Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ.
FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO
PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA,
PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B.
BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO
NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA,
3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT
MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL),
MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE,
MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE,
RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C.
CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO,
ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL,
MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE
EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO
DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO,
FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA,
ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO
TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO,
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY,
JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO
ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA,
VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS
ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO,
RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA,
FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA,
PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI
UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA,
LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993

ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA

EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA
YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND
CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity
as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO
GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL,
LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES,
RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE
AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE
MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ,
HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN,
NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO
DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS
SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS
MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA,
CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO,
EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO,
RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA,
FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA,
PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI
UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA,
LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.
Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 & private
respondents in 84607.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is
quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to
the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now,
the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those
however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just
that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again.
Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted
this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent Judge
Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.

Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R.
No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil
Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:
With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military
Officers, since they are being charged in their personal and official
capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial
responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can
not conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the
Philippines is hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the
motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings.
On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both
parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no
cogent reason to disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by
members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry
(now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration
Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called
"genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to
farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land
payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The
two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only
on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson
Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following day.
On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo
demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted
immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the
matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January
21, 1987.
Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of
encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going
inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his
leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo,
however, countered by saying that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a

genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated

discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister
Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their
demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered
fiery words, the most telling of which were:
". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan
alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak
ang dugo . . . ." 4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at
10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino
Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief
program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the
Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter,
they joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto
Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital
Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break
through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander General
Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government forces
to quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command
of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance
control units of the Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim
were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA
elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were
also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly
occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate
the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short) stated that the government
anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the
following manner:
(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4,
6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown detachment of the Western Police
District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the
Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC
first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the
intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were ordered to
move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in

khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum

shields, truncheons and gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD
policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field
Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force,
who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and
gas masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police Major
Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control
Battalion composed of the first and second companies of the Philippine
Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with
shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under
the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was
positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field
Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the
entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water
cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on
each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of
Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply
water to the two water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal
Teams (MDT) each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an
assistant grenadier, a driver and the team leader.
In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood
the VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of the Commanding General of
CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after
General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander,Colonel
Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was
agreed thatPolice General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel
Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as negotiators with
the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC
elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to
Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the
latter would negotiate with the marchers. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto
Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the
marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and,
borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission
stated in its findings, to wit:
. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and
bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the
police. The police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The

police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators
disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto
Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt.
Laonglaan Goce sped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the
remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing
the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to
Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the
rallyists assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of
policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands,
who were armed with long firearms. 6 (Emphasis ours)
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according
to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address
of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained
minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20)
suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 11, 7(A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created
the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria
and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was
created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths,
and casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and
Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission
was expected to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed
to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative
Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on
February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No.
17, issued on February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with
the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of
paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of
said law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were
armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a
prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under
paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the
Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers of the

police and military commanders were incivilian attire in violation of

paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal
control units in dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph
(e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden
clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are
prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and punishable
under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials
and were determined to march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by
the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo
"bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom
na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces.
Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the
marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through
the first line of the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood
their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire from
both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and
tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because
(a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned;
and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the
rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and the wounded and dead were
being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the military with their tear
gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the
Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the
remnants of the marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason
was given for its absence. 8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution
of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at
the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's
recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake
investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted

in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested
that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the INP Field
Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g)
of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The
Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for
carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have yet to be established.
As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation
of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a
permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for
inciting to sedition. As for the following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2)
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio
dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make
effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in
Mendiola, administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.
The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the
government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received
by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal
letter of demand for compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was
indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on
February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the
Mendiola victims. 11
After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to
institute an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the
military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March
16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the
dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International
Law on Human Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as
against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the
State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the
same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently,
Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and
personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.

Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues,
the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and
resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the
State has waived its immunity from suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation
made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the
Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino in the
aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is
expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence
of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of
public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and
consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the
heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any
way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that
A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body
that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is
relevant to Our discussion reads:
1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the
commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same
shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation
and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper
court. 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as
the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore,
the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself.
Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence
of it being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or
said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The
President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there
was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners
(Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people".

Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government
would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the
State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the
suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that
such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

16

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to
the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants,
were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions
ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use
of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units
committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by
them in dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly
without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found application, this
Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic. The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are
duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they
fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state
and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its
consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any
liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief
demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor
the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or
act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has
made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license
to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths
that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the
lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein
public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority,
may be held liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE
LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN
LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN
SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M.
LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO
TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO
BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV
(95), Quezon City,respondents.

YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It
poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations
of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be
maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly
involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others,
that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of
the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information
and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in

the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting
to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their
official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente,
Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by
plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma,
Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated
Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95,
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I
sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a
judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because,
as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the
court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against
defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the
possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts
of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision
and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments,
the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand,
plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983,
respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of
plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W.
Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L.
Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag,
Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of
dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the]
aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to
plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending
motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration
signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee,

by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984,
the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting
on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose
W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez,
Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by
counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty.
Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren
Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983,
dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final
against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May
28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco
Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing
the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the
order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the
plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to
reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the
resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of
November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the
order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth ProtacioMarcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present
action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it
affects and refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated
November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect,
reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and
set aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and
its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the
petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government
for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may
seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and
political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind
ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else
liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless
the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect
implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we
discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from
reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that
as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain
that
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides
that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution,
Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial
law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion
shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements
of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against
unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the
right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of
the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent
members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for
acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy
considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue interference
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the
necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions

from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan

v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their
duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct.
631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S.
Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller
v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President
and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such
immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced.
The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of
official duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a
legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the
Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants,
and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are
left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this
power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for
the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers
vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that
the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in
damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such
objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled
by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are
excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or
carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic
from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy
or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely
trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of
competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit
aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the
main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered,
their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their
constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from
detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts
cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do
by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are
explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding
the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasidelict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within
one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to
remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March
25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos.
2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
question therefore has become moot and academic.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion
of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates,
to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We
agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to
principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article
32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in
the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that
propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government
was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human
rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson,
Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson,
Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the
acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and
Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of
alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But
such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional
rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from

being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made
without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to
plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the
search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper
and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses"
where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory
statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face
of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in
the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of
action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master
Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if
admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all
of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with
respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of
the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by
'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel
for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin
Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V.
Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and
Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the
plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for

when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers
who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio
Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr.,
Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas
S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so
on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an
attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged
by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was
grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set
aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the
plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of
all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality
to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of
the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with
legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent
court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings.
With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906

October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF

THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret
walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The
constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the
rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to
stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary
remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24,
2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not
limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and
(2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting,
curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as AmparoPetition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by

the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition
under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file
with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from
service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on
November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners
(herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of
this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this
decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007
within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be
express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14,
2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a
meeting all the residents of theirbarangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not

able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the
soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and
army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his
mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him
on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of
his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and
face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but
three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They
were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also
recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While
he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo
Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity,
he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom
he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house
and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit
beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally
arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the
doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his
(Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member
of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns.
He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many
NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat
him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds
when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of
the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While
these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the
soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents.
During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and
beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood,
slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of
his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly
breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and
kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then
made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came
to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window.
He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used
stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an
Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he
was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the
highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and
caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was
Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she
wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was
returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated.
When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents'
guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed
by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did
everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He
counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother
Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They
were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into
the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
"DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took
their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they
had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body.
The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them
medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results
of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine.
The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the
"master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in
the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and
several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario
and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board
the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for
about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were
brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit.
Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in
the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then
asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond
responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil
man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa
akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay,
basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag
pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang
kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na
kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise.
At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that
abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while
Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and
other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were
afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued
to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were
then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking
with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen.
Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood
outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to
take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at
Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are
on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.31 During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The
medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box
of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting

their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt
heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military
trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of
the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and
civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the
24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren
went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was
removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many
soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In
one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing
to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was
made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room
with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or
"commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the
adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they
should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the
hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them
not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November
2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out
as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names
and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred
to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp.
They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them.
While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit
him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the
camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were
brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man

doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the
NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog,"
Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only
his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in
a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier
was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and
chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and
Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he
witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald
na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon
man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang
bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang
katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong
sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng
dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa
labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang
isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong
pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga
bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod.
Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila
sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin
daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas,
pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig
at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng
mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang
sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang
babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni
Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi
na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to
raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for
which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a
small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were
instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed.
They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they
saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how
he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived
nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some
more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them
while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of
the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no
television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had
a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none
of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway,
leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila
and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from
their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded
with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was
detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped.
With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no
longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo
was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house
of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name
"Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes,
Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose,
del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also
brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these
trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but
allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by
Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp
Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action
Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where
torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the
respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent
with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on
August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into
writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul
Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance
with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ
of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly
abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the
military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf
by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen.
Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely:
Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4,
2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19,
2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding
that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of
the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any
capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining
respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release
the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner)
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007
and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional
operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field,
nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the
Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this
case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance
with Section 9(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance...
Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a

policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the
following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court
against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death
or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance
as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return
of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of
National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I
have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to
Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the
matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007,
addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D
PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this
Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted
by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the same has
been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another
Petition for the Writ ofAmparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a
certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to
establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to

bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or
had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when
warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC)
PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan,
Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay,
Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay,
Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the
Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and
were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the
alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry,
however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj.
Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons
implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return
and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U.
Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora,
Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is
part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry
Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the
alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA
Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA
Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative
liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated
not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw
news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned
about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn
statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00
in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt.
Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were
no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses
summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to
investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not
known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he
was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not
propound a single question to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30,
2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29,
2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his
investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June
1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their
evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were
forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for
Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela
Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged
members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together
with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed
by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that
they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those
who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject
vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo
@ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of

the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the
suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just
came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being
informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is
a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
"O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a
member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was
very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother
"KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that
on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of
his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He
claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his
mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE
who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him
in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E")
states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still
unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that
on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He
claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of
any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the
military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because
there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA
leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father
and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate.
He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when
rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,

Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for
twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of
the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb
2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he
learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him
about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him
as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy
his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of
linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that
incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this
investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the
killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando
Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the
abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused
claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this
would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the
abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant
in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their
village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far
as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of
abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this
investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment
and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be
exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the
foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING
AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO
BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO
aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS,
AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND
MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A
LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO
THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations
that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to
provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as
well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve
the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the
Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In
1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great
interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican

jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in
1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted
pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal
or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in
litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that
motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after
hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he
orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary
measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to
enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them
from using this power to make law for the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into
various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of
a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of
conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her
own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public
authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for
the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted
to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas.
In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of
constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to
some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo,
several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the
judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the
Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is
comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review,
which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas
corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness
required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ
of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the
respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the
promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal
and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007,
they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective
and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court
granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument
in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and
credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed
and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners'
cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the
degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims bysubstantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals
that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on
August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were
narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are
the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang
hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may
palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa
isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang
isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond
Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries.
Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear
door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the
CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and
Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members,
served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military
men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners,
validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the
petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the

abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best,
merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division
focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness
might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation
of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from
outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he
was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his
command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and
told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands
of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy
that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without
due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could
not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario
drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction,
did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which
the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond
also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board
a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where
they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan
on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they
were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the
petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only
Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to
join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not
again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations.
(Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others
being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the
occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health.
(Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that
Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military
personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly
established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the
abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony
and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left
by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the
facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister
Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case,
Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of
fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by
Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where
she was detained.107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that
the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with
her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will
come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents
admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not
"free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that
people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of
Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are
directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position
to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied)

Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or
even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often
associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition
against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security
expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be
kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall
under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They
submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in
view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."
Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the
teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if
there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement
to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being
put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life
and liberty, and aviolation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated
as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a
textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her
person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits
the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by
the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful
invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is
an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security
of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence.
(Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches
and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is
a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not
a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In
a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation
of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise
of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially
an individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis
supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat
to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range
from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to
say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute

more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger
to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of
the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although
not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not
even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was
made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v.
Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state
authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person.
Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right
to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3,
on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged
ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the
time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to
ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the
procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his
allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a
statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to
security and liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human

rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific
human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the
Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective
if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and
be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. 135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has
been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases
involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction
with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of
person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.
In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a
secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic
Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a
part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the
context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions
of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of
article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right
to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements
have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in
article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the
right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same
time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known
threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is

not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article
9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of
non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the
guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and
prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his
movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the
Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that
state;Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a
supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the
complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt
on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security"
not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on
the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security
of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case
on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been
arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information
and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was
a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the
very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life,
liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with
gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call
from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to
pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released
by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that

towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a
camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng
mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they
have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and
torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection
by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their
free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because
respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be
expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written
threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents'
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of
petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7thInfantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided.
He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation
when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single
question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of
the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum
Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of
Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a
competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification
of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence;
identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the
person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected
offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the

units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance
and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive
was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have
not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant
petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is
a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by
the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the
court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of
M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports,
records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought
by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the
production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3)
there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point
out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also
argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true
in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should
not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the
unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand
of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things
under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under
authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of
among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company
questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure
clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil
procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of
the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the
present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as
the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will
unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military
officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even
death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind
their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their
areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers
can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for
violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are
snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ
of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission
on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a
decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasijudicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or
other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission
on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing
and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or
otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary
of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives,
the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of

Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed
to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H).
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others,
named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and
also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the
Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining
order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of
the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally
made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted
in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I).
Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition
before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were
filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members
so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous
to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September
27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . .
(DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case
No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11,
1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario)
received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear
the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due
process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass
leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission
thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in
its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two
teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very
badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to
bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave
to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990
alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has
no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case
No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still
timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on
the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful
for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges
against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion
to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within
ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on
the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers"
"were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to
reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect
to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by

the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August
6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers,
(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or
strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,
this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take
appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial
agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or
hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving
civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the
Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the
following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It
may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of
any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any

department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular
or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged
in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not
the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion
to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and
making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may
well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of
the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would
be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful
purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary
Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof
can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to
the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome
the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case
and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights
of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the
victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but
also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a
consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending socalled "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private)
and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in
this case.

# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome
the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case
and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights
of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the
victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but
also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a
consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending socalled "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private)
and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and
PEDRO ORDONEZ,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in
Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For
purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was
bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was
later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises
and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor,
Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financialassistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita
Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro
Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint
(Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at
iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.
According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on
May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March
20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project
Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought
a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop
them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering
postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by
a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor
Remulla!"
On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the
happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by
members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian
followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP
Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts
of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal
before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).
On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla,
again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed
their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order
reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:
Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being
bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent
cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by
some farmers-complainants, and their possession and cultivation thereof
spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with
the Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural "squatters", the Commission
reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways, their Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist
from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come to the
Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain
from further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of
the Commission.
This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative is requested to
appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)
On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of
authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.
On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.
On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this
Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ;
that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that
the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the
issue raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining
order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and
harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987
Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)
On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he
be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the
latter "fully traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo).
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the
acts complained of?
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December
2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it mayinvestigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise

restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those
actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to
their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 &
8.)
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October
1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R.
No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action
pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for
the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction
dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are here by
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on
September 19, 1991, is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado, Devide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et
al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it
is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)
If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status
quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in
effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR,
consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist
orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends
to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of
the other constitutional commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings (investigation).

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et
al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it
is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)
If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status
quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in
effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR,
consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist
orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends
to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of
the other constitutional commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings (investigation).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83896

February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815

February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as
Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment;
LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of
National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as
Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science
and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary
of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication;
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head
of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the
assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or
controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter
to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as
members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to
the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
83815 3 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 4 from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815
the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition andmandamus, as well as a temporary
restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in
addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the
1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of
privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public
respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have
received from such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the
aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, 5 declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public
office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly
provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if
allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that
on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days
before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284. 6

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and
Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the
general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage"
between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers
one, the President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general
allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank
assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government
expected to lead by example." 7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,
as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 9 and DOJ Opinion
No. 155, series of 1988, 10being the first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary
of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution,
involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to
positions other than his primary position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that
Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is
consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and
DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not
applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as exofficio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to the holding of
multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public
official concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided
in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB
on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in
general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of
the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the
Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public
respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of

the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the
exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President
being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3,
Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein
are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of
the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members
of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time
legislative powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential
decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding
salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of selfenrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the
floor of the Batasang Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report
of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: GovernmentOwned and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried
as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government
service were the data contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing

boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda

R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of
fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C.
Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each; Manuel P.
Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and
Teodoro Q. Pea of ten (10) each. 13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming
sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the
people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed
Constitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct,
the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as
keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of
the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was
the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation
therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should
see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional
provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other
provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees
from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the
active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government,including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter provision,
the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The

prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers
both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of
the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his
official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner
Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no
symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and
the anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We
actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they
exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article
I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in
Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would
have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13
of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate
the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking
officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand,
and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary
downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their
tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under
Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the
Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is

absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB
would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the VicePresident to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing
the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such
absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration
as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7,
par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. 17 Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution 18 and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together. 19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory. 20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be
a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. 21 The phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is
that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among
which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the VicePresident, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to

exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National
Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), both of which are attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance.
Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then
be assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money,
banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted
as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences,
if possible, should be avoided. 26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means
"from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely,
not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence
of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. 28To illustrate, by express provision of
law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board
of the Philippine Ports Authority, 29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority. 30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael vs.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of
the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to
qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of
the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must
already be holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who
does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be
designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect to the
representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should
be, because the representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to
those already performed under their original appointments." 32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus
means chief or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the
plural. 33 The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the
official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary
functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board,
and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime
Industry Authority 34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An
example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on
the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not
limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members,
their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their
offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice
justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing
and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic
services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter
egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 35 Without these additional duties and
functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or
boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by their primary functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of
the means for control and resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such
additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned,
who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered
by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof,
he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in
defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation,
whether it be in the form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner
Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the
General Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his position," 36 express
reference to certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made. 37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out
that there are instances when although not required by current law, membership of certain highranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said

officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of
Trade and Industry. 38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for
saying that additional functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may
be imposed upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it
cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7,
par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary
session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee
Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed article on General Provisions. 39 At that time, the
article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on July 22,
1986, 40 while the article on the Executive Department, containing the more specific prohibition
in Section 13, had also been earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. 41 It was
only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Committee on
Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B
and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would serve as
constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What
was primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and
delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all
appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific
prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform
to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later
placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family
is by reason of the legal principles governing additional functions and duties of public officials
rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that
only the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary
functions may be considered as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.1wphi1Debates in
the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." 43 The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those
cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive

officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order
No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict
application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the
Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an exofficio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified
in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional
compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not
fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than
real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job,
requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to
be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment.
He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many
positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the
advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise,
particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if
any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more
than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders
respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.,
Secretary of Local Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos,
Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to
immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to
the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no
longer occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers
and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that "in
cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession
of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de
facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. 47 Any per diem,

allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services

rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180543

August 18, 2010

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as represented

by JOVITO R. SALONGA, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY;
GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the
Courts Decision inKilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,1 filed a petition2 under Rule 108 of the
Rules Court for the "amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry on
citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch
264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio
Janolo, Jr. presided.
Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the
proceedings in the RTC case.
As Ongs petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28, 2007,3 petitionerstherein oppositors4 filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for voluntary inhibition, which the RTC
denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior to the hearing on the
motion.5 Despite the pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to
hear Ongs petition on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was only by Order of September 17,
20076 that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on October 4, 2007.
Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007,7 the RTC declared petitioners in default. Petitioners
motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied by Order of October 4, 2007,8 a copy
of which was received by petitioners on October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the RTC granted
Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, by Decision of
October 24, 2007.9
In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public respondent
"erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting himself from
presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in
granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong."10

The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment on the
petition, with which Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied on March 14,
2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted their Consolidated Reply on
December 10, 2008.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and the
OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the
hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification renders the petition as unsigned
pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules.
The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v.
Tuazon,11 where the Court discussed the various remedies available to a party declared in
default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if the trial
court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in
default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in default may
thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment
of default.12 On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners recourse procedurally
allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the choice of court forum.
The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals
and petitions for extraordinary writs.13 The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the
Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it. A direct
invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and
important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.14
The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling
circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection elicited no response
from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If
petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is
not minded to search for one.
Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating the basis
thereof. In the Verification/ Certification of the Petition, the affiant states that he "has read the
same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct."15 The Rules clearly state that a
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a
pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.16 Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never
be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the
matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.17
Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his
identity before the notary public, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.18The
Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to the notary public,
for the jurat does not contain a statement to that effect.
Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the petition.
The Rules require that the petition should be filed with proof of service on all adverse parties,

and that the failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.19
On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court deems it
best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of justice.
In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public
respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the
schools Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ongs petition through
newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point out
that issuing the order of default without resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly
unwarranted.
The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (underscoring supplied)
In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness, independence,
impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities,
the Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in 1964. In outlining the genesis of the provision,
the Court narrated:
In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to
that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend upon the
discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were
not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon
to account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of
prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an active
part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v. Javelona paved the way for
the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification those that depended upon the
exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.20
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition
and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid
reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on
whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.
It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or

previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that
could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a
sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and
varied.21
In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of
judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar
circumstances.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb
in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to
trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the
issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their
courtrooms.22
Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its
reality, in order to provide "good, sound or ethical grounds" or "just and valid reasons" for
inhibition.23 Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.24 InGochan v.
Gochan,25 the Court elucidated further:
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and
valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit,
especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if
weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice
fairly and equitably both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the
well-connected.26 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning,
Inc.27 where the judges right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to decide the case without
fear of repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open
the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a
judge more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair
administration of justice.28
A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing
in a case brought before him.29 In the present case, petitioners cite public respondents
affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their motion for the
voluntary inhibition of public respondent.

Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong
and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell
partiality.
Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the
judge as counsel for one of the parties, however.30 In one case,31 the Court ruled that
organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.
Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an
investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a
member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is
or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic
association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or
Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit
himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens
to come before him or her for action.
A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain
the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of
the legal profession.32(underscoring supplied)
The added fact that the law schools alumni association published statements in support of
Ongs application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic
respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent
actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni associations
stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni associations statement obliged all its
members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.
Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved the motion
for voluntary inhibition one day after it was filed. Since the personal process of "careful selfexamination"33 is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the
factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from there on the
resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase.
That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all graduates
of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence, this sole ground relied
upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer required a hearing or called for
the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not prejudice
petitioners.
In one case,34 it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order the filing of
comments or oppositions to the motion before the motion is resolved. The parties may orally
argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court may rule on the motion.
The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration and
deferment) which basically reiterated their previous arguments, they no longer set the motion for
hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments, thereby
recognizing the non-litigious nature of their allegations.

Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to public
respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in a case by sheer
agreement of the parties.
Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and declared
them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records show that petitioners filed
on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion35 for reconsideration of the August 7, 2007 Order and
for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not
appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they
deem to be an "overriding consideration" partaking of a "highly prejudicial matter," had yet to be
resolved by the trial court.36
While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a
motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly
on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial.37
The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the entry of the
nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the denial of the Omnibus
Motion.
During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the arguments and counterarguments from petitioner [Ong] and the Office of the Solicitor General, and finding no cogent
reasons to reconsider its earlier position, denied in open court the motion seeking a
reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 2007 which denied movants "Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition of Presiding Judge". Corollarily, for lack of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings
in the instant case was similarly denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation in the
original)38
The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court on the given
date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the arguments, the trial court
ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:
COURT: Thats right, so theres no basis to overturn our previous Order denying the motion to
voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong Now, theres another matter being raised here,
counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the proceedings What the Supreme
Court wanted is to have an Order summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought
at their level. Supreme Court was expecting that they will do so again in our level, but in since
theres seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary arguments, so, it will, when it
reaches the Supreme Court, it will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to litigate.
Theyre supposed to litigate because if they believe theyre for the denial of the petition,
unless the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should do so without any
delay, so, use Bayan as a very an active group and Bantay Katarungan, they should be a
party to expeditious resolution of cases, not to a delay. How many are we here from
government. We are here to litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Motion to
Defer Further Proceedings is also denied. The settings for August were all placed in the Order
which was published in the newspaper of general circulation. We have previously agreed that
we will proceed to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or would you agree to the
suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial?39 (underscoring supplied)

The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a
court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered.40 The phrase nunc pro
tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal force and
effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done.41 The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc
is to make a present record of an order that the court made in a previous term, but which was
not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made, but,
by inadvertence, has not been entered.42
In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however, by mistake or
inadvertence, not placed in proper form on record. In any event, petitioners neither seriously
contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such confirmatory order nor claim any
unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their non-appearance in the
scheduled hearing.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and
partiality of the trial court.43 For one, the grant of such is not a matter of right for it is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.44Parties have absolutely no right to assume that their
motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing, lest they
pass the blame to no one but themselves.
Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the
postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.45 In this case, the requested
postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. The Omnibus
Motion was, however, "submitted ex parte and without further arguments from
Oppositors,"46 drawing public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying it.
As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to assess since
they did not file any Opposition to Ongs Petition despite the grant to them of extension of time
for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial court all related to peripheral issues.
No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare petitioners in
default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine that bias and
prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an
extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as
opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and
the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later found to be erroneous will
not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be
inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose.47
Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the judge is
not a proper ground for disqualification. Opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings,
although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct
observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no
matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualification.48
As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the trial
court even granted petitioners additional period within which to file an Opposition and in view of
the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders expediting proceedings.49

In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit
oneself cannot just be overturned.50 In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such acts or
conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of
prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are
patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.
In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit
himself from hearing the case.
On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October 4, 2007
declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order, respectively.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.51 Section 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[t]he civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto." Records
show that the notice was last published on July 26, 2007.52
The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance53 without any attached
Opposition to Ongs petition and that, despite the grant to them of additional five days from
August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a submission. Petitioners do not contest the trial courts
earlier observation that at the August 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners counsel undertook to submit
the Opposition within the extended period and to appear at the next hearing,54 where eventually
both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming.
Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007 Order,
insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been resolved
first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to Vacate Order
and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly
waived other defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order.
For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be
shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.55
As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to comply
with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,56 it noting, inter alia, that the motion
was "not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed any opposition to
the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit."57
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default where such
motion was not made under oath.58 Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default must allege
with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect which
caused the failure to answer.59

In this case, petitioners unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their failure
to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Petitioners persistent stance on the pendency of
their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of the nunc pro
tunc order confirming the August 14, 2007 denial of such motion.
Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the reglementary period
to file a responsive pleading, for where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading,
the Rules of Court expressly provides for such a suspension.60 Despite the grant of an
extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ongs Petition, even one ex
abundante ad cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the alleged
pending incident.
Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any
argument to protect whatever interest they may have under the entry which they resist to be
corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified motion
itself.61 Petitioners would later admit that they are "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical
sense" as they are acting as "judicial monitors and observers."621wphi1
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo63 discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:
Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that she has a
meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the order of default set aside.
The term meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of proving such a
defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually do not require such a strong
showing. The test employed appears to be essentially the same as used in considering
summary judgment, that is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for
submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the
judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a meritorious
defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove to be a useless exercise. Thus, her
motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she intends to
present if the motion is granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable belief that
the result of the case would probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.64 (emphasis in
the original)
Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no intention to
delay the case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of day in court. David v.
Gutierrez-Fruelda65 did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic requirements of a
motion to lift an order of default. Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them
in default and deny their motion to lift the order of default.
Respecting the trial courts Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate their
arguments against the inhibition and default orders to conclude that the assailed decision is
"insupportable."66 As lone ground, petitioners posit that the special proceedings under Rule 108
do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective
adversaries since the Office of the Civil Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the
Solicitor General sided with Ongs legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being parties
in interest in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial litigants in
the juridical sense.67

The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,68 stated that substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition
filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such
proceedings are adversarial in nature or "[o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it."69 In this case,
impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other
person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the
State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while petitioners "interest"
was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading.
Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the October 24, 2007
Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from making
a definitive pronouncement on the substantial aspect of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: