Spotlight On Commission On Judicial Performance PDF

WhyaSpotlightmustbeputonthe
CommissiononJudicialPerformance
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Judicialmisconductisoneofthemostimportant,underinvestigatedandunderreportedissues
affectingCalifornians.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceistheagencyresponsiblefor
investigatinganddiscipliningjudicialmisconductinCalifornia.Whencomparedtotheoversight
commissionsofotherstates,Californiascommissionisasevere,negativeoutlierin
investigatinganddiscipliningjudicialmisconductandmakingefficientuseofpublicfunds.This
reportcomparesCaliforniascommissiontothoseofArizona,Texas,andNewYork.
Californiav.Arizona(past10years)
Budget
(2015)
No.of
Staff
(2015)
Avg.number
ofcomplaints
peryear
Avg.numberof
totaldisciplines
peryear
Avg.numberof
publicdisciplines
peryear
Avg.rateof
totaldiscipline
California
$4,334,000
20
1082
36
3.4%
Arizona
$522,300
4.5
346
47
10
13.6%
Californiav.TexasandNewYork(past10years)
No.of
Staff
(2014)
California 20
Budget
(2014)
Complaints
0514
Prelim.
Inquiry
Prelim.or
Full
Investigns
Public
Discipline
(Censure,
Admonish,
Removal/
Suspension)
Resign/Retire
/Leftofficefor
otherreasons
withcomplaints
pending
State
Pop.
$4.3m
10,821
754
712
67
34
38.8
million
168
50resign
(39removal)
(retireorother
reasonsnot
reported)
26.9
million
221
358
(6removal)
Texas
New
York
13
45
$933k
$5.5m
10,964
17,719
2,629
4,318
2,636
2,139
(23removal)
19.7
million
TheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceoperatesinsecrecybecauseitisexemptfrom
CaliforniaConstitutionArticleI,Section3(b),theCaliforniaPublicRecordsAct,RalphM.Brown
Act,BagleyKeeneAct,andCaliforniaRulesofCourt,rule10.500.Thecommissionrefusedto
produceanyrecordsinresponsetoarecordsrequestfromFirstAmendmentCoalitioneven
basicstaff,salary,andbudgetinformation.Therequestandresponseareattachedherein.The
CommissiononJudicialPerformanceresidesintheInternationalWatersofpublicdisclosure
laws.
ThebudgetofCaliforniasjudicialbranchis$3.8billion,andits2,200judicialofficersdisposeof
approximately7millioncasesannually.Thedispositionofeachofthesecaseshasadirect,
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lifelongimpactonthepersonsinvolved.Astrongjudicialoversightagencyisofparamount
publicimportancebecausebadjudgescauseinnocentpeopletobefoundguilty,guiltypeopleto
befoundinnocent,issueunfairandinconsistentsentences,damagethelivesofchildrenand
families,erodethepublictrust,andwastemillionsoftaxpayerdollars.Californiansshouldhave
confidenceintheircourts,buta2014studyfoundthatofall50statesCaliforniahasthehighest
levelofperceivedillegalcorruptioninitsjudicialbranch.
ThedatacompiledinthisreportsuggestthattheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceseverely
underinvestigatesandunderdisciplinesjudicialmisconductandmisappropriatespublicfunds.
PotentiallyhundredsofunfitjudgescurrentlysitonCaliforniasbencheswhoseremoval,
resignation,orretirementwouldhavebeencausedbythecommissionsofotherstates.
Giventhetremendousdisparitiesininvestigationrates,disciplinerates,andbudgetefficiencies
betweenCaliforniascommissionandthoseofotherstates,typically200300%differences
acrosstheboard,theintegrityoftheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceshouldbe
questioned.OversightofthelargestjudiciaryintheWesternworldcannotbetrustedtoasmall
agencythatisanoutlierinjudicialdisciplineandsubjecttominimalpublicdisclosurelaws.
CaliforniansurgetheLegislaturetoorderanauditoftheCommissiononJudicialPerformance
andtorequireincreasedtransparencyandaccountability.
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
Page
1. PURPOSE...................................................... 7
2.COMPARISONOFTHECOMMISSIONSOFCALIFORNIA,ARIZONA,NEW
YORK,ANDTEXAS.............................................. 8
A. Californiav.Arizona(past10years)............................... 8
B.Californiav.NewYorkandTexas(past10years).................... 9
3.THEPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMMISSIONONJUDICIAL
PERFORMANCEHASSTEADILYDEGRADEDOVERTHEPAST25YEARS.
THECOMMISSIONNOWFAILSTOPROTECTTHEPUBLICAGAINST
JUDICIALMISCONDUCT..........................................
11
A. Thenumberofcomplaintshastripledsincethe1980s,yetthecommission
meetslessfrequently.Commissionmembersnowreviewcomplaintsfor
approximately2minutes........................................ 11
B.Inquiryanddisciplinerateshavedroppeddrasticallysincethe1980s...... 12
C.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancemayhaveadoptedunderground
complaintreviewpractices,whichmayconstituteimpropergovernmental
activityunderGovernmentCode8547et.seq...................... 13
D.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancesharesabuildingwiththeCourts,
creatingtheappearanceofimpropriety............................. 15
4.THECOMMISSIONONJUDICIALPERFORMANCEOPERATESINSECRET
ANDREFUSESTOCOMPLYWITHPUBLICRECORDSREQUESTS....... 15
A.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancerefusestoproduceanyrecords
tothepublic.................................................. 15
B.ThenumbersreportedbytheCommissiononJudicialPerformancedont
addup...................................................... 16
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5.ASTRONGJUDICIALOVERSIGHTAGENCYISNECESSARYTO
PROTECTTHEPUBLICAGAINSTJUDICIALMISCONDUCT............. 17
A. TheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceistheonlyrealdeterrentagainst
judicialmisconduct............................................. 17
i.Impeachmentandconvictionofjudicialofficersdoesnotoccur..... 18
ii.Recallelectionsandelectionsarenotapracticalmechanismto
removebadjudicialofficers.................................
iii.Thejudicialbranchanditsofficersdonotcomplywithlawsthat
protectthepublic.........................................
18
19
iv.Therefore,theCommissiononJudicialPerformanceprovidesthe
onlyrealprotectionagainstjudicialmisconduct.................. 20
6.CONCLUSION................................................... 20
APPENDIX
Themostrelevantpagesofdisciplinedatafromstatecommissionsareincludedintheappendix.
CompleteAnnualReportsandothersupportingdocumentscanbeobtainedfromthestate
commissionwebsitesat::
http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions(allArizonacomplaints2006present)
http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/AnnualReports(ArizonaAnnualReports1971present)
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports.htm(NYAnnualReports1975present)
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/reports.asp(TexasAnnualReports2001present)
http://cjp.ca.gov/annual_reports.htm(CAAnnualReports1983present)
California..........................................................
CACommissiononJudicialPerformance,StatisticsbyYear(20052014).
GeneratedfromCommissiononJudicialPerformance2014AnnualReport,
page14Summaryofcomplaintstatistics20052014.
22
CommissiononJudicialPerformance20142015ActualExpenditures
(http://www.cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/appendix/Budget_20142015.pdf)
OrganizationalChart(http://www.cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/appendix/Current_Staff_Org_Chart.pdf)
Arizona............................................................ 27
AZCommissiononJudicialConductStatisticsbyYear(20062015).Generated
fromcomplaintdataavailableat:http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions(all
Arizonacomplaints2006present)
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ArizonaCommissiononJudicialConduct,2015AnnualReport,pages1617,
budgetandstaffinformation(AZAnnualReportscanbefoundatthelinkabove)
NewYork.......................................................... 31
NYStateCommissiononJudicialConductStatisticsbyYear(20052014).
GeneratedfromAnnualReports20062015(reportingyears20052014).Select
supportingpagesfromAnnualReportsincluded.(fullAnnualReportscanbe
foundatthelinkabove)
Texas............................................................. 44
TXStateCommissiononJudicialConductStatisticsbyYear(20052014).
GeneratedfromAnnualReports20052014.Selectsupportingpagesfrom
AnnualReportsincluded(fullAnnualReportscanbefoundatthelinkabove)
PublicRecordsRequestfromROCKAttorneysatLawandFirstAmendment
CoalitiontoCommissiononJudicialPerformance.......................... 70
ResponsetoPublicRecordsRequestfromCommissiononJudicialPerformance
76
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1.
PURPOSE
ThisreportisintendedtoalerttheLegislature,media,andPublictotroublinginformation
regardingtheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceCaliforniassolejudicialoversightagency.
SupportingdocumentsareincludedintheAppendixandotherdocumentsarereferencedby
footnote.
TheinformationcontainedinthisreportsuggeststhattheCommissiononJudicialPerformance
isunderinvestigatingandunderdiscipliningjudicialmisconductandmisappropriatingpublic
funds.
ThisreportcomparesthedataandpoliciesofthecommissionsofCalifornia,Arizona,Texas,
andNewYork.Additionally,importantbackgroundinformation,law,andlegislativehistoryare
includedforcontextandtodemonstratethegravityofthesematterstothePublic.Itishoped
thatthisreportwillcatalyzeoneormoreofthefollowingactions:
1. InquiryandinvestigationintotheCommissiononJudicialPerformancebythemedia
2. FormalauditbytheStateAuditorsOfficetodetermineifthecommissionisengagingin
misconductand/ormisappropriationofpublicfunds
3. InvestigationofcommissionpoliciesandoperatingproceduresbytheOfficeof
AdministrativeLawtodetermineifanycommissionrules,policies,andoperating
proceduresconstituteanUndergroundRegulation
4. Legislativeactiontoimprovethetransparencyandaccountabilityofthecommission:
a. Publiclypost:
i.
judicialcomplaintsupondisposition
ii.
responsesfromjudges
iii.
votesofcommissionmemberstodismissorinvestigateacomplaint
iv.
ordersofdismissalwithabriefexplanationfordismissal(e.g.frivolous,
legalerrornotrisingtothelevelofmisconduct,etc.)
b. Eliminateprivateadvisorylettersandprivateadmonishments.
5. Movethecommissionofficestoadifferentlocationsothecommissiondoesnotsharea
buildingwiththeJudicialCouncil,AdministrativeOfficeoftheCourts(JudicialCouncil
staff),CaliforniaSupremeCourt,theFirstDistrictCourtofAppeal(fiveDivisions),and
theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.
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2.
COMPARISONOFTHECOMMISSIONSOFCALIFORNIA,ARIZONA,NEWYORK,
ANDTEXAS
In1960,Californiabecametheleaderinjudicialaccountabilitywhenitestablishedby
ConstitutionalamendmentthefirstjudicialoversightagencytheCommissiononJudicial
Qualifications(laterrenamedtheCommissiononJudicialPerformance).TheConstitutional
mandate,asstatedbyitsdrafters,SenatorsEdwardJ.ReganandJosephA.Rattigan,wasto
assurerealprotectionagainstincompetency,misconductornonperformanceofdutyonthe
Bench."Oversubsequentdecadesall50stateswouldestablishsimilarjudicialoversight
commissions,largelyimplementingpoliciessimilartothoseofCalifornia.
Overtime,Californiahasfallenbehinditspeersinjudicialaccountability.Infact,theCenterfor
PublicIntegrityahighlyregardednonpartisan,nonprofitorganization,andwinnerofthe2014
PulitzerPrizeforInvestigativeReportingpublishedanindepthstudyassessingthesystemsin
placetodetercorruptionandpromotetransparencyinstategovernments.1 WhileCalifornias
executiveandlegislativebranchesrankedhighly,pushingthestateinto2ndplaceoverall,
CaliforniareceivedanFinthecategoryofJudicialAccountability.
Californiasfailuretoprovideadequatejudicialoversightisnotmerelytheoretical.Comparing
theratesofinvestigationanddisciplinebyCaliforniascommissionwiththoseofitsneighbor,
Arizona,andthenexttwomostpopulousstates,TexasandNewYork,isalarming.
A.Californiav.Arizona(past10years)
Budget
(2015)
No.of
Staff
(2014)
Avg.number
ofcomplaints
peryear
Avg.numberof
totaldisciplines
peryear
Avg.numberof
publicdisciplines
peryear
Avg.rateof
totaldiscipline
California
$4,334,000
20
1082
36
3.3%
Arizona
$522,300
4.5
346
47
10.4
13.6%
Californiacomplaintanddisciplinestatisticstakenfrom20052014asreportedinCJPs2014AnnualReport,p.14:
http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/annual_reports/2014_Annual_Report.pdf
CaliforniabudgetandstaffinformationtakenfromCJPwebsite,OrganizationandBudgetpage:
http://cjp.ca.gov/organiztion_budget.htm.
Arizonacomplaintanddisciplinestatisticstakenfrom20062015asreportedontheircommissionwebsitebyyear:
http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions.
Arizonabudgetandstaffinformationtakenfrom2014AnnualReport,p13:
http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/2014%20CJC%20Annual%20Report.pdf
ThoughCaliforniascommissionreceivedthreetimesmorecomplaints,itdisciplinedfewer
judgesthanArizona.Arizonascommissionismoretransparentandpubliclydisclosesredacted
dismissedcomplaints,ordersofdismissalwithabriefexplanation,andthefullrecordforpublic
1
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18342/californiagetscgrade2015stateintegrityinvestigation
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disciplines:unredactedcomplaint,responsefromjudicialofficer,writtencommunicationsfrom
thecommission,andthecommissionsOrder,whichincludesasummaryoffacts.2 Californias
commissiondoesnotdisclosecomplaints,ordersofdismissal,orexplanationsfordismissal.For
publicadmonishmentsandcensures,CaliforniascommissiondisclosesaDecisionandOrder,
whichincludesthecommissionsinterpretationofthefactsandconclusionstherefrom,which
areoftenstipulatedtobythedisciplinedjudicialofficer.3 Whenformalproceedingsareinitiated
toremoveajudicialofficer,onlythenoticeofcharges,theanswer,andallsubsequentpapers
andproceedingsaremadepublic.4
B.Californiav.NewYorkandTexas(past10years)
OnemightsuspectthatArizonaisanoutlier,orthatthesmallerpopulation(approximately6.7
million)contributestobetteroversightandhigherratesofjudicialdiscipline.Butacomparison
withthenexttwomostpopulousstates,NewYorkandTexas,dispelsanysuchsuspicion.
TheAnnualReportsofCalifornia,NewYork,andTexasduringthetenyearperiodfrom2005
through2014showthatCaliforniascommissiononceagainpalesincomparison.
20052014
No.of
Staff
(2014)
Budget
(2014)
Complaints
0514
Prelim.
Inquiry
Prelim..or
Full
Investigns
Public
Discipline
(Censure,
Admonish,
Removal/
Suspension)
Resign/Retire
/Leftofficefor
otherreasons
withcomplaints
pending
State
Pop.
California
20
$4.3m
10,821
754
712
67
34
38.8
million
168
50resign
(39removal)
(retireorother
reasonsnot
reported)
26.9
million
221
358
(6removal)
Texas
NewYork
13
45
$933k
$5.5m
10,965
17,719
2,502
2,636
4,318
2,139
(23removal)
19.7
million
Californiacomplaintanddisciplinestatisticstakenfrom20052014asreportedinCJPs2014AnnualReport,p.14:
Californiabudgetandstaffinformationtakenfromcommissionwebsite,OrganizationandBudgetpage:
http://cjp.ca.gov/organiztion_budget.htm.
NewYorkcomplaintanddisciplinestatisticstakenfrom20052014asreportedintheirAnnualReports,accessiblehere:
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports.htm
NewYorkbudgetandstaffinformationtakenfromtheirwebsite:http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/General.Information/budget.htmand
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/General.Information/Gen.Info.Pages/staff.htm
Texascomplaintanddisciplinestatisticstakenfrom20052014asreportedintheirAnnualReports,accessiblehere:
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/reports.asp
2
3
4
http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions
http://cjp.ca.gov/desisions_by_judges.htm
Cal.Const.Art.VI,Section18(i)(2)(j).
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Texasbudgetandstaffinformationtakenfromtheirwebsiteathttp://www.scjc.state.tx.us/staff.aspandLegislativeAppropriations
Request(2014est.,Exhibt2A)http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/SCJCLAR.pdf
StatepopulationfromU.S.CensusBureau,2014Estimate
TheTexascommissionprocessesapproximatelythesamenumberofcomplaintsasCalifornia,
andtheNewYorkcommissionprocessesmore.Californiapubliclydisciplinesatafractionthe
rateofeitherTexasorNewYork.DespitethefactthatthepopulationofCaliforniais50%more
thanTexasandnearlydoublethatofNewYork,bothTexasandNewYorkhaveseveraltimes
thenumberofresignations,retirements,andremovalsperyear.Texaspubliclydisciplined3
timesasmanyjudgesandremoved6timesasmanyjudgesasCalifornia.NewYorkpublicly
disciplined4timesasmanyjudges,removed4timesasmanyjudges,andhad10timesas
manyjudgesresign,retire,orleaveofficeforotherreasonswhilecomplaintswerepending.
Supportedbythedataabove,anexplanationforthelowerratesofdiscipline,resignation,and
removalisthatCaliforniascommissionconductsafractionofthenumberofinquiriesand
investigations,whichalsoresultsinatroublingcostandjobperformancecomparisonbetween
thecommissions:
2014
Budget
No.
of
Staff
Averagecost
perstaff
member
No.of
Prelim.
Inquiries
No.of
Investigations
Averagecost
perinquiryor
investigation
No.ofinquiries
orinvestigations
perstaffmember
peryear
Texas
$908,623
13
$69,894
260
331
$1,537
45
NewYork*
$5,484,000
45
$121,867
499
145
$8,516
14
California
$4,334,000
20
$216,700
84
101
$23,427
*TheNewYorkCommissiononJudicialConductmaintains3separatecommissionofficesinNewYorkCity,Albany,andRochester
Theamountofworkperformedperstaffmember,orperdollar,byCaliforniascommissionisnot
remotelycomparabletothecommissionsofNewYorkorTexas.Further,theNewYork
commissionsbudgetincludesexpensesfordoublethenumberofstaffmembersandfor
maintainingthreeseparateofficesinNewYorkCity,Albany,andRochester.Theaboveanalysis
alsoconfirmsaconclusionfroma2012StanfordLawReviewreportcomparingdatafromthe
judicialoversightcommissionsof35states:increasedcommissionbudgetsresultinincreased
disciplineofjudges,withCaliforniabeinganegativeoutlier.5
Thus,theabovedatasuggeststhattheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceseverely
underinvestigatesandunderdisciplinesjudicialmisconduct,misappropriatefunds,andfailsto
protectthepublicfromjudicialmisconduct.
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Abel64StanLRev1021.pdf
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10
3.
THEPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMMISSIONONJUDICIALPERFORMANCEHAS
STEADILYDEGRADEDOVERTHEPAST25YEARS.THECOMMISSIONNOW
FAILSTOPROTECTTHEPUBLICAGAINSTJUDICIALMISCONDUCT.
A. Thenumberofcomplaintsfiledhastripledsincethe1980s,yetthecommissionmeets
lessfrequently.Commissionmembersnowreviewcomplaintsforanaverageof
approximately2minutes.
Thecommissionconsistsof11unpaidappointeeswhoarejudges,attorneys,andcitizens
employedfulltimeelsewhere.6 Thecommissionmembersmeetseventimesperyeartodispose
ofcomplaints.7 Thecommissionhasanannualbudgetofapproximately$4.3millionand
employsasupportstaffofapproximately22administrators,attorneys,investigators,clerks,and
secretaries.8
Thecommissionreceivesapproximately1,300complaintsperyear.9 Thus,onaverage187
complaintsaredisposedofateachofthecommissionsseven1daymeetingsperyear.Ifthe
commissionspends8hoursreviewingcomplaints,eachcomplaintreceivesanaverageof2
minutes34secondsofreview.
Itisnotplausiblethatcommissionmemberscanreadmostcomplaintsinsuchashortperiodof
timesincemanycontainextensivedocumentationsuchascourtpleadingsandtranscripts.Itis
evenmoreimplausiblethatcommissionmemberscanhaveameaningfuldiscussionaboutthe
complaintwithothermembersandmakeaninformeddecision.
Historically,thecommissionhasspentmoretimereviewingcomplaints.Forexample,in1983,
thefirstyearAnnualReportsareavailable,thecommissionmetforatotalof6onedayand2
twodaysessionstoresolve351complaints.10Thisis10daystotaltoresolve351complaints.
Assuming8hoursofreviewperday,eachcomplaintreceivedonaverage13minutes40
secondsofreview.
Thecommissionsofotherstatesspendmuchmoretimereviewingcomplaints.Forexample,
Alaskascommissionmeetsquarterlytoresolve3070complaintsperyear.11 Texascommission
members,whoreceiveapproximatelythesamenumberofcomplaintsasCalifornia,meetthree
daysaweek,everyothermonth,12, 13 or18daystotal.TheNewHampshireJudicialConduct
http://cjp.ca.gov/Commission_Members.htm
http://cjp.ca.gov/Meeting_dates.htm
8
StateofCalifornia,BudgetChangeProposalDF46(Rev08/15)
6
7
http://web1a.esd.dof.ca.gov/Documents/bcp/1617/FY1617_ORG0280_BCP328.pdf
10
1983AnnualReport.CommissiononJudicialPerformance.http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/annual_reports/1983_Annual_Report.pdf
11
https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Commission_on_Judicial_Conduct#Complaint_statistics
12
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/specialreports/texasjudgesmisdeedsoftenkeptsecretbyovers1/nRm2Z/
13
2015AnnualReport.TexasCommissiononJudicialConduct.http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/rpts/ARFY15.pdf
9
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11
Committeemeets12ormoredaysperyeartoresolveapproximately7080complaintsannually
thecommitteeindicatesthat10complaintsisalargenumbertoreviewinameeting:
TheJudicialConductCommitteehaselevenmembers,consistingofjudges,lawyers,
andpublicrepresentatives,andmeetstwelveormoretimeseachyear.Allofthe
membersreadallofthereportsofallegedjudicialmisconductthatarefiledwiththe
Committee.However,becauseeachmeetingagendamaycontainasmanyastenor
morereportsandsinceeachreportcanbelengthyandcanincludemanypagesof
attachments,theCommitteeasksareportertofilloutasummaryCoverSheet.This
CoverSheetenablesCommitteememberstokeepinmind,astheyread,whoisfiling
thereportofjudicialmisconduct,whatthereportisallabout,andwhatkindofsupporting
evidencetheyshouldbelookingfor.TheCommitteefeelsthatthissummarizingand
focusingoftheallegationscanalsobehelpfultothereporter.14
Additionally,theNewHampshirecommissioninstructsthecomplainant(thereporter)to
prepareasummarycoversheetforthecommission,notthecommissionstaff:
Process:AttachedisaReportofAllegedJudicialMisconductCoverSheet,whichwe
askthatyoufilloutandreturntotheCommitteeinorderthatitmaybeconsideredbythe
Committeealongwithyourreport.Again,thissummaryinformationwillnotbea
substituteforyourreport,whichwillbereadandconsideredinitsentiretybyeach
Committeemember.TheCoverSheetissimplydesignedtoenablethememberstoread
eachreport,nomatterhowcomplicatedanddetailed,whilelookingfortheinstancesof
judicialmisconduct(andforthesupportingevidence)thatarebeingalleged.15
B.Inquiryanddisciplinerateshavedroppeddrasticallysincethe1980s.
TheratesofinquiryanddisciplinebyCaliforniascommissionhavebeenhalvedsincethe
1980s.Because1984wasthefirstyearprivateadvisoryletterswereimplementedasaformof
discipline,alookatthe5yearperiodsfrom19841988andthemostrecent5yearperiod,
20102014,serveasausefulcomparison:
Complaints
Inquiries/
Investigations
Disciplines/
Resign/Retire
PercentInquiry PercentDiscipline
/Investigation
/Resign/Retire
19841988
2,421
548
192
22.6%
20102014
5,778
695
215
12.0%
7.9%
3.7%
16
Datafrom1988AnnualReport,Appendix22014AnnualReport,page14.
14
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/judconductcomm/docs/ADMNJCCReportofAllegedJudicialMisconductProcedure.PDF
15
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/judconductcomm/docs/ADMNJCCReportofAllegedJudicialMisconductProcedure.PDF
16
2014AnnualReport.CommissiononJudicialPerformance.
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12

Despiteanincreaseof138%inthenumberofcomplaintsbetweentheperiods,thenumberof
disciplinesincreasedbyjust12%.
AccordingtoCommissionRule109,acomplaintcanonlybedismissedifitisdeemed
obviouslyunfoundedorfrivolous.In2014,thecommissiondismissed1,039of1,174
complaintswithoutastaffinquiryorpreliminaryinvestigation.17 Thus,thecommissiondeemed
that88.5%ofallcomplaintswereobviouslyunfoundedorfrivolous.Suchahighpercentageis
troublingand,asdetailedabove,departsfromCaliforniashistoricaldismissalratesbyafactor
of2,andfromotherstatesbyafactorof23.
C.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancemayhaveadoptedundergroundcomplaint
reviewpractices,whichmayconstituteimpropergovernmentalactivityunder
GovernmentCode8547etseq.
Thecommissionmusthaveadoptedanotherprocesstodisposeofcomplaintssorapidly.Thisis
apparentlythecase.AsdescribedbycommissionmemberHonorableIgnazioRuvoloina
speechtotheContraCostaCountyBarAssociationinJanuary2015,wehaveastafftohelpus
wehaveastaffofabout20lawyerswhodotheinvestigationandduediligencewheneverwe
getcomplaintsHefurtherdescribesthattheresamemowegetoneachoneofthose
casesThecommissionmembersthenvoteonwhetherornottodismissacomplaint,
presumablybasedonthecontentofthestaffpreparedmemo.18
Iftrue,thecommissionstaffhascooptedthecomplaintreviewprocess.
Thedraftersandvotersofthe1960andsubsequentamendmentsdidnotintendforthe
commissionstafftoreviewcomplaintsandadvocateadispositiontothecommissionmembers.
Theyintendedfor2judges,3attorneys,and6qualifiedmembersofthepublicappointedbythe
Governor,ChiefJusticeoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,AssemblyandSenatetocarefully
reviewcomplaintsandinstructthecommissionstaffonhowtoproceed.Nottheotherway
around.Itisfaciallyapparentthatthestaffarereviewingcomplaintsandmaking
recommendationstothecommissionmembers,whoaregivingthemarubberstamp.
Arizonascommissionexplicitlyassuresthat[e]achandeverycomplaintfiledagainstajudgeis
reviewedbyallelevenmembersofthecommission19 Thecommissionsofotherstateshave
similarexplicitprotocols.
17
18
2014AnnualReport.CommissiononJudicialPerformance.http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/annual_reports/2014_Annual_Report.pdf
ProtectingthePublicandtheIntegrityoftheJudiciary.Speaker:Hon.IgnazioJ.Ruvolo,PresidingJustice,1stDistrictCourtof
Appeal,Division4.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLd7HSlxjk8(lastvisitedJanuary11,2015).Seetimelapse20:1522:15.
http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions
19
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13
Itappearsthecommissionmayhavesubverteditsconstitutionalmandatebyadopting
undergroundregulations.20Suchundergroundregulationsmayconstituteimproper
governmentalactivityasdefinedunderGovernmentCode8547etseq.:
anactivitybyastateagencyorbyanemployeethatisundertakenintheperformance
oftheemployee'sduties,undertakeninsideastateoffice,or,ifundertakenoutsidea
stateofficebytheemployee,directlyrelatestostategovernment,whetherornotthat
activityiswithinthescopeofhisorheremployment,andthat(1)isinviolationofany
stateorfederallaworregulation,including,butnotlimitedto,corruption,malfeasance,
bribery,theftofgovernmentproperty,fraudulentclaims,fraud,coercion,conversion,
maliciousprosecution,misuseofgovernmentproperty,orwillfulomissiontoperform
duty,(2)isinviolationofanExecutiveorderoftheGovernor,aCaliforniaRuleofCourt,
oranypolicyorproceduremandatedbytheStateAdministrativeManualorState
ContractingManual,or(3)iseconomicallywasteful,involvesgrossmisconduct,
incompetency,orinefficiency.
Whatdothecommissionstaffandthecommissionmembersdowhenacomplaintisreceived?
Arethememospreparedbyasinglestaffmember,ormultiplestaffmembers?Dothestaff
membershavethesamequalificationsastheappointedmembers?Howdocommission
members(orthepublic)knowthatallmemospreparedbythestaffaccuratelyrepresentthe
factsorallegationsandmakeanappropriaterecommendation?
Aperemptoryreviewprocessalsocreatesanunacceptableopportunityforcomplaintstobe
improperlyhandledandforthememostobetaintediftheyareselectivelyreviewedbyoneora
fewstaffmembers.Withoutfullyreviewingeachcomplaint,commissionmembershavelittle
abilitytojudgewhetherthestaffsummaryandrecommendationareaccurate.Californiansvoted
tohave11qualified,vettedjudges,attorneys,andcitizensreviewanddisposeofcomplaints.A
subversiveprocedureviolatesthecommissionsconstitutionalmandate.
WhilecommissionmemberIgnazioRuvoloattributestheextremelylowratesofdisciplineto
meanthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofjudgesaredoingaterrificjob,21 thepublicisnot
convinced.Infact,a2014studyreportsthatofall50states,Californiahasthehighestlevelof
perceivedillegalcorruptioninitsjudicialbranch,ratinga2.5outof5,between"slightlycommon"
and"moderatelycommon.22
20
21
OfficeofAdministrativeLaw.http://www.oal.ca.gov/Underground_Regs.htm
ProtectingthePublicandtheIntegrityoftheJudiciary.Speaker:Hon.IgnazioJ.Ruvolo,PresidingJustice,1stDistrictCourtof
Appeal,Division4.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLd7HSlxjk8(lastvisitedJanuary11,2015)
MeasuringIllegalandLegalCorruptioninAmericanStates:SomeResultsfromtheCorruptioninAmericaSurvey.Oguzhan
DincerandMichaelJohnston.
http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuringillegalandlegalcorruptionamericanstatessomeresultssafra
22
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D.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancesharesabuildingwiththeCourts,creatingthe
appearanceofimpropriety.
ThecommissionwasestablishedaspartoftheJudicialCouncil,butCaliforniavotersapproved
aconstitutionalamendmentin1994thatrequiredthecommissionbecomeanautonomous
agency.23 Althoughthecommissionbecameautonomousonpaper,itcontinuestosharethe
samebuildingastheJudicialCouncil,AdministrativeOfficeoftheCourts,CaliforniaSupreme
Court,FirstDistrictCourtofAppeal(fivedivisions),andtheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral.Thus,
thecommissionmaintainsapresencealongsidenumerousjudicialoffices.Commissionstaff
memberslikelyhaverelationshipswithandregularlycommunicatewithothersinthebuilding.
ThecommissionalsoretainedmuchofitsoriginalJudicialCouncilstaff,includingDirectorChief
CounselVictoriaHenley,whohasbeenwiththecommissionsince1990.Asaresult,thereisan
unacceptableappearanceofimpropriety:theagencychargedwithinvestigatingjudicial
misconductishousedinthesamebuildingasmanyofthosejudicialofficersandtheirstaffers.
Citizensdonotpermitbankregulatorstoshareabuildingwiththeheadquartersoflarge
financialinstitutions.Likewise,thecommissionshouldnotshareabuildingwiththe
headquartersofthejudicialbranchandsixhighcourtsunderitsjurisdiction.
Further,SanFranciscoisthemostexpensivecityinthenationinwhichtolive.24This
circumstancenegativelyimpactsthecommissionsabilitytohirethemostqualifiedstaff,which
maybecompromisingtheagencysabilitytoprovideoversightandmayalsobeacontributing
factortothecommissionsinefficientperformancerelativetothecommissionsofotherstates.
4.
THECOMMISSIONONJUDICIALPERFORMANCEOPERATESINSECRETAND
REFUSESTOCOMPLYWITHPUBLICRECORDSREQUESTS.
A.TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancerefusestoproduceanyrecordstothepublic.
OnFebruary12,2016,ROCKAttorneysatLawofSanFrancisco,onbehalfofFirstAmendment
CoalitionofSanRafael,submittedapublicrecordsrequesttotheCommissiononJudicial
Performance,largelyrequestingitemsthataredisclosedbyothergovernmentagenciesandthe
commissionsofotherstates,suchasArizona.InthecommissionsresponsedatedFebruary26,
2016,onbehalfofthecommission,DirectorVictoriaHenleyrefusedtoproviderecordstoany of
therequests,arguingthatthecommissionisexemptfromArticleI,Section3(b)oftheCalifornia
Constitution,theCaliforniaPublicRecordsAct,theBagleyKeeneAct,andCaliforniaRulesof
Court,rule10.500.
Thepublichasarighttoknowaboutevenanisolatedactofmisconductortheappearanceof
impropriety.Judgesareelectedorretainedbythevotingpublic.Inordertobeaninformed,
CommnonJudicialPerformance,Mandate&LegislativeHistory,ST.CAL.,http://cjp.ca.gov/mandate_legislative_history.htm
(lastvisitedJanuary11,2015).
24
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/mostexpensivecity_n_2002532.html
23
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responsibleelectorate,thepublicrequiresinformationaboutjudicialdisciplinaryactionsand
complaints,eveniftheyaredismissed.
Althoughsomecomplaintsmaybefrivolousandsomedisciplineminor,citizensshouldbe
permittedtoevaluatetheinformationforthemselves,astheydowithotherprofessionals.
Additionally,ifthecomplaintsarepostedaftertheyaredismissed,theyshouldhavenonegative
impactonajudgebecausethecommission,ifitdiditsjob,willhavedeemedthemunwarranted.
Californiacitizenscancurrentlylearniftheirdoctorshavebeencarelessortheirlawyerswere
suspectedofmisconduct,buttheyarerarelytoldwhentheirjudgesarereprimandedfor
violatingthelaworCodeofJudicialEthics.
TheCommissiononJudicialPerformancewasestablishedin1960byvoterapprovalofan
amendmenttoArticleVIoftheCaliforniaConstitution.TheintentoftheConstitutionalmandate,
asstatedbyitsdrafters,SenatorsEdwardJ.ReganandJosephA.Rattigan,wastoassurereal
protectionagainstincompetency,misconductornonperformanceofdutyontheBench."25 A
1988amendmentgavethecommissionauthoritytoopenhearingstothepublicwhenitwould
beinthepursuitofpublicconfidenceandintheinterestsofjustice.Theamendmentalso
providedforpublicstatementsbythecommissionundercertaincircumstances.A1994
amendmentconferredauthorityofcensureandremovaltothecommission,mandatedopen
hearingsinformalproceedings,transferredcommissionrulemakingauthorityfromtheJudicial
Counciltothecommission,andchangedmembershipofthecommissionto3judges,2
attorneys,and6citizens.26 Theseamendmentsestablishapatternofincreasingaccountability,
transparency,publicaccess,andcitizenoversightofthejudiciary.Thepoliciesofthe
CommissiononJudicialPerformancehavenotchangedtokeepcurrentwiththepositivetrends
intransparency.
In2006,theArizonaSupremeCourtchangedtheircommissionsrulestomandatepublic
disclosureofdismissedcomplaints27,whichwassupportedbyprosecutorsandtheArizona
NewspapersAssociation.Californiasconstitutionalandstatutoryrightstoaccessaregenerally
strongerthanthoseofArizona.Thus,justastheArizonaSupremeCourtamendedits
commissionrulestoupholdthatright,sotooshouldCaliforniascommissionrulesbeamended.
B.ThenumbersreportedbytheCommissiononJudicialPerformancedontaddup.
ItisfaciallyconcerningtoareasonablepersonthattheresidentsofbothTexasandNewYork
reportedlyfilemorejudicialcomplaintsthanCalifornians,eventhoughCaliforniahas
approximately50%and100%moreresidents,respectively.Itisalsoconcerningthatthe
numberofcomplaintsreportedlyfiledinCaliforniafrom20002009wasactuallylowerthan
1960CaliforniaBallotPropositionsandInitiatives.ArgumentsInFavorofSenateConstitutionalAmendment14. SenatorsEdward
J.ReganandJosephA.Rattigan.
26
CommnonJudicialPerformance,Mandate&LegislativeHistory,ST.CAL.,http://cjp.ca.gov/mandate_legislative_history.htm
(lastvisitedJanuary11,2015).
27
SupremeCourt,StateofArizona,Order.https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/20/ramd_pdf/R040023.pdf
25
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19901999,despitepopulationgrowthbyover33%overtheperiodandincreasedpublic
awarenessabouthowtofilecomplaintsduetotheInternet.Asthe2012StanfordLawReview
articlenoted,thenumberofdisciplinesissuedbythecommissionfollowsadecreasingtrend
from19902010.Whenquestionedduringaphoneinterviewbytheauthorofthearticle,
CommissionDirectorVictoriaHenleysuggestedthatrecordkeepingchangesmayaccountfor
thedrop.28
Thereportedstatisticsshouldbequestioned.Giventhecommissionsextremelylowinquiry,
investigation,anddisciplinerates,secrecy,andrefusaltoprovideanyrecords,thereisan
unacceptablyhighriskofmisconductwithinthecommissionitself.
5.
ASTRONGJUDICIALOVERSIGHTAGENCYISNECESSARYTOPROTECTTHE
PUBLICAGAINSTJUDICIALMISCONDUCT.
A. TheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceprovidestheonlyrealprotectionagainst
judicialmisconduct.
Thejudicialbranchinterpretsthemeaningoflaws,decidesiflawsviolatetheConstitution,and
appliesthelawtoindividualcases.
TheConstitutionestablishesasystemofchecksandbalancestopreservetheintegrityofthe
threebranchesofgovernment.Thejudicialbranchregularlycheckstheactionsoftheexecutive
andlegislativebranchesthroughjudicialreview.DecisionsfromtheCaliforniaSupremeCourt
andCourtsofAppealareroutinelymonitoredbythepublic,membersofthebarandjudiciary,
andthemedia.ButthereislittleoversightoraccountabilityofjudicialofficersattheSuperior
Courtlevel,whichconstitutesapproximately99.54%oftotalcasedispositions.29 Thus,itisof
greatpublicimportancetoensurethelawisfairlyandconsistentlyappliedtoindividualcasesat
theSuperiorCourtlevel.
Whileappellatedecisionsaresupposedtocorrectlegalerrorsandprotectlitigantsfrom
misconductinSuperiorCourts,theappealsprocessiseffectivelyunavailabletomostlitigants
duetocostorinabilitytorepresentoneself.Approximately0.33%ofSuperiorCourtdispositions
areappealed.23Theabsenceoftranscriptsinmanytrialcourtproceedingsmakesuccessful
appealsevenmoreimprobable.Unrecordedproceedingsexposelitigantstomisconduct,hinder
accesstojustice,andunderminepublicconfidenceinthecourts.SeeproposedAssemblybills
AB803(2011)30andAB251(2013)31,whichexpoundedtheneedforelectronicrecordinginall
SuperiorCourts.
28
29
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Abel64StanLRev1021.pdf,page1039
2014CourtStatisticsReport.StatewideCaseloadTrends,20032004through20122013. JudicialCouncilofCalifornia
(Dispositions:6,620,807Superior22,092Appellate8,269Supreme).
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB803
31
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB251
30
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BecauseoversightislackingattheSuperiorCourtlevel,itisimperativethatrobustmechanisms
areinplacetodeter,investigate,anddisciplinejudicialmisconduct.TheCommissiononJudicial
PerformanceissolelyresponsibleforensuringthatjudicialofficersupholdtheCodeofJudicial
Ethics.Failuretoupholdthecoderesultsinunfairapplicationofthelawanderodespublictrust
inthejudiciary.Californiahasestablishedthreeprocedurestodisciplineanunfitjudge:
ImpeachmentandconvictionbytheLegislature
Recallelection
ActionbytheCommissiononJudicialPerformance
i.Impeachmentandconvictionofjudicialofficersdoesnotoccur.
UnderCal.Const.,Art.IV,Sec.18,ajudgemaybeimpeachedbytheAssemblyandconvicted
byatwothirdsvoteintheSenateafterhearingsonthemerits.WhiletheLegislaturehas
impeachmentprocessesavailabletoremovejudicialofficers,theyarenotusedinpractice.The
lastimpeachmentoccurred87yearsago,in1929.Onlytwojudgeshavebeenimpeachedin
Californias165yearhistory.32
OnereasonjudicialimpeachmentsdonotoccurinCaliforniaisbecausetherearevirtuallyno
mechanismsinplacetoevaluatetheperformanceofjudicialofficersortoexposemisconduct.
TheCenterforPublicIntegrityahighlyregardednonpartisan,nonprofitorganizationand
winnerofthe2014PulitzerPrizeforInvestigativeReportingpublishedanindepthstudy
assessingthesystemsinplacetodetercorruptionandpromotetransparencyinstate
governments.WhileCaliforniaranked2ndoverall,itreceivedanFinthecategoryofJudicial
Accountability.33
ImpeachmentsarealsononexistentbecausetheLegislaturelacksthecapacitytooverseethe
judiciary40Senatorsand80Assemblymembersalreadyresponsibleforrepresentingnearly
40millionpeoplecannotalsooversee2,000+judicialofficers.Further,legislatorsarekeenly
awarethatthecourtscanmakeimportantrulings,includingchangingtheelectoralmapswith
easebythemanylawsuitsbroughtagainstdistricts.
ii.Recallelectionsandelectionsarenotapracticalmechanismtoremovebadjudicial
officers.
Cal.Const.,ArtII,Sec.19,andElectionsCode11001and11006providefortherecallof
stateandlocalofficers.However,therecallprocessisextremelyburdensome,requiringdozens
ofstepsandtimeconsumingworkthatisallbutimpossibleexceptbylarge,wellfunded
movements:
32
JudicialDisciplineinCalifornia:ACriticalReEvaluation. LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview.WilbankJ.Roche.December1,
33
1976.
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Preparation,service,andfilingofaNoticeofIntention
PublicationoftheNoticeofIntention
FilingofaProofofPublication
AnswerofRecallee
PreparationofRecallPetition(withnumerouspreciserequirementsregardingthe
heading,sections,signaturespace,declarationofcirculator)
ApprovaloftheRecallPetition
Circulatingandacquiringsignatures(rangingfrom1030%ofthenumberofregistered
votersinmostlocalelections)
FilingRecallPetitionwithinarelativelyshortperiodoftime(40160daysdependingon
thenumberofregisteredvoters).
Absentegregious,publicmisconductbyajudge,recallelectionsareanunrealisticprocedureto
disciplineorremoveanunfitjudge,especiallyattheSuperiorCourtlevelwherethepublicis
largelyuninformedorcomplacentaboutinjusticesinindividualcases.
Californiahasthelowestoppositionrateinthecountryforjudicialelectionsat8%further
evidencethatelectionsarenotaneffectivemethodforremovingabadjudge.Moreover,
becausetheCommissiononJudicialPerformancemaintainscompleteconfidentialityofall
recordsexceptthoseresultinginpublicdiscipline(anaverageof6peryearduringthepast10
years),thepublichaslittleabilitytoobtaininformationrelevanttoajudicialelection.California
alsodoesnotimplementjudicialperformanceevaluations,oneofthereasonsitreceivedanF
inJudicialAccountabilitybytheCenterforPublicIntegrity.34 Thesecircumstancescreatea
protectiveshieldforsittingjudges:thepublicisnotinformedaboutajudgesmisconductor
performance,sotheyhavenoreasontovotethemoutduringanelection.
iii.Thejudicialbranchanditsofficersoftendonotcomplywithlawsthatprotectthepublic.
GovernmentCode77001.5requirestheJudicialCounciltoadoptandimplementstandards
thatmeasuresthatpromotethefairandefficientadministrationofjustice,including[p]roviding
equalaccesstocourtsandrespectfultreatmentforallcourtparticipants,[c]aseprocessing,
includingtheefficientuseofjudicialresources,andtoreportonthosestandardstothe
Legislatureannually.However,theJudicialCouncilfailstocomplywiththelaw.
CodeCiv.Proc.170.1etseq.allowsapartytochallengeajudgeforcausebyfilingamotion
todisqualifythemandhaveahearinginfrontofathirdpartyjudge.However,judgesare
routinelydenyingtheirown170.1challengesknowingthatlitigantsareunrepresentedandthe
onlyremedyforadenialistofileawritinaCourtofAppealwithin10days,whichmost
unrepresentedlitigantsareincapableofpreparingorcannotafford.Further,over90%ofwrits
aredenied.35
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2014CourtStatisticsReport.pdf
34
35
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iv.Therefore,theCommissiononJudicialPerformanceprovidestheonlyrealprotection
againstjudicialmisconduct.
Indeed,eventhe1960ballotinitiativearguedthatacommissionmustbeestablishedbecause
impeachmentandrecallarenoteffectivemethodstoremoveabadjudge:
First,themeasureproposesaneffectiveandexpeditiousmethodfortheremovalofa
judgewhoisunableorunwillingtoperformhisduties.Impeachment,recallandother
existingmethodsaretoocumbersomeandexpensivetobeworkable.Itisonlyrarely
thatcauseexistsfortheremovalofajudge.Butwheresuchcausedoesexist,the
removalshouldbefastandsure.TheConferenceofCaliforniaJudges,byan
overwhelmingvote,hasendorsedthismeasureasaprotectionforthecompetent,
hardworkingjudgesagainsttherarecasesofincompetencyandmisconductonthe
Bench.ThePeopleareatleastequallyentitledtosuchprotection.
ForallpracticalpurposestheCommissiononJudicialPerformanceservesastheonly
protectionagainstbadjudges.Astateagencychargedwithsuchanimportanttaskpreserving
theintegrityofanentirebranchofgovernmentshouldadoptrulesandproceduresthat
promoteaccountability,transparency,andconsistencyinresolvingcomplaints.The
Commissionscurrentruleslargelydonotadheretheseprinciples.
6.
CONCLUSION
Judicialmisconductandaccountabilityisamajorproblemacrossthecountry,andCaliforniaisa
severe,negativeoutlier.Judicialmisconductisoneofthemostimportant,underinvestigated
andunderreportedissuesaffectingCalifornianstoday.Thebudgetofthejudicialbranchis$3.8
billion,anditsmorethan2,000judicialofficersdisposeof7millioncasesannually.The
dispositionofeachofthesecaseshasadirect,lifelongimpactonthepersonsinvolvedandtheir
familiesandfriends.Californias40millionresidentsshouldhaveconfidencethatjusticeisbeing
doneinthecourts,buttheydonot.36
[P]ublicperceptionofjudicialintegrityisastateinterestofthehighestorder
justicemustsatisfytheappearanceofjustice.
U.S.SupremeCourtinYuleev.StateBarofFlorida( 2015)
ThereisstatewidepublicconcernabouttheintegrityofCaliforniascourtsandtheCommission
onJudicialPerformance.Grassrootsmovementsthatpromotejudicialaccountabilityand
transparencyarerapidlyformingacrossthestate,andtechnologywillcontinuetogivethe
movementsastrongervoiceandgreaterorganization.Manyoftheseactivistsandtheirfamilies
havebeenirreparablyharmedbyjudicialmisconduct.Badjudgescauseinnocentpeopletobe
foundguilty,guiltypeopletobefoundinnocent,issueunfairandinconsistentsentences,cause
36
http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuringillegalandlegalcorruptionamericanstatessomeresultssafra
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harmtochildrenandfamilies,erodethepublictrust,andwastemillionsoftaxpayerdollarsina
dysfunctionalsystem.
TheintegrityofthelargestjudiciaryintheWesternworldcannotbetrustedtoasmallagency
undercircumstanceswithnoaccountabilityortransparency.Basedonthetremendousdisparity
inthedisciplineratesbetweenCaliforniaandotherstates,iftheintegrityoftheCommissionon
funfitjudges
JudicialPerformancehasbeencompromiseditpotentiallymeansthathundredso
currentlysitonCaliforniasbencheswhomwouldhavebeenremovedbythecommissionsof
otherstates.ThepublicurgestheLegislaturetomakeincreasedjudicialaccountabilityatop
priority.
At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies weresupposedto

be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience,
however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous
that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a
freehold and irresponsibility in office that their decisions, seeming to concern
individual suitorsonly,passsilentandunheededbythepublicat largethatthese
decisions,nevertheless,become law byprecedent,sapping,bylittleandlittle,the
foundations of the constitution, and working its change by construction, before
any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily
employed in consuming its substance. In truth, manisnot madetobetrusted for
lifeifsecuredagainstallliabilitytoaccount.
ThomasJefferson,lettertoA.Coray.October31,1823.
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APPENDIX
22
California
23
CA Commission on Judicial Performance

Statistics by Year (2005 - 2014)
Data from California Commission on Judicial Performance. 2014 Annual Report.
Website: http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/annual_reports/2014_Annual_Report.pdf
Year
Complaints
Disposed
Private Discipline
Public Discipline
Total
Resign / Retire Preliminary
Discipline with charges
Inquiries
pending
Advisory
Letters
Private
Admonishments
Public
Admonishments
Public
Censures
Removals
Preliminary
Investigation
s
2005
955
12
24
55
41
2006
1023
16
37
67
51
2007
1058
20
37
55
54
2008
892
18
34
70
42
2009
1115
25
31
102
63
2010
1133
31
46
101
101
2011
1138
26
10
42
95
77
2012
1152
30
43
72
80
2013
1181
21
30
53
102
2014
1174
29
43
84
101
Total
10821
300
67
367
28
754
712
Average
1082.1
30
6.7
36.7
2.8
75.4
71.2
2.8%
0.6%
3.4%
0.3%
7.0%
6.6%
Percent
24
ACTIVE
AND
III.
FORMER JUDGES 2014 STATISTICS
10-YEAR SUMMARY OF COMMISSION ACTIVITY

NEW COMPLAINTS CONSIDERED BY COMMISSION
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
965
1,019
1,077
909
1,161 1,176
1,158
1,143
2007
2008
2009
2011
2012
70
102
2013
2014
1,209 1,212
COMMISSION INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED

2005
55
Staff Inquiries
(6%)
Preliminary Investigations
(4%)
Formal Proceedings
Instituted
(<1%)
41
4
2006
67
(7%)
51
(5%)
55
(5%)
(8%)
54
42
(5%)
(5%)
(9%)
63
(5%)
2010
101
(9%)
101
(9%)
95
(8%)
77
(7%)
72
2013
53
(6%)
(4%)
80
102
(7%)
(8%)
2014
84
(7%)
101
(8%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total Dispositions
955
1,023
1,058
892
1,115
1,133
1,138
1,152
1,181
1,174
Closed After Initial Review
(92%)
805
1,007
1,000 1,061
1,039
Closed Without Discipline

After Investigation
(5%)
Advisory Letter
(1%)
Private Admonishment
(<1%)
Public Admonishment
(<1%)
Public Censure
(<1%)
Removal
(0%)
Judge Retired or Resigned

with Proceedings Pending
(<1%)
DISPOSITION OF COMMISSION CASES
PAGE 14
876
51
12
6
4
2
0
4
919
(90%)
64
(6%)
16
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
975
(92%)
(90%)
45
48
(4%)
(5%)
20
18
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
25
(90%)
74
(7%)
25
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
988
(87%)
96
(8%)
31
(3%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
995
(87%)
99
(9%)
26
(2%)
10
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
(87%)
106
(9%)
30
(3%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(90%)
88
(8%)
21
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
(89%)
90
(8%)
29
(2%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(<1%)
(0%)
(<1%)
2014 ANNUAL REPORT
Commission on Judicial Performance

2014-2015 Actual Expenditures
$4,302,681
Administration/
General Office
15%
Facilities
15%
Legal Advisor
7%
Formal Proceedings
12%
General Operating
Expenses
9%
Investigations
42%
26
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
COMMISSION MEMBERS
DIRECTOR -CHIEF COUNSEL
OFFICE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL
INVESTIGATION STAFF
1 Attorney
Administrative Assistant
3 Intake Attorneys
6 Investigating Attorneys
3 Secretaries*
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
1 Administrative Assistants
1 Data/Systems Manager*
1 Business Services Officer
1 Secretary
* Two positions are vacant.
27
OFFICE OF
LEGAL ADVISOR TO
COMMISSIONERS
1 Attorney
Arizona
28
Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct

Data from Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct. Public Decisions 2006 - 2015.
Website: http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Public-Decisions
Year
Complaints
Disposed
Private Discipline
Letter - advice to
change behavior
or procedure
Letter - warning to
avoid appearance of
impropriety
Public Discipline
Consultation with
commission, or
consolidation of
complaint
Reprimands
Censures
Total
Discipline
Suspensions
Removals
2006
320
28
16
54
2007
324
36
51
2008
334
38
54
2009
352
34
55
2010
361
29
16
55
2011
313
29
10
50
2012
361
24
23
56
2013
344
17
33
2014
413
11
28
2015
337
18
10
34
Total
3459
366
104
470
Average
345.9
36.6
10.4
47
10.6%
3.0%
13.6%
Percent
29
communities he has resided in and as a result, has volunteered on a number of boards

of organizations making a significant difference.
Colleen Concannon (Commission Secretary) is the Information Technology
Supervisor of Project Management for the City of Tempe. She is also the CEO of an
international gemstone company based in Tucson, Arizona. She is a native Tucsonan
who received her Bachelors Degree from the University of Arizona, a Master of Public
Administration from the University of North Texas, and a Master of Science in
Accounting from the University of Houston. She has also worked in the public sector
as Controller for the Park Board of Trustees of the City of Galveston, Texas and
returned to Tucson in 1993 to become the Vice President and Chief Information
Officer for Thomas-Davis Medical Centers and later the Clinical Administrator for
TDMCs Main facility. Ms. Concannons private sector career has been focused on
establishing and building distinctive business enterprises in both Texas and
Arizona. Ms. Concannon is a dedicated community volunteer and has served as a
board member for numerous public and private organizations within the State of
Arizona. She has been a member of the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct
since January 2010.
Christopher (Chris) R. Ames has 40 years of software industry experience
ranging from programmer to senior executive. He is the President of Paragon
Technology, Inc., a company he co-founded in 1983. Early clients included the Apache
County Treasurer and Trans World Airlines. In 1992 he entered into a project
management contract with ADS Communications, Inc., for the development of its
field service product. Over the next 11 years he led the company through several
phases of expansion in product offering and corresponding revenue growth. ADS was
purchased by EFI (Electronics For Imaging, Inc.) in 2004, and Chris continued his
responsibility as Chief Technology Officer for another 2 years. Chris is a patented
inventor and holds a BS in Computer Information Systems from Arizona State
Universitys W.P. Carey School of Business. The Ames family has lived in the east
valley since 1976. Chris was a member of the Capital and Development Fees
subcommittee of the 2009 Town of Gilbert Citizens Budget Committee and is an
original member of Gilberts Operation Welcome Home Committee.
Commission Budget and Finances
The commission is funded as a part of the legislatures general fund
appropriation to the Arizona Judicial Branch. For the fiscal year ending on June 30,
2016, the commissions budget totals $505,000 to cover all operations and activities.
Employee compensation and benefits and facilities rent make up over ninety percent
of the commissions expenditures.
16
30
Commission Staff
The commissions full-time staff consists of an executive director, disciplinary
counsel, commission specialist, and administrative assistant. A part-time temporary
employee supports the commissions database program and related activities.
George Riemer has been the commissions executive director since July 2011.
He is an active member of the State Bar of Arizona and has been a licensed attorney
since 1975. Mr. Riemer also serves as the Staff Director for the Arizona Supreme
Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee and is an attorney member of the Arizona
Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Advisory Committee.
April Elliott has been the commissions disciplinary counsel since October
2014. Ms. Elliott is an active member of the State Bar of Arizona and most recently
served as the Public Defender in Pinal County. Her previous experience includes
serving as a Pinal County family court commissioner and Pinal County Superior
Court Judge.
Administrative support for the commission in 2015 was provided by Kim
Welch, commission specialist, and Camille Keltz, administrative assistant.
Pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order 2014-11, the
position of independent bar counsel (IBC) was placed under the supervision and
direction of the commissions executive director and is located in the commissions
office suite. IBC investigates and resolves through the lawyer discipline process
complaints filed against lawyers that for conflict of interest reasons cannot be
investigated and resolved through that process by the Office of Chief Bar Counsel of
the State Bar of Arizona. IBC also assists the commission in the investigation and
resolution of complaints about judges. Administrative support for IBC is provided by
commission staff.
Meredith Vivona has served as Independent Bar Counsel since April 2014. Ms.
Vivona is an active member of the State Bar of Arizona. Her prior experience includes
the private practice of law with several Phoenix area law firms for over ten years.
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
The commissions executive director supports the activities of the Arizona
Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC). The JEAC has nine
members, including seven judges and two lawyers. The committees charge, as set
forth in Arizona Supreme Court Rule 82, is to provide prospective advice to judges
and judicial employees in order to avoid violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees. The executive director is the initial
contact for judicial ethics inquiries. He provides inquirers with his reaction and if
requested, the inquiry is submitted to the committee for further consideration. The
objective is to assist judges and judicial employees in avoiding ethics violations. A
17
31
New York
32
NY State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Data from New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Annual Reports
Website: http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports.htm
Year
Complaints
Disposed*
Private
Discipline
Public
Discipline**
Letter of
Dismissal
and Caution,
Letter of
Caution
Public
Admonition,
Public Censure,
Removal
(removals in
parentheses)
Total
Resign***
Discipline
Retire, did not run

for reelection, or
vacated office for
other reason****
Total vacancies
of office for any
reason (resign,
retire, removal,
no reelection,
other)
Preliminary
Inquiries
Investigations
2005
1574
43
34 (4)
43
18
15
37
366
260
2006
1446
60
18 (3)
60
22
32
375
267
2007
1748
28
25 (5)
28
12
28
45
413
192
2008
1953
39
24 (1)
39
35
21
57
354
262
2009
1820
58
32 (2)
58
21
12
35
471
257
2010
2042
43
21 (1)
43
20
10
31
439
225
2011
1828
29
16 (2)
29
19
10
31
464
172
2012
1795
28
28 (3)
28
18
17
38
460
182
2013
1775
18
16 (2)
18
20
14
36
477
177
2014
1797
28
7 (0)
28
27
12
39
499
145
Total
17778
374
221 (23)
374
212
146
381
4318
2139
Average
1777.8
37.4
22.1
37.4
21.2
14.6
38.1
431.8
213.9
2.1%
1.2%
3.3%
1.2%
0.8%
2.1%
24.3%
12.0%
Percent
33
Discipline statistics as reported in the New York State Annual Reports, Statistical Analysis of Complaints sections, All Complaints
Considered in [Year] (typically found near the very end of the Annual Reports)
*Complaints Disposed = Complaints filed in current year + Complaints pending from prior year - Complaints pending at end of current
year (as reported in Statistical Analysis of Complaints sections of Annual Reports)
**Reported as Action in the Statistical Analysis of Complaints sections
***Approximately one-third to one-half of resignations are made public. These resignations are not included in the Public Discipline
numbers above. Thus, the number of Public Disciplines is significantly higher than reported above.
****Reported as Closed in the Statistical Analysis of Complaints sections
34
ALL COMPLAINTS CONSIDERED IN 2005: 1565 NEW & 230 PENDING FROM 2004
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
AFTER
PRELIMRY
INQUIRY
STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

TOTALS
PENDING
DISMISSED
DISMISSAL
& CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
677
677
NON-JUDGES
281
281
DEMEANOR
112
69
67
18
14
284
DELAYS
38
19
12
74
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
26
11
13
60
BIAS
59
11
13
88
CORRUPTION
13
12
38
INTOXICATION
DISABILITY/QUALIFICATIONS
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
23
39
FINANCES/RECORDS/TRAINING
11
23
11
51
TICKET-FIXING
ASSERTION OF INFLUENCE
25
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
56
40
26
142
MISCELLANEOUS
20
27
1305
221
159
43
18
15
34
1795
TOTALS
251
*Matters are closed upon vacancy of office for reasons other than resignation. Action includes determinations of admonition, censure and
removal from office by the Commission since its inception in 1978, as well as suspensions and disciplinary proceedings commenced in the courts
by the temporary and former commissions on judicial conduct operating from 1975 to 1978.
35
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
AFTER
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

TOTALS
PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
692
692
NON-JUDGES
266
266
DEMEANOR
114
76
32
10
250
DELAYS
28
15
10
66
20
26
10
63
BIAS
35
13
56
CORRUPTION
19
11
35
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
10
24
12
52
13
15
45
TICKET-FIXING
11
22
35
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
22
61
20
14
127
MISCELLANEOUS
14
19
1233
275
106
60
22
18
1721
TOTALS
163
36
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
TOTALS
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
941
941
NON-JUDGES
307
307
DEMEANOR
113
55
42
14
235
DELAYS
35
14
13
68
26
25
12
67
BIAS
15
33
CORRUPTION
19
33
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
11
25
52
10
18
40
TICKET-FIXING
16
15
19
49
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
10
52
29
10
111
MISCELLANEOUS
13
22
1519
238
136
28
12
28
25
1986
TOTALS
241
37
APPENDIX G
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
TOTALS
ACTION*
2009 ANNUAL REPORT
978
NON-JUDGES
396
396
DEMEANOR
114
39
51
229
DELAYS
55
18
10
91
16
27
15
72
BIAS
23
10
44
CORRUPTION
19
12
37
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
15
20
59
20
13
53
TICKET-FIXING
15
14
11
11
46
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
10
46
38
117
MISCELLANEOUS
16
1661
208
173
39
35
21
24
2161
TOTALS
38
978
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS
PAGE 185
INCORRECT RULING
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
TOTALS
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
959
959
NON-JUDGES
334
334
DEMEANOR
91
68
27
208
DELAYS
66
20
11
105
21
31
14
76
BIAS
29
46
CORRUPTION
24
12
50
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
25
57
18
19
59
TICKET-FIXING
16
37
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
23
39
13
15
102
MISCELLANEOUS
14
16
1598
243
99
58
21
12
32
2063
TOTALS
2010 ANNUAL REPORT

39
PAGE 248
ALLCOMPLAINTSCONSIDEREDIN2010:2025NEW&243PENDINGFROM2009
UBJECT
F
OMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ONFIRST
REVIEWOR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY
STATUSOFINVESTIGATEDCOMPLAINTS
PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
TOTALS
ACTION*
IC
NCORRECT RULING
1664
1164
NON-JUDGES
354
354
DEMEANOR
102
47
50
216
DELAYS
38
18
73
20
24
21
79
BIAS
18
38
CORRUPTION
20
39
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
20
22
61
25
10
56
TICKET-FIXING
11
16
46
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
24
38
25
98
MISCELLANEOUS
17
10
28
1800
226
148
43
20
10
21
2268
*Mattersarecloseduponvacancyofofficeforreasonsotherthanresignation.Actionincludesdeterminationsofadmonition,censureand
removalfromofficebytheCommissionsinceitsinceptionin1978,aswellassuspensionsanddisciplinaryproceedingscommencedinthe
TOTALS
courtsbythetemporaryandformercommissionsonjudicialconductoperatingfrom1975to1978.
2011 ANNUAL REPORT PAGE 158

40
Table of Contents
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
DISMISSED
ON FIRST
REVIEW OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
TOTALS
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
1031
1031
NON-JUDGES
304
304
DEMEANOR
115
38
31
192
DELAYS
42
15
72
28
18
63
BIAS
18
36
CORRUPTION
22
17
40
INTOXICATION
10
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
14
18
49
35
13
61
TICKET-FIXING
17
17
50
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
26
36
18
88
MISCELLANEOUS
22
40
1646
216
108
29
19
10
16
2044
TOTALS
41
Table of Contents
APPENDIX G
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DISMISSED ON
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
FIRST REVIEW
OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

TOTALS
PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
ACTION*
INCORRECT RULING
998
998
NON-JUDGES
329
329
DEMEANOR
82
48
19
160
DELAYS
52
10
77
43
23
81
BIAS
24
37
CORRUPTION
23
10
45
INTOXICATION
10
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
12
11
39
14
18
56
TICKET-FIXING
22
45
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
49
16
88
MISCELLANEOUS
12
26
1603
206
101
28
18
17
28
2001
TOTALS
*Matters are closed upon vacancy of office for reasons other than resignation. Action includes determinations of admonition,
censure and removal from office by the Commission since its inception in 1978, as well as suspensions and disciplinary
proceedings commenced in the courts by the temporary and former commissions on judicial conduct operating from 1975 to 1978.
Table of Contents
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
42
APPENDIX G
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DISMISSED ON
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
FIRST REVIEW
OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

TOTALS
PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
ACTION*
1,062
1,062
NON-JUDGES
313
313
DEMEANOR
78
40
30
159
DELAYS
35
11
53
15
15
12
49
BIAS
19
35
CORRUPTION
15
29
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
15
14
37
19
12
54
TICKET-FIXING
23
11
51
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
56
24
96
MISCELLANEOUS
15
25
1,593
201
114
18
20
14
16
1,976
INCORRECT RULING
TOTALS
censure and removal from office by the Commission.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
43
APPENDIX G
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DISMISSED ON
SUBJECT
OF
COMPLAINT
FIRST REVIEW
OR
PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY

TOTALS
PENDING
DISMISSED
CAUTION
RESIGNED
CLOSED*
ACTION*
1,056
1,056
NON-JUDGES
300
300
DEMEANOR
118
32
27
181
DELAYS
29
45
25
47
BIAS
25
37
CORRUPTION
20
32
INTOXICATION
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
11
10
34
21
48
TICKET-FIXING
14
39
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
11
52
28
106
MISCELLANEOUS
14
31
1,622
171
101
28
27
12
1,968
INCORRECT RULING
TOTALS
censure and removal from office by the Commission.
44
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Texas
45
TX State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Data from Texas State Commission on Judicial Performance. 2014 Annual Report.
Website: http://www.scjc.texas.gov/about/annual-reports.aspx
Year
Cases
Disposed
Private
Discipline*
Public
Discipline**
Suspension***
Total
Discipline
Resign / Retire
with complaint
pending
Preliminary
Investigations
Full
Investigations
2005
1106
31
16
50
198
295
2006
985
21
11
36
203
202
2007
1049
28
34
185
335
2008
1005
28
11
43
200
230
2009
1110
25
20
49
303
271
2010
1290
37
35
78
10
333
256
2011
1192
27
37
337
248
2012
1049
34
45
327
212
2013
1103
29
37
265
306
2014
1075
38
14
55
278
281
Total
10964
298
127
39
464
50
2629
2636
Average
1096.4
Percent
29.8
12.7
3.9
46.4
262.9
263.6
2.7%
1.2%
0.4%
4.2%
0.5%
24.0%
24.0%
*Private Disciplines (5): Private Order of Additional Education, Private sanction and Order of Additional Education, Private Admonition, Private Warning, Private Reprimand
**Public Disciplines (7): Public Order of Additional Education, Public sanction and Order of Additional Education, Public Admonition, Public Warning, Public Reprimand, Public
Censure and Order of Additional Education, Public Censure
***Suspensions (removal) result from a decision by a tribunal or Texas Supreme Court after a recommendation from the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct
46
Table 1: Commission Activity

FISCAL YEAR
2005
FISCAL YEAR
2006
FISCAL YEAR
2007
FISCAL YEAR
2008
398/393
393/453
453/385
385/406
Cases Filed
1101
1045
1043
1049
Total Number Of Cases Disposed
1106
985
1049
1005
% of Cases Disposed
100.5%
94%
100.4%
96%
Average Age of Cases Disposed
4.5
Months
5.1
Months
5.3
Months
4.7
Months
65
42
45
56
Criminal Conviction
Review Tribunal Order

Voluntarily Agreement to Resign in Lieu of
Disciplinary Action
Sanction:
Public Censure
Public Censure and
Order of Additional Education
Public Reprimand
Public Warning
Public Admonition
Public sanction and
Private Reprimand
Private Warning
Private Admonition
Private sanction and
Public Order of Additional Education
Private Order of Additional Education

Interim Disciplinary Action:
Order of Suspension [15(a)]

Recommendation of Suspension to
Supreme Court [15(b)]
Formal Proceedings Voted
12
Amicus Referral
1049
950
1008
966
29
28
48
43
Reconsideration Granted
Reconsideration Denied
28
26
45
35
0
0
0
2
32*
22*
0
24*
5
31*
Cases Pending (Beginning FY/To Date)
Disciplinary Action (total)

Cases Disposed through:
Dismissals
Requests for Reconsideration Received
Pending
Cases Appealed to Special Court of Review
Informal Hearings Set
Public Statements Issued
Updated 09/11/08
47
16
Fig. 4 Number of Cases Disposed By Complainant Type*
Pro Se
56
[6%]
Commission/Media
9
[1%]
Inmate/Criminal
Defendant/Traffic
Defendant
419
[42%]
Other
34
[3%]
Litigant
260
[26%]
Attorney
44
[4%]
Citizen/Family/Friend
131
[13%]
Judge/
Government Official/
Government Employee
15
[2%]
Law
Enforcement/Prosecutor
6
[1%]
Anonymous
31
[3%]
*1005 Total Cases Disposed
Fig. 5 Cases Filed and Disposed (FY 2005 - FY 2008)

1120
1100
1080
1060
1040
1020
1000
980
960
940
920
1101 1106
1049
1045
1049
1043
1005
985
2005
2006
2007
48
18
2008
CASES FILED
TOTAL DISPOSED
Fig. 6a Commission Activity (FY 2005-2008)

35
31
28
30
25
28
Interim Actions *
21
20
Public Sanctions
16
16
15
11
10
7
3
Private Sanctions
11
9
4 4
Voluntary Resignations in Lieu of

Disciplinary Action
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
Fig. 6b. Commission Activity Trends (FY 2005 - 2008)

35
Interim Actions *
30
25
Public Sanctions
20
Private Sanctions
15
10
Voluntary
Resignations in Lieu
of Disciplinary Action
5
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
*Interim Actions include: Orders of Suspension, Recommendations of Suspension to

Supreme Court, Formal Proceedings Voted, and Amicus Curiae Referrals.
49
19
Fig. 7a Comparison of Investigations by Type (2005-2008)

700
613
600
580
575
529
500
400
335
295
300
200
198
203
2005
2006
202
230
185
200
2007
2008
Administrative
Dismissals *
Preliminary
Investigations **
Full Investigations ***
100
0
Fig. 7b Investigations by Type Trends (FY 2005 - FY 2008)

700
600
500
Administrative
Dismissals *
Preliminary
Investigations **
400
300
Full Investigations ***
200
100
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
*Administrative Dismissals include files disposed without investigation, because no

allegation of judicial misconduct was raised.
**Preliminary Investigations include allegations of judicial misconduct that were
resolved without contacting the respondent judge.
***Full Investigations include those cases in which the respondent judge was asked to
respond to the allegations of judicial misconduct.
50
20

FISCAL YEAR
2008
FISCAL YEAR
2009
FISCAL YEAR
2010
FISCAL YEAR
2011
385/406
406/445
445/503
503/430
Cases Filed
1049
1204
1280
1119
1006
1110
1290
1192
% of Cases Disposed
96%
92.1%
100.7%
106.5%
4.7
Months
56
6.19
Months
70
5.35
Months
89
5.66
Months
42
Criminal Conviction

Disciplinary Action
Sanction:
10
Public Censure
Public Censure and
Public Reprimand
11
Public Warning
18*
Public Admonition
Public sanction and
10
Private Reprimand
Private Warning
Private Admonition
19
12


Cases in Formal Proceedings
12
19
Amicus Referral
Dismissals
966
1063
1208
1154
43
53
106
226
35
47
104
226
5
31
2
25
16
21
0
13 (Includes Aug.
2011 Meeting.)
0
Cases Pending (Beginning FY/Ending FY)

Pending
*Total dispositions and disciplinary action totals include a Public Warning issued by the Commission in 16 cases at the conclusion of
Formal Proceedings. In October 2010, on appeal to a Special Court of Review appointed by the Texas Supreme Court, the Public
Warning in those 16 cases was dismissed.
51
52
53
54
55
Fig. 5a Cases Filed and Disposed (FY 2011 - FY 2014)
1250
1216
1192
1200
1150
1136
1132
1119
1103
1075
1100
1054
1050
1000
950
2011
2012
2013
Cases Filed
2014
Total Disposed
Fig. 5b Case Filing Trend (FY 2011 - FY 2014)

1250
1200
1150
Cases Filed
1100
Total Disposed
1050
1000
950
2011
2012
2013
56
2014
Fig. 6a Co m m ission Activity (FY 2011 -2014)

Interim Actions *
Public Sanctions
Private Sanctions
Voluntary Resignations in Lieu of Disciplinary Action
38
40
35
30
30
29
26
25
20
10
5
14
12
15
5
1
6
3
2011
2012
2013
2014
*Interim Actions include: Orders of Suspension, Recommendations of Suspension

to Supreme Court, Formal Proceedings Voted, and Amicus Curiae Referrals.
Fig. 6b Commission Activity Trend (FY 2011-2014)

40
Interim Actions *
35
Public Sanctions
30
25
Private Sanctions
20
Voluntary Resignations
in Lieu of Disciplinary
Action
15
10
5
0
2011
2012
2013
2014
57
*Interim Actions include: Orders of

Suspension, Recommendations of
Suspension to Supreme Court,
Formal Proceedings Voted, and
Amicus Curiae Referrals.
2
2014 COMPLAINT DISPOSITIONS
2014 COMPLAINT
DISPOSITIONS
1075
CLOSED AFTER
INITIAL REVIEW/
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
DISPOSITION
FOLLOWING FULL
INVESTIGATION
794
281
CLOSED WITHOUT
DISCIPLINE
DISCIPLINE ISSUED
188
61
PRIVATE
PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE

PUBLIC ADMONITION
10
58
* Not a Final Disposition

Cases Pending (Beginning FY/Ending FY)
Cases Filed
% of Cases Disposed
FISCAL YEAR
2011
503/430
FISCAL YEAR
2012
430/564
FISCAL YEAR
2013
564/584
FISCAL YEAR
2014
584/636
1119
1216
1132
1136
1192
1049
1103
1075
106.5%
86.27%
97.79%
94.63%
5.66 Months
5.3 Months
6.1 Months
5.37 Months
42
49
42
61
12
12
12
15
1154
1004
1068
1016
226
107
80
67
226
118
79
60

Criminal Conviction
Disciplinary Action
Sanction:
Public Censure
Public Censure and
Public Reprimand
Public Warning
Public Admonition
Public sanction and
Private Reprimand
Private Warning
Private Admonition
Cases in Formal Proceedings
Amicus Referral
Dismissals
16
Pending
13
14
11/17/14
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Public Records Request
71
72
73
74
75
76
11{
QJ11 liforni11
Oiommissiott on Jju!liciaJ
455 Qf)olben Qf)ate J\6em1 e,
14400
Jlf rnnc:isco, QIJ\ 94 lll 2-3 660
(415) 557-1200
FAX (415) 557-1266
Web Site: http://cjp.ca.gov
February 26, 2016
Karl Olson, Esq.

Law Offices of Ram, Olson,
Cereghino & Kopczynski
101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94104
Dear Mr. Olson:
This responds to your letter dated February 12, 2016, designated
Records
Request," received by the Commissioi1 on Judicial Performance on
16, 2016. Yqur
request seeks records relating to commission expenses and maiuigeme'nt' as well as records
regarding complaints concluded in 2015 and public discipline imposed by the commission
between 2010 and 2015.
As your letter correctly notes, the commission is exempt from the <:;:alifornia Public
Records Act (Gov. Code, 6252(f)) and is not covered by California Rules of Court, rule
10.500, which relates to public access to comt records. Further, the commission is not a "local
agency" or the "legislative body" of a local agency and is not subject to the provisions of the
Ralph M. Brown Act regarding public meetings. (Gov. Code, 54951 , 54952.) It is also
exempt as an article VI agency from the Bagley-Keene Act (Gov. Code, 111 2 1.1.)
Accordingly, the commission is not required to provide records under those provisions.
1n addition, numerous constitutional provisions protect commission records relating to
complaints and cases involving judges from disclosure. "The commission may provide for the
confidentiality of complaints to and investigations by the commission." (Article VI, 18(i)(1).)
"The Commission on Judicial Performance may
... [ir:J (3) publicly or privately admonish a
judge or former judge[.]" (Article VI, 18(d).) While the commission is required to turn over to
the Governor of any State of the Uni on, the President of the United States or the Commission on
Judicial Appointments " the text of any private admonishment, advisory letter, or other
disciplinary action" concerning a judge who is under consideration for a judicial appointment,
the constitution expressly provides that " [a ]ll information released under thi s section shall remain
confidential and privileged." (Article V I, 18.S(a)-(d).)
.. .
l
Amendments to California Constitution, r,rticle i , section 3 I egarding pub,lic access to
meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies expressly provided
77
Mr. Karl Olson

February 26, 20 16
Page Two
that nothing in the provisions superseded or modified any constitutional provis ion, or affected
the construction of any statute court rule, or other authority to the extent it protects the
constitutional right of privacy. (Article 1, 3(3), (4).) They also c:xpressly provided that nothing
in the provisions repealed or nullified, expressly or by implication, any constitutional or statutory
exception to the right of access to public records or meetings of public bodies in effect on the
effective date of the amendments. (Article 1, 3(5).) These provisions manifest clear intent to
preserve the statutory exemption of the commission from the Public Records Act, the Ralph M.
Brown Act and the Bagley-Keene Act and to preserve the confidentiality provided under the
constitution for certain commission records and actions.
While the commission is not required to release the records you seek and declines to do
so under the foregoing provisions, some of your
raise issues that l beli eve should he
considered further by the commission. I hope that these issues can be addressed by the
commission at its March 23-24, 2016 meeting and that I will be able to get back to you shortly
after the meeting.
Thank you for your continued interest in the work of the commission.
Yours very truly,
Victoria B. Henley
Director-Chief Counsel
VBH:al/Public Records Act Request/2-26- 16 Olson
78

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At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies weresupposedto

CA Commission on Judicial Performance

10-YEAR SUMMARY OF COMMISSION ACTIVITY

COMMISSION INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED

Closed After Initial Review

Closed Without Discipline

Judge Retired or Resigned

DISPOSITION OF COMMISSION CASES

2014 ANNUAL REPORT

Commission on Judicial Performance

DIRECTOR -CHIEF COUNSEL

* Two positions are vacant.

Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct

communities he has resided in and as a result, has volunteered on a number of boards

NY State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Retire, did not run

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

2009 ANNUAL REPORT

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

2010 ANNUAL REPORT

2011 ANNUAL REPORT PAGE 158

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

STATUS OF INVESTIGATED COMPLAINTS

TX State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Table 1: Commission Activity

Total Number Of Cases Disposed

Average Age of Cases Disposed

Review Tribunal Order

Public Order of Additional Education

Private Order of Additional Education

Order of Suspension [15(a)]

Formal Proceedings Voted

Cases Pending (Beginning FY/To Date)

Disciplinary Action (total)

Fig. 4 Number of Cases Disposed By Complainant Type*

*1005 Total Cases Disposed

Fig. 5 Cases Filed and Disposed (FY 2005 - FY 2008)

Fig. 6a Commission Activity (FY 2005-2008)

Voluntary Resignations in Lieu of

Fig. 6b. Commission Activity Trends (FY 2005 - 2008)

*Interim Actions include: Orders of Suspension, Recommendations of Suspension to

Fig. 7a Comparison of Investigations by Type (2005-2008)

Fig. 7b Investigations by Type Trends (FY 2005 - FY 2008)

Full Investigations ***

*Administrative Dismissals include files disposed without investigation, because no

Table 1: Commission Activity

Total Number Of Cases Disposed

Review Tribunal Order

Public Order of Additional Education

Private Order of Additional Education

Order of Suspension [15(a)]

Cases in Formal Proceedings

Requests for Reconsideration Received

Informal Hearings Set

Public Statements Issued

Cases Pending (Beginning FY/Ending FY)