key to Space Coop/Projects

The plan solves engaging China in space through the International Space Station spills
over to enhance broader space cooperation and reverses the dangerous perception of a
space arms race
David, National Commission on Space former director of research, 2015
(Leonard, US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?, 6-16,
http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html)
There's a growing debate over whether China and the United States should cooperate in space , and the dialogue now
appears to focus on how to create an "open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese astronauts to make trips to the
International Space Station (ISS). Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House, but progress seems stymied by Washington,
D.C., politics. Specifically at question is how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination
with China regarding space. Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own

It will
take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, said John Logsdon, professor
emeritus of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. " The first step is the
White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation
revoked," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and
other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight." Logsdon said the U.S.Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar initiative
bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st
century superpowers to work together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third
space station in the 2020s. Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China collaboration in space. Presidential leadership

country to launch its citizens into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years
ago, Logsdon noted. "China

has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the converse," Logsdon

said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political, not technical."
Complicated relationship The U.S. and China have a complex relationship, said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not
like the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told
Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish ." Smith pointed out that, as far
as space cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the Richard
Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under then-President Jimmy Carter after
the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration, small programs again, mostly in the biomedical
area were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership waited
for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds
of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible,"
Smith added. The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation, she said. "The door is not completely shut." A U.S.-China space race? " It

is in the
interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy
or the Department of Defense. "The

United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the
U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space partnerships ,"
Johnson-Freese said. Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part, has spurred China to build its
own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is
deorbited." [China's Space Station Plans in Photos] Cooperation stonewalled Apollo-Soyuz demonstrated that space can be a venue to build
cooperation and trust during difficult political times, when they are most needed, and without dangerous technology
transferal, Johnson-Freese said. "However, that demonstration has gone unheeded regarding China," she noted. Johnson-Freese said the
reasoning given by those who have stonewalled cooperation in space with the Chinese "often has little to do with
space or national security." Rather, "space is merely a token for complaints about China in other areas, such as human rights," she said. Other
countries are eager to work with China in space, Johnson-Freese said, and "the U.S. merely appears petulant" in its
refusal to engage in any meaningful way with China in space.

Inviting China to the ISS solves broader space cooperation --- continued Chinese exclusion
destroys international space partnerships
Bradley, Washington University MA candidate, 2013
(Mack The Space to Lead, August, https://ucollege.wustl.edu/files/ucollege/imce/iap.bradley.thesis.pdf)
cooperation in space between
the ISS partners is well-established even if other aspects of their relationships are chillier . But what is for some the
After 40 years of intense, if peaceful, conflict, the US and Russia quickly came together on the ISS since it advanced the interests of both. Today,

obvious step of including China in the ISS family is firmly off the table, at least for the moment. Not only has America opposed
Chinese involvement in the ISS, but thanks to US Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va) its actually against the law for NASA to even
cooperate with the Chinese space agency. In a 2012 meeting in Quebec City, Canada, the ISS partners discussed Chinese participation, with ESA director general
Jean-Jacques Dordain voicing support for some level of cooperation with China. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden reminded his international 19 colleagues that his agency could not support
Chinese participation in the station, but that they should pursue other forms of cooperation with China. Despite Boldens nearly heroic efforts to thread the diplomatic needle, press reports of the

US
efforts to ice China out of the ISS, and to outlaw even the smallest cooperation with an emerging and important
space power are painfully short-sighted. A bitterly Cold War didnt stop US/Russian cooperation, as early as the 1970s. The difference in American attitudes in the case
meeting prompted an angry letter from Rep. Wolf. Wolf told Bolden that he should make clear that the U.S. will not accept Chinese participation in any stationrelated activities.34

of the station relates to the fact that the United States won the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Russia was exhausted, a spent force that would take years to rebuild and the US was in a position of
strength. China on the other hand is rising rapidly, economically, militarily and in terms of space. Concerns about technology transfer to, or technology theft by, China are rife in the US. China
didnt help themselves either in their efforts to be welcomed into the ISS community. In 2007, China's Peoples Liberation Army destroyed a defunct Chinese Fengyun-1C weather satellite with a
ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. This intentional explosion in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) was the largest debris-generating event in the history of spaceflight, creating 2,317 pieces large
enough to track, and perhaps as many as 35,000 smaller pieces according to a 2007 report by NASAs Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO).35 This unannounced ASAT test was grossly
irresponsible, making a far more dangerous environment in LEO for all spacefaring nations, and it is hard to square with the principles of the OST, to which China is a signatory. A month after
Fengyun, the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee adopted a set of seven guidelines to slow the growth of orbital debris, including a call to avoid the intentional destruction of any
orbiting spacecraft.36 Even so, the United States entered into Apollo-Soyuz in the afterglow of the moon landings. It brought Russia into the ISS partnership from a position of strength vis-a-vis

Chinas rise in terms of space

capabilities and aspirations will certainly continue. Barring some other sort of foolish and destructive behavior like Fengyun, its reasonable to assume that
Chinas international standing as a spacefaring power will continue to grow in tandem with its capabilities .20 Furthermore,
while an absolute and persistent decline in Americas space capabilities, prestige and international leadership are by
no means certain, a relative decline almost certainly is. As Dr. Paul Kaminski says, where the US once had a virtual monopoly, now the list of
spacefaring countries continues to grow. Dr. Kaminski is chairman of the Defense Science Board, a US Air Force Colonel (Ret.), former Under Secretary of Defense for
its former Cold War rival. The overall competition to come between the United States and China is too broad for the purposes of this paper, but

Acquisition and Technology, former official in the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force Systems Command and Director for Low Observables Technology who oversaw the
development of stealth technology in platforms such as the F-117 Nighthawk (popularly, and inaccurately, known as the Stealth Fighter) and the B-2 Spirit (Stealth Bomber). It was a
monopoly that we could offer to share in with key allies so it had a big influence on their willingness and interest in cooperating with us on national security policy. But now, Kaminski says,

some aspects of space are becoming more of a commodity. There are other countries now
launching their own reconnaissance satellites, launching their own communications satellites, buying communications as
a commodity, so our (space) policy and capabilities, while still very important, have a less sharp influence.36A Some new space powers, like
China, will be large, significant players whether the United States likes it or not. It would be wise therefore for the US to engage with China from
a position of relative strength. It is simply unrealistic to believe that the rest of the world will continue to ostracize
Chinas space program simply because it suits American purposes. Right now, the most obvious point of contention
is Chinas exclusion from the ISS partnership. But once the ISS is de-orbited, either in 2020 or sometime thereafter, the world will
move on to the next project, all of the options for which lend themselves to a broad international partnership. If
the US continues to snub China now, it will instead find itself having to create a working relationship with
China in the future when US power and influence are likely to be relatively diminished . The technology transfer concerns
among US policymakers go far beyond space, and China will accomplish its goals in space with or without technology transfer that may
result from US engagement, and indeed which may result whether or not the US engages China.37 Integrating China into a robust international
partnership, the ISS, of which the US was the principal creator and remains a21 strong leader despite the gap in US manned spaceflight seems far preferable to the
US entering a future partnership which could well be of Chinese design.
things are changing because

Solves Relations
International ISS cooperation with China key to US soft power, US-China resilient
cooperation, and stopping ISS shut-down
Sabathier, CSIS senior associate, 2006
(Vincent, The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration,
http://web.mit.edu/adamross/www/BRONIATOWSKI_ISU07.pdf)
International cooperation in space exploration has the potential to provide significant benefits to all participants ,
particularly if managed well. Benefits in the form of monetary efficiency, programmatic and political sustainability, and workforce stability will
accrue to those partners who choose to approach space exploration as a mutually beneficial endeavor. Furthermore, international cooperation
must be explicitly incorporated as an aspect, and goal, of a modern space exploration program to enable coordination prior to the construction of
new hardware. Such coordination can happen on both the government and industry levels and allows for advance planning and standardization
that can enhance the strategic use of redundancy through interoperability. Finally, the promotion of a set of industrial standards for cooperation in
space exploration will enable the exercise of leadership in future stages of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). If the vision is to succeed, the

United States, in particular, must engage its partners by reaffirming and strengthening its commitment to the
International Space Station (ISS) to maintain its diplomatic credibility for future exploration endeavors.
International cooperation must be an integral part of the way in which the United States, and all space-faring power s,
approach space exploration. Management of this cooperation up-front can have high payoffs in terms of both political and programmatic
sustainability, diplomatic benefits, and ultimately, the development of free-market forces in space. The first step toward making the most of
international cooperation in space exploration is the completion and utilization of the ISS. The ISS program is not complete. Therefore,
the programs utility has not yet been fully realized. To the extent that a completed ISS is beneficial, the program will deliver positive utility.
Nevertheless, for each passing year that these benefits are delayed, their perceived probability of delivering value is decreased, concomitantly
decreasing their expected utility. Given that the ISS program is significantly over budget, 10 years behind schedule, and far from complete, we
may expect that the practical benefits of ISS utilization may not be a major factor in current utility calculations. Similarly, many space exploration
endeavors promise practical benefits that can only be delivered on time scales that are significantly longer than what is required to make an
adequate business case. As such, we may assume that the purely economic benefits of space exploration are not the primary driver for exploration
in the short term. Rather, space exploration is an activity that delivers immediate value in noneconomic areas, while allowing for longer-term
practical and economic benefits. As will be demonstrated below, each of these benefits can be strengthened through correctly managed
international cooperation. Why Do Nations Choose to Cooperate in Space Exploration? The case for international cooperation varies between
nations, depending on their needs. For example, most nations lack the budgetary resources to carry out their space exploration goals alone. As
such, international cooperation is a must for these nations. The United States, on the other hand, nominally possesses the budgetary resources to
carry out the VSE but is under a presidential directive to engage in international cooperation for diplomatic reasons. If cooperation between
nations is to be successful, each nation must have an incentive to cooperate (i.e., each nation must derive positive utility from the partnership).
The remainder of this section presents four reasons why nations might choose to cooperate in space exploration. As such, international
cooperation can occur where these nations possess complementary needs. Reason #1: International Cooperation Saves Money It is common
knowledge that international cooperation in space exploration has the potential to reduce a partners costs by
spreading the burden to other nations. Although additional overhead costs increase the overall cost of any international cooperative
endeavor, these costs are spread among partners. As per-partner cost decreases, per-partner utility increases. Space exploration has proven
to be an expensive activity. Indeed, the more that any given administration and Congress must spend to maintain
and/or expand the functionality of a program like the ISS, the less utility will be derived. Therefore, a nation will have
an incentive to engage in international cooperation when doing so can reduce that nations costs. This is particularly true
for nations whose space exploration budget is insufficient to execute their space exploration goals. Aside from the United States, and possibly
China, international cooperation is necessary for all other space-faring nations simply due to the large costs involved. Reason #2: International
Cooperation Generates Diplomatic Prestige The ISS program, along with most international civil space endeavors, carries with it an
element of diplomatic cachet and control. The participation of other nations in the program increases the diplomatic
influence of participating nations and, therefore, the diplomatic utility derived from cooperation. In general, the more
countries participate, the higher will be the utility. Nevertheless, not all countries are equal, and their individual utility value depends on world
politics. For example, the utility of having Russia join the ISS program increased significantly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when
relations with a new Russia were at the forefront of United States foreign policy. To the extent that a symbol of cooperation with a given nation is
valuable, utility will be delivered. As such, Indian participation in joint space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good U.S.Indian relations. This would simultaneously increase Indian prestige by demonstrating their technological prowess. Similarly, Chinese

participation in joint space exploration would signal growing cooperation between the two nations. The use of
the ISS for a partnership between either of these nations would drastically increase its utility to those who
support friendly relations. On the other hand, those who oppose closer U.S. relations with India or China are likely to oppose their
entrance into the ISS program or into any other joint space exploration program. These diplomatic incentives may come at a cost for
the cooperating nations; for example, China would likely have to make concessions in the form of more stringent
technology export controls and/or better observance of human rights standards. If space exploration is successfully
used as a diplomatic tool to exert such soft power, its utility increases in proportion to the degree that it is successful in implementing a
policymakers agenda. Similarly, the departure of a particular nation (or, if the United States chooses to cease participating,

of all nations) will reduce U.S. utility to the extent that the aggregate symbol of cooperation is valued. Reason #3:
International Cooperation Increases Political Sustainability International cooperation is valuable to a given nation in that it
tends to increase political sustainability. Within the United States, a program is made safer from cancellation to the extent that Congress
and the administration are not willing to break international agreements. Indeed, the integration of Russia into the ISS program may
well have saved the program from cancellation (consider that the year before Russia was introduced as a partner, the ISS was saved
by one vote in Congress). Once cooperation has commenced, canceling a program becomes inconsistent with political
sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic benefits and the negative effects on
reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to
maintain the system. In the case of the ISS, international cooperation does provide a rationale for sustaining the
program, because canceling the program would result in a net loss in utility. The corollary to this is that there is a high cost to
be paid by any nation that chooses to unilaterally withdraw from an existing cooperative endeavor. This cost comes in the form of damage to the
departing nations reputation or credibility. In general, any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and
therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This tends to sabotage the possibility of future
cooperation. As such, there is a long-term benefit to maintaining cooperation, even when the immediate cost may
seem to call for terminating it. If cooperation has never occurred (as is the case between China and the United States), the
advent of cooperation is a significant event, likely delivering a lot of diplomatic utility. On the other hand, if cooperation
is the norm (as is the case between Canada and the United States), it is to be expected. The diplomatic utility of maintaining
this cooperation is often not recognized. Nevertheless, the diplomatic utility cost of terminating this
cooperation is large, because it would alienate a key ally. If it were necessary to cease cooperation, a mutual choice to do so
would likely mitigate many of the negative reputation effects, because there would be no unilateral actor to whom one could assign blame.
Indeed, if both parties choose to cease cooperating simultaneously, this would mitigate the negative-reputation effectrather, there would be a
mutual divorce. Such a mutual decision would be significantly more tenable, in a diplomatic sense, because each party might outline a set of
grievances and conditions for the termination of cooperation. Furthermore, since the agreement would be terminated in a spirit of mutual
understanding, the possibility of future beneficial cooperation would be more likely. If the ISS were unilaterally terminated, the result

would be a blow to the credibility of the United States, concomitant with the loss of trust of the foreign partners. A
U.S. withdrawal could send the message that the purpose of the program is simply to divert resources from other
nations space goals in order to prevent competition. This, in turn, would have a profoundly negative effect on any
future U.S. leadership in space exploration. If possible, international cooperation must be terminated in such a way as to avoid
portraying the terminating nations actions as unreliable, disrespectful, or malicious. As such, if the ISS is to be terminated, such a
termination should be phrased as a joint decision made among all partners, in such a way as to leave open the
possibility of future cooperation.

Solves Space Mil

ISS cooperation is key --- deters further ASAT testing and solves global stability---solves
space mill
Resslerk USAF major, 2009
[Aaron, ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION, April, online pdf, DB]
On January 11, 2007, China successfully executed a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) test/demonstration by destroying one of its
aging weather satellites. This event captured the attention of the world, especially the U.S. It is believed that China is pursuing a host of
counterspace capabilities but the question remains as to why. There are many possible reasons for Chinas pursuit of counterspace
capabilities, with one of the more likely being a means to gain an advantage when facing a dominant conventional military force. Whatever
Chinas motivation is, it is important for the U.S. to take action to deter China from further ASAT operations that could
possibly harm satellite systems on orbit. It is the intent of this research to propose the idea of U.S.-China space cooperation in
order to deter the PRC from potentially harmful ASAT operations. This is especially important given the current lack
of dialogue between these two nations with regard to space issues. The respective space policies of the U.S. and China show that
each nation is open to space cooperation, and both currently engage in international space cooperative efforts. U.S.-China space

cooperation can provide benefits to both nations and ultimately provide greater transparency and trust with regard to
each nations space activities. Acquiring this transparency and trust through cooperation could be an ideal solution
in deterring China from further harmful ASAT operations.
The ISS has proven to be the most successful space cooperation program to date for NASA . International cooperation for
this venture includes the U.S. (NASA), the Russian Federal Space Agency, the Canadian Space Agency, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and
the ESA which includes the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK.80 Hosting 19 research facilities, the ISS gives international partners the ability to conduct research and
scientific experiments in the low gravity environments of Earths orbit. This research, along with men and women living in and adapting to the
space environment, will provide the foundation for future missions to the Moon and Mars.81
U.S.-China Space Cooperation
Both China and the U.S. are open to international space cooperation, as noted in their respective policy documents on space and
current cooperative programs. History has shown that both China and U.S. have gained from space cooperation, which

could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations.
Benefits. While possibly deterring Chinese ASAT operations, this deterrence would be a secondary effect (or
benefit for that matter) of successful U.S.-China space cooperation. In order for this cooperation to take place, the benefits will
have to outweigh the challenges (some which will likely be viewed as risks) for both nations.
The first benefit of cooperation would be improved transparency.82 Secrecy of Chinas space program has led to a
suspicious outlook by many critics of this program. Space cooperation between the two countries could be based on
regular meetings which could help the two nations understand each others intentions more clearly.83 With China as
a partner, the U.S. would have better visibility and communication with the CNSA concerning Chinas space
activities, and the same would hold true for China. Reviewing Chinas White Paper on its space policy and trying to make sense of its
counterspace capabilities after the fact is the wrong approach. If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they
would more easily and directly understand Chinas space activities and directions.84
Another benefit mentioned earlier is cost savings, which would be attractive for both nations. For most countries, budgets for

space are insufficient or limited to the point where they depend on international space cooperation to meet their
goals.85 Exceptions to this in some degree are Russia, the U.S. and China, as all have achieved their own manned space programs. President
Bushs Vision for Space Exploration announcement in 2004 called for redirecting NASAs human exploration program from low Earth orbit to
the Moon, Mars, and worlds beyond.86 The timeframe specified in this announcement for the return to the moon was between 2015-2020,
carrying a price tag of $104 billion.87 China too has ambitions for manned missions to moon, so spreading the cost could

prove beneficial to both nations.

Increasing U.S. options with regard to manned spacelift could be a benefit in U.S. cooperation with China and is
something the U.S. should consider for increased safety and logistics. History has shown that the U.S. was fortunate to have the
cooperative programs it had with Russia when the shuttle fleet was grounded following the Columbia accident of 2003. If China were to
become both a U.S. and ISS partner, the U.S. would eventually (assuming continued Shenzhou success) have another
option besides Russia as a backup to deliver astronauts and supplies to the ISS .88
Global stability is another possible benefit stemming from U.S.-China space cooperation.89 Both China and the USA are
important countries in global politics, economics, and space activity. 90 Maintaining a healthy relationship between these two
countries has positive global impacts.

No ISS tech transfer, but ISS cooperation solves tension de-escalation empirics prove

Kluger, Time Editor at Large, 15

[Jeffery, 5/29, The Silly Reason the Chinese Arent Allowed on the Space Station, Time,
http://time.com/3901419/space-station-no-chinese/, DB]
Geopolitics can be childs playliterally. How else would you describe the did-not! did-too! brawl that can result when one country
crosses another countrys invisible line in the playroom that is the South China Sea? How else would you describe the G-8 canceling its playdate
in Sochi after Russia climbed over the fence to Ukraines yard? Something similar is true of the International Space Station (ISS ),
the biggest, coolest, most excellent tree house there ever was. Principally built and operated by the U.S., the ISS has welcomed

aboard astronauts from 15 different countries, including such space newbies as South Africa, Brazil, The
Netherlands and Malaysia. But China? Nuh-uh. Never has happened, never gonna happen. China has been barred from
the ISS since 2011, when Congress passed a law prohibiting official American contact with the Chinese space
program due to concerns about national security. National security, of course, is the lingua franca excuse for any country to do
anything it jolly well wants to do even if it has nothing to do with, you know, the security of the nation. But never mind. Few people in the U.S.
paid much attention to the no-Chinese law, but its at last taking deserved heat, thanks to a CNN interview with the three Chinese astronautsor
taikonautswho flew Chinas Shenzhou 10 mission in 2013. The networks visit to Chinas usually closed Space City, which will air on May 30,
is a reporting coup, especially because of the entirely familiar, entirely un-scary world it reveals: serious taikonauts doing serious work with
serious mission plannersevery bit what you see behind the scenes at NASA or Russias Roscosmos. And similar to the nature of those
other space agencies too is the professed wish of the Chinese crews to work across national borders . As an astronaut, I
have a strong desire to fly with astronauts from other countries, said Nie Haisheng, the Shenzhou 10 commander. I also look forward to going
to the International Space Station. Space is a family affair; many countries are developing their space programs and China,
as a big country, should make our own contributions in this field. But that contribution cant happen aboard the ISS.

The 2011 law draws a sort of ex post facto justification from a study that was released in 2012 by the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, warning that Chinas policymakers view space power as one aspect
of a broad international competition in comprehensive national strength and science and technology. More darkly, there
is the 2015 report prepared by the University of California, San Diegos Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ominously titled China
Dream, Space Dream, which concludes: Chinas efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological
power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests. OK, deep, cleansing breaths please. On the

surface, the studies make a kind of nervous, reflexive sense. China is big, China is assertive, China has made clear
its intentions to project its military power in ways it never has beforeincluding to the high ground of space. But if
that sounds familiar its because its an echo of the Cold War hysteria that greeted the launch the Soviet Unions
Sputnik. The worlds first satellite, Sputnik was a terrifying, beach ball sized object that orbited the Earth from Oct. 1957 to January 1958,
presenting the clear and present danger that at some point it might beep at us as it flew overhead. Every Soviet space feat that followed was one
more log on the Cold War fire, one more reason to conclude that we were in a mortal arms and technology race and woe betide us if the guys on
the other side got so much as a peek at what we were doing. That argument failed for a lot of reasons. For one thing, the Soviets
hardly needed a peek at our tech since they were the ones who were winning. When youre in first place in your division you dont to
steal ideas from the guys in last. Something similar is true of the Chinese now. After launching their first solo astronaut in 2003, they
have followed in rapid succession with two-person and then three-person crews, and have mastered both spacewalking and orbital docking. They
have orbited a core module for their own eventual space station, have sent multiple spacecraft to the moon and are planning a Mars rover. They
didnt do all that by filching American tech. The doubters are unappeased, however. Both these reports warn that all of Chinas technological
know-how, no matter how they acquired it, has multiple uses, and can be put to either good or nefarious ends, a fact that is pretty much true of
every, single technological innovation from fire through the Apple Watch. Even if all of the fears were well-foundedeven if a

Chinese Death Star were under construction at this moment in a mountain lair in Xinjiang forbidding the kind of
international handshaking and cooperating that is made possible by a facility like the ISS is precisely the
wrong way to to go about reducing the threat. The joint Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975 achieved little of technological
significance, but it was part of a broader thaw between Moscow and Washington. That mattered, in the same way ping pong
diplomacy between the U.S. and China in 1971 was about nothing more than a gameuntil it was suddenly about much more. Well before the
ISS was built and occupied, the shuttle was already flying American crews to Russias Mir space station. Russia
later became Americas leading partner in operating and building the ISSa shrewd American move that both
offloaded some of the cost of the station and provided work for Russian missile engineers who found themselves idle after
the Berlin Wall fell and could easily have sold their services to nuclear nasties like North Korea or Iran. The technology
aboard the ISS is not the kind that a Chinese astronaut with ill will would want to or need to steal . And more to
the point, if theres one thing the men and women who fly in space will tell you, its that once they get there, terrestrial politics mean nothing at
allthe sandbox silliness of politicians who are not relying on the cooperation of a few close crewmates to keep them alive and safe as they race
through low Earth orbit. From space, as astronauts like to say, you cant see borders. Its a perspective the lawmakers in Washington could use.

Wolf Amendment Solvency

Repeal Key to Coop

Without expanded space cooperation, Wolf Amendments will be interpreted as a blanket
ban on US-China cooperation --- plan is key to truly global coop in space
Kohler, Georgetown JD, 2015
(Hannah, The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International
Cooperation in Space, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf)
However the 20142015 Wolf Amendments are interpreted, they will still have resounding effects for U.S.China spaceindustry relations. Although a complete ban of all visitors of Chinese nationality would be an almost unthinkably direct political affront,

even the blanket ban on CNSANASA cooperation that is the facial purpose of the statute will have
repercussions. The moratorium on bi- or multilateral industry communications created by the 2013 Appropriations Act will severely
constrain information transfer between both space agencies, effectively blinding NASA to the Chinese space
programs current endeavors as well as the reverse (although considering how closed-mouthed CNSA is about even public projects, it
is likely that this effect will hit NASA harder than China). Additionally, such a measure could cause the already tenuous trust
developed with the CNSA to deteriorate.
Blocking the United States and NASA from cooperating with one of the major space powers of the world a country
with demonstrated ambition and an increasing capability to achieve dominance in spacemay hobble us beyond recovery, at least
for the next generation of space advancements. Space exploration is no longer the province of individual nations
operating alone, and international cooperation is both widespread and necessary. Just as the international sharing of
such sensitive and cutting-edge technology is a valid national security concern, so too should be rejecting the
contributions of a major developing power, especially considering the relative political stagnation of space exploration in the United
States and the burgeoning enthusiasm for it in China. Although it is impossible to predict what the future will hold for the space explorers of
tomorrow, it seems fully necessary to initiate cautious, but optimistic, cooperation with China in space: inviting
them as a party to the ISS, certainly, and potentially opening the door for future jointor even bilateral
projects. The Hughes/Loral debacle limited the U.S. communications-satellite industry for decades,130 and its consequences have only
recently been corrected in part; Congress must take care not to make the same mistakes with regard to other U.S.
investments in space.
The national security and morality concerns expressed by Mr. Wolf and others are unquestionably valid. Even viewing the future through rosecolored glasses, it is inevitable that there will be espionage, military developments, and political statements in any
international community, much less one as technologically irresistible as space . If the Wolf Amendment persists beyond its
creators retirement, so be it; but Congress, NASA, and members of the international space community must be careful in how they construe its
provisions. The U.S. Congress must not permit jingoistic fear to deprive the nation of the opportunity to connect with China in such a burgeoning
and politically hopeful sphere. For now, the Wolf Amendment seems intended to prohibit official visitors only, and not to

prevent Chinese scientists and researchers who desire true collaboration from sharing their discoveries with the
United States and vice versa. As the Jade Rabbit rover tweeted on the eve of its first lunar night, Ive only encountered a little problem
while on my own adventure.131 It is hopeful to believe that the Wolf Amendment, too, is just a little problem on the
way to truly global cooperation in space.

Key to Space Projects

Recent revisions to the Wolf amendment closed loopholes and spurred a staggering chilling
effect- repeal is key to create certainty
Kohler, Georgetown JD, 2015
(Hannah, The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International
Cooperation in Space, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf)
Although the treatment of the

Amendment prior to 2014 demonstrated widespread confusion among members of the national
space community with regard to its intent and applicability, Congressman Wolfs statements would seem to settle the question. The Wolf
Amendment, as introduced in 2011, was intended to restrict only bilateral activities, and only Chinese citizens representing the
government were to be excluded from multilateral endeavors. However convenient, this interpretation of the law from the mouth of its creator may no
longer be accurate. IV. THE NEW WOLF AMENDMENT OF 2014 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE
COOPERATION Although the 20112013 Wolf Amendments severely constricted NASAs ability to interact with other spacefaring nations (there are so few, after
all), at the very least their application evinced careful

consideration of a policy balance between national security, morality, international cooperation,

have changed in 2014. Public Law 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014 (2014 Appropriations Act), was signed
by the President in January 2014113 and contained a slight deviation from the core text of its three predecessorsa change so seemingly
insignificant that it might not seem worth the effort to mention it. However, the potential repercussions are staggering. The relevant text in
Sections 532(a), (c), and (d) is identical to Sections 535(a), (c) and (d) in the 2013 Appropriations Act.114 However, the newly amended Section 532(b)
states that [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese
visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA.115 Considering that the annual appropriations act dictates the
spending of NASAs entire governmental budget, this change appears to categorically bar official Chinese visitors
from NASA facilities (or even facilities used by NASA!) where any government-granted money is involved,
whether the forum is a bilateral one or not. This could reasonably be read to exclude Chinese citizens from all
multinational conventions or events with NASA, unless the events could be certified by the House Appropriations Committee as posing no
and practicality. That may

national- or economic-security risk; that is, the 2014 Appropriations Act could conceivably be enacting the very restrictions that Congressman Wolf protested so
vehemently in the wake of the 2013 Ames Conference debacle. It is reasonable to ask whether the wording change, tiny as it is, was an accident or oversight by the
House Appropriations Committee that introduced the bill. Though the available legislative history and relevant congressional reports, debates, and interviews are mute
on the issue, the structure of the 2014 Appropriations Act and its predecessors suggest that the change was deliberate. Significantly, H.R. 4660 (2015 Appropriations
Act) currently under consideration retains the amended language, continuing to insist that [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the
purpose of hosting official Chinese visitors.116 If the altered phrasing was an oversight, it would likely have been corrected in the drafting of the 2015 Appropriations
Act. As noted infra, in previous years NASAs appropriations have been constrained with regard to internal management by the prohibitive [n]one of the funds
language now found in the Wolf Amendment of 20142015.117 It can be understood that Congressby using this categorical languageintended to forbid NASA
from activities that would harm its ongoing projects. Congress did not intend to permit NASA to use available nongovernmental funds to harm the space shuttle or ISS
projects; Congress meant to stop the activity from happening at all (subject to exemption if it could be certified harmless). There are multiple references to
limitations on various aspects of funding in the 2014 Appropriations Act, demonstrating that the change cannot have been made to align the language in Section 532
with the rest of the Act. However, Sections 709, 718, 719, 720, 736, 744, and numerous others of the 2014 Appropriations Act state that none of the funds in this or
any other Act may be used to pay certain employees or accomplish or prohibit certain activities.118 Furthermore, Section 723 reads, in uniquely severe language,
[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Agriculture.119 Thus, the language used in Section 532(b) is not the most
restrictive in the statute; we can presume that the congressional language, from least to most restrictive, progresses from (1) limitations apply 3 (2) none of the
funds made available by this Act 3 (3) none of the funds made available by this or any other Act. How best to interpret this, from a congressional-intent
perspective, coming as it did directly on the heels of a public misunderstanding of the more lenient 20112013 language? If Congressman Wolfs 2013 opinions on the
purpose and character of his legislation have not changed, then perhaps the 2014 Appropriations Act will not affect much at all; if, indeed, the purpose of the Wolf
Amendment is merely to prevent direct bilateral involvement between NASA and the PLA, then the 2014 Act does not appear to have significantly changed in
measure or scope. Congressman Wolf himself has not spoken to the wording change, and his statements on the purpose of the Act apparently conflict. In an April 2014
speech at the Space Policy Institute, Wolf stated: [O]ur subcommittee has had strong oversight of NASAs security, including a provision to limit its bilateral
cooperation with the Chinese space program, which is run by the Peoples Liberation Army.... .... . . . [However] it is important to note that the congressional
restriction does provide several venues for the U.S. to maintain its dialogue with Chinese counterparts as well as opportunities for limited engagement. For instance,
the language only restricts bilateral cooperation, not multilateral venues where representatives from all countries participate. .... . . . So there is some flexibility for
NASA when it comes to China.120 However, in the March 2013 hearing with Administrator Boldenand in contrast to his (Wolfs) statements to the Space Policy
InstituteCongressman Wolf insinuated that the 2013 Appropriations Act was meant to be strictly construed. Wolf asked Bolden: Are you aware of any incidents in
which NASA has encouraged an external entity, as they did down at NASA Langley, to undertake with its own funds a cooperative activity with China that would be
prohibited using NASA funding? And are you going to be clarifying that with the contractors? Because there was almost a workaround to get around the subcommittee
language.121 Bolden took severe umbrage to the veiled criticism, replying: I respectfully disagree with the implication of what you just said.... Lesa [Roe, the Director
of NASA Langley] and her people are not attempting to use contractors as a workaround to the rules. . . . As a matter of fact, we really feel that we have been fully
complying with the law, that our processes are strong.122 Evidently, Wolf

and the other members of the House Appropriations Committee were

concerned with the possibility that NASA might use such a workaround to engage indirectly with the CNSA, and
wanted to prohibit such actions. This seems the most salient explanation for the wording change , and would align Wolfs
continuing insistence that the Amendment is meant to prohibit bilateral conduct only with the apparent tightening of the congressional noose with regard to funding
allocations. It seems most likely, then, that the

language in Section 532 of the 2014 Appropriations Act (and Section 532 of the 2015 Appropriations Act currently
deliberately amended in order to correct this perceived security flaw. By forbidding
the use of any funds made available under the 2014 Appropriations Act to facilitate official Chinese visitors, Wolf
might have hoped to strengthen the restrictive language and ensure that the PLA was not being engagedeven
indirectlyby NASA through contracting projects or other such workarounds, although the focus on facility use rather than
under deliberation in the Senate) was

cooperative projects is puzzling. The

potential implications of the changed language might even have been inadvertent, as
Wolfs continuing insistence that the Act prohibits bilateral collaboration only does not seem consistent with a plain
reading of the 2014 language. At this point, however, it must be considered that Congressman Wolfs personal
interpretation of the statute no longer controls; the plain language of Section 532 does restrict multilateral interaction.
The widespread confusion and misapplication of the Amendment between 2011 and 2013 are damning evidence; if the
international space community could not parse the wording of the old legislation, it seems unlikely that they will be
any less liberal in applying the new, stricter language. The heart of the problem lies in the misapplied focus that Wolf
and other members of the House Appropriations Committee have granted to the Amendment. Congressman Wolf, in many of his statements concerning
the Amendment, emphasizes the bilateral/multilateral nature of a given activity to determine whether it should be considered prohibited.123 However, this is not the
heart of the issue. Although bilateral coordination is unarguably banned in both the 2011 and 2014 versions of the Amendment, the true focus has consistently been on
the issue of officialness, not number of parties or even the nature of the activity. Since its inception, the Wolf Amendment has restricted the use of funds in hosting...
official Chinese visitors.124 It may be that Wolf and the Appropriations Committee have simply considered this limitation enough to prevent abuse of the provision;
Wolf has occasionally suggested as much.125 The problem with this assumption is that official is never addressed or defined in the Amendment,126 and thus cannot
be facially assumed to refer only to citizens representing the Chinese government. Merriam-Webster defines the adjective official to be of or relating to the job or
work of someone in a position of authority.127 Although this covers representatives of the Chinese government, it may also fairly be said to extend to other
prominent members of the scientific community (in the sense of an official visitor) or members with sufficient standing and authority in any public organization,
even reporters working for an official Chinese news agency.128 If

Congress wishes to curtail broadly restrictive overapplication of the

Amendment through reliance on the official language, it should make this clear by including an internal definition of official in the text of the 2016
Appropriations Act, making explicit exactly who is being barred from attending events funded by NASA. Until such a definition is agreed upon,
both the intention and the effects of the 2014 wording change will be frustratingly obfuscating, and it is likely that
industry leaders will continue to interpret the provision broadly (that is, restrictively) for fear of crossing
Congress and becoming subject to sanctions under the Antideficiency Act.

Not cooperating doesnt hurt China but does impact the US ability to sustain space
projects and establish space norms
Minter, award winning journalist covering China issues for Bloomberg, 2015
(Adam, NASA Should Boldly Go ... to China, 10-19, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-19/nasashould-cooperate-with-china-in-space)
When Matt Damon is rescued from Mars in this falls sci-fi blockbuster, The Martian, an assist from the Chinese space program is critical to getting the American
home. The plot twist is heartwarming -- not to mention about as far-fetched as a large-scale manned Mars mission. The

problem is U.S. law, which

since 2011 has prohibited bilateral collaboration with China in space. In other words, a mission to rescue Matt
Damon would be illegal. That shouldnt -- and doesnt have to be -- the case. The clause about cooperating with the
Chinese is embedded in NASAs annual appropriation and must be renewed every year. In 2016, Congress should
simply let it die. Doing so would not only be in the interest of future Matt Damons, but would help ensure that
the U.S. doesnt get left behind in a space race it currently leads. Of course, U.S. policy makers have good reason to be wary of
Chinas space ambitions. The Chinese space program, like those of many spacefaring nations (including the U.S.), has close ties to its military, raising concerns about
whether the regime is really seeking dual-use technologies that might eventually find their way into weapons systems. Likewise, Chinas well-documented history
of industrial espionage feeds suspicions that collaboration would lead to the theft of critical U.S. technology. Such objections, however, presume

that the
U.S. can somehow isolate China from a globalized scientific and industrial endeavor in which collaboration is the
norm. Already, long-standing U.S. space partners like the European Space Agency and Russia are working with
Chinas National Space Agency in order to take advantage of the countrys funding largesse and ambition. This can
have embarrassing consequences: NASA is so keen to join a proposed 2021 Sino-European solar-science mission
that its devising ways to funnel its hardware and personnel through the European Space Agency, so as to follow the
spirit of U.S. law. Thats hardly in the interest of the U.S. space program, which has thrived in part because it
has remained open to cooperating with nations around the world, including the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War (the
Apollo-Soyuz collaboration) and Russia (the International Space Station). Remaining aloof means depriving U.S. scientists of rich
opportunities for innovation and exploration. Meanwhile, the current restrictions may well limit the potential for
future collaboration, too. For example, in pursuit of its own space station (its currently excluded from the ISS),
China has developed its own docking technology for space modules instead of committing to a standard being developed in the U.S. and
Europe. That may seem like a small matter now, but such international rules of the road for space will grow in
importance in coming years. As with trade, maritime navigation and multilateral finance, this is the time to
strengthen standards and rules that all countries, including China, accept. Finally, there are the financial practicalities of a large-scale
space mission such as one to Mars (whose cost could reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars). At its high point during the Apollo lunar program, NASAs budget
represented 5.3 percent of the federal budget. Today, its less than one percent -- a serious constraint on NASAs ambitions. China

is already repeating
NASAs past exploration path, going from simple orbital missions to unmanned lunar probes to its own space
station. Though the Chinese cant be expected to renounce their solo ambitions, both the U.S. and China would
benefit from ensuring that Chinas programs dont needlessly overlap with NASAs, and instead advance the cause

of space exploration. A good place to start would be to bring China into the ISS. Russia, a U.S. geopolitical
rival, is already a core member. China should be offered the opportunity to take part as well. Back in 2009 -when it was still legal to discuss space with China -- Beijing also proposed that the two nations cooperate on smaller
scientific missions. Thats still a good idea. If those experiments dont work out, Congress can always tighten the
purse strings later. But as the rescue in The Martian demonstrated, keeping lines of communication and
collaboration open are in the interests of everyone, including NASA. Its time to reopen them with China.

Solves Space Mil

Repealing the Wolf Amendment is key to prevent space militarization- strategic trust,
communication, and mutual scientific advances
Fernholz -fellow at the New America Foundation studying financial regulation- 2015
[Tim, 10-13-2015, "NASA has no choice but to refuse Chinas request for help on a new space station," Quartz,
http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-request-for-help-on-a-new-space-station/ Accessed
6/24/16 LAO]
The ban on cooperation between NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative lawmaker
Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding for work with China in protest of political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology;
he retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And NASA is not a fan of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles
Bolden said the US, for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old ban. We will find ourselves on the outside
looking in, because everybodywho has any hope of a human spaceflight programwill go to whoever will fly their people, Bolden said, according to a report
from Reuters. Currently, China operates a space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by groups of Chinese astronauts. The US supports
the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts alongside 15 other countries, including Russia. Both the US and Russia have
committed to provide support to the station through 2024. The US has a long history of space diplomacy with opponentsas with the USSR during the 1970s. With
US policy framing China as a peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current

restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space

program has put NASA in a tough spot with space scientists from outside the agency, some of whom have protested
the ban by boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to
loosen their restrictions, theres also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of
coordination between burgeoning space programs will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite
weapons have already resulted in costly, in-orbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could
provide trust and lines of communication for de-escalation as fears of space militarization increase. And its not like
there isnt some cross-pollination alreadySpaceNews notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.

Reduces the risk of instability by creating more transparency

Listner and Johnson-Freese - founder of Space Law and Policy Solutions and professor of national security
affairs - 2014
[Michael, attorney, and Joan professor at Naval War College, 7-14-2014, "Commentary," SpaceNews,
http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/ Accessed 6/23/16 LAO]
Wolfs rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011 interview, includes three key points. We dont want to give them the opportunity to
take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them, Wolf said. And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. Would you have a
bilateral program with Stalin? The three assumptions in that statement are,

quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests.

assumes that working with the United States would give China opportunities not otherwise available and
implies that the United States would be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space station
program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own space station soon. In fact, when Chinas space station becomes operational
around 2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station, given that the ISS is currently funded only
through 2024, and that China has already invited other countries to visit its facility. In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are
still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons , specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of
spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians are
First, it

viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly
work with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not been isolated. Second, Wolfs

rationale assumes the United States has nothing

to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could learn about how they work
their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures . This is valuable
information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a
vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and solve problems together, perhaps
beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties can contribute something of value, builds
trust on both sides, trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the others cultural proclivities, reasoning
and institutional constraints with minimal risk of technology sharing. From a practical perspective, working with China could
diversify U.S. options for reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has become painfully apparent consequent
to Vladimir Putins expansionist actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin
subsequently stated, I propose that the United States delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the help of a trampoline.

DA Answers

Offensive Weapons DA Answers

Growing dependency on satellites acts as a natural deterrent to space warfare
Krepon, Stimson Center Co-Founder and Senior Associate, 2008
[Michael, 01 February, Chinas Military Space Strategy: An Exchange, Survival, 50:1, p. 162-163,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf, Accessed: June 28, 2016, CEW]
Because every spacefaring nation can lose badly in the event that vulnerable and essential satellites are
damaged or destroyed, a rudimentary form of deterrence against satellite warfare existed during the Cold War.
It continues to exist today. Deterrence of satellite warfare was far simpler and less expensive than nuclear
deterrence because so much latent capability existed to harm satellites. Dedicated ASAT tests werent needed; they were kept to a
minimum because they were provocative and dangerous. My own view, unlike the one imputed to me by Tellis, is that Beijing was not sending a cri de
coeur on behalf of arms control with its ASAT test. Instead, Beijing was sending a deterrence message that, in the
event of a crisis over Taiwan, the United States could not count on owning space. Will major spacefaring nations again settle for a
cheap form of deterrence against satellite warfare, or will they go down the space warfighting path suggested by Tellis? I believe there is reason to be
optimistic rather than fatalistic. The more spacefaring nations become invested in satellites for economic growth, global
commerce, and military capabilities, the more they will pause before opening Pandoras Box. The constraints that
worked against using satellites as target practice in the past are even stronger today. They will be stronger
tomorrow, because dependency on satellites in growing in all spacefaring nations. I rest my case by citing as
evidence the behaviour of the George W. Bush administration, which has not been shy about utilising American
military superiority and about taking significant risks in pursuit of presumed security interests. Even the Bush
administration and even after the Chinese ASAT test has refrained from undertaking the offensive ASAT
programmes endorsed by Tellis. Notwithstanding existing US Air Force guidance and the Rumsfeld Commissions recommendations, the Pentagon has
so far confined its testing in space to the demonstration of multipurpose technologies that fall far short of dedicated ASATs. The United States, like China and Russia,
is pursuing a hedging strategy in the event that the norm against harming satellites in crises or warfare is broken. This

analysis suggests breaks in the

logic train constructed by Tellis and others who advocate the testing and deployment of offensive counterspace
capabilities. To be sure, ASAT programmes are driven by national interest, but national interest also recognises that a
shooting war in space can have profoundly negative consequences. Chinese ASAT programmes do, indeed, have military logic, but it is
probably incorrect to assume that Chinese space diplomacy serves entirely as a ruse to protect the PLAs ASAT programmes. The Chinese government has many
moving parts, and Beijings conspicuous silence after the January 2007 ASAT test suggests that the Foreign Ministry and the PLA tracks were not well coordinated. In
all probability, Tellis is correct about PLA briefings to the Chinese leadership before the ASAT test, but it is also probably fair to conclude that the subject of debris did
not figure prominently in these briefings. I

believe that Tellis is correct in asserting that threats to space assets will grow, but so,
too, will global dependency on satellites. In combination, these trend lines can continue to prevent space from
becoming a shooting gallery. I happen to agree with Tellis that a treaty banning space weapons would be plagued by
problems of definition, scope and verification. I appreciate Telliss cautious endorsement of a Code of Conduct for responsible space- faring
nations, an initiative of the Henry L. Stimson Center that has gained endorsement by the European Union and other governments. A Code of Conduct
would, however, be greatly vitiated unless participating states agreed to a provision against harmful interference
with satellites. When Telliss partial truths are complicated by other truths, the inadvisability of running and trying to win an offencedefence arms race in space
becomes evident. There is nothing inevitable about the use of force against space objects. If this were the case, attacks
on satellites would have already accompanied ground combat and deep crises. If common sense, let alone wisdom,
prevails, barriers against attacking satellites can extend into the future as well.

Space Leadership DA Answers

2AC
Status quo Chinese exclusion ensures the formation of adversarial blocs that challenge
American leadership
Aliberti, ESPI resident fellow, 2015
(Marco, When China Goes To The Moon, Studies in Space Policy, Volume 11, 234-235)
Another potential positive payback stemming from cooperating with China would be greater US insight into Chinas
space programme, technical capabilities, and intentions. While there is currently uncertainty and lack of transparency over Chinas
space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning, regular dialogue and exchange of information could help
the two nations understand each others intentions more clearly, overcoming mutual mistrust and ambiguity. Over
the long term, dialogue and cooperation could potentially give way to strengthen confidence and assurance of
intentions and concerns about space and help address national security concerns while increasing
transparency across the board.205 Equally importantly, cooperative undertakings could be an important way to maintain and in a
sense renew US leadership. Many space policy experts believe that NASA is losing its appeal as trailblazer of the
international space communitys efforts. However, by leveraging the fact that the United States has already
accomplished a manned lunar landing, embarking upon a cooperative programme with China (as well as other spacefaring
nations) could generate the public perception of the United States assisting other nations to go beyond Earth, in a true
spirit of leadership. As the National Research Council notes, the underlying issue is that the U.S can advance its national goals in space by sharing the
responsibility on a global scalemaking the U.S a real leader among a host of nations contributing to space exploration and reaping the benefits, rather than
excluding them. Such

a posture would provide an important impetus to allaying the fears of the international
community about the alleged US intention of pursuing space dominance. Finally, advocates of cooperation highlight a fact that is
too often overlooked: the alternative to cooperating with China could be a descent into an unpromising space race (also
at the strategic threat level), bringing unaffordable financial and political burdens for the United States. The United States increased
NASAs budget by 89 % in the months following Kennedys 1961 Moon speech,206 and NASAs expenditure peaked at 5.3 % of the federal
budget in 1965.207 This is unimaginable today, given the severe budget constraints faced by NASA and the fact that the United
States is not a rapidly expanding but a plateauing economy. It thus behoves the United States to discard a space race scenario and consider
opportunities for cooperation. Indeed, a gradual increase in cooperation with China would make sense because it
would reduce the cost of US space exploration, enabling both countries to continue gaining scientific knowledge and also
improving relations to a degree. If the path of cooperation is pursued, it could not only avoid an ominous destabilisation of the USChina political relationship but,
equally importantly, could preventor at least inhibit the

formation of adversarial blocs, including a strengthening of the SinoRussian axis. While the latter relationship remains an axis of convenience and not a strategic alliance, the USs China exclusion policy might
further cement their cooperation and eventually spur the emergence of two competing ideological blocs. 208 It is
in Washingtons interest not to make this happen!

Lifting restrictions is key to space competitiveness- 2 reasons

1. Bandwagoning- restrictions pit the entire world against the US
Beldavs, Latvia photonics research center strategist 2015
(Vidvuds, Prospects for US-China space cooperation, Space Review, 127,www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1)
This legislation cannot guarantee US companies superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared infrastructure in cislunar space
that can reduce communications, transportation and operating costs. No country or company has mined the Moon or an asteroid, or has had
industrial operations of any kind in space. Mining technologies may, in fact, be more advanced in countries such as Australia and Canada than in
the US. In fact, space mining conferences held in Australia and in Canada have attracted significant attendance by mining companies and the
equipment industries that serve them. Notwithstanding the ambitious plans of Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources , it is not at all
clear that they will possess superior technology for space mining to other potential competitors including from China,
India, Japan, Korea, Russia, or the EU. No one has yet processed materials in space other than lab-scale experiments. China and India,
which have both mounted large-scale industrial projects, may have a body of industrial process know-how that is
already competitive with US capabilities to process asteroid or lunar materials into products. There are multiple other aspects of
industrial development in space where knowledge and technologies exist somewhere in the world where the US may not have an inherent
competitive advantage. The future that is being created through the new law will create more competitive opportunities for US commercial space
companies. But, this legislation cannot guarantee them superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared infrastructure in cislunar
space that can reduce communications, transportation and operating costs. The Wolf Amendment is counter to US national interests
Clearly sensitive technologies need to be protected. But, protecting US intellectual property is not known to be a domain where the House

Appropriations Committee of the US Congress has recognized expertise or where it has been invested with any specific authority. Additionally,
NASA is a relatively tiny domain in the vast territory of advanced technology under development by the US. The Wolf Amendment, in fact, offers
no protection of American technology but instead empowers members of a Congressional committee with no relevant expertise or authority to
play a foreign policy role. Congressman Culbertson clearly recognizes that space technology is key to addressing major challenges
facing not only the US, but the entire world community. To bar the United States from participation in global initiatives in the
peaceful uses of outer space because China is also involved is, at best, is an overemotional response to the potential for illicit
technology transfer with a totally inappropriate instrument. Far more relevant to US national interests would be for Rep. Culbertson to
support developing more effective strategies to advance US commercial interests in space. Otherwise, the Chinese, not bounded by
ineffective legislation, will eat our lunch. No one has yet developed the technologies for ISRU whether on the Moon, the asteroids,
Mars, or beyond. Yet ISRU technologies are central to the whole idea of asteroid and lunar mining. If the Chinese can

work with everyone else on the planet, but the US can only work with a short list as approved by the
Appropriations Committee, it should be expected that the Chinese, drawing on the knowledge base of the entire
world, will advance more quickly. We have no lead in ISRU, and our lead in other domains of space technology may not be
particularly relevant to this challenge.

2. STEM backlash- restrictions lead to major backlash against NASA

Sample, Guardian science correspondent, 2013
(Ian, US scientists boycott Nasa conference over China ban, 10-4,
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/oct/05/us-scientists-boycott-nasa-china-ban)
US scientists boycott Nasa conference over China ban Nasa facing backlash from US researchers due to rejection of
Chinese nationals from conference Nasa is facing an extraordinary backlash from US researchers after it emerged that
the space agency has banned Chinese scientists, including those working at US institutions, from a conference on
grounds of national security. Nasa officials rejected applications from Chinese nationals who hoped to attend the meeting at the agency's Ames
research centre in California next month citing a law, passed in March, which prohibits anyone from China setting foot in a Nasa building. The
law is part of a broad and aggressive move initiated by congressman Frank Wolf, chair of the House appropriations subcommittee that has
jurisdiction over Nasa. It aims to restrict the foreign nationals' access to Nasa facilities, ostensibly to counter espionage. But the ban has

angered many US scientists who say Chinese students and researchers in their labs are being discriminated against. A
growing number of US scientists have now decided to boycott the meeting in protest, with senior academics withdrawing individually, or pulling
out their entire research groups. The conference is being held for US and international teams who work on Nasa's Kepler space telescope
programme, which has been searching the cosmos for signs of planets beyond our solar system. The meeting is the most important event in the
academic calendar for scientists who specialise in the field. Alan Boss, co-organiser of the Kepler conference, refused to discuss the issue, but
said: "This is not science, it's politics unfortunately."

That crushes space leadership

Parriott, AAS Deputy Executive Officer, 2013
(Joel, AAS Statement on the Impact of Federal Agency Travel Restrictions on Scientific Conferences, 3-27,
https://aas.org/posts/news/2013/03/aas-statement-impact-federal-agency-travel-restrictions-scientific-conferences)
Scientific meetings and conferences are a principal mechanism for researchers, students, and educators to facilitate and
strengthen their interaction and collaborations with peers in their field, thereby advancing the state of knowledge in that field.
Scientists who are Federal employees or contractors play a critical role in all fields of science and engineering, so the Federal
agency mission suffers when they, and any students collaborating with them, are unable to travel to relevant conferences. In
response to guidance from the White House Office of Management and Budget on implementation of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 sequestration,
many agencies have issued new travel restrictions for employees, contractors, and grantees for the rest of FY 2013. For example, NASA has
effectively capped conference attendance at 50 employees and contractors and prohibited all attendance at foreign conferences. Given the

mission need for NASA personnel to regularly meet with international collaborators, we believe our international
leadership in space will be undermined by this prohibition. While conferences occurring in the remaining six months of FY
2013 will be severely impacted by these new directives, our deeper concern is the likelihood that the restrictions and reduced
conference travel spending will become standard policy going forward. We agree that all government travel expenditures should be
subject to vigorous review and oversight, but we urge the Administration to consider carefully the harm that these top-down restrictions
could cause the U.S. research enterprise and our international standing.

Cooperate to coopt
Knipfer, Space Frontier Foundation corporate secretary, 2016

(Cody, The Asian Space Race and Chinas solar system exploration: domestic and international rationales, 6-13,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3007/1)
This point invariably prompts discussions of Sino-American cooperation in space exploration . That is too broad a discussion,
with too many positives and negatives in favor of and opposed to the idea, for the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, the rationales behind Chinas
exploration program will motivate any change in current law preventing cooperation in space between the United
States in China or lend credence to the preservation of the legal status quo. It is the opinion of the author, however, that SinoAmerican cooperation in robotic exploration may be one method by which the United States could to co-opt
Chinas rise and quest for influence. China will invariably pursue solar system exploration for its national interest;
without the opportunity for cooperation with China in space exploration, the United States stands by idly as the
Chinese pursue other partners and objectives at the detriment to American global influence. If the Chinese are
seeking to rise in the international system so as to change it and are doing so in part through solar system
exploration, it may be wise strategy for the United States to cooperate withand co-optthe Chinese in order to
preserve the American national interest and international status quo to the greatest extent possible.

Cooperation builds trust and transparency while giving US opportunities to sustain space
leadership.
Johnson-Freese, Naval War College national security affairs professor, 2014
(Joan, Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation, 7-14, http://spacenews.com/41256twoperspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/)
Cooperation with China is a hot-button issue in political and advocacy circles. Whether or not to engage China in
current U.S. outer space efforts is hotly debated on Capitol Hill, in academia and among space advocacy groups . Two
experts in the field of space policy with differing views make their case for and against outer space cooperation with China. The Case for Engagement The
National Research Council (NRC) recently released a report on the future of U.S. human spaceflight. Besides
advocating a Mars mission the report also advocated pursuing more international collaboration, specifically to
include China. That would require a distinct change in U.S. policy. There will likely be resistance to that recommendation from the small but powerful
congressional enclave behind the legislatively imposed restrictions on U.S-Sino cooperation since 2011. But the realist approach advocated by the
NRC report has a much better chance of serving U.S. security interests than the current ineffectual policy that
attempts to isolate and punish China for domestic policies. President Barack Obama met with then-Chinese President Hu Jintao in January
2011. Part of their joint statement addressed the desire for deepened dialogue and interaction in space, which many people interpreted as a new willingness on the part
of the United States to work with China, perhaps leading to a cooperative program. U.S.-Sino relations had basically been moribund since the sensationalist 1999 Cox
Committee report alleging theft of information on American thermonuclear weapons and transfer of sensitive missile technology by profit-hungry American aerospace
companies. Though nonpoliticized analysis from experts at institutions such as Stanford University largely discredited the report, congressional caterwauling
successfully pushed the United States into the impossible position of trying to isolate Chinese space activities in a globalized world, and ended up primarily hurting
U.S. aerospace companies through the draconian export control measures issued consequent to the Cox Committee report. But cooperation was not to be. In April
2011, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time China hardliner, especially regarding freedom
of religion issues, inserted two sentences into funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the United States and China that involves NASA or
is coordinated by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral

Wolfs
rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011 interview, includes three key points. We dont want to give them the opportunity to take
activity with China. Though Wolf is retiring in January 2015, speculation regarding potential successors includes individuals with views similar to his.

advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them, Wolf said. And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. Would you have a

assumes that
working with the United States would give China opportunities not otherwise available and implies that the United States would
be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space station program and was banned
from doing so by the United States, it will have its own space station soon. In fact, when Chinas space station
becomes operational around 2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station, given that the
ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that China has already invited other countries to visit its facility. In terms of the U.S. doing China a
bilateral program with Stalin? The three assumptions in that statement are, quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests. First, it

favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations. But
many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the
political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other

countries, including U.S. allies, regularly work

with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not been isolated. Second, Wolfs rationale assumes the
United States has nothing to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could learn about
how they work their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures . This is
valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a
weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and
solve problems together, perhaps beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties can
contribute something of value, builds trust on both sides, trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows
each side to understand the others cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal

risk of technology sharing. From a practical perspective, working with China could diversify U.S. options for
reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has become painfully apparent consequent to Vladimir Putins
expansionist actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin subsequently stated, I propose
that the United States delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the help of a trampoline. And finally, Wolf stated that the United States should not work with China based
on moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with authoritarian regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime when it has served
American interests. That is the basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with

We live in a
globalized world. Attempting to isolate Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China and
other countries into developing indigenous space industries totally beyond any U.S. control that they might
have done otherwise. High fences around areas of technology where the United States has a monopoly and
there are few of those left combined with a realist approach to working with China when and were we can,
will allow the U.S. to lead rather futilely playing whack-a-mole, trying to beat back anticipated Chinese space
achievements.
Putin when it benefits us to do so. Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few to work with at all in the Middle East.

Plan key to space leadership --- snubbing China makes us look outdated and bitter --- total
unipolarity is dead
Johnson-Freese, US Naval War College national security affairs professor, 2015
(Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Chinas Space & Counterspace
Programs, February 18, 2015)
Chinese politicians are interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons , specifically, being accepted as part of the
international family of spacefaring nations as a sign of regime legitimacy. But it is unrealistic to expect withholding
U.S. cooperation on space issues can influence regime change in China . A similar approach was considered with the Soviet
Union, and it failed. Further, in terms of the U.S. doing China a favor by working with it, perhaps ironically many Chinese space professionals
fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politics are viewed as fickle and without the will to see
programs to completion. This view is reflected in changing European views regarding space leadership. A 2013 piece in Germanys Der Spiegel
suggested that Europe is thinking of redirecting its primary space alliance from the United States to China, due to Chinas rising power status in
space.41
The question of whether China is challenging U.S. leadership in space has received considerable media attention in the form of a U.S. China
space race, prompted largely by perceptions of declining U.S. space leadership. The U.S. civil space program is not dying, military

space activities continue to expand, and no country is doing anything in space that has not already been done by the
United States. But having started with such a spectacular accomplishment as the Apollo Program, it has been difficult to maintain the
public enthusiasm required to fund further space spectaculars, such as a human spaceflight mission to Mars. Although
not completely unsupportive, the U.S. public treats the space program as expendable to other government programs. The reality is that space, as
with other areas of international relations, will likely be a multipolar environment in the future .42 Americas unipolar
moment is over, and as long as it is reluctant to work with rising partners such as China, the perception of its
space leadership will continue to decline as well. That is not to say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of
space activity. If only by virtue of a heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in select areas. But the days of total
leadership are over. It will be a tough pill to swallow for those who crave exceptionalism but if we are unwilling to pay the price tag,
then swallow it, we must.43 In that respect, China has not usurped the perception of U.S. space leadership, it is being
ceded to them.
This rebuttal to Congressman Wolfs views assumes that the United States has a choice regarding whether or not to work with China. If ,
however, sustainability of the space environment upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military specifically
relies upon for advantages is to be maintained, the space debris issue alone requires that the U.S. not exclude
diplomacy as a policy option.

A2: Espionage
China is a responsible stakeholder --- they wont steal tech --- voting neg causes
counterspace arms racing and escalation
Johnson-Freese, US Naval War College national security affairs professor, 2015
(Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Chinas Space & Counterspace
Programs, February 18, 2015)
While missile defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since 2007, the potential threat to the space
environment in non-test circumstances has become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening realization by all
countries of the fragility of the space environment. With regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has done
nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United States. Mankinds
dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment.
China was scheduled to host an international meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) only days after its 2007
ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris, resulting in China cancelling the meeting out of embarrassment. There is a certain
(understandable) glee in the U.S. military, which has the most sophisticated government space tracking abilities, at being able to warn China of
potential collisions between its own space junk and its own satellites.44 More recent constructive Chinese involvement with the

IADC indicates recognition of need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on relevant issues ,
particularly the space debris issue.45 These are the type of common ground issues that provide opportunities to
work with all spacefaring nations to protect the congested, contested and competitive space environment.
U.S. emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and intentions of other countries ,
specifically China, presumably recent. Increasingly, however, it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material
not publically shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to
assess. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible 2007 ASAT test that
goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior.
Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward identifying common ground
among all space-faring nations, and resiliency for military systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same
energy and commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise, just as efforts to isolate Chinese space activities
have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control, the unintended consequences of a principally deter,
defend, defeat strategy could trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at significant
risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
With regard to the resilience, specifically the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), resilience has faced resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms control,
just too difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders.
He stated, While everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from low

to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target. So it doesnt attract much interest from
senior leaders.47 Counterspace, however, offers that sexy option.

Other nations fill in to provide the tech --- unilateralism causes a counterspace arms race
Turner, Analytic Services Inc distinguished analyst and PhD< 2015
(Ronald, Should the United States Cooperate with China in Space?, 5-6, http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-chinaspace-coop]
-China is militarily a threat to the United States The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to carefully restrict
access to technologies that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but excessive efforts to restrict
all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the United States. Denying

the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat
of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the
international space community or by developing the capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are
neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded
over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space
manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive in the world market. China is
increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and European nations. This supports the technological
advancements and economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry, which is hurt in two ways: it cannot
compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international missions are restricted if there is
the possibility of Chinese participation in or access to those missions. As the Chinese increase their reliance on space systems, they will

be less inclined to employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military space systems.
Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese may
be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this
could lead to a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological
position to win.

Other countries fill in to provide crucial tech --- and cooperation allows us to understand
Chinese decision-making processes to decipher what the intended use of dual-use tech
would be in the first place
Johnson-Freese, Naval War college professor, 2015
(Joan, US-China: Civil Space Dialogue, 8-7, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/)
Paranoia Wolfs scrutiny of

NASA was such that paranoia set in, resulting in a better safe than sorry attitude among
NASA employees about avoiding Chinese. There was a joke that if a NASA employee was on a DC Metro car with an Asian, he or she
better switch cars. But erring on the side of caution proved problematic as well. When NASAs Ames Research Center
excluded Chinese scientists from a conference and American scientists consequently boycotted the conference in
protest, Wolf chastised Ames for applying the bilateral ban to a multilateral conference, and NASA was left to
humbly apologize. Beyond issues related to individuals are the even more-important strategic issues that flow from a ban on U.S.-China
bilateral dialogue. It has always been in the best interests of the United States to use all tools of national power to
achieve its space-related goals, as stated in the U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Strategy, and National Security Space
Strategy. Wolfs restrictions on space cooperation constrain U.S. options. The United States could learn about how
the Chinese work their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is
valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a
weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Though Wolf retired in 2014, the new House CJS chairman, Rep. John
Culbertson (R-TX), has said he agrees with Wolfs position. The final law that Wolf put in place, and which remains in effect (P.L. 113-235, the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015), bans funding by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan, promulgate,
implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way
with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment of this Act.
Supporting an anti-China agenda accrues not insignificant domestic support among some voter constituencies. And so Congress continues to

act as though a bilateral snub by the U.S. will somehow change Chinese policies, deny them technology, or perhaps
just hurt their feelings. It has repeatedly been demonstrated though that sanctions, denying a country things that it wants,
only works when all countries possessing whatever the desired thing cooperate in denia l. If the rationale for snubbing China
is to deny it space-related technology, it should be considered that other space-faring nations do not share U.S. views toward
China. Other Western countries have shown themselves eager to work with and sell to China, with restrictions and
enforceable controls on dual-use technology, negating the effectiveness of U.S. actions. That leaves only defending the
moral high ground the U.S. as a democracy doesnt work with communist authoritarian governments as a rationale for the Congressional
position. Sometimes, however, realism isnt pretty, as it fundamentally involves acting in your own best interests . And while
the United States would like to always work with countries sharing its values, in pursuing those interests that has not always proven possible,
witness Iraq under Saddam, Iran under the Shah, and numerous other examples. Further, as President Richard Nixon showed with China and
Ronald Reagan demonstrated during his second term with the Soviet Union, diplomacy does not equate to appeasement, as seems currently to be
the popular Washington beltway interpretation. Space Environment In space, the ultimate goal of all U.S. strategies is for the U.S. to benefit from
a sustainable space environment. Risks to the space environment stem from congestion (the U.S. owns more 40 percent of the satellites in orbit),
space debris, naturally occurring space objects, and debris potentially created by anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. In recognition of its inability to
deal with the space debris issues on its own, the U.S. already works with China and 11 other countries on the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordinating Committee (IADC), which has done remarkable work at the scientific and technical level in identifying issues and suggesting
mitigation approaches. Their suggestions are largely ignored, however, due to lack of trust at the political level. Building trust takes dialogue. The
rhetoric of space competition has been escalating rapidly. Chest thumping, accusations and curious lingo such as offensive
counterspace from Congress and the Pentagon do little to build trust. Preventing that escalating rhetoric from evolving into
military confrontation that would jeopardize U.S. interests is the job of the State Department . Therefore, it makes sense
that State, with larger, strategic objectives beyond those of individual members of Congress or military services inherently needing threats to
justify enhanced budget requests, would step in to fill the void created by the 2011 legislative action. Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification and Compliance, will have a challenging task in identifying areas for civil space cooperation with China,

given the dual-use nature of space technology and the domestic Kabuki accompanying Wolfs enduring ban. But
acquiescing to talk about civil space cooperation is likely the carrot required to get to what the U.S. really wants to
talk about space security. Since its irresponsible high-altitude ASAT test in 2007, China has become politically correct when
testing ASAT technology, and now says it is testing missile defense technology, like the U.S., Russia and India, given the
similarities of the required capabilities. Chinas July 2014 missile defense test has been of particular concern to the U.S., and perhaps convinced
the State Department that it was time to step in and pursue the best interests of the United States. Notably, the usual and most vocal critics

of U.S.-China space cooperation have been largely silent, perhaps indicating that while unwilling to support the
dialogue, the need is becoming recognized. The State Department has indicated that NASA and other space-related agencies will be
invited to the dialogue, and it will be up to them to get the requisite clearances from Congress. Whether Congress grants these will be indicative.

Non Unique
No leadership now
Drca, former military trilingual linguist and International Security MS candidate, 2016
(Nenad, The Mighty Have Fallen: American Space Dependency On Russia, 5-27,
http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1454:the-mighty-have-fallen-americanspace-dependency-on-russia&Itemid=642)
The space program that gave the United States much-deserved global recognition is looking very different today.
Somewhat embarrassingly, the United States relies on the Atlas V rocket, powered by a Russian rocket engine, to
transport crucial space satellite technology. It is concerning to the US to heavily depend on Russia, at the moment still under sanctions for
interfering in Ukrainian unrest. Thus it seems imperative that this situation needs to change for the long-term benefit of the American space program. In order to be
ready for future conflicts, which may include space, US armed forces need to rely on space technology such as GPS, communication satellites, and intelligence
gathering equipment. The United States must maintain uninterrupted and independent access to space due to 21st century national security interests. By heavily
depending on Russia, Washington is supporting the defense industry of a state that carries, to put it mildly, deep skepticism toward American power. It is unwise
policy to depend on Russia for vital space missions and even worse policy when this dependence might help Russia takes steps against US national security interests.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has described American fees for the space transport as free money that is invested directly into Moscows missile

This idea of
American space dependence on Russia is receiving increasing criticism in Washington. Recently Senator John
McCain said: today Russia holds many of our most precious national security satellites at risk before they ever get
off the ground." His concerns were not unfounded because in 2014 Rogozin, in light of impending sanctions, openly
threatened to prohibit the export of Russian rockets that facilitate deployment of the American satellite program. If
that happened the United States would have no means of deploying its essential satellite technology into space.
More disconcertingly, the new federal budget proposed to cut NASAs Fiscal Year 2017 funds even further. In
perspective, NASAs budget is dangerously small when compared to regular expenditures. Former NASA
administrator Mike Griffin stated that Americans spend more annually on pizza (27 billion USD) than on space. Due
to such changes NASAs mission today is much weaker than several decades ago. The United States, first to send
men to the moon in 1969, now struggles in the 21st century to reach beyond low-earth orbit without expensive
Russian assistance. How the mighty have fallen indeed. While proposed budget cuts to NASA have been causing bitter debates in Congress,
development program. NASA spokesman Mr. Allard Beutel stated recently that his agency still has a transport contract with Russia until June 2020.

the reality is that any good change will take years before empirical results become visible. In 2011, policymakers decided to eliminate NASAs Constellation program:
$9 billion dollars of diligent labor to construct a new Orion spacecraft and Aries rocket canceled. Some of the main objectives of the program were completion of a
new International Space Station and a return to the Moon by 2020, with subsequent manned trip to Mars. The Constellation program was meant to reinvigorate
American space supremacy. No other nation, including Russia, China, India, and Japan, was meant to be able to successfully compete or outmaneuver such an
advanced program. Now those countries do not even need to bother. In 2015, Russia deployed 17 unmanned satellites into orbit, further expanding its capacity for
remote sensing systems and intelligence collection. In addition, both Russia and China are developing provocative new space technologies such as anti-satellite
weapons. That would allow Russia and China to deny access to any adversary during conflict. The intense reliance of modern warfare on satellite access is impossible
to underestimate. The possibility of having Russia and China interrupting and disabling vital communications and navigation space equipment should therefore be
very concerning to the United States. The threat is so serious that US policymakers have authorized an additional $5 billion dollars to be used on defensive and
offensive capabilities to overcome deficiencies in the American military space program. Russia

is developing its own array of military

equipment that could track, approach, inspect, and possibly sabotage foreign satellites in orbit. While China has
publicly announced its space endeavors are nothing more than peaceful science experiments, Russian officials have
remained silent. Ironically, both Russia and China have been promoting for years a treaty on the prevention of the
placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Interestingly, Washington
opposes this treaty, which was submitted to the United Nations by Russia and China. The reason for opposition is basically the American perception that Russia and
China are both disingenuous. In other words, the US feels both Moscow and Beijing will work on space militarization while letting the treaty automatically counter
any potential rival entrants. Thus, the fear is that Russia and China want to use the treaty only to curb a resurgence of American space capabilities. Regardless of
whether or not these suspicions are true, the problem with any space treaty will be the difficulty in achieving real compliance and oversight verification. China's Vice
Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping has stated on several occasions that Beijing intends to increase its cooperation with Russia on several space projects. In the
meantime, Russia is planning to build its own space station by the year 2024. The Chinese government is also planning to construct its own orbiting space station by
the year 2020. In 1998, when the International Space Station launched, it was the most expensive project ever built at approximately $150 billion. The United States
generously gave more than $100 billion toward its construction. Today, only Russian rockets equipped with a Russian docking system can bring necessary ISS
supplies. Realistically, the United States is approaching a critical moment when space dependency on Russia will have to end. Perhaps the arrival of successful private
companies such as Space X will fill the void left by diminished NASA support. By allowing private industry to compete and provide necessary services, the need for
Russia might diminish. Frankly, American

policymakers have been too slow to act on minimizing the negative

consequences of their budget cuts in crucial space areas. Allowing Russia or China to militarize space while also
making America addicted to Russian space services can only lead to vulnerability in critical military areas. Placing
Russia or China in the leadership position for space would cause great concern among many nations and even
negatively impact global economic security. Many civilian and scientific organizations have their satellites in lowEarth orbit. It is fair to assume that as of today most of them prefer a leading American presence over Russian or
Chinese. But that preference right now is not matched by any empirical reality. What might help even the playing
field is corruption and mismanagement: it was reported that over $1 billion cannot be accounted for in the

Russian space program. Even at its best, the Russian space program budget is only slightly bigger than
NASAs smallest budget. The United States still has the leading technology assets. They are simply being
hindered by poor policy choices. Both Russia and China depend on media propaganda to maintain their
image of power and strength in space. The United States space program does not need more media coverage
but better policy to move forward. But so far, that policy wisdom has yet to emerge. As a consequence, the
future of space will remain crowded, confused, and potentially conflict-ridden.

No space supremacy now

Penn-Hall, Cipher Brief Cyber and Technology Producer, 2016
(Luke, The End of U.S. Space Supremacy, 2-9, http://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/end-us-space-supremacy)
However, the dominance that the U.S. has enjoyed in space since the end of the Cold War appears to be ending.
James Lewis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies says adversaries are investing tens of millions
of dollars in a range of technologies intended to degrade or destroy satellites and space capabilities. China in
particular has become very active in this area. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Chinese satellite launches increased dramatically
between 2003 and 2012. These new satellites have served a number of different purposes, from enhancing communications to the creation of Chinas own regional
GPS constellation. The

most worrying aspect of the Chinese space program has been their anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
demonstrations. The first of these occurred in 2007, when China shot down one of its own satellites. There have
been reports of other ASAT tests in 2010 and2013, although the Chinese government disputes these reports. Bruce
MacDonald, a former Special Advisor of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, expects these trends to
continue. He says that China wants to pursue capabilities that include its own complete GPS-like satellite constellation, more satellites for both military and civilian
long distance communications, more advanced intelligence satellites, and more advanced ASAT systems. The

competition between the two

countries for supremacy in space could be complicated by the fact that, while China has been expanding its space
program, the U.S. has allowed some of its capabilities to fall by the wayside. In 2011, NASA was forced to end its
Space Shuttle program, which allowed the U.S. to send manned missions into space, due to growing budgetary pressures. Currently, American astronauts
need to go through the Russian Federation Space Agency in order to get to space. Given the degree to which relations between the U.S. and
Russia are deteriorating, this could eventually pose a problem for NASA. China is under no such constraint and has
been able to send manned missions into space since 2003. However, private companies in the U.S. such as SpaceX
and Virgin Galactic have demonstrated that they may be able to reliably send manned missions into space
sometime in the near future. The United States has made it clear to the world at large that dominance in space
translates into an advantage on the ground, and so its rivals are now seeking to catch up. The final outcome of this
contest is difficult to determine, with options ranging from the current state of peaceful expansion to outright space
war although the later is highly unlikely. The space race during the Cold War resulted in a great deal of
technological innovation that is still yielding benefits today. There is also room for cooperation between the
rising space powers. Cleaning up the large amount of debris currently in orbit is one task that would benefit
enormously from a multinational approach. Regardless of the final outcome of the race, one thing is certain
the U.S. can no longer count on having supremacy in space.

US has already lost space leadership to China

Pollpeter et al, University of California-San Diego, Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation, Deputy Director, 2015
[Kevin, Eric Anderson Research Analyst on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China for the Institute On
Global Conflict And Cooperation, Jordan Wilson U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Security
and Foreign Affairs Policy Analyst, Fan Yang with an MPIA from the School of International Relations and Pacific
Relations (IR/PS) at UC San Diego, March 2, 2015, Institute On Global Conflict And Cooperation, China Dream,
Space Dream Chinas Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf,
Accessed June 28, 2016, LAR]
Diplomatic Implications
Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and economic capabilities, it can also work to increase Chinas soft
power. According to Joseph Nye, soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important
part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. 629 Although measuring the effects of soft power
is difficult, Nye writes that it rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others . 630

Chinas burgeoning space program is used as one of the many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, and
political power. It reinforces the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well and also a
country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more attractive, especially to developing
countries without strong democratic traditions. Chinas strategy thus appears to be a combination of seeking cooperative activities
with the main space powers while at the same time seeking leadership opportunities with lesser space powers through such activities as its
leadership of APSCO and its agreements to build Beidou stations in several countries in Asia. These activities reinforce the image that China can
interact with the major space powers as equals while also creating an alternative universe where China can lead space activities free from the
interference of the other major space powers. ASPCO, for example, does not grant other countries observer status.631
Moreover, as China becomes more capable in space, it will become a more attractive partner for Europe, Russia, and

smaller space powers. These activities may increase multipolarity by presenting another avenue for countries to
participate in space in addition toor withoutthe United States. This is especially true in the area of human spaceflight where
the lack of an independent capability to launch humans into space by the United States has made China an attractive
new partner for collaboration. Although Europe states that its collaborative activities with China do not mean a diminution of its activities
with the United States, reduced budgets for space programs and the orbiting of Chinas larger space station at the same time that the International
Space Station will be nearing the end of its service life may result in increasing influence for China in space.

These additional opportunities for collaboration could not only assist Chinas space program in becoming more
competitive, they could also assist Europes space industry in becoming less dependent on the United States for space
technology. As Chinas space program continues to improve, countries without the security concerns of the United States will increasingly look
upon space as another venue for interacting with China. China cooperates with many countries in space and looks to Europe in particular for
access to technology and expertise denied by the United States. It maintains important cooperative activities with Russia and Ukraine and has
cooperative relationships with the European Space Agency and the countries of the European Union. Spurred on by U.S. export control laws,

European cooperation with China could improve Chinas space technology while at the same time making Europe
more technologically independent of U.S. industry. Although the ITAR-free satellites sold to China were eventually determined to
be anything but, the possibility of further collaboration cannot rule out such satellites being developed in the future.
The importance of Chinas space diplomacy should not be overstated, however. Relations in space do not drive relations on Earth.

International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an
indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. Although Chinas increasing space power does play a role in
advancing its diplomatic interests, there is no evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas besides space.632 As
its space power increases this may change. China, for example, could have more of a say in international technical organizations such as the
International Telecommunications Union over rules governing satellites and satellite frequency issues, but as yet this is unrealized.
Conclusion
Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid advance in space technologies will result in
relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. The real question concerning U.S. competiveness may not be whether
Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their U.S. competitors, but whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry
that can offer moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete effectively in the market. Similarly, a Chinese

space program that can provide a good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of military intervention for an
adversary may be all that is necessary.
If the current trajectory of Chinas space program continues, by 2030 the China will have a new line of advanced launch vehicles, a
robust, space-based C4ISR network made up of imagery satellites with resolutions well below one meter, and more
capable electronic intelligence communication satellites linked together by data-relay satellites , in addition to a global
satellite-navigation system that may gradually approach current GPS standards. At this point, China could also likely have made
operational a number of advanced counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill, directed-energy, and co-orbital
ASAT capabilities as well as some form of missile defense system. In addition, Chinas more capable satellites and launch
vehicles could not only compete with U.S., European, and Russian industry but also provide new avenues for cooperation. This could be
especially true if China were to conduct manned lunar missions.
Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program:

to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space .
Despite Chinese statements that it is not in a space race, Chinas space program has generated concern both in the United States and in Asia. As
Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School writes, There is a space race going on in Asia, but its outcomepeaceful competition or military
confrontationis still uncertain. He concludes that although there are still reasonable prospects for avoiding negative
outcomes in spaceAsia is at risk of moving backward, motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and hindered by poor
communications on security matters.
633 As a result, Chinas progress in space technologies, whether in relative or absolute terms, has implications for the United States and its
neighbors. As Chinas space program increases in capability, it can be expected to wield this power in ways that, according to Bonnie Glaser, not
only persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from accommodating Chinese interests but also deter countries from pursuing policies
that inflict damage on Chinese interests. 634

CP Answers

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China Coop Key

Repeal of 2011 ban is critical- Russian drawback necessitates US-Chinese alliance- key to
explore Mars
Tiezzi, The Diplomat editor, China-focused reporter, and former research associate at the
U.S.-China Policy Foundation, 2014
[Shannon, June 05, The Diplomat, Report: To Reach Mars, NASA Must Work With China,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/report-to-reach-mars-nasa-must-work-with-china/, Accessed: June 26, 2016, CEW]
Now, the NRCs report officially calls for a reexamination of the 2011 ban. This policy, while driven by congressional
sentiment, denies the U.S. partnership with a nation that will probably be capable of making truly significant
contributions to international collaborative missions, the report said. Given the rapid development of Chinas capabilities in
space, it is in the best interests of the United States to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships, it continued. The report

also recommended that NASA turn its focus to sending a manned mission to Mars, calling the red planet the
horizon goal for human space exploration. Yet the NRC cautioned that this goal could not be reached without more
extensive international cooperation. Were really talking about international collaboration of a different scale than what has been
conducted in the past, Jonathan Lunine, co-chair of the NRC panel, told reporters. Even while the NRC highlighted the need for international
efforts, Russia is drastically scaling back its space cooperation with the U.S. in response to Western sanctions

stemming from the Ukraine crisis. Russia has announced that it will withdraw from the International Space Station
in 2020, and will cease selling the RD-180 engine that currently powers the U.S. Atlas 5 rocket. With Russia
withdrawing (at least temporarily) from space cooperation with the U.S., cooperation with China becomes all the
more vital. Current federal law preventing NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese
reduces substantially the potential international capability that might be pooled to reach Mars , the report found.