UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4499

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JASON DWAYNE LEMMON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg.
Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (6:04-cr-70060-NKM-1)

Submitted:

November 19, 2013

Before WYNN and

Circuit Judge.

FLOYD,

Circuit

Decided: November 21, 2013

Judges,

and

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Donald R.
Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Michael J. Freeman,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Jason

Dwayne

Lemmon

appeals

the

nine-month

imposed for violating his supervised release.

sentence

Lemmon raises one

issue on appeal: whether the district court imposed a plainly

unreasonable sentence based on bias against him and improper
consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
3583(e) (2012).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Following

argument,

the

district

court

found

that

Lemmon had commmitted Grade C violations of release, and that,

with his criminal history category of I, his advisory policy
statement range was 3-9 months.

See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual (USSG) 7B1.4(a), p.s. (2012).

The court expressly

applied relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable

to

revocation

sentences

under

3583(e)

in

determining

the

sentence, noted Lemmons breach of trust while on supervision,

and remarked on his untruthfulness with his probation officer,
the officers involved in his vehicle stop (which led to his
Maryland state conviction for assuming another identity to avoid
prosecution

for

crime),

and

the

court.

The

courts

observation that Lemmon was a liar, and thus his testimony was
incredible does not demonstrate judicial bias or grounds for
recusal

because

the

judges

finding

was

based

on

facts

introduced or events occurring in the course of the revocation

proceeding.

See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th

Cir. 2008) (providing standard for judicial bias claim).

A

district

court

has

broad

discretion

to

impose

sentence upon revoking a defendants supervised release.

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

United
We will

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not plainly
unreasonable.

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-

40 (4th Cir. 2006).

In
plainly

determining

unreasonable,

unreasonableness,
substantive
original

whether

we

first

following

considerations

sentences.

Id.

revocation

assess

generally

that

we

at

438.

the
the

employ
A

sentence

is

sentence

for

procedural

and

in

our

review

supervised

of

release

revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district

court considered the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 3553(a) factors it is permitted to
consider in a supervised release revocation case.
3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.

See 18 U.S.C.

A district court need

not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation sentence in as

much

detail

as

when

it

imposes

an

original

sentence,

and

revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district

court stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should

receive

the

sentence

imposed,
3

up

to

the

statutory

maximum.
Only

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547; Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

if

sentence

is

found

procedurally

or

substantively

unreasonable will we then decide whether the sentence is plainly

unreasonable.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.

Lemmon
unreasonable
the

because

3553(a)

explaining

alleges
the

factors

the

that

his

district

in

sentence
court

sentencing

sentence,

the

procedurally

improperly

him.

court

is

We

considered

note

that,

specifically

in

addressed

Lemmons mitigation argument regarding his children, discussed

Lemmons

breach

of

the

courts

trust,

the

nature

and

circumstances of the violations, the history and characteristics

of

the

defendant,

and

the

need

to

protect

the

public.

Accordingly, we find the district court did not plainly err in

applying

the

3553(a)

factors

and

adequately

explained

its

decision to sentence Lemmon within the advisory policy statement

range.

See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547; USSG 7B1.4(a), p.s.

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence. We dispense with

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED