The Ukraine debate in Germany

By Ulrich Speck
1) Introduction
2) Public opinion polls
3) Main strains of the discussion
4) Who is who in the German debate?
5) The Kremlins influence
6) Recommendations for OSF

1) Introduction
This study is looking at the public debate about the Ukraine conflict in Germany from March 2014 to
February 2015.
Germany is a key country for the Kremlin. It has been a close partner in the last two decades, but
during the Ukraine conflict its leaders and its public opinion both have turned against Russia.
In the following study, the German debate about Ukraine is being analyzed under a number of angles:
public opinion polls, the position of different media, the main protagonists and the Kremlins influence.
A last chapter proposes two courses of action for OSF.

2) Public opinion polls

I have looked at the main opinion polls from March 2014 to February 2015. Annex 1 gives an overview
of the responses. In the following I draw some conclusions:
The majority of Germans moves from an anti-sanctions to a pro-sanctions position. In
March 2014 there is a large majority against economic sanctions against Russia: roughly two thirds
against and one third in favor of sanctions. But already in May 2014 50% are in favor of sanctions
(43% against). From that moment on, a majority supports sanctions. In February 2015 two thirds are in

favor, one third against sanctions (65% vs 31%).

A majority supports Merkels more hawkish policies. Already in April 2014, 65% say they view
Putin critical. In August 2014, 80% think Russia bears a large part of the responsibility for the
escalation in Ukraine, 69% are concerned about Putins policies, 58% cannot understand that Russia
feels threatened by the west. In September 2014, 82% say Russian behavior is threatening and 61%
think the EU should counter Russia more decisively. In November 2014, 76% support Merkels
sharper tone against Russia, in February 2015 55% the EU should counter Russia more decisively. In
March 2014, 69% expect that Russia and the west will be partners again in the near future. In August,
this number goes down to 58%, September to 52%.
A broad majority is in favor of supporting Ukraine, but only with non-military means. In
March 2014 58% say that the EU and Germany should support Ukraine, in May 69% are in favor of
economic help. But supplying weapons is, in February 2015, supported by only 8%. The view of a EU
membership perspective for Ukraine is mixed. In March 2014, 55% according to one poll, 41%
according to another poll support future EU membership for Ukraine, while 51% or 34% are against.
On NATO membership the view is quite negative: In April 2014 39% against, 20% in favor, in
September 2014 even 61% against, 31% in favor, in December 2014 67% against, 26% in favor.
A considerable minority is expressing understanding or support for Russian positions. In
April 2014, 33% express understanding for Russias annexation of Crimea, 10% see Russia as a
reliable partner. In May 2014, 35% say Germany should have more understanding of Russia. In
August 2014, 40% can understand that Russia feels threatened by the west, 26% dont support the
EUs reaction, and 14% dont think that Russia bears a large part of the the escalation in Ukraine. In
September 2014, 41% say that they understand that Russia feels threatened by the west and 37%
dont support the EUs reaction. In November 2014, we see 42% against sanctions in general, 36%
against a sharper tone against Russia. In February 2015, there are 31% against sanctions in general.

3) Main strains of the discussion

a) TV talk shows

The picture that emerges from the public opinion polls is different from the picture that emerges from
the analysis of the debates in TV talk shows.
Between March 2014 and February 2015, the conflict has been discussed in 24 talk shows in ARD
and ZDF, the main public channels. From the 106 guests 37 can be classified as being in the proRussia camp (15 of them Russian diplomats or journalists from state-controlled media) and 15 in the
camp of Putin critics (9 of them Ukrainian officials or journalists). Other groups of participants can be
classified as follows: representatives of the government (Merkel camp), EU policymakers, experts,
elder statesmen, Americans.
These debate, which have been viewed by between 1,5 and 4,6 Million spectators, are at the center of
the German political discourse. The main strains of the debate have been the following:
- Crimea: Has Crimea been annexed by force or integrated by Russia in accordance to legality and
legitimacy?
- Russia meddling in Ukraine: To what extent is Russia controlling the fighters in Eastern
Ukraine?
- Ukraine as a problem: How divided is Ukraine? Are Russian-speakers discriminated against?
How fascist is the Maidan and the government? Was Yanukovych ousted by a putsch?
- The Wests mistakes: Is Russia a victim, just pushing back in reaction to aggressive western
pressure, defending its legitimate rights? Was Nato enlargement a mistake? What did McCain on the
Maidan? Isnt Russias behavior legitimate because the west does the same (Kosovo)?
- How dangerous is Russia? Are we moving towards a new cold or even hot war? How can we
overcome the conflict with Russia?
The talk shows at ARD and ZDF have given plenty of space to those defending the Kremlins attack
on Ukraine, and the debates have often been centered around the arguments provided by the Kremlin.
A typcial setting has been that two speakers defend Russia, another speaker is making the case for
the chancellerys position, and another person delivering a sharp criticism of Russia. The usual debate

has consisted of a back-and-forth between those who defend and those who criticize the Russian
position.

b) Newspapers
The way the Ukraine conflict has been presented in newspapers is much more complex than the
debates in the talk shows.
The main quality press - Sddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Welt,
Tageszeitung (taz), ZEIT, Spiegel, - has done overall a good or very good job in reporting about the
conflict. And they have featured a large number of interesting and knowledgable commentators from
all sides.
The main divide has not been between newspapers but inside newspapers. While most Russia
correspondents and other correspondents based in Central Europe (Warsaw) had a deeper, realistic
understanding of the conflict and of the character of Russian politics today, German-based heads of
desks or members of the editorial teams sometimes stepped up and made the case for the Russian
point of view. What they cared about was less Ukraine but the degradation of relations with Russia.
For the foreign correspondents, it was sometimes a challenge to make sure that their expertise would
be heard.
That however changed over time. The more aggressive Russia moved ahead in Ukraine, the more
visible the breach of the European peace order became, the more difficult it became to defend Russia.
Good or excellent reporting in major newspapers blew away a lot of ideological assumptions.

c) Internet
All the newspapers mentioned in the previous chapter have their websites, which mix print content
with online only content. The most active and most relevant website is Spiegel online. This is the
medium of reference for anyone closely following political news.
Spiegel online has been ambiguous with regard to the conflict. It has send a reporter who has been

accused of pro-Kremlin bias to Ukraine. For a while, some headlines and also some reports appeared
to be at least partly sympathetic to the Kremlins view, as well as some comments.
The problem of online media is often that the level of professionalism is much lower than in printed
newspapers. Editors are badly paid and trained. Some appear to be open to the kind of anti-capitalist
and anti-American world-views that often go hand in hand with a pro-Russian position.
Other only editors may not fully understand the mechanisms of the Kremlins propaganda and take its
distortions as one element of the truth, at the same level as an official statement by the US
government, Nato, the EU or the German government.

4) Who is who in the German debate?

There are broadly two camps in Germany in the German debate about Russia and Ukraine, those who
have been called Russlandversteher (Russia understander) or Putinversteher (Putin understander),
and those who could be labeled Putin-critics.
The Russlandversteher are arguing that Russia shouldnt be condemned for its annexation of Crimea
and its attack on Eastern Ukraine using mainly the following arguments: a) Because the conflict is at
least partly the wests fault, as the west is playing geopolitics in Russias sphere of influence (Nato
enlargement; offer of EU Association Agreement; support for Maidan); b) Because Russias historical
rights/legitimate interests in Ukraine have been ignored; c) Because Ukraine is the problem, as it is
corrupt, split, attacking Russia-leaning minorities, not Russia; d) Because Russia may be dangerous;
west must avoid another Cold War.
For the Putin-critics on the other hand, Russia has become a dangerous, revisionist power, internally
corrupt and increasingly autocratic. Ukraine has been attacked without reason and must be supported.
What is at stake is not only the future of Ukraine, but the future of a European peace order.
Who are the main voices in both camps?
a) Russlandversteher

A first group is constituted by journalists. The main voice is Gabriele Krone-Schmalz who has been
invited to 5 of the 24 talk shows in ARD and ZDF between March 2014 and February 2015. She has
been a Russia correspondent in the early 1990s. Her book Russia verstehen (Understanding Russia)
has been published in late 2014. Krone-Schmalz has excused the annexation of Crimea and blamed
the west for all kinds of failures in dealing with Russia.
Another journalist in this group is Jakob Augstein. He is the son of the founder of Spiegel, the number
one political magazine in Germany. Augstein has his own left-wing weekly (Freitag), writes a weekly
column for Spiegel online and is often invited to TV talk shows to present a left-wing view. In the
Ukraine conflict, he has constantly blamed the US and excused Russia. Another pro-Russian
journalist is Alice Schwarzer a famous campaigner for womens rights in Germany.
A second group is related to business interests. Eckhard Cordes, a German manager, is head of
Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, a role that traditionally is equal to being the lobbyist for
business with Russia. Cordes is openly critical of sanctions but cautious not to publicly challenge the
chancellor.
Alexander Rahr is Senior Advisor of Wintershall, a daughter of BASF, which is closely cooperating
with Gazprom. Rahr has been a leading German Russia expert since the 1990s. In his biography of
Putin (2000) he describes how he met the Russian leader personally. Rahr is since long at the center
of German-Russian networks at the intersection of business and politics. While for many years he has
influenced the German opinion of Russia, during the Ukraine crisis he hasnt had much public profile.
The reason may be that Rahr has increasingly been criticized in media as a Putin apologist.
A third group of Russlandversteher is made of former politicians of the centre-left Social Democratic
Party, SPD. The leading figure is Gerhard Schrder, chancellor from 1998 to 2005. Schrder and
Putin have built a close relationship since 2003. Immediately after stepping down in 2005, Schrder
became head of Nord Stream, Gazproms pipeline project in the North Sea. At the height of the crisis
over the annexation of Crimea Schrder has celebrated his 70th birthday with Putin in St. Petersburg
(April 7, 2014). Schrder has several times warned against sanctions and voiced understanding for
the Russian position.

Henning Voscherau, another prominent SPD politician, former mayor of Hamburg, has taken the job of
chairman of the board of South Stream in 2012; but unlike Schrder he hasnt much commented
publicly during the Ukraine conflict. By contrast, his predecessor as mayor of Hamburg however,
Klaus von Dohnanyi, has been one of the Russlandversteher who have played down the annexation of
Crimea and criticized western reaction.
Another prominent SPD figure making the case for the Kremlins views has been Matthias Platzeck,
former Minister President of the State of Brandenburg and briefly chairman of SPD (2005-6). Today he
is chairman of the German-Russian forum, the organizer of the yearly Petersburger Dialog. Alexander
Rahr (see above) serves as Research director at the German-Russian forum. Platzeck has called for
more understanding for the Russian position during the Ukraine conflict and called for the recognition
of the annexation of Crimea.
A fourth group of Russlandversteher is made of politicians of Die Linke, the successor party to SED,
the ruling party in the GDR. Gregor Gysi, Sahra Wagenknecht, Katja Kipping and other party leaders
routinely criticize the west for the response to the Ukraine crisis and put doubt on the character of the
Ukrainian government.
A fifth group are former West German politicians who made started their career long before 1989.
They want to preserve the good relation Germany has built with the Soviet Union/Russia in the 1980s
and 1990s. Among those are two former chancellors, Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl and two
former leading intellectual figures from SPD, Egon Bahr (architect of Ostpolitik) and Erhard Eppler.
Horst Teltschik who played a leading role in managing the German re-unification and who became
head of the Munich Security Conference in the 1990s also belongs into that group. All of them have
voiced discomfort with the more confrontational approach towards Russia Angela Merkel has chosen.
Another Russlandversteher is Philip Mifelder, foreign policy spokesman of CDU/CSU group in the
German parliament. Mifelder has joined Schrder on his birthday party with Putin in April 2014.
There was a moment when it looked as if Mifelder, former head of the influential youth organisation
of CDU/CSU would lose his office as a spokesman. He remained in office, but refrained afterwards
from speaking out on Russia and Ukraine in public.

b) Putin critics
The list of explicit critics is much shorter.
Two are from Merkels party, CDU. Andreas Schockenhoff, a foreign policy expert at Bundestag, has
been one of the most outspoken critic of Putins regime long before the conflict. 2006 to 2014
Schockenhoff was coordinator for German-Russian civil society dialogue, in 2014 he was succeeded
by Gernot Erler (SPD), reportedly at the initiative of Steinmeier who became foreign minister again.
Schockenhoff died in December 2014. (Erler has moved from speaking out for Russia to becoming
rather silent during the conflict; he appears to be genuinely disappointed with the failure of
modernization approach he developed with Steinmeier in the second half of the 2000s.)
The other rather outspoken Merkel ally is Norbert Rttgen. The former minister for environment is now
head of the foreign affairs committee at Bundestag. He is regularly invited to TV where he makes the
case for Merkels course on Russia and Ukraine.
Another prominent politician from Merkels CDU who became a Putin critic is Elmar Brok, head of the
foreign affairs committee in the European Parliament. Brok is present in TV and radio in Germany. He
has been closely involved in EU policies in Ukraine for years, and he makes a very strong case for
supporting Ukraine and pushing back against Russia through sanctions.
The strongest public advocate for Ukraine in Germany is Marieluise Beck from the Green party. Beck
as well as her husband, Ralf Fcks, head of Bll Stiftung (related with the Greens), are very engaged
on Ukraine. Beck hasnt been invited to the main talk shows but she is regularly quoted in the media.
Some more Putin critics: Boris Reitschuster, a former newspaper correspondent in Moscow, sharply
critical, author of a book on Putin and increasingly present also in TV. Karl Schlgel, a leading
academic expert on Russia, highly respected but only at the margins of the public debate. John
Kornblum, former US-ambassador to Germany, often invited to TV when there is interest in having an
American voice. Berthold Kohler, an editor of FAZ, the leading centre-right newspaper, who regularly
writes very sharp, critical comments of Russias policies.

5) The Kremlins influence

It is difficult to assess what influence the Kremlin has on the debate in Germany because this
influence is by its nature not open and visible. Such an influence can only be assumed but not be
proved.
What is visible is that there are several networks in which Russian officials and businesspeople meet
with German peers. The most prominent is the Petersburger Dialog (once the year), organized by
Deutsch-Russisches Forum. What is also visible is the presence of some official Russian media in
Germany; there are several websites in Germany who present the Russian view: Russland.ru,
de.sputniknews.com, and rtdeutsch.com, the German website of Russia Today. The German Russia
Today, which does some web TV, has 81.000 Likes on Facebook. The videos of Russia Today in
German on Youtube have between 2.000 and around 100.000 views. Those outlets are far from the
mainstream and dont seem very successful.
The Kremlins views are rather introduced into the German debate a) through official Russian
statements, and their coverage in mainstream media, and b) through the group of Russlandversteher
who are in contact with Russian officials and businesspeople and often make the case for what they
see as the Russian point of view.

6) Recommendations for OSF

The debate on Russia and Ukraine has changed from March 2014 until today. In the beginning,
Russlandversteher have dominated the debate, and a large majority was against pushing back
against Putin. But since then, the mood has changed. Germany has woken up to the threat of Russian
revisionism and to the need to defend the European peace order. The main factors were that a)
Russia demonstrated increasing aggression, b) the fog of Russian propaganda has been largely
removed by good reporting and analysis in the mainstream press, c) Merkel has pushed for a tough
response to Russian aggression. Today, a solid majority of Germans supports economic sanctions
against Russia and is in line with the governments tougher approach.
There are two kinds of activities OSF could consider doing in order to reinforce the positive trends. It

could a) help making Germany more resilient against Russian info war, by setting up a fact-checking
team, and b) build more support for Ukraine in Germany through funding of networks and other
activities.

a) Set up a fact checking team

A main entry point for Russian propaganda are news. The war over Ukraine was also a war of
narratives, and narratives are based on the presentation of facts and reality in a certain light. The
Kremlin is very skilled at presenting a parallel reality in its statements and news.
While German journalists working for print media have learned to treat news coming out of the
Kremlins propaganda machinery with caution, online journalists are much more open to consider
them as the other side of truth. As looking at both sides is an important element of journalistic
ethics, many journalists treat news coming from Moscow in the same way they treat news coming
from western institutions.
OSF could consider setting up a team to do the necessary fact-checking and provide German media
(as well as Russian, English media) in almost realtime with a critical review of news items that come
from the Kremlins propaganda machinery. Such an organization, which would need to be highly
professional in order to build trust, would help the journalists and editors to better judge the value of
news items produced in Russia.

b) Build support for Ukraine

Since reunification, Germany has built all kind of relations with Russia, political, economical and
cultural. At the same time, relations with Ukraine have been very much neglected. Thats why there is
very little knowledge, understanding and sympathy in Germany today for Ukraine.
During the conflict, Ukrainian voices have gotten more attention. But still the German-Ukrainian
relationship remains underdeveloped. OSF could support the emerging networks in Germany by
setting up an internet platform, by sponsoring events and publications, and by helping to set up a

Ukraine house or centre in Berlin. More contacts between cities, professional groups (including
journalists) should also be promoted.
Over the longer term, what matters for German-Ukrainian relations is to build a critical mass of people
in Germany who know the country and can make Ukrainian views and interests better heard and
understood in Germany.