Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

Response to Discussion Questions: The Political

Economy of Collapsing Bridges


Demond Jones
Introduction to Public Administration
Rutgers University, Newark
March 22, 2016

Response to Discussion Questions: The Political Economy of


Collapsing Bridges

What political forces help prevent the more widespread implementation of


user fees?
There are several forces that prevent more widespread use of user fees. One of
these forces is the loss of value in the original tax value over time due to inflation
over the life of the tax. In essence, the ability of government to use the tax to
maintain and improve infrastructure diminishes as inflation begins to erode the
power of each tax dollar collected. Another forces working against the increased use
of user fees is the hassle or inconvenience of the infrastructure project being done
with tax-funding. Those using the road or bridge, for example, may not like the fact
that the project leads to longer time on the road during a commute. In addition, the
perceived burden of the implementation of a user fee to fund a capital project is
also a force that pushes against the widening use of user fees. In each of these
cases elected politicians are likely to avoid the increased use of user fees in hopes
of keep their constituents contented one term to another (p.129).
However, there are creative solutions to some of these unintended consequences of
our political system. An indexed or progressive tax approach, as is the case with
Social Security Tax, to alleviate the loss of tax value due to inflation (p.129). There is
also the implementation of a user fee in the form of tolls roads, which can generate
more tax revenue and reduce road use and congestion as users look for cheaper
alternatives (p.130).
Currently, it is difficult to sue the federal government unless it agrees to
be sued. If the law were changed so that lawsuits (such as by victims of
the collapse of the I-35W bridge) were easier, how would this change the
incentives of the government to properly maintain bridges, roads, and
dams? How likely is the government to agree to such a legal change?

Currently, the government/ government elected officials have little to no incentive


to maintain infrastructure in the form of bridges, roads, dams, etc. because there is
no direct cost or burden that is assumed by government as is the case with private
businesses (p.130). If the law were changed so that victims of failed infrastructure
could sue, without government consent, this could possibly provide the incentive for
government to be more proactive in hopes of avoiding lawsuits; however, there is a
potential for unintended consequences in this regard. The U.S. government
currently takes on tremendous responsibility; and therefore, liability in its operations
to provide service. By opening up government to suits, there are various dangers
that become apparent. For example, the burden to the legal system as cases are
brought against the government. In addition, there is the burden to the tax payers
who will ultimately be responsible for paying out on lawsuits against the
government. Given these realities or possibilities it is unlikely that government will
seek to change the laws governing the ability of individuals to sue the government.
Based on the argument of this chapter, do the incentives of the U.S.
senators (who serve six-year terms) differ from those of the members of
the House of Representatives (who serve two-year terms) when it comes
to engaging in long-term planning of construction and maintenance
projects? Would the imposition of term limits, which constrain politicians
in the number of years they can serve, improve or impair their long-term
incentives?
In the reading, The Political Economy of Collapsing Bridges it is argued that
government elected officials lack the incentive to engage in long-term planning of
construction projects. In general, this is true. Voter contentment provides incentives
for elected officials to avoid long-term construction and maintenance of
infrastructure. Given the relatively short political cycle elected officials are averse to
the tax burden and inconvenience associated with long-term infrastructure planning
and implementation; however, this opposition to long-term construction projects is

more acute for officials with shorter terms, such as those in the House of
Representatives because they have less time between elections; and therefore, less
time between exposure to unhappy voters resulting from increased taxes and
project delays.
If these term limits were shortened it is most likely that this would have an
increased negative effect on governmental will to address eroding infrastructure
than is currently the case. This is because officials would be subjected to more
pressure to keep their voter base pleased by avoiding the taxes and inconveniences
that result from long-term construction projects. On the other hand, if officials were
given longer terms they would be less effected, politically, by the decision to plan
long-term infrastructure projects. Longer terms provide the incentive to commit to
the long term projects.
Explain the difference between the incentive of the owner of a house and
a renter of a house to undertake expenditures designed to improve or
maintain the house. For example, are renters more likely to replace light
bulbs or wall-to-wall carpets when they wear out? When renters spend
funds on a new bookcase, is it likely to be built-in or portable? What are
the parallels between incentives here and the incentives of Congress
when it comes to current expenditure versus capital expenditure?
Incentives for owners versus renter incentives are very different when it comes to
undertaking expenditures designed to maintain or improve a home. Owners are
more likely to invest in long term maintenance and improvements. Renters are more
likely to invest in short term maintenance and improvements. Owners are more
likely to undertake long term investments in maintenance and improvements
because it directly improves the value of their investment and the use or improved
use of the house/ investment. Renters are unlikely to undertake long term
investments in maintenance and improvements because they do not benefit long
term from this maintenance and improvement, although they do benefit directly.

The latter scenario shares parallels with Congress in terms of capital expenditure.
Congress, as elected officials, act as renters of a house, opposed to owners. They
are averse to long term investment in capital projects, such as bridge repair and
maintenance. This is due to the short-terms within office and the need to satisfy
voters leading up to the next election cycle. These facts create incentives to avoid
long term investment in infrastructures, as is the case with renters.

Вам также может понравиться