Legal Realism

A report for the subject of Legal Philosophy section 1-D under Atty. Rochelle
Dakanay-Galano for the 2 Semester, Academic Year 2015-2016 as prepared by
the following students;
nd

Ms. Marnelli Joy P. Ajas;

Mr. Brianne A. Du;
Mr. Jerome Napoleon T. Gonzales;
Mr. Vladimir S. Linawan;
and Mr. Dale Edward L. Yu.

This report is submitted on the 12 of March 2016, Saturday.

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction (as prepared by Mr. Gonzales)............................................................4
2 Judicial Legal Realism (as prepared by Mr. Gonzales and Ms. Ajas).......................5
2.1 Intellectual Forebears.................................................................................... 5
2.2 Constructive Skeptics..................................................................................... 6
2.3 Role of Material Facts..................................................................................... 6
2.4 Role of Experience and Social Advantage......................................................7
2.5 Role of Metalegal Stimuli...............................................................................7
2.6 Law as Product of Judicial Processes.............................................................7
2.7 Exclusion of Legislative and Executive Actions..............................................8
2.8 Adjudicative Process as the Prime Mover.......................................................8
2.9 Law and its Purpose....................................................................................... 8
3 Social Legal Realism (as prepared by Mr. Du).........................................................9
3.1

Source of Law.............................................................................................. 9

3.2

End or Purpose of Law................................................................................ 9

3.3 Application of Law........................................................................................ 10

4 Critical Legal Realism (as prepared by Mr. Linawan).............................................11
4.1 Preliminaries:............................................................................................... 11
4.2 Attacks against Critical Legal Realism..........................................................12
5 Psychological Legal Realism (as prepared by Mr. Yu)............................................15
5.1 Nature of Law.............................................................................................. 15
5.2 Jural Relations.............................................................................................. 15
Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 17
1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 17
2 Juridical Legal Realism.................................................................................... 17
3 Social Legal Realism........................................................................................ 18
4 Critical Legal Realism...................................................................................... 18
5 Psychological Legal Realism............................................................................18

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1 Introduction

(as prepared by Mr. Gonzales)

Legal Realism is a school of thought working under the premise that legal
institutions do not exist independently from the framework of social, political, and
moral conflict (Fuller, 1934). According to Schlegel (2015), legal realists had four
overlapping interests creating a coherent framework in direct contrast to the
assertions of legal positivism; pursuing studies of legal institutions, criticizing legal
formalism; arguing a certain interpretation of juridical decision making; and refining
legal education. The fact that something is valid law does not give those to whom
the law applies an objective reason for obedience. (Green, 2005; pp. 1925-1926) It
is worth noting that the theory disregards the conventional definition of Law as the
legal realist framework defines the latter as what courts and partly irresponsible
administrative agencies will do or say within the limits set by statutes and public
opinion. (Radin, 1931; p. 824).
Although some scholars (Bodenheimer, 1940, and Stone, 1946) regard legal
realism as a subdiscipline of legal functionalism, Frank (1930) argues that the
concern of legal realism is with the operation of legal orders in terms of human
experiences in the legal ordering of society. Pragmatism is the central theme of
Legal Realism as the former is based on human experience, hence outweighing
transcendental principles as such principles detaches itself from experiential factors
which grounds Law to societal realities in which the Law thrives (Pascual, 2003).
Pascual credits Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey as proponents of
legal realism.
This report will discuss different types of legal realism; Juridical Legal
Realism by Justice Wendell Holmes, Social Legal Realism by John Dewey, Critical
Legal Realism by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and Psychological Legal Realism by
Axel Hagerstorm; as patterned after the discussion of Pascual (2003).

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2 Judicial Legal Realism

(as prepared by Mr. Gonzales and Ms. Ajas)

Judicial Legal Realism is characterized by healthy skepticism for positivism as

the latter is dependent on the role of rules in the legal ordering of society (Pascual,
2003). The realists were deeply skeptical of the increasingly popular notion that the
creation of the Judicial legislation is a rarity. While not entirely rejecting the ideas
that judges can be constrained by rules, the realists maintained that the judiciary
creates new law through the exercise of law-making discretion considerably more
often than is commonly supposed (Burke, 2012). In the words of Justice Benjamin
Cordozo, no system of living law can be evolved only by the interaction of rules on
the facts and no judge of a high court worthy of his office will view the function of
his office so narrowly. Simply put, Justice Holmes, one of the forefathers of realism,
was now apparently informing everyone that law does not exist in the present. It
only comes into existence in the future when courts issue their rulingsafter people
have made their decisions.

2.1 Intellectual Forebears

Two legal philosophers are credited for the concept of judicial legal realism;
United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Harvard School
of Law Professor John Chipman Gray.
Holmes (1920) has criticized natural law for being self-evident as its precepts
are abstract leading to contradictory results. He firmly believed that the law should
address human experiences past and present. (Hurst, 1964). He further stated
that;
The life of the law has not been logic. It has been experience.
The felt necessities of the times, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intentions of public policy avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a lot to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. (Holmes, 1881).
Anthony D'Amato of Northwestern University School of Law posits that
Holmes Judicial Legal Realism can be reduced to the following: (1) prophecies
exist in the present; (2) prophecies are determinable (i.e., a numerical probability
can be attached to them); (3) the term law means either the precepts that affect
or channel the choices people make, or the assemblage of precepts that can be
found in law libraries and are modified or deleted by the application of other
constitutional or juridical precepts. (4) the law that affects human behavior is
nothing but the prophecies of what courts will do in fact. (5) the law that affects
the choices people make in their everyday lives consists not of rules but of
probabilities of rules.
John Chipman Gray, on the other hand, approached the problem of the
nature of law by complete avoidance of the transcendental ought (Pascual, 2003).
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Gray (1909) created differentiated sources of law from law itself, as he stated; A
law ordinarily means a statute passed by the legislature of the state. The law is the
whole system of rules applied by the courts.. From this, the philosophy of law
under a legal realist framework has been defined as what the courts hand down as
decisions. Gray holds the final interpreter of the law as the true lawgiver, as the
statutes are mere sources of the law. Such thought differentiates legal realism from
legal positivism as advocated by John Austin for the latter failed to distinguish the
law from its sources.

2.2 Constructive Skeptics

Works by Jerome Frank (1942) characterized skepticism as an integral part of
legal realism. That skepticism as seen through the works of Holmes and Gray may
be divided into three; skepticism to rules, to facts, and to opinions.
Rule skepticism levels itself against the formalist approach through two
means; first, that the precision of rules formulated by legal formalism have
universal application; second, that said rules dictate the decision of the case
(Pascual, 2003). Rule skeptics argue that legal formalism did not take into
consideration the inarticulate premises and uncommunicated reactions of persons
involved in conflicts of interests (Frank, 1951) making formalists rely heavily on the
infallibility of legal rules (Frank, 1930). The reason for which is that the courts
deal with the dynamics of the human experience, hence the certainty of formalism
is opposed to the pragmatism required in the administration of justice.
Fact skepticism asserts that the primary cause of legal uncertainty is factual
uncertainty brought about by the lack of attention to actualities in trial courts.
Hence, such skepticism concerns itself with the need of greater accuracy in the
process of determination of facts in relation to predicting the ruling with some
certainty. Frank, in a US Court of Appeals case (In Re Fried, 1947) stated that trial
courts the power to determine the outcome of a case as it has discretionary power
in choosing from the following types of witnesses the facts appreciated for the case;
(1) witnesses unconsciously or consciously selective of fact; (2) witnesses who are
liars or honestly mistaken; and (3) fact-interpretative witnesses. And such
discretionary power creates subjective facts without a proper measurement of
accuracy for fact-finding by the courts (Frank, 1932; and 1931-1932).
Opinion skepticism concerns itself with the purpose and impact of the
metalegal stimuli on the judicial personality. Such skepticism doubts the validity of
certain judicial decisions emanating from the lower courts.

2.3 Role of Material Facts

Judges may hold the power over material facts to be appreciated in a case.
Pascual cited the concurring opinion of Philippine Supreme Court Associate Justice
Ricardo Paras for a case (Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 1945) wherein the fact of
good behavior of the petitioner was assumed as there was nothing to the contrary
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in the records. Such exemplifies the discretion of the judge translating to power to
determine the outcome of a case.

2.4 Role of Experience and Social Advantage

Several cases, some of which are controversial, were decided upon by Justice
Holmes taking into account the role of experience and social advantage.
Buck v. Bell (1927) involved the constitutionality of a state sterilization
statute for feeble-minded persons. Justice Holmes decided in the affirmative for the
purpose of social advantage. In Lochner v. New York (1905) where the validity of
statute prohibiting daily working period of more than 10 hours for bakeries was
struck down, Holmes dissented as market theories should not decide the
constitutionality of a social welfare legislation and that the the state should have
the discretion in choosing between acting to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare, or liberty to engage in a contract.

2.5 Role of Metalegal Stimuli

In the discussion in Pascuals book, the metalegal stimuli is a manifest
content of what he calls hard cases which includes; if the rules appear to be
indeterminate, where a prior decision is to be reversed, modified or discarded,
where a prior decision is to be established apart from a legislation or where a rule
or principle stands to be ignored. Thus, when faced with cases as such, the judges
will continue to have diverging opinions and decisions at a certain time and certain
situation. This was illustrated in several cases decided upon as regards to the
ruling on whether freedom of expression can be suppressed or not. Gray
responded to this question by posing a question and we quote
Take an instance for the constitutional law of the United States, suppose
Chief Justice Marshall has been ardent a democrat, as he was a federalist. Suppose
instead of hating Jefferson and loving the United States Bank, Marshall had hated
the United States Bank and hated Jefferson, how different would the law under
which we are living today.
Jerome Frank responded to Grays question that the answer may vary
dependent on the date it was asked, the composition of the courts and the shifting
opinion of its members. Ultimately for realists there are unavoidable metalegal
factors which affects the judicial personality of the adjudicating officials. These
factors not only as important as the facts but they become the creative channel for
the play and action of what Holmes call the experience and social advantage.
However, judicial discretion and metalegal stimuli are absolutely applicable in all
cases. As mentioned in Pascuals annotations, if a will is submitted for probate,
Article 805 of the Civil Code aptly applies and no judicial discretion is necessary.

2.6 Law as Product of Judicial Processes

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For Judicial Legal Realists, the ratio decidendi or the rationale of the decision
is an important factor in the application of such in succeeding cases as warranted.
The judicial process determine the material facts amongst the raw facts of the case,
to which the ratio is based upon. In this regard, when the material facts are
determined and by the aid of the metalegal stimuli affecting the judicial personnel,
the law will be produced.

2.7 Exclusion of Legislative and Executive Actions

Contrary to the positive school of thought, Judicial Legal Realism does not
recognize the contribution of the executive and legislative in producing laws. Their
participation only forms part of the adjudicative process when such respective
branches of government are involved as in extradition for the executive and
impeachment and legislative contempt proceedings for the legislative.

2.8 Adjudicative Process as the Prime Mover

As John Chipman Gray defines, "the Law of the State or of any organized
body of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs
of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties (Gray, 1909).
This hints us that the prime mover in judicial legal realism is the adjudication
process which eventually creates the law.

2.9 Law and its Purpose

For Legal realists of jurisprudence, law is not something that is just just
because the legislative and executive promulgated them. Legal Realists actually
avoids to define that laws are just because it is unjust or unequal in a naturalist
perspective. It simply assign law as a body of rules, just or unjust, that continue to
be a rule of action so long as it enjoys recognition and it do not cease to control
human actions. The end of judicial legal realism, is the administration of justice.
Justice in the sense of legality or the application of legal rules. Injustice will occur
whenever there is difficulty in the determination of material facts.

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3 Social Legal Realism

(as prepared by Mr. Du)

It is on the philosophy of education of John Dewey (1859-1952) that social

legal realism is based. Dewey held that knowledge is a part of life-experience
involving the intercourse of a living being with his physical and social environment.
Stated differently, learning becomes effective and adequate to the necessities of life
only when it is coordinated with experience. As Dewey puts it, learning by doing
and participation. This is an echo of David Humes idea that knowledge is derived
from experiential observation (Hume, 1738).
On this basis, John Dewey (1924; pp. 26) advanced the view that the life of
the law is the social experience of the people and tested and guided by social
experience. As Dewey explained it, the law cannot be understood apart from its
social environment but must profit from social experience in the development of
concepts, rules and regulations. (Patterson, 1953; pp. 466)
Thus, John Deweys excursus into the study of the nature of law as through
and through social phenomenon covers three distinct yet related issues, namely;
(1) source of law; (2) the end and purpose of law; and (3) the application of law.

3.1

Source of Law

John Dewey broke with the natural law theory in the determination of the
ultimate source of law. Dewey disagreed with the natural law jurisprudence who
insist that unless a source of higher and more fixed than that of experience can be
found, there is no sure ground for any genuinely philosophic valuation of law as it
actually exists (Patterson, 1953; pp. 74). For Dewey, this idea is not supported by
practical experience.
Likewise, Dewey (1924; pp. 74) posited the view that the law is the product
of the on-going human activities and interactivities. Thus, the phenomenon of
human activities and interactivities strikes down any notion about the source of law
outside the structure of society itself. For Dewey, the source of law is the social
experience of the people, not some transcendental concept, since all that the
people can appreciate well are their own experiences. The idea of social experience
as the source of law refers to the customs and usages of the people. These are the
continuing human activities and human interactivities. To put this in another way, a
group of people recognizes and accepts the desirable human activities (customs)
enriched by the desirable human interactivities (usages).

3.2 End or Purpose of Law

John Dewey faced a dichotomy of sorts insofar as the end of the law is
concerned. Specifically, the critique is that if the law is the product of the activities
and interactivities of the people, then the standard for judging the end or purpose
of the law as well as its validity must depend on some axiological or non-empirical
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criterion. In other words, the matter of the end or purpose of law would be outside
the domain of the experiences of the people.
John Dewey insist that this not the case at all. The test, according to him,
still lies in the societal experience of man. On this point, Dewey made it clear that
the law is a program of action to be tested in action not something that can be
judged on a purely intellectual basis. The life of the law is the social experience of
the people and tested also by their social experience. Human activities and
interactivities are on-going and as such they are not closed and completely ended
social facts. The consequences of human activities and interactivities provide the
basis for collective decision that they are to be maintained either intact or changed
(Dewey and Tufts, 1923; pp. 302).
The end or purpose of the law is the deliberate achievement of social
contentment. And for John Dewey, social contentment is the satisfaction which
comes when the dominant active tendencies are made interests in the maintenance
and propagation of the things that make life worth living. Upon these conditions,
the other members of society can and should be happy since regard for happiness
of others means regard for those conditions and objects which permits others freely
to exercise their own initiative, reflection and choice. The end or purpose of the law,
thus, remains social in nature for it is found in the society of the individual
members that compose it as a whole.

3.3 Application of Law

Until law is set into operation in the field modifying and/or maintaining
human activities as going concerns there can be no law in the real sense, according
to John Dewey. On the basis of this condition, the law becomes an instrument of
social control. Implicit in this concept is the use or threat of sanctions for the
attainment of the social ends. Thus, in postulating the social aspect of the
application of law. Dewey said that what is called application is not something that
happens after a rule or statute is laid down but is a necessary part of them; such a
necessary part indeed that in given cases we can judge what the law is as a matter
of fact only by telling how it operates and what its effects are in and upon human
activities that are going on (Dewey, 1941).

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4 Critical Legal Realism

(as prepared by Mr. Linawan)

The basic idea of Critical Legal Realism is that the law must not involve
politics and should be neutral or value free, the application or interpretation of the
law must reflect the reality of the issues that needs to be addressed.
The proponents of this theory believe that logic and structure attributed to
the law grow out of the power relationships of the society and that the prevailing
liberalistic views on law exists to support the interests of the party or class that
forms it and is merely a collection of beliefs and prejudices that legitimize the
injustices of society.

4.1 Preliminaries:
4.1.1 Who is a realist?
In art, realists depict the world around them as it actually appeared, rather
than painting flattering portraits of unattractive people and scenes too good to be
true.
In legal parlance realists seeks to deconstruct, challenge, and overturn
accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice that mask the injustices
by bent doctrines or erroneous interpretation of the law that seem acceptable to
society.

4.1.2 What is realism?

Realism is the belief that some aspect of our reality is independent of our
conceptual schemes, or perceptions (Aquinas).

4.1.3 Critical
Expressing disapproval or dissent; analytical approach
Critical Legal Realism therefore is the analytical deconstruction of the
prevailing liberal legal paradigm such as the ways in which the language of
impartiality, objective due process, and value free procedures hide and conceal
partisan operations of power and elite forms of social victimization.

4.1.4 Origins
Officially Started at 1977 at the conference at the University of WisconsinMadison, but its roots extend back to 1960 when many of its founding members
participated in social activism surrounding the Civil Rights movement and the
Vietnam War. apply the ideas, theories, and philosophies of postmodernity

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(intellectual movements of the last half of the twentieth century) to the study of
law. (Cornell)

4.2 Attacks against Critical Legal Realism

Defenders of the dominant liberal paradigm has denounced CLR as another
form radical socialism similar to Marxism.
Although CLR may have a leftist sentiment the same is not an entirely leftist
legal movement in fact CLR and Marxism have only one commonality shared by Karl
Marx and Roberto M. Unger the leading figure in CLR, is their disenchantment with
1. The elitist tendencies of the dominant legal paradigm
2. Concealed intentions and judgements behind legal concepts and ideas
However unlike Marx, Unger had repeatedly asserted that CLR is not an
affirmation of Marxism but a staunch denial of bourgeois agenda of social divisions
and economic hierarchies

4.2.1 Deconstruction of the Dominant Liberal Paradigm

In the hands of critical legal realists deconstruction is the technique of
1.

Stinging analysis of the traditions (ideas, beliefs, attitudes and

propensities) of the DLP

2. Reformation of the traditions of the DLP through presentation of the rationale

and justification for censure and offer of alternative solutions

4.2.2 Trashing the traditions of the Dominant Legal Paradigm

The traditions of the DLP in which CLR intensely dislikes can be summed up
to:
1. The contemporary order is a free society for there is individual initiative to
undertake any business enterprise.
Reason: While the contemporary society maybe free it is not really a just
society for it is characterized by widening social divisions and sharpening
economic hierarchies
2. The underlying thrust of the contemporary social order in the control of
goods, production, distribution and exchange of goods.
Reason: It is characterized by exploitive, individualistic, and possessive
propensities through the use of power and resources.
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4.3 Reformation of the Dominant Legal Paradigm
After trashing out and exposing the DLPs erroneous traditions and opening its
elitist discourse, and practice hiding behind jural constructs that have been abused
and misinterpreted to give them different casts and meanings in furtherance of
elitist protests

4.3.1 The Rule of Law

In its purest form the rule of law is not license for extemporaneous and
arbitrary exercise and arbitrary exercise of authority, but a limitation on the
far reaching exercise of political and economic authority.
But in the contemporary liberal society the rule of law had become a myth
to be winked at if not mocked it had become another ideological and
rhetorical ruse in which the elite transmit false consciousness to the society

Case: Carino v. Insular Government 7 PHIL 132

Facts:
The plaintiff-petitioner filed a petition seeking inscription in his name
some 146 hectares of land situated in the city of Baguio. It is averred the
petitioner had inherited the land from his ancestors The Insular
government of the Philippine Islands opposed the petition on the ground
that the land is agricultural and was intended for the public and the
military purposes of the Government of the U.S.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner may claim ownership of the land through the
claim of immemorial occupation?
Ruling:
No,
The Court characterized the Igorot tribe as uncivilized and strongly
implied that the igorots have no idea or concept of private property. Mere
possession of the land did not give Carino the title to it and the same
cannot be conclusively presumed that after the lapse of any number of
years.

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4.3.2 Separation of Powers

The Legal order has become politicized to the point that governmental
powers are no longer separated, and the separation of powers have been
obscured by the fact that to a great extent the different branches of the
government had become the means to power and wealth of the dominant
liberal class.
4.3.3 Judicial Activism
While conventional wisdom favors judicial discretion what outrages the
critical legal scholar s is the abuse of the courts of the text of the statutes
are otherwise determinate.
And there are instances that Judicial discretion reflects only personal or
collective prejudices of the judges on what a statute or rule should be.

4.4 Function of the Law

The Law must be an instrument to redeem the people from social
divisions and economic hierarchies.
CLR is an advocacy of the law as a neutral and objective means of social
control with emphasis in its liberating function. Only when the law is neutral
in the inevitable conflict of claims.

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5 Psychological Legal Realism

(as prepared by Mr. Yu)

Psychological Legal Realism is an approach to the study of the nature of the

law and that beliefs that the aspect of our reality depends on the persons
perception of what is just or unjust . It originated from a small group of
Scandinavian jurisprudents namely, Axel Hagerstrom (1868 1939), acknowledged
as the founder of psychological legal realism, Vilhelm Lundstedt (1882 1955) ,
Karl Olivercrona (1839 1963), and Alf Ross (1894 1974).

5.1 Nature of Law

The Scandinavian Jurisprudent, Vilhelm Lundstedt expressed his idea of
psychological legal realism. He states that legal activities such as legislation,
execution of statutes, and adjudication of cases are essential to the social order,
and to assure the legal ordering of society the law and its component jural relations
must be based on the feeling for justice prevalent and current within society.
The concept of justice by Lundstedt is very much different from what was
made by the natural law philosophers which is that there is one and only solution.
He further explains that the appreciative perception of that which is good for society
does not necessarily point to just one and only solution of the problem but rather
the feeling for the good of society is the substance that gives meaning to the legal
ordering of society.
For psychological legal realism, the law and its component system of jural
relations are real due to the social facts given. The law then and its component
system of jural relations are open to public and not for private evaluations.
Lindstedt further explains that the feeling for what is good for society is not an
abstract criterion but a fact of conscious behaviour since it is psychologically real.
Karl Olivercrona states that laws involve behaviour patterns since they deal
basically with the exercise of rights and the performance of obligations. The
purpose of the law is to influence human behaviour and due to that, it follows that
the binding force of the law is no longer an illusory idea of the consent governed.
Thus the command of the law is found on the fact that it is psychologically bound.
Alf Ross states that we have a psychological compulsion to obey the law.
These psychological pressures and impulses lead to regularity of behaviour to
comply with the law as well as the right and obligations flowing for given jural
regulations. Due to this, the obligatory nature of the law became socially acceptable
making enforcement unnecessary yet obtaining positive results.

5.2 Jural Relations

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Obligations are the basic jural relationship of individuals to other individuals
and to individuals of the state. This represents the real connection to which all legal
facts, legal things and legal persons are reduced.
Under Article 37 of the Civil Code of the Philippines where it defines juridical
capacity as the fitness to be the subject of legal relations and is inherent in every
legal person and is lost only through death. In psychological legal realism, when a
person enjoys a right someone, sometime, somewhere has the burden of the
correlative obligation. But no person can ever have both parts of a jural
relationship because a right and obligation are both jural opposites.
The Scandinavian legal realists believes that the conventional concept of
rights and obligations are verbal magic. Vilhelm Lundstedt points to the hazard of
imparting the objective to the subjective idea and the notion to do so is to engage
in a huge contradiction. They then further emphasized the need to explain jural
relations in some way other than the usual reasons.
In the case of ownership, the command prohibits the interference with the
owners possession of a thing under the punishment of certain sanctions. That
concept of ownership is considered as word magic for there can be rights and
obligations even without legal rules and sanctions. Due to that, the Scandinavian
legal realists does not see it as the legal rule that prescribes the right or the
obligation. In the case of obligations and rights, their reality must be based on the
feeling of ascertaining a position of advantage and the feeling of complying with the
prestation constituting the undertaking.

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Holmes, O.W. (1920). Collected Legal Papers. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.
Hurst, J. (1964). Justice Holmes on Legal History. New York: Macmillan. p. 56.
In Re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (United States Court of Appeals June 23, 1947).
Pascual, C. (2003). The Legal Realist Perspective. In C. Pascual, Introduction to
Legal Philosophy (10th ed., pp. 288-418). Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Law Center.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49 (Supreme Court of the Philippines
November 12, 1945).

3 Social Legal Realism

Dewey, J. (1924). Logical Method and Law. Cornell Law Review 10(17).
Dewey, J. (1941). My Philosophy of Law. in My Philosophy of Law: Credos of
Sixteen American Scholars (pp. 73-85). Boston, Mass.: Boston Law Book Co.
Dewey, J., and Tufts, J.H. (1923). Ethics. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
Hume, D. (1738). A Treatise of Human Nature. pp. 368
Patterson, J. (1953). Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of Law. Brooklyn, New York.:
Foundation Press.

4 Critical Legal Realism

Critical Legal Theory. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2016, from Pascual, C. (2003). The
Legal Realist Perspective. In C. Pascual, Introduction to Legal Philosophy
(10th ed., pp. 288-418). Quezon City: University of the Philippines Law
Center.
Legal Realist Perspective. In C. Pascual, Introduction to Legal Philosophy (10th ed.,
pp. 361-408). Quezon City: University of the Philippines Law Center.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/critical_legal_theory

5 Psychological Legal Realism

Lundstedt, V. The Relation Between Law and Equity. Tulane Law Review(25)
Article 37, Civil Code of the Philippines

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